

**We affirm, Resolved: Spain should grant Catalonia its independence.**

**Our sole contention is preventing violence.**

**Catalonia is one of Spain's most prosperous regions, and is attractive to businesses.**

**McRae at the Independent writes in 2017:**

**McRae 17** Hamish McRae, 10-28-2017, "Catalonia could be an extremely successful economy and EU member state," The Independent,

<http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/catalonia-spain-independence-vote-economy-population-location-trade-currency-a8025051.html> //DF

**Third, it [Catalonia] has an established economic base. It is a manufacturing centre, has two top-ranking business schools, and the usual array of service industries.** Separatists have noted that though **Catalonia** has about 18 per cent of Spain's population, it **generates more than 20 per cent of [Spain's] its GDP.** Were it to be fully independent, with Barcelona and its 1.6 million people, it would have one of the glitziest capital cities on earth. A final point: **[As a result,] Catalonia has brand recognition.** Brand is an intangible advantage, but can be deployed to leverage other economic advantages. Ireland is a fine example of that, using its brand (and its educated workforce) to make it a base for high-tech American companies seeking to enter the European market. **On its own, Catalonia could be [more] nimble in attracting business, and consequently creating jobs, than it has been as part of Spain.**

**Spain's overreaction to Catalonia's attempt at independence has inflamed the situation. Huddleston at Foreign Affairs magazine writes in 2017:**

**Huddleston 17** R. Joseph Huddleston, 10-6-2017, "How Madrid Should Address the Catalonia Crisis," Foreign Affairs,

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/western-europe/2017-10-06/how-madrid-should-address-catalonia-crisis> //DF

**Through its draconian post-referendum crackdown, Madrid has transferred the allegiance of many Catalans from itself to a disjointed independence movement that, one week ago, looked destined for failure.**

The Spanish government had a straightforward path ahead of it. The referendum, unconstitutional and widely perceived as illegitimate, came with no legal guarantees. Turnout was only 42 percent. Absent Madrid's illiberal reaction, it would have been viewed as a possibly cathartic but basically meaningless political act.

The world and many Catalans would have ignored it. But **Madrid has botched its response so badly that it has injected life into the movement and made formerly ambivalent parties take sides.** Witnessing such a nakedly repressive crackdown

and occupation on its own streets, the Catalan regional government has decided to affirm its citizens' right to vote on independence by officially considering the referendum's results. But rather than recognizing his government's profound mistake and changing course tactically, Rajoy has pressed forward. On the first day of the crackdown, he asserted to Catalans that Spain is "a mature, advanced, kind, and tolerant democracy" as images of police brutality continued to dominate

Catalan social media. He also said that Catalan voters had "trespassed the boundaries of democratic custom." **Now the Spanish government seems likely to move forward with the suspension of autonomy in the region,** having already decided to block the

Catalan parliament's next session on Monday. **These actions would be profoundly damaging to the implied contract between these two levels of government,** and between Spain and Catalans at large. Regardless of the constitutionality of the vote on

October 1, **this overreaction is so extreme that it risks completely undermining the legitimacy of Madrid's rule of the region in the minds of its people.** Legitimacy is the elusive main ingredient of any

**democratic government, and it is now at stake** in this conflict in a way no observer could have predicted a week ago. In its simplest definition, legitimacy is the right to rule, given by the ruled. At its best, it takes the form of cooperation: different levels of government working together, considering themselves part of the same governing body. It also consists of cooperation between citizens and government: calling the police when one witnesses a crime, paying one's taxes, and cheering on the national team in the next match. No less important, it is characterized by citizens effortlessly carrying multiple

identities while perceiving no conflict between them. One is a Spaniard and a Catalan, and that is not a contradiction. Spain's current course of action seems like the death of legitimacy: an overreliance on force to maintain the status quo, and the destruction of valued institutions in that effort. As political scientist Victor Lapuente Giné put it a few days ago, "a modern state depends not on the monopoly of violence, but on the monopoly of legitimacy." In a democracy, it is the latter that begets the former, not vice versa. In the circumstances that Spain's government has created for itself, even those most averse to change and politically hesitant can become rebels and resisters. This is why the actions the Spanish government is now taking—threatening to suspend Catalans' own institutions of self-rule—are so dangerous. Before last week, there were many Catalans who perceived no contradiction in identity. This crackdown and escalation will only cause ever more of them to resent Spanish authority. The most baffling part about this development is that there was never any good reason for it to happen. The government is punishing the many for the deeds of a stubborn few, and is strengthening those few in the process. It is a profound miscalculation. It is still unclear how the international community will react. EU members have remained silent, but if those newly dispatched soldiers continue the crackdown, that state of affairs will not persist for long. Because the situation more and more resembles a full-scale military occupation rather than the routine administration of a legitimate state's right of force, some of the more liberal interpreters of international norms may begin treating it as such. This could start to generate pressure for urgent votes to end their silence and officially take a stance in the crisis, perhaps pushing for passive intervention, such as calls for human rights monitors.

## **Catalonia secession solves for violence in three ways**

### **First, economic harms.**

**The lack of clarity over Catalonia's national status harms investment into both Spain and Catalonia, since investors are less confident putting money into a place that could change overnight.**

**The battle between the Spanish and Catalan governments is driving economic uncertainty, and money and fear just don't go together. Darsch at INC in 2017 writes:**

**Darsch 17** Dave Darsch, 10-27-2017, "4 Ways Uncertainty Impacts Business," Inc,

<https://www.inc.com/this-way-up/4-ways-uncertainty-will-impact-business-in-catalonia.html> //DF

1. Spending risks There are many variables and different forces at play to accurately predict how Catalonia will handle these large-scale changes. The human reaction to change is discomfort - and discomfort creates fear. **Uncertainty is always bad news for business spending,** at least temporarily. **In this limbo stage, with no idea what is in store, Catalan businesses may cut down on spending, begin precautionary saving and be less willing to take risks, with a negative impact on the business environment.** Polls show that 62% of Catalonia residents are worried about the future, while 32% are excited. To find a way through the discomfort of change, Catalonia will need strong leaders in companies, ready to listen, learn and negotiate clear strategies to create the "positive mood" in which business thrives. 2. Travel hesitation **Tourists looking to relax will often rule out destinations with any hint of instability.** Three out of four Catalan hoteliers felt that the push for independence might hurt their business. And certainly, some reports show a **drop in tourism rates of up to 15% compared with last year's** figures. It's important to remember that it's early days, though. The drop is in the couple of weeks immediately following the referendum, the aftershock of the images of conflict that dominated the international press. Catalonia's beautiful coast, great weather and culture of food and art might be enough to keep attracting tourists throughout this volatile period. However, this uncertain atmosphere must be managed, so that tourists feel secure that the volatile situation will not affect their stay. 3. International uncertainty Barcelona is a global city. **Catalonia needs to maintain strong international connections to maintain its core industries through this turbulent time.** The Catalan start-up scene is particularly international, even internally with a high number of start-up founders (14%) and start-up employees (23%) from other countries. Combined with significant global trade links, this means that international access is crucial for Catalonia. **The current situation has generated uncertainty around Catalonia's future place in the EU,** and whether residential visas or trade tariffs will affect business. When Brexit happened, there was an impact on both existing and new businesses. Now that it's Catalonia's turn, global trade insecurities could create strong economic discomfort, unless a clear path forward with agreed international alliances can be found, whatever the political outcome. 4. Fiscal complexity **Uncertainty creates a negative atmosphere, which companies want to dissociate themselves from. Many major IBEX companies**

**previously stationed in Catalonia have relocated their headquarters** to other parts, including Banco Sabadell, CaixaBank, and Cellnex. **This could be a blow for Catalonia that exacerbates the mood of ambiguity.** Still, these companies have retained their work-forces and operations in Catalonia, suggesting these moves may be at least partly symbolic. Times of big change generate anxiety and also opportunities. Catalonia has always been an entrepreneurial culture that promotes international trade and business-friendly fiscal policies. The President of the American Enterprise Institute sees the situation as a chance for the region to create a unique identity as "an example of free enterprise", whether Catalonia remains part of Spain or not. But **mood is everything in business. [Thus, he concludes that] What is really harming enterprise in Catalonia is uncertainty. Whichever political solution is found must take the economic effects of uncertainty seriously, and create a secure base from which to reinvigorate Catalan business.**

## Chislett of the Elcano Royal Institute reports this November:

William Chislett (Associate Analyst, Elcano Royal Institute). "The potential impact of the Catalan crisis on the Spanish economy." 11/8/17. <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/01e82708-49a4-463c-a65a-a632517a2e80/Commentary-Chislett-Potential-impact-Catalan-crisis-Spanish-economy.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=01e82708-49a4-463c-a65a-a632517a2e80>

The Bank of Spain does not say this, but this scenario assumes that the anti-secessionist parties –the conservative Popular Party, which governs Spain, the Socialists and the centrist Ciudadanos– could win more seats than the pro-independence parties, an unholy alliance of conservative nationalists (PDeCAT), the more rabidly secessionist Republic Left of Catalonia and the anti-capitalist far-left CUP. In the worst-case scenario, **following** a victory by the pro-independence bloc and **a continued stand-off with Madrid, up to 60% of the projected growth for 2018 and 2019 could evaporate.** A lot is riding on this election. The pro-independence parties won 72 of the 135 seats in the 2015 election on 47.8% of the vote. Recent polls show these parties narrowly gaining control of the parliament again, but Madrid is hoping that the anti-secessionist parties will galvanise the increasingly vociferous 'silent majority' against independence into voting on a larger scale than previously. The Bank of Spain is currently holding to its GDP growth forecasts of 3.1% this year, 2.5% in 2018 and 2.2% in 2019. Luis de Guindos, **[Spain's] the Economy Minister, has already lowered growth from 2.7% to 2.3% next year. 'A potential** heightening, or **prolongation, of the political situation might adversely impact the economic outlook and financial stability in Spain',** says the Bank of Spain's report. **'Greater uncertainty might dent economic agents' confidence and thereby affect their spending and investment decisions, subsequently exerting a negative impact on economic activity and employment'.** The report also underscores 'the political tension in Catalonia and its potential repercussions for funding conditions on the capital markets and for the Spanish economy as a whole'

## Economic growth makes conflict less likely

Macartan Humphreys "Economics and Violent Conflict" Unicef.org. 3 Feb. 2017. Web. 15 Dec. 2017. [https://www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/files/Economics\\_and\\_Violent\\_Conflict.pdf](https://www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/files/Economics_and_Violent_Conflict.pdf)>// NS

One might expect rich nations to be more violent than poor ones because the rich ones have more to fight over.<sup>10</sup> The econometric evidence however suggests the opposite. Most research shows that wealth reduces the likelihood of civil war,<sup>11</sup> and that economic growth also reduces risks while recessions worsen them. Figures derived from World Bank econometric models (Figure 1) show a striking relationship between the wealth of a nation and its chances of having a civil war.<sup>12</sup> The figure suggests that differences in wealth are most relevant among poorer countries. A country with GDP per person of just \$250 has a predicted probability of war onset (at some point over the next five years) of 15%, even if it is otherwise considered an "average" country. This probability of war reduces by half for a country with GDP of just \$600 per person and is reduced by half again to below 4% for a country with income of \$1250. **Countries with income per person over \$5000 have a less than 1% chance of experiencing civil conflicts,** all else being equal. There are various explanations for why this is so. But so far little work has been undertaken to distinguish between them. The most common is that wealthier societies are better able to protect assets, thus making violence less attractive for would-be rebels.<sup>13</sup> Another explanation, given by political scientist Thomas Homer Dixon argues that poverty causes violence, and points to cases where scarcity leads to migrations that result in conflicts between identity groups over resources. Alternatively, the relationship could be spurious in the sense that there are other features of a country, such as a democratic culture, that make it at once more prosperous and less violent. And causality may in fact run in the opposite direction: rich countries may be rich in part because they have had little civil conflict in their recent past.

**AND Catalans would blame the Spanish government for their economic grievances.**

## Second, political grievances.

### The longer this dispute goes on, the greater the chance of violence spilling out. Powell writing for the New York Review of Books explains this November:

Jonathan Powell (The New York Review of Books). "How to Solve the Catalan Crisis." 11/3/17.

<http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/11/03/how-to-solve-the-catalan-crisis/>

Yet Europe is not magically immune to the horrifying violence that surrounds it in an arc from Syria to Libya. The continent has been plagued by violent conflicts over the issue of self-determination until very recently. It was only twenty years ago that a long-running war in Northern Ireland ended, eighteen years ago that serious armed conflict in Kosovo ended, and just six years ago that the ETA terrorist campaign in the Basque Country was brought to an end by the Aiete Declaration. None of these bloody European conflicts ended by themselves. They were only brought to an end by political leaders on both sides who were prepared to engage in negotiations, at considerable personal and political risk.

**The conflict in Catalonia over self-determination will not end by itself, either. Although it has so far been a largely peaceful dispute, if both sides persist in escalating the dispute, they could turn it into another bloody conflict inside Europe's borders—with consequences for all of us. In other similar disputes, it has been a short step from heads being broken in the streets in clashes between protesters and police to young, over-enthusiastic partisans responding with violence of their own. Far better to solve the conflict now, before real violence begins, than allow the blood to flow and then try to stop it.**

We have experience in stopping such conflicts. The demand for national self-determination is not a new phenomenon. European countries in particular faced it often enough through the half-century of decolonization and they reached negotiated settlements in the end to nearly all the demands for independence. Self-determination is, however, a devilish problem to solve because it involves the clash of two rights: in this case, the right of the Catalan people to govern themselves, assert sovereignty, and run their affairs, and the right of Spain to maintain its national territorial integrity unless a majority of the Spanish people vote—across the country as a whole—to allow Catalonia to leave.

Griffiths of Washington Post furthers that:

Ryan Griffiths (Washington Post). "Kurdistan and Catalonia are voting on independence. Welcome to the age of secession." 9/23/17.

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/09/23/kurdistan-and-catalonia-are-voting-on-independence-heres-what-we-know-about-secessionist-groups/?utm\\_term=.4e4f74b6ca92](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/09/23/kurdistan-and-catalonia-are-voting-on-independence-heres-what-we-know-about-secessionist-groups/?utm_term=.4e4f74b6ca92)

Controversial **referendums on independence are scheduled in** Iraqi Kurdistan on Sept. 25 and the Spanish region of **Catalonia on Oct. 1. Both referendums place these secessionist regions on a collision course with their central governments and the international community, increasing the probability of conflict.** What is the purpose of these referendums, and what is the strategy behind them? **Secession occurs when a region within a state breaks away to form its own sovereign state. There were 55 active secessionist movements around the world as of 2011,** and an average of 52 movements per year since 1945. **Most have failed to achieve their goal of independence, sometimes coming to an agreement with their central government or simply fading away. Roughly a third have resulted in violence.** Indeed, some claim that **secessionism is the chief cause of violence in the world today.** As I argue in my recent book, we are truly living in the Age of Secession.

## Granting Catalonia independence is the only way to avoid the outbreak of violence.

### Powell at the Financial Times explains in 2017:

**Powell 17** Jonathan Powell, 10-4-2017, "Talks are the only way to solve the crisis in Catalonia," Financial Times, [//DF">https://www.ft.com/content/8cc87e00-a8f9-11e7-ab66-21cc87a2edde](https://www.ft.com/content/8cc87e00-a8f9-11e7-ab66-21cc87a2edde) //DF

The separatist Catalan government has said it will make a unilateral declaration of independence within days. The Spanish government will not recognise it, plunging the two sides deeper into confrontation. Conservative politicians in Madrid are urging the government to invoke Article 155 of the constitution, which would suspend the devolved administration in Barcelona and impose direct rule from the centre. This is unlikely to be accepted quietly by many in Catalonia. It is urgent to find a way out for both sides. Before either takes a step everyone in Europe will later

regret, they should take a deep breath, calm down and agree to negotiate. I have worked **in many countries facing similar conflicts based on deeply rooted historical grievances. The only non-violent way to resolve them in the end is by talking.** All too often governments and oppositions try everything else before they return to this obvious point. **The objective must be to avoid Catalonia settling into a protracted armed conflict** of the sort we saw in Northern Ireland. That, too, might possibly have been averted before it started if there had been an inclusive and patient negotiation, **something that almost happened in Sunningdale in 1973.** Catalonia is not Northern Ireland, of course, but **the two sides often tip into such conflicts without intending to do so.** Before it is too late the Spanish and Catalan governments should learn the lessons from similar confrontations elsewhere. What appears to be stopping them from sitting down is, in part, the preconditions set by both sides. The Spanish government insists that it will never discuss independence and the Catalan side says it will not negotiate unless independence is on the table. Setting such preconditions is almost always a mistake, just as the insistence on prior decommissioning of IRA weapons was in Northern Ireland. They just become a way of preventing negotiations ever happening. It is perfectly possible to sit down with nothing ruled off the table, but with no commitment by either side that it will ever agree to what the other side is demanding. When such negotiations begin they often go in surprising directions. The British side did not insist on excluding a united Ireland from the Northern Ireland negotiations. But in the end Sinn Féin accepted power sharing, cross-border bodies and other guarantees instead, while maintaining their own desire to get rid of the border one day. Governments find it very hard to accept third-party mediation in such conflicts. The British rejected the idea consistently for decades in Northern Ireland. But in the end John Major's government accepted former US senator George Mitchell as chair of the talks, and he made an agreement possible. Experience round the world shows that the two sides are far more likely to reach an agreement if there is a third party. It makes it easier to decide on prosaic issues such as where and when meetings should take place. The presence of a third party also makes it possible to have compromise proposals put forward on substance that are not automatically rejected because they come from one side or the other. You wouldn't play a game of football without a referee, after all. Particularly when trust has become as fractured as it has in Catalonia, it is not wise to embark on a negotiation without someone neutral to facilitate it. It may be that the Spanish government hopes and believes that the separatist sentiments in Catalonia will fade away over time. That does not seem likely after Sunday. Immobilism is not a safe policy in these circumstances. **There clearly has to be a new relationship between Spain and Catalonia based on consent on both sides and this can only come about by talking.** At its root, this is a political problem and it can only be resolved by political means. I hope that both sides realise the only way to get there is through a structured and serious negotiation before it is too late. **The alternative could all too easily be the sort of long running, and often bloody, conflicts over self determination we have seen all too often — from Burma to South Sudan.**

### Third, social grievances.

**Cederman 10** LARS-ERIK CEDERMAN [Professor at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology], 2010, "WHY DO ETHNIC GROUPS REBEL? New Data and Analysis," Journal of International Conflict Studies, <http://www.columbia.edu/~aw2951/WhyGroupsRebel.pdf> //DF

While our work relates to a rich research tradition that links the causes of such conflicts to the mobilization of ethnic minorities, it also goes beyond this tradition by introducing a new data set that addresses some of the shortcomings of this tradition. Our analysis is based on the Ethnic Power Relations data set (EPR), which covers all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to power around the world from 1946 through 2005. This data set improves significantly on the widely used Minorities at Risk data set, which restricts its sample to mobilized minorities and thus largely overlooks the ethnopolitical constellation of power at the center. Improved theory and data allow us to show that, contrary to the expectations held by many scholars of civil wars, competing ethnonationalist claims over the state constitute the driving force behind many internal conflicts in the post-World War II era. While we have analyzed this data set at the country level in another publication, 1 we pursue a more disaggregated, group-level analysis here. We show that **conflict with the government is more likely to erupt (1) the more representatives of an ethnic group are excluded from state power, especially if they experienced a loss of power in the recent past, (2) the higher their mobilizational capacity is, and (3) the more they have experienced conflict in the past.** In view of these findings, we conclude that ethnonationalist struggles over access to state power are an important part of the dynamics leading to the outbreak of civil wars.

**Catalonia checks all of these boxes. 20 of Catalonia's ruling politicians are being sought on arrest warrants and the leader of Catalonia has been forced to flee.**

**Minder 17** Raphael Minder and Milan Schreuer, 11-3-2017, "Spain Issues Arrest Warrant for Ousted Catalan Leader," New York Times,

[https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/03/world/europe/spain-catalonia-puigdemont-warrant.html?\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/03/world/europe/spain-catalonia-puigdemont-warrant.html?_r=0)  
//DF

Judge Carmen Lamela, who sits on Spain's national court, is seeking the detention of the former leader, Carles Puigdemont, and four former members of his cabinet who left Catalonia for Brussels on Monday. The warrant was sent to Belgium's public prosecutor. The Spanish attorney general is seeking to prosecute Mr. Puigdemont and another 19 politicians on rebellion and other charges for declaring Catalonia's independence from Spain last month. On Thursday, Judge Lamela ordered eight of those former members of the regional government jailed without bail, pending a full trial, after they appeared before her. Belgium's judiciary will have to decide whether to arrest Mr. Puigdemont and the four members of his cabinet and then send them back to Spain to stand trial. That process is likely to take more than a month and could provoke a diplomatic wrangle between Spain and Belgium, where Mr. Puigdemont and the others could seek asylum. It is also likely to trigger political tensions within Belgium, which has a fragile coalition government that includes some Flemish politicians who support the Catalan independence movement.

**Catalonia can easily mobilize people to their cause because of the homogeneity of the region.**

**They have also experienced historical grievances for the past 300 years.**

**Link: granting Catalonia independence puts to bed the questions of the region's statehood; Catalonia will be an independent state**

**Internal Link: this allows businesses to return to Catalonia**

**McRae concludes that in the long-term, if Catalonia gained independence, it could have an extremely successful economy, more so than it does today.**

**McRae 17** Hamish McRae, 10-28-2017, "Catalonia could be an extremely successful economy and EU member state," The Independent,

<http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/catalonia-spain-independence-vote-economy-population-location-trade-currency-a8025051.html> //DF

It is not for foreign economists to take positions on the independence of Catalonia, for that is for the people of Catalonia and Spain to decide.

What can be said, though, is that if Catalonia were to become a fully independent country there is no reason why it should not – after a period of disruption – be an extremely successful economy. There are a number of reasons why this is likely to be so. For a start, it has a population of 7.5 million. There is no right or wrong size as such, for there are successful countries that are very small: Luxembourg, with a population of just under 600,000, is the richest country in the world in terms of GDP per person. (Monaco probably comes in higher, but it is a special case.) And of course the three largest countries in terms of population – China, India and the US – are also success stories in their own ways.

**Overall, the crisis will only get worse if Spain does not grant Catalonia its independence. Perez Bel of Al Jazeera reports that:**

Rafa Perez Bel (Al Jazeera). "The elections in Catalonia will not resolve the crisis." 11/18/17.

<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/elections-catalonia-resolve-crisis-171118142441159.html>

Dangerous polarisation ahead of the elections The recent events have mobilised not only a huge part of the population that is unhappy about the central government's mismanagement of the crisis and mistreatment of Catalans, but also the part that is ready to defend the unity of

Spain, fearing Catalonia could develop an extreme form of nationalism. **Pro-independence voices have increasing influence in the Catalan society. They enjoy strong emotional support from the general public which remembers vividly the police violence in October and continues to protest the ongoing victimisation of imprisoned activists and politicians. They do not trust Madrid. They see the actions of the central government not as attempts to resolve the crisis, but as punishment and deliberate humiliation of the Catalan people. The pro-independence crowd continues to organise large gatherings to defy the central government.**

On November 8, a general strike paralysed parts of Catalonia as thousands went out in the streets blocking, railroads and highways and chanting "Freedom!" Three days later, hundreds of thousands marched in Barcelona demanding the release of pro-independence movement leaders which they consider political prisoners.

**Maestre in the Nation concludes that:**

Sebastiaan Faber and Bécquer Seguí (The Nation). "Have Spain and Catalonia Reached a Point of No Return?" 9/26/17.

<https://www.thenation.com/article/have-spain-and-catalonia-reached-a-point-of-no-return/>

According to journalist Antonio Maestre, **the result is that Spain is rushing toward the edge of an abyss.** The situation, he wrote in La Marea in early September, reminds him of Croatia and Serbia in 1990: **"Emotionally and socially something has snapped among an immense majority of the population." The two trains are racing full speed toward a head-on collision,** his colleague Martínez says, **yet there are no political incentives for either to slow down or change course.** "The Spanish and Catalan right are precisely where they want to be," he notes. "One is engaged in a non-stop crusade against Catalonia; the other is wallowing in martyrdom." Those at the helm of the Procés point to the opportunity independence would create to remake democracy itself. "It's a question of democracy," Lluç Salellas, brother of Benet and a councilman for the pro-independence CUP in Girona, says. "The people will be able to vote and decide." One thing is clear: The Spanish state "offers few guarantees to Catalans." Many inside and outside the CUP believe an independent Catalan Republic is the only hope for progressive change. "I believe in and defend the self-determination of peoples," filmmaker Eulàlia Comas posted on social media,

**For these reasons, only Spain can end the situation it started. Willingly granting Catalonia its independence is the only way that the crisis can be peacefully resolved. Granting Catalonia its independence would resolve two major issues.**

**First, the economy**



**However, Spain granting Catalonia independence would resolve this issue, since Spain and Catalonia would likely negotiate over the terms of secession. Evarter of the Harvard International Review explains that:**

Artur Mas and David Gevarter (Harvard International Review). "Negotiating A Country." 9/2/17. <http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=14557>

You recently mentioned that you envisioned Catalonia being the "Denmark of the Mediterranean" in terms of the economy. What do you think the economic implications are for the rest of Spain should independence for Catalonia be achieved? It depends on the capacity to reach agreements with Spain, or not. **If there is a negotiation and agreements are reached, then nothing will happen because we will share the debt and the liabilities. We will also share the assets, and I'm sure that in this case, if negotiations exist we can reach a normal and profitable agreement for both sides. If there is no agreement because Spain refuses to sit down at the table, talk about the issues, and reach an agreement, then the situation would be more complicated. If there is no agreement and Catalonia goes ahead with the creation of a new state, then the result of that would be that Spain would lose 19 percent of its GDP but keep 100 percent of its public debt. In these circumstances, the Spanish economy would not be viable, and there would be threats to the Euro because the Spanish economy is too big in Europe to be considered a marginal economy. The situation would be so negative for everyone that, in my opinion, it won't happen.** For many, the ruling by the Constitutional Court of Spain in 2015 put an end to the independence process. What do you think is a potential resolution to this issue of the Spanish judiciary?

**Rodriguez-Pose of the London School of Economics continues that:**

Andrés Rodríguez-Pose (Professor of Economic Geography, London School of Economics/World Economic Forum). "Does independence make countries wealthier?" 11/21/14.

<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/11/does-independence-make-countries-wealthier/>

Our research highlights that better economic trajectories are not linked to the mere fact of seceding but by how the process of secession took place. **In cases where secession happened without real conflict and without significant alteration of previous socioeconomic links to the rest of the world, secession has not had any noticeable impact on the resulting economic performance. When secession is achieved by conflict, destruction and disruption of pre-existing trade patterns, all those involved in the process suffer. This underlines that, at least in terms of economic impact, secession is not an event but a process. How the process takes place – and largely whether there is agreement between the host and the seceding country – determines the subsequent economic performance for both. It also emphasises that the politics involved in any process of secession will almost certainly determine ensuing economic trajectories.** Hence, in the current atmosphere of secessionist movements in different parts of the world, more attention needs to be paid to how any potential divorce between countries can be achieved, rather than to the simple act of independence as such. Based on the case of former Yugoslavia, an amicable divorce will deliver no independence dividend but likewise not significantly damage the future development prospects of all parties involved. A bitter divorce, by contrast, is likely to have long-lasting, negative economic consequences. Unfortunately, so far the focus has been mainly on the implications of secession, rather than on how any secessionist process is managed.



# R2R

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**Our sole contention is preventing violence.**

**Catalonian non-secession causes violence in three ways.**

**First, economic harms.**

**The lack of clarity over Catalonia's national status harms investment into both Spain and Catalonia, since investors are less confident putting money into a place that could change overnight.**

**The battle between the Spanish and Catalan governments is driving economic uncertainty, and money and fear just don't go together. Darsch at INC in 2017 writes:**

**Many major companies previously stationed in Catalonia have relocated their headquarters. Thus, what is really harming enterprise in Catalonia is uncertainty.**

**In fact, Chislett of the Elcano Royal Institute reports this November:**

**following a continued stand-off with Madrid, up to 60% of the projected growth for 2018 and 2019 could evaporate. A potential prolongation of the political situation might adversely impact the economic outlook and financial stability in Spain.**

**Economic turmoil raises the chance of violence. Catalonians are likely to blame Spain for their worsening financial situations, and lash out violently. Humphreys at Harvard finds in 2003:**

**Lower per-capita income increases the chance of experiencing civil conflicts**

**Second, political grievances.**

**The longer this dispute goes on, the greater the chance of violence spilling out. Powell writing for the New York Review of Books explains this November:**

**The conflict in Catalonia over self-determination will not end by itself. Although it has so far been a largely peaceful dispute, if both sides persist in escalating the dispute, they could turn it into another bloody conflict inside Europe's borders—with consequences for all of us. In other similar disputes, it has been a short step from heads being broken in the streets in clashes between protesters and police to young, over-enthusiastic partisans responding with violence of their own. Far better to solve the conflict now, before real violence begins, than allow the blood to flow and then try to stop it**

**Granting Catalonia independence is the only way to avoid the outbreak of violence.**

**Powell at the Financial Times explains in 2017:**

There clearly has to be a new relationship between Spain and Catalonia based on consent on both sides and this can only come about by talking. The alternative could all too easily be the sort of long running, and often bloody, conflicts over self determination we have seen all too often — from Burma to South Sudan.

**Third, social grievances.**

conflict with the government is more likely to erupt (1) the more representatives of an ethnic group are excluded from state power, especially if they experienced a loss of power in the recent past, (2) the higher their mobilizational capacity is, and (3) the more they have experienced conflict in the past.

**Catalonia checks all of these boxes. 20 of Catalonia's ruling politicians are being sought on arrest warrants and the leader of Catalonia has been forced to flee.**

**Catalonia can easily mobilize people to their cause because of the homogeneity of the region.**

**They have also experienced historical grievances for the past 300 years.**

**The issue is not if Catalonia will try to secede, but whether they will try to do so peacefully.**

**Rodriguez-Pose of the London School of Economics continues that:**

In cases where secession happened without real conflict and without significant alteration of previous socioeconomic links to the rest of the world, secession has not had any noticeable impact on the resulting economic performance. When secession is achieved by conflict, destruction and disruption of pre-existing trade patterns, all those involved in the process suffer. This underlines that, at least in terms of economic impact, secession is not an event but a process. How the process takes place – and largely whether there is agreement between the host and the seceding country – determines the subsequent economic performance for both. It also emphasises that the politics involved in any process of secession will almost certainly determine ensuing economic trajectories.

**Thus, we affirm.**