We *negate*,

Resolved: The United States should end its arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

Our sole contention is Subduing the Saudis.

Since 2015, a civil war and humanitarian crisis have raged in Yemen. Unfortunately, there are two main reasons these conditions are set to endure, regardless of arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

First, the United Arab Emirates.

Byman ‘18 of the Brookings Institute writes that the United Arab Emirates is a more active player in Yemen, and would remain involved even if Saudi Arabia were to completely withdraw. Indeed, Griffing ‘18 of Haaretz finds that the UAE does the heavy lifting in Yemen with the most advanced military, as the Saudis serve a support role. As such, the brunt of the offensive will continue with or without the Saudis.

Second, economic leverage.

Walsh ‘18 of the New York Times writes that while the media has been focused on the direct military operations in the region, the Saudi-led coalition has engaged in economic warfare against Yemen, denying salaries to civil servants, printing bank notes to wreck the currency, and engaging in a **partial** blockade that has driven up food prices. The result has been a rapid economic collapse that has heightened the risk of widespread famine.

Fortunately, by maintaining our arms sales, America is able to leverage our influence to alleviate the conditions on the ground. Jerome ‘10 of the Council for Foreign Relations writes that arms sales bind Saudi Arabia to the United States, providing the unique ability to influence Saudi decision-making.

This leverage manifests in three key ways.

First, by mitigating civilian strikes.

Rogan ‘18 of the Washington Examiner writes that absent US pressure, Saudi Arabia would lose a major moral obligation to avoid civilian casualties while targeting Houthi groups. Indeed, Hartung ‘18 of the Security Assistance Monitor writes that American pressure forced the Saudis to accept $750 million dollars in training to avoid civilian casualties. Thus, Alasrar ‘18 of National Interest writes that while civilian casualties have not disappeared, American pressure has been successful in reducing the overall amount of casualties and bombings of innocent Yemenis. This is why Rogan concludes that thousands more civilian lives would be lost without US arms **sales**.

Second, creating windows for aid.

Rogan ‘18 of the Washington Examiner writes that if America stopped supporting the Saudi coalition, Saudi Arabia would have no interest in pursuing peace. He continues that the only reason Saudi Arabia stopped its deadly offensive in the Yemeni city of Hodeidah and engaged in talks was American pressure. These negotiations are rapidly reducing conflict in the region; Wintour ‘19 of the Guardian explains that despite a couple, limited violations, current peace talks have ended Saudi airstrikes and offensive operations, thus putting the country on the path to peace.

Indeed, Fassihi ‘19 of the Wall Street Journal furthers that peace talks have dramatically de-escalated violence through allowing aid to flow into Yemen, thus saving over half of Yemen’s population from the brink of starvation. Even short-term peace talks have dramatic effects as Byman ‘18 of Lawfare quantifies that many Yemenis teeter on the edge of survival, meaning short-term spikes in prices of food can be the difference between life and death for millions.

Third, by solidifying Saudi initiatives.

Miller ‘18 of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace writes that the U.S. has **leveraged** its arms sales to force Saudi Arabia to support American aid initiatives across the Middle East. For example, Young ‘18 of the Hill explicates that the U.S. coerced Saudi Arabia into ending its blockade of Hodeidah and allowing the development of humanitarian aid cranes intended to help the poor in Yemen. Overall, Carafano ‘18 of the Heritage Foundation writes that America must use its arms sales to establish the conditions for the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Yemenis.

Saudi aid has a massive impact. Beaumont ‘18 of the Guardian writes that Saudi Arabia has pledged over $1 billion in humanitarian aid alongside the UAE to alleviate conditions in Yemen. Thus, Arab News reports this month that Saudi humanitarian aid efforts are set to help an additional 13 million in the coming months.

Ultimately, Rogan ‘18 of the Washington Examiner concludes that on its own, Saudi Arabia has deep ideological, historical, and theological motivations to commit to total war in Yemen. It is restrained only by U.S. leverage.

Thus, we negate.

Byman, Daniel. "Yemen after a Saudi Withdrawal: How Much would Change?" Brookings Institute. December 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/05/yemen-after-a-saudi-withdrawal-how-much-would-change/ //RJ

Yet **even if Saudi Arabia comes to its senses or is compelled to do so, an end to the intervention would only be the beginning of what is needed. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) would still be militarily involved in the fighting against the Houthis, and it is a much more active player than Saudi Arabia on the ground in Yemen. Local actors would continue to fight: The country is highly divided, and the main factions themselves are further divided. Yemen today is a failed state, and there is no accepted political leadership to pick up the pieces**. The Houthis, Iran's ally, would be the strongest of the factions, and they are brutal and authoritarian as well as tied to Tehran. Terrorist groups like al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula would remain active, trying to establish themselves in any areas that lack a strong rival. **Perhaps most important from Riyadh's point of view, Tehran can claim a victory over its long-time rival. Although Houthi reliance on Iran would decrease as well, the alliance is likely to endure, and Iran will have influence on yet another of Saudi Arabia's borders**. Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, who championed the Yemen war, would be admitting his intervention failed. To improve both the strategic and humanitarian situation, any decrease in the Saudi military campaign must become the impetus for broader measures to end the war and decrease the suffering. Most important, Iran and the UAE should also be pressed to end their involvement. Yemen's fires won't be extinguished if outsiders no longer fuel them, but they will diminish. Hoping to seize the moment, U.N. envoy Martin Griffiths is currently trying to arrange a ceasefire and ensure the key Yemeni port of Hodeidah is open for international aid to enter the country. Griffiths is also fostering a broader dialogue, and key parties to the conflict are expressing a willingness to negotiate—a willingness that might grow if Riyadh moves to end its bombing campaign and other forms of intervention. **The United States should continue to offer Saudi Arabia assistance with its territorial defense from any Houthi missiles. In addition, the Saudis are more credibly able to hold Iran responsible for Houthi missile attacks on the Kingdom after a withdrawal if Washington is behind them, so U.S. support for deterrence is vital**. Because terrorist groups remain a concern, the United States must also continue counterterrorism operations in Yemen. All this must be supplemented by a rapid and massive humanitarian effort to move Yemenis away from the brink of starvation. An end to the Saudi intervention is a good first step to ending this suffering, but by itself it will not be enough.

Griffing, Alexander, 07-22-18, Haaretz, Why Saudi Arabia and 'Little Sparta' Still Can't Defeat Iran in Yemen, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/saudi-arabia-vs-iran-why-th..e-arab-coalition-can-t-win-the-war-in-yemen-1.6273832

Why Saudi Arabia and 'Little Sparta' Still Can't Defeat Iran in Yemen ALEXANDER GRIFFING JULY 22, 2018 In the annual U.S. News & World Report "Power Rankings" that came out last week, Saudi Arabiaand theUnited Arab Emirates were ranked the ninth and 10thmost powerful countries in the world, respectively. Yet these two military powers are currently embroiled in the fourth year of conflict in one of the world's poorest countries, Yemen, against Iran-backed rebels whom they just can't seem to defeat. The Saudi and UAE militaries are two of the best funded and equipped in the world. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Saudi Arabia even surpassed Russia in 2017 with the world's third-largest military expenditure, totalling $69.4 billion. The think tank also ranked Saudi Arabia as the second-largest importer of weapons in both 2015 and 2016, noting that such imports have increased by over 200 percent in the past six years. However, the limitations of the Saudi military are well-known. Despite its massive budget and arms purchases, it suffers from a lack of experience, a reliance on U.S. refueling and resupplying, and from a human capital issue. "They haven't fought a war since 1991," says Dr. Yoel Guzansky, a senior researcher at Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies, while on the other side the Houthi rebels have "decades of guerrilla-warfare experience and fighting on this terrain, which is difficult." The Arab coalition fighting in Yemen, led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, has been forced into a stalemate in recent weeks following an attempt to take the key port city of Hodeidah from the Iran-backed Houthis. Iran, which isfighting various proxy wars in the Middle East, has been accused by both the U.S. and Saudi intelligence agencies of arming the Houthis with weapons and rockets, which are currently aimed at Saudi Arabia's Jizan Economic City, where Saudi Aramco, answering a call from U.S. President Donald Trump to help stabilize the global oil market, is building a 400,000-barrel-per-day refinery that is expected to become fully operational in 2019. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi had promised a swift campaign in what has now become one of the fiercest battles in the devastating conflict. The coalition claims its goal is to cut off the Houthis' main supply line and force the group to the negotiating table. However, little progress has been made since the campaign was launched on June 12, as the Red Sea city is heavily defended by land and sea mines. The United Nations fears the campaign could trigger even more widespread famine, since the port is a lifeline for an impoverished state

where 8.4 million are believed to be on the verge of starvation. **Heavy lifting Guzansky notes that in Yemen it is actually the UAE, and not the Saudis, doing the heavy lifting. The Saudis are primarily providing aerial support, he says, while the UAE has actual troops on the ground** – albeit many of them mercenaries from countries like Sudan – constituting a fighting force to be reckoned with. The UAE has even "earned itself the nickname 'Little Sparta,'" in the U.S. military, says Guzansky, citing current U.S. Defense Secretaryand former U.S. Marines Gen. James Mattis as having "an admiration for what they've done – and what they can do." **The UAE**, like the Saudis, **is extremely well equipped with the most advanced weapons systems, purchased with its enormous financial resources**. The Stockholm research institute claims the UAE should be listed among the world's top 15 military spenders, but notes that the lack of publicly available data has resulted in the country's absence from its survey.Additionally, and unlike the Saudis, the UAE has gained extensive operational experience in countries such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Bosnia. Its forces are led, at least in part, by former Australian Gen. Mike Hindmarsh, who is currently commander of the UAE Presidential Guard – a military division that includes both conventional and special-ops units, which are active in Yemen. Guzansky explains the extent of the UAE's military reach, noting it is the only Arab country to have opened a military base outside of its borders with a naval and air force base in Eritrea - eyeing even more bases on the Red Sea and in Libya. However, the UAE's involvement in Yemen does have its domestic critics, which was highlighted last last weekby reports of the May defection of an Emirati prince to Qatar, who feared for his life after criticizing the war and accused the UAE of hiding the true death toll of Emirati soldiers in Yemen. Last week the UAE announced it extended compulsory military service for Emirati men from 12 to 16 months. The Saudi problem The Saudi military has a highly centralized operational structure, a feature common in many nondemocratic countries, where command and loyalty come from the top. Princes and other royals do not serve as soldiers, according to Guzansky, although "maybe they will pilot a fighter jet, something with prestige" – an inequity that does not help to boost morale among the troops. In February, Saudi King Salman, paving the way for his son Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to further consolidate power ahead of his ascension to the throne, fired all his top military commanders. The crown prince, who also serves as defense minister, has staked his reputation and rule on winning the war in Yemen and rolling back Iranian influence in the Middle East. As a result, the Saudis keep information regarding the conflict secret. Guzansky notes that Crown Prince Mohammed "is afraid of casualties, which is why in four years of war there has never been an official count from the Saudis." The ineffectiveness of the military mirrors deeper issues in Saudi society in general – particularly those involving the economy. The United States has been helping to equip and train Saudi armed forces since U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt and Saudi King Abdulaziz Al Saud struck an oil-for-security alliance in 1945. To this day, the kingdom relies heavily on the United States for refueling and maintenance of its military assets. In the 1970s, Dutch social psychologist Geert Hofstede created the Power Distance Index, which ranks how hierarchical a country is. Hofstede found that countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE are among some of the most hierarchical in the world, and as a result their flexibility in solving problems both large and small is limited, as is their ability to innovate. Israel, which is lauded for its military prowess and innovative economy, ranks second-lowest of all countries on Hofstede's Power Distance Index of 2009. However, Guzansky cautions that, despite its military advantages, adaptability on the battlefield and experience fighting an insurgency, Israel would face many of the same problems in Yemen as the Saudis and the UAE, and would not necessarily be more successful against experienced guerrilla fighters. As a result, the Arab coalition's inability to win or even to advance in Yemen has a two-pronged diagnosis: The fact that the Houthis are well-situated to repel foreign fighting forces; and the fact that the Saudi military suffers from its own systemic ineffectiveness – despite the UAE's efforts to bring its power to bear in the fight war.

Johnsen, Gregory. "Yemen's Three Wars." Lawfare. September 2018. https://www.lawfareblog.com/yemens-three-wars //RJ

As distinct as these three wars are, each has porous borders, which bleed into one another. So the United States, which is fighting AQAP and the Islamic State, is also aiding Saudi Arabia and the UAE in its war against the Houthis, who are, in turn, themselves fighting AQAP and the Islamic State. UAE proxy forces, which were established to fight AQAP and the Houthis, also periodically clash with government troops loyal to President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who asked for the UAE's military help in the first place. Salafi militias in Taizz fight the Houthis one day and government forces the next. *Yemen, which only unified in 1990, is broken and probably will be for years to come. No one peace agreement, no matter how comprehensive, will be able to end each of these three wars.* The most likely scenario—which itself will not be easy—is that a UN-sponsored deal will end the regional war, leading to the withdrawal of Saudi and UAE troops and the end of Iranian support to the Houthis, while the fighting on the ground in Yemen continues. UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths has made clear his preference that the domestic future of Yemen, including the south, be discussed as part of a future national dialogue, not as part of UN-sponsored talks. *Yemen has been down this road before, with poor results. Indeed, much of the current fighting in the country can be traced back to Yemen's last national dialogue, which ended in 2014 and left many parties frustrated, most notably the Houthis. Within months of the dialogue's conclusion, the Houthis moved out of Sadah, initiating the coup and subsequent civil war. The problem that prevented a conclusive agreement then is the same problem that prevents one today: There are too many armed groups in the country, none of which is strong enough to impose its will upon the entire country but all of which can act as spoilers anytime they don't like a*

particular decision. Add a couple of terrorist groups to the mix and you have a recipe for the sort of disaster that can destroy multiple generations and unravel a nation.

Walsh, Declan. "The Tragedy of Saudi Arabia's War." The New York Times. Oct. 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/26/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-war-yemen.html

But **those efforts have been overshadowed by the coalition's attacks on Yemen's economy, including the denial of salaries to civil servants, a partial blockade that has driven up food prices, and the printing of vast amounts of bank notes, which caused the currency to plunge.** Under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, **the Saudi-led coalition and its Yemeni allies have imposed a raft of punitive economic measures aimed at undercutting the Houthi rebels who control northern Yemen. But these actions — including periodic blockades, stringent import restrictions and withholding the salaries of about 1 million civil servants — have landed on the backs of civilians, laying the economy to waste and driving millions deeper into poverty. Those measures have inflicted a slow-burn toll: infrastructure destroyed, jobs lost, a weakening currency and soaring prices.** But in recent weeks the economic collapse has gathered pace at alarming speed, causing top U.N. officials to revise their predictions of famine.

Miles & Blankenship 1/22/16 (Brian, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University studying international relations, Renanah, Ph.D. student in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University studying international relations. Prior to graduate school, she was a program analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense., "The Risks of U.S. Allies Going Rogue", http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-risks-us-allies-going-rogue-14985?page=show)

Recent events in the Persian Gulf suggest that U.S. partners are increasingly willing to act on their own. Saudi Arabia has initiated steps toward an anti–Islamic State coalition, launched military operations against Shiite Houthi rebels in Yemen *and sharply escalated tensions with Iran* after the Saudi execution of Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr and Iranian protestors' subsequent ransacking of the Saudi embassy in Tehran.

Domestic pressures undoubtedly play a role in encouraging risky foreign policies and brinkmanship. But this is only a partial explanation; *deciding to escalate or go it alone* also depends on a *state's allies and their expected behavior*. Much hay has been made out of how Gulf state actions *result from U.S. strategy* (or the lack thereof) *in the region*. This assertiveness could be a response to U.S. pressure for burden sharing, or to perceived U.S. disengagement. The problem is that both go hand-in-hand and cannot be assessed separately.

For example, these moves could be interpreted as the result of U.S. pressure on its partners to take on a more active role and to carry more of the costs. The United States has long been dissatisfied with the effort put forward by its regional partners, particularly in the fight against the Islamic State. On the other hand, these moves could be a response to perceived U.S. unreliability. The American withdrawal from Iraq and concurrent "pivot to Asia," as well as the nuclear deal and feared rapprochement with Iran, has led observers to conclude that Washington's commitment to the region has diminished.

Most analysis explains current events as the result of one or the other—U.S. pressure or (fears of) U.S. disengagement. In reality, these incentives are hard to separate. Moreover, allied self-help may relieve the American burden, but it can also *undermine U.S. interests*. This is because self-reliance both encourages and enables allies to pursue a more independent course. It encourages allies to do so *by decreasing the benefits of falling in line*, as protection is America's quid pro quo; *it enables them to do so by empowering them and reducing their dependence*.

Disengagement and burden sharing, then, should not be seen as policy alternatives, but instead as *inextricably linked*. On the one hand, these developments may signal partners' willingness and ability to deal with regional security issues, allowing Washington to turn its attention elsewhere. This offers a reprieve at a time marked by resource constraints, ongoing commitments in Afghanistan and the pivot to Asia. It may also serve to reduce tensions in an area where a large force presence is likely to do more harm than good, fueling conflict or terrorism directed at U.S. interests.

On the other hand, the more equitable the burden sharing, *the less Washington gets to dictate the terms of the partnership*. Indeed, Saudi Arabia's increasingly assertive posture has already resulted in behavior that arguably *runs counter to U.S. preferences*. Saudi Arabia has prioritized quashing Shiite Houthi rebels in Yemen over fighting the Islamic State and is openly ambivalent about the nuclear deal with Iran. Behavior that inflames tensions promises to deepen regional conflicts, not resolve them.

Thus, Washington *faces trade-offs when it comes to choosing where to step back and let others step forward*. Less dependence on Washington is in many ways exactly the point, but it comes at a cost. This partly explains—then and now—U.S. ambivalence on allied burden sharing.

Have We Seen this Before?

Some Middle East analysts have already observed that these events in the region are not without precedent. During the Cold War, the United States wanted to minimize Soviet influence in the Middle East, and leaned heavily on local partners to do so rather than relying on an onshore presence. Yet it repeatedly failed to intervene to save friendly regimes. However, an even better comparison to modern Middle Eastern dynamics may be found in East Asia during the 1970s.

The costs of the Vietnam War and domestic pressure for retrenchment led to the U.S. "Guam Doctrine," which called for allies to shoulder more of the regional defense burden. In response, U.S. partners began to seriously doubt whether the United States would continue to protect the region. Hanoi's impending takeover of South Vietnam, the withdrawal of tens of thousands of American troops from allied soil and the U.S. opening with China only exacerbated these fears.

The result was increased allied self-help. The non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia joined together to create the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) in large part to fill the perceived void created by U.S. disengagement. South Korea and Japan boosted their defense efforts and managed to (partially) set aside their historical antagonism to cooperate in the face of perceived American unreliability and fears about China, North Korea and the Soviet Union.

In a sense, the United States got what it wanted: partial disengagement coupled with increased burden sharing. Yet it came at a price. Allies found fewer reasons to accommodate U.S. preferences—South Korea and Taiwan both explored nuclear weapon options during the 1970s, while U.S. policymakers grew concerned that pressure to burden share would encourage Japanese remilitarization.

This movement generated a ripple effect, with the ASEAN states and even Australia pursuing a more independent foreign policy that included friendlier relations with the Communist bloc, open criticism of U.S. conduct in Vietnam, and exclusion of the United States from new regional groupings. Nor was this fear limited to East Asia; the same period saw European allies hedging their bets against U.S. retrenchment by pursuing unilateral détente with the Communist world.

Trade-Offs and Tough Choices

Shifting alliance dynamics in East Asia, then, offer several insights for policymakers weighing options in the Middle East now. In some ways, the trade-offs are less severe in the Middle East. Unlike Asia, the United States doesn't face the prospect of a near-peer competitor emerging as a result of regional power balancing. Moreover, none of the U.S. or its allies' potential adversaries—Iran, Syria and the Islamic State—poses the same threat that the Soviet Union did.

However, no U.S. partners in the Middle East (aside from Turkey) enjoy a formal security guarantee, as its allies in East Asia did, and thus fears about American reliability *are likely to be exacerbated*. In particular, the pressure to go it alone may *result in* three *major risks.*

First, U.S. partners may try to *manage alone and fail.* Due to its size and position as a distant extra-regional actor, the *U*nited *S*tates is uniquely suited to playing the role of de facto regional leader. Without it, regional actors are likely to encounter *collective action problems* that impede their ability to *cooperate towards a common defense*—not to mention the historical *conflicts* of interest and *sectarian divides* that are likely to impede deep cooperation.

Second, states may turn to other extra-regional sponsors. Russia's resurgent role in the Middle East is not limited to its military presence in Syria. Recent nuclear energy agreements suggest that allies may not be averse to reaching out to Russia for support if U.S. reliability (or malleability) is in doubt. Indeed, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir recently argued in favor of deepening economic ties with Russia, and there have been other signs of interest in increased economic and military ties by Saudi Arabia and other Arab states.

Third, *they may turn to their own devices*. U.S. partners in the Middle East may be considering their options for *obtaining nuclear weapons*. In 2015, Russia signed nuclear deals with three traditional U.S. allies in the region: *Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.* All three countries see nuclear energy as a means of satisfying their growing energy needs, but Russian assistance carries fewer restrictions than that of the *U*nited *S*tates. Despite a U.S. offer of assistance, Jordan balked at signing a so-called "123 agreement" that would have precluded it from enriching uranium, instead turning to Russia for help with its nuclear infrastructure.

There has yet to be any clear evidence of desire for nuclear weapons from the Arab Gulf states, and the United States would still have tools at its disposal for halting proliferation—including arms embargoes—if they did seek a bomb. However, *if backed into a corner*, allies could at the very least see the threat of *nuclearization as a bargaining chip* to extract security assurances.

Moreover, U.S. partners can "go it alone" in other ways; for example, *diminished willingness to cooperate on oil exports and counterterrorism*. The United States heavily relies on Gulf cooperation to ensure the consistent flow of oil, and as the 1973 OPEC embargo showed, this cooperation is not a guarantee. And counterterrorism is already an area where interests don't fully align. The Saudis have been

more concerned with containing Iran than with combating the Islamic State; *less U.S. engagement* won't reverse this trend, and *may exacerbate it.*
These risks are real, *but not inevitable*. The American position is in many ways *stronger now* than it was during the Cold War, with multiple levers to influence erstwhile partners and deter would-be adversaries. As such, this analysis neither advocates a more robust U.S. presence in the Middle East nor continued disengagement. Rather, it underscores that allied self-reliance doesn't help the United States achieve more for less; instead, Washington may have to accept increased risk and less accommodation from its allies.

Jerome, Deborah, "Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?" Council on Foreign Relations, 1 Jan. 2010, https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea.

Fourth, the proposed arms saler package creates a level of interdependence that gives both the current Saudi government as well as Saudi governments for the next fifteen to twenty years a strong incentive to work with the United States. Saudi Arabia will need continuing support from the United States during the entire lifecycle of every major system sold, and no future Saudi government can ignore this fact. Moreover, the sales are large in dollar terms, but not in terms of numbers of weapons. This will not be some kind of massive build-up. Saudi Arabia had an air force with some 417 combat aircraft in 2000, and it now has only 219. *The Saudi F-15 buy will not even restore the force to 2000 numbers*. It will take some three to five years to deliver and put fully in service, replace some eighty-seven obsolete F-5A/Bs and F-5EIIs that were in service in 2000, and help Saudi Arabia compensate for the serious performance limits on 107 aging Tornados still in service.

Rogan, Tom. "Ending US Support for Saudi Arabia would make things much worse in Yemen." Washington Examiner. November 2018. https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/ending-us-support-for-saudi-arabia-would-make-things-much-worse-in-yemen //RJ
But the problem is that the senators are wrong. *If the U.S. pulls its functional support for the Saudi alliance,* two negative consequences will immediately follow. First, *the Saudis will lose all the inhibitions about accurate targeting of Houthi formations that American intervention has forced.* Second, *Riyadh will lose interest in energetic efforts by Washington to reach a durable cease fire.* Both of those developments will be disastrous for Yemeni civilians. For a start, *the only reason the Saudis are now moving toward a cease fire is the Trump administration's pressure*. Trump has earned Saudi trust and their corresponding deference on issues negatively affecting America: in this case, the human suffering of the Yemeni civil war. The Saudis have not suddenly woken up and realized that the war is causing too much suffering without adequate prospect of strategic gain. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin *Salman sees Yemen as a defining battleground in an existential fight against Iran. With Iran repeatedly firing ballistic missiles at Riyadh and helping assassinate erstwhile Saudi allies, it is ludicrous to think the prince would cease his war effort absent the present mix of major U.S. pressure and resolute U.S. support.* And if you want to understand how a U.S. withdrawal of military support would affect the Saudi war effort, look no further than President Bashar Assad's Syria. The Saudi coalition has far more advanced weapons platforms than the Syrians, but it lacks the integrated command and control, intelligence, targeting, communications, and logistical skill to employ its military effectively. The U.S. has been absolutely critical in filling in the gaps in these areas. *And although the Saudis are still too capricious with their use of force, American guidance has helped them target Houthi formations rather than entire city blocks with a few Houthis somewhere inside those blocks. Again, motivated by their historic, cultural, and theological blood feud with Iran, the Saudis would care little about killing*

thousands more civilians if they believed it might win the war. America is the only check on them at this moment. And, as demonstrated by the Saudi suspension of operations around the port of Hodeidah, that check has held.

Alasrar 7/25/18 (Fatima Alasrar is the Senior Yemen Analyst at The Arabia Foundation. "Yemen Is Bad but It Would Be Worse Without U.S. Involvement" https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/yemen-bad-it-would-be-worse-without-us-involvement-26801?page=0%2C1)

During this week's visit to the United Arab Emirates, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told his hosts than a new nuclear deal with Iran ought to be of "permanent" duration and address the Islamic Republic's "malign activity" in neighboring states.

Over the past few weeks, several leading congressmen have pushed for an end to U.S. intervention in Yemen, *the continuation of which is cited by lawmakers as a clear example of executive overreach*. For instance, U.S. congressman Ro Khanna argued in a recent op-ed that America has no business backing a "Saudi-led conflict" that is "deliberately starving millions." He later tweeted , "Supporting war crimes against civilians [in Yemen] doesn't make us safer, it simply turns potential allies into enemies." Similarly, Senator Chris Murphy tweeted that Yemen is "the world's worst humanitarian disaster caused largely by a U.S. funded nonsensical bombing campaign."

Congress may have a point to make when it comes to defining and limiting the war-making powers of the executive branch. However, roping Yemen into this just debate obfuscates the origins of the Yemen war, the nature of the country's humanitarian crisis, *and the clear links between this conflict and U.S. credibility and interests.*

For example, congressional narratives depict the Saudi-led coalition as the instigators of the Yemen conflict. In fact, the war in Yemen did not begin with Saudi Arabia's March 2015 military intervention in the country but with the Houthi militias' violent overthrow of Yemen's internationally recognized government, which happened in September 2014. Following their takeover of Yemen's capital, Sana'a, the Houthis, backed by Iran, imposed a fundamentalist, sectarian, brutal, and repressive regime that dashed any hope for political pluralism and democratic governance in the wake of Yemen's Arab Spring. The government-in-exile then requested external military intervention, and the Saudi-led coalition responded. That Saudis also got involved because they feared that Iranian military and financial support for the Houthis would create a new and deadly proxy force for Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps within the Arabian Peninsula.

There is no question that Yemen is confronting a humanitarian crisis that has been exacerbated by the entry of the Saudi-led coalition into the war. However, much of this crisis has been manufactured by the Houthis themselves. The Houthi government's total neglect of sanitation services, and its failure to maintain and repair sewer and water infrastructure, has contributed to the deepening of the cholera epidemic. Additionally, the Houthi have confiscated food, medicine, and critical life-saving medical equipment to give to militia members or to sell on the black market at wildly inflated prices. Also, they have widely used landmines and the forced recruitment of child soldiers, many of whom are under fifteen years of age, all of which further compounds Yemen's humanitarian crisis. In contrast, areas that the Saudi-led coalition have restored to Yemeni government control do not suffer the same disastrous conditions that civilians in Houthi-controlled regions are experiencing.

Furthermore, *vital U.S. interests are at stake*. The Houthis have repeatedly threatened to disrupt *international shipping*. Earlier this year, they made good on this promise by firing on a Saudi oil tanker and a Turkish freighter carrying wheat. The Houthi militias are a sworn enemy of the United States and a *tool for expanding Tehran's destabilizing influence throughout the Middle East*. The Iranians have supplied ballistic missiles to the Houthis that have been launched against America's Saudi, Emirati, and Yemeni allies. *For the United States to withdraw its support now would be tantamount to conceding Yemen to Iran, which would deal a serious blow to Washington's regional credibility.*

The war against Iran and the Houthis is also linked with the United States' war on terror, which is supported by Congress, specifically the fight against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), an organization that is based in Yemen and is widely considered to be the most dangerous of al-Qaeda's remaining regional affiliates. For example, the Saudi-led coalition helped to build the elite anti-Houthi Southern Security Belt forces. These United Arab Emirates–trained Yemeni units have, alongside Emirati special forces, fought AQAP. Last year, they pushed them out of the Shabwah Governorate, where, six years ago, a U.S. drone successfully targeted one of the al-Qaeda terrorists responsible for the 2000 attack on the USS Cole.

In addition, *the U.S. military plays a critical role in safeguarding Yemeni civilians by identifying nonmilitary and civilian facilities for the coalition so that these are not accidentally targeted by air strikes*. This intelligence support has not prevented civilian casualties altogether, but it has almost certainly reduced their number. Also, American-produced Patriot missile defense systems have allowed the coalition to intercept dozens of Houthi ballistic missiles fired against Saudi, Emirati, and Yemeni civilian population centers. American involvement also *bolsters ties between the U.S. military and the militaries of its Arab allies and these*

relationships are a key tool of U.S. power and influence if America is to remain globally relevant.

America should continue to support United Nations Special Envoy Martin Griffiths' in his attempt to broker a lasting political resolution. But the Houthis will have little incentive to negotiate in good faith absent continuing military pressure. *Withdrawing U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and for Yemen's internationally recognized government will ease this pressure without doing anything to end Yemen's war*. It also will not help—and may even exacerbate—the country's humanitarian crisis while *dealing a blow to America's regional prestige and its short and long-term strategic interests. Lawmakers would do well to consider these costs as they seek to reclaim war-making powers from the executive branch.*

Hartung, William, SENIOR ADVISOR, SECURITY ASSISTANCE MONITOR, 04-18, Trend Report, Trends in Major US arms sales in 2017, A Comparison of the Obama and Trump Administrations

In approving the sale of Paveway missiles, the Trump Administration reversed an Obama Administration decision to suspend the sale of these types of munitions to Saudi Arabia without a clear reduction in Saudi Arabia's airstrikes on the civilian population.8 President Obama held these weapons out of concern for Riyadh's indiscriminate use of U.S. weaponry to bomb civilian targetsin Yemen. These bombings and a related blockade on goods entering Yemen has reportedly put millions of Yemenis at risk of famine and spawned the worst cholera outbreak in recent memory.9**The Trump Administration did require Saudi Arabia to buy $750 million worth of U.S. training tohelp itigate civilian casualties in Yemen. President Trump also successfully pushed Saudi Arabia to lift the blockade for 30 days to allow U.S. supplied cranes to be installed at a key port of entrypoint in Yemen.**During the last year of the Obama Administration, Qatar was the largest recipient of U.S. armssales notifications, receiving a combined total of $22.2 billion. However, the Trump Administration made arms sales offers to Qatar for only $1.1 billion, including notifications for F-15QA fighter jet construction and for firearms. The drastic change in the total dollar amount between 2016 and 2017 is largely because of one major deal in 2016: a notification for F-15QA fighter jets and relatedweapons support totaling $21.1 billion. The Obama Administration also proposed seven other majorarms sales deals with Qatar compared to the two offers the Trump Administration sent to Congress.These Obama Administration deals included Javelin guided missiles, fast patrol boats, C-17 military transport, RIM-116C and RIM-116C-2 Rolling Airframe Missiles, and logistics support.

Wintour, Patrick, The Guardian, 1-30-19, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/30/yemen-ceasefire-is-holding-says-un-envoyYemen ceasefire looks dire but is holding, says UN envoy
Yemen's fragile ceasefire is holding and Saudi Arabia remains intent on reaching a negotiated end to the four-year-old civil war, Martin Griffiths, the UN special envoy for the country, has said. *Admitting the state of the ceasefire looked dire from the outside, he nevertheless said the key metric for the UN was the absence of offensive military operations to take territory and the end of Saudi airstrikes in the area.* Griffiths has been in Yemen's capital, Sana'a, and the Red Sea port of Hodeidah this week to discuss blockages to agreements reached in UN-led talks in Stockholm in December. Yemen has been gripped by civil war between Iranian-backed Houthi rebels and the Saudi-backed – and UN-recognised – Yemen government of Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi since 2015. Griffiths said the vital next steps were gaining access to grain in Hodeidah's mills, and a UN-sponsored meeting between the warring factions to start the process of redeploying Houthi troops. Speaking on BBC Radio 4, he said the UN world food programme needed access to the mills in which enough grain to feed nearly 4 million Yemenis for a month had remained since October. Houthis claimed on Wednesday they were fired on by government forces as they tried to de-mine the route to the mills. Griffiths also said he had plans for the UN-led redeployment co-ordination committee (RCC), bringing together the rival military leaderships, to restart its

meetings within the next few days. The Houthis recently refused to attend the RCCmeeting as it was due to be held in Yemen government-held territory. Griffiths refused to disclose the proposed venue or agenda for the next critical meeting but said: "It is the redeployments out of the port and out of the city which are the essential aim of the Stockholm agreement – to demilitarise the entire port and city area. If we don't, the ceasefire will inevitably fray and disappear." The Houthi forces are reluctant to withdraw from the city and port, and allow a new security force to take over. The nature of that security force is disputed and was not spelled out in the Stockholm agreement. Griffiths said: "The Saudis are incredibly helpful in trying to make these things work." He added: "*At the political level we have the will – making this happen operationally on the ground – the first time ever these two sides have promised to disengage* – is complicated and one bullet can change somebody's life. It is tricky, *it's not perfect but we have to move forward*." Some limited prisoner exchanges have started.

Fassihi '19 – cease-fire has significantly lessened fighting in Yemen; absent cease-fire, food to half of Yemen's population could have been interrupted

Fassihi, Farnaz. "U.N. Security Council Votes to Send Monitors to Yemen." Wall Street Journal. Jan. 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-n-security-council-votes-to-send-monitors-to-yemen-11547687794 //RJ

The deployment in the Red Sea port city, where the majority of Yemen's humanitarian aid enters, had been requested by U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres. *While violations have been reported, U.N. officials say the cease-fire has significantly lessened fighting in Yemen, where a Saudi-led coalition has engaged in a bombing campaign that has drawn wide condemnation. Had fighting continued, food to half of Yemen's population on the brink of famine could have been interrupted.* The Security Council, which approves U.N. monitoring missions in conflict areas, has put its weight behind the cease-fire agreement in two resolutions. The U.K. ambassador to the U.N., Karen Pierce, told reporters on Wednesday that Yemen would be an important issue for 2019, "but hopefully with the deployment of the substantive mission, we can start to make progress on the ground." U.N. Special Envoy Martin Griffiths told the Council in a briefing last week that the two sides aren't yet ready for the next round of talks. As a measure of good faith, a prisoner exchange is also part of the Stockholm agreement.

Miller '18, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/12/u.s.-saudi-relationship-is-out-of-control-pub-77484
In May 2017, the Saudis promised to buy $110 billion worth of additional U.S.military weapons and equipment. Trump has cited those arms sales as a reason not to pressure the Saudis over Khashoggi's disappearance. **But there's a lot less here than meets the eye. The Saudis have also opened their checkbook to support U.S. aid initiatives in the Middle East. In response to American prodding,** they have offered $100 million in reconstruction assistance to Syria. This is a welcome step, but they could be doing much more, as, for example, they've been doing in Iraq.

Young, Todd, 01-08-19, The Hill, Sen. Young: Progress in Yemen requires American leadership, https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/424266-sen-young-progress-in-yemen-requires-american-leadership

Sen. Young: Progress in Yemen requires American leadership JANUARY 08, 2019 Yemen's civil war is an unmitigated humanitarian and national security disaster. Almost 16 million men, women, and children are now on the verge of starvation. That's almost two and a half times the population of Indiana. In addition to this horrible human suffering, Iran and terrorist groups like al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have exploited the war and humanitarian crisis to further expand their influence and threaten the United States, our partners, and our interests. As retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General John Castellaw testified before my subcommittee in March, "food crises … grow terrorists." Some have suggested that

we should not criticize Saudi Arabia because Riyadh is standing up to Iran. Iran is the world's worst state sponsor of terrorism, and I will take a back seat to no one as an Iran hawk. I have studied the situation in Yemen as closely as anyone on Capitol Hill, and the best way to oppose Iran in Yemen and stop ballistic missile attacks on our partners is to bring all parties to the negotiating table, end the civil war, and address the humanitarian crisis. Famine and the indiscriminate targeting of civilians will only push more Yemenis toward Iran and its proxies. Those who question this should ask themselves whether Iran has gained or lost influence in Yemen since the civil war started. Solely from an anti-Iran perspective, an objective assessment of those questions demonstrates the need to end the civil war and pursue an inclusive political solution that seeks to reduce Tehran's influence in Yemen. If you are still not persuaded, consider that the Trump administration's nominee to serve as ambassador to Yemen testified in December that the civil war has exacerbated the world's largest food security emergency, created power vacuums that terrorists have exploited, facilitated Iran's ambitions, and complicated our counterterrorism efforts. That's why the agreement reached in Sweden between the warring parties in Yemen's civil war represents such a significant and positive step. This agreement almost certainly would not have been reached if it weren't for the pressure applied by the international community led by the United States. More importantly, compliance with the agreement and additional steps toward durable peace will require continued scrutiny. Even a cursory review of events over the last year and a half demonstrates why continued **U.S. pressure is necessary—including from Congress**. For too long, **Saudi Arabia demonstrated that it would not lift humanitarian impediments or come to the negotiating table in good faith absent strong and sustained U.S. diplomatic pressure**. Consider three examples. **When the Saudi-led coalition deliberately bombed cranes at Yemen's most important humanitarian port, the U.S. government purchased replacement cranesto enable the quicker delivery of food and medicine. When the World Food Programme tried to deliver the four U.S.-funded cranes to offload humanitarian supplies to replace the capacity destroyed by the Saudi-led coalition, the Saudis would not permit the replacement cranes to be delivered—literally forcing the vessel carrying the cranes to turn around. Riyadh** stubbornly refused to permit the delivery of the cranesfor more than a year and **only relented after a comprehensive pressure campaign.** In response to unacceptable ballistic missile attacks, Riyadh closed Yemen's Red Sea ports and imposed a starvation blockade—depriving millions of civilians of desperately needed food. Saudi Arabia's actions constituted a clear violation of international humanitarian law and U.S. law. In short, Riyadh was using food as a weapon of war. **Riyadh eventually relented and finally opened the Red Sea ports—lifting its full starvation blockade only after intense pressure from Congress and the White House.** More recently, **only after heightened Congressional pressure related to Yemen and the horrific murder of Jamal Khashoggi, has Riyadh been willing to engage in the good faith diplomatic negotiations.** These examples demonstrate that U.S. diplomatic pressure is both necessary and effective. In early February, pursuant to the legislation I drafted and the president signed into law, Secretary of State Mike Pompeowill have another opportunity to provide Congress a Section 1290 submission related to Saudi Arabia's efforts to end the civil war, alleviate the humanitarian crisis, and protect civilians. I look forward to reviewing that submission. I have focused on the Saudis not because Riyadh is solely to blame for the situation in Yemen but because the U.S. has a strategic relationship with Riyadh that we do not have with their adversaries. In addition, the American people have a right to expect that their tax dollars not be used for munitions, fuel, and information that facilitates the repeated and indiscriminate bombing of civilians. The American people are right to expect their government to speak up when our partners use food as a weapon of war. While the situation in Yemen is daunting, the good news is that the United States is not helpless in the face of this man-made crisis. **If Congress and the**

administration will utilize all available leverage, we can effectively encourage Riyadh to eliminate humanitarian obstacles, negotiate in good faith, and support a sustainable political solution. That is what I have tried to do since March 2017, and that is what I intend to keep doing. Our national security interests and our humanitarian principles demand nothing less.

Hartung, William, SENIOR ADVISOR, SECURITY ASSISTANCE MONITOR, 04-18, Trend Report, Trends in Major US arms sales in 2017, A Comparison of the Obama and Trump Administrations

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Byman, Daniel. "The U.S. 'Yellow Light' in Yemen." Lawfare. Aug. 2018. https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-yellow-light-yemen //RJ

The Hodeidah operation is likely to push Yemen's humanitarian situation from nightmarish to something worse, both because of the fighting and the slow (or nonexistent) pace of post-conflict reconstruction. *Millions of Yemenis teeter on the edge of survival, and even temporary disruptions in food supplies would push them over. The Houthis, who are known for torturing political opponents and are often indifferent to the widespread misery of ordinary citizens, have an incentive to play up the suffering to pressure their enemies*. The UAE promised to address the humanitarian crisis that its military operation exacerbates, and that would be progress. International actors should press the UAE and Saudi Arabia to make good on that offer.

Carafano 18—James Jay Carafano, Vice President, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute, Heritage Foundation ("Chaos Will Erupt in the Middle East If U.S. Leaves Yemen," *Heritage Foundation*, March 7th, https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/chaos-will-erupt-the-middle-east-if-us-leaves-yemen)

For some Americans, that's too much. On Feb. 28, Sens. Mike Lee, R-Utah; Bernie Sanders, I-Vt.; and Chris Murphy, D-Conn., introduced a *joint resolution invoking the War Powers Act*. The goal: to yank all U.S. military support from the conflict.

Legal *scholars debate the constitutionality* of the War Powers Act. Still, even if the Hill could tell the president to pull out of Yemen, it should not. If America walks away, it will only *bring* more *war*, not peace.

America is there for a reason: *to keep the region from falling apart*. The collapse of any friendly regime there is bad for us.

The greatest threats to *Middle East stability* and security are *Iran and* transnational *Islamist terrorists groups*, principally ISIS and al-Qaida. And it is precisely these forces that are fueling the Yemen war.

If Congress forces the administration to abandon our allies, *Tehran, ISIS, and al-Qaida* would feel *emboldened* and likely *double-down* on *expanding* the *war*.

Meanwhile, Washington would lose its ability to *influence* how Saudi Arabia and the UAE conduct coalition operations. Without our mitigating presence, *the carnage of this vicious war would only increase*.

And *Russia* would be tempted to further complicate the situation. Moscow has already vetoed a draft U.N. Security Council resolution to hold Iran accountable for providing Yemen's rebels with the long-range missiles recently fired at the Saudi capital.

Putin would interpret an American withdrawal as a *green light for additional Russian meddling* – the type that Moscow has brought to the Syrian civil war.

Instead of turning our back on Yemen, the U.S. should focus on ending the war. The longer the conflict persists, the more the chaos benefits terrorist groups in the region and the more the main rebel group, the Houthis, becomes dependent on Iran.

There are no easy answers. Just ask American Enterprise Institute analyst Katherine Zimmerman, who follows the issue as closely as anyone. Her assessment: "The (Saudi-led) coalition's efforts to end the war militarily have been unsuccessful and will likely continue to fail...."

There is no clear military solution. There is no clear political resolution either. Yemen's political landscape remains hopelessly fractured. Any settlement talks that exclude key stakeholders are likely to go nowhere.

A new U.N. envoy, Martin Griffiths, is expected to try to launch another round of negotiations. But for now, at least, too many key actors seem unwilling to engage in serious peace talks.

Rather than pull out, the U.S. should continue to *use its presence and influence* to establish the conditions that will allow for the delivery of humanitarian aid and the start of real peace negotiations that put the people of Yemen first.

U.S. military activities contribute to both those goals, particularly *by supporting counterterrorism* operations *against ISIS and a-Qaida*.

In addition to continuing that support, the U.S. should work to diminish Iranian meddling – not just by disrupting its aid to the Houthis, but by broadly attacking Tehran's foreign escapades throughout the region.

Pressing the regime overall will strain its capacity to support the rebels in Yemen – and that may lead to all sides in the conflict coming *to the peace table* sooner rather than later.

If Congress wants to see an end to the humanitarian suffering in Yemen, then writing off the current U.S. role there ought to be the last thing lawmakers think about.
The U.S. cannot be a bystander. In fact, it may be the only actor with sufficient influence to drive the other players toward a peaceful political settlement in Yemen.

Beaumont '18, The Guardian
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/apr/03/saudi-arabia-united-arab-emirates-pledge-nearly-1bn-aid-yemen-un-conference
A UN donor conference for people affected by war in Yemen – which has been labelled as the "world's worst humanitarian crisis" – has **received pledges of more than $2bn (£1.4bn), close to half of which is promised by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, two key protagonists in the conflict.** Despite falling well short of the almost $3bn being called for by the meeting in Geneva, the UN secretary general, António Guterres, hailed the donor conference a "remarkable success".

Arab News, February 4, 2019
http://www.arabnews.com/node/1447141/saudi-arabia
King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center (KSRelief) has distributed 48 tons and 100 kg of food baskets in directorates in Al-Jawf governorate in Yemen, benefiting 3,900 people.
As many as 2,501,897 Yemenis benefited from medical services provided by the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center (KSRelief) in 2018, the Saudi Press Agency reported.
Last year, kidney centers in Hadramout received some 56 tons of medical supplies from KSRelief.
The center provides health services to all Yemeni people in coordination with the Yemeni authorities and local and international partners.

Arab News, January 9, 2019
http://www.arabnews.com/node/1433106/saudi-arabia
JEDDAH: Dr. Abdullah Al-Rabeeah, supervisor general of King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center, on Wednesday signed six agreements with a number of civil society organizations to boost humanitarian assistance to Yemen. Members of the coalition supporting the legitimate government in Yemen against the Iranian-backed Houthi militias have so far donated $18 billion in aid to help Yemen over three years. **The coalition is making efforts in coordination with different UN agencies to provide relief to the Yemenis.In response to UN reports about worsening food security in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the UAE pledged $500 million that will help around 13 million Yemenis in the coming months.**The center is also actively involved in the rehabilitation of children affected by the war. The program aims to help the children return to their normal lives, through teaching them and practicing different sports, as well as field trips.