

# BLOCKS

## Overview

**Upon reducing arms sales, the costs of SA interaction becomes intolerable. They are willing to tolerate immense costs b/c it's in their core security interests**

**Most nation states resist sanctions because they care more about core security interests above all else, and can almost always find their way around sanctions. Thus, Pape of the University of Chicago finds that sanction work less than 5% of the time.**

Robert Pape, 1998, "Why Economic Sanctions Still Don't Work", U Chicago

[https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2539368.pdf?casa\\_token=pziW0sgnTNsAAAAA:8Meu1iq1q9XqtCGTeAi62ZpxqnYGOE9Vh9mV8VHQ4zc5cONFD5ba-ywfrLCXiiYjhLj4xKg30MY7zlgSJiGGWTK-U3t2UPfW83M6YqSWvirS9CUyCY0](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2539368.pdf?casa_token=pziW0sgnTNsAAAAA:8Meu1iq1q9XqtCGTeAi62ZpxqnYGOE9Vh9mV8VHQ4zc5cONFD5ba-ywfrLCXiiYjhLj4xKg30MY7zlgSJiGGWTK-U3t2UPfW83M6YqSWvirS9CUyCY0) (NK)

To resolve this question, this article performs two main tasks. First, it reexamines the HSE database to determine whether sanctions worked as often as its authors claim. Second, it challenges the causal logic of the theory of economic sanctions, especially whether the nature of modern nation-states provides grounds for today's optimism. The article concludes that economic sanctions have little independent usefulness for pursuit of noneconomic goals. The HSE study is seriously flawed. Practically none of the claimed 40 successes of economic sanctions stands up to examination. Eighteen were actually settled by direct or indirect use of force; in 8 cases there is no evidence that the target made the demanded concessions; 6 do not qualify as instances of economic sanctions; and 3 are indeterminate. **Of HSE's 115 cases, only 5 are appropriately considered successes.** The deductive case that we should expect sanctions to be more effective in the future is also flawed, because it relies on the expectation that economic punishment can overwhelm a state's commitment to pursue important policy goals. **Most modern states, however, resist external pressure. Pervasive nationalism often makes states and societies willing to endure considerable punishment rather than abandon what are seen as the interests of the nation, making even weak or disorganized states unwilling to bend to the demands of foreigners.** In addition, states that have modern administrative capabilities can usually mitigate the economic damage of sanctions through substitution and other techniques. Finally, even when such capabilities are lacking and ruling elites are unpopular, they can still often protect themselves and their supporters by shifting the economic burden of sanctions onto opponents or disenfranchised groups

**They will use other means**

### **1. They'll buy weapons, like ballistic missiles, from CN or RUS**

**Roblin 18** Sebastien Roblin [master's degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China], 9-22-2018, "Saudi Arabia Already Has a Ballistic Missile Arsenal Courtesy of China—With a Little Help from the CIA," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/saudi-arabia-already-has-ballistic-missile-arsenal-courtesy-china%E2%80%94little-help-cia-31772> //DF

You would be hard pressed to find two more determined foes of Iran other than Saudi Arabia and Israel. The latter country has long been perturbed by bellicose anti-Israeli rhetoric from Tehran, and has unleashed hundreds of air strikes and artillery bombardments targeting Iran's efforts to arm Hezbollah forces in Lebanon and Syria. Meanwhile, **Riyadh appear to see itself as engaged in nothing short of an epic struggle for dominance of the Middle East, and has oriented its foreign policy around**

combating the perceived Iranian menace, even in places its influence is moderate at best. Iran hawks are preoccupied by the possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapon—a weapon which, given the limitations of Tehran’s air and sea forces, would need to be delivered by a ballistic missile. Iran’s continuing development of such missiles has been proposed as a casus belli, and was cited to justify the U.S. withdrawal from a nuclear deal struck in 2014 (the deal constrained Iran from developing nuclear warheads, but not ballistic missiles to carry them in). **It’s often ignored that Israel and Saudi Arabia themselves maintain some of the largest ballistic missile arsenals in the region**—the latter of which is the subject of this article. Iran’s ballistic missile program began during the ‘War of the Cities’ phase of the devastating Iran-Iraq war, when Baghdad rained hundreds of Scud missiles on Iranian metropolises. Though Iran managed to acquire a few Scuds from Libya with which to retaliate against Iraqi cities, it mostly could only strike back with air attacks—which placed its steadily diminishing fleet of U.S.-built warplanes at risk. **Saudi Arabia was also growing nervous of Iraq’s evidently huge missile arsenal. Denied access to U.S. ballistic missiles, Riyadh instead went knocking at the door of Beijing**—which had previously proven willing to export arms to Iran when Moscow and Washington refused to do so. **In 1987, China transferred** between thirty and 120 Dongfeng (‘East Wind’) DF-3A **intermediate range ballistic missiles** measuring twenty-four meters long and a dozen Transport-Erector-Launcher trucks. Once gassed full of liquid fuel, the missiles could strike targets as far as 2,700 miles away—though they required special launch pads. **Saudi Arabia formed a Royal Saudi Strategic Missile Force to operate the weapons, much to Washington’s annoyance.** Just four years later, Riyadh did end up in a war with Baghdad, and forty-six Iraqi missiles did fall upon Saudi territory. Yet **Riyadh never bothered flinging missiles back at Baghdad. Why?** The problem with the DF-3 is that it has a Circular Error Probable of at best 300 meters. This means that if you fired a half-dozen at a given target, you could expect on average only three to land within the length of three football fields of the aim point; with the other three most likely falling further afield. Other sources claim the CEP may even be as large as one or two miles. A weapon that inaccurate is pretty much useless for striking a military target—unless equipped with a nuclear warhead, which is what the DF-3 was designed to do. But China wasn’t going to sell nukes to the Saudis. The DF-3s were instead modified to carry 3,000 pounds of high explosives. This meant **the Saudi DF-3s were only ‘useful’ for dropping high explosives on a target as large as a city and randomly killing whatever unlucky civilians happened to be nearby the point of impact. However, the abundant firepower of U.S. war planes during the Gulf War meant the Saudis felt little need for such +tactics.** Over a decade later, Riyadh grew interested in acquiring a more effective strategic missile deterrence, and again turned to China—this time seeking its much more accurate DF-21 IRBM, which has a CEP of only 30-meters. (China even developed a guided DF-21D model designed to hit large ships at sea.) Furthermore, the DF-21’s use of solid-fuel rockets means it can be launched on very short notice.

## 2. They’ll use ground troops

**NBC 15** 3-26-2015, "Saudi Arabia Masses 150,000 Troops to Support Airstrikes in Yemen," NBC News <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/saudi-arabia-masses-150-000-troops-support-airstrikes-yemen-n330416> //DF

RIYADH, Saudi Arabia — **Saudi Arabia has mobilized 150,000 troops and some 100 fighter jets to rout Iran-linked fighters** that have taken over swathes of neighboring Yemen, a security adviser to the kingdom told NBC News on Thursday. **The adviser, who asked that his name not be used, did not say whether any of Saudi troops had crossed the border into Yemen as part of the kingdom's military intervention to arrest Yemen's rapidly deteriorating crisis. But he said Saudi Arabia was in “complete control” of Yemeni airspace after launching airstrikes overnight and started implementing a no-fly zone.** The conflict risks becoming a proxy war between Sunni Muslim states and Shiite Iran, which Saudi Arabia accuses of supporting the Houthi rebels and trying to increase its influence throughout the region.

**Urban 16** David Urban, 1-4-2016, "Assessing Saudi Arabia's Military Might," ForcesNetwork <https://www.forces.net/news/tri-service/assessing-saudi-arabias-military-might?&cmd=redirect&amp;arubalp=12345> //DF

The Saudi military numbers 227,000 troops, including 75,000 in the army, 13,500 in the navy and 20,000 in the air force. Some 16,000 personnel are committed to air defences, 2,500 are responsible for strategic missiles and 100,000 man the National Guard, according to the IISS Military Balance, 2015. The Saudi Army also has 600 heavy tanks, 780 light armoured vehicles and 1,423 armoured troop carriers. Its air force is equipped with 313 fighter jets, including F-15s, Tornados and Eurofighter Typhoons, as well as helicopters: **With all this firepower, and 150,000 troops ready to mobilise, it's no wonder the world's eyes are turned to the Gulf state.** So we've analysed what firepower Saudi Arabia's has at its disposal, and how this shapes up to other military forces from around the world. According to a study released in 2015 by U.S. based analysts IHS Jane's, the Kingdom, which is a leading player among the Gulf monarchies, was the world's biggest importer of defence equipment last year.

### 3. They'll use hired guns

**Kirkpatrick 18** David D. Kirkpatrick, 12-28-2018, "On the Front Line of the Saudi War in Yemen: Child Soldiers From Darfur," NYT,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/world/africa/saudi-sudan-yemen-child-fighters.html> //DF

The United Nations has called the war in Yemen the world's worst humanitarian crisis. An intermittent blockade by the Saudis and their partners in the United Arab Emirates has pushed as many as 12 million people to the brink of starvation, killing some 85,000 children, according to aid groups. Led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudis say they are battling to rescue Yemen from a hostile faction backed by Iran. But **to do it, the Saudis have used their vast oil wealth to outsource the war, mainly by hiring** what Sudanese soldiers say are **tens of thousands of desperate survivors of the conflict in Darfur to fight, many of them children.** At any time for nearly four years as many as 14,000 Sudanese militiamen have been **fighting in Yemen in tandem with the local militia aligned with the Saudis,** according to several Sudanese fighters who have returned and Sudanese lawmakers who are attempting to track it. Hundreds, at least, have died there. **Almost all the Sudanese fighters appear to come from the battle-scarred and impoverished region of Darfur,** where some 300,000 people were killed and 1.2 million displaced during a dozen years of conflict over diminishing arable land and other scarce resources. Most belong to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, a tribal militia previously known as the Janjaweed. They were blamed for the systematic rape of women and girls, indiscriminate killing and other war crimes during Darfur's conflict, and veterans involved in those horrors are now leading their deployment to Yemen — albeit in a more formal and structured campaign.

### 4. Funding terrorists

Sheikh Meshal bin Hamad Al-Thani, The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are aiding terrorists in Yemen" Washington Post, 08-29-2018.

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/08/29/the-united-arab-emirates-and-saudi-arabia-are-aiding-terrorists-in-yemen/?utm\\_term=.94f8cfd5f485](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/08/29/the-united-arab-emirates-and-saudi-arabia-are-aiding-terrorists-in-yemen/?utm_term=.94f8cfd5f485)

The military coalition led by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes this month in northern Yemen that hit a bus filled with children, killing dozens of young boys who were on a school field trip. The incident prompted outcries from the international community and drew further concerns about the war in Yemen.

**At the same time we are reading about the horrific bombing that killed 44 children, new Associated Press reporting from Yemen has laid bare the fact that the UAE and Saudi Arabia have been busy cutting "secret deals with al-Qaeda fighters, paying some to leave key cities and towns and letting others retreat with weapons, equipment and wads of looted cash ... hundreds more were recruited to join the coalition itself."**

It is rather ironic that while working with al-Qaeda in Yemen, the UAE has been relentlessly demonizing Qatar, the American ally that hosts the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East, accusing it of supporting terrorist groups. While the UAE has been pursuing its own expansionist ambition in Yemen and the Horn of Africa at the expense of regional security, Qatar has been facilitating hundreds of missions through Al-Udeid Air Base against al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and others who threaten peace and stability in the Middle East.

Unfortunately, our neighbors are shortsighted when it comes to Yemen. They see the war as a public relations exercise in which stories are contained and American perceptions reshaped, instead of properly addressing the very real problems they have created. We have seen this approach to countering terrorism and extremism before, with deadly results. There is no option to sweep radicals under the rug. Saudi Arabia and the UAE tried to ignore radicalization within their own borders in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The result was Osama bin Laden's attacks against American embassies and the USS Cole, and on 9/11. Nearly all the 9/11 hijackers came from Saudi Arabia or the UAE, and the UAE was being singled out in the 9/11 Commission's report for its role in laundering money for the terrorists.

**Recent history proves that radicalized extremists who are allowed to fester cause more harm than if they are dealt with swiftly and directly.**

**Thus, there are three specific reasons why Saudi Arabia would not pull out of Yemen.**

**1. If the lose Iran is on their border... they'd have none of that**

Maysam Behraves, 7-18-2017, "Why Saudi Arabia can't let Yemen go," Middle East Eye, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/why-saudi-arabia-cant-let-yemen-go> (NK)

The **military action against the Houthis** – which subscribe to the Zaidi branch of Shia Islam almost unknown outside of Yemen - **has arguably sharpened the sense of nationalism in Saudi Arabia, enhancing the popularity of its leaders, in particular the defence minister, Mohammed bin Salman** (MBS), who has marshalled the campaign from the onset. Interestingly, **MBS's recent promotion from deputy crown prince to crown prince would not be so convenient without his military adventures in Yemen and their impact on the Saudi national perception of him as a patriotic war hero and a determined defender of the realm.** Another pertinent advantage of the intervention was its diversionary effect. It redirected public attention from the economic problems and high-level political schisms that Saudi Arabia has been grappling with since King Salman acceded to the throne in January 2015. It is little wonder that the coalition campaign in Yemen started only around two months later.

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**Saudi foreign policy represents one of the most masculinist and patriarchal in the international community.** A **masculinist foreign policy** may be characterised by tendencies that **are conventionally associated with masculinism and male dominance such as hawkishness, aggressiveness, coerciveness, proneness to violence, compromise aversion and so on.** In her groundbreaking book *A Most Masculine State*, Madawi al-Rasheed, a visiting professor at the London School of Economics, probes the political, religious and historical roots of patriarchy in the Saudi society and demonstrates how it has affected the lives of women and their struggle for recognition, emancipation and equality. It is equally evident in **Saudi Arabia's foreign policy which usually manifests itself in its aversion to diplomacy and diplomatic solutions to conflicts, hasty recourse to aggressive measures without exhausting all non-military options, and obstinate insistence on policies whose ineffectiveness has been proven.** The sudden decision to intervene in Yemen encapsulates all these tendencies quite evidently. Other examples of Riyadh's rigid patriarchal foreign policy orientation are its denunciation of political negotiations with Iran over bilateral tensions and the abrupt diplomatic and transport boycott of Qatar, a Sunni sheikhdom and former Saudi ally in the Middle East. Along parallel lines, Saudi Arabia prompted a diplomatic row with Sweden in early 2015 over a speech the Swedish feminist foreign minister Margot Wallstrom's had been invited to give at an Arab League summit in Cairo on 9 March.

**SA would turn to Russia because it views the war in Yemen as of critical importance; the other Gulf states would likely follow, too**

**Svet 16** Oleg Svet, 9-26-2016, "Why Congress Supports Saudi Arms Sales," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-congress-supports-saudi-arms-sales-17840> //DF

Maintaining a robust security cooperation relationship with Saudi Arabia also helps America's defense industry in the region as a whole. Saudi Arabia is the most important member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which includes five other large purchasers of American defense articles: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. These countries are gradually creating a multinational, interoperable force that requires all of the countries to maintain similar weapons systems. When Saudi Arabia purchases U.S. defense articles, other countries in the Gulf follow suit. For example, a \$7 billion deal to sell three dozen F-15 jets to Qatar and twenty-eight Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets to Kuwait is currently in the works. Furthermore, in the crucial period from 2011 to 2015 (when U.S. defense spending was especially under strain), the UAE was the second-largest importer of U.S. defense articles, after Saudi Arabia. In 2015, the United States sold \$33 billion in defense articles and services to the GCC countries. For large American defense companies, such exports are crucial. In recent years an estimated one-quarter of Raytheon's sales came from foreign purchases. A few years ago, the UAE's \$3.3 billion order enabled Raytheon to restart the Patriot production line and add new features. Such purchases save highly-skilled manufacturing jobs in the United States, and, by adding advanced capabilities, will help win new customers unless Congress blocks them from happening. If Senators Paul and Murphy would have succeeded in their measure, Riyadh would almost certainly have gone to another large military supplier, possibly Russia. Saudi and other GCC officials fear that Iran, which is not only ideologically and theologically diametrically opposed to the Kingdom, but also has a population and territory several times the size of Saudi Arabia, poses an existential threat. The uncomfortable truth is that Yemen is a proxy war in the Saudi-Iranian competition. Riyadh feels that it must win in Yemen against the Houthi rebels (who the Saudis are convinced are sponsored by Iran), and the only way to win is through military power. Saudi Arabia does not have an indigenous military industry to support the war; it has to find military suppliers to sustain its war effort. Had the sale been blocked and Saudi Arabia shifted to Russia, China, or other suppliers for military purchases, other Gulf States would have followed suit, putting in jeopardy an additional tens of billions of dollars in sales by American multinational companies and thousands of highly-skilled manufacturing jobs. Going forward, when considering whether to block arms sales to Saudi Arabia, therefore, Congress should not only worry about the particular sale in question. It should also consider the wider negative implications that a suspension would have on tens of thousands of high-skilled manufacturing jobs all across America, tens of billions of dollars in revenues for U.S. companies, and the wider defense industry.

**However, even if you buy our opponents argument that Saudi Arabia will not be able to get weapons from Russia or China, you should still vote for us, because the war in Yemen will get far worse in two main ways:**

**First, they would be forced to shift to ground troops.**

**This is bad because**

**a) ground troops are the most lethal form of attack. In fact, data from WWII indicates that casualties from ground assault forces is 15x higher than from sea based forces**

CG Blood, Naval Health Research Center, "SHIPBOARD AND GROUND TROOP CASUALTY RATES AMONG NAVY AND MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL DURING WORLD WAR II OPERATIONS" <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a230803.pdf> (NK)

Afloat casualty rates were computed using Bureau of Personnel casualty lists in conjunction with records detailing ships and dates of ship involvement in various World War II operations. Shore-based rates were calculated using data from various sources including the History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II. Casualty rates were computed per 1000 men per day. The rate of shipboard **casualties** in the Asiatic-Pacific theater across all operations was 0.56, while the rate in the European theater was 0.84. Individual operation rates ranged from 0.01 to 50.50. Among Pacific afloat operations there were 115 men wounded for every 100 killed. Eight of the 117 ship types had KIA rates more than double their WIA rates; among these only submarines and oilers involved more than ten vessels. **Ground assault force rates averaged 15 times higher than ship-based rates.** The highest rates for both afloat and ashore operations were seen for brief engagements occurring early in the war.

**b) The Saudi military specifically is untrained, and their deployment would cause more destruction than there is now (Brimelow - Business Insider)**

## Ground Troops

Ben Brimelow, 12-16-2017, "Saudi Arabia has the best military equipment money can buy — but it's still not a threat to Iran," Business Insider, <https://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-arabia-iran-yemen-military-proxy-war-2017-12> (NK)

Knights estimates that 10,000 to 20,000 troops would be required to have the desired affect. Yet **the Saudi military has not deployed its ground forces** — most likely **because the Saudi leadership knows that**, as Knights says, **they "suffer from significant weaknesses."** These weaknesses include **a lack of logistical equipment and experience needed to carry out such a campaign.** **"They have no experience in an expeditionary operation,"** he said, noting that the Desert Storm campaign against Iraq — which Saudi Arabia did contribute to — was largely an American effort. **Additionally, Saudi ground forces as a whole are not trained well enough to where they would be able to perform successfully in large-scale operations. As such, a Saudi ground force in Yemen may cause more harm than good.** Bilal Saab, the senior fellow and director of the Defense and Security Program at the Middle East Institute, told Business Insider that Saudi Arabia understood the potential harm of its ground forces. In an email, Saab said **Saudi Arabia would not deploy large contingents of ground forces "because their casualties would be severe and they most probably would cause tremendous collateral damage in Yemen."**

**Two, because civilian targeting goes up when the balance of power shifts away from the Saudis.**

**a) In his 2004 book "targeting civilians in war" Alexander Downes writes that When militaries take a turn for the worse they are more likely to target civilians in order to try and quickly coerce their opponents into giving up**

**B) Wood of ASU writes in 2012 writes that With less capabilities, less violent means of detturrence become harder to employ, making violent tactics the only option**

**In a situation as complex and volatile as Yemen, there are no easy fixes; we should be realistic about the consequences of our actions. The consequence of ending arms sales and weakening SA will be to make them more desperate and likely to unleash harm on civillians.**

**When militaries take a turn for the worse they are more likely to target civilians in order to try and quickly coerce their opponents into giving up (Downes - A BOOK)**

Alexander Downes, 2004, Cornell University Press, "Targeting Civilians in War"  
<http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100214420> (NK)

Alexander B. Downes reminds readers that democratic and authoritarian governments alike will sometimes deliberately kill large numbers of civilians as a matter of military strategy. What leads governments to make such a choice? Downes examines several historical cases: British counterinsurgency tactics during the Boer War, the starvation blockade used by the Allies against Germany in World War I, Axis and Allied bombing campaigns in World War II, and ethnic cleansing in the Palestine War. He concludes that **governments decide to target civilian populations for two main reasons—desperation to reduce their own military casualties or**

**avert defeat, or a desire to seize and annex enemy territory. When a state's military fortunes take a turn for the worse, he finds, civilians are more likely to be declared legitimate targets to coerce the enemy state to give up. When territorial conquest and annexation are the aims of warfare, the population of the disputed land is viewed as a threat and the aggressor state may target those civilians to remove them.**

Democracies historically have proven especially likely to target civilians in desperate circumstances. In *Targeting Civilians in War*, Downes explores several major recent conflicts, including the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

**With less capabilities, less violent means of detturrence become harder to employ, making violent tactics the only option (Wood - ASU)**

Wood, 2012, "Armed intervention and civilian victimization in intrastate conflicts" ASU, [http://www.public.asu.edu/~rmwood4/woodkathgent\\_jpr.pdf](http://www.public.asu.edu/~rmwood4/woodkathgent_jpr.pdf) (NK)

We extend this work by examining the effect of external armed intervention on the decisions of governments and insurgent organizations to victimize civilians during civil wars. We theorize that changes in the balance of power in an intrastate conflict influence combatant strategies of violence. **As a conflict actor weakens relative to its adversary, it employs increasingly violent tactics**

**toward the civilian population as a means of reshaping the strategic landscape to its benefit.** The reason for this is twofold. First, declining capabilities increase resource needs at the moment that extractive capacity is in decline. Second, declining capabilities inhibit control and policing, making less violent means of defection deterrence more difficult. As both resource extraction difficulties and internal threats increase, actors' incentives for violence against the population increase. To the extent that biased military interventions shift the balance of power between conflict actors, we argue that they alter actor incentives to victimize civilians. Specifically, intervention should reduce the level of violence employed by the supported faction and increase the level employed by the opposed faction. We test these arguments using data on civilian casualties and armed intervention in intrastate conflicts from 1989 to 2004. Our results support our expectations, suggesting that interventions shift the power balance and affect the levels of violence employed by combatants.

## **R/T Oil Dependence Bad**

### **R/T Econ**

**The stability of foreign oil markets is important to the US economy**

**Cordesman 10** Anthony H. Cordesman [Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies], in an article written by Andrew Chatzky, 9-24-2010, "Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?," Council on Foreign Relations,

<https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea> //DF

The United States shares critical strategic interests with Saudi Arabia that shape the proposed Saudi arms sale. First, for all the talk of energy independence over the last four decades, **the U.S. Department of Energy estimates that the United States will be as strategically dependent on imported oil through 2035 as it is today. These projections do not even take account of our indirect imports of oil in the form of manufactured goods, or our dependence on the health of a global economy that requires stable supply- and market-driven prices. The stability of Gulf energy exports is critical to our economy and every job in the United States** Second, U.S. military power is finite, and both the United States and Saudi Arabia face rapidly changing threats. The United States needs allies that have interoperable forces that can both fight effectively alongside the United States and ease the U.S. burden by defending themselves. Iran already poses a massive asymmetric naval-air-assault force



threat to the Gulf states. The U.S. invasion of Iraq has left Iraqi forces a decade away from being a counterbalance to Iran; Saudi Arabia is the only meaningful regional power to work with. Additionally, al-Qaeda in the peninsula is based in Yemen, and the threat of terrorism and outside infiltration means highly mobile Saudi forces are critical to the security of Saudi energy and civil facilities. Helping Saudi Arabia create a combination of effective air and naval power also helps ensure the security of tanker and other shipping in the Gulf of Oman and a steadily more unstable Red Sea.

## R/T Renewable Energy

### **1. People are investing in solar with the expectation that it will become cheaper**

**Shaffer 14** Leslie Shaffer, 12-4-2014, "Will oil's drop hurt renewable energy?," CNBC,  
<https://www.cnbc.com/2014/12/04/will-oils-drop-hurt-renewable-energy.html> //DF

To be sure, in the wake of oil's decline, renewable energy shares have lost ground. For example, the Powershares WilderHill Clean Energy exchange traded fund (PBW) is down around 30 percent from its March peak, while the First Trust Nasdaq Clean Edge Green Energy ETF (QCLN) is down around 19 percent from its March peak. But buying into the sector now represents "a great hedge" if oil prices suddenly spike higher, the Bernstein report said. Read More Strange bedfellows: Solar power meets oil drilling "**The cost of sunshine does not change over time. It is not the cost of solar today versus the price of oil today that is the relevant consideration. Rather, it is the cost of solar today versus the price of oil for the next 20 years,**" the report said.

### **Renewable sources of energy are becoming dramatically cheaper. Hoium 17 writes:**

**Hoium 17** Travis Hoium, 11-24-2017, "How Renewable Energy Will Destroy Fossil Fuels," Motley Fool,  
<https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/11/24/how-renewable-energy-will-destroy-fossil-fuels.aspx> //DF  
There's an energy revolution taking place before our eyes, but it doesn't seem to be getting a lot of attention from the media or investors.

**Over the past decade, energy from wind and solar has become so cheap that it's making new fossil fuel plants nearly obsolete.** This isn't just happening in the U.S. but in China and India as well, where coal plants are being shut down in favor of wind and solar energy. Close behind renewable energy is improving battery technology that's making electric vehicles and energy storage viable options for consumers and businesses. As this combination of technologies improves and grows, it will slowly but surely replace fossil fuel use as we know it today. Let me be clear about what I'm saying: **The conditions for the demise of fossil fuels are already in place and a massive disruption of the fossil fuel industry is on the horizon.** Electric grid disruption has already begun Renewable energy changes the energy paradigm for the electric grid, and there will be a lot of casualties in the old world of energy. For example, ever since Thomas Edison invented the light bulb, people have relied on electricity from their electric grid to power their homes and any electric devices they own. For the first time ever, over a million homes are now their own mini-power plants with solar panels on their roofs. Given another year or two, energy storage will begin to be commonplace and removing yourself from the grid altogether will be a viable option for consumers. Utilities, power generators, and companies supplying fuel will all be disrupted in the process. **Gasoline will go the way of the horse and buggy Rapid advances in battery technology are likely to make gasoline vehicles all but obsolete in a decade or two. Electric vehicles are already cheaper to fuel and maintain than traditional vehicles.** The obstacle to a complete takeover of the auto market is the vehicle's range and the lifecycle of batteries. Tesla (NASDAQ:TSLA) has made the biggest strides in range and lifecycle, offering a 337-mile range for the 100D model. Its warranty also runs for eight years and unlimited miles for new vehicles.

**Leary 18** Kyree Leary, 2, 1-17-2018, "Renewable energy will be cheaper than fossil fuels by 2020, according to a new report," Business Insider,  
<https://www.businessinsider.com/renewable-energy-will-be-cheaper-than-fossil-fuels-by-2020-2018-1>  
//DF



Renewable energy may not be completely replacing fossil fuels just yet, but it's undeniable that society is warming to the idea of using solar and wind power in place of coal. In some parts of the world we're already beginning to see the effects of such a paradigm shift: Last year, Britain began generating twice as much electricity from wind than coal, which contributed to 2017 being the greenest year ever for the United Kingdom. In the United States, solar and wind power accounted for nearly 95 percent of all new electricity capacity added last year, according to Engadget. That success can also be partially attributed to the closures of fossil fuel plants. In the coming years, we're sure to see renewable energy become a real competitor in the fossil fuel industry. A new report recently published by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), predicts the cost of renewable energy will experience a noticeable drop by 2020, putting it on par with, or cheaper than, fossil fuels. The report, titled "Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2017," read: "[By 2020,] all the renewable power generation technologies that are now in commercial use are expected to fall within the fossil fuel-fired cost range, with most at the lower end or undercutting fossil fuel." Fossil fuel generation today costs between \$0.05 - \$0.17 per kilowatt hour in G20 countries, including the U.S., the U.K., Russia, Japan, India, and Germany. By 2020, however, renewables are expected to cost \$0.03 - \$0.10 per kilowatt hour, with the price of onshore wind power and solar photovoltaic (PV) projects expected to be as low as \$0.03 per kilowatt hour by 2019. Presently, offshore wind projects and solar thermal energy can still be quite costly, but they too are expected to drop in price between 2020 and 2022 — to \$0.06 - \$0.10 per kilowatt hour. "This new dynamic signals a significant shift in the energy paradigm," said Adnan Z. Amin, IRENA Director-General, in a statement. "These cost declines across technologies are unprecedented and representative of the degree to which renewable energy is disrupting the global energy system."

## **2. Crude oil is used for transportation, while renewables are more used for power generation, so their markets aren't substitutable**

**Shaffer 14** Leslie Shaffer, 12-4-2014, "Will oil's drop hurt renewable energy?," CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2014/12/04/will-oils-drop-hurt-renewable-energy.html> //DF

But others also noted that renewable energy use may not suffer much. Read More Solar power's stunning growth: US generation up 100 percent this year "Crude oil price weakness unlikely to exert pressure on wind and solar, as oil is not a substitute," UOB KayHian said in a Thursday note on China's renewable energy sector. "It is very rare for a country to use crude oil as a major source of power generation," it said, noting that within China, at least, renewables are almost solely used for power generation. Indeed, in China, Europe and the U.S., natural gas provides more competition for renewable energy than oil, noted Xizhou Zhou, senior director at IHS Energy. In these regions, natural gas is generally traded independently of oil, with its link to crude prices weakening, he noted. "In the short term, utilities might want gas more than renewables," he said, but he doesn't expect the lower fossil fuel prices to affect renewable demand much in the short-to-medium-term. IHS expects oil prices could remain low for the next couple years, and it's only likely to affect renewable demand if they remain relatively low for longer than that, he said.

## **Renewables don't compete with oil but with natural gas, and renewables are now competitive with natural gas**

Ghada Abdulla, 2019, "What does falling oil prices mean for renewable energy?," Derast, Bahrain Center for Strategic and International Studies and Energy, <http://www.derasat.org.bh/publications/what-does-falling-oil-prices-mean-for-renewable-energy/> //DF

One of the most important developments in the field of energy in the current decade is the sharp and sustained improvement in the economic feasibility of the technologies used in renewable energy generation. These technologies have greatly evolved due to their large and rapid deployment in many countries. Some of these renewable energy technologies have become cost competitive with conventional hydrocarbon sources of energy, which caused many countries, including the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) countries, to become increasingly interested in renewable energy. But the sharp decline in oil prices since mid-2014 — where oil lost about 50% of its value since last summer — raised concerns about the impact of falling oil prices on the economic feasibility of renewable energy sources. Some believe that this decline in oil

prices would delay the the growth of renewable energy worldwide. But in fact, we find that the fall in oil prices did not have a significant impact on renewable energy. The renewable energy sector reached a level of high maturity where oil prices no longer affect its fate. When oil prices collapsed in the 1980s, several large renewable energy projects were stopped in a number of countries such as Japan and the United States. This happened even though oil is not considered as a substitute resource in the generation of electric power. However, oil prices affected renewable energy deployment through its effect on the pricing of other fossil fuel sources such as natural gas. As oil prices fell, the demand for hydrocarbon sources of energy rose and the demand for the relatively expensive renewable energy retreated. Today, we find that renewable energy technologies have greatly evolved, no longer constituting an expensive alternative to conventional energy sources. For this reason, the recent fall in oil prices did not have a significant effect on investments in renewable energy. Renewable energy technology is continuously and rapidly developing leading to large price reductions. Prices of wind turbines fell by almost a third since 2009. The cost of utility scale solar PV fell by about 50% since 2010, while the cost of rooftop solar panels has declined by 70% since 2008. It is clear that the cost of renewable energy will continue to decline over time.

### **3. Countries are investing in renewables for environmental, not economic, reasons, meaning they'd do it regardless of the oil price**

Ghada Abdulla, 2019, "What does falling oil prices mean for renewable energy?," Derast, Bahrain Center for Strategic and International Studies and Energy,

<http://www.derasat.org.bh/publications/what-does-falling-oil-prices-mean-for-renewable-energy/> //DF

Renewable energy production is encouraged in many countries, not only as an alternative source to fossil fuels, where if its prices rises compared to fossil fuels production of renewable energy will decline. Today, countries are investing in renewable energy for environmental reasons, most importantly to prevent global warming. For example, China, which is the largest investor in renewable energy today, refuses to reduce its investments in renewable energy with falling oil prices and with the falling coal prices, which is the main source of electricity generation in China, because the purpose of investment in renewable energy is first to reduce pollution in cities and secondly to diversify energy sources and achieve energy security. Because countries are investing in renewable energy for environmental reasons or to diversify energy sources, oil prices today no longer have a significant effect on investments in renewable energy. Looking at the history of oil prices, one can observe that oil prices are in constant fluctuation. These low oil prices are temporary, and even if oil prices stayed at current levels for a few years, oil prices would eventually rise again. Therefore, investment decisions regarding electricity generation should not be based on current oil prices. Investing in renewable energy sources are investments for power generation in the long term since the lifespan of solar and wind technologies is more than 25 years.

## R/T Arms Race

### **US arms sales to Saudi Arabia create a perception of confidence that prevents proliferation**

**Gause 10** F. Gregory Gause III [Professor and chair of political science department, University of Vermont], in an article written by Andrew Chatzky, 9-24-2010, "Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea> //DF Still, one good reason to move ahead with the sale is that there is no good reason not to. Though some might oppose it on grounds of disliking the Saudi political system, selling or not selling the arms is not going to affect Saudi policies on democracy, women, Islam, or anything else one whit. Moral purity would be purchased at the price of reduced American regional influence. If the arms sale could destabilize the Saudi regime, that would be a reason not to do it. Many think that U.S. arms sales to the Shah [of Iran] in the 1970s helped to bring him down, but arms were part of the larger strategic relationship, to which many Iranians objected; the arms themselves did not cause the relationship or the popular reaction against it. The Saudis and the United States are similarly tied together in the eyes of Saudi citizens and others in the region. But this arms sale would not change that perception. The larger issue is whether we are selling arms to a stable regime in Riyadh. The short answer is "yes." Also, there are two positive foreign policy consequences that could come from the sale. Its psychological effect could give the Saudis more credibility with regional elites in their contest for influence with Iran, making potential Saudi allies in places like Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and Yemen more confident in throwing in their lot with Riyadh. And if Iran obtains a nuclear weapons capability, the Saudis would undoubtedly consider the option of proliferating themselves. [but] `If they are confident of their American security guarantee--and these big arms sales are warrants of the American commitment to their security--American advice not to obtain nuclear weapons will carry more weight. In the end, the Saudis are going to buy weapons. If we do not sell them, Moscow, London, Paris, and Beijing will.

## R/T Destabilizes Saudi Arabia

### **Saudi Arabia's stability is affected by many other factors than US arms sales; this one aspect of our relationship won't make or break the country, as history proves**

**Gause 10** F. Gregory Gause III [Professor and chair of political science department, University of Vermont], in an article written by Andrew Chatzky, 9-24-2010, "Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea> //DF Still, one good reason to move ahead with the sale is that there is no good reason not to. Though some might oppose it on grounds of disliking the Saudi political system, selling or not selling the arms is not going to affect Saudi policies on democracy, women, Islam, or anything else one whit. Moral purity would be purchased at the price of reduced American regional influence. If the arms sale could destabilize the Saudi regime, that would be a reason not to do it. Many think that U.S. arms sales to the Shah [of Iran] in the 1970s helped to bring him down, but arms were part of the larger strategic relationship, to which many Iranians objected; the arms themselves did not cause the relationship or the popular reaction against it. The Saudis and the United States are similarly tied together in the eyes of Saudi citizens and others in the region. But this arms sale would not change that perception. The larger issue is whether we are selling arms to a stable regime in Riyadh. The short answer is "yes." Also, there are two positive foreign policy consequences that could come from the sale. Its psychological effect could give the Saudis more credibility with regional elites in their contest for influence with Iran, making potential Saudi allies in places like Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and Yemen more confident in throwing in their lot with Riyadh. And if Iran obtains a nuclear weapons capability, the Saudis would undoubtedly consider the option of proliferating themselves. If they are confident of their American

security guarantee--and these big arms sales are warrants of the American commitment to their security--American advice not to obtain nuclear weapons will carry more weight.

## **R/T Changes Saudi Politics**

### **The Saudis will not change their political system because of arms sales**

**Gause 10** F. Gregory Gause III [Professor and chair of political science department, University of Vermont], in an article written by Andrew Chatzky, 9-24-2010, "Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea> //DF  
The Iranian regional challenge is based on the political and ideological links with important state and sub-state actors in the region: Hezbollah, Hamas, various Iraqi parties, the Syrian regime, and Shia activists in the Gulf monarchies. Better fighter jets and attack helicopters will not help the Saudis to contain or roll back this kind of Iranian ideological influence. If [the Saudis] are confident of their American security guarantee--and these big arms sales are warrants of the American commitment to their security-- American advice not to obtain nuclear weapons will carry more weight. Still, one good reason to move ahead with the sale is that there is no good reason not to. **Though some might oppose it on grounds of disliking the Saudi political system, selling or not selling the arms is not going to affect Saudi policies on democracy, women, Islam, or anything else one whit. Moral purity would be purchased at the price of reduced American regional influence.** If the arms sale could destabilize the Saudi regime, that would be a reason not to do it. Many think that U.S. arms sales to the Shah [of Iran] in the 1970s helped to bring him down, but arms were part of the larger strategic relationship, to which many Iranians objected; the arms themselves did not cause the relationship or the popular reaction against it. The Saudis and the United States are similarly tied together in the eyes of Saudi citizens and others in the region. But this arms sale would not change that perception. The larger issue is whether we are selling arms to a stable regime in Riyadh. The short answer is "yes."

### **Obama already tried to hold sales but had no effect on human rights**

**Gould 18** Joe Gould, 10-18-2018, "Will Congress really cancel US-Saudi arms deals? It's complicated, but let us explain," Defense News, <https://www.defensenews.com/news/pentagon-congress/2018/10/18/will-congress-really-cancel-us-saudi-arms-deals-its-complicated-but-let-us-explain/> //DF  
"Clearly we need to find out what happened before deciding what action should be taken," McConnell, R-Ky., said Tuesday. "I can't imagine if what we think happened, that we would take no action." To what end? **The Obama administration used arms-sale holds in an attempt to improve a customer nations' behavior on human rights, but to limited effect,** said Becca Wasser, a researcher with the think tank Rand. "You have to ask the question: What end is the hold supposed to achieve? Is it intended to condition a partner's behavior or punish them?" Wasser said. "I have a healthy amount of skepticism on both counts." Wasser predicted that holding up arms sales is not going to massively impact the U.S. defense industry or bin Salman's signature economic agenda, Vision 2030. As for Magnitsky sanctions, Wasser argued they're more effective in Russia, targeting businessmen in the oligarch class who have reach with the Kremlin. "It is less likely to be effective in Saudi, where the royal family and upper echelons of government that may be implicated are insulated," she said.

## R/T Yemen War

**Turn: ending arms sales will just make Saudi Arabia more reckless and prompt them to buy from Russia, with whose weapons they will kill more civilians**

**Chollet 18** Derek Chollet, Ilan Goldenberg, 11-30-2018, "The United States Should Give Saudi Arabia a Choice," Foreign Policy,

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/30/saudi-arabia-should-be-given-a-choice-stop-the-surprises-or-suffer-the-consequences-mbs-khashoggi/> //DF

It might feel good for the United States to turn its back on the Saudis, but that won't enhance U.S. interests or save lives. The United States has leverage it must use, but that has to be carefully estimated. **A divorce will not cause the Saudis to walk away from the war in Yemen or make up with the Qataris. If anything, the end result will be the Saudis will be less restrained, because they will no longer feel the need to acquiesce to U.S. requests. They will certainly feel the loss of sophisticated American weaponry, but the Russians will step in and supply them with less accurate weapons that will likely just kill more in Yemen (for evidence of that, consider Syria).** The United States will no longer be complicit in problematic Saudi behavior, but that behavior won't stop. Moreover, there is some truth to the argument that Saudi cooperation on counterterrorism, countering Iran, managing oil prices, and investing in the U.S. economy are important benefits, even if they do not matter as much as Trump thinks they do.

R/T Link: Diplomacy

**TURN: Less US support does not mean diplomacy, but rather a more aggressive foreign policy. When Obama took a more hands off approach to the middle east, Saudi Arabia reacted by increasing arms exports and sending militias into Bahrain to support their dictator rather than the democratically elected Shiite candidate (Soage - IEEE).**

## R/T Practical Benefits of Ending Arms Sales

**Ending arms sales wouldn't make any practical difference to Saudi Arabia because they could buy weapons from other states**

**Thompson 10** Loren Thompson [Chief Operating Officer, Lexington Institute], in an article written by Andrew Chatzky, 9-24-2010, "Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?," Council on Foreign Relations,

<https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea> //DF

For Iran, though, the transaction presents a powerful deterrent since there is nothing in Tehran's current arsenal that can cope with the latest versions of the F-15 fighter or the AH-64 attack helicopter. The radical Shiite regime in Iran constitutes the most serious military threat to Saudi Arabia, so I expect that the pending arms sale will be followed by additional agreements to modernize the Saudi Eastern Fleet in the Gulf and upgrade missile defenses. **If Congress delays or modifies the proposed transaction, the Saudi government will probably move to purchase modern weapons from other sources such as Britain or France. The kingdom needs to replace its aging Cold War arsenal, and it is surrounded by nations potentially posing a threat to**

its security. Little purpose would be served by declining to assist Saudi Arabia in meeting its legitimate defensive needs. Whatever the differences may be between our governments and cultures, the Saudis have been reliable allies of America for decades and have exercised a moderating influence on the behavior of other oil-producing states. Helping them means helping ourselves.

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Also, there are two positive foreign policy consequences that could come from the sale. Its psychological effect could give the Saudis more credibility with regional elites in their contest for influence with Iran, making potential Saudi allies in places like Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and Yemen more confident in throwing in their lot with Riyadh. And if Iran obtains a nuclear weapons capability, the Saudis would undoubtedly consider the option of proliferating themselves. If they are confident of their American security guarantee--and these big arms sales are warrants of the American commitment to their security--American advice not to obtain nuclear weapons will carry more weight. **In the end, the Saudis are going to buy weapons. If we do not sell them, Moscow, London, Paris, and Beijing will.**

## **R/T Threatens Israel**

**The US sells Saudi Arabia weapons that don't pose threats to Israel because that country has the capabilities to nullify those weapons**

**Thompson 10** Loren Thompson [Chief Operating Officer, Lexington Institute], in an article written by Andrew Chatzky, 9-24-2010, "Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea> //DF

Congress will closely scrutinize the proposed arms deal with Saudi Arabia to make sure it does not threaten Israel or otherwise destabilize the region. The package appears to be a careful reconciliation of Saudi requirements with Israeli fears, while also offering a strategic balance against Iran. The biggest component of the transaction involves new and refurbished F-15 fighters, which are designed for both air dominance and attack of ground targets. The fighter sale could have been a serious problem for Israel if Saudi Arabia had been offered stealthy F-22s or F-35s, because those aircraft would have been suitable for executing a surprise attack. The F-15 is not stealthy, and although its movements can be masked through the skillful application of tactics and electronic-warfare technology, Israeli defenders should have no difficulty detecting any threatening moves. "I see little danger to Israel in the proposed transaction. For Iran, though, the transaction presents a powerful deterrent since there is nothing in Teheran's current arsenal that can cope with the latest versions of the F-15 fighter or the AH-64 attack helicopter." The helicopters included in the package are among the most capable in the world, but they could be easily repulsed by Israeli tactical aircraft if ever dispatched against the Jewish state. Thus, I see little danger to Israel in the proposed transaction. For Iran, though, the transaction presents a powerful deterrent since there is nothing in Tehran's current arsenal that can cope with the latest versions of the F-15 fighter or the AH-64 attack helicopter. The radical Shiite regime in Iran constitutes the most serious military threat to Saudi Arabia, so I expect that the pending arms sale will be followed by additional agreements to modernize the Saudi Eastern Fleet in the Gulf and upgrade missile defenses.

## R/T Saudi Arms Buildup

**Even though the US is selling Saudi Arabia expensive weapons, they still have less now than they did in the past**

**Cordesman 10** Anthony H. Cordesman [Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies], in an article written by Andrew Chatzky, 9-24-2010, "Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?," Council on Foreign Relations,

<https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea> //DF

Fourth, the proposed arms sale[s] package creates a level of interdependence that gives both the current Saudi government as well as Saudi governments for the next fifteen to twenty years a strong incentive to work with the United States. Saudi Arabia will need continuing support from the United States during the entire lifecycle of every major system sold, and no future Saudi government can ignore this fact. Moreover, the sales are large in dollar terms, but not in terms of numbers of weapons. This will not be some kind of massive build-up. Saudi Arabia had an air force with some 417 combat aircraft in 2000, and it now has only 219. The Saudi F-15 buy will not even restore the force to 2000 numbers. It will take some three to five years to deliver and put fully in service, replace some eighty-seven obsolete F-5A/Bs and F-5E/Es that were in service in 2000, and help Saudi Arabia compensate for the serious performance limits on 107 aging Tornados still in service.

## R/T No more Saudi Arms

**Military ties with China are growing closer (WAC Austin)**

World Affairs Council Austin, October 2018, "Saudi Arabia Pivots toward China: The Rise of a New Global Order"

<https://wacaustin.org/saudi-arabia-pivots-toward-china-the-rise-of-a-new-global-order/>

Recall Chinese president, Xi's speech last year before the Arab league when he, indirectly, referred to American presence in the Middle East as diminishing and that China could be seen as the alternative. Yet, economic ventures are not the only factor that drives China-Saudi Arabia relations, security ties seem to grow even more significantly. Of interest is how Saudi Arabia's Air Force is deploying Chinese unmanned attack drones. Also, the Chinese and Saudi militaries are currently holding joint counter-terrorism exercises in western China; exercises the kingdom use to conduct mainly with the US military. In a show of growing military ties, Chinese navy vessels have also visited the Saudi port of Jeddah as part of increasingly active maneuvers in the Gulf of Aden. While China might be perceived as the new comer to the Middle East, its strategy is perfectly aligned with its long-term objectives. Its presence is felt militarily (agreements with both Iran and Saudi Arabia), economically (oil refineries contracts worth \$10 billion with Saudi Arabia) and strategically (resetting the Middle East geopolitical table in coordination with Russia and Iran).

## R/T Cease Fire

**Even if the Saudi seek to capitulate, a cease fire is unlikely because the Houthis have no incentive to give up fighting (Gordon - WSJ)**



Gordon, 2018, Wall Street Journal, "Saudi Arabia's War in Yemen has Failed"

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/11/12/saudi-arabias-war-in-yemen-has-failed/?noredirect=on&utm\\_term=.194c24854dee](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/11/12/saudi-arabias-war-in-yemen-has-failed/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.194c24854dee) (NK)

We should all hope that U.N. talks, led by the able British mediator Martin Griffiths, succeed — but we should also be realistic. **Even if the Saudis and their Emirati partners show up ready for compromise, the Iran-backed Houthis, who**

**control much of Yemen today, are sadly unlikely to reciprocate.** Having survived years of economic isolation and

relentless Saudi bombing, the Houthis know all the pressure is now on the other side. **Their Iranian backers, in turn, likely**

**assume they have nothing to gain from compromise either given the Trump administration's hostility to the Tehran regime**.

Houthi rejectionism would give the Saudis and Emiratis a pretext to resume the war, possibly including a bloody assault on the port of Hodeidah, which U.N. officials assess could considerably worsen the humanitarian situation even while failing to force the Houthis to give in. The Saudis claim they will have no choice but to escalate the war if they cannot reach an agreement at the talks, but here's a better alternative: Declare victory and go home.