We negate.

The Belt and Road Initiative is on the verge of collapse. **Meyer of Penn explains in 2019** that Chinese funding for the BRI has dropped by 89% since 2015.

However, according to **Curtin of the European Institute**, bringing the EU onto the BRI would help fund the trillions of dollars needed to sustain the program.

Furthermore, Smith '19 finds that the international perception of the BRI has declined due to a lack of transparency in the projects.

For instance, Smith furthers that after western leaders started voicing their concerns, developing countries pulled out of deals.

Europe joining would change this. European Institute for Asian Studies '17 explains that the EU's close cooperation with China on the BRI can help standardize rules and regulations, thus increasing transparency and free trade.

Overall, Landry in '18 of Foreign Policy writes that Chinese investors under BRI don't understand the markets they are investing in, and as a result of the experience gap results in risky investments that Western firms uniquely have experience investing in, meaning that with the EU integrated, investments would be more successful and thus would encourage more investment into BRI.

With that, **our sole contention is the environment.**

The UN Environment in 2017 finds that over half of the new renewable energy in 2016 came from the developing world, concluding that these countries are implementing more Renewable and Electric Policies than ever.

Unfortunately, the EU joining the BRI would leave the environment out to dry, in three ways.

1. **The first is the arctic.**

Anna of Bellona in 2019 writes that 80% of the Arctic Shelf resources belong to Russia.

At the same time, **Yang of the International Journal of Science in 2019** writes that China's BRI has interest in funding Russia's infrastructure expansion and energy exploitation in the Arctic.

These investments are the only way Russia can drill in the Arctic. **The Washington Post in 2018** writes that China is the only realistic source of financing for Arctic Russian projects, and has helped finance projects in the Arctic before.

The EU signing on will lead to a renewed supply of capital, allowing Russia to expand into the Arctic.

The impact is worsening Climate Change.

Yang writes that extraction and use of raw materials in the Arctic through the BRI will only further exacerbate carbon emissions, worsening the climate crisis.

Wadhams of Yale in 2016 furthers that warming in the Arctic is equivalent to a 25 percent boost in global CO2 emissions, and could add as much as 50 percent to the global heating effect.

2. **The Second is by Locking in Fossil Fuels.**

In the status quo developing nations around the world are faced with serious energy problems,

Seeing the large demand, the **Motts Institute in 2016** furthers that China has leapfrogged the world of development finance with large sums of money for projects.

Unfortunately this investment is extremely harmful to the environment.

Zhou of the World Institute quantifies that over 80% of Chinese energy investment into the BRI has been in dirty fossil fuels.

For example, **Hilton of Yale in 2019** finds that the BRI initiative has invested in over 240 coal plants with low efficiency and sub-optimal technology.

Problematically, every additional fossil-fuel project raises the political and economic cost of switching to alternative sources of energy.

Inskeep of NPR in 2019 finds that every investment into fossil fuels such as coal have huge upfront costs which is why they're long term investments that last 40-50 years.

That's why the **The Coal Centre** writes that countries who take Chinese financing are creating long term dependency on volatile fossil fuels, just as renewables are becoming a cheaper source of energy, potentially endangering the switch to green energy that is currently happening.

This long term shift to coal technology is incredibly harmful.

Hilton furthers that just the current Chinese financed, coal fired power plants would release nearly 600 million tonnes of carbon dioxide a year.

3. The Third is by promoting general infrastructure.

Hilton '19 of Yale finds that the BRI will absorb massive amounts of concrete, steel, and chemicals, creating new power stations, mines, roads, railways, airports, and container ports.

The BRN News '19 finds that new infrastructure will be a major contributor to global emissions over the coming decades. Problematically, BRI nations will make up 60% of global infrastructure over the coming years, making them the single largest source of growing carbon emissions over this critical period.

The BRN concludes that BRI countries will account for 50% of global emissions by 2050, up from just 15% in 2015.

I: The impact of rising emissions in all three links is Climate Change.

As emissions rise, life becomes unsustainable on Earth. **The National Research Council** quantifies that a one degree celsius increase will reduce crop yields by 15%, compromising the lives of the 2.5 billion people worldwide that are dependent on agriculture.

And, **Profeta of the National Geographic in 2018** concludes that just a 0.5 degree rise in Celsius would cost 153 million people their lives.

Thus, we negate.

https://www.mnn.com/earth-matters/wilderness-resources/blogs/5-dangers-of-oil-drilling-in-the-arctic-ocean

Burning the Arctic Ocean's oil could release an additional 15.8 billion tons of CO_2 into the atmosphere, which is equivalent to all U.S. transportation emissions over a nine-year period. It would raise global CO_2 levels by 7.44 parts per million (ppm), nearly 10 percent of the global rise in atmospheric CO_2 over the past 50 years.

Zadek '19 of the Taipei Times finds that although investors are becoming more sensitized to climate risks, because most BRI countries lack carbon regulations, such as a carbon-pricing system, there is a financial incentive for global investors to go in and profit from carbon-intensive assets like infrastructure.

Wadhams of Yale in 2016 furthers that warming in the Arctic is equivalent to a 25 percent boost in global CO_2 emissions, and could add as much as 50 percent to the global heating effect.

Weighing against adaptability

1. Cause global natural diASASTERS SO circumvent
2. Cause recessions in the meantime that trigger a reverse in adaptability
3. Irreversible, adaptability can be reversed

Frontlines grouping

China funding →

- china funding increase in the squo
- china slowing down funding in the squo so they can sustain it more over the long-term

Debt

Third party funding in the squo increasing

eu joining doesn't mean they have to fund

eu limited by recession and austerity

eurobean banks don't have enough money

eurobean banks can't spend money outside the eu / won't

eu will never politically agree on what to fund or where [many eu countries already have joined on (italy -> switz and nz)]

Overall, the MNN in ‘15 finds that drilling and burning arctic oil would lead to 15.8 billion tons of CO_2 into the atmosphere.

Topshelf (China Funding) →

china funding increase in the squo

1. The Japan Times ‘19 [1] writes that while it’s true that $64 billion worth of deals were signed, Xi didn’t announce any new numbers on incoming investment and was more muted on the BRI’s initiative growing presence in other countries. That’s why you prefer the Schraeder ‘18 [2] evidence which indicates that the amount of funding from China has dropped by 89% since 2015 and private banks has functionally ceased entirely.

china slowing down funding in the squo so they can sustain it more over the long-term

- elites in chn don’t support bri
- chn funds BRI through corrupt methods, so eu wont fund them

China can take on more Debt

1. The quorum center finds that China is heavily using debt in the status quo to manage its economy but the accompanying rise in debt is also decreasing growth. This is counterfactual to China’s long term strategy of growth, they would never use this strategy of debt.

Quorum http://www.quorumcentre.com/reports/chinas-economic-model-is-unsustainable-and-heading-for-disaster-and-could-lead-to-global-economic-instability/ Some economists are sounding the alarm, but many disregard this as necessary growing pains. They cite the fact that China has been growing faster than other countries and can sustain such rapid growth in debt. After all, the government pushed banks to lend throughout China as a massive stimulus package aimed at diversifying the economy.Trillions of dollars in economic stimulus would require rapid economic growth. **However, in China's case, the opposite is happening. The more debt that is issued, the slower the GDP grows. While government officials claim they are trying to manage a slowdown, a rapid rise in debt says the opposite. The centrally-planned economy has been injecting trillions of dollars into the economy in order to save it from recession and it is failing. A recession would mean a disaster for China. There would be trillions of dollars in bad debts, which would mean bankruptcy for the entire Chinese banking system.** Though most of China's debts are owned by Chinese, it would still have global ramifications. Banks in China spent the last decade lending heavily to government companies, private corporations and individuals. Government companies are severely indebted and have been having problems making basic payments in their loans. The government's solution to banks is to give them more loans so they can continue operations even though they are unprofitable.

Topshelf (Private funding) →

Third party funding in the squo increasing

1. 2018 CNBC: AIIB, New Development Bank, CDB, and private investors are pulling out because it isn't profitable. They will invest in the EU because they make the BRI more legitimate.

eu joining doesn't mean they have to fund

1. It is profitable

eu limited by recession and austerity

1. Invest in the BRI for stimulus to get out of recession
2. Reuters: Austerity rules are never enforced

eurobean banks don't have enough money

1. According to Summers, the EU has $953 billion to spend

eurobean banks can't spend money outside the eu / won't

1. Why can't they, literally no warrant
2. Curtin says the EU already has a huge commercial interest in the parts of the world in which BRI is in.

eu will never politically agree on what to fund or where

1. On arctic coal, they already are investing in fossil fuel shit and have interests in the arctic.
2. General infrastructure, would still get funding doesn't respond to the 3rd warrant.

many eu countries already have joined on (italy -> switz and nz)

1. EU commision bank

Russia

F2: Climate change inevitable

1. According to a study done by the UN, we haven't met the 2 degree brigline for climate change. However, the best way to meet the 2 degree goal for climate change involves ending Arctic oil drilling plans. The brighline for climate change being inevitable has not been met, and stopping drilling is the best way to solve.
2. The impact is scalar. Even if down the line there

https://www.climatecentral.org/news/limiting-oil-coal-key-to-slowing-warming-18504

The most efficient way of meeting the world's most prominent climate goal would involve ending all Arctic oil drilling plans, drastically curbing tar-sands oil mining in Canada, and leaving most of the world's remaining coal reserves in the ground.

That's according to a new study that aimed to determine how best to limit the burning of different fuels to meet the international goal of holding global warming to less than 2°C, or 3.6°F. The goal was established during United Nations climate negotiations, and meeting it would require leaving two-thirds of remaining fossil fuel reserves unburned.

F2: Drill Anyways

WP: fianncial can't

F2: Russia doesn't have tech

1. WP ev says that CH funding would pay for things like icebreakers, obviously gonna pay for other tech too, no incentive to develop now
2. RCNet 18', norway giving russia the tech, tech isn't issue

Norway giving russia the tech, a) tech isn't a issue

Staalesen, Atle. "Norwegian supply ships support drilling activities in Russian Arctic." The Barents Observer. August 2018. http://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2018/08/16/norway-ships-russia-drilling-oil-platforms-supply-arctic //RJ

Norwegian ships are also playing key roles in connection with the ongoing well drilling in the nearby Nyarmeysky license area. Drilling is conducted by semisubmersible rig Arkticheskaya, an installation owned and operated by Gazprom subsidiary Gazflot. It left Murmansk on 19th July and **has since been operating along coast of the** Yamal Peninsula (**Russian Arctic**). On site near the Arkticheskaya is the Norwegian supply ship Boa Bison, a vessel owned by company Boa, and the Norsea Fighter, a ship owned by Vestland Offshore. In the area are also the Sea Spear and Sea Supra, two supply ships owned and operated by Norwegian company Solstad Farstad ASA. According to company Operations Director Bjørn-Inge Engene, Sea Spear and Sea Supra are engaged in supporting drilling activities at both the Rusanovsky and Nyarmeysky areas. **The Kara Sea** (north of Yamal Peninsula) **is ice-free at the moment and the ships will be on site until the end of the drilling**, he says in a comment to the Barents Observer. "We have operated in this area several times before and have gained solid experience from ship management in this kind of remote areas", he underlines. **There hasn't been so many Norwegian vessels in the Kara Sea since 2014 when ExxonMobil drilled its University-1 well in the area.** That drilling was part of the U.S company's comprehensive cooperation with Rosneft, and results showed the discovery of many million tons of oil. **The well was drilled by the Norwegian rig West Alpha and logistical operations were comprehensive. About 2,000 people were involved in the drilling operations and most of them were Norwegians.** The cooperation between ExxonMobil and Rosneft came to a halt after Russia's annexation of Crimea and the subsequent introduction of western sanctions. The sanction regime prohibits key services necessary for deep water and Arctic oil exploration and production. **However, there is still a loophole for offshore supply services.**

F2: Seasons shit

1. Only implication is that you can only do limited testing, a) this is just mitigation, we still access our impact bc as soon as you strike oil you build massive drilling operations, b) as the arctic melts it'll get easier to mine year round

F2: drilling starts years later

Lamont, Guardian 2017, oil rigs only take 2-3 years to build, and ton of rigs lying around, russia can just buy them

Lamont, Tom. "Where Oil Rigs go to Die." May 2017. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/may/02/where-oil-rigs-go-to-die //RJ

The world has a problem with its oil rigs. There are too many of them, and for the first time since the earliest manufacture of seaborne drilling platforms 50 or 60 years ago, decisions are being made about how and where to get rid of them in number. That there should be a sudden surplus is vexing for those invested in undersea drilling: as recently as 2010 the rigs were thought too few. Back then, had an oil company such as Shell or BP or Marathon wanted to dig down and discover what was lying beneath a particular patch of sea, it wasn't unusual for them to wait as long as a year until an exploration company such as Transocean or Diamond or Ensco had a rig available to lease to them. It was a time of undersupply. Dozens of new rigs were commissioned, and worldwide orders tripled between 2010 and 2011. But **oil rigs take two or three years to build**, and by the time these were ready for use, the price of oil had declined sharply, and with it the industry's hunger to prospect – thus the oversupply. Rigs without contracts to drill were either "cold-stacked" (anchored without crew) to wait for a market recovery, or sold for demolition. More than 40 oil rigs were waved off on end-of-life voyages in 2015, according to data gathered by a Brussels-based maritime NGO called Shipbreaking Platform; up from a single dispensed-with rig, so far as the NGO knew, in 2014.

F2: EU won't fund Arctic

That's fine, our link is legitimacy bolsters BRI confidence and investment from China

F2: Sanctions against Russia/China

NR, can fund even if w sanctions

Lukin 18

The Arctic development requires huge investments, such as funding the building of powerful ice breakers. With Russia strapped for cash, China seems to be the only realistic source of financing. It may not be by chance that **China's** single **biggest investment in Russia has been in the Yamal LNG project on the Siberian Arctic coast** — the world's coldest liquefied natural gas plant, in which Beijing acquired a major stake and provided $12 billion in loans, **even as the project was under U.S. sanctions.**

F2: No incentive for Chinese investment into Russia

US hostility → they get closer

Lukin '18

Of course, Russia finds the growing economic imbalance with China unpleasant and knows that it must work quickly to spur its own economic growth. But even if that gap continues to widen, it does not automatically increase the threat from China. After all, Canada does not fear the US, and Belgium has no worries about France. It all depends on **the nature of bilateral relations between Russia and**

China, and for now, those relations **are deepening. This trend will continue, thanks in large part to the extremely hostile approach the US has taken towards both countries.** This is not about US President Donald Trump or any other leader; Trump is only a symbol of the larger situation. The US has long been accustomed to profiting from its global economic dominance, but its influence is declining, even as the relative influence of other centres of power, including Russia and China, is growing. Washington finds it especially irritating that the collapse of the Soviet Union did not mark the "end of history" and the ultimate triumph of the US, but only the start of new and far less advantageous global developments.

F2: Russia has the tech, they finna drill

Funding still needed

Gorodentsev '19

Russia has ambitious military programs for the Arctic, although it is not plausible that it will be able to fulfill all its goals with the current financial and technological constraints and without foreign financial assistance, meaning that some of these ambitions may go unrealized

F2: CH recession → no carbon capture tech

1. BRI is irrelevant for Carbon Capture. For example Salon in 2019 writes that Chinese companies aren't even using carbon capture tech for their projects.
2. A recession happening doesn't even mean that they can't fund the research. If anything, in a recession countries use stimulus spending to fund more academic research to inc. econ growth in the long term.

https://www.salon.com/2019/05/04/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-shows-how-china-and-the-u-s-are-swapping-roles-in-global-trade/

She writes that Chinese companies are involved in at least 240 coal projects in 25 BRI states and many of these projects are installing older technologies and exclude modern carbon capture technologies.

F2: Oil Demand will flatline

Not true, two reasons,

First is economically, clemente 18', global oil demand isn't peaking anytime soon, meaning regardless of squo prices the long term trend provides incentive to go in

Second is security, WP 18', russia views arctic as key to security, even if prices low, doesn't matter

Clemente '18

Looking forward, with no significant substitute whatsoever, **there is simply no evidence that global oil demand will peak anytime soon. Around 85 percent of the global population lives in still developing nations**, such as China, India, Pakistan, and Nigeria**. They have huge populations, and their future transport needs contingent on more oil are just now coming to light. These poorer countries naturally seek to become rich, and the West has shown them that the ascension from poverty begins as extensive petroleum-based transportation infrastructure gets constructed.** These systems are capable of achieving massive economies of scale that provide large amounts of energy at low cost. Illustrating the high value of oil, the rich OECD nations constitute 46 percent of global use despite being just 15 percent of the population.The numbers in oil's favor are overwhelming. The global oil-based passenger vehicle fleet is around 1.5 billion, with 95 million new ones being bought this year alone. In total, there are less than 5 million electric cars in operation, a growing niche market but nowhere near lowering oil demand in any significant way. In fact, just achieving a 20 percent market share of total global car sales by 2040 would be a huge achievement for those running on electricity—but not nearly enough to significantly reduce oil needs since more oil-requiring planes and heavy-trucks will compensate.**Even with incentives and huge subsidies, electric cars are much more expensive than conventional oil-based ones.** This is a major problem for the poorer nations that comprise nearly all of new oil demand in the world. With less than 1 percent of the global population able to afford them, electric cars truly are "toys for the rich." Ultimately, the fact remains: until we see an absolute decline in global oil demand over a number of years (not just a decline in incremental growth) the idea of "peak oil demand" is without substance. So, while it is understandable that oil titans like Shell want to position themselves as "natural gas majors" in the era of climate change and anti-carbon policies, they would be well advised to remember that oil's future is pretty bright too.

Washington Post '18

China has declared itself a "Near-Arctic State" and aims to build a "Polar Silk Road." Russia appears ambivalent on China's Arctic ambitions. On the one hand, **the extreme north is regarded by Russia as** a sanctuary **critical to the country's security and national identity.** On the other hand, Russia's economic growth is more and more dependent on exploitation of Arctic resources.

bri brojects unbrofitable, so eu wont fund these while china will

Summers

http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/CHHJ5627_China_EU_Report_170912_WEB.pdf

(its a graph so command F 953)

EU doesn't really enforce austerity rules

Strupczewski, Jan. "EU may not enforce its rules on Italy, but financial markets will." Reuters. 2018//SK https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-politics-markets-rules-analysis/eu-may-not-enforce-its-rules-on-italy-but-financial-markets-will-idUSKCN1IQ1IJ

EU UNLIKELY TO INTERVENE. As an EU member, Italy is obliged seek a balanced budget in structural terms and have debt below 60 percent of gross domestic product. Instead, its structural deficit has been rising since 2015 and its debt has been close to 132 percent of GDP since 2014. But **most Brussels-watchers do not expect Europe to take political action to enforce its rules**. **The European Commission**, the guardian of EU laws, has the task of disciplining profligate governments through what is called an excessive deficit procedure that could end in fines. But it **has repeatedly declared that punishment is not the way to deal with budget rule-breaking, and showed leniency to repeat budget offenders like France, Portugal and Spain**. The Commission is also held back by concern that enforcement action would only strengthen eurosceptic sentiment in Italy, the euro zone's third biggest economy, where many people are already ambivalent about the euro currency. "In the end, crazy countries are always disciplined by markets. Rules can be broken. But you cannot replace market funding with wishful thinking," one senior euro zone policy-maker said, expressing a widely-shared view.

[1] The Japan Times. "Xi Jinping's Wins and Losses at Second Belt and Forum." 28 Apr. 2019. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/04/28/business/economy-business/xi-jinpings-wins-losses-second-belt-road-forum/#.XTZgFZNKhQI //RJ

Compared with his keynote speech two years ago, Xi was more muted on the "Belt and Road" initiative's growing presence in other countries. The president stuck to discussing steps China is taking to clean up the project, and vowed "zero tolerance" on corruption. People's Bank of China Gov. Yi Gang said the central bank would "build an open, market-oriented financing and investment system," and the government released its analysis framework for debt sustainability. **Xi didn't announce new numbers on upcoming investment into the program, though he said $64 billion worth of deals were signed at last week's forum**. **In 2017, he said China would add 100 billion yuan ($14.8 billion) to the Silk Road Fund** and two state-owned banks would provide special loans for BRI projects worth 380 billion yuan in total.

[2] Schraeder, Matt. "Domestic Criticism May Signal Shrunken Belt and Road Ambitions - Jamestown," Jamestown. Aug. 2018. https://jamestown.org/program/domestic-criticism-may-signal-china-scaling-back-its-bri-ambitions/ //TP

This is not a point that domestic critics of BRI typically cite. Censorship may again be the culprit. Although an 86% success rate for BRI projects is certainly better than some Western observers might guess, the PRC government may not eager for it to be widely known at home that China's banks have tens of billions of dollars tied up in problematic projects abroad. Indeed, the PRC's policymaking apparatus appears to have already responded to concerns of BRI overreach by adjusting the scale of lending to limit possible financial risk**. BRI lending by major PRC banks has dropped by 89% since 2015, and lending by commercial banks**—who are dealing with their own financial issues domestically—**has ceased almost entirely. Policy banks have also scaled back,** despite their status as arms of PRC government policy.

Not enough funding rn

Huifeng, He. "Is China's belt and road infrastructure development plan about to run out of money?" CNBC. 2018//SK

https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/15/is-chinas-belt-and-road-infrastructure-plan-running-out-of-money.html

Wang Yiming, deputy head of the Development Research Centre of China's State Council, said at the forum that **although many belt and road projects were funded by major financial institutions — including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, New Development Bank, China Development Bank (CDB), the Export-Import Bank of China and the Silk Road Fund — there was still a huge funding gap of up to US$500 billion a year. The limited participation of private investors, narrow financing channels and low profitability levels were major problems**, Wang said. "Countries involved in belt and road projects have low financial capabilities and high liability ratios" he said. "It is important to encourage financial innovation to raise funds to support the development of the belt and road."

Weighing (IMPACT WEIGHING):

Climate Change comes first for three reasons:

1) Magnitude
    a) CC hits the developing world the hardest because they have no resources to fight it and it would decrease crop yields, meaning that even more people would be pushed into poverty since agriculture is the biggest employer in the world
2) Scope
    a) Everyone is affected by climate change because the heating effects extreme weather everywhere no matter where the pollution came from, whereas recessions are usually limited to a single country or a few, and even rarely when you have a giant recession it still does not affect everyone
3) Pre-req
    a) CC devastates developing countries the most, as they are the least prepared for it
    b) CC depresses economic growth across entire world, meaning that solving for CC comes first as its the internal link to global economic development
    c) CC from arctic drilling would decrease oil prices, making any shift to GT at best impossible and at worst delayed for decades
    d) **CC depresses global trade by decreasing the ability of developing nations to create their most common and valuable good: agriculture. This means there is a less incentive to build ports and other trade infrastructure that require steel and it becomes harder to bring steel to other countries with more extreme weather, meaning that CC comes before over-production issues**
    e) CC increases volatility as there's very little we can do to predict future climate events, meaning that CC comes before solving any specific recessions because

CC can cause a recession to happen on its own, if lets say the entire NYC is devastated by a hurricane, we're probably going into a recession

f) Keeping the trend of green tech comes before biomass just because green tech and its zero emissions is always preferable to even a less evil emission source.

4) Irreversibility

a. <u>Recessions are inherently cyclical meaning that a country can always recover and get their economy back on track. However, once CC is too far past the brink, its impacts are irreversible and there is literally no way that countries ever recover.</u>

Weighing (LINK WEIGHING):

Arctic

1. EU Recession
    a. **Mag-**Even if they win an EU recession at their best, the global increase in temp. And 2.5 billion pushed into agrarian poverty is much more severe of an impact.
    b. **Prob-**They don't prove they make the infrastructure fast enough or in high enough of a quantity to solve their impact, insofar as we prove we are the specific preq, to drilling we are much more probable.
    c. **Mag.-**Even if they win they solve this recession, the impacts of climate change by displacing farmers you cause recessions around the developing world, insofar as majority of the world's population works in agriculture.
    d. **Severity:** Recessions inherently hurt developing countries that are already connected to global markets. On the contrary, climate change impacts to the people that are the most disenfranchised - like sustenance farmers that depend on growing crops to live. The people that climate change impacts are much more disadvantaged, and thus should be prioritized first.
2. Overcapacity
    a. **Prob-A lot of internal variables that affect this argument, they have to prove they create enough demand and projects to reduce overcapacity enough to stop a recession, however outr link is a lot more probable insofar as we prove the political will and funding ability**
    b. **Irreversibility-** if we begin arctic drilling that only increases the death toll from climate change which is inherently irreversible. Economies can always bounce back from a recession.

c. **Scope/Magnitude:** Drilling in the Arctic exacerbates climate change which puts the life of every single person at risk -- recessions only impact people integrated in the global market which excludes the majority of the developing world
d. **Timeframe: Insofar as China's growth rn is still at 6%, there is a lot of time before China enters a recession, and in that time plenty of things can be done to prevent the recession. However, you know that as soon as Russia gets the funding from China for BRI they go into the Arctic so our harms trigger immediately.**
e. **Prereq** - these materials would be dumped into countries where they can be bought for cheap, and then used to develop Arctic technology on the cheap, thus making it more profitable for them to go into the arctic because the up-front costs are much cheaper.

3. Trade
4. CC from arctic drilling would decrease oil prices, making any shift to GT at best impossible and at worst delayed for decades
    a. **Control Link-**If we have climate change we destroy things like the ports and infrastructure to facilitate trade in the first place, even if there is more trade now in the long term we say we control this argument.
    b. **Mag/Scope-**Climate Change kills millions of people around the world and affects everyone, there impact is specific to marginal increases in trade to a limited amount of countries.
    c. **Control Link-**If climate change destroys the crops in developing worlds then they lose the capability to trade insofar as a majority of their tradable commodities are crops.
5. Adaptation
    a. **Timeframe:** Industrialization (or the transition from agriculture sectors to manufacturing) takes decades. For example, the US took 100 years to do so. This means the harms of climate change will spawn much earlier than industrialization will be able to combat the harms.
    b. **Probability:** There are a multitude of factors that aren't being considered. Recessions, regime change, and wars are all unpredictable factors that could take place, preventing industrialization 40 years down the line, whereas you know for sure, if Russia has the funding, they will use it to drill in the Arctic as part of their geopolitical strategy.
    c. **Scope:** Climate change affects the entire world, whereas they at best, only help a few BRI countries adapt to the effects of climate change.
    d. **Prerequisite:**
    e. **2 Delinks:**
        i. **Adaptation doesn't really check back climate change:**
        ii. **Climate Change is scalar, so their underlying presumption is not correct.**
6. Green Technology
    a.

Coal

1. Green Tech
    a. **Magnitude:** Even if China exports some amounts of green technology, they export 100x more fossil fuels, so the impact of fossil fuels will always have a higher magnitude
    b. **Incentive Structure:** China always has an incentive to export fossil fuels over green tech because they want to get rid of dirty energy in order to appear greener … China cares about their image … want to be perceived as a leader in clean energy
    c. **Probability:** the probability of developing nations rejecting China's coal and adopting green tech is really low at the point where green tech prices fluctuate constantly so green tech does not provide a sustainable solution to the energy needs of developing nations. It is a lot more probable for these countries to accept China's coal because a) China handles the investments and b) China helps with the financing so developing countries don't have to worry as much about price fluctuations

2. Adaptability
    a. Timeframe-Adaptability happens very gradual over a long period of time ,within that time period there could be many factors that prevent that development like political support and recessions, whereas we tell you within that time period we have hundreds of coal plants emitting millions of tons of gas.
    b. Control Link-With waning natural resources especially in these isolated countries, they need to shift to green tech to have a long term sustainable future.
    c. Probability-It is very improbable that these developing countries get the advanced technology to adapt they have to prove reach the development stage to implement the technology.
3. Overcapacity
    a. Incentive Structure. If we bail out production companies now and let them know that they'll always be saved in the future, then companies won't change their behavior. If we punish now, we gain in the long term by discouraging this behavior.

Frontline: Russia drilling in Yamala

1. Groffman of SCMP '19 finds that even though they are drilling in the yamal peninsula, most future plans have been halted by sanctions. That's why they conclude that this gives the chance for China to invest into Russia's arctic ventures

https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2133039/why-china-russia-relations-are-warming-arctic Groffman evidence
Russia is a difficult country for foreign investors, who are not allowed to export any resources they extract, a perk only allowed for state-owned monopolies Gazprom and Rosneft. **It is pursuing a new onshore gas**

project on the Yamal peninsula, but most future plans of offshore oil drilling in Russia have been halted, or at least hampered, by Western sanctions. This gives plenty of opportunity to China, and the China Development Bank will invest in the Russian energy giant Novatek's Arctic LNG II, giving China access to Arctic liquefied natural gas. But more importantly, the deal will give Beijing the right to demarcate sectors of the Arctic within Russia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) for Chinese exploration.

Frontline: Russia wants to diversify their economy

Frontline: Takes a long time to go drill into the arctic

1. They are drilling/Discovery now in the status quo the

Frontline: EU won't fund coal

1. EU doing it in the squo, they are financing coal plants and other fossil fuel projects.

https://bankwatch.org/blog/when-the-eu-s-bank-can-t-kick-the-fossil-fuels-habit -March 27 2019

The numbers speak for themselves – EUR 13.5 billion spent on various fossil fuels projects since the latest revision of this policy in 2013 is an alarming sign even if renewables have been granted much more. This is the equivalent of EUR 6.2 million in EU public money – every day – over these six years going for the top culprit behind the climate crisis.Every additional cent spent on another fossil fuel project, particularly in the relatively rich EU, makes it more difficult to realize the Paris Agreement and achieve the global Sustainable Development Goals which are intended to "leave no one behind," irrespective of where people live or their material status. Fossil fuels investments threaten people's health and well-being, and undermine the fight against poverty, access to clean water as well as peace and justice – these are just a few among the 17 global goals. The EIB's staff and leaders are certainly aware of the detrimental impacts of the bank's continued fossil fuel financing. During the public consultation meeting in Brussels last month, Andrew McDowell, the bank's Vice President responsible for energy projects, admitted the EIB has financed several uneconomic and heavily subsidized gas projects and regretted that projects defined by the European Commission as Projects of Common Interest (PCI) are not subject to a climate impact assessment

Frontline: Arctic all melt

On top of that, **InsideClimate News** quantifies that leaks during the drilling, production and transmission of gas are the largest source of methane emissions, accounting for about ⅓ of all man-made methane emissions.
Dr. McPherson of the University of Arizona quantifies that methane release could raise temperatures by 10 degrees Celsius.

Frontline: Biomass Turn

1. If we win uniqueness that they are shifting to green tech in the status quo, it means we win this argument because the status quo is already solving back for biomass.
2. Our links on general GW increases o/w this argument on magnitude, even if biomass is comparatively better, a small sector of the sector using biomass compared to a fully developed fossil fuel sector still probably means on net emissions increase.

Frontline: green tech cheaper

1. Forbes ‘19 writes that these countries take Chinese investments because they are extremely desperate to solve their energy poverty problem. On urgency, they would want to develop their energy sectors as fast as possible, and chinese coal would always do that faster than a long term shift to renewables.
2. In Vietnam, that was not the case. According to the SCMP in ‘19, because of low payments to households or businesses generating renewable electricity, power agreements that involve high local risks, and a general lack of technical expertise among local developers, Vietnamese regulatory authorities find it easier to succumb to money from Beijing, and renewable energy projects are displaced by dirtier coal.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2019/01/23/coal-is-not-dead-china-proves-it/#3c78eed865fa

And almost a quarter of the coal plants China is funding in other countries would be less efficient, higher emission subcritical units that are no longer allowed to be used in China. **These nations have less environmental standards and are desperate for investment of any kind.** I do find this a bit contradictory though given that one of China's major climate plans has been to replace inefficient, older coal plants with state-of-the-art coal plants. **The goal of many poorer nations to install any type of power generation is easy enough to understand. The depressing amount of global energy poverty, particularly electricity deprivation, is largely forgotten here in the rich West, where we have all the energy that we need at our fingertips.** For example, as measured by per capita per year, over 3,500,000,000 humans - nearly half of the world - use less than 10% of the electricity that we privileged Americans do. With electricity the foundation of modern life, l**iving with such low access to power is a worsening calamity that is simply unacceptable for leaders in the still developing world.** 6 **all energy sources are on the table: the destructiveness of the growing digital divide is incalculable.Coal often makes sense for them: coal leads and supplies 40% of the world's electricity, is reliable and cost effective, and is widely available.**

https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3013878/how-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-could-lead-vietnam-away

Vietnam clearly has an ideal opportunity to tap into its abundant wind and solar potential, but greater levels of green investment are being constrained by relatively low payments to households or businesses generating electricity through renewable means, power purchase agreements that involve high local risks, the perceived credit risk of EVN, the sole purchaser of electricity, and a general lack of technical expertise among local developers.

In recent years, there has been an abundance of international assistance on offer for Hanoi to help tackle these difficult issues, from bankable power-purchase agreement templates to partial guarantees, **yet Vietnamese regulatory authorities may find it far easier to again succumb to the money on offer from Beijing and renewable energy projects will be displaced by dirtier coal.**

Unless and until belt and road funding for coal-fired power is withdrawn or Hanoi changes its approach, Vietnam will remain a laggard in the development of renewable energy in the region and continue to put its environment and people in jeopardy.

http://www.eias.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/EIAS_Event_Report_BRI_4_Years-1.pdf
Mr Peeters stressed that the EU taking on a leading role in the BRI is of paramount importance, so that it could help steer projects onto a course, which respects international rules. The notion that Europe could hide behind walls was an "illusion". The EU and its member states need to take on a proactive role in the AIIB, if they are going to have any influence on how the BRI pans out. **Furthermore, Mr Peeters emphasised that China and the World need the EU to be on board in order for the BRI to prove successful. The BRI has the potential to deepen economic connections between the world's two largest markets, so without the EU, the BRI cannot achieve its full potential.** Mr Peeters states that the BRI "begins in China, but it ends in Europe". **Close cooperation on the BRI between China and the EU can help standardise the rules and regulations by which BRI projects have to abide. Such cooperation can ensure maximum transparency and openness, which are essential to achieving prosperity.** Additionally, the BRI should be fair and equally beneficial to all parties involved. Mr Peeters outlined that **the EU can help make the BRI an open and transparent platform, which helps facilitate business. Furthermore, the EU can also export its own social and labour standards to other BRI countries**. In Mr Peeters' view, **the EU must facilitate unhindered trade flows, but emphasise that these need to be sustainable and in line with the UN 2030 agenda for Sustainable Development**. To aid in this, Mr Peeters acknowledged certain areas, which needed improvement, most notably, the cohesion of administrative and regulatory barriers, and clarifying customs procedures. **Mr Peeters concluded that the BRI is the largest infrastructure investment programme that the world has ever seen and as such, the EU needs to be a part of it. In order for this to be as effective as possible, the EU needs to speak with one united voice, not 27 divided ones.**

Smith → rumbling of disconnect
https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/the-end-belt-and-road-or-just-the-beginning
Leaders from Australia and several European countries soon began voicing their own concerns—about the lack of transparency, accountability, and financial sustainability, while highlighting the risks of corruption and debt traps. Rumblings of discontent then spread to the developing world. Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Malaysia, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, and several African countries began scrutinizing, amending, or canceling BRI deals. Meanwhile, the U.S., India, and some European countries had official endorsements of the BRI scrubbed from UN resolutions.

a/2 extinction

We link in, o/w prob

Global Warming is the most likely cause of the next mass extinction

Meates , 13' (Megan Meates, Public Relations and Communication Consultant at Curtin University, author, December 11th 2013, http://www.reportingclimatescience.com/news-stories/article/does-global-warming-cause-mass-extinctions.html,GS)

Researchers have discovered two of Earth's ancient mass extinctions wiped out life on the planet in a similar way to one another and that both were associated with global warming conditions. Research led by Curtin University in Perth, Western Australia, and published in Geology, demonstrated the cascade of events during the fourth largest extinction, at the end of the Triassic period 200 million years ago, were remarkably similar to those of the largest extinction that occurred at the end of the Permian 250 million years ago.The research suggests perhaps all global warming-related mass extinctions show similar patterns of change. From rock samples collected by colleagues in Plymouth University, lead scientists Professor Kliti Grice, Director of the WA Organic and Isotope Geochemistry Centre (WA-OIGC) program and Dr Caroline Jaraula and Dr Pierre Le Metayer, Research Fellows of the WA-OIGC program from Curtin, discovered and examined molecular fossils of land plants, algae and green sulfur bacteria (known as Chlorobi).Alongside their international research team, they were able to determine the oceanic and atmospheric conditions that caused the end-Triassic extinction 200 million years ago."Back then, the world's continents were being pulled apart to create what is now the Atlantic Ocean. This event was accompanied by frequent, massive volcanic eruptions that injected great quantities of CO_2 into atmosphere, estimated at four times higher than today's levels based on plant physiology," Professor Grice said.The high CO_2 levels triggered global warming; leading to a cascade of atmospheric and oceanic changes that were very similar to those that we found had caused the largest mass extinction, which happened 50 million years prior to this one. **Of the five mass extinctions to have ever occurred in the past 600 million years, four were associated with global warming.** Our research suggests if two of these had similar processes operating, perhaps all other global warming-related extinctions do too, helping us understand more about Earth's history."Dr Jaraula said the research team looked at stable carbon isotopes of molecular fossils of plant waxes, algae and chlorobi before, during and after the extinction period.Professor Richard Twitchett of Plymouth University said the next step was to compare the results to changes in the fossil record of marine animals, to help understand how future marine extinctions are likely to occur. "Our study has provided a glimpse of how extinctions happen and their rates of change. While ocean circulation and aspects of the carbon cycle will always be different, the general patterns of change can still be compared," Professor Michael Böttcher, of the Leibniz Institute for Baltic Sea Research, Germany, said. Professor Grice and her research colleagues previously determined the conditions of the largest extinction occurring at the end of the Permian, 250 million years ago in a report published in Science in 2005.The recently published research in Geology was carried out in conjunction with Plymouth University and Leibniz Institute for Baltic Sea Research, Germany. The research has been funded by the Australian Research Council under a QEII Discovery Fellowship awarded to Professor Grice and

Professor Twitchett. Professor Grice has also recently been awarded a Discovery Outstanding Research Award to continue this research and investigate the recovery of the largest extinction events and their association with oil and gas resources on a global scale. The paper entitled “Elevated pCO2 leading to Late Triassic extinction, persistent photic zone euxinia, and rising sea levels” was published in Geology.**The Late Triassic mass extinction event is the most severe global warming-related crisis to have affected important extant marine groups such as scleractinian corals.** and offers potential insights into climate change scenarios. Here we present evidence from Chlorobi-derived biomarkers of episodic and persistent photic zone euxinia. From biomarkers and stable carbon isotopes, we present evidence of rapid mixing of atmospheric and oceanic carbon reservoirs. Global versus regional trends are resolved in kerogen organic matter type, carbonate δ13C, and bulk and pyrite δ34S. This suite of data demonstrates for the first time a comprehensive organic and stable isotope geochemical reconstruction of events leading up to the Late Triassic extinction event and its aftermath. The cascade of events prior to, during, and after the extinction is remarkably similar to those reported for the Late Permian extinction, the largest extinction event of the Phanerozoic. We predict that similar conditions will have occurred during all past episodes of rapid global warming and biotic crisis that are associated with similar rises in pCO2.

The second is the South China Sea.

Bohman 17’ writes that in the status quo, China cannot act overly aggressively in the SCS because of its dependence on maritime trade.

However, **Nantulya 19’** writes that the BRI would increase trade rounds by building ports, communication lines, and route development.

With the EU joining, these projects would become a priority as the EU wants to see their trade increase as well.

This would result in more Chinese aggression. **Bohman 17’** continues that China is using BRI to distance itself from Western economic dependence, and that the new trade routes would serve as lifelines if China were to be sanctioned, concluding that if BRI were to be successful, China could gain the option, and be more likely to take decisive military action.

The impact is Climate Change Diplomacy.

Aggression would torpedo regional climate change cooperation. **Denyer of WP 14'** writes that past Chinese aggression has undermined efforts to promote a more cooperative, development-focused relationship with its neighbors, on issues such as climate change.

Stopping Climate Change will depend on countries cooperating with China. **Ye of Brookings 15'** writes that cooperation with China will key, writing that either the world will rise or fall with China's leadership.

China plays a key role in multilateral climate change cooperation

Ye and Qu 15, (Qi Ye is a Director and Senior Fellow of Foreign Policy at the Brookings-Tsinghua Center, Tong Wu is a Visiting Scholar at Tsinghua University, "China's "Yes" to New Role in Climate Battle",http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2015/12/04-chinas-yes-new-role-climate-battle-qi-wu, 12/04/2015, GO)

In previous years, some Western negotiators - half-jokingly and half-mockingly - nicknamed the Chinese climate negotiator "Mr No" for his consistent rejections of Western proposals. Today, China has given a resounding "yes" to climate leadership, demonstrating through actions that it is both willing and capable of building global governance. **From Copenhagen to Paris, China's role in global climate governance has changed**: **from a seemingly passive participant to a proactive builder.** **Underlying this transition is the vision of a more inclusive system of international cooperation.** China's new leadership has been advocating a vision of human beings as a community with a common destiny. **Xi has stressed the need to recognize that all people and countries face common challenges, and through their actions will arrive at a common fate.** In the 21st century, **the world will succeed or fail together**. **On no issue has this been more evident than on climate change**, and **nowhere has Xi's leadership of China been more important at the global level.**

SCS conflict is driving Asian instability and weakens US credibility while the pivot tanks Chinese cooperation—makes effective climate change cooperation impossible.

Denyer 14. (Simon Denyer is The Washington Post's bureau chief in China. He served previously as bureau chief in India and as a Reuters bureau chief in Washington, India and

Pakistan. China's rise and Asian tensions send U.S. relations into downward spiral. July 7, 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-rise-and-asian-tensions-send-us-relations-into-downward-spiral/2014/07/07/f371cfaa-d5cd-4dd2-925c-246c099f04ed_story.html) BEIJING — Hundreds of rocky islands, islets, sandbanks, reefs and cays lie scattered across Asia's eastern waters, unimportant-looking to the naked eye but significant enough to spark what may be the most worrying deterioration in U.S.-China relations in decades. China's military rise, and its increasingly assertive claims to sovereignty over these largely uninhabited lumps of rock, coral and sand, have set it on a possible collision course with its neighbors, which also make various claims on the archipelagos, and with the United States, which has important alliances with three of the rival claimants and would be obliged to defend them in the event of an attack. As Chinese and Vietnamese ships ram each other in the contested waters, and Chinese and Japanese fighter jets play games of chicken in Asia's disputed skies, the risk of military escalation is growing. Even more significantly, the standoff is generating bad blood between Washington and Beijing and could **torpedo cooperation on important global issues, including** the Middle East**, climate change** and nuclear proliferation. Secretary of State John F. Kerry and Treasury Secretary Jack Lew will visit Beijing on Wednesday and Thursday for the sixth annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue. And while Washington has been focused more on Iraq, Syria, Ukraine and Russia, some say the U.S.-China relationship is facing its stiffest test since President Richard M. Nixon traveled to Mao Zedong's China in 1972. "U.S.-China relations are worse than they have been since the normalization of relations, and East Asia today is less stable than at any time since the end of the Cold War," said Robert Ross, a political science professor at Boston College and associate of Harvard's John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. The Obama administration's foreign policy rebalance, or "pivot," to Asia has been widely interpreted in China as an attempt to contain its rise. U.S. efforts to bolster ties with regional states such as Vietnam and to reassure nervous Asian allies such as Japan and the Philippines that it stands ready to defend them militarily have created a new narrative in Beijing — that the United States has encouraged China's neighbors to push their territorial claims more aggressively. "It is clear that the disputes are between two sides, but the United States is taking sides, and it is not impartial," Adm. Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of the general staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, said in an interview. In Washington, a rival narrative is taking hold: that China is intent on pushing its territorial claims through the threat of military force and that it ultimately wants to push the United States out of Asia. There have been more intense crises in U.S.-China relations, including the fallout from the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre of pro-democracy protesters, but none, perhaps, as fundamental and structural as this. In November, China spooked its neighbors by announcing an air defense identification zone over the East China Sea, including over islands administered by Japan. In March, the Chinese coast guard tried to block Philippine vessels from resupplying soldiers stationed on the disputed Second Thomas Shoal. Two months later, it deployed a $1 billion deep-sea oil drilling rig into disputed waters off the Vietnamese coast. **It has also been building artificial islands in the South China Sea that U.S. officials say are meant to enhance its stance on sovereignty. China says it has historical claims to a huge swath of the South China Sea, but its recent assertiveness has puzzled experts, appearing to**

undermine last year's efforts to promote a more cooperative, development-focused relationship with its neighbors. Some argue that President Xi Jinping may see external threats as useful in ushering in tough reforms, including of the military; others say that China is simply baring its fangs as it seeks to build a new Asian order in which it, not the United States, is the major player in the region. Most agree, though, that China is asserting itself partly because it now possesses a modern deep-water navy and professional coast guard. Whatever the reason, China's rise has left the United States caught between its commitments to allies and its desire to maintain a constructive relationship with China. In recent months**, it has seemed to emphasize the former**, sending B-52 bombers to fly through China's air defense zone and threatening to reevaluate its military posture in Asia if China extends the zone to the South China Sea. In April, President Obama visited U.S. allies Japan, South Korea and the Philippines in a trip that pointedly excluded China. While in Japan, he became the first president to explicitly say that the U.S. defense treaty covered islands administered by Japan. In the Philippines, he signed a new 10-year defense agreement. There has been an equal and opposite reaction from Beijing. When U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel implicitly accused China in May of "intimidation, coercion or the threat of force" in asserting its territorial claims and warned that the United States "will not look the other way when fundamental principles of the international order are being challenged," Lt. Gen. Wang Guanzhong called Hagel's comments "excessive" and "suffused with hegemony, incitement, threats and intimidation," China Central Television reported. Daniel Russel, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, argues that the blunt exchanges between the countries could be beneficial. "It is an indication of health, I believe, that we are able to be so direct with China, without fearing that we are tanking the relationship or the prospects for cooperation," he said in an interview. "We do not pull our punches, but at the same time, we are working hand in hand in China wherever we can." Some critics say that the United States should have been more assertive in forging closer economic links with Asia through a Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal and with China through a bilateral investment treaty. "We need a lot more weight on the economic side, because that's what keeps your relationship from tipping into a Cold War relationship," said Christopher Johnson of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. **Also fueling China's adventurism is a feeling among some Chinese officials that the United States is inconsistent and lacks resolve. They point to the administration's unwillingness to punish Syria for using chemical weapons and its failure to prevent the Russian move into Crimea as showing it to be a "paper tiger,"** said Johnson, the CIA's former top China analyst, who is in regular contact with Chinese officials. "They believe Obama is fundamentally weak and disinterested," he said. But, Johnson added, Beijing would be wrong to underestimate the U.S. commitment to defend Asia. "America is a sleeping giant," he said, "and if you prod us too hard, we are going to mobilize." Either way, foreign policy experts agree that the relationship deserves much more attention than it is getting. Kerry is widely seen as more interested in the Middle East, while national security adviser Susan E. Rice has yet to visit Beijing, leaving China policy without a sufficiently senior voice in Washington. Meanwhile, Obama's refusal to visit China for a return version of last year's Sunnylands summit in California with Xi has also "personally irritated" his Chinese counterpart, Johnson said — although he is scheduled to visit Beijing for an Asia-Pacific summit in November. With that visit, at least, and with this week's Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the administration has a chance to focus minds on one of its most serious foreign policy challenges, experts say. "Summits," said Ross, of Boston College, "have the value of making presidents pay attention."

Bohman 17

The main constraint on China's recuperating these islands is economic vulnerability. China depends greatly on competitors such as the United States, Japan and European countries for economic growth. Sanctions following a decisive Chinese move to reclaim Taiwan or other islands would hurt the Chinese economy in a way that the Communist Party is unwilling to risk. The same is true for maritime trade. **China is highly dependent on energy imports crossing the S**outh **C**hina **S**ea**, and its economy would not last** long **in the case of a U.S.** naval **blockade**. In other words, **the main reason that China refrains from acting aggressively in the South China Sea is its dependence on maritime trade** and the West for its economic well-being. (Military inferiority also plays a role, but China's military buildup means that it will eventually be able to challenge the United States in its neighborhood.)

However, the BRI creates new trade routes

Nantulya '19

[The BRI] also **increases Beijing's control of critical global supply chains** and its ability to redirect the flow of international trade. Central to these efforts are moves to open new sea lines of communication and expand China's strategic port access around the world. In 2017, **Chinese state**-owned companies **announced plans to buy** or secure **majority stakes in nine overseas ports,** all located in regions where China plans **to develop new sea lanes.** This is in addition to the 40 ports in Africa, Asia, and Europe in which Chinese state-owned firms hold stakes worth a combined $40 billion.

Economic independence allows China to lash out

Bohman 17

Against this background, the early developments of the Belt and Road Initiative are concerning. There are already indications that **China is using the [BRI]** initiative **to decouple itself from Western dependence** and maritime trade. Among other things, **trade routes** to China (**[,]many of which are questionable from an economic perspective[,]**) are being constructed across Eurasia. In a crisis situation, these routes **could serve as lifelines if China were to be sanctioned** or cut off from trade in the Pacific. The BRI is also establishing a foundation for what could become a more self-sufficient Eurasian industrial base. Similarly, through financial initiatives, such as the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, China's economy is becoming less dependent on the Western-dominated financial system. To counteract these developments, and to ensure that China remains integrated into the global economic system, we should not ignore the Belt and Road Initiative in the hope that it goes away (it won't). Nor should we further encircle China militarily. Such responses often lead to increased tension and risk of conflict. Our answer should be to take part in the initiative and work hard to shape it. Failing to engage China on its new infrastructure strategy would give China space to use its economic size and leverage to define the rules of the future economic system in Eurasia and elsewhere. It would also allow China to decouple itself from the global economic system and attain enough economic self-sufficiency to reduce any potential effects of Western sanctions or a naval blockade**. If successful,** this **[Chinese economic decoupling] would grant China the option to take decisive military action in its neighborhood without risking hefty economic decline**—thereby increasing the likelihood of it doing so.

SCS conflict is driving Asian instability and weakens US credibility while the pivot tanks Chinese cooperation—makes effective climate change cooperation impossible.

Denyer 14. (Simon Denyer is The Washington Post's bureau chief in China. He served previously as bureau chief in India and as a Reuters bureau chief in Washington, India and Pakistan. China's rise and Asian tensions send U.S. relations into downward spiral. July 7, 2014.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-rise-and-asian-tensions-send-us-relations-into-downward-spiral/2014/07/07/f371cfaa-d5cd-4dd2-925c-246c099f04ed_story.html)
BEIJING — Hundreds of rocky islands, islets, sandbanks, reefs and cays lie scattered across Asia's eastern waters, unimportant-looking to the naked eye but significant enough to spark what may be the most worrying deterioration in U.S.-China relations in decades. China's military rise, and its increasingly assertive claims to sovereignty over these largely uninhabited lumps of rock, coral and sand, have set it on a possible collision course with its neighbors, which also make various claims on the archipelagos, and with the United States, which has important alliances with three of the rival claimants and would be obliged to defend them in the event of an attack. As Chinese and Vietnamese ships ram each other in the contested waters, and Chinese and Japanese fighter jets play games of chicken in Asia's disputed skies, the risk of military escalation is growing. Even more significantly, the standoff is generating bad blood between Washington and Beijing and could **torpedo cooperation on important global issues, including** the Middle East**, climate change** and nuclear proliferation. Secretary of State John F. Kerry and Treasury Secretary Jack Lew will visit Beijing on Wednesday and Thursday for the sixth annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue. And while Washington has been focused more on Iraq, Syria, Ukraine and Russia, some say the U.S.-China relationship is facing its stiffest test since President Richard M. Nixon traveled to Mao Zedong's China in 1972. "U.S.-China relations are worse than they have been since the normalization of relations, and East Asia today is less stable than at any time since the end of the Cold War," said Robert Ross, a political science professor at Boston College and associate of Harvard's John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. The Obama administration's foreign policy rebalance, or "pivot," to Asia has been widely interpreted in China as an attempt to contain its rise. U.S. efforts to bolster ties with regional states such as Vietnam and to reassure nervous Asian allies such as Japan and the Philippines that it stands ready to defend them militarily have created a new narrative in Beijing — that the United States has encouraged China's neighbors to push their territorial claims more aggressively. "It is clear that the disputes are between two sides, but the United States is taking sides, and it is not impartial," Adm. Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of the general staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, said in an interview. In Washington, a rival narrative is taking hold: that China is intent on pushing its territorial claims through the threat of military force and that it ultimately wants to push the United States out of Asia. There have been more intense crises in U.S.-China relations, including the fallout from the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre of pro-democracy protesters, but none, perhaps, as fundamental and structural as this. In November, China spooked its neighbors by announcing an air defense identification zone over the East China Sea, including over islands administered by Japan. In March, the Chinese coast guard tried to block Philippine vessels from resupplying soldiers stationed on the disputed Second Thomas Shoal. Two months later, it deployed a $1 billion deep-sea oil drilling rig into disputed waters off the Vietnamese coast. **It has also been building artificial islands in the South China Sea that U.S. officials say are meant to**

enhance its stance on sovereignty. China says it has historical claims to a huge swath of the South China Sea, but its recent assertiveness has puzzled experts, appearing to undermine last year's efforts to promote a more cooperative, development-focused relationship with its neighbors. Some argue that President Xi Jinping may see external threats as useful in ushering in tough reforms, including of the military; others say that China is simply baring its fangs as it seeks to build a new Asian order in which it, not the United States, is the major player in the region. Most agree, though, that China is asserting itself partly because it now possesses a modern deep-water navy and professional coast guard. Whatever the reason, China's rise has left the United States caught between its commitments to allies and its desire to maintain a constructive relationship with China. In recent months**, it has seemed to emphasize the former**, sending B-52 bombers to fly through China's air defense zone and threatening to reevaluate its military posture in Asia if China extends the zone to the South China Sea. In April, President Obama visited U.S. allies Japan, South Korea and the Philippines in a trip that pointedly excluded China. While in Japan, he became the first president to explicitly say that the U.S. defense treaty covered islands administered by Japan. In the Philippines, he signed a new 10-year defense agreement. There has been an equal and opposite reaction from Beijing. When U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel implicitly accused China in May of "intimidation, coercion or the threat of force" in asserting its territorial claims and warned that the United States "will not look the other way when fundamental principles of the international order are being challenged," Lt. Gen. Wang Guanzhong called Hagel's comments "excessive" and "suffused with hegemony, incitement, threats and intimidation," China Central Television reported. Daniel Russel, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, argues that the blunt exchanges between the countries could be beneficial. "It is an indication of health, I believe, that we are able to be so direct with China, without fearing that we are tanking the relationship or the prospects for cooperation," he said in an interview. "We do not pull our punches, but at the same time, we are working hand in hand in China wherever we can." Some critics say that the United States should have been more assertive in forging closer economic links with Asia through a Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal and with China through a bilateral investment treaty. "We need a lot more weight on the economic side, because that's what keeps your relationship from tipping into a Cold War relationship," said Christopher Johnson of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. **Also fueling China's adventurism is a feeling among some Chinese officials that the United States is inconsistent and lacks resolve. They point to the administration's unwillingness to punish Syria for using chemical weapons and its failure to prevent the Russian move into Crimea as showing it to be a "paper tiger,"** said Johnson, the CIA's former top China analyst, who is in regular contact with Chinese officials. "They believe Obama is fundamentally weak and disinterested," he said. But, Johnson added, Beijing would be wrong to underestimate the U.S. commitment to defend Asia. "America is a sleeping giant," he said, "and if you prod us too hard, we are going to mobilize." Either way, foreign policy experts agree that the relationship deserves much more attention than it is getting. Kerry is widely seen as more interested in the Middle East, while national security adviser Susan E. Rice has yet to visit Beijing, leaving China policy without a sufficiently senior voice in Washington. Meanwhile, Obama's refusal to visit China for a return version of last year's Sunnylands summit in California with Xi has also "personally irritated" his Chinese counterpart, Johnson said — although he is scheduled to visit Beijing for an Asia-Pacific summit in November. With that visit, at least, and with this week's Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the administration has a chance to focus minds on one of its most serious foreign policy challenges, experts say. "Summits," said Ross, of Boston College, "have the value of making presidents pay attention."

Landry '18 – Chinese investors under the BRI don't understand the markets they are investing in AND this experience gap results in risky investments that A. tradeoff with investments that could develop China and B. could have broader effects on the Chinese economy AND Western firms uniquely have experience investing in these countries

Landry, David. "The Belt and Road Bubble is Starting to Burst." Foreign Policy. June 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/27/the-belt-and-road-bubble-is-starting-to-burst/ //RJ

In a sense, the Sicomines resources-for-infrastructure agreement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been just another underperforming deal in a country with no shortage of them. But it is also more than that — namely, a window into the flaws at the heart of Chinese international economic policy, which is already costing its economy dearly. At the turn of the century, *the Chinese government started implementing its "Go Out" policy, which o look for business overseas*. Chinese firms would invest and seek contracts abroad, which would make them more competitive globally while alleviating some of the pressures of a domestic market that was starting to saturate. At the same time, the move would allow Chinese firms to secure new markets for their exports. *The policy was supported by cheap and easy credit from China's policy banks*. *Chinese firms responded to these incentives. Fueled by easy credit and the impetus to go out, taking increasingly risky projects. Unsurprisingly, many of these projects have underperformed massively. And the impacts for Chinese banks, and through them the Chinese economy, are now becoming visible. Consider Congo's Sicomines agreement.* In 2007, the Congolese government signed an enormous resource-for-infrastructure deal originally valued at $9 billion with a consortium of Chinese companies. According to the fleshed-out version of the agreement, signed in 2008, more than 10 million metric tons of copper and some 600,000 metric tons of cobalt were ceded to the newly minted Sicomines, of which the major Chinese state-owned enterprises China Railway Engineering Corp. (CREC) and Sinohydro had majority ownership. In exchange, Sicomines would build $6 billion (later adjusted to $3 billion) worth of infrastructure and invest $3 billion in the mine itself. China's Export-Import Bank agreed to finance the whole thing, with the guarantee that the mine's output would serve to repay its loans down the line. *Ostensibly, the deal was good for China*. Through Sicomines, it would gain a new friend in Joseph Kabila. (Relevant here is that in 2007, unlike today, Kabila had just won Congo's first ever democratic election and was portrayed as a figure of hope for stability, democracy, and development.) The Chinese side of the agreement would also secure massive mineral reserves. Finally, China would offload some of its domestic overcapacity by carrying out $9 billion worth of investments halfway across the world. According to new research — based on dozens of interviews and an in-depth financial model of the agreement — the deal had a net value more than $10 billion to the Chinese consortium when it was signed. But the deal soured. *The Chinese consortium misjudged the market it was entering.* As can be expected from any venture in one of the world's least stable countries, also infamous for its infrastructure deficit, massive delays plagued the development of the mine. For example, after failing to secure electricity from the Congolese grid at the agreed-upon price, Sicomines had to import electricity from Zambia. It is now in the process of building a hydroelectric plant, without which the mine cannot produce at full capacity. Sicomines also got unlucky. In 2013, news broke out that the total estimated copper reserves in its concession had been adjusted down to 6.8 million metric tons — a 35 percent drop. Mirroring this drop, the consortium readjusted its copper production targets down by 37.5 percent. To make things worse, in the years following the signature of the deal, the price of minerals took a hit. Copper now costs under $7,000 per metric ton, down from about $9,000 when the deal was finalized in April 2008. As things stood in late 2016, Sicomines may result in a substantial net loss for the Chinese consortium. *The Sicomines case is not unusual. China's mammoth firms frequently make massive losses on foreign investment ventures.* A recent Foreign Policy piece points out that *individuals and firms have made up an increasingly large share of China's total* *foreign asset purchases in recent years*, from 12 percent in 2011 to nearly 40 percent in 2017, as the People's Bank of China's share of total foreign direct investment shrank. *It turns out that these new investors are poor asset judges. As their share of China's portfolio grew, its aggregate returns dwindled. In 2016, the total return on Chinese foreign investment was 0.4 percent, which is dramatically lower than the 4 percent earned by foreign reserves. Through* the Go Out policy and *Initiative, China's firms have been economically and politically incentivized to invest in countries where they have little to no experience. Chinese President Xi Jinping's trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative has backed the Go Out policy's economic incentives with a healthy dose of political pressure*, *reflecting China's desire to have its economic rise matched by political clout. Chinese firms lack the experience of their Western counterparts when investing abroad; some Western investments date back to colonial times*. Because of their late entry into new markets, Chinese firms may also be more likely to invest in lemons — projects deemed too unprofitable or risky by other investors. *Chinese firms have also been taking on projects that are far outside their field of competence*. The Sicomines deal is a case in point, resulting in two Chinese construction giants now sharing a controlling stake in a copper mine. The possibility has been raised that Chinese firms may be in a haste to invest in large projects, regardless of risk, because they aim to become too big to fail, with the expectation that they will be bailed out even if they throw money down the drain. They may also be seeking to transfer assets abroad to shield them from the state's prying hands should their political fortunes turn. Regardless of Chinese firms' motives for undertaking such risky projects abroad, *failed investments are now fixtures of China's foreign investment portfolio*. Furthermore, *many of these projects are on the books of the ese policy banks that finance them. These banks [expect](#) all their loans to be repaid — and are unlikely to forgive them. However, they will likely renegotiate or even reschedule many loans down the line. The new [rules](#) the Chinese government has recently imposed on policy banks suggest that Beijing believes their lending poses a risk to the broader Chinese economy.* Meanwhile, *risky ventures such as Sicomines carry a huge opportunity cost. While Go Out has funneled billions of dollars out of the Chinese economy, ths of China remain underdeveloped*. It's true that much of the Chinese market is saturated. But *investments in Tibet and Xinjiang would likely yield better returns than those in Congo and South Sudan*. As a bonus, *they would also opment and help ease some of its domestic tensions.*

Van der Putten '16 – China views Western Europe as cooperative and integral to OBOR projects in third countries

Van der Putten, Frans-Paul. "Europe and China's New Silk Roads." Real Instituto Elcano. Dec. 2016.

https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Europe_and_Chinas_New_Silk_Roads_0.pdf //RJ

While China's OBOR approach has been mainly targeting the CEE and Mediterranean countries, other parts of Europe have not been entirely neglected and the list of countries forming part of OBOR is evolving. Beyond regional clusters that play an important role for China's practical outreach, countries can be categorized very roughly by distinguishing three factors (see Figure 1 below): (1) whether a country hosts major concrete 'OBOR projects'; (2) whether China attaches great importance and attention to a country in terms of its OBOR outreach; and (3) whether a country is strongly receptive to China's OBOR initiative. Apart from the railway projects in Western European countries and China's interest in the United Kingdom's role in the internationalization of the RMB, *the Chinese government has shown an interest in cooperating with mainly Western European countries* – such as the United Kingdom, France, Portugal and Spain – *on OBOR projects in 'third countries' – that is, countries in Asia, Africa and even Latin America. China shows active willingness to cooperate with France in francophone Africa, with Spain in Spanish-speaking countries in Latin America, and with Portugal in Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa and Brazil.*

https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/22149/1_Gigaton_Third%20Report_EN.pdf?sequence=1
Renewable energy (RE) and energy efficiency (EE) initiatives are the most prominent and effective means for cutting carbon emissions while promoting sustainable economic growth. As with their timing and scale, the location of these efforts is crucial to achieving global climate goals. Developing countries are projected to drive almost all of the world's energy demand growth this century as well as the vast majority of new buildings, new modes of transportation, and new industrial activity.236 These countries must balance domestic development needs with global climate goals, and they cannot be expected to do so without support from the rest of the world. Developing countries are installing RE facilities at a record pace, accounting for more than half of the nearly 140 GW of RE that came online in 2016. These nations are also developing and implementing more RE and EE policies than ever before, as documented in Chapter 2 of this report.