**North April Neg File**

# Framing

## Topshelf Defense

### Game Over- China

No matter what their link says, **Rehman ‘09 of the Journal for Asian Security** explains that China will go out of their way to contain and reduce India’s influence which means that anything India attempts to do will never materialize because China has a vested interest in alwaybfs preventing India from increasing their regional influence.

Iskander Rehman,5-28-2009, Keeping the Dragon at Bay: India's Counter-Containment of China in Asia, Taylor &amp; Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14799850902885114, //CJ

Ironically, India has a better history of relations with the state of Myanmar than China. The real turning point occurred during the 1988 democratic uprisings. China remained silent during the military junta's brutal repression while India joined the world in condemning the regime's actions and openly supporting the democratic protesters. Having been given the cold shoulder by most of the international community, India included, Myanmar began to gradually drift into China's orbit, the only state that had refrained from criticizing its internal politics. China rapidly became the first hi-tech arms supplier to the massive Burmese Army, and a major investor in Myanmar's natural gas fields. Since the early 1990s, Beijing has been involved in several large infrastructure projects in Myanmar, the most notable being the construction of an all-weather road joining the Chinese city of Kunming to the Burmese town of Mandalay. China has also negotiated the joint development of a naval base on the island of Hianggyi, as well as the construction of Signal Intelligence Facilities (SIGINT) on the Great Coco Islands. 40 40. Anindya Batabyal, “Balancing China in Asia: A Realist Assessment of India's Look East Strategy,” China Report Vol. 42, No. 2 (2006), pp. 179–197. View all notes By the mid-1990s, the evolution in the nature of the Sino-Burmese relationship had not gone unnoticed by India or the countries of ASEAN, which invited Myanmar to join the organization in 1997, in an attempt to prevent it from becoming China's proxy in Southeast Asia. 41 41. Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2001), p. 254. View all notes Myanmar is now viewed by many observers as the epicenter of Sino-Indian rivalry for influence in South and Southeast Asia, where an isolated and impoverished state, largely ignored by the rest of the world, has become the theater of a desperate struggle for resources, regional influence and maritime access. **The persistence and strengthening of the Sino-Pakistani nexus, China's attempts to hinder India's rise as a peer competitor on the regional or world stage, and the deepening of China's forays into South Asia are all factors pointing to a Chinese policy of containment of India. China nurtures the ambition of remaining the sole potential superpower in Asia and is pragmatically pursuing this goal by keeping India bogged down in regional, rather than global affairs, and by neutering Indian influence in its own backyard**. **All this is occurring despite a significant spurt in trade and a renewed emphasis on bilateral engagement. This indicates once again that liberal theories cannot be applied to contemporary Sino-Indian relations. Analysts have often criticized India for its seemingly naïve attitude towards China; officials from Delhi's South Block indulging in longwinded exhortations of Sino-Indian friendship while behind the scenes the Chinese go out of their way to contain Indian power and reduce Indian influence.** The next section of this article will argue, however, that this is no longer the case, and that over the past few years, especially since 1998, India has shed most of its romanticized notions of Sino-Indian friendship and developed a more hard-headed realist approach towards its Chinese neighbor. It would seem that India has chosen to back its engagement of its overbearing neighbor with an active policy of counter-containment.

### Game Over- Factions

It does not matter what India says they can do, **Zakaria ’12 of Harvard University** indicates that the while Indian government is able to cooperate on very few issues, due to the large fractionalization of parties, and the government is very decentralized they are unable to push forward any major foreign policy commitments.

### No Advocacy

Even if India is offered a seat on the Security Council, it won’t be able to effectively exert influence in that position.

**Zakaria ’12** writes in his book **“The Post American World”** that because

a) India’s government is far too decentralized, and lacks the power the prime minister held during the 20th century, and

b) Because of the country’s immense political diversity, causing fracturing among political groups,

India has struggled to push one coherent foreign policy agenda.

### No Veto

**Singh ’17** finds that India has said it would not exercise veto power if it became a permanent member because it has the goal of expediting the reform process of the UNSC.

**Singh 17** (Yoshita Singh, 3-9-2017, "India offers to give up veto 'for now' for UN Security Council seat," Rediff, [https://www.rediff.com/news/report/india-offers-to-give-up-veto-for-now-for-un-security-council-seat/20170309.htm DoA 3/19/19](https://www.rediff.com/news/report/india-offers-to-give-up-veto-for-now-for-un-security-council-seat/20170309.htm%20DoA%203/19/19))

In a bid to get the United Nations reform process moving, India and other G4 nations have said they were open to innovative ideas and willing to not exercise veto as permanent members of a reformed Security Council until a decision on it has been taken. In a joint statement, delivered by India’s Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador Syed Akbaruddin at an inter-governmental negotiations meeting, the G4 nations of India, Brazil, Germany and Japan emphasised that an overwhelming majority of the UN member states supports the expansion of both permanent and non-permanent membership in a reformed Security Council. On the issue of the veto, Akbaruddin said the question of veto has been addressed by many from differing perspectives but the G4 approach is that the problem of veto is not one of quantity (of extending it immediately to new permanent members) but of quality -- of introducing restrictions.

Lydia Swart, 3-1-2015, "Changing the Composition of the Security Council: Is There a Viable Solution?," Center for UN Reform, http://centerforunreform.org/?q=node/629 // JJ  
To our knowledge, no aspirant country has embraced the French proposal. Discussions on it could slow down the negotiations on expansion. Moreover, it seems likely that the G4 is careful not to alienate some of the current permanent members so as not to undermine their bids for permanent seats. Hasn’t the G4 been somewhat flexible about obtaining veto rights? Although the G4 has the reputation for flexibility, its most recent position suggests otherwise. The G4 members are currently willing to agree to a solution where they, and two African countries, would get permanent seats with all the prerogatives and privileges attached, but they would agree not to use their veto power until a review that would take place 15 years later. Obviously, to remove those veto rights at a review will be nearly impossible, not unlike taking away the permanent status and veto power of some of the current permanent members, which everyone seems to agree will be impossible. But isn’t a review in the GA a way to achieve partial reform now, and make additional decisions at a later time? If a decision is difficult now, what would make it any easier to decide 15 years from now? Especially making decisions that are not easily reversible - the biggest problem of the notion of permanency - seems a non-starter.

# Argument Answers

## Developing Countries

### AT: India Protects Developing Countries

1. **Delink:** India might claim to protect developing countries, but its actions don’t match its words. As it has become an emerging power, **Stuenkel ’13 of the India Foreign Affairs Journal** writes that India is rapidly reducing its commitment to developing countries. Indeed, **Dabhade ’17 of Rising Powers Quarterly** writes that, during its time on the Security Council, India rarely voted against the grain.

2. **Impact Mitigation/Defense:** Historically, **Murphy ’18 of the Carnegie Foundation** notes that both Indian leaders and policies have reflected the notion that they would not like a global leadership role, because at any point it would immediately mean that they are attempting to push other smaller and developing countries into a backward position. This controls the direction of the impacts, because Indian leaders have literally come out and said that they would reject leadership roles, because what follows is a long history of colonialism, and Indian leadership would be no different.

C. S. R. Murthy,4-11-2018, India and the Commonwealth: Redirecting the Relationship, Carnegie India, https://carnegieindia.org/2018/04/11/india-and-commonwealth-redirecting-relationship-pub-76054, //CJ

SHIFTING PRIORITIES AFTER NEHRU In the 1960s, as India began to pull away from the Commonwealth, several developments transformed the organization’s character. A large number of African countries joined, and issues in South Africa and Rhodesia attained high priority on the Commonwealth’s agenda. African states felt that India was not aggressive enough in its support for their continent’s anticolonial agenda. Indeed, Indian leaders refrained from continuing an active role on African problems because they believed it might cause resentment among the newly independent African members. In 1970, then **prime minister** Indira Gandhi acknowledged **this risk: We ourselves . . . would not like that position [of a leadership role for India]. . . . We should be very careful that at no time we give an impression that we . . . [want] to take a leading position. That would immediately mean that we are trying to push them [other smaller developing countries] towards a somewhat backward position**.18 During the 1970s, Indian foreign policy makers also paid greater attention to bilateral and regional security issues. The importance of the Commonwealth and India to each other diminished in parallel. Between 1950 and 1971, the net value of India’s trade with the Commonwealth, as a percentage of the total value of the country’s foreign trade, dropped from 38 percent to 15.9 percent.19 The shrinking economic value of the Commonwealth, therefore, curtailed its significance in the overall framework of Indian foreign policy. At the 1975 CHOGM, other participants saw India as a “diffident” attendee.20 Parallel to these transformative developments in India’s engagement, the institutionalization of the Commonwealth to make it functionally autonomous from the UK’s foreign policy establishment received a major boost with the creation of the secretariat. India worried that formal institutions might dilute the potential of the Commonwealth as an informal venue for building a constructive atmosphere of mutual accommodation.21 CHOGMs began to be held outside the United Kingdom, beginning with the 1971 meeting in Singapore. The Singapore Declaration was an organizational milestone in terms of enunciating a set of political values, such as a commitment to democracy, peace, and human rights.

Manish S. Dabhade, August 2017, "India’s Pursuit of United Nations Security Council Reforms", Rising Powers Quarterly, <http://risingpowersproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/vol2.3-dabhade.pdf> // JJ  
India has been elected for seven terms for a two-year non-permanent member seat, the last being 2011-12, only behind Japan, Brazil and Argentina. Except for the first time, when India held the seat earmarked for the Commonwealth group, it has held the seat on every other occasion on behalf of the Asian group. India has been a member of the Council during 1950-51, 1967-68, 1972-73, 1977-78, l984-85, 1991-92, and lastly, 2011-12 which was seen as a “rehearsal for permanent membership” (Srinivasan 2013) During the last term, India won the non-permanent seat with the highest number of votes in the General Assembly showing its impressive electoral popularity. It needs to be recalled that not long ago in 1996, India had lost the elections to Japan by a wide margin for a non-permanent seat. The typical Indian preferences in the UNSC has always been to be the part of the democratic majority contributing to the adoption of broadly acceptable resolutions and decisions. Analyzing all terms of India in the SC barring the last one, Murthy (2011, p.3) points out that India joined 59 per cent of the resolutions adopted either unanimously or without a vote. With regard to aggregate of 113 adopted resolutions (41 percent) that gave rise to a division, India cast an affirmative vote on 101 (89 per cent) of them. Significantly, on not more than a dozen times did India stood aside without joining the concurrent majority, and has not voted against any resolution, and resorted to abstentions only to express its reservations. Remarkably, India was never a loner in abstaining as it always had company of other Council members on many occasions. The Indian behavior herein clearly points to a systematic effort to display a constructive, rule of law abiding and a democratic majority building state in a global, multilateral setting like the Security Council. India’s Security Council Calculus The origins of the Indian interests in the Security Council can be traced as back to the founding of the UN itself when Mahatma Gandhi felt that India, then including Pakistan and Bangladesh, should become a veto-wielding member of the Security Council. But the leadership precedence for independence and managing the difficult, bloody partition followed by the India-Pakistan conflict on Kashmir moved their attention and interests away from the possible opportunity of a seat. (Cohen 2001, p. 33) Later, India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru shied away from the highly debatable offer to join the Security Council by both the superpowers, the US and the then Soviet Union in 1950 and in 1955 respectively, keeping in mind the emerging Cold war calculus and steadfastly refused to join at the expense of China (Harder 2015). Specifically acknowledging India’s rightful claim to a permanent seat, Nehru wrote:

Oliver Stuenkel, December 2013, "Emerging India: A Farewell to Multilateralism?", India Foreign Affairs Journal, http://www.associationdiplomats.org/Publications/ifaj/Vol8/8.4/ARTICLE%204-OS.pdf // JJ [brackets in card, not added by me]

Yet such claims overstate India’s controversial negotiation behaviour and omit significant successes. In many instances, it has proven to be a shrewd strategist. For example, India consistently voted with Washington against Iran’s program at the IAEA, while at the same time maintaining cordial ties with the regime in Tehran.42 As part of the BRICS outfit, it engages in a meaningful way, but cleverly allows Russia and China to spearhead the outfit’s more contentious plans - such as replacing the dollar as the world’s prime currency - in order not to compromise its ties to Washington. In a low-key manner, it firmly promotes the G4’s proposal for UN Security Council reform, while still holding an influential position among the G77 in the UN (although the latter one will be difficult to maintain as India turns into one of the world’s largest economies.) Finally, at the WTO, India is a member of the Five Interested Parties and the G-20, thus effectively straddling both worlds.43 It is important to keep this dual role in mind when making predictions about India’s future role in multilateral outfits. While the call for a more democratic and just world order still tinges India’s foreign policy rhetoric, there is a growing sense among poor developing countries that India no longer represents their interests. This has become clear in several instances. For example, during the WTO negotiations, India’s interests were clearly opposed to those of small developing countries. Similar reservations exist among small poor nations in the Climate Change negotiations. Nayar and Paul argue that “emotionally though not formally, India has…already left…the Non-Aligned Movement”,44 thus moving further away from the position of developing countries. Similarly, as Raja Mohan adds, “by the late 1990s, [India] was compelled to look for ways to ease out of the political straightjacket the NAM had become on its external relations.”45 This matters for India’s multilateral strategy. While it has traditionally called for a more prominent position in institutions such as the UNSC in its role as ‘spokesperson of the poor’, yet already in 2005, the G4’s effort failed, among other reasons, because poor developing countries remained unconvinced that emerging powers such as Brazil and India would effectively represent their interests at the high table. Does India genuinely want to make the global order more legitimate and democratic? Or does it merely seek to join an extended oligarchy? Over the next years, India will face the stark choice of opting for either inclusive and more ineffective, or exclusive and more effective, outfits. It will be increasingly tempted to opt for the latter. There is growing evidence to support the claim that, as India grows more powerful, it is keener to work bilaterally, or in small, at times regional, groupings. The unexpected benefits that emerged from the bilateral relationship with the USA seem to have encouraged the Indian government to sign a strategic partnership with virtually all global actors. In response to the nuclear deal, Pratap Banu Mehta is worried about India becoming more like the USA as it emerges “unilateral, oriented towards hegemony more than the stability of the world”.46 Indeed, as India grows more powerful, it will increasingly be able to dictate terms in its bilateral relationships which are likely to be more beneficial to India.

### AT: I/L – Sanctions

1. **Delink:** Sanctions are no longer mis-used. **McMahon ’06 of the Council on Foreign Relations** writes that, since then, the U.N. has reformed the sanctions process by targeting specific commodities and individuals, as opposed to using sanctions as a ‘blunt instrument’.

Robert McMahon, 11-17-2006, "UN Sanctions: A Mixed Record", Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/un-sanctions-mixed-record // JJ  
Yes. The humanitarian toll of the Iraq sanctions—thousands of child deaths were attributed to the early years of the sanctions regime by some health experts—brought an end to the blunt instrument of comprehensive sanctions in the mid-1990s. UN sanctions regimes since that time have targeted sectors such as arms, cash-earning commodities such as diamonds, or financial assets and travel. Lopez, of the Kroc Institute, says the UN’s method for mounting sanctions programs, especially when there is a strong lead nation chairing a Security Council sanctions committee, have improved. “The sanctions package, if you will, now includes support and investigative missions, external expert monitors, a more effective accountability system,” he says. But targeted sanctions, especially those related to counterterrorism efforts, have drawn criticism that once a person lands on a UN terrorism blacklist, it is difficult to get delisted. Chesterman says: “Once you start identifying individuals there is a presumption that these individuals should be able to challenge that identification.” Brown University’s Watson Institute for International Studies raises concern about emerging legal challenges to such targeted sanctions in a March 2006 [study (PDF)](http://watsoninstitute.org/pub/Strengthening_Targeted_Sanctions.pdf). The report recommends improving Security Council procedures to make sure such sanctions are “fair and clear” and do not invite a judicial backlash in some jurisdictions.

Rishika Chauhan,12-16-2014, Decoding India’s Stand on International Sanctions, Center for the Advanced Study of India (CASI), https://casi.sas.upenn.edu/iit/chauhan, //CJ  
The third factor is India’s willingness or unwillingness to support the cause of sanctions, i.e., the salience of the issue for India. While India’s bitter experience as a sanctionee and its interests in opposing sanctions considerably explains its behavior, salience of the issue that sparks sanctions also has a role to play. **New Delhi has stood by sanctions that are imposed to support issues it believes in**. Democracy, as C. Raja Mohan puts it, has not been a “political priority” in India’s foreign policy, consequently sanctions imposed to promote democracy have not managed to strike a chord with the Indian government. However, sanctions placed to protest discrimination, especially against the Indian diaspora, have garnered support from New Delhi. In the 1940s, India became the first country to impose sanctions on South Africa to protest against apartheid. In addition to the action, it also supported unilateral sanctions on the South African government, convincing countries, as well as international organizations, to follow suit. Subsequently, in the late 1980s, India followed a similar policy and imposed sanctions to protest against discrimination of people of Indian origin living in Fiji. Sri Lanka is a recent case where issue-salience has been recognized and a pro-sanctions public opinion seems to be emerging. In the last few years, the heads of various political parties have urged the government to support and impose sanctions on the southern neighbor as a punitive action for its alleged abuse of power during the twenty-six-year civil war. In 2013, the Tamil Nadu governor, K. Rosaiah asked the Indian government to not only place economic sanctions but also collaborate with other countries to design a sanction regime against the Sri Lankan government. He reasoned that it was maltreatment, discrimination, and displacement of Tamils in Sri Lanka that was making him demand sanctions. Notably, sanctions were an important subject for Jawaharlal Nehru, the original architect of Indian foreign policy. He discussed this instrument of statecraft as early as in 1938 while explaining the Congress’s attitude towards collective security. He said that for any system of collective security to be successful, it had to be backed by sanctions. However, lately the Indian leadership has been reticent about the topic. Meanwhile, it cannot be ignored that on certain occasions, New Delhi has had to learn to adapt to unilateral sanctions. Iran is an important case in this regard. Though India was against unilateral sanctions placed on Iran, it could not overlook secondary sanctions which were a part of the U.S.-led sanctions regime. As the secondary sanctions threatened economic restrictions on non-U.S. citizens and companies, several Indian investors were deterred from investing and engaging with Iran. **Though in principle, India supports UN sanctions and has wholeheartedly supported important UN sanctions like the ones placed on North Korea, there have been some departures**. In 1990, India had opposed UN sanctions against Iraq and abstained from voting in 1992 when the UN Security Council wanted to sanction Libya. Nevertheless, it can be said that domestic reasons as well as normative considerations have played a primary role in determining India’s response to unilateral sanctions. Domestically, India’s past experience with sanctions and national interests have been imperative. At the same time, normative concerns arising from sensitivity to particular issues have also determined India’s position on sanctions. However, it cannot be denied that in the past, India has, itself, used sanctions to forward its domestic and foreign policy objectives, though it remains to be seen what kind of considerations determine its stance on sanctions as the country gains influence in world politics.

### AT: I/L – Myanmar Sanctions

1. **Strength of link weighing:** A variety of other countries have imposed sanctions on Myanmar. The U.N. isn’t the brink.

2. **Delink:** Others will block any action on sanctions in Myanmar. **Yhome ’18 of the Observer Research Foundation** writes that China and Russia protect Myanmar from any retaliation by the U.N.

K. Yhome, Observer Research Foundation, 8-29-2018, "Why UN’s report and sanctions are unlikely to change Myanmar", ORF, https://www.orfonline.org/research/43678-why-uns-report-and-sanctions-are-unlikely-to-change-myanmar/ // JJ  
In a significant development concerning Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslims minority in Rakhine, the United Nations has charged Myanmar of “genocidal intent”, the strongest condemnation from the international community so far. The background and UNHRC’s report Violence in northern Rakhine displaced several hundred thousand Rohingyas within Myanmar and driven out some 700,000 of them to neighbouring Bangladesh after the military launched a bloody crackdown triggered by militant attacks on security forces in late August 2017. The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC)-appointed Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar in its report called for the UN Security Council (UNSC) to set up an ad hoc tribunal to try suspects or refer them to the International Criminal Court in the Hague, impose an arms embargo on Myanmar and subject its officials to targeted sanctions and travel bans. Myanmar has consistently rejected UN reports on human rights violations in Rakhine and it’s likely to do so this time around. In fact, when the UN fact-finding mission issued an interim report in March, Myanmar rejected it and accused its members as “biased” and “one-sided”. Myanmar also refused access and cooperation in the UN investigation. Why international pressure fails to work The question is where would the UN three-member penal report go from here. Much will depend on whether the permanent members of the UNSC want to pursue the allegations. The veto-wielding members have often found themselves divided on Myanmar with China and Russia protecting it from any harsh action. The report has yet again brought into focus the gravity of the issue before the international community. However, it also raises the question if international pressure on Myanmar would be effective in finding a lasting resolution. The UN mission hinges its recommendations largely on the threat of legal action. In a divided UNSC, such an action looks distant. On the other hand, the wider societal challenge in Myanmar forms the other side of the problem that needs urgent attention. Punishing the guilty needs to go hand-in-hand with finding ways in resolving the deep-rooted ethnic and religious animosities in the country. As the international community takes measures to punish the perpetrators of violence, it is equally important to help build social co-existence as a long-term guarantee to avoid renewed conflicts. Little achieved from economic sanctions In the past, blanket economic sanctions by western countries on Myanmar had little impact in inducing a behavioural change among Myanmar military ruling elites. Last year, the United States re-imposed targeted sanctions on Myanmar, the effectiveness of which remains to be seen. The UN report recommends travel bans and targeted sanctions against Myanmar’s military generals. Such measures may have symbolic significance, particularly if they come from the UN. The UN report has charged Myanmar’s top military brass of the “gravest crimes” and blamed the country’s de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi for failing to use her “moral authority” to protect civilians. With the top military and civilian leadership under the scanner, both may work in unison to minimise the impact of the report. This means the country’s internal politics may not be adversely affected by the report. However, if the calls for Myanmar’s military commander Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to step down emerge as a rallying point in the days to come, it will have repercussions on the internal power dynamics within the armed forces and in ties with political parties. India-Myanmar ties Delhi has long opposed unilateral actions against Myanmar, although it has supported UN initiatives. India was part of a UNSC delegation that visited Myanmar in May along with three other neighbours — China, Laos, and Thailand. When the UNHRC passed the resolution extending the mandate of this fact-finding mission on Myanmar in September 2017, India did not openly disassociated itself from the resolution, even as it argued for “constructive engagement” as a preferred approach to protect and promote human rights. The UN report may not change India’s official position on Myanmar and Delhi would continue its constructive engagement with the country. Even so, given the magnitude of the allegations made by the UN report, external pressures on India in its bilateral dealings with Myanmar and when the issue comes up in UN bodies cannot be ruled out.

### ~Peacekeeping~

### AT: PKO Reform General

1. **Delink:** India isn’t willing to bring anything new to the table. **Yadav ’14 of Singhania University** writes that India is simply advocating for the same old reforms that any other power has.

2. **Delink:** India alone doesn’t have the power to change the structure of peacekeeping. It still faces opposition from the other members of the Security Council, who also have vetos. This is why the **The United States Institute of Peace** writes that, while the US talked about reforming peacekeeping for years, they have been unable to change anything.

**This outweighs** any of their warrants on probability insofar as no matter how much it makes sense that they should be able impact change, it’s just empirically not what happens.

3. **Delink:** **Sidhu ‘16 of Global Peace Operations Review** analyzes that it’s simply untrue that India has better motivations than the rest of the UN. In fact, their primary motivation is selfish: building international credibility and gaining a seat on the UNSC, as well as free training for their troops. Unless they prove that affirming will see an enormous change not only in India’s power, but also in India’s peacekeeping goals, peacekeeping will not change for the better with Indian reform.

**This outweighs** whatever they say on strength of link because while their words may say they care about reform, their actions simply don’t.

4. **Delink: Okochi ’17** finds that reform of the council is nearly impossible, as the council is entirely gridlocked and requires consensus of the P5 and has historically been extremely difficult.

5. **Leon ’19 of UN Dispatch** writes that peacekeeping forces are already massively underfunded and will soon run out of money. This means peacekeeping doesn’t exist in either world.

[**Turn:** peacekeepers disproportionately abuse civilians as **Anderlini 17** of **Foreign Affairs** writes that in 2016 alone, the UN filed 41 cases of abuse by their own peacekeepers. This only increases if you affirm because India’s goal in reform, according to **Akbaruddin 16**, is to increase the presence of peacekeepers not only during the process of crafting peace but also before and after. This outweighs because structural abuse short circuits the impact of peace insofar as state level peace doesn’t matter if interpersonal violence is simultaneously increasing.]

Mark Leon, 1-16-2019, "UN Peacekeeping Faces Massive Funding Shortfall," UN Dispatch, https://www.undispatch.com/un-peacekeeping-faces-massive-funding-shortfall/ // JJ  
“Active peacekeeping missions are soon expected to face liquidity gaps due to late payments and increasing arrears,” Antonio Guterres wrote in the letter, seen by UN Dispatch. “As of today, arrears are nearing US$2 billion and are likely to keep growing. Current cash balances cover less than two months of operations, compared to four months last year.” Peacekeeping is funded through dues payments from member states to the United Nations. The problem is that UN member states are not paying their dues on time and in full. If this trend continues much longer, the United Nations will simply run out of money to pay for all the peacekeeping operations it deploys around the world, which includes about 100,000 troops deployed to 14 global hotspots. The top contributors to UN Peacekeeping include the United States, China, Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Of these, the United States is by far the largest single contributor, and is assessed at nearly 28% of the cost of UN Peacekeeping. The problem is, the Trump administration has not been paying its dues in full and has consequently wracked up arrears to UN Peacekeeping of about $750 million — a significant portion of the $2 billion shortfall.

Sanam **Anderlini**, Foreign Affairs, 6-9-**2017**, "UN Peacekeepers' Sexual Assault Problem," [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2017-06-09/un-peacekeepers-sexual-assault-problem //](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2017-06-09/un-peacekeepers-sexual-assault-problem%20//) RM

When I started working in peacebuilding over 20 years ago, the United Nations was coming under fire because multinational forces working as **peacekeepers in Cambodia had sexually abused women and girls and spread HIV/AIDS and other diseases among local populations. In the many years since, UN peacekeepers have been accused of doing the same in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Liberia, and beyond. In 2014, peacekeepers from France and Georgia were implicated in incidents of sexual violence against young children in the Central African Republic. In 2016, following investigations, the UN**[**reported**](https://apnews.com/4282fe269faa42c5a2dc7d6eded9af54)**41 cases** of abuse involving peacekeepers from Burundi and Gabon, including eight paternity cases and six filed on behalf of minors.

**Okochi 17** (Olufunke Christiana Okochi, from the University of Regina, Reforms in the United Nations’ Security Council: A Case Study of Nigeria, <https://ourspace.uregina.ca/bitstream/handle/10294/7737/Okochi_Olufunke_200267741_MA_JS_Spring2017.pdf> , DoA 3/19/19)

Though there have been calls for reform over the years, the UN General Assembly began to debate UNSC reforms in 1993 (Global Policy Forum, 2015). However, this remains a complex issue, likely to be debated well into the future. Each of the four proposals studied in Chapter 4 lays out its reasons for reform and presents its suggested approach to these expansions. However, they each have challenges to their adaptation. A common challenge is consensus. It has thus far been impossible to achieve consensus from all other UN members on any reform, including the two proposals put forward by the UN High Level Panel in its report. Even if any proposal does obtain the consensus needed from the UN General Assembly, it is likely to be very difficult to achieve consensus from all the P5, an important and necessary step to achieving ratification. This will be made even more difficult with proposals that require amendments to the use of the veto or veto rights. Members of the exclusive P5 group on the Council are unlikely to give up or share their rights to the veto and may veto any proposals put before them for a vote, if they disagree with its terms. In view of all of the above, this study thus concludes that it would be very difficult to reform the UNSC membership, particularly by expanding or amending its permanent membership structure. However, if this is to be considered, a possible approach may be to identify and examine criteria from reform proposals (e.g. the criteria identified from the four proposals in this thesis) and use these as a basis for determining membership eligibility. 90 Nigeria, its Role in Africa and Potential in the United Nations As earlier stated, the criteria used for this exercise was derived from all four reform proposals examined in Chapter 4. It includes measures such as a country’s

Syed **Akbaruddin**, 5-19-**2016**, "Syed Akbaruddin: UN Peacekeeping is About Politics, not Troop Numbers," No Publication, <https://peaceoperationsreview.org/interviews/syed-akbaruddin-un-peacekeeping-is-about-politics-not-troop-numbers/> // RM

SA: **In theory, everyone agrees that peace is a spectrum and recently the General Assembly and Security Council passed the**[**Peacebuilding resolution**](http://peaceoperationsreview.org/commentary/sustaining-peace-is-a-core-activity-of-the-un/) **agreeing it is not only in post-conflict that peacebuilding should be a focus but that it can be used prior to the conflict, during, and after. But when we compare the budgetary requests for peacebuilding, even 1 per cent of what is being given to peacekeeping was not accepted**. How do we expect to do all of this with not even 1 per cent of the budget, perhaps $80 million? Several countries feel that such requests should go through extra-budgetary channels. Other member states see peacebuilding as a good way to protect or restore institutions before you even need peacekeeping. If peacebuilding is so important, then why not commit at least 1 per cent to such initiatives? **There is a disconnect between what is being said and what is being done. If you claim the whole spectrum is important, then you need to put equal resources behind this.**

**US Institute of Peace**, "U.N. Peacekeeping Is Vital—and So Is its Reform," United States Institute of Peace, [https://www.usip.org/events/un-peacekeeping-vital-and-so-its-reform //](https://www.usip.org/events/un-peacekeeping-vital-and-so-its-reform%20//) RM

On Dec. 6, the U.N. undersecretary-general for peacekeeping operations, Jean Pierre Lacroix, and a group of experts discussed what reforms are planned, and what obstacles they face. This event is sponsored by the U.N. Association of the National Capital Area, the United Nations Foundation, and the U.S. Institute of Peace. **The Trump Administration has called for constructive U.N. reforms to answer the challenges of inefficiency and sexual abuse and U.S. officials promise to support reforms announced by Secretary General Antonio Guterres in September. What can the U.N. reform effort mean for making our world more stable—and for U.S. interests?**

WPS **Sidhu**, 1-11-**2016**, "What drives South Asians to peacekeeping?," No Publication, <https://peaceoperationsreview.org/article/what-drives-south-asians-to-peacekeeping/> // RM

SHOWING COMMITMENT Besides financial incentives, experts note, these **countries gain diplomatic benefits by committing to peacekeeping operations. "It shows that they are committed to the UN,**" says Anit Mukherjee, an assistant professor in the South Asia Program of the Singapore-based S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS). "**When these nations have an active peacekeeping profile, they enhance their image. They can argue that they are doing their part to help promote international stability**," he said. And **in the case of India**, some analysts argue, part **of the motivation may also be linked to the South Asian giant's aspirations as a global power. "New Delhi has often built its case for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council on the back of its contributions to UN peacekeeping,**" Princeton's Mukherjee told DW. Analyst WPS Sidhu has a similar view. He argues that India's economic rise and the growing risks of peace operations, which are now increasingly tasked with protecting civilians, has underlined the need to align the objective of participating in peace operations with New Delhi's strategic interests. "**India's increasing economic stakes in many of the countries that host UN peace operations further stressed this linkage**," he told DW. UN-FUNDED TRAINING Michael Kugelman, a South Asia expert at the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson Center, also points out **that by contributing to international peacekeeping these countries gain a foothold in regions where they'd like to deepen diplomatic and economic relationships, and build capacity and morale within their armed forces through ample training opportunities.** Moreover, says Princeton's Mukherjee, **when South Asian soldiers are deployed as UN peacekeepers, they often gain in terms of training, experience with new technologies and combat techniques, as well as the ability to learn from other countries' military practices.** Analyst Kugelman added: "And best of all for these South Asian countries - many of them cash-strapped - is that **the UN foots the bill.**" However, not everyone believes there are always qualitative benefits. Sushant Singh, associate editor of The Indian Express newspaper, and a former UN military observer in Cote d'Ivoire, argues that troops are not necessarily better trained when serving in the UN given that the role of a UN peacekeeper is totally different to that needed in a conventional operation. But regardless of any potential similarities with South Asia, the operational areas often remain foreign to many South Asian troops who, according to Colonel Raman, often struggle to cope with issues such as food, social adjustment, an unfamiliar cultural context, or develop health problems. And then there are the differences in language. "Language is somewhat a barrier since the local language like Temne in Sierra Leone is not known to anyone in the UN contingent. However, since officers are fluent in English (especially in the Indian Army), it is not a problem in most places. In Francophone countries, however, English speakers face a functional issue," said Raman. Apart from military personnel, South Asian nations also contribute election observers, civil reconstruction teams and development specialists. So it would be incorrect to argue that South Asia only sends its troops and not other resources, say experts. However, while some of these may be at the governmental level, others are deployed either through international NGOs or private sector, as Anit Mukherjee indicates.

### AT: Spec: Misconduct

1. **Non-unique:** **The Defense Post ’18** writes that the U.N. is currently reforming peacekeeping operations and toughening responses to peacekeeping misconduct.

Defense Post, September 21, 2018, "UN resolution reinforces response to peacekeeper misconduct," https://thedefensepost.com/2018/09/21/un-resolution-peacekeeper-misconduct/ // JJ  
The U.N. Security Council unanimously passed a resolution on Friday, September 21 aimed at toughening the response to peacekeeper misconduct following a string of failures by the blue helmets to protect civilians. U.N. peacekeeping missions are facing a damaging wave of allegations of sex abuse and of failing to come to the aid of civilians caught up in violence, notably in the Central African Republic and South Sudan. The United States presented the measure to improve peacekeeping performance but faced resistance from Russia, China and other nations, which found it harsh toward troop-contributing countries. A council diplomat described negotiations on the text as “very tough” and said there had been changes to the original draft. The [resolution](https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13518.doc.htm) is intended to reinforce measures such as repatriating peacekeepers and withholding U.N. payments for soldiers involved in misconduct – penalties that have irked troop contributors. Stressing the need to improve posture, behaviour, leadership, initiative and accountability at all levels, the resolution reaffirms Security Council support for the development of a comprehensive policy framework that identifies standards of performance and benchmarks for evaluating U.N. peacekeeping personnel to ensure accountability. That accountability should incorporate “a range of responses proportionate to the identified performance failures,” including withholding reimbursement, repatriating or replacing units, as well as revocation of delegated authorities, change of duties, or dismissal. The resolution requests that these decisions are “predicated on objective performance data.” It welcomes member states’ commitment to support improved training and capacity building activities to strengthen peacekeeping, and calls on the Secretary-General to ensure that U.N. missions have capable and accountable leadership, including through improving selection processes, training and mentoring. The measure also welcomes initiatives by U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to set up special investigations, and requests that he “act with urgency” to look into significant alleged peacekeeping failures, stressing that the findings of these probes should be transparent. The resolution requests that Guterres include in his reports on peacekeeping missions a summary of actions taken to improve mission performance and address performance challenges. Resolution ‘creates real accountability measures’ Speaking after the its adoption, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley [said](https://usun.state.gov/remarks/8625) the resolution “mandates a timely and transparent reporting process for performance failures.” “It creates real accountability measures for when these failures occur. And it applies objective criteria – data, not politics – to match the right police and troops with the right peacekeeping roles,” Haley said. U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration has taken a hard line on U.N. funding, cutting contributions and pushing for cost-saving reforms. In July, [U.N. member countries agreed a peacekeeping budget of just under $6.7 billion](https://thedefensepost.com/2018/07/01/un-peacekeeping-budget-agreed/). The top contributors to peacekeeping funding are the U.S. with 28.5 percent, China with 10.3 percent Japan with 9.7 percent, Germany and France with 6.3 percent each, and the U.K with 5.8 percent. But in March, Haley said other countries need to “step up” and pay a larger share. She said Washington would cap its contribution to 25 percent, which has been U.S. law since the 1990s but has been waived in the past.

### AT: Spec: Sexual Assault

1. **Delink:** **The Defense Post ’18** continues that new regulations — designed to toughen regulations and advocate for victims of sexual assault — implemented by the U.N. Secretary General are currently improving peacekeeping operations.

Defense Post, September 21, 2018, "UN resolution reinforces response to peacekeeper misconduct," https://thedefensepost.com/2018/09/21/un-resolution-peacekeeper-misconduct/ // JJ  
Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN Peacekeeping Guterres has vowed to toughen the U.N. response to sexual abuse committed by the blue helmets and has appointed a victims’ advocate to oversee the handling of cases. As of September 21, a total of 136 out of 193 member states have [endorsed](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/action-for-peacekeeping-a4p) the [Declaration of Shared Commitments](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/dpko-dfs-declaration-shared-commitments-unpeacekeeping-1812605e.pdf) on U.N. Peacekeeping, ahead of a high-level [meeting](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/ga73-high-level-meeting-action-peacekeeping) on peacekeeping on September 25 during this year’s General Assembly General Debate. The declaration is key element of Guterres’ Action for Peacekeeping [initiative](https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2018-03-28/secretary-generals-remarks-security-council-high-level-debate) to strengthen support for peacekeeping operations. It is based on months of consultations with member states as well as international and regional organizations and reflects their commitment, representing collective action to strengthen peacekeeping. Guterres’ predecessor Ban Ki-moon took the unprecedented step of firing the commander of [Minusca](https://thedefensepost.com/tag/minusca), the U.N. mission in the Central African Republic over his handling of dozens of cases of sex abuse and misconduct by the peacekeepers. Ban also sacked the head of [UNMISS](https://thedefensepost.com/tag/unmiss/), the mission in South Sudan, following a report that showed peacekeepers failed to respond to appeals for help from aid workers who came under attack at a hotel compound near a U.N. base in Juba in July 2016. On September 6, a [South Sudan military court found 10 soldiers guilty of raping five foreign aid workers and murdering a local journalist](https://thedefensepost.com/2018/09/06/court-finds-10-south-sudan-soldiers-guilty-rape-murder/) during the fighting in Juba.

### AT: Spec: Reform R2P

U.N. intervention abroad is built upon the idea of the “responsibility to protect”, which gives the international community a mandate to intervene militarily in others’ conflicts.

1. **Non-unique:** **Von Eisiedel ’16 of UN University** writes that China and Russia already oppose these missions. **Chesterman ’18 of the National University of Singapore** confirms that China and Russia, following Libya, have vetoed a variety of important R2P missions.

2. **Delink:** **Virk ’13 of the International Conflict Center** reports that India hasn’t even taken a clear stance on R2P, standing for it sometimes and against it others.

Simon Chesterman, 8-1-2018, "R2P and Humanitarian Intervention: From Apology to Utopia and Back Again" National University of Singapore, https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=544017099074094112029118099020068011027055029016031058025073030064120016095092104074110122119106047059058117067124127120085031102009075041077099107021125110077004088011018120083015127112012121116117125109029098099121016116117068094006127123004101084&amp;EXT=pdf // JJ  
Despite clearly satisfying any notional threshold for action, the failure to respond meaningfully to the unfolding Syrian crisis can only partly be explained by Russian ties to Assad’s regime. China joined with Russia in vetoing several resolutions, with Libya casting a shadow over these debates insofar as resolutions explicitly renouncing regime change as a goal had been used to achieve exactly that.48 Perhaps of more interest for present purposes is that the states agitating for action tended not to use the language of R2P — either wary of raising the spectre of Libya or, perhaps, because that language tends to be used in support of foreign policy objectives rather than to create those objectives. If the latter is true, this would be consistent with the more cynical accounts of humanitarian intervention, which posit that the volume of a state’s outrage at a humanitarian crisis varies directly with its willingness to act in response to that crisis. Much as triumphalism at R2P’s influence in Libya tended to overstate the case, reports of the death of R2P after Syria were greatly exaggerated.49 Subsequent years saw continued mixed blessings for R2P. Russia and China vetoed at least four resolutions with R2P language over Syria,50 while the Council as a whole was manifestly unable to deal with the crises in Central African Republic, Yemen, and elsewhere. There were also some indications of a more principled opposition to R2P. Although China’s former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Qian Qichen, was a commissioner on the body that came up with the concept of R2P, there are signs that it is rethinking its support. In a 2014 speech on the international rule of law, the current Foreign Minister Wang Yi highlighted some of the ongoing difficulties: ‘Hegemonism, power politics and all forms of “new interventionism” pose a direct challenge to basic principles of international law including respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs.’ 51 Though China’s rise sometimes inspires fears that it will seek to establish an alternative model of international order — an ‘Eastphalian’ system,52 for example, opposed to the ‘Westphalian’ one that now dominates — such statements actually appear more consistent with a traditionally conservative approach to sovereignty that dominated for most of the twentieth century. 53

Kudrat **Virk**, **2013**, "India and the Responsibility to Protect: A Tale of Ambiguity," No Publication, [https://www.academia.edu/1622236/India\_and\_the\_Responsibility\_to\_Protect\_A\_Tale\_of\_Ambiguity //](https://www.academia.edu/1622236/India_and_the_Responsibility_to_Protect_A_Tale_of_Ambiguity%20//) RM

Military intervention to halt atrocities is one of the most contentious aspects of R2P and with which India has often expressed disagreement in the past. Since the 2005 World Summit, however, there has been an apparent softening in that opposition. This article takes a close-up look at the empirical record, revealing ambiguity in Indian attitudes from the outset that militates against categorizing them as either ‘for’ or ‘against’ humanitarian intervention. The portrait that emerges is of a reactive actor driven incrementally away from a default preference for sovereignty as autonomy, whilst harbouring deep concerns about armed intervention. This article suggests that cautious and reluctant accommodation offers the best description of India’s still unresolved stance on humanitarian intervention. That fits in with a broad preference for pragmatism in foreign policy, which has struggled to balance traditional concerns with a ‘new’ ambition to acquire and sustain greater power-political influence in a changing world.

**International Council for the Responsibility to Protect**, 10-7-**2011**, "UN Security Council Fails to Uphold its Responsibility to Protect in Syria," ICRtoP Blog, <https://icrtopblog.org/2011/10/07/un-security-council-fails-to-uphold-its-responsibility-to-protect-in-syria/> // RM

In this post, we explore the efforts to negotiate a Resolution on Syria leading up to the 4 October vote, and discuss the explanations of the **double veto by Russia and China in an effort to comprehend the Council’s failure to uphold its responsibility to protect.**

Von Einsiedel and Salih 2016 (Sebastian Von Einsedel, ex-director of the UN University Center for Policy Research, and Cale Salih, research officer with the Center for Policy Research at UN University. November 29, 2016. *Center for Policy Research.* “The UN in the Era of Trump”, https://cpr.unu.edu/the-un-in-the-era-of-trump.html . DOA: April 14, 2019)

be felt and tested is probably Syria, where Presidents Putin and Trump may agree on backing Assad as the lesser evil against ISIS (notwithstanding the fact that Iran would emerge as a main beneficiary). Washington and Moscow could reinforce each other’s take-no-prisoners approach to terrorism, to the detriment of respect for human rights and due process. Already, the UNSC has a dire human rights record in the context of its counter-terrorism work.[[1]](https://cpr.unu.edu/the-un-in-the-era-of-trump.html" \l "_ftn1) These [human rights deficits](https://cpr.unu.edu/the-un-security-council-in-an-age-of-great-power-rivalry.html) have undermined the legitimacy and effectiveness of the UNSC’s counter-terrorism effort, which may suffer further as a result of a growing perception that it is directed against the Muslim world. With the America First crowd’s prioritisation of a [narrowly defined](http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/02/01/commentary/world-commentary/long-last-trump-doctrine-revealed/#.WDehvrJ96Uk) “national interest,” a convergence of views on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) may well emerge between the US on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other. The latter two, despite their rhetorical endorsement of the concept in 2005, have always seen R2P as a [smokescreen for the pursuit of Western interests](https://cpr.unu.edu/how-antonio-guterres-can-advance-the-uns-protection-agenda.html). UN-authorised use of force principally for humanitarian purposes may well be a thing of the past – at least for the foreseeable future. That said, the US-Russian honeymoon period is unlikely to last, as the interests of the two countries are not aligned on a number of regions and issues, from Eastern Europe to missile defence. The Republican establishment remains largely anti-Russian and is likely to pressure the administration to respond forcefully if faced with Russian moves to expand its influence in its near-abroad and, possibly, countries that are NATO allies. It is worth remembering that the “reset” policy, actively promoted by President Obama after entering the White House in an effort to enlist Russian cooperation to address the Iranian nuclear crisis and other security challenges, was a short-lived one.

### AT: Spec: Efficiency

1. **Analytical delink:** Making the process more efficient would require permanent members to give up part of their veto power. This will never happen – **Hosli ’17 of Leiden University** writes that reforming the veto would require the assent of the P5 in order to amend the U.N. charter.

2. **Link turn:** India’s inclusion on the Council would make it less efficient, not more. **Gardiner ’07 of the Heritage Foundation** writes that expanding the UNSC would elongate negotiation time by introducing new, contrarian voices into the mix, thereby subjecting the Council to paralyzing gridlock.

**This outweighs on strength of link:** There are a variety of other political barriers — e.g., P5 support — to India passing the reforms they're talking about, butcouncil paralysis is inherent to India joining.

Madeleine O. Hosli, 4-18-2017, "Why is change so slow? Assessing prospects for United Nations Security Council reform," Taylor & Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17487870.2017.1305903 // JJ  
To alter the fundamental properties of the UNSC, namely its size, composition, the majority threshold or the P-5 veto, the UN Member States have to amend UN Charter articles 23 and 27 collectively (Russett, O’Neill, and Sutterlin [1997](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17487870.2017.1305903)Russett, Bruce M., Barry O’Neill, and James S. Sutterlin. 1997. “Breaking the Restructuring Logjam.” In The Once and Future Security Council. 1st ed., edited by Bruce M. Russett and Ian Hurd, 153–169. New York: St. Martin’s Press. [[Google Scholar]](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?hl=en&publication_year=1997&pages=153-169&author=Bruce+M.+Russett&author=Barry+O%E2%80%99Neill&author=James+S.+Sutterlin&title=Breaking+the+Restructuring+Logjam), 163). This could be done in two ways: Article 108 of the UN Charter requires two-thirds of the UNGA membership including all of the P-5 to ratify an agreement on UNSC reform. Alternatively, article 109 stipulates that two-thirds of the UNGA membership, in addition to nine of the 15 UNSC members can convene a conference of UN member states. Any amendment adopted there enters into force if two-thirds of the UNGA, as well as all permanent members, have ratified it (Witschel [2012b](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17487870.2017.1305903)Witschel, Georg. 2012b. “Article 109.” In The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary. 3rd ed., edited by Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Hermann Mosler, Georg Nolte, Andreas Paulus, and Nikolai Wessendorf, 2232–2241. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [[Google Scholar]](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?hl=en&publication_year=2012b&pages=2232-2241&author=Georg+Witschel&title=Article+109)). With a total number of 193 member states, the two-thirds majority threshold amounts to 129 votes. Accordingly, 65 UN member states can form a blocking minority. To date, UN Member States have amended the UN Charter three times on the basis of article 108, notably to increase UNSC membership from 11 to 15. In contrast, the UN Member States have never invoked article 109 (Witschel [2012a](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17487870.2017.1305903)Witschel, Georg. 2012a. “Article 108.” In The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary. 3rd ed., edited by Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Hermann Mosler, Georg Nolte, Andreas Paulus, and Nikolai Wessendorf, 2199–2231. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [[Google Scholar]](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?hl=en&publication_year=2012a&pages=2199-2231&author=Georg+Witschel&title=Article+108), [2012b](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17487870.2017.1305903)Witschel, Georg. 2012b. “Article 109.” In The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary. 3rd ed., edited by Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Hermann Mosler, Georg Nolte, Andreas Paulus, and Nikolai Wessendorf, 2232–2241. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [[Google Scholar]](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?hl=en&publication_year=2012b&pages=2232-2241&author=Georg+Witschel&title=Article+109)).

Nile Gardiner, Heritage Foundation, 2-7-2007, "The Decline and Fall of the United Nations: Why the U.N. Has Failed and How It Can Be Reformed", https://www.heritage.org/report/the-decline-and-fall-the-united-nations-why-the-un-has-failed-and-how-it-can-be-reformed // JJ  
A major reform that would adversely affect the U.N., as well as American interests, is significant expansion of the Security Council. The United States has correctly set increased effectiveness of the Security Council as the bench­mark for council reform. As the war on terrorism continues to unfold around the globe, as greater urgency is paid to limiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and as the free world faces a growing threat from rogue regimes such as Iran and North Korea, the U.N. Security Council can play an important and useful role. It is in the U.S. national interest to have a lean and effective Security Council that can help address these issues on the interna­tional stage. Unfortunately, the most prominent proposals to expand the Security Council will have the opposite effect. Security Council expansion will make it far more difficult for the United States to work through the council. With the exception of Germany and Japan, the voting records of the main contenders for addi­tional permanent Security Council seats indicate that they will likely vote against the U.S. on most key issues. In other words, a larger Security Council with these nations as permanent members will like­ly be less supportive of U.S. policy priorities. More­over, any enlargement of the council would make it more unwieldy and subject to conflicting interests, contributing to gridlock that will paralyze the coun­cil and decrease the probability that it will act quick­ly or effectively to address threats to international peace and security. The U.N. Security Council's legitimacy depends far more on its actions than on its membership. The Security Council is by no means perfect as it cur­rently stands. It is subject to delay and indecisive­ness, as its failures in Iraq and Sudan clearly demonstrate. However, a larger council would not solve these problems. On the contrary, it would fur­ther undermine the council's ability to act decisively as timely action would fall victim to political impasse, conflicting interests, or debate among nations that have little to contribute to the council's ultimate responsibility-enforcement of interna­tional peace and security. However imperfect, the current composition of the council is infinitely pref­erable to ill-considered expansion that will surely weaken its standing and ability to meet its man­date-ultimately making the Security Council less relevant and increasing the likelihood that crises will be addressed outside of the U.N. framework. From a U.S. national interest point of view, there is a clear-cut case against Security Council expan­sion. Analysis by The Heritage Foundation of actu­al votes (not including consensus votes) in the General Assembly over a six-year period (1999 to 2004) revealed that five of the leading candidates voted against the United States more than 70 per­cent of the time.[[16]](https://www.heritage.org/report/the-decline-and-fall-the-united-nations-why-the-un-has-failed-and-how-it-can-be-reformed#_ftn16) Only Germany (55 percent) and Japan (50 per­cent) voted with the U.S. at least half of the time. Brazil, the only contender from Latin America, vot­ed with the U.S. just 29 percent of the time, while India, often touted as a major future ally of the Unit­ed States, voted with the United States just 20 per­cent of the time. The records of the three leading African contenders for Security Council seats are equally poor. Nigeria and South Africa voted with the U.S. just 25 percent of the time, while Egypt- a huge beneficiary of American aid-sided with the U.S. in only 18 percent of the votes. Of 190 members of the General Assembly (not including the U.S.), Germany had the best record among Security Council candidates, ranking 12th in voting coincidence with the United States. Japan ranks a surprisingly low 41st but is still ahead of any other major country in Asia. Brazil ranks 80th, while Nigeria, South Africa, and India rank 104th, 106th, and 149th, respectively. Egypt ranks very near the bottom at 168th, behind Sudan and just ahead of rogue regimes such as Libya, Burma, and Syria. Significantly, support for U.S. voting positions in the General Assembly has fallen since 1999 (dra­matically in some cases) for all the countries com­peting for Security Council seats. While Germany backed the United States in 70 percent of votes in 1999, it voted with the U.S. just 45 percent of the time in 2004. Similarly, Japanese support for U.S. voting positions fell from 63 percent in 1999 to 43 percent in 2004. In 2004, Brazil and Nigeria voted with the U.S. just 15 percent of the time, and South Africa voted with the U.S. only 11 percent of the time. In 1999, these three countries voted with the U.S. 39 percent, 35 percent, and 40 percent of the time, respectively. Egypt's record was a pitifully low 8.5 percent in 2004 (down from 29 percent in 1999). India has consistently voted against U.S. positions over the past five years, voting in opposi­tion to the U.S. 80 percent of the time in 2004 and 78 percent of the time in 1999. Every year, the U.S. Department of State identi­fies votes of fundamental national interest in the U.N. General Assembly. Support for the U.S. voting position on key issues over the past five years among the key Security Council contenders has been low (Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa, India, and Egypt) to middling (Japan and Germany). South Africa and Nigeria voted against the U.S. position on key votes an average of 80 percent of the time between 2000 and 2004. India voted with the U.S. just 19 percent of the time, and Egypt just 16 per­cent. The Brazilian record was slightly better, voting with the U.S. 35 percent of the time. The U.S. did not receive a single vote of support from Nigeria, South Africa, India, or Egypt on any key vote in 2001. While the voting record of Germany and Japan is considerably stronger (Germany voted with the U.S. 64 percent of the time, and Japan 66 per­cent of the time), their voting coincidence can hard­ly be considered reliable. Worse than their actual voting records is the fact that these countries' opposition to U.S. priorities is increasing. Germany, Japan, Brazil, South Africa, and Nigeria have sharply reduced their level of sup­port for the U.S. on key votes since 1999. In 2004, Brazil, Nigeria, India, South Africa, and Egypt voted with the U.S. on just two key votes. Germany's and Japan's records were slightly better, voting with the U.S. on four votes. The Debate over John Bolton Finally, any discussion of the current state of the United Nations and U.S. investment in the U.N. would not be complete without an assessment of the record of John Bolton, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.[[17]](https://www.heritage.org/report/the-decline-and-fall-the-united-nations-why-the-un-has-failed-and-how-it-can-be-reformed#_ftn17) Few political figures in recent American history have so polarized opinion as has John Bolt­on. Faced with Senate gridlock, Bolton was sent by President George W. Bush as a recess appointment to the United Nations last August.

### AT: Spec: Peacebuilding

1. **Internal link turn:** While peacekeeping is effective, peacebuilding is not. Empirically, **Blanco ’15 of the University of Brazil** writes that the peacebuilding process ignores local voices, which forecloses future opportunities for self governance. Thus, the concludes that, in East Timor, peacekeeping resulted in state failure.

**This outweighs on timeframe –** even if peacebuilding ops build temporary peace through [their internal link], in the long term, target countries are unable to sustain themselves or those benefits because they have a weak or nonexistent government.


Ramon Blanco, June 2015, "The UN peacebuilding process: an analysis of its shortcomings in Timor-Leste", University of Brazil, http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci\_arttext&amp;pid=S0034-73292015000100042 // JJ  
This paper discusses the UN peacebuilding process in Timor-Leste. Firstly, it briefly outlines the scholarly debate around the UN peacebuilding efforts. Then, it presents a panoramic view of the UN peace operations deployed to Timor-Leste by clarifying their main elements and characteristics. In addition, the paper evinces that the fragilities of the foundations left by such process is anchored on two fundamental axes: (1) structural limitations of such engagement and (2) the negligence, by the UN, of fundamental elements of the Timorese reality. Regarding the first axis, the paper sheds light on the some structural shortcomings of the UN peacebuilding process in Timor-Leste. While discussing such limitations, the paper focuses on the internal shortcomings of the reconstruction process, on the marginalization of the Timorese in regards to the decision-making of the peacebuilding process, and also the deficiencies of dimensions, such as, the military/security and political-constitutional. Finally, this paper delineates several strands of the Timorese reality which were neglected, or at least underestimated, by the UN during its peacebuilding process in Timor-Leste. They were at the basis of the 2006 crisis. Through the delineation of them, the paper evinces that the UN overlooked fundamental dimensions of the Timorese reality. This leads to the apparent contradiction that, in Timor-Leste, the UN state-building process ended up being, in fact, a state failure process, which sheds light to the fragility of the peace built. However, paradoxically, the appearance of Timor-Leste as a successful case is fundamental to the UN. In order to legitimize its peace operations to a broader audience and itself as an international actor, fundamental to the conflict resolution throughout the globe, Timor-Leste has to appear internationally as a successful case. Nevertheless, it is precisely the rigorous analysis of this process that allows the clarification of its limitations and, most importantly, opens of the space for its structural reproblematization, which might be the first step towards the emergence of a sustainable peace at post-conflict scenarios.

## Econ Development

### AT: Low Growth Now

1. **Non-unique: Oberoi ’19 of the Economic Times** writes that India’s economy growing faster than any other economy in the world, and is poised for its best decade in growth. Even if there’s downturn, it’s temporary: **The IMF ’14** writes that India’s monetary policy has allowed it to become resilient, able to rebound in times of economic downturn.

Rahul Oberoi, 4-18-2019, "India poised for best decade in growth, says Rakesh Jhunjhunwala," Economic Times, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/stocks/news/india-poised-for-best-decade-in-growth-says-rakesh-jhunjhunwala/articleshow/68936340.cms // JJ



The IMF, 2-21-2014, "Indian economy much more resilient to external shocks now, says IMF", No Publication, https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/imf-says-indian-economy-much-more-resilient-external-shocks/story/203547.html // JJ  
The Indian [economy is much more resilient](https://www.businesstoday.in/story/india-annual-economic-growth-average-8-per-cent-11th-plan/1/203517.html) to external shocks now than was last year, a top International Monetary Fund (IMF) official has said, attributing this to a series of administrative decisions and policy measures taken by the Union Government. "We see India much more resilient than they were about the middle of last year to external shocks," Paul Cashin, IMF Assistant Director of the Asia and Pacific Department, told reporters during a conference call. "In recent months, India has taken very substantial measures to [narrow both its external and fiscal imbalances,](https://www.businesstoday.in/story/moodys-on-interim-budget-capital-infusion-into-psu-banks/1/203545.html) tighten monetary policy, move forward on structural reforms, and address aspects of this market volatility," Cashin said in response to a question during the call. "The authorities have met their fiscal target for this fiscal year. Investment project approvals are accelerating, and they're beginning to [tackle the inflation issue](https://www.businesstoday.in/story/imf-says-rbi-will-need-to-keep-raising-policy-interest-rate/1/203542.html) by tightening the monetary stance," he said. Cashin said all these developments "certainly make India more resilient to any external shocks that may be coming along".

### AT: Favors Link General

1. **Analytical delink:** India can sell favors in pretty much any other way.

2. **Turn:** Politically-motivated foreign aid reduces growth. Because foreign aid motivated by political gain doesn’t take into account the actual needs of the country, and instead randomly offered as a bribe, **Dreher ’13 of Georgetown University** writes that foreign aid actually reduces economic growth.

Axel Dreher,12-21-2103, No Publication, http://wp.peio.me/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Conf6\_Dreher-Eichenauer-Gehring.pdf, //CJ  
That is, **foreign aid granted for short-term geopolitical motives is less effective than other types of aid in those places where development would be most needed.** While we did not aim to rigorously test whether aid is effective, but rather, whether aid effectiveness is reduced by the short-term political motivations of donors, our findings have 33 direct implications for the existing and future aid effectiveness literature. To the extent the reader accepts the regressions presented in Clemens et al. (2012) and Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) as causal tests for the effectiveness of aid, our results show **that politically motivated aid tends to reduce growth,** while other aid seems to enhance it. In any case, politically motivated aid is less effective than average aid. When **donors allocate a fixed aid budget according to different motives, political motives channel more aid to temporary UNSC members whose growth rates might increase t**o the extent that the marginal effect of aid remains positive. This increase would however come at the cost of reduced aid and larger losses of growth elsewhere. An important implication of our results relates to the identification strategy in the previous aid effectiveness literature, much of which tries to identify the causal effects of aid by instrumenting for aid using political variables. As already argued in Kilby and Dreher (2010) and Faye and Niehaus (2012), our results show that geopolitical variables are invalid as instruments for aid when “political aid” is different, as we find here.46 The results of previous studies identifying the effect of aid on growth relying on variation caused by changing political alliances thus have to be treated with caution. In terms of increasing the effectiveness of aid, there are arguably two possibilities. First, foreign aid could be separated from political motives, so that it truly becomes “development aid.” Given the incentives of donors to use aid to achieve their geopolitical goals this is unlikely to happen. Second, the exact channels by which geopolitical motives reduce the effectiveness of aid should be identified. The choice of a suitable remedy would depend upon which of the channels outlined above is responsible for the reduced effectiveness of aid. We leave such analysis for future research.

### AT: Spec: Foreign Aid

1. **Delink:** India no longer is eligible for foreign aid. As its economy has flourished, **Mohan ’06 of Foreign Affairs** writes that India has begun giving out aid, as opposed to receiving it.

2. **Mitigate the impact:** India doesn’t need aid. **Sky News 18** explains that the UK is sending them aid but this aid proves unimportant as India is spending prolific amounts on a space program. Aid to India has become a waste of money as they have become so rich that they now spend more in aid than they receive.

3. **NUQ:** India is already receiving more aid than it needs. **Sky News 18** writes that the UK is giving India millions of dollars in aid, increasing the amount right now. At best, there’s a marginal increase in aid that doesn’t really do much because of the defense above!

4. **Delink:** Foreign aid isn’t that effective in India as **Sharma 19** of the **Associated Press** writes that the government has cracked down on charities, preventing them from receiving foreign aid. The article concludes that over 1,500 charities were closed during Modi’s presidency, which only further hurt the people. It means that even if aid is flowing in, that aid is not going to organizations doing actual work to support the people.

(tw below: sexual misconduct – not graphic)

6. **Turn:** Aid is actually a really bad thing. **Yanguas 18** studies that historically, no matter how much people have tried to change it, aid never goes to the right programs. While aid could be effective if it went to transformation and development, it is being done as a means to quick cash which only breeds things like sexual misconduct, political battles, and ignoring real problems.

7. **Delink:** According to the New Zealand Taxpayers Union 16, the last time New Zealand sent aid to India, the money literally went to spending on a space program. At best that functions as terminal defense because it means they are just spending the same amount on welfare programs as they were before the aid but at worst it functions as a turn because they are diverting money away from welfare programs to help contribute to a newly growing space program.

8. **Delink/turn:** Aid is misused such that it only goes to funding more privilege for the rich and corrupt, especially in India. **Elgar 14** gives the example of education aid, citing that aid to education doesn’t matter as 42% of teachers in government schools don’t show up to work and of those that do, only half teach. That money is used, however, to fund luxuries for education officials. Moreover, notably in India a large portion of that money has been stolen, used by education officials and outside parties to fund corrupt political motives. At that point, not only is aid not doing anything, it is also actively funding corruption. This short circuits any of their impacts because even if they prove that some welfare increases to the Indian population, as long as money is being diverted away from children’s education there is no hope for the future. Education is a prereq to ever getting out of poverty.

C.R. Mohan, 2006, “India and the Balance of Power”, Foreign Affairs, <http://sci-hub.tw/https://www.jstor.org/stable/20032038?casa_token=jyIytuF5fBcAAAAA:YJvUOJqY8fJChrE8d9xxOnXyiJLwb-6_unBSGt0buI-Takgyo_HyHmvQnq2lmTXcKFhpkbWpv6CalAOyMbVdpMeDB6nPTRE4I6q_svwrLvOyIcONVA&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents> // JJ  
Even as the Kashmir and China questions have remained unsettled, India's profile in its extended neighborhood has grown considerably since the early 9ggos. India's outward economic orientation has allowed it to reestablish trade and investment linkages with much of its near abroad. New Delhi is negotiating a slew of free- and preferential-trade agreements with individual countries as well as multilateral bodies including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the Southern African Development Community. Just as China has become the motor of economic growth in East Asia, a rising India could become the engine of eco nomic integration in the Indian Ocean region. After decades of being marginalized from regional institutions in different parts of Asia, India is also now a preferred political partner for ASEAN, the East Asian Summit, the GCC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the African Union. Moreover, it has emerged as a major aid donor; having been an aid recipient for so long, India is now actively leveraging its own external assistance to promote trade as well as political objectives. For example, India has given $650 million in aid to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban. Meanwhile, the search for oil has encouraged Indian energy companies to tail their Western and Chinese counterparts throughout the world, from Central Asia and Siberia and to western Africa and Venezuela. On the security side, India has been actively engaged in defense diplomacy. Thanks to the strength of its armed forces, India is well positioned to assist in stabilizing the Indian Ocean region. It helps that there has been a convergence of U.S. and Indian political interests: countering terrorism, pacifying Islamic radicalism, promoting democracy, and ensuring the security of sea-lanes, to name a few. The Indian navy in particular has been at the cutting edge of India's engagement with the region-as was evident from its ability to deploy quickly to areas hit by the tsunami at the end of 2004. The Indian navy today is also ready to participate in multinational military operations.

Axel Dreher,12-21-2103, No Publication, http://wp.peio.me/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Conf6\_Dreher-Eichenauer-Gehring.pdf, //CJ  
That is, **foreign aid granted for short-term geopolitical motives is less effective than other types of aid in those places where development would be most needed.** While we did not aim to rigorously test whether aid is effective, but rather, whether aid effectiveness is reduced by the short-term political motivations of donors, our findings have 33 direct implications for the existing and future aid effectiveness literature. To the extent the reader accepts the regressions presented in Clemens et al. (2012) and Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) as causal tests for the effectiveness of aid, our results show **that politically motivated aid tends to reduce growth,** while other aid seems to enhance it. In any case, politically motivated aid is less effective than average aid. When **donors allocate a fixed aid budget according to different motives, political motives channel more aid to temporary UNSC members whose growth rates might increase t**o the extent that the marginal effect of aid remains positive. This increase would however come at the cost of reduced aid and larger losses of growth elsewhere. An important implication of our results relates to the identification strategy in the previous aid effectiveness literature, much of which tries to identify the causal effects of aid by instrumenting for aid using political variables. As already argued in Kilby and Dreher (2010) and Faye and Niehaus (2012), our results show that geopolitical variables are invalid as instruments for aid when “political aid” is different, as we find here.46 The results of previous studies identifying the effect of aid on growth relying on variation caused by changing political alliances thus have to be treated with caution. In terms of increasing the effectiveness of aid, there are arguably two possibilities. First, foreign aid could be separated from political motives, so that it truly becomes “development aid.” Given the incentives of donors to use aid to achieve their geopolitical goals this is unlikely to happen. Second, the exact channels by which geopolitical motives reduce the effectiveness of aid should be identified. The choice of a suitable remedy would depend upon which of the channels outlined above is responsible for the reduced effectiveness of aid. We leave such analysis for future research.

**Sky News**, 9-3-**2018**, "Fury over UK's 'unjustifiable' £98m foreign aid injection for India," [https://news.sky.com/story/fury-over-uks-unjustifiable-98m-foreign-aid-injection-for-india-11489332 //](https://news.sky.com/story/fury-over-uks-unjustifiable-98m-foreign-aid-injection-for-india-11489332%20//) RM

**The UK is to hand over £98m to India despite the country - which has spent almost the same on a lunar probe - now giving out more foreign aid than it receives. As part of the UK's aid budget, the Department for International Development (DfID) will give £52m this year and a further £46m in 2019/20. It comes despite India spending £95.4m on the lunar probe, Chandrayaan-2, which is set to launch in January. Meanwhile, India gives away more in foreign aid than it receives - in 2015/16 it took in £254m but gave away £912m**. Tory MP David Davies said India did not "want or need" UK aid and that "in effect we are sponsoring an Indian moon launch". Another Tory MP, Phillip Davies, told the Daily Express: "**Here we are spending money in a country that has not only got its own space programme but is developing its own overseas aid programme. "To be honest, the government needs looking at if it thinks that is an appropriate way of spending taxpayers' money. "It needs to get out of Whitehall and appreciate the public is not just sick and tired of this but angry too. It is completely unjustifiable and truly idiotic."** There is no suggestion that India, reportedly home to 230 million people who live in poverty, will use aid from the UK directly for its space programme. The Chandrayaan-2 orbiter, which also sent a probe to the moon in 2008, will look to land a rover again and collect data from the start of next year. In 2013, India launched an orbiter to Mars, which is still in operation.

Ashok **Sharma**, 2-7-**2019**, "Foreign aid groups accuse Indian government of impeding work," AP NEWS, [https://www.apnews.com/7d10fe61ef3d4038af120f0ae8c6dfe3 //](https://www.apnews.com/7d10fe61ef3d4038af120f0ae8c6dfe3%20//) RM

NEW DELHI (AP) — Their offices raided, bank accounts frozen and travel restricted**, international aid and rights groups with deep roots in India** say they **are struggling to operate under Prime Minister** Narendra Modi, **who**se Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party has elevated the role of sympathetic homegrown social organizations while **cracking down on foreign charities. Greenpeace India, which has repeatedly pushed the government to address hazardous air quality in cities across India, said this month that it was forced to close two regional offices and sharply reduce its staff after its Benagaluru offices were raided and its bank accounts frozen.** Tax officials allege it was illegally receiving funds through a shell company set up to evade authorities after India’s home minister canceled the group’s license. **Amnesty International India,** which has accused the Modi government of eroding freedom to dissent by jailing prominent critics, **had to slash** 68 jobs **— 30 percent of its in-country workforce** — **and cancel programs after Finance Ministry officials carried out a 12-hour raid on its headquarters in November**. While the raid was underway, the government released a statement accusing the group of illegally receiving 260 million rupees ($3.5 million) from an overseas account through a shell company. Both Greenpeace and Amnesty International have denied the allegations. International aid organizations have operated in India for decades, collaborating with the government on issues ranging from clean water to children’s education to disposal of e-waste. **The government no longer sees these groups as partners**, activists and observers say, **but rather as threats**. Critics say **the government is attempting to cover up human rights failures by cracking down on groups that expose them. “Government authorities are increasingly treating human rights organizations like criminal enterprises,”** said Amnesty International India executive director Aakar Patel. Vijay Khurana, secretary-general of the Confederation of Non-Governmental Organizations of India, supports **the government crackdown on international organizations doing aid work with foreign funding**. “It has become a business for them. They misuse funds, land and other facilities provided by donors,” Khurana said, adding that the government should further encourage Indian organizations funded by local donors. The Modi government has used the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act, which regulates foreign funding for civil society groups, to cut off funds and stymie activities of organizations that question its policies, rights activists say. Since coming to power in 2014, **the** Modi **government has canceled the licenses of nearly 15,000 charities, preventing them from receiving foreign funds**, for failing to produce timely tax returns and other required documents, Junior Home Minister Kiren Rijiju told Parliament last year. “There is complete intolerance to any kind of government criticism,” said Jayati Ghosh, an Indian economist who studies India’s human rights landscape. At the same time, Hindu nationalist organizations, especially the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, or National Volunteer Corps, a hard-line Hindu group that Modi belongs to, have flourished, she said. “Nothing happens to them if they get foreign funds. There is absolutely no kind of control on their activities,” Ghosh said. John Dayal, a civil liberties activist and former president of the 16 million-member All India Catholic Union, said Christian charities with a longtime presence in India running programs in education, health and development in remote villages haven’t been spared in the crackdown. **Christian aid groups “cannot receive even small donations. Many have had to close down. Many hostels and medical centers have closed down. The people are the ones who suffer,”** Dayal said. Meenakshi Ganguly, South Asia director of Human Rights Watch, places the blame at the feet of the previous Congress party government for amending the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act in 2008 to require organizations to reapply for registration every five years — over the concerns of civil groups who said their operations would become subject to the whims of the government. Ganguly said she has seen the Modi government’s aversion to scrutiny by foreign aid groups and agencies since it came to power in 2014. “The message is clear that the government wants to cover up human rights failures by cracking down on critics,” she said. Last year, India refused to allow investigators from the Geneva-based office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human rights to visit the Indian-controlled portion of Kashmir and investigate reports of rights violations in the disputed region. India’s crackdown on international rights groups mirrors developments elsewhere in South Asia. In neighboring Pakistan, the government of Prime Minister Imran Khan has ordered more than a dozen international aid organizations to wind up their activities after determining they were “working against the interest of the state,” according to Pakistan’s Interior Ministry. The groups include U.S.-based Catholic Relief Services, ActionAid U.K. and the Danish Refugee Council. In India, Greenpeace and Amnesty International have responded to the setback with defiance.

Pablo **Yanguas**, 3-18-**2018**, " Foreign aid is a waste of money—unless it’s used for transformation ," openDemocracy, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/transformation/foreign-aid-is-waste-of-money-unless-it-s-used-for-transformation/> // RM

**The ongoing outcry about sexual misconduct in charities and international organisations is**[**breathing much needed fresh air into the global aid community**](https://www.opendemocracy.net/transformation/michael-edwards/it-s-time-to-take-our-charities-to-cleaners)**.** However, there’s little indication that this particular scandal will have a meaningful impact on how foreign aid supports development and social change. After all, **there have been plenty of aid scandals in the past, but instead of helping donor publics to develop a better grasp of the challenges involved they’ve reinforced a survival logic that focuses on quick wins instead of longer-term institutional, economic and social transformation**. Take the case of Ireland in 2012, for example, when Irish Aid suspended its entire assistance programme in Uganda after [it was revealed](https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/press-releases/press-release-archive/2012/november/report-into-misappropriated-aid-funds-uganda/) that four million Euros that were destined to help rebuild the country’s war-torn northern region had been siphoned off to a personal account by the Office of the Prime Minister. The Tánaiste—Ireland’s Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs in charge of Irish Aid—was reportedly [‘absolutely disgusted’](http://www.thejournal.ie/uganda/) by the revelation, which was followed by a sudden burst of op-eds and public debates not unlike those surrounding the current #Aidtoo moment. Then, in January of 2013, the Ugandan government [repaid the misappropriated funds](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-20935149), and by 2014 [Irish aid was once again flowing](https://www.irishaid.ie/news-publications/publications/publicationsarchive/2016/november/uganda-country-strategy-paper/) into the country. As public attention moved on, aid professionals got on with business more or less as usual. The disconnect between the public outcry in Dublin and the pragmatism on display in Kampala might seem jarring. **But when one takes a critical look at public conversations about foreign aid it quickly becomes evident that they hardly ever concern development at all: most of the time they revolve around money, and sometimes around partisan competition that itself breeds disinformation**. In the United States in 2013, for example, [the Pew Research Center](http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/03/13/wide-partisan-gap-exists-over-u-s-aid-to-worlds-needy/) asked  which federal government programmes the public would increase, decrease, or maintain at the same level. Of the nineteen categories surveyed, foreign aid had the biggest partisan gap, with 45 per cent more Republicans than Democrats supporting a decrease; the gap was wider than for high-profile, controversial issues such as unemployment benefits and public healthcare. This hyper-partisanship probably explains the widespread misperception among American voters about the size of the US aid budget, which they estimated as 26 per cent of the total federal budget in [a 2015 survey](https://www.kff.org/global-health-policy/poll-finding/data-note-americans-views-on-the-u-s-role-in-global-health/). The actual figure is ten times smaller. Such misperceptions are possible because most people know remarkably little about what foreign aid actually does. Processes of development in Africa or Asia are as contentious as in Europe or the USA. Change takes time and needs activist reformers, people willing to challenge the status quo in order to build something different. Take Valentine Collier, for example, an old-school civil servant in Sierra Leone who shook up the country’s post-war politics when he became anticorruption commissioner in 2000 and, against all the odds, [decided to take the job seriously](https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/1534/A_matter_of_graft)—to the point of investigating sitting ministers and embracing an open confrontation between his office and that of the president who appointed him. Collier was ultimately let go, but not before raising the political profile of corruption as an issue and thereby ensuring that the next government [strengthened the anti-corruption regime](https://www.economist.com/node/14920076). Across the border in Liberia, a young man called John Morlu turned the General Auditing Commission into [a political threat to Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Africa’s first female president](https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-2007-06-13-voa5/348280.html), between 2007 and 2010. This was at a time when, as one foreign diplomat said to me, the country could have “a capable government, or a clean one, but not both.” In cases like these, reformers were able to wage **dangerous political battles in part because they had support from external partners and resources from foreign aid.** Morlu was recruited and his office supported by the European Union, granting him financial autonomy and a modicum of political cover that were rare in a politicized public sector, but essential for the job of Auditor General. Collier was supported by a British deputy, and his Anti-Corruption Commission supported financially by the United Kingdom. It was the UK, in fact, that mediated between Collier and the Sierra Leonean president when their confrontation escalated, keeping him active until the political pressure became unbearable. Taxpayers in donor countries are unlikely to read such stories in the media, or even in reports produced by NGOs and other donor agencies themselves. Instead, they are treated to simplistic stories of how their Pounds and Dollars are saving children, or shallow polemics supporting one end of the political spectrum or the other, though they are particularly common in certain corners of the conservative movement. For example, in 2016 Britain’s  Secretary of State for International Development at the time (Priti Patel) declared  that [‘British aid is being wasted and stolen’](http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3788162/My-fury-wasted-foreign-aid-International-development-secretary-Priti-Patel-pledges-major-overhaul-12billion-budget.html) in the pages of the Daily Mail. Despite the lack of evidence to substantiate such claims, strident rhetoric and simplistic success stories encourage aid agencies to choose quick, technical fixes over support for long-term transformation. Controversial programmes usually close all too quickly, their lessons ignored or silenced [in favour of expenditure reports and spreadsheets full of arcane indicators](https://www.odi.org/publications/10902-politics-results-agenda-dfid-1997-2017) and metrics. **Aid is trapped in a process of chasing quick wins which reinforce the message that development is easy, ignoring “a central principle of development theory that those development programmes that are most precisely and easily measured are the least transformational, and those programmes that are the most transformational are the least measured**,” [in the words of former USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios](https://www.cgdev.org/publication/clash-counter-bureaucracy-and-development).

**New Zealand Taxpayers' Union**, 7-17-**2016**, "Aid money wasted on countries spending it on space programmes," Taxpayers' Union, [https://www.taxpayers.org.nz/space\_aid //](https://www.taxpayers.org.nz/space_aid%20//) RM

**The Taxpayers’ Union is questioning why NZ Aid money, meant to help the world’s poorest, is being used to support countries and governments with their own space programs**. The figures (see below) show that since 2010 more than $214 million of taxpayer money has been given to countries rich enough to fund their own space ambitions. If a foreign government has enough cash to invest in ambitious space programmes, it should not expect to be receiving cash from New Zealand taxpayer which is earmarked for helping the world’s poorest. Key findings: Total amount of NZ Aid money (since 2010) given to countries with government space programmes: $214,111,149 Indonesia: Received $88,753,539 in NZ Aid since 2010. According to the [World Bank’s open budget](http://wbi.worldbank.org/boost/country/indonesia), over the same period Indonesia was able to spend $223 million (NZD equivalent) on LAPAN, Indonesia’s aeronautics and space program. Last year Australia announced that it would cut its annual Aid of $627 million to Indonesia by 40% to $379 million. **India: Received $4,038,956 in NZ Aid since 2010. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has developed multiple Lunar and Mars bound missions in that time. This year alone ISRO will receive $1.2 billion (U.S) from the Indian government.**

**Elgar**, 7-15-2014, "What’s the problem with International Aid for Education? By Pauline Dixon," ElgarBlog from Edward Elgar Publishing, <https://elgar.blog/2014/07/15/whats-the-problem-with-international-aid-for-education/> // RM

**Aid for basic education typically targets government schools. Government schools have inherent problems when serving the poor. Research has shown that in some states in India teacher absenteeism in government schools can be as high as 42 per cent. And of those teachers present only half of them are teaching. Even though government teachers are typically well qualified, experienced, trained, and highly paid, lethargy, lack of commitment and low morale are endemic. In many developing countries government jobs are regarded as a job for life where the lack of accountability and the inability to be sacked, owing to a heavily unionised workforce, generates complacency**. Money targeting institutions where no one teaches isn’t going to have much effect. No teaching, no learning. There are also examples of theft, corruption and irresponsible use of money targeting education. In Kenya, ministers in the education department, according to some reports, misappropriated $1.3 million from the World Bank and DfID destined for education. Textbooks costing $17.3 million have been ‘lost’, according to some newspaper reports, through fraud, theft and destruction. In other countries such as **India, £14 million set aside for government schools was discovered as being stolen by Indian officials by the auditor general and according to some sources the money was used by education officials to buy themselves cars.** In the extreme case **international aid money has been set aside for government schools in India that don’t even exist.**

### ~World Bank Loans~

### AT: Spec: World Bank Loans

1. **Non-unique:** As **Nayar ’03 writes in his book “India in the World Order”**, India already has power and influence within the World Bank. Thus, **Matthews ’18 of Business Today** finds that the Work Bank already approved of a $30 billion-dollar plan to further develop India. Even if you believe they provide India with more in loans from the World Bank, it really doesn’t matter because it is only a matter of time before India receives these loans anyway.

2. **Outweigh on timeframe:** as **Glennie ’10** finds that due to India’s growth and graduation from being a “low-income country,” within a few years, they will no longer be eligible for World Bank loans.


3. **Turn: Gallagher ’18 of Boston University** explains that when countries are on the UNSC receive world bank projects, they also receive less environmental and social safeguards with less preparation time.

Kevin P. Gallagher, 10-2018, Boston University, <https://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2018/10/Kilby-Gallagher-WP-1.pdf//CJ>

Finally, there is an apparent geopolitical dimension to the application of safeguards. **The probability of a safeguard designation is almost 8 percentage points lower (dropping from 61% of projects to 53% of projects) when countries hold a nonpermanent seat on the UNSC, ceteris paribus**. This result holds also in a conditional logit specification that nets out time invariant country-specific effects and so is not the indirect effect of other, fixed country characteristics that impact election to the UNSC.

Nayar 03

<https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=0jDobsZatW0C&oi=fnd&pg=PR8&dq=india+pakistan+%22great+power+status%22&ots=yPi0ivqpwa&sig=1PU_W2XtsfiRAXcFTl48BwANVF8#v=onepage&q=india%20pakistan%20%22great%20power%20status%22&f=false>



**Glennie 10** (Jonathan Glennie, 11-8-2010, "If India doesn't 'need' aid, why do foreign governments still give it?," Guardian, [https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2010/nov/08/india-aid-economic-development DoA 3/23/19](https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2010/nov/08/india-aid-economic-development%20%20DoA%203/23/19))

There are three ways that aid should be spent in India. Firstly, in support of big infrastructure projects. This will mostly be in the form of concessional loans from the World Bank and other regional development banks, which count as aid but will end in the next few years as India "graduates" from being a low-income country and so stops being eligible. The second way is through the work of big international efforts to support development, particularly in the areas of health, water and resilience to climate change. One of the great things about being alive in this era is that noble international initiatives exist to help all human beings, regardless of which country they are in. These attempts, mostly led by the UN and supported by other funds such as the [GAVI (Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation](http://www.gavialliance.org/)) and the [Global Fund](http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/whoweare/), are a work in progress, with failures to learn from as well as successes. But those successes have been fairly spectacular in some places, and need to be scaled up. We also need to develop new ways for the international community to unite to fight poverty and promote clean development. We need to invest in health and climate change technology, and support knowledge-sharing between rich, middle-income and poor countries. Thirdly, some rich countries should continue to contribute bilaterally. Donor government aid agencies have acted a little like NGOs in India, only with more money and more access to the top decision-makers. Their money is small fry even for Indian states, let alone for the central government, so lesson-learning and knowledge-sharing are at least as important as the financial investments themselves. The work they do on the ground, and the money they invest, allow innovative ideas to be applied, increasing the pool of knowledge and experience in breaking through difficult problems of extreme poverty.

Joe Matthews,10-31-2018, World Bank endorses $25-30 billion plan for India- Business News, No Publication, https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/world-bank-endorses-25-30-billion-dollars-plan-for-india/story/282709.html, //CJ

**The World Bank Group (WBG) has approved a $25-30 billion commitment plan for India for the 2019-22 period.** The new Country Partnership Framework (CPF), endorsed by the WBG board of executive directors **focuses on the development priorities of the country - resource efficient and inclusive growth, job creation and building its human capital.** The WBG institution comprises of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). "This CPF charts a path for how the World Bank, IFC and MIGA, will leverage their relative strengths to deliver stronger development outcomes for this dynamic country, half of whose population is under the age of 25," Hartwig Schafer, World Bank South Asia Vice President says.

Axel Dreher 12-1-2013, The costs of favoritism: Do international politics affect World Bank project quality?, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268256449\_The\_costs\_of\_favoritism\_Do\_international\_politics\_affect\_World\_Bank\_project\_quality, //CJ

Thus, with the above caveats in mind, we suggest that **when development aid is extended in the name of international political imperatives, it is less effective than when it is extended on more economic grounds.** In support of this argument, we have preliminary evidence that **World Bank project quality is lower for countries temporarily serving on the UNSC than for countries not**. **When countries rise to the international stage of the UN Security Council, they have increased leverage and importance for the major shareholders of the World Bank, and thus appear to receive softer conditionality attached to projects funded through the Bank, and the projects appear to be of lower quality as a result**. 7 If World Bank projects for temporary UNSC members are of inferior quality, why do governments pursue them? Why do powerful countries “reward” UNSC members with inferior aid? The answer to these questions has to do with time-inconsistent preferences. The evaluations of World Bank projects we consider take place some years after the projects have been completed and certainly after the two-year term of a UNSC member has ended. **At the inception of the project, both the lenders and the borrowers of World Bank funds are pressed by short-run considerations. While some governments may be better than others, even the most secure dictatorships may maintain power by paying off a small group key constituency rather than pursuing the public good (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), and even the best elected leaders in democracies may have pressing reelection concerns**. If World Bank conditionality requires short-run sacrifices, governments may wish to avoid it. And if these **governments are serving on the UNSC, the Bank’s major shareholders just might be willing to provide weaker conditionality in return for good behavior when important votes come before them. Powerful countries might be better off in the long-run with more prosperous allies, but the short-run security concerns they pursue through the UNSC may often outweigh the long-run development concerns they are supposed to pursue through institutions like the World Bank.**

Axel Dreher 12-1-2013, The costs of favoritism: Do international politics affect World Bank project quality?, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268256449\_The\_costs\_of\_favoritism\_Do\_international\_politics\_affect\_World\_Bank\_project\_quality, //CJ

Most projects are rated as satisfactory – 77 percent – with the remaining 23 percent rated as unsatisfactory. In 38 percent of our country-year observations, at least one project (many countries have more than one project simultaneously) is rated as unsatisfactory. In the remaining country-years (62 percent), all projects are rated as satisfactory. What about the difference between UNSC and non-UNSC members? Figure 1 presents descriptive data. **As can be seen, the percentage of country-year observations with at least one unsatisfactory rating is higher for UNSC members than non-members. For UNSC members about 48 percent have unsatisfactory ratings, while for non-members only about 35 percent have unsatisfactory ratings**. A t-test for difference in means indicates that the difference is statistically significant at the one percent level.

### AT: >> Infrastructure

1. **Internal link non-unique:** Private investment is sufficient to promote infrastructure development. **Al Lawati ’19 of Bloomberg** writes that India is about to experience an influx of investment from Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Abbas Al Lawati, 2-12-2019, "Saudi Arabia Follows Abu Dhabi to Invest in India Infrastructure", Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-12/saudi-arabia-follows-abu-dhabi-to-invest-in-india-infrastructure // JJ  
Saudi Arabia is considering investing in India’s infrastructure fund as the kingdom’s crown prince plans his debut visit to the South Asian nation next week. The cabinet authorized the energy minister to study entering into an agreement to invest in the [National Investment and Infrastructure Fund](https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/1584275D:IN), the Saudi Press Agency reported. The move follows Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth fund becoming the first institutional investor in NIIF’s Master Fund in 2017 with a commitment of $1 billion. DP World Ltd., the Dubai-based port operator, and NIIF said [last year they plan](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-22/dp-world-india-s-infrastructure-fund-plan-3-billion-investment) to jointly invest up to $3 billion in India. Prince Mohammed bin Salman will visit India on Feb. 19-20. The prince and Prime Minister Narendra Modi [met](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/terminal/PIZILI6JTSEC) in Buenos Aires in November and discussed investment opportunities through Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund. Saudi Arabia is India’s fourth-largest trading partner, supplying about 20 percent of the nation’s crude requirements.

### ~IMF Loan~

### AT: IMF Loan Now

1. **Delink:** Modi’s policies have been exceptionally effective at promoting economic growth, and the IMF agrees. **Mourdoukoutas ’18 of Columbia University** writes that, according to the IMF, India’s economy has been hailed as on track to beat China. This means that a) India doesn’t need a loan, and b) the IMF certainly isn’t interested in giving them one when there are far poorer countries.

Panos Mourdoukoutas, Professor of Economics at Columbia University, April 21, 2018, "India's Economy On Track To Beat China", Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2018/04/21/indias-economy-on-track-to-beat-china/#577de2675136 // JJ  
Prime Minister Narendra Modi may be unpopular among Indian citizens lined up in front of empty ATM machines lately, but his policies seem to have helped the Indian economy regain momentum and be on track to beat China’s economy. On economic growth rates that is. The Indian economy is expected to grow at an annual rate of 7.4% in 2018 and 7.8% in 2019, according to a recently [released](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2018/03/20/world-economic-outlook-april-2018) IMF Economic Outlook. India’s economy is “lifted by strong private consumption as well as fading transitory effects of the currency exchange initiative and implementation of the national goods and services tax,” notes the report. “Over the medium term, growth is expected to gradually rise with continued implementation of structural reforms that raise productivity and incentivize private investment.” India’s projected 2018-19 growth rates are well above China’s 6.6% and 6.4% over the same period. And things could get even worse for Chinese economic growth over the long-term, due to the continued rise of the country’s nonfinancial debt. “Over the medium term, the economy is projected to continue rebalancing away from investment toward private consumption and from industry to services, but nonfinancial debt is expected to continue rising as a share of GDP, and the accumulation of vulnerabilities clouds the medium-term outlook,” notes the IMF report.

### AT: More IMF Loans

1. **Turn:** IMF loans impose harsh conditions on their recipients. For instance, **Chossudovsky ’93 of the University of Ottawa** writes that conditions on IMF loans to India in the 90s forced India to give up fertilizer subsidies, pushing millions of farmers into poverty.

2. **Turn:** IMF loans increase deforestation, as **Vreeland et al ’01** finds that these loans force budget cuts to environmental programs, causing a 246% increase in deforestation. Because deforestation undermines local industry and those populations who rely on agriculture to survive, **Lazaro ’18 of PWP** writes that deforestation leads to widespread poverty and starvation.

Philippe Lazaro, 3-12-2018, "Poverty and deforestation are deeply connected challenges," Plant With Purpose, https://plantwithpurpose.org/poverty-deforestation/ // JJ  
In order to care for those affected by poverty, it’s important to understand what poverty really looks like. You may envision an overcrowded urban slum. Globally, however, 85 percent of the world’s poor live in rural settings and rely on agriculture to survive. When things are going well, farming can produce enough food for people to feed their families and a surplus to sell for a sufficient income. Trees restore land by anchoring topsoil, increasing organic matter, and helping the soil absorb water. They also contribute to healthy water cycles by pulling water from the ground to the air. Roots allow water to infiltrate soil and refill aquifers. Habitats for wildlife are created as trees provide homes, food, and shade. Environmental damage disrupts this process. Every year, the planet loses 50,000 square miles of forest—about 50 football fields each minute. Without these trees, soil deteriorates—erosion is dramatically accelerated and farmers are no longer able to produce enough food.

Michel Chossudovsky, Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Ottawa, March 6, 1993, "India Under IMF Rule", Economic and Political Weekly, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4399453.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ae1223dc710d8906a7b851195bd36d334 // JJ  
In India, more than 70 per cent of rural households are smal and mainal fanrers or landless farm workers representing a population of over 400 million people. In irrigated areas, agricultural workers are employed for 200 days a year, and in rain- fed farming for approximately 100 days. The phasing out of fertiliser subsidies (an explicit condition of the IMF agreement) and the increase in the prices of farm inputs and fuel is pushing a large number of small and medium sized farmers into bankruptcy. In turn, millions of landless farm workers belonging to the scheduled and backward castes-already well below the official poverty line-will be crushed by the new economic policy. These are 'the untouchables of economic policy' For the upper-caste elites, the scheduled castes are people who really do not matter, the im- pact of the IMF's 'economic medicine' on these sectors of the labour force has been carefully overlooked. For the IMF and the government, there are no 'exit policies' for the unorganised sectors: "the cottage in- dustries have no problems because the wages will go down".3

**Vreeland et al 01** (James Raymond Vreeland Robynn Kimberly Sturm Spencer William Durbin, researchers at Yale University, “The Effect of IMF Programs on Deforestation”, 2001, [http://jrv.mycpanel.princeton.edu/IMFdefor.PDF DoA 3/24/19](http://jrv.mycpanel.princeton.edu/IMFdefor.PDF%20DoA%203/24/19))

What is the effect of International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs on the environment? Critics of the Fund claim that **I**MF structural adjustment programs hurt the environment by encouraging budget cuts to environmental programs, promoting primary product export-oriented development, and inducing economic contractions that lead to extensive migration to marginal lands. As a result, IMF Structural Adjustment Programs may cause widespread environmental destruction, squandering the country’s natural resources, environmental capital and economic future (Hayter, 1989; George, 1992, 1998; Cruz and Repetto, 1992; Cruz and Munasinghe, 1996; Owusu, 1998).

**Vreeland et al 01** (James Raymond Vreeland Robynn Kimberly Sturm Spencer William Durbin, researchers at Yale University, “The Effect of IMF Programs on Deforestation”, 2001, [http://jrv.mycpanel.princeton.edu/IMFdefor.PDF DoA 3/24/19](http://jrv.mycpanel.princeton.edu/IMFdefor.PDF%20DoA%203/24/19))

Consider what is observed: our data include 2,258 country-year observations from 112 countries between 1970 and 1990. The average annual rate of deforestation for the entire sample is 0.54 percent of GDP. We observe 1,553 country-years where the country was not participating in IMF programs with an average rate of deforestation of 0.37 percent of GDP. There are 705 observations of countries participating in IMF programs with an average rate of deforestation of 0.91 percent of GDP. Clearly, countries under IMF programs have higher rates of deforestation. The difference is stark: 0.54 percent of GDP.

**Vreeland et al 01** (James Raymond Vreeland Robynn Kimberly Sturm Spencer William Durbin, researchers at Yale University, “The Effect of IMF Programs on Deforestation”, 2001, [http://jrv.mycpanel.princeton.edu/IMFdefor.PDF DoA 3/24/19](http://jrv.mycpanel.princeton.edu/IMFdefor.PDF%20DoA%203/24/19))

Yet, IMF officials contend that their programs have beneficial effects on the environment. They argue that the macroeconomic stability their programs promote is vital for environmental preservation (Fischer, 1996). Furthermore, programs reduce resource waste and improve resource allocation by correcting market distortions and stimulating competition (Owusu, 1998). Despite the disagreement over how IMF programs affect the environment, there has been no large-n study of the systematic effects of these programs using a methodology that controls for the problem of nonrandom selection. IMF programs may affect all sorts of environmental factors – raw materials exports, mineral depletion, and deforestation, to name a few. Our question, as a first step towards assessing the overall environmental impact of IMF programs, is a very narrow one: What is the effect of IMF programs on deforestation? We have chosen to study deforestation because of its saliency to global environmental issues vis-à-vis climate change, biodiversity, clean air and water, and many other environmental and human considerations. Moreover, there is a large body of quantitative literature available on deforestation to inform our study (see Allen and Barnes, 1985; Palo et al., 1987; Capistrano and Kiker, 1995; Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1999). Note that analyzing the effects of IMF programs is not straightforward (Goldstein and Montiel, 1986). If countries entered into IMF programs as random experiments, then the impact of the IMF could be measured as the difference between the average rate of deforestation in countries that do implement IMF programs and in those that do not. These two groups would conveniently serve as the necessary treatment and control groups. However, previous research concludes that countries do not enter IMF agreements randomly (Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000). Usually they approach the IMF because they need a loan due to a balance of payments disequilibria, low foreign reserves, or high debt. They may also participate in IMF programs only when governments have the political will to swallow the “bitter pill” of economic reform. Note that the factors that influence selection into IMF programs may also influence rates of deforestation. The methodology used to evaluate IMF programs must, therefore, distinguish the effects of selection from the inherent effects of these programs. In this paper we use a dynamic version of the Heckman selection model to ascertain the effects of IMF programs on deforestation (Przeworski et al., 2000). Our sample includes 2,258 observations from 112 countries from 1970 to 1990.1 We find that deforestation increases when governments participate in IMF programs, even after controlling for nonrandom selection.

### AT: Unconditional IMF Loans

[Be careful – these answers contradict the AT More IMF loans ones]

1. **Delink:** The IMF won’t force reforms. **Javed ’18 of PTI** writes that, even absent external reforms, the IMF sees India as a model for debt reduction.

2. **Turn:** If there are conditions attached to the loan, they’ll be good ones. The reforms my opponents are talking about are for developing economies. India is a much larger economy than it was when it first took out loans. Now, the IMF’s mission in India has changed. **The Daily Financial Times ’19** writes that the IMF now advocates for India to hire more women and build more infrastructure, both of which would reduce inequality and improve economic growth in the long term.

**This outweighs on probability** – it’s what the IMF is currently encouraging India to do; the question is whether the IMF has the leverage to do it.

Faizan Javed, PTI, 10-10-2018, "India's debt lower than advanced, emerging market economies average: IMF", Moneycontrol, https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/economy/indias-debt-lower-than-best-emerging-market-economies-imf-3030101.html // JJ  
India's debt is lower than the best or emerging market economies in the world, a top IMF official has said as he cautioned that the global debt has reached a new record high of USD 182 trillion in 2017. Vitor Gasper, International Monetary Fund (IMF) Director of Fiscal Affairs Department, said India's debt was substantially less than the global debt as percentage of world Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In India, private debt in 2017 was 54.5 percent of the GDP and the general government debt was 70.4 percent of the GDP, a total debt of about 125 of the GDP, according to the latest IMF figures. In comparison, debt of China was 247 percent of the GDP. "So, it (India's debt) is substantially less than the global debt as percentage of world GDP," Gasper told PTI. India's debt is below the average of advanced economies and below the average of emerging market economies, he said. "There is a positive relation between the debt to GDP ratio and the level of GDP per capita. If you compare around the world with the best economies or emerging market economies, the level of debt in India is lower," the top IMF official said. The IMF is very much stressing that global debt at USD 182 trillion in 2017 is at a new record high, he said. Debt in advanced economies, since the global financial crisis, has increased quite substantially while the private sector has been very gradually leveraging, he added. "If you look at emerging market economies, that includes India, you see that private debt in the last 10 years has increased quite substantially, although in the last two years, since the end of 2015, 2016 and 2017, there is a slowdown in the process of leveraging, but debt is very high and public debt is a very high as well," Gasper said. In the last few years in India private debt has declined from almost 60 percent to 54.5. "So, it's very stable. So, what you do see is that emerging market economies, which is where India is, there's a very fast buildup in private debt with a slowdown in the last two years, But India is basically steady. So, India is not an emerging market economy where leveraging is progressing fast," Gasper said. According to Gasper, in emerging market economies private debt has risen much faster than public debt. "Take China, for example. Total debt is 247 percent of the GDP. But the dividing line between what is public and private debt in China is blurry. This blurriness reflects the very large number of public units and corporations, the complex layers of government, and widespread subnational off-budget borrowing," he said. "As a result, estimates of 2017 public debt vary considerably: the official government debt figure is 37 percent of GDP, while the data reported in the latest World Economic Outlook show it at 47 percent of GDP, and the 'augmented' debt measure, which includes more off budget borrowing by local governments, stands at 68 percent of GDP," he said. As China works to compile a full general government balance sheet, this picture will come into clearer focus, he added. Gasper said China had substantial government assets, reflecting years of high infrastructure investment. These assets are larger than its liabilities, putting net worth — the difference between assets and liabilities — well above 100 percent of the GDP, the highest among emerging economies, he said.

Daily Financial Times, 3-8-2019, "Employing more women could boost economies by 35%, says IMF chief Christine Lagarde", http://www.ft.lk/opinion/Employing-more-women-could-boost-economies-by-35---says-IMF-chief-Christine-Lagarde/14-674263 // JJ  
Hiring more women and abolishing discriminatory laws would significantly boost the world economy, according to Christine Lagarde. In a recent interview with The Guardian, the head of the International Monetary Fund argues that countries ranked in the bottom 50% for gender equality — such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon — would experience economic gains of as much as 35%. New IMF research shows that the new skills and productivity levels that women introduce to the workforce yields higher economic benefits than previously thought. Hiring more women leads to “higher growth, a reduction in inequality, an improvement in the strength of the economy and a more diversified, export-focused country,” Lagarde said. “Things are changing. There was a time when women in the economy, women in employment, and women in finance were not seen as macro-critical. That’s no longer the case,” she told The Guardian. The new IMF study shows that a greater number of women on bank boards is associated with higher financial resilience and stability within the industry. However, less than one fifth of bank board members — and only 2% of bank CEOs worldwide — are women. “What we have observed is that when there are more women the banks’ capital buffers are larger, the number of non-performing loans is smaller and the risk indices are lower,” Lagarde said. “It is not causality but it is a strong correlation.” She added that more advanced countries would also benefit from empowerment initiatives, citing the 16% gender pay gap among the richest countries within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, an economic think tank. “In the advanced countries, I would say Austria which is changing its tax laws, and Japan, which has put its money where its mouth is and increased the budget for childcare facilities so that women can take jobs without feeling guilty,” she said. A recent World Bank study that shows 88% of countries have restrictions against women in the workplace embedded in their legislation. Furthermore, 59 countries have no laws prohibiting sexual harassment in the workforce and 18 countries still require women to have permission from their husband to get a job. But there has been some progress. Although the proportion of countries with discriminatory laws remains stagnant, the study showed that over the past two years, 65 countries passed a total of 87 legal reforms to increase women’s economic opportunities. Lagarde said the IMF is currently pressuring countries to implement policies to empower women, such as improving road infrastructure in India to help women get to work. She added that the IMF is addressing its own “teeny tiny” pay gap. Across all countries, Lagarde said that men too have a responsibility to empower women and combat gender discrimination.

## Broader Reform

### AT: (Link) Justifies G4 Membership

1. **Delink:** G4 members can’t use India’s membership as a justification for theirs, because India is uniquely qualified. **Pillalamarri ’15 of the Diplomat** writes that India and Brazil are the only G4 countries who really measure up to the P5 economically and population wise and who have underrepresented regions. Out of those, India is the only one not facing regional opposition.

2. **Delink:** Even if they did have a justification, justifications are irrelevant. Countries like China respond to the geopolitical implications of India’s bid, not their theoretical arguments about legitimacy. Even if G4 countries have a slightly stronger argument, that doesn’t necessitate others supporting them.

**3. Delink:** India would join separately from other reforms such as admitting the G4 countries because **Okochi ’17** finds that it has been historically impossible for all of the current P5 to reach consensus on the UNSC due to their diverging interests, as membership bills are never agreed upon. Just because we fiat India entering doesn’t mean we get to bypass gridlock and admit other countries.

Akhilesh Pillalamarri, The Diplomat, 2-13-2015, "China Should Back India for a Permanent UN Security Council Seat", Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-should-back-india-for-a-permanent-un-security-council-seat/ // JJ  
India and Brazil have long had the strongest bids, due to their sizes, populations, economies, and the fact that their regions (South Asia and Latin America) are unrepresented as Security Council permanent members. India’s bid in particular is strong as it only faces significant opposition from Pakistan and some misgivings on the part of China. Brazil, on the other hand, faces opposition from other Latin American countries like Mexico and Argentina. Japan, in particular, has faced the opposition of its neighbors including China and both the Koreas. It is highly [unlikely](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-japan-will-never-be-permanent-member-the-un-security-11014) that Japan will join the Security Council as a permanent member anytime soon due to China’s ability to veto such a proposal. Furthermore, as the recent Japanese hostage debacle in Syria has demonstrated, Japan is simply not ready to wield the diplomatic and military clout that comes with being a permanent member of the Security Council. India, on the other hand, has the best chance of joining the Security Council. Whenever and however this proposal is made to India, India should accept it, even it if means joining the Security Council without the other G4 countries. That would be in India’s long term interest and worth any short-term animosity with the other G4 powers, which would be brief at most. Indeed, China had previously [implied](http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article2233806.ece) that it would support India’s bid if it were de-linked from Japan’s bid. India is one of the [largest contributors](https://www.pminewyork.org/pages.php?id=1985) to the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces and as of 2014, had the second largest troop contribution to peacekeeping missions. In order to attain a permanent seat, India would need the support of all five of the current permanent members. The United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France have all said that they [support](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council#Japan) India’s bid. With the notable exception of Pakistan (as to be expected), many U.N states would be unopposed to India’s bid. Some states, however, remain wary of the overall reform this would require to the U.N. system. India should convince China that its presence on the U.N. Security Council is not only vital to India’s long term interests but to China’s as well. An agreement with China should then be quickly translated into an actual position at the Security Council, regardless of the bids of Brazil, Germany, Japan, or a member from Africa or the Arab world.

**Okochi 17** (Olufunke Christiana Okochi, from the University of Regina, Reforms in the United Nations’ Security Council: A Case Study of Nigeria, <https://ourspace.uregina.ca/bitstream/handle/10294/7737/Okochi_Olufunke_200267741_MA_JS_Spring2017.pdf> , DoA 3/19/19)

Though there have been calls for reform over the years, the UN General Assembly began to debate UNSC reforms in 1993 (Global Policy Forum, 2015). However, this remains a complex issue, likely to be debated well into the future. Each of the four proposals studied in Chapter 4 lays out its reasons for reform and presents its suggested approach to these expansions. However, they each have challenges to their adaptation. A common challenge is consensus. It has thus far been impossible to achieve consensus from all other UN members on any reform, including the two proposals put forward by the UN High Level Panel in its report. Even if any proposal does obtain the consensus needed from the UN General Assembly, it is likely to be very difficult to achieve consensus from all the P5, an important and necessary step to achieving ratification. This will be made even more difficult with proposals that require amendments to the use of the veto or veto rights. Members of the exclusive P5 group on the Council are unlikely to give up or share their rights to the veto and may veto any proposals put before them for a vote, if they disagree with its terms. In view of all of the above, this study thus concludes that it would be very difficult to reform the UNSC membership, particularly by expanding or amending its permanent membership structure. However, if this is to be considered, a possible approach may be to identify and examine criteria from reform proposals (e.g. the criteria identified from the four proposals in this thesis) and use these as a basis for determining membership eligibility. 90 Nigeria, its Role in Africa and Potential in the United Nations As earlier stated, the criteria used for this exercise was derived from all four reform proposals examined in Chapter 4. It includes measures such as a country’s

### AT: (Link) Reform Inherent

1. **Delink:** Full reform will never happen; even if this is the current proposal, it’s not the most likely one to pass. **Gowan ‘17** explains that no matter what, China has made gridlock inevitable by opposing the G-4 reforms. If not China, **Cartensen ‘18** explains that self-interest will remain a permanent roadblock in UNSC reform. Regional rivals oppose all the G4 members joining the Council – China opposing Japan, Pakistan opposing India, Argentina opposing Brazil, and Italy and Spain opposing Germany.

Even if India joins, China will not stop their opposition to Japan’s ascent to power. Insofar as China will still maintain a veto seat, India’s presence won’t change anything.

2. **Link turn:** Other reforms are unlikely and if anything, India joining makes reforms less likely. **Apps ‘18 of** **Reuters** explains that the council is so deadlocked that reforms will almost certainly not happen. The primary reason for this, he cites, is that council members are unwilling to share power. If India joins and they are forced to share power, they will become more entrenched in their opposition to reform.

3. **Delink:** In order for reform to pass, an agreement would have to dilute it to the point of inefficacy. **Evans ‘15 of the** **World Economic Forum** writes that in order to come to an agreement, countries like China, the US, and Russia would demand that the definition of war crimes not be too wide, take serious investigation, and that they get a veto if they claim it impacts their national safety. This is critical because it means that vetoes won’t really be stopped as countries like the US can always claim national security qualms.

Richard **Gowan**, 9-11-**2017**, "U.N. Security Council Reform Is Dead. That’s Still a Problem," No Publication, [https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/23677/u-n-security-council-reform-is-dead-that-s-still-a-problem //](https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/23677/u-n-security-council-reform-is-dead-that-s-still-a-problem%20//) RM   
**New Delhi has campaigned for a permanent seat on the council as part of a “Group of 4,” along with Brazil, Germany and Japan**. **The G-4,** as the group is known, **was highly active at the start of this decade, but while it still exists, all its members now seem skeptical that they can make much progress**. In 2015, **China used all its diplomatic leverage to kill off a well-intentioned initiative by Jamaica’s ambassador to the U.N. to put new life into talks on council reform.** The proposal—to compile a new document outlining different powers’ positions on the issue—was hardly earthshaking, but **Beijing was not willing to countenance any step that could result in its old foe Japan moving an inch closer to a permanent seat.** **China’s push to halt this limited initiative has had a chilling effect on all ensuing discussions of council reform. U.N. diplomats suspect that if they push for any advances on the issue, they will incur Beijing’s wrath. Few imagine that the Trump administration, which needs Chinese cooperation in the Security Council over North Korea, has any interest in council reform of its own. Deadlock seems inevitable.**

James **Cartensen**, 12-5-**2018**, "Self-Interest and Regional Rivalry Ensure UN Security Council Reform Remains Elusive," CNS News, [https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/james-carstensen/self-interest-and-regional-rivalry-ensure-un-security-council-reform //](https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/james-carstensen/self-interest-and-regional-rivalry-ensure-un-security-council-reform%20//) RM

Kleinsmith agreed **reform was long overdue**, but said **self-interest and nationalism were key roadblocks. Increasing the UNSC’s size or adding more permanent members, such as the G4 nations, was not in the self-interest of either the current P5 or regional competitors of the G4. Germany, Brazil, Japan and India have long proposed the number of permanent seats be increased by six seats – for themselves and two African nations.** (Nigeria and South Africa are sometimes proposed.) **But the proposal is not supported by their regional rivals – Italy and Spain in the case of Germany**, Pakistan vis-à-vis India, **Argentina in the case of Brazil, and most evidently, China in the case of Japan.** “President Trump may be harshly criticized for his nationalistic policies of Making America Great Again, but every other country continues to act in within their own self-interest and the UNSC members are no exception,” said Kleinsmith.

Peter **Apps**, 9-25-**2018**, "Commentary: An imperfect U.N. is still the world’s best hope," U.S., [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apps-un-commentary/commentary-an-imperfect-un-is-still-the-worlds-best-hope-idUSKCN1M51TF //](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apps-un-commentary/commentary-an-imperfect-un-is-still-the-worlds-best-hope-idUSKCN1M51TF%20//) RM

**Decades of attempts to reform the U.N. Security Council are** – like the Council itself on issues such as Syria, the South China Sea and wider human rights – **comprehensively deadlocked. The five permanent members – Britain, France and the United States on one side, Russia and China the other – are increasingly at loggerheads. Other emerging powers such as India and Brazil want permanent access, but there seems little or no road map to obtaining it. Those five permanent members have minimal incentive to share power, and no one can agree which other states should be allowed to join them.**

Gareth **Evans**, 2-5-**2015**, "Should the UN Security Council veto be limited?," World Economic Forum, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/02/should-the-un-security-council-veto-be-limited/> // RM

Back in 2001, **France**[**floated a proposal**](http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/vetorestraintparis21jan25i15rev.pdf)**that the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (P5) should voluntarily refrain from using their veto power when dealing with mass-atrocity crimes. And now**, in the lead-up to the commemoration of this year’s 70th anniversary of the UN, French President François Hollande’s **government is actively pursuing the idea again**. Could such an arrangement really work? The predictable initial response is to dismiss the possibility out of hand. As Australia’s wartime prime minister, Ben Chifley, once famously remarked, “The trouble with gentleman’s agreements is that there aren’t enough bloody gentlemen**.” It is indeed hard to believe that Russia and China, in particular, would be accommodating.** **Russia**, for example, **has**[**exercised vetoes**](http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick)**more than 100 times** since 1946, most recently – and unhappily – four times since 2011 to block resolutions intended to halt the carnage in Syria. Nor has **the United States**, **which has used its veto some 80 times** (most frequently, in recent years, on Israel-related issues), shown much enthusiasm, notwithstanding its generally strong stand on genocide and related cases. **Only the United Kingdom** (which, like France itself, last resorted to the veto in 1989) **has given any hint of support for the French initiative**. The right to veto was the price demanded by China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the US for joining the UN. No one believes that a formal Charter amendment to abolish or limit this right is remotely likely. But international pressure on the P5 has been mounting for the last 15 years – and especially since the General Assembly’s unanimous embrace in 2005 of the [“responsibility to protect”](http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml) (R2P) principle. Advocates of the French position want these countries to forswear their veto when a clear majority supports proposed action to mitigate the risk of a mass-atrocity crime. Distaste for the blocking of the Syrian resolutions has been particularly intense, and, at last count, 68 countries had given explicit support to the French proposal in various UN forums. The moral argument that the veto should not be used in cases of mass-atrocity crimes is overwhelming. The P5 have obligations under the UN Charter, as well as international humanitarian and human rights law, not to undermine the effectiveness of the UN or that body of law. And the political argument against using the veto in these situations – that it jeopardizes the credibility and legitimacy of the Security Council, whose structure is already seen as not reflecting the geopolitical realities of the twenty-first century – should also weigh heavily on the P5. But **is it possible to craft a veto-restraint proposal to which all of the P5 can agree**? In January, at a conference I attended in Paris that brought together French policymakers and international experts, it became clear **that a draft agreement could meet most, if not all, objections. But it would need to have at least three key elements**. **First, the agreement would have to define the relevant cases clearly** **– neither too widely nor too narrowly** – and build on well-established R2P language. The definition might be something like “situations where populations are suffering, or at imminent risk of, genocide, other crimes against humanity, or major war crimes.” **Second, an agreement would need to include a mechanism to determine when such cases had actually arisen.** This would need to be speedy, provide some assurance of objective assessment, and ideally generate strong concern across a wide cross-section of the international community. One way to meet these needs would be to have a double trigger. The first requirement would be a certification, communicated to the Security Council by the UN Secretary-General and his Office of Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and R2P (which has the necessary resources, expertise, and credibility) that the case meets the agreed definition. The other would be a request for veto-restraint by at least 50 member states, including at least five members from each of the recognized geographical groupings. **A third key element, unattractive ethically but** probably **necessary politically to win the support of the US and others, would be a provision allowing any P5 member to veto when it claimed a “vital national interest” to be at stake.** The consolation is that trying to rely on such an escape clause in most atrocity cases would not pass the laugh test. Could Russia and China really have used it to veto Security Council resolutions on Myanmar and Zimbabwe in, respectively, 2007 and 2008? Even given the intensity of Russia’s political and military relationship with Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, could it really claim that a resolution would place its own vital interests at risk?

### AT: Spec: Japan

1. **Delink:** In order to receive permanent membership, India would need China’s support. **Harris ‘14 of the National Interest** writes that even if other nations prove successful in their bid for permanent membership, China will always veto Japan. Because China holds a veto, it doesn’t matter if other countries support Japan because China has the sole power to end their search. In 2005, tens of thousands of demonstrators in China marched against Japan gaining a seat. This is a long standing rivalry that cannot be quelled by India joining the UNSC.

Thus, **Pillalamarri ’15 of The Diplomat** writes that China will only support India’s bid if it were de-linked from Japan’s. Thus, India’s membership doesn’t inherently mean Japan’s, as well.

[The **Economic Times 18** continues that in fact, India’s push for Japan to join with them is the biggest roadblock to Indian membership. China will only approve India joining if Japan doesn’t come with it. **(be careful reading this because if they frontline the defense well it magnifies the link to Japan joining bad)]**

Peter **Harris**, 8-4-**2014**, "Why Japan Will Never Be a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council," National Interest, [https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-japan-will-never-be-permanent-member-the-un-security-11014 //](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-japan-will-never-be-permanent-member-the-un-security-11014%20//) RM

Unlike Abe’s others attempts to bolster **Japan’s** international security posture, however, the **bid for permanent membership of the UNSC is something that China is able to block with relative ease.** **As an existing permanent member of the council, China wields a veto over any proposals to alter its composition.  Japan’s permanent membership is therefore not possible without Chinese consent. As such, Japan’s membership of the P5 is a non-starter,** but Japanese ambitions on the world stage will nevertheless redound to the fraught Sino-Japanese relationship.  [During](http://www.researchgate.net/publication/236823930_Youth_and_Nationalism_in_Japan/file/e0b495266203e0f7b4.pdf) previous discussions about reform of the UN in April 2005, “tens of thousands of demonstrators marched on the streets of major Chinese cities, throwing stones and other objects at the Japanese Council’s Office and vandalizing Japanese stores and restaurants.”  A decade on, domestic disgust at perceptions of Japanese hawkishness—stoked by state-controlled media—have hardly abated in China. For years, Japan has proceeded cautiously and relatively successfully when it comes to pressing its case for reform of the UNSC.  Tokyo has the support of many nations large and small, and has made common cause with both Brazil and India (and [Russia](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/meet0505.html), for that matter)—China’s supposed allies in the BRICS bloc.  **But Japan’s efforts never will be enough.  There is only one vote that matters when it comes to determining Japan’s future as a prospective permanent member of the Security Council and it is to be found in Beijing, not anywhere in Latin America.  Another round of non-permanent membership is thus the best that any number of Abe’s diplomatic offensives can buy.**

**Economic Times**, 7-12-**2018**, "India's UNSC alliance with Japan biggest mistake: Chinese media," [https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indias-unsc-alliance-with-japan-biggest-mistake-chinese-media/articleshow/49042814.cms //](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indias-unsc-alliance-with-japan-biggest-mistake-chinese-media/articleshow/49042814.cms%20//) RM

**BEIJING: India's alliance with**[**Japan**](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topic/Japan)**, Germany and Brazil to press for a permanent seat in the expanded**[**UN Security Council**](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topic/UN-Security-Council)**is "a biggest mistake", an article in the state-run Chinese daily said today.** "This year marks the 70th anniversary of the UN, and appeals for UN [Security Council](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topic/Security-Council) (UNSC) reform are becoming increasingly louder," Liu Zongyi, research fellow at the state-run Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, wrote in an article published in the Global Times. The G4 nations namely Brazil, India, Germany and Japan, are the most active in calling for a change, it said. Since the UN General Assembly on September 14 adopted a negotiating text, setting the stage for talks on the reform, "some Indian media acclaimed that the nation's bid for permanent UNSC seat has been boosted. However, in reality, it will take a long time to discuss only the wording of this document," the article said. Despite the Indian media's warm responses to the move, Japan, rather than India, has played the most active role in seeking a permanent seat within the G4 bloc, it said. "**Indian politicians, academics and media insist China as its biggest obstacle in winning the seat. Beijing as a UNSC permanent member has not openly supported New Delhi's UN aspiration.** India, taking this as an excuse, pressures China through every possible means," it said. "In fact, **India's biggest mistake is to ally itself with Japan**, Germany and Brazil. First of all, these three countries have opponents in the region. **Japan's bid for permanent membership will definitely invite strong opposition from China** and [South Korea](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topic/South-Korea)," it said. **China has been maintaining for long that it is a mistake on the part of India to join Japan specially, whose candidature Beijing opposes for historical reasons. China has not gone beyond saying that Beijing understands New Delhi's aspiration to play a bigger role in the UN.**

Akhilesh Pillalamarri, The Diplomat, 2-13-2015, "China Should Back India for a Permanent UN Security Council Seat", Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-should-back-india-for-a-permanent-un-security-council-seat/ // JJ  
India and Brazil have long had the strongest bids, due to their sizes, populations, economies, and the fact that their regions (South Asia and Latin America) are unrepresented as Security Council permanent members. India’s bid in particular is strong as it only faces significant opposition from Pakistan and some misgivings on the part of China. Brazil, on the other hand, faces opposition from other Latin American countries like Mexico and Argentina. Japan, in particular, has faced the opposition of its neighbors including China and both the Koreas. It is highly [unlikely](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-japan-will-never-be-permanent-member-the-un-security-11014) that Japan will join the Security Council as a permanent member anytime soon due to China’s ability to veto such a proposal. Furthermore, as the recent Japanese hostage debacle in Syria has demonstrated, Japan is simply not ready to wield the diplomatic and military clout that comes with being a permanent member of the Security Council. India, on the other hand, has the best chance of joining the Security Council. Whenever and however this proposal is made to India, India should accept it, even it if means joining the Security Council without the other G4 countries. That would be in India’s long term interest and worth any short-term animosity with the other G4 powers, which would be brief at most. Indeed, China had previously [implied](http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article2233806.ece) that it would support India’s bid if it were de-linked from Japan’s bid. India is one of the [largest contributors](https://www.pminewyork.org/pages.php?id=1985) to the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces and as of 2014, had the second largest troop contribution to peacekeeping missions. In order to attain a permanent seat, India would need the support of all five of the current permanent members. The United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France have all said that they [support](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council#Japan) India’s bid. With the notable exception of Pakistan (as to be expected), many U.N states would be unopposed to India’s bid. Some states, however, remain wary of the overall reform this would require to the U.N. system. India should convince China that its presence on the U.N. Security Council is not only vital to India’s long term interests but to China’s as well. An agreement with China should then be quickly translated into an actual position at the Security Council, regardless of the bids of Brazil, Germany, Japan, or a member from Africa or the Arab world.

### AT: Spec: Brazil

1. **Delink:** **Pillalamarri ’15 of The Diplomat** writes that Brazil’s own region doesn’t support its candidacy. It’s highly unlikely this would happen.

2. **Delink:** Brazil doesn’t even want a seat anymore. According to **Bosco ‘18 of the** **Wilson Quarterly**, new Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro is part of a rising populist movement opposed to the United Nations. In fact, on the campaign trail he even vowed to leave the United Nations as it “serves no purpose.”

David **Bosco**, Fall **2018**, "For the UN, a Rise in Populism Reveals an Old Challenge," No Publication, <https://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/the-fate-of-the-international-order/for-the-un-a-rise-in-populism-reveals-an-old-challenge/> // RM

But the U.S. president’s inadvertent comic relief could not dissipate the cloud created by what senior UN officials see as rising populism, nationalism, and anti-multilateral sentiment in several corners of the globe. The American president’s version gets by far the most attention, but he is hardly alone. **From Italy to the Philippines to Hungary and now Brazil, a generation of leaders is rising that harbors an active distaste for the United Nations and other parts of the global architecture**. Last spring, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán used a new UN agreement on migration as a foil in local elections; posters appeared across the country rejecting the body’s interference on migration policy. Italy’s Matteo Salvini, now serving as deputy prime minister, [recently described](http://www.ansa.it/english/news/2018/09/10/italy-to-weigh-cutting-un-funding-says-salvini_ecf723c5-5c7a-4ed0-9a93-5435dd070b7d.html) the UN as “an organization that costs billions of euros,” funding “waste, embezzlement, and theft.” Others have been even more hostile. **During a campaign stop, Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro**[**pledged to leave**](https://www.plataformamedia.com/en-uk/news/politics/interior/if-im-elected-president-i-will-leave-the-un-says-bolsonaro-9735658.html)**the United Nations, which he said “serves no purpose.**” As is his wont, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte topped them all, suggesting that several UN officials should be [fed to crocodiles](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/03/12/duterte-goes-war-un-threatens-throw-rights-team-crocodiles/).

Akhilesh Pillalamarri, The Diplomat, 2-13-2015, "China Should Back India for a Permanent UN Security Council Seat", Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-should-back-india-for-a-permanent-un-security-council-seat/ // JJ  
India and Brazil have long had the strongest bids, due to their sizes, populations, economies, and the fact that their regions (South Asia and Latin America) are unrepresented as Security Council permanent members. India’s bid in particular is strong as it only faces significant opposition from Pakistan and some misgivings on the part of China. Brazil, on the other hand, faces opposition from other Latin American countries like Mexico and Argentina. Japan, in particular, has faced the opposition of its neighbors including China and both the Koreas. It is highly [unlikely](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-japan-will-never-be-permanent-member-the-un-security-11014) that Japan will join the Security Council as a permanent member anytime soon due to China’s ability to veto such a proposal. Furthermore, as the recent Japanese hostage debacle in Syria has demonstrated, Japan is simply not ready to wield the diplomatic and military clout that comes with being a permanent member of the Security Council. India, on the other hand, has the best chance of joining the Security Council. Whenever and however this proposal is made to India, India should accept it, even it if means joining the Security Council without the other G4 countries. That would be in India’s long term interest and worth any short-term animosity with the other G4 powers, which would be brief at most. Indeed, China had previously [implied](http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article2233806.ece) that it would support India’s bid if it were de-linked from Japan’s bid. India is one of the [largest contributors](https://www.pminewyork.org/pages.php?id=1985) to the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces and as of 2014, had the second largest troop contribution to peacekeeping missions. In order to attain a permanent seat, India would need the support of all five of the current permanent members. The United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France have all said that they [support](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council#Japan) India’s bid. With the notable exception of Pakistan (as to be expected), many U.N states would be unopposed to India’s bid. Some states, however, remain wary of the overall reform this would require to the U.N. system. India should convince China that its presence on the U.N. Security Council is not only vital to India’s long term interests but to China’s as well. An agreement with China should then be quickly translated into an actual position at the Security Council, regardless of the bids of Brazil, Germany, Japan, or a member from Africa or the Arab world.

### AT: Spec: Germany

1. **Non-unique:** France pretty much does everything Germany would do, and Germany has a lot of power already on the Security Council. In fact, **UNRIC ’19** writes that France and Germany have decided to share the Council presidency.

2.**Turn: Beal ’19 of Stanford** explains that Germany as a permanent member would actually be a good thing, as it has recently become committed to international cooperation and reform. In fact, Germany actively and vocally opposed the UNSC sanctions/intervention upon Iraq as well as being the single largest global leader in the “humanitarian and economic reconstruction of Iraq” to provide a lasting framework for stability. In addition, Germany has started more than 470 developmental aid projects across the globe in places from El Salvador, Sierra Leone, and Pakistan.

UNRIC, Feb 22 2019, "Security Council: a dual presidency between France and Germany to defend multilateralism", United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe (UNRIC), https://www.unric.org/en/latest-un-buzz/31308-security-council-a-dual-presidency-between-france-and-germany-to-defend-multilateralism // JJ  
France and Germany will consecutively chair the United Nations Security Council in March and April. The two countries have decided to coordinate their efforts by jointly preparing the Council's work plans for these two months. As a founding member of the United Nations in 1945, France holds a permanent seat on the Council and therefore has the right of veto. Germany is a non-permanent member and was elected to serve on the Security Council from 2019 to 2020. The Security Council is composed of 15 members: 5 permanent members and 10 non-permanent members, each elected for 2 years. The two working programmes of these countries reflect their values as well as those of the European Union. The main objective of this "dual presidency" is to defend multilateralism which the French and German foreign ministers stated, "is experiencing perhaps its gravest crisis since its emergence after the Second World War". In the document of their joint statement, Germany’s Heiko Maas and France’s Jean-Yves Le Drian note that "more people are rejecting it as too expensive, acting as though global problems such as climate change, migration and cybersecurity could be successfully tackled at national level.” "The rivalry among major powers and growing nationalism have resulted in an increasingly fragmented world order – in political, economic and social terms," the two ministers added. "To counter this trend, like-minded states must make common cause and double their efforts to promote multilateralism. France and Germany intend to lead the way.” The two consecutive Presidencies will also focus on the protection of humanitarian personnel and respect for international humanitarian law, commitment to peace and conflict resolution and women's rights as well as women’s increased participation in peacekeeping.

David Beall 3-28-2019, “Germany’s Inclusion as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council: Breaking Free from its Historic Subservience” <https://web.stanford.edu/class/e297a/Germany%27s%20Inclusion%20as%20a%20Permanent%20Member.doc//CJ>

Viewed as a pillar of strength within a community of smaller nations in Europe, Germany has not bowed to international pressure to persuade the UN Security Council for a quick decision regarding the attack on Iraq**. Working with other Council members for a compromise over the Iraqi issue, rather than let the US use the Council for its own ends, Germany hoped a resolution could be created that included the cooperation of all involved parties**. Besides being backed by Berlin, such a resolution was also backed by Paris and Moscow: leaving the United States impatient for a decision. Though Schroeder and **Germany were against a war in Iraq**, Schroeder commented that “‘Germany has always been prepared to fulfill its international obligations, under the United Nations’” (Eddy). Although Germany would disagree with a resolution issuing a declaration of war against Iraq, Germany would stand up and support any UN resolution. **Unlike the United States and other permanent members, who use the Security Council for their own political gains and the sanctioning of an UN-legitimatized war, Germany would back UN resolutions that it disputed, despite differences in political opinions. Germany, therefore, would set aside discrepancies in international political ideals to uphold the greater good of the world.** Germany would not agree to a resolution against Iraq, due to the fact that all “peaceful means [had] not been exhausted” in the disarmament of Iraq and Saddam Hussein (Germany Rejects). Certainly not pacifist by nature, Germany was impelled to take action in Kosovo in 1999 and Afghanistan in 2001, because all other alternatives had failed. Regarding the Iraq issue, Germany maintained the fact that Chapter VI of the UN Charter was not fully depleted, and therefore there was still a possibility of peaceful negotiations, and a peaceful ending. The United States, on the other hand, hoped to use it political dexterity to dissuade other members of the Council from continuing peaceful options. The US hoped to enact the UN military powers of Chapter VII and engage in war with Iraq with the backing of the UN,. **Germany’s even-temperedness in quarrelsome times and its ability to value UN resolutions and standards over its own political ideals makes itself a fine candidate for permanent membership on the Security Council**. With the recent splits that occurred in the Security Council over involvement in Iraq, supporters of expanding the Council have become more vocal as of late. Hoping expansion would curb such splits, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has stated he’s in favor of a larger, more diverse Security Council (Warren). On par with their most recent alignment over the United States decision to take military action against Iraq, French President Jacques Chirac has given Germany his backing. Outside of the Security Council, **Germany participates in a large number of humanitarian and other developmental projects. Germany is a top fifteen donator to UNICEF, an international children’s fund introduced by the United Nations at the end of World War II; at the end of 2002, Germany had increased its contributions to UNICEF by 17.5 percent (UNICEF). Germany’s humanitarian efforts are a high priority in their global policy.** Working closely with a multitude of UN agencies, **German relief groups provide food, housing, education, and medical care to those in need across the globe. As an active participant in the World Food Program, Germany has recently established its own mission in Rome, Italy, and also contributes financially through the United Nations and the European Union. Germany also provides assistance in the form of emergency relief; in 2001, Germany’s Federal Foreign Office Task Force for Humanitarian Aid agency provided funding for over 470 aid projects which totaled 67.1 Euro.** Most of the aid was directed to the Balkans, but **countries all over the world received aid: El Salvador, Palestine, and Sierra Leone are some of the many. Not including the United Nations, Germany still undertakes an active role in world wide humanitarian efforts (**Humanitarian). In October of this year, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder continued to announce his desire for Germany to have permanent member status on the Security Council at the UN General Assembly. Schroeder stated “on behalf of Germany, I repeat that we are prepared to take on more responsibility in the framework of such a reform” and insists that such membership should include veto power (Warren). Chancellor Schroeder, along with his German ministry, believes the next stage of UN involvement resides heavily in the reconstruction of Iraq. Supporting the humanitarian efforts of the UN in Iraq, **Germany has devoted** to **help in the “humanitarian and economic reconstruction of Iraq, and in training the country's police officers” (Warren). According to German officials, the enlarging of the United Nations’ role in world affairs would help to facilitate a healthier, more peaceful environment for all nations involved. Also, to help foster a greater positive growth in UN involvement in world issues,** Germany claims that European Union needs to further integrate on the supra-national level. Such integration would help encourage a better foreign policy for all of Europe not only Germany. Germany has risen from the ashes of World War II to become a leading power in Europe and the rest of World. Originally set up to prevent and ultimately stop the Nazi advancement over Europe, Asia, and Northern Africa, the United Nations has progressed to take a much larger role in world events, and Germany has been a part of this progression. Not only a leader in humanitarian efforts and financial contributions for aid relief, Germany has also been a major contributor to the Security Council, the strongest branch of the United Nations. As recently as February of 2003, Germany headed the Security Council during turbulent times, as the United States pressed for a resolution that declared an attack on Iraq. Standing strong under US pressure for a quick resolution, Germany vowed not to let the superpower use its political power for its own gains. Germany’s current involvement with the UN and their willingness to help in other avenues, besides monetary aid, demonstrate the point Chancellor Schroeder has been preaching for the past three years: Germany is ready for a permanent seat on the Security Council. Out contributing four of the five permanent members on the council, Germany is long overdue to take its permanent member status. Over the last fifty years, Germany has risen to one of the top European powers, becoming a prominent leader in the European Union**. As a devout supporter of United Nations expansion in overall world involvement and as an advocate of a more cohesive European Union, Germany should be the next permanent member admitted to the UN Security Council.**

### AT: Spec: Africa

1. **Delink:** Africa will never actually get a seat. **Johnson 19** explains that the countries vying to join the UNSC work like a queue, not a package, and Africa is at the back of this queue. This is the case because a) Africa habitually pays fees late and abuses resources, b) Russia is opposed to South African candidacy because they oppose Israel, and c) any “package deal” would be such that a western ally like India is added alongside a Russia-China ally, and none of the countries in Africa are a solid Russia-China ally.

RW **Johnson**, 2-24-**2019**, "The ANC`s UN Security Council pipedream," No Publication, [https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/the-ancs-un-security-council-pipedream //](https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/the-ancs-un-security-council-pipedream%20//) RM

There is a financial question too. As of 2012-2013 the UN spent $5.152 billion in direct costs and another $7.8 billion in peace-keeping. Today, the total costs are closer to $20 billion a year. The top contributor is the USA (22%), followed by Japan, China, Germany, France, the UK, Brazil, Italy, Russia and Canada. The problem is that over half the national contributors are chronic bad and late payers. On the other hand there are some conspicuously good payers – Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, the UAE, and Australia, for example. A glance at that list suggests why **Japan, Germany and Brazil are among the top candidates for any extra seats on the UNSC. Now that the Indian economy is growing so fast one must expect India to move powerfully into that club of top payers too. China, which used to be a long way down the list of contributors, has very deliberately stepped up its contributions** – it is now the second biggest contributor to peace-keeping operations as well as the third biggest contributor overall – and it is clear that there is a general acceptance that he who wishes to call the tunes must help pay the piper. **This creates a particular problem for would-be African candidates for the UNSC. Many African countries are among the bad and late payers** while no one at the UN is unaware that Africa gobbles up, year after year, the lion’s share of peace-keeping costs. That is to say, **Africa is the place which creates much of the troubles and whose own institutions are so weak that the AU has to depend on donations from Western countries to be able to function**. **This puts it right at the back of the queue.** **Is South Africa really, seriously wanted to make a bid for a permanent UNSC seat, it would behave very differently. For a start it would stop wasting its money paying an exorbitant contribution to the AU and for a nonsense like the Pan-African Parliament, beef up its armed forces so that it could play a bigger peace-keeping role, and up its contributions to the UN. It would also stop supporting Maduro, Cuba and other Third World dictators, revert to Mandela’s human rights-based foreign policy and stop attacking Israel**. It should remember that **a hostile attitude to Israel would not only provoke a US veto but would also upset Russia.** **Putin is very proud of the fact that Russian is the second language of Israel and is a frequent visitor there and a good customer for Israeli technology. Moreover, these days Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan and Egypt are all friendly with Israel**. Given that South Africa is not a Muslim state, the clever position would be a policy of strict neutrality towards Israel. However, **not even** such **disciplined behaviour would get round the fact that there is a long queue of countries – India, Brazil, Japan and Germany - whose claims to a permanent UNSC seat would have to be settled before the question of such a seat for South Africa even got onto the agenda.** And, as one can see, all these countries currently face deadlocks of their own, **so there is little immediate likelihood of any change at all. Even if that changes – as it may in time – there is no chance of Africa getting two permanent seats on the UNSC.** If change does come it would be likely to take the shape of a package deal which would not threaten the positions of any of the five existing UNSC members. That is to say, if you add an extra “Western” state then add an extra friend for China-Russia too. The trouble is that while there are plenty of possible “Western” candidates, it is hard to see who, apart from North Korea, would be a reliable member of the China-Russia camp. And no matter how many wacky meetings Donald Trump has with Kim Jong-un, one suspects one will never see Pyongyang on the UNSC.

### AT: Increase Temp. Seats

1. **Delink:** This won’t ever occur, because America opposes this reform. **Bosco ’15 of Foreign Policy** writes that the U.S. gains from a limited nonpermanent member bloc, because it means the permanent members are able to gain more power.

David Bosco, September 29, 2019, "The United States Doesn’t Want to Reform the U.N. Security Council," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/29/the-united-states-doesnt-want-to-reform-the-u-n-security-council/ // JJ  
Behind the scenes, however, U.S. diplomats have been content to watch the different factions in the U.N. General Assembly squabble. When Washington has bestirred itself, it has been to signal its opposition to any hasty moves. America’s lethargy reflects the reality that, rhetoric aside, U.S. leaders aren’t convinced that council reform is in the national interest. The United States has an awfully good deal on the Security Council. On many issues, it can use the council to help share burdens, amplify its voice, and endow policies it favors with the force of international law. When Washington doesn’t find the council convenient, the veto power means it can work around the body without risking an official reprimand. The Security Council’s cozy size — the number of nonpermanent members hasn’t increased since 1965 — is also conducive to American interests. Divided by region and interests, the ten rotating nonpermanent members are rarely able to operate as an effective bloc. That leaves the veto-wielding five mostly in charge of the council’s agenda. When they can agree, the rest of the council almost always follows behind. In many respects, preserving the status quo is Washington’s best option. The diplomacy of likely new members, including Brazil, India, and South Africa, has been frustrating to U.S. policymakers. During the Libya intervention, these countries complained about what they perceived as America’s abuse of its council mandate. Susan Rice, then the U.N. ambassador, was unimpressed. “We’ve learned a lot,” she said of emerging-power diplomacy, “not all of it encouraging.” The prickliness of these emerging powers likely sapped whatever limited energy the Obama administration had for Security Council reform.

### AT: Veto Reform

1. **Delink: Hosli ’17 of Leiden University** writes that reforming the veto would require the assent of the P5 in order to amend the U.N. charter. The P5 won’t vote to reduce their own power.

Madeleine O. Hosli, 4-18-2017, "Why is change so slow? Assessing prospects for United Nations Security Council reform," Taylor & Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17487870.2017.1305903 // JJ  
To alter the fundamental properties of the UNSC, namely its size, composition, the majority threshold or the P-5 veto, the UN Member States have to amend UN Charter articles 23 and 27 collectively (Russett, O’Neill, and Sutterlin [1997](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17487870.2017.1305903)Russett, Bruce M., Barry O’Neill, and James S. Sutterlin. 1997. “Breaking the Restructuring Logjam.” In The Once and Future Security Council. 1st ed., edited by Bruce M. Russett and Ian Hurd, 153–169. New York: St. Martin’s Press. [[Google Scholar]](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?hl=en&publication_year=1997&pages=153-169&author=Bruce+M.+Russett&author=Barry+O%E2%80%99Neill&author=James+S.+Sutterlin&title=Breaking+the+Restructuring+Logjam), 163). This could be done in two ways: Article 108 of the UN Charter requires two-thirds of the UNGA membership including all of the P-5 to ratify an agreement on UNSC reform. Alternatively, article 109 stipulates that two-thirds of the UNGA membership, in addition to nine of the 15 UNSC members can convene a conference of UN member states. Any amendment adopted there enters into force if two-thirds of the UNGA, as well as all permanent members, have ratified it (Witschel [2012b](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17487870.2017.1305903)Witschel, Georg. 2012b. “Article 109.” In The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary. 3rd ed., edited by Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Hermann Mosler, Georg Nolte, Andreas Paulus, and Nikolai Wessendorf, 2232–2241. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [[Google Scholar]](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?hl=en&publication_year=2012b&pages=2232-2241&author=Georg+Witschel&title=Article+109)). With a total number of 193 member states, the two-thirds majority threshold amounts to 129 votes. Accordingly, 65 UN member states can form a blocking minority. To date, UN Member States have amended the UN Charter three times on the basis of article 108, notably to increase UNSC membership from 11 to 15. In contrast, the UN Member States have never invoked article 109 (Witschel [2012a](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17487870.2017.1305903)Witschel, Georg. 2012a. “Article 108.” In The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary. 3rd ed., edited by Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Hermann Mosler, Georg Nolte, Andreas Paulus, and Nikolai Wessendorf, 2199–2231. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [[Google Scholar]](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?hl=en&publication_year=2012a&pages=2199-2231&author=Georg+Witschel&title=Article+108), [2012b](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17487870.2017.1305903)Witschel, Georg. 2012b. “Article 109.” In The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary. 3rd ed., edited by Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Hermann Mosler, Georg Nolte, Andreas Paulus, and Nikolai Wessendorf, 2232–2241. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [[Google Scholar]](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?hl=en&publication_year=2012b&pages=2232-2241&author=Georg+Witschel&title=Article+109)).

### AT: Accountability

1. **Non-unique:** The U.N. Secretary General is already making reforms. **Nguyen ’19 of the Development Policy Center** writes that Guterres has implemented an ambitious reform agenda to increase accountability.

Michael Nguyen, February 26, 2019, "Guterres’ UN reforms: necessary, modest, and progressing", Devpolicy Blog from the Development Policy Centre, http://www.devpolicy.org/guterres-un-reforms-necessary-modest-and-progressing-20190226/ // JJ  
This year, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres [announced](http://webtv.un.org/watch/un-secretary-general-ant%C3%B3nio-guterres-marks-the-%E2%80%9Cgo-live%E2%80%9D-of-sweeping-un-reforms-on-1-january-2019/5986100355001) the official launch of sweeping reforms to the United Nations which promise to focus on “people rather than progress, effectiveness and adaptability, and on equality, diversity and integrity.” However, whilst Guterres [proclaims](http://webtv.un.org/watch/un-secretary-general-ant%C3%B3nio-guterres-marks-the-%E2%80%9Cgo-live%E2%80%9D-of-sweeping-un-reforms-on-1-january-2019/5986100355001) that 2019 will be a year of action, New Year’s resolutions are always precarious. The implementation of these reforms will be achievement in and of itself, but their success also hinges on whether they can deliver effective development responses against a backdrop of increasing geopolitical tensions. The reforms Since assuming his role as UN Chief in 2017, reform has become a [central tenant](https://www.universal-rights.org/blog/un-secretary-generals-reform-agenda-important-address-human-rights-pillar/) of Guterres’ platform. [Fragmentation and bureaucratisation](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198705833.001.0001/acprof-9780198705833-chapter-6) have long plagued the UN, leading to duplication of work, resource wastage and ineffective implementation of programs. His predecessors have struggled to make significant headway with these bureaucratic obstacles, but Guterres has persevered and (surprisingly) delivered [seven major](http://sdg.iisd.org/commentary/policy-briefs/an-annotated-guide-to-the-un-secretary-generals-reform-proposals/) changes: A system-wide strategic document to accelerate the alignment of the UN development system with the 2030 Agenda and serve as a method of accountability. A new generation of UN Country Teams (UNCTs), with the expertise to support the advancement of the SDGs, working in tandem with local actors. A Resident Coordinator (RC) with greater authority to make final strategic development decisions as well as defining which agencies will lead responses to humanitarian crises. A strengthened Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) through its inclusion in the Regional Coordination Mechanism (RCM). Improved strategic guidance, transparency and accountability by implementing the ECOSOC Operational Activities Segment (OAS) as an accountability system for the 2030 Agenda. A system-wide approach to partnerships, including the launch of six partnership-related work streams. A new Funding Compact between Member States and the UN development system that would enhance transparency of financial data. Along with the creation of [four new UN departments](http://webtv.un.org/watch/player/5986100355001), [restructuring](https://undocs.org/A/72/525) of the United Nations Peace and Security Pillar, and the achievement of [gender parity](https://www.unric.org/en/latest-un-buzz/30942-gender-parity-reached-in-un-senior-management) amongst senior UN management, these reforms are arguably the most significant in a generation. The most important of these is the reinvigoration of the [Resident Coordinator (RC) System](https://www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/files/en/qcpr/2_%20The%20reinvigorated%20Resident%20Coordinator%20system.pdf) which aims to coordinate all UN agencies within a country. Previously, because no parallel function existed at UN headquarters level, the system was largely dismissed by individual development organisations. RCs struggled to coordinate agencies, given both lack of funding and a specific hierarchic structure that clearly delegated their authority over in-country agency heads. As a result, sister UN agencies often found themselves insulated and compartmentalised within their project countries, eventually developing [contradicting](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/21/not-perfect-but-it-is-effective-un-from-the-point-of-view-of-its-staff) development goals and remaining entrenched within their own organisational chains of command. These reforms give RCs the much-needed authority to remedy this. No longer filled by a UNDP official, the RC will have an independent office with [reporting lines](https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/dsgsm1189.doc.htm) to the Secretary General. The RC will have [greater autonomy](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Y_D6HlFx6Q) towards the strategic direction of UN operations and be the primary source of authority for UN agencies in each country, with the aim of directing [collective organisation](https://www.devex.com/news/a-vision-of-un-development-reform-takes-form-amid-funding-concerns-93073) through a standard operating system rather than the individual managerial networks that previously existed. The road ahead Whilst the reforms are promising, there is substantial pressure on Guterres and the UN to deliver, despite an increasingly difficult political environment. Internationally, the UN is under close observation and pressure to sustain the fragile peace talks in [Yemen](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/04/un-yemen-envoy-to-accompany-houthi-team-to-stockholm-peace-talks). The international community is also closely observing the implementation of the UN’s [controversial](https://theconversation.com/global-compact-for-migration-what-is-it-and-why-are-countries-opposing-it-106654) [Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM)](https://www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2018/07/migration.pdf), developed to coordinate a collective response to the growing [record number](https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2018/6/5b222c494/forced-displacement-record-685-million.html) of refugees and relieve pressure on the Turkish, Lebanese, Jordanian, Egyptian and Iraqi governments, which have [borne the brunt](http://click.info-unhcr.org/?qs=d358d701106c1af8179152a3116baebf20830f23c41cee880708f0305b63fde4dd3495533027670778d26b421b50957817bc4260c92984ac) of the Syrian refugee crisis. Within the UN itself, the [departure](https://qz.com/1417942/nikki-haleys-departure-wont-cheer-un-officials/) of Nikki Haley is a significant loss for Guterres, given the [surprising partnership](https://edition.cnn.com/2017/12/20/politics/nikki-haley-taking-names-on-jerusalem/index.html) they shared. The implementation of his reforms can be attributed in part to her [threatening](https://qz.com/1405965/many-un-agencies-are-in-a-precarious-position-if-the-us-decides-to-cut-foreign-aid/) to slash US funding unless other countries [increased](https://www.devex.com/news/haley-says-she-will-help-un-reform-but-warns-us-funding-wont-be-taken-for-granted-91701)their own contributions. Additionally, her ability to balance President Trump’s aggressive foreign policy positions with remarkable private [pragmatism](https://qz.com/1417942/nikki-haleys-departure-wont-cheer-un-officials/) undoubtedly insulated the UN from the worst impulses of the Trump administration. It is uncertain whether the next US ambassador, [Heather Nauert](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-46477719), will be able to leverage the UN or Trump administration as skillfully. Moreover, expectations should be appropriately tempered given the UN’s track record with high profile reforms. From 2005-2006 Kofi Annan introduced the “[In larger freedom](https://www.globalpolicy.org/un-reform/32283-secretary-general-kofi-annans-reform-agenda-1997-to-2006.html)” reform agenda which, although providing a degree of modern management, was more symbolic than pragmatic, and is often characterised as being part of an underlying US agenda. Alternatively, Ban Ki Moon, though described as a dogmatic reformer early in his tenure, made even less progress than his predecessor because of a [reluctance](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/12/21/commentary/world-commentary/ban-ki-moons-mixed-legacy/) to offend major powers. It is therefore hardly surprising that the reforms have not attracted considerable excitement, given the tentative results of previous reforms and the likely assumption that these changes will not be dissimilar. Yet the reforms were necessary. Slow progress on the SDGs means that the UN is [not](https://www.devex.com/news/sdgs-show-slow-progress-not-on-track-to-reach-2030-targets-un-reports-92971) on track to meet the [2030 Development Agenda](https://www.globalpolicywatch.org/blog/2017/02/22/un-development-system/). The bold changes demonstrated in these reforms are thus critical not only to accelerating progress but also to injecting a much needed sense of [urgency](https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld) to UN development programs. Despite the challenging conditions they enter, their implementation represents a shift away from the UN of the 20th century and a stemming of the [haemorrhaging legitimacy](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/07/what-has-the-un-achieved-united-nations) suffered by UN development agencies. Though the result of these reforms remains to be seen, scepticism of their implementation should be tempered with a hint of optimism that Guterres can deliver at least a small degree of progress towards UN modernisation.

## U.N. Collapse

### Weighing

1. **Strength of link:** **Ross ’16 of the Guardian** writes that there are many alt causes to UN collapse: failings of the Secretary-General, and the world is no longer ordered by states -- yet the UN treats non-state actors as irrelevant.

Carne Ross, 3-10-2016, "The UN is failing. Is it heading the way of the League of Nations?", Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/mar/10/un-failing-league-of-nations-isis-boko-haram // JJ  
As good a place as any to witness the slow decline of the post-second world war global “order” is the [UN security council](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/17/70-years-un-security-council-key-moments) – if they would let you in, which they won’t. Don’t bother with that rarefied organ’s “public” meetings. None of its real diplomatic business is conducted in the open. In a reflection of the state of the world, the security council, which is charged with the maintenance of international peace, is busier than ever. Years ago, the council met for a few hours once or twice a week. These days it meets all day, often at night and weekends too. Overworked diplomats discuss an ever-lengthening agenda of crises, from North Korea to [Libya](https://www.theguardian.com/world/libya). The long list of meetings and committees may demonstrate the council’s energy in addressing the manifold factors behind modern conflict but it also reflects the council’s failure: it doesn’t take a diplomat to see that insecurity is spreading. Then there’s the semiotics. Once limiting itself to crisp, pointed decisions (such as its demands for Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territories), its resolutions have grown ever longer and less intelligible. The council has designed five or six (no one can say with certainty) different categories of its public statements. There used to be one. Heads of UN missions tell me they cannot understand the confused mandates the council has given their peacekeepers. Governments I have advised say they have no idea of the meaning of resolutions directed at them. There are many reasons behind the [UN’s inability to stop the devastating war in Syria](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/21/medecins-sans-frontieres-plea-for-civilian-bombings-syria-stop), but it’s not good enough merely to blame Russia, as western diplomats tend to do. The disturbing truth is that the world’s primary institution to deal with war is not working. The basic problem is that the council’s founding premise of a world ordered by states no longer holds. Conflicts involving [al-Shabaab](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/29/somalia-attacks-signal-escalation-of-al-shabaab-offensive), [Boko Haram](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/04/join-us-or-die-birth-of-boko-haram) or [Islamic State](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/07/isis-planning-enormous-and-spectacular-attacks-uk-counter-terrorism-chief-warns) originate from particular local circumstances but often have regional and global reach and consequence. Designed to prevent and arbitrate state-to-state conflict, the council has failed to adapt to an entirely different world. On 12 September 2001, when I was part of the British delegation, I joined other shocked diplomats in the council chamber to condemn the previous day’s attacks. Long before that awful day in New York and Washington, the nature of political violence and global insecurity had already altered forever. But the council’s arrogant presumption that governments decide and the rest abide has not changed. The failure of governments and their multilateral institutions is epic. What seemed then like episodic and geographically limited threats have now morphed into permanent war, insecurity and extremist violence on almost every continent. Unfortunately, most of the debate about reform at the UN misses the point. Discussion revolves around the stale questions of new permanent members of the security council or restrictions on the use of the veto. Both are desirable but neither will happen soon – or fix the deeper problem. If we’re not careful, the UN will collapse into irrelevance, much as the [League of Nations](https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/nov/06/guardians-league-of-nations-susan-pedersen-review) failed in its day. This year, a successor to Ban Ki-moon will be appointed. We need a tough and independent secretary general who will give impartial and specific recommendations to the council, without fear or favour to the prejudices of the [“P5” permanent veto-wielding members](http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/), and with one over-riding prerogative: the protection of civilian life. In one notorious example, the head of UN peacekeeping failed to pass on warnings to the security council of [imminent genocide in Rwanda](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/714025.stm) because he believed its members didn’t want to hear them. An independent secretary general would long ago have demanded a ceasefire in [Syria](https://www.theguardian.com/world/syria) with clearly spelt-out consequences, including coercive sanctions, for those who breached it. Likewise, an international conference to agree and implement a timetable for the two-state solution for Israel/Palestine, a requirement endorsed repeatedly by the council and every member state of the UN. The secretary general would need the freedom to appoint a strong, experienced team, with appointment on merit and not the traditional divvying-up of senior jobs among the P5, a practice that institutionalises their unhealthy dominance, not only within the council but also of the secretariat and the information it conveys to the council. Officials have admitted that certain UN reports are edited by permanent members before delivery to the security council (I did it myself once). There are taboo issues, such as [Chechnya](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/23/chechen-leader-ramzan-kadyrov-threatens-whole-of-russia-opposition-warns) or tensions in the [South China Sea](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/28/whats-behind-beijings-drive-control-south-china-sea-hainan), which are banished from the council’s agenda because it is “understood” but never publicly admitted that certain powerful countries forbid their discussion. In recent years, it was confrontation over Kashmir that brought the world closest to nuclear war, yet mention of this hotspot is tacitly prohibited too. The UN investigations into its failure to prevent mass killings in Rwanda, [Srebrenica](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/04/how-britain-and-us-abandoned-srebrenica-massacre-1995) and Sri Lanka all identified serial weaknesses, both political and institutional. But no one should be confident that such tragedies will be competently addressed in future. The need for a brave and decisive new secretary general is literally a matter of life and death, in fact many deaths. Despite the claim that the security council now holds more public meetings than ever, the vast majority of its substantive negotiations are conducted in private. I spent four and a half years in the council and never saw a good reason why most of its deliberations should remain closed to public scrutiny except to disguise the frequent superficiality and poverty of its debates (though occasionally privacy may help negotiation). Televising parliaments has improved democracy. Diplomats should be judged by what they say: a weak form of accountability but an improvement on its total absence today. Transparency in the diplomatic dealings at the UN would render the resulting decisions more comprehensible and thus legitimate. The public would be more engaged, for instance, when the council discusses aid delivery to [besieged towns in Syria](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/11/madaya-more-starvation-deaths-as-aid-convoys-head-to-besieged-syrian-town). People might begin to care about what happens at the UN. Finally, there’s one simple reform the council could put in place tomorrow. It can listen to the people and parties affected by its decisions. When the council discusses Syria, Libya or [Somalia](https://www.theguardian.com/world/somalia), you can safely assume Syrians, Libyans or Somalis will not be present. It is indefensible that, despite the reality that almost all its agenda concerns conflict between “non-state” groups, the security council still only allows states to address it, and even that is not frequent practice when they are not members of the council. On rare occasions the council grants an audience to non-state parties – but only those it approves of. It should be routine practice that legitimate and representative parties present their views before the council takes decisions about their futures. After all, they know their countries – and conflicts – best. Diplomats should get used to dealing with more eclectic groups who must be persuaded if there is to be peace. Ending conflict requires multiple stakeholders in the room. This kind of work takes patience; it is already practised by the better mediators and diplomats. They understand that sometimes unwieldy coalitions and repeated rounds of talking (and listening) are more likely to effect peace than over-negotiated pieces of paper that almost no one reads. These improvements do not require the UN charter to be rewritten: they are already stated within it. There’s way too much deference to decades of musty and antediluvian tradition at the UN; a few determined and gutsy diplomats could make these changes happen. Beset by new forms of conflict, the world outside its gloomy chambers demands that the UN lets in some light.

### AT: Collapsing Now

1. **Non-unique:** Just because an institution is unrepresentative does not make it less legitimate. For instance, the Supreme Court is extremely unrepresentative, yet remains legitimate to Americans. Thus, despite their rhetoric, **Hurd ’03 of Global Governance** writes that countries still associate the UNSC with power and spend millions to get on the UNSC.

2. **Uniqueness overwhelms the link:** Even if the Security Council is threatened, it’s not because it’s unrepresentative. **Weiss ’03 of the CUNY Graduate Center** writes that changing the composition of the UNSC is not enough to overcome its key issues: reliance on U.S. military supremacy and the veto.

Hurd, Ian. "Myths of Membership: The Politics of Legitimation in UN Security Council Reform," Global Governance vol. 14, no. 2 (April-June 2008): p. 199-218. HeinOnline, <https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/glogo14&i=207> // JJ  
The decline in the difference of decisionmaking power between states with nonpermanent seats on the Council and nonmembers has come about through several means. As noted, power over the Agenda has been somewhat diffused to all members, but more important is the increase in consultation between the permanent members and states not formally involved with the Council. 27 The form of consultation that has been most institutionalized has involved the states that have contributed matdriel to peacekeeping missions. Extensive rules are now in place to regularize contact between the troop-contributing countries and the Council. 28 Other states that contribute exceptional resources to the UN, notably through the budget (such as Germany and Japan) have also developed something like "quasi-membership" on the Council by virtue of their frequent and substantial participation in Council consultations, whether they are in a nonpermanent seat or not. In addition, certain groups of states, such as the Nonaligned Movement, have extensive consultations between their members that have a Council seat and the rest in the General Assembly. Still others participate less often, but perhaps more visibly, in the shape of being invited to Council debates without a vote when their interests are at stake. Such invitations have become routine. Approximately one third of all official Council meetings now involve the formal participation of non-Council members. The increase in participation by nonmembers has increased greatly since the early history of the United Nations, devaluing the special privileges of membership. 29 In addition to the growing consultation between nonmembers and the Council, a second movement has increased the gap between the Permanent Five and the nonpermanent members. Increasingly, the real work of the Council takes place among the Permanent Five in "informal sessions" (which, because they are not official Council meetings, do not need to be open to the nonpermanent members or to the public). Almost every formal Council meeting now is a pro forma affair, scripted in these advance informal consultations. The president of the Council almost invariably notes in opening an official meeting that "the Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations." 30 As the distance between the Permanent Five and the nonpermanent members has grown, and that between the nonmembers and the nonpermanent members has diminished, the difference between nonmembers and nonpermanent members has doubly declined. This should reduce the value of a nonpermanent seat to aspiring states. Despite a decline in the operational distinction between nonmembers of the Council and nonpermanent members of the Council, the energy and resources spent by states trying to get themselves elected to a nonpermanent seat is considerable and is apparently increasing. In the election in 1998 within the Western European and Others Group, selfstyled candidate states Canada, Greece, and the Netherlands engaged in strenuous lobbying and gift giving. The Netherlands invited voting delegates to performances of the Royal Concertgebouw Orchestra of Amsterdam and took them on cruises of the East River; Canada ran a fouryear campaign, costing an estimated $1.9 million, that included sending retired diplomats and academics to lobby governments in nearly 100 countries and ended with free tickets to a performance of the Cirque du Soleil in New York; and Greece hosted a weeklong cruise in the Aegean for 120 UN delegates and their families. 3 1 Earlier campaigns in this and other groups have also been extravagant, including "brown envelopes left in hotel rooms during junkets," with new levels being reached in 1998.32 What is the payoff to such efforts, particularly on the part of states that are already in a position to consult closely with the Council because of their roles in peacekeeping operations or elsewhere? The answer is that Council membership confers status and recognition on a state and allows the state to appropriate some of the authority derived from the legitimacy of the Council. The status and prestige of the state's diplomats increases, in New York and around the world; the state is in a position of prominence, even if not of actual power, should a world crisis arise; and the state knows that it is in a position that other states envy. A Security Council nonpermanent seat is to established states what a General Assembly seat is to new states: a source of authority-byassociation. This status can also be useful to governments in domestic political contests if a high international profile is valued by voters or by other powerful interests. 33 Even if the real increase in decision or access influence due to winning a nonpermanent seat is minimal, the jump in status is huge. With the growing clubbiness of the Permanent Five, the value of a nonpermanent seat can perhaps be measured in terms of a single, symbolic payoff for the state: international recognition. The desire to be a nonpermanent member is not for the power it brings, but rather for the apparent proximity it brings to those with real power, the Permanent Five. "Peacekeeping" as a Label The third form of symbolic recognition sought by states from the Council has arisen increasingly since 1992 as so-called regional peacekeeping forces have become more common. Since the retreat from "conventional" UN peacekeeping after the U.S. reaction to the Somalia mission, it has become more common for a regional power to intervene in local conflicts under the rubric of "peacekeeping." However, because these missions often resemble the kind of overt regional imperialism that has lost much of its credibility in the international community, they leave participants vulnerable to criticism as "neoimperialists." Russia, in particular, has suffered criticism from many quarters that its regional "peacekeeping" in Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, and elsewhere in its "near-abroad" 34 is a "figleaf' 35 that merely covers up "the Kremlin's imperialistic recidivism" 36 and that signals its desire to return to the Russian continental empire. 37 Similar doubts about the intentions of peacekeeping by former colonial powers have been raised with respect to most of the large states, even when involved in operations that originate at the UN, including France in Lebanon, 38 and the United States in Africa, Haiti, and elsewhere. 39 While the following examples are drawn from Russian cases, other military adventures (such as in West Africa and Central America) could usefully be explored.

Thomas G. Weiss, Presidential professor and director of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies at The CUNY Graduate Center, 1-7-2003, "The illusion of UN Security Council reform", The Washington Quarterly, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1162/016366003322387163 // JJ  
In the contemporary world, the Security Council should retain, as specified in the UN Charter, the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." Yet, it will also retain the same permanent members with vetoes and, in all likelihood, the same number of nonpermanent members. "The key issue for the council," as the International Peace Academy's president David Malone tells us, "is whether it can engage the United States, modulate its exercise of power, and discipline its impulses."31 Will the inability to reform the UN Charter compromise the credibility of the Security Council, particularly regarding matters shaping the future use of force? The answer is "probably not" or at least "no more than in the past." Changing the composition of the Security Council would not, in any case, overcome its core weaknesses—the veto and almost total reliance upon U.S. military power. In short, the Security Council will remain the first port of call for authorizing the use of military force. The former foreign minister of Australia and president of the International Crisis Group, Gareth Evans, has pointed to the more difficult question: "whether it should be the last."32 Washington and the other permanent members would certainly answer "no." Major powers normally pursue their self-determined interests in their backyards without the UN's blessing—look no further than Cote d'lvoire, Sierra Leone, Chechnya, or Xinjiang. The U.S. backyard, however, is considerably bigger than that of most other nations, and the ability of the United States to project military power worldwide is unparalleled. Friends and foes alike are uncomfortable with Washington's present gear: what the EU commissioner for external relations Chris Patten has dubbed "unilateralist overdrive."33

### AT: Legitimizes

1. **Link turn:** **Gardiner ’07 of the Heritage Foundation** writes that expanding the UNSC would elongate negotiation time by introducing new, contrarian voices into the mix, thereby subjecting the Council to paralyzing gridlock. **Gardiner** writes that the UNSC’s legitimacy depends on its actions far more than its membership; as such, this paralysis would **delegitimize** the UNSC.

2. **Delink:** India’s mere presence isn’t enough. If it doesn’t defend the interests of developing countries, it won’t make the UNSC more legitimate. Unfortunately, ait has become an emerging power, **Stuenkel ’13 of the India Foreign Affairs Journal** writes that India is rapidly reducing its commitment to developing countries.

Nile Gardiner, Heritage Foundation, 2-7-2007, "The Decline and Fall of the United Nations: Why the U.N. Has Failed and How It Can Be Reformed", https://www.heritage.org/report/the-decline-and-fall-the-united-nations-why-the-un-has-failed-and-how-it-can-be-reformed // JJ  
A major reform that would adversely affect the U.N., as well as American interests, is significant expansion of the Security Council. The United States has correctly set increased effectiveness of the Security Council as the bench­mark for council reform. As the war on terrorism continues to unfold around the globe, as greater urgency is paid to limiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and as the free world faces a growing threat from rogue regimes such as Iran and North Korea, the U.N. Security Council can play an important and useful role. It is in the U.S. national interest to have a lean and effective Security Council that can help address these issues on the interna­tional stage. Unfortunately, the most prominent proposals to expand the Security Council will have the opposite effect. Security Council expansion will make it far more difficult for the United States to work through the council. With the exception of Germany and Japan, the voting records of the main contenders for addi­tional permanent Security Council seats indicate that they will likely vote against the U.S. on most key issues. In other words, a larger Security Council with these nations as permanent members will like­ly be less supportive of U.S. policy priorities. More­over, any enlargement of the council would make it more unwieldy and subject to conflicting interests, contributing to gridlock that will paralyze the coun­cil and decrease the probability that it will act quick­ly or effectively to address threats to international peace and security. The U.N. Security Council's legitimacy depends far more on its actions than on its membership. The Security Council is by no means perfect as it cur­rently stands. It is subject to delay and indecisive­ness, as its failures in Iraq and Sudan clearly demonstrate. However, a larger council would not solve these problems. On the contrary, it would fur­ther undermine the council's ability to act decisively as timely action would fall victim to political impasse, conflicting interests, or debate among nations that have little to contribute to the council's ultimate responsibility-enforcement of interna­tional peace and security. However imperfect, the current composition of the council is infinitely pref­erable to ill-considered expansion that will surely weaken its standing and ability to meet its man­date-ultimately making the Security Council less relevant and increasing the likelihood that crises will be addressed outside of the U.N. framework. From a U.S. national interest point of view, there is a clear-cut case against Security Council expan­sion. Analysis by The Heritage Foundation of actu­al votes (not including consensus votes) in the General Assembly over a six-year period (1999 to 2004) revealed that five of the leading candidates voted against the United States more than 70 per­cent of the time.[[16]](https://www.heritage.org/report/the-decline-and-fall-the-united-nations-why-the-un-has-failed-and-how-it-can-be-reformed" \l "_ftn16" \o ") Only Germany (55 percent) and Japan (50 per­cent) voted with the U.S. at least half of the time. Brazil, the only contender from Latin America, vot­ed with the U.S. just 29 percent of the time, while India, often touted as a major future ally of the Unit­ed States, voted with the United States just 20 per­cent of the time. The records of the three leading African contenders for Security Council seats are equally poor. Nigeria and South Africa voted with the U.S. just 25 percent of the time, while Egypt- a huge beneficiary of American aid-sided with the U.S. in only 18 percent of the votes. Of 190 members of the General Assembly (not including the U.S.), Germany had the best record among Security Council candidates, ranking 12th in voting coincidence with the United States. Japan ranks a surprisingly low 41st but is still ahead of any other major country in Asia. Brazil ranks 80th, while Nigeria, South Africa, and India rank 104th, 106th, and 149th, respectively. Egypt ranks very near the bottom at 168th, behind Sudan and just ahead of rogue regimes such as Libya, Burma, and Syria. Significantly, support for U.S. voting positions in the General Assembly has fallen since 1999 (dra­matically in some cases) for all the countries com­peting for Security Council seats. While Germany backed the United States in 70 percent of votes in 1999, it voted with the U.S. just 45 percent of the time in 2004. Similarly, Japanese support for U.S. voting positions fell from 63 percent in 1999 to 43 percent in 2004. In 2004, Brazil and Nigeria voted with the U.S. just 15 percent of the time, and South Africa voted with the U.S. only 11 percent of the time. In 1999, these three countries voted with the U.S. 39 percent, 35 percent, and 40 percent of the time, respectively. Egypt's record was a pitifully low 8.5 percent in 2004 (down from 29 percent in 1999). India has consistently voted against U.S. positions over the past five years, voting in opposi­tion to the U.S. 80 percent of the time in 2004 and 78 percent of the time in 1999. Every year, the U.S. Department of State identi­fies votes of fundamental national interest in the U.N. General Assembly. Support for the U.S. voting position on key issues over the past five years among the key Security Council contenders has been low (Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa, India, and Egypt) to middling (Japan and Germany). South Africa and Nigeria voted against the U.S. position on key votes an average of 80 percent of the time between 2000 and 2004. India voted with the U.S. just 19 percent of the time, and Egypt just 16 per­cent. The Brazilian record was slightly better, voting with the U.S. 35 percent of the time. The U.S. did not receive a single vote of support from Nigeria, South Africa, India, or Egypt on any key vote in 2001. While the voting record of Germany and Japan is considerably stronger (Germany voted with the U.S. 64 percent of the time, and Japan 66 per­cent of the time), their voting coincidence can hard­ly be considered reliable. Worse than their actual voting records is the fact that these countries' opposition to U.S. priorities is increasing. Germany, Japan, Brazil, South Africa, and Nigeria have sharply reduced their level of sup­port for the U.S. on key votes since 1999. In 2004, Brazil, Nigeria, India, South Africa, and Egypt voted with the U.S. on just two key votes. Germany's and Japan's records were slightly better, voting with the U.S. on four votes. The Debate over John Bolton Finally, any discussion of the current state of the United Nations and U.S. investment in the U.N. would not be complete without an assessment of the record of John Bolton, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.[[17]](https://www.heritage.org/report/the-decline-and-fall-the-united-nations-why-the-un-has-failed-and-how-it-can-be-reformed" \l "_ftn17" \o ") Few political figures in recent American history have so polarized opinion as has John Bolt­on. Faced with Senate gridlock, Bolton was sent by President George W. Bush as a recess appointment to the United Nations last August.

### AT: I/L – UN Collapse

1. **Analytical delink:** Just because the UNSC is delegitimized doesn’t mean the entirety of the U.N. is. The General Assembly votes and acts on a variety of other issues outside of the Council.

### AT: I/L – Multilat

1. **Link turn:** India is only pro-multilateralism when they’re weak and need the support of other countries. **Stuenkel ’13 of The Indian Foreign Affairs Journal** writes that, as India becomes more powerful (when it becomes a member of the UNSC, for example), it turns increasingly toward bilateralism.

**This outweighs:**

a) Short circuits their link / timeframe – even if India is on the Security Council, it will becoming anti-multilateral, which accomplishes the opposite in the long term.

b) Strength of link – there are so many other factors affecting multilateralism (for instance, support for the IMF, WHO, FAO, the rest of the U.N., etc.) but Security Council membership has been India’s most important foreign policy goal for a long time, so it will be uniquely empowered.

Oliver Stuenkel, December 2013, "Emerging India: A Farewell to Multilateralism?", India Foreign Affairs Journal, http://www.associationdiplomats.org/Publications/ifaj/Vol8/8.4/ARTICLE%204-OS.pdf // JJ

This matters for India’s multilateral strategy. While it has traditionally called for a more prominent position in institutions such as the UNSC in its role as ‘spokesperson of the poor’, yet already in 2005, the G4’s effort failed, among other reasons, because poor developing countries remained unconvinced that emerging powers such as Brazil and India would effectively represent their interests at the high table. Does India genuinely want to make the global order more legitimate and democratic? Or does it merely seek to join an extended oligarchy? Over the next years, India will face the stark choice of opting for either inclusive and more ineffective, or exclusive and more effective, outfits. It will be increasingly tempted to opt for the latter. There is growing evidence to support the claim that, as India grows more powerful, it is keener to work bilaterally, or in small, at times regional, groupings. The unexpected benefits that emerged from the bilateral relationship with the USA seem to have encouraged the Indian government to sign a strategic partnership with virtually all global actors. In response to the nuclear deal, Pratap Banu Mehta is worried about India becoming more like the USA as it emerges “unilateral, oriented towards hegemony more than the stability of the world”.46 Indeed, as India grows more powerful, it will increasingly be able to dictate terms in its bilateral relationships which are likely to be more beneficial to India. In order to consistently seek the multilateral route, India would have to both learn to engage more effectively as also begin to develop a sense of ownership of the current system. The notion that India’s participation is crucial to shoulder global burdens may have been embraced by key decision makers. However, they have not communicated this notion effectively to society. This is necessary to reduce the risk of political backlash against complex multilateral agreements for which India needs to meet its counterparts half-way. In addition, the government is taking smaller outfits, such as IBSA, the BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BASICS and the G4, very seriously. For example, IBSA is designed as a platform for dialogue; so it may help to jointly coordinate positions within larger negotiations (such as the WTO), rather than replacing institutions with a global reach.

### AT: I/L – Diplomacy

1. **Analytical non-unique:** Diplomacy can continue through literally any other multilateral organization or bilaterally. Diplomacy exists far outside of the U.N.

### AT: I/L – UN-Imposed Negotiations

1. **Delink:** U.N. negotiations rarely work; the U.N. isn’t flexible enough to accomplish sustainable peace. **Lacher ’18 of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs** writes that the U.N. puts excessive time pressure on negotiations, leaves out critical regional actors due to backlash from major powers and, above all, remains too focused on previously agreed on, legitimized international goals rather than adapting to the situation at hand. Thus, **Lacher** writes that U.N. interventions in Libya, Syria, and Yemen all have failed.

Wolfram Lacher, October 2018, "Mission Impossible? UN Mediation in Libya, Syria and Yemen", German Institute for International and Security Affairs, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research\_papers/2018RP08\_Ass\_EtAl.pdf // JJ  
The upheavals in the Arab world since 2011 have led to civil wars in three countries: Libya, Syria and Yemen. In all three cases, the United Nations have tried to mediate agreements between the conflicting parties to bring about peace through power-sharing. In this endeavour, the UN can lean on its broad experience in mediation efforts to end civil wars. In the three conflicts examined here, however, the UN’s attempts at resolution through power-sharing have failed. In Yemen and Libya, power-sharing agreements have not prevented conflicts from lingering on or violence from breaking out again. In Syria, the UN has not even managed to bring together the Syrian parties in the civil war for direct talks. The altered military balance of power has rendered the initial goal of a political transition unrealistic. This study answers the following questions: Why are these three conflicts so resistant to resolution efforts? What are the specific aspects of the conflict configurations that impede UN efforts? What factors in the UN approach are obstacles to a successful conclusion? What lessons can be learned for future mediation efforts? And how can Europe contribute to progress in this area?

[…]

In the three cases studied here – Libya, Syria and Yemen – the UN has tried to mediate power-sharing agreements to pacify (Libya, Syria) or avert (Yemen) civil wars that had broken out or were looming following Arab Spring protests. However, in none of these has the UN special envoy achieved a negotiated resolution to the conflict or even effective conflict management, or contributed significantly to protecting civilians. Although the UN envoys in Yemen and Libya were able to negotiate power-sharing agreements, these did not overcome the political divide in Libya or lastingly end armed confrontations in Yemen. In Syria, no negotiations on power-sharing even took place, merely separate talks between the UN mediator and the regime and opposition delegations. All three cases have clear parallels regarding conflict dynamics and the international context, which should be considered the main causes of the lack of success in mediation efforts. First, in none of the three situations was a stalemate possible, whereby the local conflict parties would have preferred a negotiated solution to continued armed confrontations, thus making the conflict “ripe for resolution”. Instead, the local conflict parties were able to rely on external support, albeit to varying degrees, which strengthened their trust in a military, rather than political, solution to the conflict. External backers thus fuelled the conflicts even when – as in the case of the US support for rebels in Syria – their intention was to enable negotiations. Moreover, with time the conflicts became increasingly internationalised, and third parties engaged in ever more energetic military interventions on the side of one or several conflict parties to pursue their own respective objectives. The main conflict parties also changed during the conflicts: new actors featured, old actors lost relevance; alliances were formed and splintered. As a result, the original parties in the civil war were not interested in the talks offered by the UN to solve the conflict. Nor were negotiations between them any longer a meaningful way of addressing the increasingly complex conflicts. In addition, the UN missions were not mandated to balance the interests of external actors. Second, coercive measures that would have put pressure on the conflict parties to agree to a negotiated settlement were only used to a very limited extent – or not at all, as in Syria due to the Russian veto in the Security Council. Where such measures were decided by the UN Security Council, they were not consistently applied. Responsibility for this lies with the interests of external actors. Arms embargoes, for example, were undermined by Egypt and the UAE in Libya, and only imposed on one conflict party in Yemen, namely the Houthi-Saleh alliance. UN sanctions targeting those who tried to undermine power-sharing agreements remained a mere threat in Libya and were only imposed on one Yemeni conflict party, the HouthiSaleh alliance. In any case, their impact was negligible where spoilers, such as the Houthi rebels in Yemen, neither travelled abroad nor invested assets abroad. The sanctions imposed by the USA and EU against conflict parties – for instance representatives of the Syrian regime – had an extremely limited effect and were also repeatedly circumvented by EU member states. Deploying peace-keeping troops to accompany and secure the implementation of an agreement on conflict resolution was not a realistic option in any of the three cases – both because of disagreements within the Security Council and because of the resistance by local conflict parties. Furthermore, the approach of the UN mediators in Yemen and Libya contributed to the power-sharing agreements being short-lived and not resulting in pacification. They put excessive time pressure on the negotiation of agreements, which led to the conflict parties not assuming any personal commitment for their implementation and left significant issues unresolved. Important conflict actors were left out (because of vetoes by regional or major powers or controversially being defined as terrorists). The UN mediators backed unity governments even when the latter turned into parties in the conflict, thus forfeiting the special envoys’ impartiality. In Syria issues Conclusions and Recommendations Conclusions and Recommendations SWP Berlin Mission Impossible? UN Mediation in Libya, Syria and Yemen October 2018 59 of representativeness and inclusiveness moved into the background since no negotiations on powersharing took place – or are likely to take place in the near future. In all three cases, the mediators focused on internationally legitimised objectives, which had been rendered unrealistic or obsolete by the changed balance of power. In Syria, these objectives were power-sharing and a political transition despite the fact that the rebels had lost the civil war and been pushed back to a few enclaves. In Libya, the UN special envoy adhered for far too long to the negotiation framework based on the two parliaments, despite them no longer representing the increasingly fragmented actor landscape. And in Yemen, the UN mission stubbornly insisted on the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference as the basis of negotiations and on Hadi as “legitimate” president although the latter had barely any support left in the country. The approaches pursued by the UN mediators thus offered fewer and fewer chances of bringing about a negotiated resolution to the conflict. On one issue the three cases diverge. In Syria alone an external conflict actor has been active since the autumn of 2015 who is not only militarily dominant but also has the power of veto in the Security Council: Russia. The UN mediation therefore cannot circumvent Russia. This has presented the UN mission with a dilemma: it cannot bring about pacification without or against Russia, but any cooperation with Russia grants legitimacy to an approach that runs counter to a resolution to the conflict negotiated between the Syrian conflict parties according to Security Council Resolution 2254, and violates fundamental tenets of international law, for example through the bombing of civilian targets. In the case of Yemen, it is Saudi Arabia that is militarily and politically dominant. The Security Council members have allowed the Kingdom to largely dictate the rules of engagement in the conflict and a negotiation mandate opposed to a negotiated solution that integrates the interests of the Houthis and other local actors. Clearly, the conclusion from UN mediations in Yemen, Libya and Syria that have seen little success cannot be that mediation should not even be attempted in similarly complex future conflicts. After all, the world community has a duty to act to re-establish peace and security and protect human lives. The issue is therefore how to make such mediation efforts more effective even where the circumstances complicate a successful resolution to a conflict. Three conclusions can be drawn from the cases studied here. First, the mandate should not be limited to mediation between local parties in the civil war, but also from the outset provide forums that would allow for the reconciliation of competing interests of all relevant regional or major powers, or at least enable the UN to influence the rules of engagement in the conflict. As a point of principle, the UN should not permit the exclusion of actors based on other actors’ vetoes. Second, it must ensure that power-sharing agreements are inclusive, that the representatives involved in the negotiations are truly representative, and that adhering to agreements is incentivised. All these elements should take precedence over a quick conclusion. Third, UN mediators must avoid taking sides with unity governments generated by powersharing agreements when these turn into parties in the conflict, circumvent agreements and fuel the conflict rather than pacify it. The EU and its member states have little influence over the regional and global configurations that constrain UN mediators. Nevertheless, two general recommendations can be made. First, Europeans should refrain from anything that undermines UN mediation efforts, be it through circumventing unilateral or multilateral sanctions or through direct cooperation with conflict actors not aimed at a negotiated resolution to the conflict. This is the case, for example, with the upgrading of Libyan militia to control sea borders to prevent unlawful migration or with arms deliveries to Saudi Arabia or Turkey that are not effectively conditioned. Rather, the EU and its member states should use their influence to support a negotiated resolution to conflicts. This includes making deliberate use of any potential influence (through tightening or loosening sanctions, or granting reconstruction assistance or recognition), preferably within the framework of broad international coalitions. Second, where UN missions are not mandated as stipulated to reconcile the interests of all relevant regional and major powers, Europeans should make use of their own diplomatic contacts so as to contribute to regional and international arrangements that prevent further escalation of the war, establish rules of engagement, uphold international humanitarian law, and are centred on protecting civilians.

### AT: I/L – Non-Compliance

1. **Delink:** Even if countries don’t want to comply, the Council can force them to do so. **Brubaker ’17 of United Nations University** writes that the council can impose sanctions on countries who don’t comply in order to ensure their compliance.

Dr Rebecca Brubaker, 8-7-2017, "Strengthening UN Sanctions", United Nations University, https://cpr.unu.edu/strengthening-un-sanctions.html // JJ  
Third, Council-mandated sanctions, in any shape or form, do not matter if neighboring states keep supplying the individuals, group or regime targeted by sanctions with money, arms, mercenaries or trading opportunities. The application of UN sanctions has almost always followed the application of regional sanctions or a request by regional states to apply sanctions. Yet the same actors who call for sanctions can be quick to blame them for little effect or unintended outcomes. For this tool to have the best chance at success neighboring states must comply. If the frontlines are weak, sanctions’ potential to act as a deterrent diminishes significantly. Fourth, a better use of existing incentives as well as a more concerted matching of capacity assistance with states in need would go a long way towards increasing compliance. While the Security Council designs sanctions, all 193 member states are responsible for implementing them. Current implementation rates vary by regime, but overall they are quite low. Security Council members have the ability to punish non-compliance by placing “secondary sanctions” on states that fail to comply. But this “stick” has been too rarely used, despite its demonstrated effectiveness; according to the widely-used [Targeted Sanctions Consortium database](http://sanctionsapp.com/) the application of secondary sanctions in the cases of Somalia/Eritrea and Sierra Leone/Liberia significantly increased the effectiveness of achieving the regimes’ stated objectives. Conversely, the Security Council could mandate the UN Secretariat to further support frontline states through needs assessments, capacity building and awareness raising. In addition, [Article 50](http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html) of the UN Charter gives Member States the right to consult the Security Council on compensation for undue hardships incurred following good faith attempts to implement UN sanctions. Yet Council members have used neither the carrots of assistance and compensation nor the stick of secondary sanctions sufficiently. Underuse has contributed to poor implementation rates, with, at times, even members of the Council failing in their obligations.

### AT: I/L – Counterterrorism

1. Delink:

2. **Link turn:** **Von Einsiedel ’16 of United Nations University** writes that the United Nations is often too far removed from the region at hand to be effective in its counterterrorism operations. Instead, he writes that regional organizations are far more effective in combatting terrorism, because they have insight into the issues on the ground.

Andrew Hudson, 2007, " Not a Great Asset: The UN Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Regime: Violating Human Rights", Berkeley Journal of International Law, https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1339&amp;context=bjil // JJ  
Despite these procedural changes, the Committee still lacks criteria stipulating how it determines whether an individual should be listed in the first place. Until Resolution 1617 in 2005, there were no guidelines on how closely affiliated an individual must be to Al-Qaeda or how far the concept of "associated with" could stretch through inadvertent and indirect funding or otherwise. Resolution 1617 now provides a very broad definition of "associated with" Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, or the Taliban which extends to "otherwise supporting an affiliate" of these three groups. 27 Moreover, the Committee still makes decisions on the basis of the "no-objection" procedure, whereby a name will be added to the list if no member objects to the listing within forty-eight hours.28 The default assumption, therefore, is that a proposal will be added to the list unless a member objects. Finally, while states are encouraged to inform individuals of their inclusion on the list, these individuals are still not presented with reasons for their listing or with any details of the proposed case against them. C. De-listing Procedures Before November 2002, there was no formal process to allow for individuals to be removed from the list. In November 2002, the Committee adopted the following guidelines for the de-listing of individuals: 29 \* The individual must petition his or her government of residence or citizenship to request a review of the case; \* The government of residence or citizenship, if it wants to support the petition, should approach the government that originally proposed the individual's listing; \* The government which designated the individual can seek information from any other government; \* If the government of residence or citizenship wishes to pursue a de-listing request, it should seek to persuade the designating government; and \* The government of the individual's residence or citizenship may then submit a request to the Committee. However, the Committee makes all decisions on the basis of consensus, so any one member of the Committee effectively has the ability to veto a request for de-listing. 30 Meetings are also private, and members are not required to provide reasons for their objections.

[…]

Unlike most national legislators, the Security Council suffers from a lack of accountability.15 8 To compound this lack of accountability, the 1267 regime has been described as reflecting hegemonic international law.159 There is no doubt that the 1267 regime has shifted some responsibility for dealing with individuals who pose a security threat from member states to the Security Council. While there has been a transfer of authority, there has been no commensurate transfer of legal safeguards. This is problematic for a regime which has unprecedented and serious powers, no definition of terrorism, and an exceptionally broad category of individuals it can target. In this paper, I have argued that the 1267 regime is restrained by the core right to a fair hearing as reflected injus cogens and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. The sanctioning regime breaches this right in particular by providing no effective mechanism of review for listed individuals. The right to a fair hearing requires, as a bare minimum, the ability for individuals to challenge their listing to a body independent from the 1267 Committee. Such an amendment is necessary to ensure that sanctions are not imposed arbitrarily or unfairly and to minimize the risk of innocent people being targeted. 160 Moreover, reforming the 1267 regime would strengthen it by adding credibility and encouraging better cooperation from states. It is indeed possible to ensure basic due process while effectively sanctioning those who support terrorism. The Security Council is required to do both.

Sebastian von Einsiedel, October 2016, "Assessing the UN’s Efforts to Counter Terrorism”, United Nations University, http://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:6053/AssessingtheUNsEffortstoCounterterrorism.pdf // JJ  
While that conclusion is doubtless accurate, the UN needs to reflect on how it can adapt its peace operations to deliver on their mandate in theaters where terrorist networks are present. Among the key questions the UN will need to confront are: how to identify elements among violent extremist groups that could potentially be engaged in mediation, peace and reconciliations processes, and how to peel them away from die-hard radicals; how to reconcile the implementation of mandates to extend state authority with the need to address grievances of local communities which have mainly experienced state authority as oppressive and exclusionary force; and how to adapt Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programs to the context of violent extremism.11 10 High-level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, “Uniting our Strengths for Peace – Politics, Partnerships and People, 16 June 2015, page 31. 11 James Cockayne and Siobhan O’Neil (eds), UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism: Is it Fit for Purpose? (Tokyo: UNU Centre for Policy Research 2015). 12 Somini Sengupta, “Examining the UN’s Record on Urgent Global Challenges,” The New York Times, 19 Sep 2016. Conclusion What do all the UN’s efforts in the field of counter-terrorism add up? This review lends some credence to the damning assessment of Richard Barrett, the former head of the UN expert panel monitoring implementation of sanctions against Al Qaida and the Taliban, who recently concluded that “[t]he U.N. is too political, too uncoordinated, too focused on process rather than outcomes and follow-up, and too far removed from the people who actually deal with the problems of terrorism on the ground to make much of an impact, or even to appear relevant.”12 While it is true that the UN’s operational counter-terrorism activities have faced severe shortfalls and limitations, the UN has proven a useful venue for establishing the broad normative and cooperative frameworks for collective counter-terrorism action. It thus provides conducive background music that can be helpful to those member states who want to embark on comprehensive counterterrorism efforts in line with human rights and international law. However, the UN’s norm development has proven too weak to offset the negative effects of counterproductive counter-terrorism policies by Member States that ultimately exacerbate the terrorist threat.

Sebastian von Einsiedel, October 2016, "Assessing the UN’s Efforts to Counter Terrorism”, United Nations University, http://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:6053/AssessingtheUNsEffortstoCounterterrorism.pdf // JJ  
Meanwhile, rhetorical support by many governments for the UN strategy notwithstanding, its call for more comprehensive counter-terrorism approaches largely fell on deaf ears. Indeed, around the world many governments continued to rely primarily on military and law enforcement tools in their counter-terrorism efforts, often to the detriment of human rights and with insufficient attention paid to underlying drivers of extremism. French President François Hollande’s invocation of a “war on terrorism” and adoption of reflexive security measures following the November 2015 Paris attacks, while understandable given the very serious pressure exerted by these attacks on French society, suggest that the lessons of the US-led “war on terror” have not been internalized. To be fair, the rise of the Islamic State and the growing problem of foreign fighters have led, in recent years, to some wider acknowledgement that security-based counterterrorism measures alone have not been sufficient to prevent the spread of violent extremists. This has given rise to efforts to operationalize the elements of the UN’s global counter-terrorism strategy that deal with root causes and human rights. These efforts are now framed, at the UN and beyond, under the new headline of “Countering Violent Extremism,” (CVE) which Peter Romaniuk has called “the most significant development in counter-terrorism in the last decade.”4 In 2014, the Security Council endorsed the concept in Resolution 2178, mentioned earlier. In December 2015, the UN Secretary-General issued a “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism” which promoted a laundry list of measures, from conflict prevention and strengthening governance, human rights and the rule of law to engaging communities, empowering women and youth, and advancing education and employment - amounting to a vast, and largely unfunded, agenda.5 Effective pursuit of any of these activities may – or may not - contribute to reducing violent extremism. However, there are valid concerns about pursuing a broad range of UN activities under the CVE-label, which risks “securitizing” development efforts,6 leading activities the UN does and should pursue in their own right to be seen as counter-terrorism endeavours. Framing CVE in this way also entails the danger of “downplaying other sources of fragility, delegitimizing political grievances and stigmatizing communities as potential extremists.”7 Moreover, as an intergovernmental organization catering to the needs and driven by the interests of national governments, the UN is constitutionally ill-equipped to implement CVE measures. Eric Rosand rightly notes that these measures are better carried out by local actors, such as municipal governments, who are “best positioned to prevent the spread of violent extremism within their communities.”8 The UN’s comparative advantage may thus lie in supporting and mobilizing funding for networks that would allow for sharing of best practices among such local actors.

### AT: (!) Terrorism Cooperation

1. **non-unique;** Pakistan has already made huge strides against terror, as **The Kashmir Monitor ’19** finds that Pakistan has single-handedly turned the tide of terrorism and abolished national terrorist safe-havens, furthering that there is consensus in Pakistan that combatting terrorism must be a priority. In fact, **Hashim** from **March of 2019** finds that Pakistan has now begun detaining and turning against members of JeM (the terror organization that the UNSC has been pushing for crack down on)

2. **Turn** – supporting India’s permanent membership increases Pakistani terrorism, **Grennell 2010** explains this support would make Pakistan upset and insecure, eliminating any incentive to root out al Qaeda and other insurgent groups. Logically, why would Pakistan listen if their arch enemy India got more powerful rather than double down?

3. **Delink; Jaishankar ’19** finds that China backs Pakistan on terrorism, and will veto anti-terror resolutions.

**The Kashmir Monitor 19** (The Kashmir Monitor, newspaper centering around regional affairs, “Neither War, Nor Peace,” 3/29/19, <https://www.thekashmirmonitor.net/neither-war-nor-peace/> DoA 4/2/19)

India as a hegemonic power is looking at ways to escalate tensions and create a new normal in the region where it can take unilateral military action against Pakistan in the name of self-defence against alleged terrorists. This is, of course, an unacceptable situation for Pakistan, which in round one fully demonstrated its capabilities and will, and denied India the chance to tilt the balance in its favour. But going forward, Islamabad will have to perform a high-wire diplomatic act to avoid the escalation of tension with India, resist diplomatic pressure regarding its core national interests, including a stand on Kashmir and the nuclear programme, and ensure that its national security red line stays in place. At the same time, the government has to ensure internal security at every cost. On this front, Pakistan has already achieved a lot as the country has, virtually single-handedly, turned the tide of terrorism and abolished the terrorists’ safe-havens. But the fight against extremism is still far from over. It needs to be taken to the next level in line with the 20-point National Action Plan, which was the result of a national consensus following the terrorist attack on the Army Public School Peshawar on December 16, 2014. The past government failed to empower and activate the National Counter Terrorism Authority, introduce reforms in the police and judiciary, effectively curb the extremist narrative, and defang some of the already banned organisations. This Pakistan has to do in its own national interest and in line with the policy that only the state, not non-state actors, has the authority to formulate the rules of engagement vis-à-vis terrorism and related activity. There is already a consensus on this issue within all the state institutions. But it is time to double these efforts to deny anti-Pakistan forces the propaganda space they enjoy because of various loopholes.

Grenell, 2010 (Richard Grenell is the longest-serving U.S. Spokesman in the History of the United Nations. 11/12/2010. “Japan Deserves a UN Permanent Seat Before India.” *HuffPost.* <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-grenell/japan-deserves-a-un-perma_b_783069.html> DOA 03/08/19)

Supporting India for a permanent seat on the Security Council comes at an even greater cost to the war on terror by unnecessarily upsetting Pakistan at a time when controlling the borders and mountainous regions of Pakistan is key to rooting out al-Qaida. Almost instantly after Obama’s announcement on India, government spokesmen in Pakistan issued statements pointing out that India has not lived up to its responsibility in the disputed territory of Kashmir and that it wasn’t qualified to be a global leader sitting on the UN’s most prestigious body. Pakistan’s political class has roundly criticized Obama for his decision to support India at a time when the U.S. needs Pakistan’s stalwart support. And Japan, the second most generous funder of the UN behind only the United States and one of our closest allies at the UN, was left wondering if it would get the same endorsement from Obama when the president visits Tokyo.

Hashim 2019 (ASAD HASHIM is Al Jazeera’s digital correspondent in Pakistan, “Pakistan Says It’s Cracking Down on Terrorists, Again”, *Atlantic*, March 11th 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/03/pakistan-targets-terrorists-anti-india/584566/. DOA: April 20th 2019)

Officials insist that they are serious about taking action after the latest crisis. Last week, the government passed a new bureaucratic regulation authorizing the application of UN sanctions on Pakistan-based militant groups (though this new order remains subject to judicial appeal). LeT offices in the eastern cities of Lahore and Muridke have also been shut down. And the authorities have detained at least 44 people, including the son and brother of Masood Azhar, the JeM chief, and have sealed scores of JeM properties across the country. Azhar himself remains a free man, but Fawad Chaudhry, Pakistan’s information minister, told me that the government is considering whether to allow Azhar to be listed on a UN sanctions list, a long-standing demand of India that has been consistently blocked by Pakistan’s ally China.

Hashim 2019 (ASAD HASHIM is Al Jazeera’s digital correspondent in Pakistan, “Pakistan Says It’s Cracking Down on Terrorists, Again”, *Atlantic*, March 11th 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/03/pakistan-targets-terrorists-anti-india/584566/. DOA: April 20th 2019)

“They don’t have that bad blood with Imran,” Simbal Khan told me. “They have far more power in his government. On the foreign-policy front, they are literally running the show, with no pushback.” Indeed, the military has backed Khan’s peace overtures in recent months, and diplomats and analysts I spoke with indicated that in policy circles, there has been a marked change in the past year, with even some in power suggesting that Pakistan’s support for armed groups was causing more harm than good. Many militants not only move between the various groups, but have also been implicated in attacks against government facilities, according to Hassan Akbar, the director of programs at the Islamabad-based Jinnah Institute think tank. “Pakistan’s relationship with these organizations has also changed,” he told me. “This remains an underappreciated point.”

Hashim 2019 (ASAD HASHIM is Al Jazeera’s digital correspondent in Pakistan, “Pakistan Says It’s Cracking Down on Terrorists, Again”, *Atlantic*, March 11th 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/03/pakistan-targets-terrorists-anti-india/584566/. DOA: April 20th 2019)

“The steps we have taken have never been taken before,” Chaudhry said. “These steps are actually big.” The government has outlined a three-pronged approach to dealing with these militant groups: It will take over administrative control of all mosques, seminaries, and humanitarian-relief facilities run by JeM, LeT, and other groups; it plans to offer avenues to earning a livelihood for those not deemed an armed threat; and it will encourage members of these groups to enter mainstream politics.

**Jaishankar 19** (Dhruva Jaishankar, Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings India in New Delhi and the Brookings Institution in Washington DC., 2-15-2019, "Pakistan Has No More Excuses for Supporting Terrorism," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/15/pakistan-has-no-more-excuses-for-supporting-terrorism/> DOA 4/20/19)

The story goes even further than that. **India has been trying to rally international efforts to have Azhar listed as an international terrorist by the United Nations. While its efforts have been supported by the United States, United Kingdom, and France, they have been repeatedly blocked by China. China’s obduracy further exposes Beijing’s double standards: While China points to Islamist terrorism to justify imprisoning more than a million Uighurs in camps in its western region of Xinjiang, it continues to protect Pakistan on terrorism.** Pulwama may generate further Indian skepticism about China’s bona fides at a time when Beijing was hoping for a continued thaw in relations. With the Indian elections around the corner, there is also a domestic angle. The Narendra Modi government has highlighted the decline of terrorist incidents on its watch, and that certainly applies to major urban centers and the country as a whole. But violence in Jammu and Kashmir has picked up somewhat since 2016, with India’s security forces continuing to bear the brunt of it. It seems irresponsible to try to predict what retributive actions may follow in the coming days, weeks, and months. For now, largely leaving aside overt partisanship, India’s leaders have been united in standing behind the country’s security services.

### AT: I/L – Peacekeeping

1. **Delink:** Regardless of the other issues with the U.N., peacekeeping is as popular as ever. **PTI ’18** confirms that peacekeeping received large donations this year, indicating high confidence in the peacekeeping program.

2. **Non-unique:** Whether or not the U.N. exists, peacekeeping will continue in some form. **Mollenkamp ’18 of International Policy Digest** writes that the U.N. annexed responsibility for peacekeeping. If world powers regard peacekeeping missions as so important, some other organization would do the same in the U.N.’s stead.

3. **Internal link defense/internal link turn [be careful reading this]:** Peacekeeping is ineffective. **Autesserre ’19 of Columbia University** writes that peacekeeping is ineffective at creating sustainable peace for two reasons.

a. The U.N. employs a “top down” approach, working with elites to solve problems while ignoring the local violence in the country.

b. On a tight schedule, the U.N. often pushes for premature elections, which further inflame tensions.

This is why U.N. intervention in the Congo caused one of the deadliest conflicts since 9/11.

PTI, 5-25-2018, "India concerned over lack of political will for adequate funding for UN peacebuilding", Moneycontrol, https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/earnings/india-concerned-over-lack-of-political-will-for-adequate-funding-for-un-peacebuilding-2576041.html // JJ  
"Despite the growing attention, the concept of peacebuilding that expanded the focus to post conflict situations and led to the establishment of UN's peacebuilding architecture around a decade ago continues to struggle due to lack of adequate funding that betrays a lack of genuine political will". The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) during last year supported projects in 31 countries including the six country-specific configurations that were on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission, he said. "While the high donor contributions to the Fund in 2017 were a clear sign of confidence in UN peacebuilding activities, the funds available for peacebuilding efforts are not even one per cent of the annual budget for UN Peacekeeping," Kumar said at the General Assembly debate on report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace. Bayyapu said India welcomes the specific financing options presented by the Secretary General in his report for peacebuilding efforts and these need to be given serious consideration in order to address the current levels of funding that remain very inadequate.

Daniel Mollenkamp, August 25, 2018, "The Collapse of the UN?", International Policy Digest, https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/08/25/the-collapse-of-the-un/ // JJ  
As a Jordanian, it is perhaps a little unsurprising that Zeid holds this view, but if anything, he was being too mild. When the US recently decided to exit the Human Rights Council, US Ambassador Nikki Hailey called it a “[cesspool of political bias](https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/19/politics/haley-pompeo-human-rights-bias/index.html).” This may have had something to do with Zeid saying the separation of children from parents at the Mexican border is “unconscionable.” Still, some things are true even when the Trump administration says it in a hysterical fit. Indeed, the problem may have to do with the structure and functions of the UN more generally. The UN has, through accretion, picked up duties it is not necessarily capable of fulfilling. In particular, the UN has annexed responsibility for nuclear nonproliferation and peacekeeping. Its record on these issues is, to understate things a little, far from excellent. On peacekeeping, the UN’s record is becoming increasingly bleak. It has moved from Lebanon and Sierra Leone to Srebrenica, Rwanda, and South Sudan. Regarding the latter, the egregious failure of UN forces to keep the peace in 2016 in Malakal, one of the most populated cities in South Sudan, led to an internal investigation which concluded that the displaced persons who had sought sanctuary in the UN “protection of civilians site” had [“unrealistic” expectations](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/08/06/peacekeepers-made-major-errors-that-led-to-south-sudan-massacre-u-n-report-finds/)about the ability of UN forces to keep them safe from marauding ethnic cleansers. And that’s not to mention the abuse cases from the Central African Republic in 2015.

Séverine **Autesserre** (Professor of Political Science at Barnard College and Columbia University). “The Crisis of Peacekeeping.” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2019, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-12-11/crisis-peacekeeping>.

Both the peacekeeping leadership in New York and the rank and file in the field tend to blame all these woes on the Security Council, which provides neither adequate resources nor clear mandates. To ensure success, they say, peacekeepers need more money, more logistical support, and more people, along with more realistic instructions. And, they add, the Security Council needs to force countries that contribute troops to stop interfering with the operations on the ground and instead tell their officers to respect the UN chain of command. But **peacekeepers can’t hold the Security Council responsible for all their shortcomings**. Because they are the product of compromise, **mandates are always vague, and they always need to be interpreted. Besides, even when powerful states and troop-contributing countries devote ample resources to a UN mission, the resulting efforts often fail. The problem** is bigger than mandates and resources. Above all, it **has to do with two strategic choices the UN frequently makes: first, to work with national elites to stop violence from the top down and, second, to push for quick elections as a way to consolidate the peace. The standard UN approach to ending wars is to host large, costly conferences in order to strike agreements between governments and rebel leaders and then organize a national vote and declare victory. Both tendencies are based on faulty assumptions. The weakness of the top-down approach is that warfare is often the result of not just national or international competition but local competition, too. In many conflict zones, the fight is over** such issues as **land, water, livestock, and low-level traditional and administrative power**. In South Sudan, for example, it is not only tensions between President Salva Kiir and the former vice president and now rebel leader Riek Machar that fuel the current fighting; it is also **clan rivalries and countless spats between herders and farmers**. When it comes to the UN’s fixation on elections, **the problem is that pushing for a vote before a country is ready may do more harm than good**. **In Angola in 1992, a premature vote triggered a resumption of fighting between the ruling party and the main rebel group (resulting in more deaths in two years than there were in the 17-year war that the UN had supposedly ended). Both of these errors are on full display today in Congo, the site of both the world’s deadliest conflict since World War II and the largest peacekeeping mission in the world.** The UN attributes strife there to national and international factors: a weak central government, tensions between Congolese President Joseph Kabila and his opponents, and disputes with neighboring Rwanda and Uganda. It views elections, which Kabila has delayed for years, as a sort of cure-all. In fact, much of the violence in Congo is local in origin. Disputes often center on who will control neighboring land, the exploitation of local mining sites, or the traditional or administrative power over a village or a district. These tensions often result in localized fighting in one village or territory but frequently escalate into generalized conflict across a whole province and even at times spill over into neighboring countries.

## Peacekeeping Reductions

### AT: India Reduces Commitment

1. **Delink:** India isn’t being altruistic when they provide peacekeepers. They benefit too, which means these are empty threats and they won’t actually stop doing so. There are two ways India benefits:

A. **Cabuyao ’14 of the School of International Studies** writes that because India is able to further its national interests, and look good in the eyes of major international players through committing peacekeepers.

B. **Taneja ’15 of The Diplomat** writes that these missions help India train its troops, improving combat readiness.

2. **Analytical delink:** The U.N. isn’t just going to let peacekeeping operations fail. If India weren’t supplying these troops, other countries would be.

3. **Link turn:**  The **Stanley Foundation** explains that India doesn’t want to see peacekeeping end, they just want to use smarter tactics to reform it. For example, **Day ’19 of World Politics Review** reports that the UN could use data-based methods to systemically track peacekeeping efforts and save more lives. But only if India has a seat on the UNSC, can they push for these reforms.

**Stanley Foundation**, <https://www.stanleyfoundation.org/articles.cfm?id=769&title=A%20Smarter%20Approach> // RM

If **a withdrawal is out of the question**, **then India’s only recourse against the dangers of peacekeeping is a smarter approach to its present and future contributions. India will likely take more care in choosing new missions by instituting a reform process.** Another key strategy, and challenge, will be encouraging other countries to step up their contributions. **India does not want to see UN peacekeeping end, nor does it want to play any role in weakening the foundations of present or future missions.** The South Sudan attack has not unleashed a wave of cynicism in India. Instead**, it has highlighted the changing nature of peacekeeping as India seeks to start what will hopefully be a worldwide discussion about a smarter approach to using blue helmets.**

[Day 19] Peacekeepers should adopt techniques the UN is already using to become more efficient

Adam Day, 02-28-19, Can Data Save U.N. Peacekeeping?, No Publication, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/27479/can-data-save-u-n-peacekeeping, // ZMC  
The U.N.’s Department of Peace Operations has taken some steps toward better use of data. The Situational Awareness Geospatial Enterprise, or SAGE, in theory has begun to allow peacekeeping to track incidents systematically and begin developing a system of data-driven protection. Other innovations, such as the Comprehensive Performance Assessment System, which is beginning to focus U.N. monitoring and evaluation more on impact, and other new IT platforms are gradually strengthening data collection and may eventually lead to “smart peacekeeping.” And the U.N.’s internal office of oversight has made efforts to track protection responses with the large amounts of data that can be extracted, with great effort, from the system. In some places, like Haiti, tech-driven peacekeeping has already shown promising results. So data can be put to work. But if peacekeeping is to show that the billions of dollars it spends patrolling war-torn countries does in fact save lives, it should systematically use the cheap and easy tools at its disposal. Transitioning from a paper fragmentary order to an electronic one would be an easy and cheap first step, allowing the U.N. to track its patrols in real time and compare responses to incidents as they are reported. Other steps, such as GPS trackers on U.N. troop vehicles, would build an even more sophisticated picture of when and where the U.N. is acting to carry out its protection mandate. This is already being done for civilians in the U.N., with electronic movement of personnel forms and GPS trackers in civilian vehicles. It would be easy and cheap to apply these simple tools to the troops. Using data to tell a story of peacekeeping may not be popular. Troops that do not patrol much, or that refuse to leave their barracks during an attack, will have nowhere to hide when the press—and hopefully the secretary-general—comes for them. Many troop contributors may not like the idea of being under the spotlight, but those are almost certainly the underperformers. In contrast, the thousands of peacekeepers who regularly respond to protection threats in a fast, effective manner should welcome this opportunity to showcase their work, as should the secretary-general’s Action for Peacekeeping initiative. With this minimal shift toward smart peacekeeping, the U.N. has an opportunity to show clearly that it does save lives.

[**Priscilla Cabuyao; S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies**; UN Peacekeeping: Bangladesh, India and Pakistan’s Troop Contributions; June 18, 2014; http://www.e-ir.info/2014/06/18/un-peacekeeping-bangladesh-india-and-pakistans-top-troop-contributions/]

For almost a decade, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India have consistently been the top 3 contributors of troops for UN peace operations. It is ideal to think that this trend is a clear manifestation of the three states’ pure commitment to international peacekeeping. However, **the reality is that UN peacekeeping is an instrument for the top 3 contributors to pursue economic, professional, and political interests. Their active participation in UN peace missions is reciprocated by a number of benefits and rewards.** The international community could regard Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh as valuable, responsible, and reliable supporters of peacekeeping, and this is perfectly fine, however, **it cannot be denied that behind their consistent performance in peacekeeping are motivations and goals that are difficult to disregard and leave behind.**

Kabir **Taneja** (Scholar at The Takshashila Institution). “India's Infatuation With the UN Security Council.” The Diplomat, 27 April 2015, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/indias-infatuation-with-the-un-security-council/>.

Of course, South Asian countries are not participating entirely out of altruism. **India takes advantage of what UN peacekeeping missions offer. The missions are a chance to bolster the combat readiness at UN expense**; for Bangladesh, they are an opportunity for airmen to get some flying time. In 2013, two Indian peacekeepers died in South Sudan after Neur rebels targeting the majority ethnic Dinka community, which sought shelter at the base, attacked their UN compound. In fact, **both South Sudan and Sudan are diplomatically important to India – Sudanese oil fields were the first overseas fields to receive Indian investment – and they remain an integral part of New Delhi’s diplomatic maneuvering against China in Africa.**

### AT: Spec: Congo

1. **Non-unique:** **The Defense Post ’19** writes that the U.N. is already charting a course toward an exit strategy, for reasons having nothing to do with India.

Defense Post, March 8, 2019 "UN considering downsizing DR Congo peacekeeping mission", https://thedefensepost.com/2019/03/08/un-downsizing-dr-congo-peacekeeping-mission/ // JJ  
The United Nations is considering a drawdown of its large peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of Congo and charting a course towards an exit strategy, a senior U.N. peacekeeping official said Thursday. After presidential elections in December that ended Joseph Kabila’s tenure as president and improved security, the 16,000-strong MONUSCO mission can be reconfigured, said the official, who asked not to be named. “We are looking at a gradual process of adjusting the MONUSCO – probably downsize it,” the official told reporters. “We have to work together with the Congolese on a path toward a gradual exit strategy.” Kabila had repeatedly called for MONUSCO to pull out of the country but new President Felix Tshisekedi has said the force should be “better armed” and has offered to cooperate with the United Nations on next steps. The Security Council must decide later this month on renewing the mandate of the peacekeeping mission. U.N. diplomats said MONUSCO’s mandate could be renewed for seven months to allow negotiations on the future of the force. Discussions on drawing down MONUSCO come as the United States is seeking to reduce its share of the U.N. budget for peace operations. The U.S. is the top financial contributor to the [U.N.’s $6.7 billion peacekeeping budget](https://thedefensepost.com/2018/07/01/un-peacekeeping-budget-agreed/), providing 28.5 percent of funds. China contributes 10.3 percent, Japan 9.7 percent, Germany and France 6.3 percent each, and the United Kingdom 5.8 percent.

### AT: Peacekeeping Good

**[CW: Sexual Assault; Sexual Violence] (Also B Careful W These Responses bc lots of shit is going on)**

1. **Turn:** peacekeepers disproportionately abuse civilians as **Anderlini 17** of **Foreign Affairs** writes that in 2016 alone, the UN filed 41 cases of abuse by their own peacekeepers. This only increases if you affirm because India’s goal in reform, according to **Akbaruddin 16**, is to increase the presence of peacekeepers not only during the process of crafting peace but also before and after.

**This outweighs**: structural abuse short circuits their impact of peace, insofar asstate level peace doesn’t matter if interpersonal violence is simultaneously increasing.

2. **Turn:** *Peacekeeping increases sexual violence.* **Smith ’10** finds that peacekeeping uniquely facilitates demand for prostitutes, as the UN tends to intervene in areas of small militaries. Thus, the large increase in military presence causes demand to skyrocket. Consequently, **Smith** furthers that empirically the addition of peacekeepers to a region caused a 1012% increase in sex trafficking.

This is **exacerbated** by a lack of retribution, as **Sapkarova ’14** finds that peacekeepers often utilize these services and involve themselves in trading womxn, but are rarely prosecuted by their country of origin and cannot be legally prosecuted in their country of deployment.

3. **Turn: Blair ’14** finds that peacekeeping often lengthens the duration of conflicts, as groups backed by UN missions perceive that they can win due to increased support, decreasing the propensity for negotiations.

4. **Internal link defense/internal link turn [be careful reading this]:** Peacekeeping is ineffective. **Autesserre ’19 of Columbia University** writes that peacekeeping is ineffective at creating sustainable peace for two reasons.

* 1. The U.N. employs a “top down” approach, working with elites to solve problems while ignoring the local violence in the country.
  2. On a tight schedule, the U.N. often pushes for premature elections, which further inflame tensions.

This is why U.N. intervention in the Congo caused one of the deadliest conflicts since 9/11

[**Charles Smith; International Political Science Review**; Human Trafficking: The Unintended Effects of United Nations Intervention; 2010; http://college.lclark.edu/live/files/10776-1pdf]

Our theory begins with three observations. The initial observation that informs our theory is that foreign soldiers and the ancillary support networks that surround them use prostitutes (Elliot, 1996; Malone et al., 1993; Turner, 1994). **Where there is a military presence; there is a demand for prostitutes. Second, because the UN is more likely to intervene in conflicts where the domestic military is small (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003), intervention introduces a sizeable increase in the military population and thus a corresponding increase in the demand for prostitution.** Importantly, any UN intervention brings with it a host of NGOs, private military contractors and other internationals, which exponentially increase the actual presence arising from the intervention to well over the formal number of troops.

1012% [**Charles Smith; UC Irvine**; Human Trafficking in Conflict Zones: The Role of Peacekeepers in the Formation of Networks; November 10, 2010; http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/298/art%253A10.1007%252Fs12142-010-0181-8.pdf?auth66=1421402610\_4ee97add95d140e4c13ad2826546c717&ext=.pdf]

As predicted, **the large and dramatic introduction of foreign peacekeepers precipitated an equally dramatic rise in human sex trafficking.1 From 1999 to 2003, the number of exploited women increased from 18 to over 200.2 In a 2005 IOM report based on conversations with 474 victims of sexual trafficking victims in the previous 5 years,** it was estimated that most women were trafficked from abroad, mostly from Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine.3 According to AI, the arrival of peacekeepers was directly responsible for the unprecedented increase in the demand for sex workers, with a concomitant increase in trafficking.4 Within a year of KFOR’s deployment, 80% of sex worker clienteles were international.5

[**Krasimira Shapkarova; University of Denver**; War, Peacekeeping, and the Trade in Women; 2014; http://humantraffickingcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/War-Peacekeeping-and-the-Trade-in-Women.pdf]

The UN emphasizes, “Protection of civilians is very often at the heart of our mandate and it is the Blue Helmets that are the key to providing this security.” This statement is most probably true of some of those who join the peacekeeping missions. However, it is the ones who violate the rules that often grab the attention of the media and general public and demand closer look at the establishment. Investigating reports from a variety of organizations, Mendelson (2005) identifies that “in Kosovo, as in Bosnia, the brothels followed the deployments” (p.11). **The peacekeepers were, however, not simply the target of traffickers; they also actively, by purchasing the services and participating in the trade, and passively, by knowing that colleagues take advantage of girls but say nothing, shape the demand for trafficked girls and women.**

[**Krasimira Shapkarova; University of Denver**; War, Peacekeeping, and the Trade in Women; 2014; http://humantraffickingcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/War-Peacekeeping-and-the-Trade-in-Women.pdf]

Peacekeepers, however, did not contribute to the abuse of women simply by using the services the local bars offered; some were even actively involved in the trade itself and instead of protecting the vulnerable women, they protected those enslaving them and played a vital role in making sure girls and women do not escape their enslavement and participated in punishing those who make such attempts (Mendelson, 2005). The HRW report on Bosnia and Herzegovina published in 2002 reveals that when interviewed, **trafficked women mentioned that the police officers appeared friendly with the bar owners and as such, the women would fear speaking with them. What is even worse is that even though prosecution of local police officers is dismal, peacekeepers engaging in the trade of women often do so with impunity. Members** of the International Police Task Force [IPTF] **are granted immunity from the U.N. secretary general and as such, they cannot be prosecuted in local Bosnian courts. Violations are supposed to be investigated by the respective country from which the peacekeeper comes, but as HRW highlights, this is rarely the case.** The strictest sanction available to human rights violators among IPTF members is removal from service. As the highly contentious case of Kathryn Bolkovac reveals, those using the services of trafficked girls included members of SFOR, IPTF, local police, and international employees. The individual who was punished, however, was Kathryn Bolkovac, the person who tried to expose the problem and assist the trafficked girls and women.

**Peter Blair; Princeton University**; Adapting and Evolving: The Implications of Transnational Terrorism for UN Field Missions; April 2014; http://wws.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/591c\_Adapting\_and\_Evolving\_The\_Implications\_of\_Transnational\_Terrorism.pdf]

One academic observer, for example, notes that the Force Intervention Brigade in the DRC took the wind out of the negotiations by convincing M23 that the government and the UN was committed to a military victory.93 Furthermore, interviews with host state officials in Mali and Nairobi (speaking with Somali officials) corroborated the claim that **governments supported by UN missions feel less inclined to negotiate once the UN or UN-sanctioned parallel forces tip the military balance in their favor.** Thus, transnational terrorist networks (and their local affiliates) will be skeptical of UN impartiality and, as such, are less likely to consent to the UN serving as a mediator.

[**Patrick Regan; Binghamton University**; Diplomacy and other Forms of Intervention in Civil Wars; 2005; http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache%3ArKjgRUCfIlIJ%3Awww3.nd.edu%2F~pregan3%2FDipolmacy%2520and%2520Other%2520Forms%2520of%2520Intervention\_JCR.doc+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us]

In a second model, we have excluded structural interventions and included the effect of diplomacy and the timing of diplomacy on the length of the conflict. The results show that diplomatic interventions dramatically reduce the expected duration of a conflict. For example, **the expected duration for civil conflicts that have experienced diplomatic interventions is reduced by about 76% over conflicts without diplomatic interventions.**  This interpretation is, however, made more complicated by the decay function we used to model the effects of interventions over time, though we will address this issue when we interpret the full results (see Model II).

**Donald Sylvan; Journal of Conflict Resolution**; Consequences of Sharp Military Assistance Increases for International Conflict and Cooperation; Nov 2 2002; http://jcr.sagessaepub.com/content/20/4/609.abstract]

**Effects of sharp increases in military assistance on international conflict and cooperation on the part of recipient nations are investigated.** Since traditional bivariate and multivariate statistical techniques are oftenconceptually inapplicable to this subject matter, a quasi-experimental design is used which relies onautoregressive moving average models and exponential smoothing forecasting mechanisms. **Twenty-five annual observations, from 1946 through 1970, of 15 Asian nations serve as the data base. Key findings are: (1) sharp increases in military assistance tend to change decidedly the recipient nation's international conflict and cooperative behavior; (2) in a substantial majority of cases examined, the direction of that behavior change is toward increased conflict and decreased cooperation; and (3) a twoyear lag between military assistance and behavior change of recipient nations is statistically supported.** The effects of increased capabilities as well as bureaucratic politics, habit, expectation, and prior deals areoffered as possible reasons for these results. The findings seem to refute the argument that giving military aid toa nation not involved in a war will help strengthen that nation and thereby avoid future conflict.

[Autesserre 19] Current Peacekeeping failes a) because of the top-down strategy which neglects root causes (land, food, etc) and b) because of premature elections – fail to end wars

Séverine **Autesserre** (Professor of Political Science at Barnard College and Columbia University). “The Crisis of Peacekeeping.” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2019, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-12-11/crisis-peacekeeping>.

Both the peacekeeping leadership in New York and the rank and file in the field tend to blame all these woes on the Security Council, which provides neither adequate resources nor clear mandates. To ensure success, they say, peacekeepers need more money, more logistical support, and more people, along with more realistic instructions. And, they add, the Security Council needs to force countries that contribute troops to stop interfering with the operations on the ground and instead tell their officers to respect the UN chain of command. But **peacekeepers can’t hold the Security Council responsible for all their shortcomings**. Because they are the product of compromise, **mandates are always vague, and they always need to be interpreted. Besides, even when powerful states and troop-contributing countries devote ample resources to a UN mission, the resulting efforts often fail. The problem** is bigger than mandates and resources. Above all, it **has to do with two strategic choices the UN frequently makes: first, to work with national elites to stop violence from the top down and, second, to push for quick elections as a way to consolidate the peace. The standard UN approach to ending wars is to host large, costly conferences in order to strike agreements between governments and rebel leaders and then organize a national vote and declare victory. Both tendencies are based on faulty assumptions. The weakness of the top-down approach is that warfare is often the result of not just national or international competition but local competition, too. In many conflict zones, the fight is over** such issues as **land, water, livestock, and low-level traditional and administrative power**. In South Sudan, for example, it is not only tensions between President Salva Kiir and the former vice president and now rebel leader Riek Machar that fuel the current fighting; it is also **clan rivalries and countless spats between herders and farmers**. When it comes to the UN’s fixation on elections, **the problem is that pushing for a vote before a country is ready may do more harm than good**. **In Angola in 1992, a premature vote triggered a resumption of fighting between the ruling party and the main rebel group (resulting in more deaths in two years than there were in the 17-year war that the UN had supposedly ended). Both of these errors are on full display today in Congo, the site of both the world’s deadliest conflict since World War II and the largest peacekeeping mission in the world.** The UN attributes strife there to national and international factors: a weak central government, tensions between Congolese President Joseph Kabila and his opponents, and disputes with neighboring Rwanda and Uganda. It views elections, which Kabila has delayed for years, as a sort of cure-all. In fact, much of the violence in Congo is local in origin. Disputes often center on who will control neighboring land, the exploitation of local mining sites, or the traditional or administrative power over a village or a district. These tensions often result in localized fighting in one village or territory but frequently escalate into generalized conflict across a whole province and even at times spill over into neighboring countries.

## Elections

### AT: Modi Loses Now

1. **Non-unique:** **Lam ’19 of the South China Morning Post** writes that Modi is poised to win the election and has 60% favorability. This is for three reasons.

a. **Media Madness.** **Inamdarmarch ’19 of Quartz India** writes that Modi has complete control over the media. He and the BJP control the narrative and are able to effectively manipulate voters.

b. **Good Growth. Lam** writes that India’s economy is booming – in particular, the Bombay Stock exchange crossed the 39,000 benchmark for the first time.

c. **Nervous Nationalism. Gettleman ’19 of the New Yrok Times** writes that, in the wake of the recent skirmishes in Kashmir, Modi has capitalized on nationalist sentiment and a desire for strong leadership to make critical inroads with undecided voters.

d. **A fractured opposition party.** According to **SCMP ’19**, there is no strong leader to oppose Modi.

Overall, **The Economist ’19** confirms that Modi has won a decisive victory in a critical state eleciton, and has regained his electoral momentum.

South China Morning Post, 5-19-2019, "India votes: how elections are a tragedy in world’s largest democracy," South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/comment/letters/article/3006186/elections-india-real-tragedy-worlds-largest-democracy // JJ  
The true catastrophe for India is that we have highly qualified professionals, but we do not have capable leaders to challenge the status quo. We have Mr Modi, whose performance in the past five years has been average to mediocre, and then there is Mr Gandhi who is just [unable to present](https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3004912/indian-election-cow-vigilantes-gst-job-losses-voters-should-have) a cogent profile of himself or a coherent vision of the India he will build. So Mr Modi seems powerful purely because the opposition cannot position a strong leader, who is intellectually able and street smart enough to sway the masses with the right appeals and rhetoric. Herein lies India’s tragedy.

The Economist, March 11, 2019, "The party of Narendra Modi wins a decisive victory in Uttar Pradesh," Economist, https://www.economist.com/asia/2017/03/11/the-party-of-narendra-modi-wins-a-decisive-victory-in-uttar-pradesh // JJ  
ONE television channel calls it a TsuNaMo. The term, playing on the initials of India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, is apt. In the most politically critical of five state elections whose result was announced on March 11th, Mr Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) all but drowned its rivals in a tide of its trademark orange. The capture of some 312 out of 403 seats in the state assembly of Uttar Pradesh was not merely a result of harder work, superior organisation and a more aggressive message. Indian pundits, a normally quarrelsome bunch, are virtually unanimous in crediting Mr Modi himself as the biggest vote-getter. Having won power in 2014 on a wave of hope for change, Mr Modi’s government had begun to lose momentum and the prime minister himself his aura of invincibility. In particular his abrupt move in November to scrap higher-denomination currency notes, which caused widespread hardship for little evident gain, raised doubts about Mr Modi’s competence. But now his hawa, meaning wind—as in a political tail-wind—is back. From one end of the Britain-sized state to another, voters proudly declared confidence that Modi-ji is the man to sort out India’s myriad woes.

Jeffrey Gettleman, Vindu Goel and Maria Abi-Habib, 3-11-2019, "In India’s Election Season, a Bombing Interrupts Modi’s Slump," The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/world/asia/modi-india-election.html // JJ  
But one bombing in Kashmir, and weeks of military brinkmanship with Pakistan afterward, appears to have interrupted Mr. Modi’s slump. A young suicide bomber [blew up a military bus](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/14/world/asia/pulwama-attack-kashmir.html?module=inline) in Kashmir on Feb. 14, killing more than 40 troops. The group Jaish-e-Muhammad, which operates from Pakistan and is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States, claimed responsibility. Mr. Modi ordered airstrikes on Pakistan, which he blamed for the attack, and Pakistan struck back. Never before, experts said, had two nuclear-armed nations bombed each other. From the outside, Mr. Modi was widely criticized as being willing to risk war for even the chance at a political boost. And when an Indian pilot was captured in Pakistani territory — and [was then quickly returned in a good-optics moment for Pakistan](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/world/asia/pakistan-india-pilot-kashmir.html?module=inline) — some international analysts thought Mr. Modi’s military adventurism had backfired. But that’s not how it has played out within India. Political analysts say that Indians are rallying behind Mr. Modi again, and that he seems to be making crucial gains among independent and undecided voters. The fact that India’s airstrikes probably missed their targets, and that a fighter jet was shot down by Pakistan, doesn’t seem to matter to most Indians. Their country was hit, and Mr. Modi hit back. “Even if they go below the seven seas, I will find them,” Mr. Modi said in a speech this month, referring to terrorists. “To settle the score is my habit!” Some of his supporters in India see Mr. Modi’s aggressive stance not as pandering for votes, but as a return to his old passion and focus. “Whatever our criticisms about him regarding the economy and jobs, at the end of the day he has done an incredible job of delivering justice for the martyrs,” said Prapti Bhattacharya, a law student and first-time voter. “Before this, I would have voted for Congress,” the leading opposition party, she said. “Now I’m voting for Modi.” The Pakistan crisis “has provided him with a golden narrative,” said Milan Vaishnav, the director of the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “The thing about a national security crisis is that it plays up decisiveness, leadership and nationalism. These are three characteristics he often touts.”

Nikhil Inamdarmarch, March 12, 2019, "How Narendra Modi has almost killed the Indian media," Quartz India, https://qz.com/india/1570899/how-narendra-modi-has-almost-killed-indian-media/ // JJ  
The Modi era coincided with an exponential rise in the use of social media in India, a medium that this government exploited to the hilt to target critics, [mobilise public opinion](http://time.com/5512032/whatsapp-india-election-2019/), and use tags like “anti-national,” to discredit anyone showing a hint of circumspection with the state narrative. It is estimated that between 2016 and 2018 alone, the number of [Indians using social networks grew](https://www.statista.com/statistics/278407/number-of-social-network-users-in-india/) from 168 million to 326 million, making it a handy tool for the ruling party to spread half-truths and fake news through a cobweb of unofficial accounts and unleash trolls to attack journalists who tried to counter them. As a result, reporters in India have over the past five years regularly had their mobile numbers circulated on WhatsApp groups, and been subjected to a deluge of sexually explicit messages, death and rape threats, and other forms of online intimidation. “The pattern of trolling has led many to speculate whether there is an organising hand at work. There is. The BJP has a wide network of volunteers and paid workers scattered across the country and in their offices in Delhi’s Ashoka Road which sends daily instructions on WhatsApp. Each troll has a contact point in the Ashoka Road central cell,” [Swati Chaturvedi](https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/india/bjps-troll-army-bullies-abuses-and-fights-dirty-with-narendra-modi-as-the-general-1.1541941374832), journalist and author of I Am a Troll: Inside the Secret World of the BJP’s Digital Army, wrote in the Gulf News. But the government hasn’t always hidden behind the smokescreen of social media. There have been more blatant attempts to arm-twist media proprietors. [Raiding news channels](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/05/world/asia/india-ndtv-raids-narendra-modi-prannoy-roy.html?mcubz=3), boycotting prime-time debates, and stopping government advertising—a significant source of revenue for the industry—have been among the common tactics used by the Modi regime. Unwillingness to toe the line has often led to high-profile editorial sackings.

Pok Fu Lam ,4-12-2019, Modi will win the Indian election: critics just need to deal with it, South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/comment/letters/article/3005555/why-narendra-modi-will-win-indias-general-election-simple-most, //CJ

**Narendra Modi will win Indian election: blame games will achieve little Blaming weak opposition leaders and appeals to populism for the likely re-election of India’s prime minister ignores the fact that the people are happy with the government** I read with concern “The Modi blues” and various other articles in This Week in Asia. Most Indians in Hong Kong would concur with the views expressed in Vikram Dravith’s letter, “Why so harsh on Modi and Indian Hindus?”(April 6), and it didn’t take long for you to live up to those claims, with three articles and six pages on Modi and the Indian elections on April 7. The writer made such an effort to interview the opposition Congress and its associates, Praveen Chakraborthy, Jean Dreze and Pallam Raju – but only one person from the BJP camp. Whatever happened to impartiality? **A sure sign of a solid economy is investor confidence and this is evident in the Bombay Stock Exchange crossing the 39,000 benchmark for the first time on April 1. The markets are booming**. The article cited the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies to support the view that **jobs are a priority, but the same organisation in its most recent survey says that 59 per cent of the people in the country are satisfied with the government and that Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s popularity remains high**. Having settled on a Modi victory, the article indulges in a blame game – weak opposition leaders, people being swayed on emotive issues and so on. Ever considered that when the majority of the people are happy with their government at the tail end of its term, it could mean that it has been doing a great job? India election: Narendra **Modi’s BJP promises to reserve one-third of seats for women in parliament ‘The BJP is committed to 33 per cent reservation in parliament and state assemblies through a constitutional amendment,’ t**he party said in its election manifesto **The party also promised to inject over US$300 billion for rural development, introduce a pension scheme for small and marginal farmers,** and simplify the GST India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party promised on Monday to reserve one-third of seats in the Indian parliament and state assemblies for women if it returns to power in an election due to begin on April 11. “**Women’s welfare and development will be accorded a high priority at all levels within the government, and the BJP is committed** to 33 per cent reservation in parliament and state assemblies through a constitutional amendment,” the party said in its manifesto. The document by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s right-wing BJP, released with fanfare in New Delhi, balanced nationalist policies with development talk. The party said it was committed to building a grand temple for Hindu god Rama “as soon as possible in a harmonious way” and pass a citizenship bill that would grant Indian nationality to Hindus from neighbouring countries. Under fire from the opposition Congress party for not doing enough for India’s struggling farmers, the party said it would infuse more than US$300 billion for rural development. **It would also extend an annual handout of 6,000 rupees (US$86) and introduced a pension scheme for small and marginal farmers**  Nationalism is our inspiration ... good governance is our mantra,” Modi, 68, said at the launch. “It (the manifesto) is multi-layered and multi-dimensional because our society is very diverse. We can’t have a one-size-fits-all kind of policy. It addresses the needs of all sections of society.” The party also pledged to simplify the goods and services tax (GST) – which disrupted businesses and hurt economic growth when it was introduced by Modi’s government in 2017 – and to revise income tax brackets to help the middle-class if the party retained power. India election: Modi, Gandhi and the Chinese dragon in the room **“We are committed to further revise the tax slabs and the tax benefits to ensure more cash and greater purchasing power in the hands of our middle income families**,” the BJP said. The party’s manifesto comes on the heels of a similar document released by Congress last week, which promised to “create wealth and guarantee welfare” to India’s 1.3 billion people. Indian PM Narendra Modi speaks after releasing the BJP’s election manifesto. Photo: ReutersIndian PM Narendra Modi speaks after releasing the BJP’s election manifesto. Photo: Reuters Indian PM Narendra Modi speaks after releasing the BJP’s election manifesto. Photo: Reuters India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party promised on Monday to reserve one-third of seats in the Indian parliament and state assemblies for women if it returns to power in an election due to begin on April 11. “Women’s welfare and development will be accorded a high priority at all levels within the government, and the BJP is committed to 33 per cent reservation in parliament and state assemblies through a constitutional amendment,” the party said in its manifesto. The document by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s right-wing BJP, released with fanfare in New Delhi, balanced nationalist policies with development talk. From Gandhi to cow vigilantes: a guide to the Indian election The party said it was committed to building a grand temple for Hindu god Rama “as soon as possible in a harmonious way” and pass a citizenship bill that would grant Indian nationality to Hindus from neighbouring countries. Under fire from the opposition Congress party for not doing enough for India’s struggling farmers, the party said it would infuse more than US$300 billion for rural development. SUBSCRIBE TO THIS WEEK IN ASIA Get updates direct to your inbox your email SUBMIT By registering for these newsletters you agree to our T&C and Privacy Policy It would also extend an annual handout of 6,000 rupees (US$86) and introduced a pension scheme for small and marginal farmers. A Modi supporter at a BJP election rally in Assam, India. Photo: Reuters A Modi supporter at a BJP election rally in Assam, India. Photo: Reuters Share: “Nationalism is our inspiration ... good governance is our mantra,” Modi, 68, said at the launch. “It (the manifesto) is multi-layered and multi-dimensional because our society is very diverse. We can’t have a one-size-fits-all kind of policy. It addresses the needs of all sections of society.” The party also pledged to simplify the goods and services tax (GST) – which disrupted businesses and hurt economic growth when it was introduced by Modi’s government in 2017 – and to revise income tax brackets to help the middle-class if the party retained power. India election: Modi, Gandhi and the Chinese dragon in the room “We are committed to further revise the tax slabs and the tax benefits to ensure more cash and greater purchasing power in the hands of our middle income families,” the BJP said. The party’s manifesto comes on the heels of a similar document released by Congress last week, which promised to “create wealth and guarantee welfare” to India’s 1.3 billion people. **Congress had announced 72,000 rupees (US$1,045) each to India’s poorest 250 million families. The BJP, which decimated Congress as it swept to power in 2014, has been riding a nationalistic wave, vowing to protect the country against Pakistan-backed “terrorism”. In February, India and Pakistan faced off in their worst confrontation in years over Kashmir, conducting tit-for-tat air strikes.**

### AT: BJP Lose Now

1. **Non-unique:** **Patanaik ’19 of Reuters** writes that the BJP is already poised to win for two reasons.

a) According **Patanaik**, to voters care more about national security afforded to them by the BJP than economic concerns.

b) **Gilbert ’19 of Vice** writes that the BJP controls the online media – moreso than any other party – and is able to control the narrative.

David Gilbert, 4-11-2019, "Modi's trolls are ready to wreak havoc on India's marathon election," VICE News, https://news.vice.com/en\_us/article/597mwk/modis-trolls-are-ready-to-wreak-havoc-on-indias-marathon-election // JJ  
In 2014, Modi used social media to spread his message and help him win a landslide victory, and [Facebook worked closely](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/inside-facebooks-political-unit-that-enables-the-dark-art-of-digital-propaganda/articleshow/62222158.cms) with the leader to supercharge his online presence and make him [the most-followed world leader](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/inside-facebooks-political-unit-that-enables-the-dark-art-of-digital-propaganda/articleshow/62222158.cms). In the years since, Modi and the BJP have developed their online operation into a sophisticated machine that includes a huge “troll army” of paid and voluntary supporters who help spread the party’s message on platforms like Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter, instantly reaching millions of people. “In the last few years, he has reset the tone and normalized a kind of bigotry and is openly campaigning on sectarian and anti-Muslim grounds,” Rohit Chopra, a media studies professor at Santa Clara University, told VICE News. With internet usage in India exploding — WhatsApp alone has 230 million users in the country — it has never been easier for Modi to shape the narrative, stoke division and spread misinformation. Other parties are following his lead, but nowhere near the scale of the BJP, and experts warn that for all the steps companies like Facebook and WhatsApp have taken, the sheer scale of these elections means those measures are having little to no impact. WEAPONIZING WHATSAPP If 2014 was the Facebook election in India, then 2019 is shaping up to be the WhatsApp election. The BJP began its focus on WhatsApp in 2017 and 2018 local elections, weaponizing the platforms to foment fear and confusion among supporters, which in turn has led to real-world violence, especially in rural areas where access to other sources of information is limited. Though many parties are leaning on WhatsApp to get their message out, the BJP has far and away the most sophisticated operation in place, allowing it to reach even the most remote voters. Last September, the BJP [laid out an ambitious election plan](https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/bjp-plans-a-whatsapp-campaign-for-2019-lok-sabha-election/story-lHQBYbxwXHaChc7Akk6hcI.html) to have 900,000 volunteers create specific WhatsApp groups for each of the country’s polling stations, allowing the party to control the narrative at a granular level. Often these messages push anti-Muslim sentiments that travel far and wide on WhatsApp, increasing the chance of violence. An image of [a man’s body hanged outside a temple](https://twitter.com/RSFBLB/status/1080856820841799680) was shared with the “Vote for Modi” group, with the caption: “One more priest has been murdered, Remember, the jihadis are not going to stop at just this.” [The claims were later shown to be false](https://www.altnews.in/death-of-priest-at-raebareli-temple-communalised-on-social-media/).

Subrat Patnaik, 4-9-2019, "Modi's alliance to win slim majority in Indian election, poll shows," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-election-poll/modis-alliance-to-win-slim-majority-in-indian-election-poll-shows-idUSKCN1RL0U3 // JJ  
NEW DELHI (Reuters) - Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ruling alliance will win a thin majority in a general election that starts on Thursday, an average of four opinion polls showed, with a focus on national security appearing to trump concerns over jobs and farm prices. The coalition led by Modi’s Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is expected to win 273 of the 543 parliament seats at stake, one more than the halfway mark required to rule. In the last election the alliance won more than 330 seats - the biggest mandate in three decades. Most of the polling agencies that released surveys in the last four days said Modi got a boost from recent tension with arch enemy Pakistan after a militant group based there killed 40 Indian policemen in the disputed region of Kashmir in February.

### AT: UNSC Makes Modi Win

1. **Delink:** **Tewari ’18 of ThePrint** writes that rural voters will be the key contested demographic for the Indian elections. Rural voters vote off of things like agricultural subsidies, not diplomatic victory.

Ruhi Tewari, December 22, 2018, "Sorry urban voters, election 2019 is all about wooing the rural Indian," ThePrint, https://theprint.in/opinion/sorry-urban-voters-election-2019-is-all-about-wooing-the-rural-indian/167583/ // JJ  
The political theatre has shifted to rural India ahead of the 2019 election. The rural voter is in vogue, and has pushed some much-publicised flagship programmes of the Narendra Modi government to the backseat. In the din of farm loan waivers, one doesn’t hear much about Startup India, Make in India or Digital India. It’s safe to say that the political theatre has shifted in the election season. It is rural and not urban India that will be at the centre of the political rhetoric in the run-up to 2019. In what is just a trailer, Congress president Rahul Gandhi, who promised to waive off farm loans in almost all his campaign speeches ahead of the state elections, [has now said that](https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/rahul-gandhi-says-wont-let-pm-rest-till-farm-loans-are-waived-1964299) he “won’t let the Prime Minister sleep” till a nationwide farm loan waiver is announced. Rahul Gandhi knows the rural voter is perhaps the BJP’s biggest worry. The closely-contested Gujarat election last year had shown a clear rural-urban divide, with the Congress [performing better](https://www.rediff.com/news/interview/must-read-why-bjp-lost-rural-gujarat/20171221.htm) than the BJP in the rural areas. And, the 11 December results in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh indicated that the [agrarian anger against the BJP](https://theprint.in/politics/bjps-anti-farmer-policies-led-to-hindi-heartland-loss-says-farmers-body/162093/) is very real. In 2004, the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government lost the Lok Sabha polls after its glamorous ‘India Shining’ campaign failed to cut ice with the rural voters. Reeling from the recent electoral losses, the BJP is now engaged in a ‘who loves the farmer more’ competition with the Congress. With the newly-elected Congress chief ministers in the three states announcing farm loan waivers this week, the BJP [lost no time](https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/gujarat-assam-governments-waive-rural-electricity-bills-farm-loans/story-Aep0xBnQW8Rl3GOJmdJz8N.html) in waiving off farm loans in Assam and rural electricity bills worth Rs 650 crore in Gujarat.

The Economist, February 28, 2019, "India and Pakistan should stop playing with fire," Economist, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/02/28/india-and-pakistan-should-stop-playing-with-fire // JJ  
But unemployment has actually risen during Mr Modi’s tenure, according to leaked data that his government has been accused of trying to suppress (see [article](https://www.economist.com/node/21760227)). The gst was needlessly complex and costly to administer. Other pressing reforms have fallen by the wayside. India’s banks are still largely in state hands, still prone to lend to the well-connected. And as the election has drawn closer, Mr Modi has resorted to politically expedient policies that are likely to harm the economy. His government hounded the boss of the central bank out of office for keeping interest rates high, appointing a replacement who promptly cut them. And it has unveiled draft rules that would protect domestic e-commerce firms from competition from retailers such as Amazon. By the same token, Mr Modi has not sparked the outright communal conflagration his critics, The Economist included, fretted about before he became prime minister. But his government has often displayed hostility to India’s Muslim minority and sympathy for those who see Hinduism—the religion of 80% of Indians—as under threat from internal and external foes. He has appointed a bigoted Hindu prelate, Yogi Adityanath, as chief minister of India’s most populous state, Uttar Pradesh. A member of his cabinet presented garlands of flowers to a group of Hindu men who had been convicted of lynching a Muslim for selling beef (cows are sacred to Hindus). And Mr Modi himself has suspended the elected government of Jammu & Kashmir, India’s only Muslim-majority state, and used force to suppress protests there against the central government, leading to horrific civilian casualties. As reprehensible as all this is, the Hindu zealots who staff Mr Modi’s electoral machine complain that he has not done enough to advance the Hindu cause (see [article](https://www.economist.com/node/21760243)). And public dissatisfaction with his economic reforms has helped boost Congress, the main opposition party, making the election more competitive than had been expected. The temptation to fire up voters using heated brinkmanship with Pakistan will be huge. Mr Modi has made a career of playing with fire. He first rose to prominence as chief minister of Gujarat when the state was racked by anti-Muslim pogroms in 2002. Although there is no evidence he orchestrated the violence, he has shown no compunction about capitalising on the popularity it won him in Hindu-nationalist circles. With a difficult election ahead, he may think he can pull off the same trick again by playing the tough guy with Pakistan, but without actually getting into a fight. However, the price of miscalculation does not bear thinking about. Western governments are pushing for a diplomatic settlement at the un. If Mr Modi really is a patriot, he will now step back.

### AT: Modi Good General

1. **Turn:** Modi’s tenure has incited massive violence against Muslims. **Gowen ’18 of the Washington Post** writes that Modi has appealed to nationalism and hatred of Islam, increasing religious based hate crimes by 28%.

2. **Turn:** Modi is destroying India’s economy. **BBC ’19** explains that India’s unemployment rate is the highest it has been since the 1970s, with 1 in 5 young people unable to find work, furthering that Modi’s policies have uniquely destroyed the economy in two ways:

a) **Demonetization**: In 2016, Modi took 86% of India’s currency out of circulation in an attempt to crack down on illegal cash, but failed in that much of the illegal cash remained in circulation, but the removals harmed cash run industries such as agriculture, small businesses, and the informal sector – causing layoffs, closures, and decreased wages

b) **Goods and Services Tax:** in 2017, Modi implemented a new single tax code that was poorly thought out and implemented and ultimately harmed small businesses across India

[1. **Turn: Jangid ’19** finds that Modi has reshaped Indian foreign policy to be unapologetic about its military might, fueling nationalism and going so far as rallying the nation against Pakistan as cheerleaders for war. Indeed, leading up to the 2019 elections, Modi is becoming increasingly aggressive in order to create a diversion from high unemployment, poor growth, and an agricultural crisis.]

Ashok Sharma, 4-10-2019, "Jobs, castes and other issues in India's general elections," AP NEWS, https://www.apnews.com/eaeb48cc959d40a781163e3327f2fd2a // JJ  
Analysts say Indian airstrikes inside Pakistan in response to the attack gave Modi a pre-election boost. BJP leaders quickly made national security a central plank of their campaign. In northern parts of the country bordering Pakistan, anti-Pakistan sentiment has always been strong because of the bloodshed during the countries’ partition in 1947 and three wars since then. But anti-Muslim sentiment in India has become more common and more violent since the BJP came to power in 2014. At least three dozen Muslims have been lynched by self-styled Hindu vigilante groups or mobs on suspicion of illegally moving cows, sacred to Hindus, or eating beef, according to Human Rights Watch. \_\_\_ CASTE The BJP is mainly supported by upper-caste Hindus, while struggling to make headway with lower-caste voters and non-Hindus.

Annie Gowen, 10-31-2018, "Lynch mobs, “cow vigilantes” and Whatsapp: What hate looks like in India," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/reports-of-hate-crime-cases-have-spiked-in-india/?utm\_term=.2a3f8f3e67f6 // JJ  
Reports of religious-based hate-crime cases have spiked in India since the pro-Hindu nationalist government of Narendra Modi came to power in 2014, according to new data from IndiaSpend, which tracks reports of violence in English-language media. The data shows that Muslims are overwhelmingly the victims and Hindus the perpetrators of the cases reported. The government of India does not record religious-based hate crimes as separate offenses and so does not provide data on the category. The government does monitor incidents of communal violence — such as riots between religious communities — and has data [that shows such incidents rose 28 percent between 2014 and 2017](http://164.100.47.190/loksabhaquestions/annex/14/AU590.pdf).

Khinvraj **Jangid**, 03-03-2019, "Under Modi, the 'new' India prioritizes aggression – and prizes Israel's example," haaretz, <https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/.premium-under-modi-the-new-india-prioritizes-aggression-and-prizes-israel-s-example-1.6982517>

**India's national security doctrine has generally prioritized caution**, not least regarding its nuclear-armed neighbor. **But that constraint is coming under intensifying pressure as India faces a rising death count – and the Modi government accelerates its commitment to a far more aggressive and nationalistic policy towards Pakistan. That is part of a broader undertaking to frame a "new" India as a "strong" state, unapologetic about its military might**, and one that takes inspiration from, among others, Israel and its uncompromising counter-terrorist policies.**India's response to the**[**killing of 44 Indian soldiers**](https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/asia-and-australia/saudi-prince-due-in-pakistan-u-s-backs-india-amid-tension-after-kashmir-attack-1.6938787)**by the Pakistan-based Islamist militant group Jaish-e-Mohammed in Kashmir has been instructive – and worrying, about the trajectory of the Modi government and its apparent cheerleading for war.  Partly, the severity of the attack and the serial nature of Pakistan-based terror changed the old response and was the reason the Modi government gave India's armed forces a free hand**. The Foreign Affairs ministry was careful to maximize international diplomatic support for the use of Indian military might so deep into Pakistani territory by presenting it as a "[non-military](https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/31089/Statement+by+Foreign+Secretary+on+26+February+2019+on+the+Strike+on+JeM+training+camp+at+Balakot) [not targeting Pakistan’s army or civilians] pre-emptive action led by intelligence," aimed at preventing further attacks on the Indian side of Kashmir by Jaish-e-Mohammed. Another reason is electoral. **Modi is in full vote recruitment mode for the April-May national elections. It's a truism that war is an excellent diversion from a tough fight caused by high unemployment, poor growth, an agricultural crisis and major policy blunders such as demonetization. He knows well that his five years have failed to achieve neither of his core promises: "vikas" (development) or "achhe din," the "good days" of prosperity that was a key party slogan in 2015.** But there is another source for India's unprecedented response.Modi's ["new" India](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sWaPnvM5QMM), a phrase coined by him to describe a newly confident, and proudly nationalistic state drawing on a weaponized Hindu political identity, is not just about bear hugs and promoting an International Day of Yoga. His Bharatiya Janata Party is ideologically wedded to the idea of India as a strong state, and the way such a state is described slides easily into the idea of an aggressive state, one that holds up as an idea a lack of any hesitation to retaliate with force against its neighbors.

**BBC News**, 1-31-2019, "India job data spells trouble for Modi," <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-47068223>

**India's unemployment rate is the highest it has been since the 1970s, according to a leaked government jobs report. Economist Vivek Kaul explains what this means and why it matters to Prime Minister Narendra Modi's government, which is accused of withholding the findings months before the general election.** It says that **India has a jobs problem.** **The country's unemployment rate - 6.1% - is the highest it has been since 1972-73, the earliest year for which comparable data is available. This is according to**[**the latest employment survey, which was leaked to The Business Standard newspaper**](https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/unemployment-rate-at-five-decade-high-of-6-1-in-2017-18-nsso-survey-119013100053_1.html)**, after the government refused to release it. On its own, an unemployment rate of 6.1% may not sound too dire, until you consider that in 2011-12, it was just 2.2%. And it's particularly high among people between 15 and 29 years - in urban India, 18.7% of men and 27.2% of women in this age group are looking for jobs, while in rural India, its 17.4% and 13.6% respectively. But, as the survey shows, the unemployment rate among young people is very high. Nearly one in every five is unable to find a job.** India's so-called demographic dividend is nowhere in sight. This timing of this finding - just months ahead of a general election - makes it all the more significant. The report was approved by India's national statistics commission. [Two of its members resigned earlier this week](https://www.livemint.com/news/india/nsc-members-resign-after-row-over-nsso-employment-report-1548778444218.html), citing the government's alleged refusal to release the report as one of the reasons. **Job creation was a key promise during Mr Modi's election campaign in 2013.** [Why are millions of Indian women dropping out of work?](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-39945473) [Narendra Modi: India's economic saviour?](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-27412507) **In early January, the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, a private institution, had raised the alarm, saying the number of unemployed people has been rising steadily and had reached 11 million by the end of December 2018. Mr Modi had promised "minimum government and maximum governance" - which translates to efficiency and growth - and failed to deliver on this. His government also did two things that badly hurt the economy**. **In**[**2016, his government cancelled all 500 ($8; £6) and 1,000 rupee notes**](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-37919292)**, which accounted for 86% of the currency in circulation. This was supposed to be a crackdown on illegal cash but** India's central bank subsequently said **most of that money made its way back into the banking system. Demonetisation**, as it is known, **adversely affected large parts of India's economy and particularly the informal sector which relied heavily on cash transactions. Agriculture also suffered as farmers largely pay in and get paid in cash. A number of small businesses shut down and those that managed to survive cut jobs**. In such situations, young people are more likely to get fired. Then [**in July 2017, the government implemented the Goods and Services Tax (GST)**](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-40453774)**, a sweeping new single tax code that** replaced numerous central and state levies. But it **crippled small businesses, partly because it was shoddily designed and implemented.** This has also delayed job recovery, suggesting that employment could increase next year.

### AT: BJP Good General

1. **Turn:** According to **Sharma ’19 of the Associated Press**, BJP rule has encouraged nationalism, religiously fueled violence, and the lynching of Muslims.

Ashok Sharma, 4-10-2019, "Jobs, castes and other issues in India's general elections," AP NEWS, https://www.apnews.com/eaeb48cc959d40a781163e3327f2fd2a // JJ  
Analysts say Indian airstrikes inside Pakistan in response to the attack gave Modi a pre-election boost. BJP leaders quickly made national security a central plank of their campaign. In northern parts of the country bordering Pakistan, anti-Pakistan sentiment has always been strong because of the bloodshed during the countries’ partition in 1947 and three wars since then. But anti-Muslim sentiment in India has become more common and more violent since the BJP came to power in 2014. At least three dozen Muslims have been lynched by self-styled Hindu vigilante groups or mobs on suspicion of illegally moving cows, sacred to Hindus, or eating beef, according to Human Rights Watch. \_\_\_ CASTE The BJP is mainly supported by upper-caste Hindus, while struggling to make headway with lower-caste voters and non-Hindus.

### AT: I/L – Climate Change

1. **Delink:** **Sagar ’19 of NYU** writes that Modi’s has asserted he will deal with the issue of climate change, but his policy has accomplished nothing in actuality.

(Rahul **Sagar** is global network associate professor of political science at New York University (NYU) Abu Dhabi and a Washington Square fellow at NYU New York, Abhijnan **Rej** is a New Delhi–based analyst. His current research focuses on Indian foreign policy and defense. He was previously a senior fellow in the Strategic Studies Program at the Observer Research Foundation. “The BJP and Indian Grand Strategy” <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/04/bjp-and-indian-grand-strategy-pub-78686)>

Modi also has promoted multilateral Indian diplomacy around the issue of climate change.56In the run-up to the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris, he referred to “sunshine countries” (states lying between the Tropic of Cancer and Tropic of Capricorn) as Suryaputras as a way to help rhetorically promote joint efforts to address the global issue. (In the Sanskrit epic known as the Mahabharata, Suryaputra is another name of Karna, the emblem of virtue.) Yet when all was said and done, the core of India’s position at the climate change conference was a hard-nosed form of exceptionalism, asserting in effect that India (and other developing countries) should have different, lower obligations to address climate change—as newly industrializing states—than historically industrial nations do.57Yatharadwad (realism) seems to be the civilizational ethos Modi—like Vajpayee before him—has internalized the most in shaping India’s foreign policy. AT HOME IN THE WORLD During the Cold War, many observers thought that the BJP had little to say about Indian foreign policy.58 Once the party came to power and operationalized India’s nuclear deterrent, scholars began to scrutinize its views more carefully, if only to reach the dire conclusion that it championed “strong, assertive, and militaristic nationalism.”59 More recently still, some observers have questioned whether the BJP even has a distinctive approach to international relations, arguing that its policies simply mirror those of its principal rival, the Congress Party.60

## Checks China

### AT: Sino-Indian War

1. **delink:** despite skirmishes persisting for decades, war has not and will not break out between China and India. This is because **Markey 15** of the **Council on Foreign Relations** outlines a number of conditions that have to be met before war is even possible.

a) A series of disputes must happen either in quick secession or simultaneously

b) US policy-making and preventive efforts must fail and

c) All efforts at communication between the two countries – which have succeeded every time there was a skirmish in the recent past – must fail.

Even if all of these things happen, Markey continue that full-out warfare is unlikely as the United States will immediately work to limit the costs of confrontation, meaning the greatest risk is merely the potential for “dozens of deaths.”

Daniel S. **Markey**, 11-18-**2015**, "Armed Confrontation Between China and India," Council on Foreign Relations, [https://www.cfr.org/report/armed-confrontation-between-china-and-india //](https://www.cfr.org/report/armed-confrontation-between-china-and-india%20//) RM

**The China-India relationship is remarkably stable in many ways.** Bilateral summits and new multilateral groupings often bring the two Asian giants together in common cause. **Both sides clearly appreciate the value of peace as a way to expand their trade and investment ties and to enable a continued focus on economic development at home.** Yet important differences and suspicions persist; some date back to 1962, when India lost a short but decisive war to China. Others relate to the rising global ambitions, military capabilities, and political and economic influence of these two Asian neighbors. Although **Beijing and New Delhi have repeatedly demonstrated a mutual desire to prevent conflict and mitigate tensions when they arise and have avoided a serious violent clash since 1967**, the potential for their relationship to deteriorate is ever present. **No single issue or crisis is likely to produce this result. However, a series of disputes in quick succession or their simultaneous emergence could lead to an armed confrontation worse than any since the 1960s.** **A border clash could inflict dozens of casualties**, jolt global markets, hurt regional economic growth, and undermine cooperative China-India efforts on regional and global issues of concern to the United States, including counterterrorism and counterpiracy, even if both sides managed to avoid a more serious military escalation. Every year, China and India claim hundreds of incursions by the other across the line separating them in the Himalayas. **The United States has a major interest in preventing armed confrontation between China and India. If preventive efforts fail, however, U.S. policymakers should work to limit the immediate costs of a confrontation and to avoid unnecessary new points of friction with Beijing.** But in doing so they should seek to resolve the crisis on terms that favor a closer U.S.-India partnership.

The Contingencies: Under normal circumstances, **India and China** are likely to **have sufficient desire and capacity to prevent any single point of friction from sparking a military crisis.** Yet if more than one dispute were to unfold at the same time, the risk of escalation would grow as positions taken in one conflict could complicate the management of another. Leaders would have stronger political and strategic incentives to avoid backing down, fearing the costs of domestic opinion and sacrificed leverage on the other dispute. Of the conceivable differences that could arise between China and India, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is the most likely theater for an armed confrontation. Three other conceivable disputes have the greatest potential to aggravate tensions and spark a crisis that could result in military escalation. Skirmish along the LAC. Every year, China and India claim hundreds of incursions by the other across the line that separates them in the Himalayan region, near the politically sensitive areas of Kashmir and Tibet. Many of the flare-ups can be traced to the practical challenge of managing a contested border in difficult, mountainous terrain; over time, **forces on both sides have developed signals to warn the other and avoid deadly clashes.**

### AT: China Rise = War

1. **Delink: Li ‘11 of the Copenhagen Business** **School** explains that a) China is focused on its own development and preservation, which requires that it avoid conflict, and b) it has a desire to be viewed as a peaceful, friendly power and protect their national image. Thus, according to **Zakaria ’12 in his book, “The Post American World” (pg 133)**, China hasadopted a strategy to facilitate a “peaceful rise”. China’s foreign policy has been focused on its economic influence, which has been responsible for massive economic growth in places like Africa.

However, opposing China’s peaceful rise would dissuade it and cause it to lose faith in that strategy, forcing it to turn to military aggression.

Xin Li, March 2011, "(PDF) Building China’s Soft Power for a Peaceful Rise," https://www.researchgate.net/publication/226526970\_Building\_China's\_Soft\_Power\_for\_a\_Peaceful\_Rise // JJ  
We argue China has a genuine desire for peace in her rise for several reasons. Firstly, Chinese culture advocates moral strength instead of military power, worships kingly rule instead of hegemonic rule, and emphasizes persuasion by virtue and returning good to evil. Therefore, at the individual level, even if there has been a victim mentality and retaliation sentiment in populace, when promoted to a top leadership position, Chinese will tend to behave like a benevolent sage, partly because of the cultural norm and partly he/she may feel good by doing so. On 10 April 1974, Deng Xiaoping delivered a speech at the United Nations General Assembly in which he declared ‘if one day China should...play the tyrant in the world, and everywhere subject others to her bullying, aggression and exploitation, the people of the world should...expose it, oppose it and work together with the Chinese people to overthrow it’. 3 Secondly, at the state level, China’s priority in the ‘important strategic opportunity period’ is still domestic development so that China would try her best to avoid conflict and seek peace. Thirdly, at the international level, today’s international system is characterized by economic interdependence and nuclear weaponry. This reality makes a military or confrontational power-shift/rise less likely or too costly for China to even consider [4]. Ikenberry [5] argues that China not only needs continued access to the current global capitalist system but also wants to protect the system’s rules and institutions because China has thrived in such system. We argue even if China desires to reform the current world order which China perceives imbalanced and unreasonable, China can be patient enough and adopt a gradualist approach toward that end, just like what China did in its gradual economic reform and opening up. Last but not least, Chinese history does not support that kind of prediction that Chine will use non-peaceful means to rise as well. By reexamining the evidences of diplomacy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Johnston makes a convincing case that China ‘has become more integrated into and more cooperative within international institutions than ever before’ and ‘behaviorally it does not appear at the moment that China is balancing very vigorously against American military power or U.S. interests as its leaders have defined them’ [6]. We also disagree with those arguments based on power transition theory, according to which, the rise of China will ultimately lead to Chinese power parity with the US [7], which may cause structure-changing wars under certain circumstances. Theoretically, the power transition theory posits that a rising power is likely turn into a revisionist with two conditions: its capability and willingness (or dissatisfaction with the status quo). Empirically, history has shown that an international system with shifting power structure is fueled with conflicts and militarized disputes [8–10]. Based on this logic, a rising China will change the international power structure and eventually lead to conflicts. We argue there is a missing point in such argument, namely, there should be another condition: whether the rising power is willing to take unilateral and radical action to reduce its dissatisfaction. Clearly, China appears to be a pragmatic power which prefers modest actions.

### AT: Military Spending ! War

1. **Delink:** According to **Rudd ’15 of Harvard University**, China is increasing its military spending to posture and enforce deterrence, not to go to war.

Kevin Rudd, April 2015, "The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under Xi Jinping”, Harvard University, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf // JJ  
Of course, Xi Jinping has no interest in triggering armed conflict with the U.S., a nightmare scenario that would fundamentally undermine China’s economic rise. Furthermore, there are few, if any, credible military scenarios in the immediate period ahead in which China could militarily prevail in a direct conflict with the U.S. This explains Xi’s determination to oversee the professionalization and modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a credible, war-fighting and war-winning machine. Xi Jinping is an intelligent consumer of strategic literature and would have concluded that risking any premature military engagement with the U.S. would be foolish. Traditional Chinese strategic thinking is unequivocal in its advice not to engage an enemy unless you are in a position of overwhelming strength. Under Xi, the ultimate purpose of China’s military expansion and modernization is not to inflict defeat on the U.S., but to deter the U.S. Navy from intervening in China’s immediate periphery by creating sufficient doubt in the minds of American strategists as to their ability to prevail. In the medium term, the report analyzes the vulnerability of the U.S.-China relationship to the dynamics of “Thucydides’ Trap,” whereby rising great powers have historically ended up at war with established great powers when one has sought to pre-empt the other at a time of perceived maximum strategic opportunity. According to case studies, such situations have resulted in war in 12 out of 16 instances over the last 500 years. 6 Xi Jinping is deeply aware of this strategic literature and potential implications for U.S.-China relations. This has, in part, underpinned his desire to reframe U.S.-China relations from strategic competition to “a new type of great power relationship”.

### AT: Island Building ! War

1. **Delink:** According to **Austin ’16 of the East West** Institute, China is building islands primarily for political reasons, not to prepare for military attack. Thus, as **Yoshihara ’11 of the Naval War College** finds, the islands are mostly militarily useless.

Greg Austin, 1-12-2016, "China's Land Reclamation and Island Building Not Territorial Expansion," No Publication, https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/chinas-land-reclamation-and-island-building-not-territorial-expansion // JJ  
In an article for Xinhua News, Mark Burgess interviews EWI Professorial Fellow Greg Austin who argues China's land reclamation and island building is not naked aggression, but rather a case of China defending its historical territory claims. China's artificial island building in the South China Sea is a product of defending its historical territory claims and not a case of territorial expansion, an Australian expert has told Xinhua. China's reclamation efforts in the Nansha Islands, though not illegal, have shocked strategic analysts despite the moves being made so China avoids conflict with other claimants who have already occupied all "natural" islands in the area. "The idea that the building of these artificial islands is somehow creeping territorial expansionism is really not what China thinks it is," said Professor Greg Austin, fellow at the EastWest Institute in New York and visiting professor at the University of New South Wales, Canberra. Austin, a former Australian intelligence analyst turned academic who has studied the South China Sea for over 30 years, said China is defending historical claims that were first made in 1933 by the then government and date back almost five centuries. "China is trying to keep alongside a position against the rival claimants who have occupied all of the natural islands. China's only natural option was to build up these artificial Islands." The land reclamation efforts are essentially a catching up of what other regional claimants have previously done: expand the islands they hold and build "what you might call reasonable forward posts that are habitable," Austin said. "We shouldn't allow our shock at China's building up of artificial islands to somehow convince us that this is naked aggression by China. It's not naked aggression," Austin said, noting the threat to commercial shipping is "completely fabricated." "There is no evidence of any Chinese government attack or pressure on any commercial shipping in the South China Sea since 1949 when the Communist Party took control of the Chinese mainland, and even before." The only countries to ever use significant force against commercial shipping in the South China Sea were the Japanese and allied forces against each other in World War II. Austin all but rejected assertions of a regional conflict between China, the United States and other claimants as stressed by U.S. Republican lawmakers - in an election year - following the first test flights of commercial aircraft landing on Yongshu Jiao. Instead, Austin suggested the current rhetoric is "stoking the level of political intensity," given Vietnam and the Philippines also have airfields and military assets in the disputed areas. "What this is about is geopolitical positioning," Austin said. "The complaint now is that the Chinese have outdone the Vietnamese and the Philippines," from a greater access to wealth and capability to build the airfields. "The recent tensions in the South China Sea are serious (but) they're more political than military," Austin said. He said it is time for Chinese and regional authorities to be "a bit more creative" and called on China to take a leadership role and settle the dispute once and for all. "As senior Chinese officials have said in the last two weeks, China showed great flexibility, great responsiveness in negotiating disputed land boundaries along its border in the last 20 to 30 years, including the disputed border with the former Soviet Union and Russia," Austin said. "We're really looking to China now to see how it can apply its creativity to try and settle down its dispute."

Toshi Yoshihara, Assistant Professor at the Naval War College, Spring 2011, "Can China Defend a ‘‘Core Interest’’ in the South China Sea?" The Washington Quarterly, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/17919/uploads // JJ <https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/17919/uploads>  
Alongside the fleet, Mahan listed forward bases athwart vital SLOCs as a second ‘‘pillar’’ of sea power. To provide constant presence, the PLA would benefit immensely from bases in the southern reaches of the South China Sea. Taiwan holds Itu Aba, or Peace Island, the largest island in the Spratly archipelago, along with the adjacent Center Cay and Sand Cay islets. But even these Taiwanese possessions would be of dubious strategic value to China in a major military contingency, particularly one involving the U.S. Navy. The islands are too small and boast too few resources to stage major sea-control or power-projection operations. At most, they could act as way stations resupplying and rearming smaller PLA Navy flotillas. The greatest value these islands offer may lie in their potential to deny access to nearby waters. China could deploy long-range antiship cruise missiles on these outposts, in effect creating no-go zones in the South China Sea. Such assets, then, may do little more than telegraph Chinese resolve.

### AT: Island Building ! Enviro

1. **Strength of link weighing: Pumphrey ’02 of the Strategic Studies Institute** writes that the primary problem in the SCS is actually overfishing, which destroys reefs and reduces fish populations. This is a result of population growth, unrelated to island building.

2. **Non-unique: Duong ’15 of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative** writes that there has already been disastrous and irreversible environmental impacts on the area.

Caroline Pumphrey, 2002, "The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications", Strategic Studies Institute, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB61.pdf // JJ  
V. ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION AND RESOURCE DEPLETION The problems of environmental pollution and resource depletion around the South China Sea are generally due to population growth and urbanization in coastal cities, and highly polluting technologies for energy production and primary resource extraction. Among the many environmental issues in the region, the problem of dwindling fish stocks is of pressing concern. Fisheries are very important in Southeast Asia. They provide inexpensive sources of protein, increased job opportunities, and revenue for foreign exchange. In the mid-1990s, the region produced over eight million metric tons live weight of marine fish per year, about 10 percent of world total catch.27 In addition, more and more coastal areas were converted for aquaculture of shrimp and fish, a booming industry of economic importance in the region. However, as more people move to coastal cities around the South China Sea, the pressure to increase fish catch leads to overfishing, an extremely destructive force in the South China Sea. Destructive and illegal fishing methods—common in China, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia—include dynamite blasting, coral mining, and cyanide “fishing” to stun fish for live collection. China depends heavily on fishing resources; one-fourth of all PRC aquatic products comes from the South China Sea. According to fishery specialists, the potential catch of the South China Sea is in the area of 2.5 million tons; however, in 1998, the marine catch in Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan provinces had reached 3.1 million tons. With 70,000 boats, the fleet has increased ten times over in the last 20 years, along with considerably decreasing yields per vessel.28 In 1998, 60 percent of fishing enterprises had lost money, and many fishermen were unable to sustain their livelihoods, according to the Guangdong Marine and Aquaculture Department. In 1999, the Director of Guangdong Marine and Aquaculture Department, Li Zhujiang, issued limits on any increase in marine production and disallowed introduction of any new fishing boats. Vice-Minister of Agriculture Wan Baorui imposed a seasonal moratorium on fishing in the South China Seas, from June 1 to August 1, due to failing fishery production.

Huy Duong, 6-15-2015, "Massive Island-Building and International Law," Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, https://amti.csis.org/massive-island-building-and-international-law/ // JJ  
Within the short span of a year, China’s rapid construction of artificial islands in the disputed Spratlys has radically changed the geographical and security landscapes in the South China Sea. This island construction has so far created over eight million square metres of real estate in the open sea, outstripping other countries’ reclamation activities by far, and shows no sign of abating. Hundreds of millions of tons of sand and coral have been dredged from the seabed and dumped atop fragile coral reefs that are vital components of the maritime ecology. Marine experts expect that the work has already caused disastrous and essentially irreversible environmental impacts. The newly created and enlarged islands will be infrastructure that facilitates China’s projection of force and assertion of control not just in the disputed Spratlys area but also over most of the South China Sea, deep into the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) that by any reasonable interpretation of international laws on maritime delimitation would rightfully belong to other countries. Although conflicting claims have existed over the islands and these EEZs for decades, a precarious balance has endured until now partly because China’s nearest military infrastructure is hundreds of miles further to the north. Defence planners in other claimant countries now have to face a future without this protection by distance.

### AT: Check China Generally

1. **Delink:** According to **Smith ’15 of the Naval War College**, China is dominated by nationalists who will not settle for attempts at compromise. Thus, **Nye ’13 of Harvard University** writes that China cannot be contained. In fact, he continues that efforts by the United States at Chinese containment – much stronger than India – have been mere annoyances. In fact, **turn – Smith** continues that China responds to attempts with containment with more aggression, as the country swings towards hardliners.

2.**Terminal Defense/Turn: Sheng ’14 of UChicago** explains that China will never negotiate or cede land in the SCS because of the immense cultural and territorial value, even worse, **Smith ’15 of the AFPC** explains that the proliferation of nationalism has quickly raised the costs of making concessions for the CCP, as seen in 2009. **Lee ’16 of UCLA** a century of humiliation has made China hyper sensitive to disrespect, if India does attempt to check China makes them more hostile and lash out.

3.**Turn: Bateman ’16 of the University of Wollongong** explains that when regional powers such as India attempt to posture it pushes China further, as they have no end game strategy and are willing to shoot first. In fact, India sent four naval vessels to the SCS and increased tensions.

Jeff Smith.,8-3-2015, RIP: America's "Engagement" Strategy towards China?, National Interest"https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-americas-china-strategy-should-be-13473?nopaging=1, //CJ

Today, Washington is confronting the dreadful realization that with each passing year, the goals of political liberalization and peaceful integration appear to grow more distant, while the prospect for conflict with China draws nearer. Even advocates of engagement, like Dr. David Shambaugh, are warning that the strategy “is unraveling” while domestic repression in China “is the worst it has been in the twenty-five years since Tiananmen.” So what went wrong? After a decade of reaping the benefits of a soft-power offensive, China’s “peaceful rise” took an abrupt turn in the late 2000s. The country that emerged from a unique confluence of events beginning in 2008 has proven a more assertive, authoritarian and nationalistic rising power. While the precise causes for this shift are still being debated, we know the 2008 global financial crisis was (mis)interpreted by much of China’s elite as symbolic of long-term U.S. decline and retreat from the Western Pacific. For some in Beijing, the crisis—and China’s hosting of the Olympics that year—reinforced the coalescing perception that China’s long wait to reclaim its position atop the Asian hierarchy had come to an end. Second, **in 2009, Vietnam and Malaysia submitted proposals to a UN commission outlining expanded sovereignty claims in the disputed South China Sea. A surge in provocative Chinese posturing there followed, culminating most recently in an unprecedented artificial island-building spree that is inflaming regional tension**s. In 2012, China assumed an equally combative posture in the East China Sea after Japan “nationalized” the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, with Chinese naval and air forays into the territorial waters of the disputed islands now a regular occurrence. As these events unfolded, **China witnessed the precipitous rise of a new strain of nationalism**, cultivated and magnified by a new media and technology landscape. Once confined to a handful of stodgy Communist Party mouthpieces, China’s public space has expanded rapidly in the digital age. While liberal commentary has been heavily restricted, hawkish rhetoric and nationalist outlets like the Global Times have been permitted to fill the void. This **proliferation of nationalist discourse has** partly served the Party’s interests, but it’s also **created new pressures and incentives that reward hardline posturing and** raise the political cost of concessions and compromise. Finally, the early tenure of China’s avowedly nationalist and politically powerful president, Xi Jinping, has produced a material rise in domestic repression and tensions with the United States and China’s neighbors. **Xi has expanded the definition of China’s “core interests,”** militarized its maritime doctrine, and overseen devastating cyberattacks against the U.S. government. At home he’s **adopted a hard line on domestic dissent and launched repeated broadsides against** “Western values,” NGOs and civil-society groups.

Yubing Sheng (Contact Author),8-1-2014, Preventing Balancing: China’s Territorial Concessions and Threat Reduction by Yubing Sheng :: SSRN, No Publication, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2454343, //CJ

**Among China’s disputed territories, three areas, namely Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands, and the** Islands in the **South China Sea (including the sea territory), are un likely to be part of any territorial concessions from China**.. There are several reasons why **these territories cannot be conceded.** **First, all three territories contain high tangible value.** The surrounding sea territory of Taiwan and the islands in the East and South China Sea contains a great volume of oil, fish, and other natural resources. One study even argues that fisheries rather than fossil fuels are more likely to spark regional conflict over the South China Sea.29 Moreover, the three territories as well as their surrounding waters are of great strategic importance. Obtaining these islands as well as the surrounding waters gives a state significant control over the navigation routes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Control of these islands can also provide a staging point for launching attacks against neighboring states, making them an important offensive and defensive commodity. For instance, during World War II, the Japanese Imperial Army used the Spratlys in the South China Sea as a jumping-off point for a successful invasion of Southeast Asia. Secondly, all the aforementioned territories have been described by Chinese officials as “sacred territory since history,” thereby indicating each region’s highly symbolic value. Most Chinese citizens take it for granted that these three areas are sovereign Chinese territory since such views have been internalized and passed on for generations through official education and propaganda since the 1980s**. The Chinese government cannot afford to make concessions over Taiwan, the South China Sea, or the Diaoyu Islands because strong nationalist protests could mount in response to any show of weakness regarding these territories**. Finally, the involvement of the United States, which considers its primary great power competitor, reduces the likelihood of Chinese concessions. The United States maintains alliances with Japan, Taiwan, as well as other Southeast Asian states in the South China Sea region and has offered its allies significant military and political assistance. **For China, any concession made to the allies of the United States is tantamount to shifting the balance of power in favor of the U.S. sphere of influence.**

Yubing Sheng (Contact Author),8-1-2014, Preventing Balancing: China’s Territorial Concessions and Threat Reduction by Yubing Sheng :: SSRN, No Publication, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2454343, //CJ

Whether China’s rise can be peaceful or not draws a lot of attention in the study of international relations. Some argue that China’s active territorial disputes with Japan, South East Asian states and Taiwan could spark fierce conflicts in the foreseeable future. However, the fact that **since 1949 China has tried to solve 15 of its 19 territorial disputes with neighbors by offering 26 concessions draws a sharp contrast with its current standing**. Why China made territorial concessions instead of bargaining hard over the territory lost through “unequal treaties” is puzzling. This paper tries to answer the question for what purpose China made territorial concessions. I argue that **China conceded its disputed territory in order to ameliorate the threat it imposed on neighboring states so as to avoid the latter’s direct confrontation or formation of a joint balancing coalition against China**. **China is able to reassure the threatened neighbors and to prevent balancing from them because territorial concession, with the feature of high cost and irreversibility, serves as a credible signal of a state’s benign intention.**

Nevertheless, **since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the government in Beijing has made a number of significant concessions in fifteen out of its nineteen territorial disputes, nearly all of which were made to weaker neighboring states**. Considering that most of these territorial disputes are the products of the infamous “unequal treaties” signed by the Qing government during the “Century of Humiliation”, why China did not use its superior military power to fulfill its irredentist goals and avenge its past embarrassments remains an empirical puzzle. Why did China make concessions in its territorial disputes? Answering this question is important both theoretically and practically. From a theoretical perspective, the rise of nationalism has increased expectations that states will be more resilient in holding on to their territorial claims, even at the risk of engaging in armed conflict. Precisely because conceding territories in the era of nationalism is so counterintuitive, explaining and understanding states’ decisions to negotiate and make concessions yields important theoretical insights into the study of how territorial disputes get resolved. China’s history of using both military force and concessions in order to resolve its territorial disputes provides ample variation across space and time, making China an ideal candidate for further theoretical study over why territorial concessions occur. Practically, a theory on states’ concessions in territorial disputes is needed should policymakers attempt to make confident predictions regarding China’s future behavior.4 More specifically, an analysis of China’s past concessions has important implications on whether or not China can rise peacefully. Unlike structural realists who believe that counter-balancing coalitions are bound to form in response to relative shifts in power, I demonstrate that r**ising states can play an active role in blocking counter-balancing dynamics from taking root. By taking the initiative to pacify threatened states, rising powers can avoid the security dilemma and marshal their resources for less militant methods of power maximization, such as economic development.**

Jeff Smith.,8-3-2015, RIP: America's "Engagement" Strategy towards China?, National Interest"https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-americas-china-strategy-should-be-13473?nopaging=1, //CJ

Today, Washington is confronting the dreadful realization that with each passing year, the goals of political liberalization and peaceful integration appear to grow more distant, while the prospect for conflict with China draws nearer. Even advocates of engagement, like Dr. David Shambaugh, are warning that the strategy “is unraveling” while domestic repression in China “is the worst it has been in the twenty-five years since Tiananmen.” So what went wrong? After a decade of reaping the benefits of a soft-power offensive, China’s “peaceful rise” took an abrupt turn in the late 2000s. The country that emerged from a unique confluence of events beginning in 2008 has proven a more assertive, authoritarian and nationalistic rising power. While the precise causes for this shift are still being debated, we know the 2008 global financial crisis was (mis)interpreted by much of China’s elite as symbolic of long-term U.S. decline and retreat from the Western Pacific. For some in Beijing, the crisis—and China’s hosting of the Olympics that year—reinforced the coalescing perception that China’s long wait to reclaim its position atop the Asian hierarchy had come to an end. Second, **in 2009, Vietnam and Malaysia submitted proposals to a UN commission outlining expanded sovereignty claims in the disputed South China Sea. A surge in provocative Chinese posturing there followed, culminating most recently in an unprecedented artificial island-building spree that is inflaming regional tension**s. In 2012, China assumed an equally combative posture in the East China Sea after Japan “nationalized” the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, with Chinese naval and air forays into the territorial waters of the disputed islands now a regular occurrence. As these events unfolded, **China witnessed the precipitous rise of a new strain of nationalism**, cultivated and magnified by a new media and technology landscape. Once confined to a handful of stodgy Communist Party mouthpieces, China’s public space has expanded rapidly in the digital age. While liberal commentary has been heavily restricted, hawkish rhetoric and nationalist outlets like the Global Times have been permitted to fill the void. This **proliferation of nationalist discourse has** partly served the Party’s interests, but it’s also **created new pressures and incentives that reward hardline posturing and** raise the political cost of concessions and compromise. Finally, the early tenure of China’s avowedly nationalist and politically powerful president, Xi Jinping, has produced a material rise in domestic repression and tensions with the United States and China’s neighbors. **Xi has expanded the definition of China’s “core interests,”** militarized its maritime doctrine, and overseen devastating cyberattacks against the U.S. government. At home he’s **adopted a hard line on domestic dissent and launched repeated broadsides against** “Western values,” NGOs and civil-society groups.

Lee, 16 - Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles (James Jungbok Lee (2016) Will China’s Rise Be Peaceful? A Social Psychological Perspective, Asian Security, 12:1, 29-52, DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2016.1140644 SIT =

Social Identity Theory Unfortunately, such glorious heyday had come to an end with the arrival of Western powers in the late 1830s. The Treaty of Nanking (1942), which ended the First Opium War (1839–1842) and took Hong Kong away from China, initiated what is known as **China’s Century of Humiliation**. The period—coming to an end nearly hundred years later when Chairman Mao Zedong proclaimed the founding of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949116—was marked by major wars and conflicts between China and the Western powers or Japan: the First and the Second Opium War of 1839–1842 and 1856–1860, the Sino-Japanese “Jiawu” War of 1894–1895, the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, and the “War of Resistance against Japan” of 1931/1937–1945.117 **Not only causing humiliating military defeats, these events also destroyed China’s sense of sovereignty and territorial integrity by forcing on it unilateral concessions that included indemnities, extraterritoriality,** and the opening of treaty ports.118 A**s sudden and long lasting as these traumatic confrontations were, they have left an indelible mark on China’s historical memory, fundamentally reshaping its views on international politic**s. In particular, the Century of Humiliation has primed the Chinese to view the Western powers, especially the United States, as holding aggressive, interventionist intentions toward China.119 For example, in 1990, China attacked President George H. W. Bush’s call for a “new world order” as the “invisible integrationist hand of the conspiratorial ‘peaceful evolution’ strategy” that seeks to bring the entire world under hegemonic US rule.120 **The Chinese even criticized the stricter policy review standards WTO imposed on China as an attempt by foreigners, especially the United States, to create more opportunities to snoop into and intervene in China’s internal affairs**. Considering that the stricter requirements were completely legitimate given China’s admission into WTO prior to its full compliance with the terms of membership, the extent of China’s bias can be said to have been quite substantial.121 Moreover, in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989, Deng Xiaoping said, “**I am a Chinese, and I am familiar with the history of aggression against China. When I heard that the seven Western countries, at their summit meeting, had decided to impose sanctions on China, my immediate association was to 1900 [referring to the Boxer Rebellion], when the allied forces of the eight powers invaded China.” 122 Basically, the historical loss of sovereignty has greatly sensitized China to the behaviors and intentions of the Western powers (and other parties involved). Against any signs of disrespect toward its sovereignty, China was willing to go quite far in order to prevent any further acts of disrespect—**even as it was pursuing social creativity. The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996 was an exemplar case in point.

Sam Bateman, professorial research fellow at the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong, and also an adviser to the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore., 2016, (“America, China, India and Japan: Headed Towards a South China Sea Showdown?”, The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/america-china-india-japan-headed-towards-south-china-sea-16485>,//CJ

Recent months have seen a **continuing increase in military activities in the South China Sea**, particularly by the United States and China, but also **by ‘bit players’ like India and Japan**. These activities only **serve to heighten tensions in the region at a time when the priority should be to demilitarize the area.** In the most recent serious incident, on May 17, two Chinese fighter jets intercepted a US Navy EP-3 intelligence and surveillance aircraft about 50 nautical miles east of Hainan Island. This incident could have violated agreed upon procedures between the United States and China to manage such encounters. It follows earlier incidents when Chinese jet fighters intercepted US P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft over the South China and Yellow seas. The United States recently conducted its third freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) in the South China Sea since China started its extensive land reclamation and building of airfields and support facilities on reclaimed land in the Spratly Islands. The latest FONOP involved a US warship sailing close by the disputed Fiery Cross Reef. In March, the United States sent a small fleet of warships — comprising aircraft carrier John C. Stennis, two destroyers, two cruisers and a Japan-based US Seventh Fleet flagship — into contested waters to counter the presence of China. During his recent visit to Vietnam, President Barack Obama announced that the United States would be lifting its longstanding ban on sales of lethal military equipment to Vietnam. This has been construed as part of a strategy to help Vietnam defend itself against an increasing threat from China in the South China Sea. In return, Vietnam might grant the United States access to the strategic Cam Ranh Bay military base. Along with access to bases in Palawan in the Philippines, this would markedly enhance America’s ability to project military power into the South China Sea. Lyle Goldstein from the US Naval War College suggests in his recent book Meeting China Halfway that rather than enhancing US military engagement with Vietnam, Washington should be ending it, arguing that “recent overtures toward military cooperation between Hanoi and Washington have violated reasonable principles of geopolitical moderation.” Unfortunately, moderation has not been evident in any recent developments in the South China Sea. What is significant about recent American naval activities in the region is that Washington has chosen to announce them with a blaze of publicity. This suggests a clear intention to confront China and to show the world that the United States is doing so. **India added to tensions recently when it sent a force of four naval vessels into the South China Sea** for a two-and-a-half-month-long deployment, which includes participation in Exercise Malabar off Okinawa, jointly with the US Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. Predictably, Beijing reacted strongly to this naval deployment, saying that New Delhi should not encourage Tokyo and Washington to bring added tensions to the region. Meanwhile a Chinese strike group of three guided missile destroyers, two frigates and a supply ship, in addition to a submarine and aircraft carrier, have been conducting exercises in the South China Sea. This group patrolled off Chinese-controlled reefs in the Spratly Islands, including Fiery Cross Reef, only a day before the American FONOP near that reef. **All this is looking like dangerous brinkmanship.** All the major powers in the South China Sea are trying to achieve an advantageous outcome by pushing dangerous events to the edge of active conflict. Anyone who knows China and its history will know that China will go to the brink. But it will not be China that actually goes over the brink. It’s much more likely to be one of the countries taking China to the brink that does so. China, with a ‘home ground’ advantage and numerous military and civil assets in the region, can readily create **a situation where one of the other parties will be forced to fire the first shot** or to back down. Hopefully, though, current rules of engagement won’t allow a first shot to be fired. But we can’t be sure of that. Significantly, **the countries that are taking China to the brink are extra-regional players with often overstated interests in the South China Sea. They are ‘burning their boats behind them’, with nowhere to go other than to back down or fire the ‘first shot’. They have no concept of an end game other than compelling China to back down and follow their ‘rule of law’. But that is not going to happen. The sad reality is that all this brinkmanship is adding to the strategic distrust that pervades the region at present.**

### AT: (Link) U.S.-India Rels

1. Non-unique: Tellis ’18 of the Carnegie Endowment indicates that the U.S. is India’s closest ally, including collaboration on defense, counterterrorism, security, intelligence, education, health, science and technology.

Ashley J. Tellis, 11-1-2018, Narendra Modi and U.S.–India Relations, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/11/01/narendra-modi-and-u.s.-india-relations-pub-77861, // ZMC  
Today, the US–India relationship encompasses the most intense bilateral engagement that New Delhi enjoys with any nation. Given the steady expansion of the bilateral partnership over the last two decades, the range of joint activities today is breathtaking: from frequent bilateral summits between the heads of government to regular senior-level dialogues, the US and India today engage in numerous strategic consultations, wide-ranging defence, counterterrorism, homeland security, cybersecurity and intelligence cooperation, as well as myriad activities in energy, education, science and technology, public health and culture.19 What the density of these interactions makes clear is that the US seeks the closest possible relationship with India, while remaining respectful of India’s constraints, even as New Delhi seeks a deeper affiliation with Washington that bolsters its national power.

### ~Belt and Road~

### AT: Membership Solves

1. **Delink:** According to **Tharoor ’19 of the Washington Post**, the U.S. already opposes BRI.

2. **Delink:** Even if the U.S. wasn’t on the Security Council to oppose it, **Dollar ’15 of the Brookings Institute** writes that BRI deals are made bilaterally — not through the Security Council. India’s membership doesn’t change anything.

### BRI Good General

1. **Turn: The University of Pennsylvania knowledge department of Wharton** finds in **2011** that China’s Belt and Road Initiative has saved tens of millions of lives in Africa through health diplomacy, including medical aid as a soft power strategy to strengthen bonds with African governments, furthering that by the end of 2010, China’s medical workers have treated 200 million patients in 48 African countries and around 30 malaria prevention and treatment centers have been built.

2**. Turn: Nassiry ’16 of the ODI** finds that the Belt and Road initiative is creating enormous infrastructural opportunities, especially in terms of sustainability, especially as China has cancelled construction of coal plants and is replacing them with investments in renewable energy.

David Dollar, Summer 2015, "The AIIB and the ‘One Belt, One Road’," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-aiib-and-the-one-belt-one-road/ // JJ  
The ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative is larger than the AIIB. It started with the idea that nearby countries in Central Asia—spread along the traditional Silk Road—could benefit from more transport infrastructure, some of which China could finance bilaterally. However, the economies of Central Asia are not that large, and the potential for investment is limited. Overland transportation will remain expensive, compared to sea-going shipments. For that reason, China added the idea of a maritime road—that is, the expansion of infrastructure along the sea-going routes from the Chinese coast through Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean and all the way to Europe. A vast amount of world trade already traverses this route. Because ‘One Belt, One Road’ will be implemented bilaterally between China and different partners, it may seem that there is more potential for China to use this initiative to vent some of its surplus. But I still doubt that this will be on a scale that would make a macroeconomic difference for China. Among the various developing countries along ‘One Belt, One Road’ routes, there are some with relatively strong governance—India, Indonesia, and Vietnam, for example—which will be hard for China to push around. Those countries will not want to accept large numbers of Chinese workers or take on large amounts of debt relative to their GDP. On the other hand, there are weak governance countries—Cambodia and Pakistan, for instance. It may be more feasible for China to send some of its surplus production to these countries, but there is a reasonable prospect that in the long run, China will not be paid.  
  
Ishaan Tharoor, March 25, 2019, "China Lays Down a Marker in Europe" Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/03/25/china-lays-down-marker-europe/?utm\_term=.d396d6ebbf56 // JJ  
“Some major Western powers on both sides of the Atlantic rushed to raise a red flag on the BRI’s alleged national security and financial risks, distort the initiative as China’s self-serving geo-political tool, and accuse Beijing of trying to expand its spheres of influence into the heartland of the European continent,” [Xinhua noted](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-03/23/c_137918250.htm). “For them, the Cold War seems to be still raging on.” The main culprit here, in Beijing’s eyes, is the United States. The Trump administration has been outspoken in its [criticism of China’s overseas infrastructure projects](https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKCN1MW03N) and is separately trying to convince its European allies to resist the inroads of major Chinese telecoms firm Huawei, which is on the front lines of a global tussle over the next generation of wireless technology. In a striking rebuke of its NATO ally, the White House National Security Council tweeted its dismay with Rome lending “legitimacy to China’s predatory approach."

**UPenn 11**, University of Pennsylvania knowledge department of Wharton, 2011 (“Health Diplomacy: In Africa, China’s soft power provides a healing touch,” 2011, November 22, available online at <http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/health-diplomacy-in-africa-chinas-soft-power-provides-a-healing-touch/>, accessed on June 22, 2016, )

**Much has been made about China’s commercial push into Africa. But a less-publicized facet of its foreign policy strategy there is actually helping millions of Africans. Sometimes dubbed “health diplomacy,” China has been offering much-needed medical aid to African countries for over half a century as a soft power strategy to strengthen bonds with African governments.** This tactic has, in turn, paved the way for Chinese companies to profit in Africa. In addition, the Chinese government has been able to influence the way African countries have supported China on the international stage, including the United Nations and the World Trade Organization.**The medical help that China has been providing includes sending doctors overseas to staff clinics, building hospitals and clinics, and training African medical staff in China. Though Africa has had to depend on foreign countries to alleviate** some of **its dire health issues, China may be the only country to send government-paid medical workers to work and stay in Africa for extended periods of time**. **That level of commitment has proven to be an important facet of its soft power foreign policy strategy**. Many other medical organizations working in Africa are sponsored by charities or private groups, not governments. Soft power is the ability to co-opt other countries by getting other nations to want what you want. Political scholar Joseph Nye coined the term “soft power” in the late 1980s and then later wrote a book called *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.*“**Using medical teams as a ‘soft power’ strategy is a new term for something that China has been doing for decades**,” notes Elizabeth Larus, professor of political science at the University of Mary Washington. **It’s not just China that has been implementing soft power as a tactic. The U.S. and other democratic governments do this too but their mission encompasses other goals. “Soft power consists of democracy, human rights and humanitarianism**, culture, and [advancing their] high-tech sector,” Larus says. “China’s soft power does not consist of democracy and human rights, but can promote soft power by using medical teams.” In fact, **China is known to provide assistance to African countries with almost a “no-strings-attached” policy, making the nation very popular with some controversial African governments**. Deborah Brautigam, professor at the School of International Service at American University, notes “China does this all over in the South Pacific and the Caribbean. Not as much in the Middle East but they do. They have aid programs in Syria and in Egypt.” Cuba also implements a similar exchange with Venezuela, consisting of medical aid for oil, she adds. “**It’s very important for China to build relationships with Africa**,” Brautigam says. “There are 53 countries in Africa, each has a vote in the United Nations and most have a vote in the World Trade Organization (WTO). It’s important for China to befriend these nations because they want support in these international bodies. They want support on Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet. They regard these as internal issues and they think aid helps.” In China’s first public white paper on foreign aid published in April this past year, **China reported that 51 (out of the 53) countries in Africa received aid from China**. Nearly 46% of its funds in 2009 were distributed to Africa, outweighing the funds that went to other parts of Asia.

(**UPenn 11,** University of Pennsylvania knowledge department of Wharton, 2011 (“Health Diplomacy: In Africa, China’s soft power provides a healing touch,” 2011, November 22, available online at <http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/health-diplomacy-in-africa-chinas-soft-power-provides-a-healing-touch/>, accessed on June 22, 2016,)

**By the end of 2010, China has sent 17,000 medical workers to 48 African countries, treating 200 million patients, according to China’s Ministry of Health. In 2009 alone, 1,324 medical professionals worked at 130 institutions in 57 developing countries. Of that number, more than 1,000 Chinese doctors were in 40 African countries**, reports China Radio International. **Since the program began in 1950, China has contributed $US39 billion** (256 billion yuan) **in foreign aid**, according to *The Guardian* newspape*r*. More than 40% were allocated to “aid gratis,” or grants, while the other 60% were distributed between interest-free loans and concessional loans. Concessional loans are used to finance major capital projects with the aim of generating profit. The money is used in the construction of transportation, communications and electricity infrastructure, while less than 9% has been given to developing oil and mineral resources, writes *The Guardian*. The money for the concessional loans is raised on the market by the Export-Import Bank of China, while grants and interest-free loans are distributed from government finances. “**Now that China has more money, they’ve expanded their foreign aid program even more so** with loans,” Brautigam says. “Concessional loans are relatively new instruments introduced in 1995,” Brautigam continues, “but the mutual benefit is they’re tied to Chinese companies and foster Chinese exports.” She also estimates that China’s biggest expansion in their foreign aid sector is in concessional loans, accounting for the bulk of aid that has doubled between 2006 and 2009. **The majority of the foreign aid funds have gone into building hospitals and clinics, establishing malaria prevention and treatment centers, dispatching medical teams as well as training local medical workers, and providing medicines and equipment. By the end of 2009, China built over 100 medical facilities with over 30 hospitals currently under construction all over the world. Around 30 malaria prevention and treatment centers have been built in Africa countries** and approximately $US30 million (190 million yuan) of anti-malarial medicines have been distributed. China has helped build hospitals in the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Zimbabwe, and Chad. They’ve also financed the building of the Ta’izz Revolution Comprehensive Hospital in Yemen and another hospital in Laos. **When China didn’t have much money early on in its foreign aid outreach, China sent medical teams abroad instead of providing funds**, according to Brautigam. She adds that **China had started sending their doctors overseas when the country didn’t have much money. Now that China has money, health diplomacy is still a very effective relationship-building strategy. “It’s very popular and people really appreciate [the Chinese doctors] treating their illnesses**,” Brautigam says. In 1963, the first Chinese medical team arrived in Algeria, the first year that the country was founded and there was a dire need for health care in the fledgling nation. “In the 1960s, Mao tried to position China as the leader of the Third World,” Larus notes. “**Taiwan has been sending medical teams to poor countries for decades as well. So some of the impetus for sending medical teams is historic. Some of it is competition with Taiwan for diplomatic partners, although China and Taiwan have called a truce** since the election of Taiwan president Ma Ying-Jeou.” According to Brautigam, **most of the Chinese provinces are partnered with an African country to provide doctors**. Some provinces staff more than one nation. Many of the host nations provide accommodation for the Chinese medical teams, who are employed by the government. Depending on the level of income in the country, the contracts vary. “There isn’t one standard package,” Brautigam says. Doctors are sent for a two-year rotation but Brautigam has noticed that it’s been harder and harder to convince Chinese doctors to agree to go to Africa. “They don’t always feel the need to be a Peace Corps volunteer but some do,” she adds. Brautigam’s observed that in some cases, rural Chinese doctors have been recruited to fulfill the provincial obligation to staff African clinics. Another aspect to the **Chinese medical assistance program is that Chinese companies have begun to sponsor medical missions themselves**. Last year, the first large-scale private charity mission sponsored by Chinese companies doing business in Africa took place. It was called “an important step in Chinese companies’ reward for African people,” in a press release from HNA Group, a Chinese company that was involved in the project. Called the 2010 China-Africa Brightness Action, Anhui Foreign Economic Construction (Group) and HNA Group, along with the Beijing Tongren Hospital, sent more than 20 medical personnel on a charter flight to Malawi and Zimbabwe to perform 1,000 cataract surgeries in one week. **In the future, China is showing no signs of letting up on its medical aid to Africa**. Chen Zhu, China’s Health Minister, announced at an international conference on China-Africa cooperation on health held in February 2011, that China plans on sending 3,000 medical specialists to developing countries in the next five years. **They will also provide medical equipment and medicines for 100 hospitals. In addition, there are plans to train 5,000 medical personnel**, according to an article in the People’s Daily Online. While China has focused on the prevention of malaria, tuberculosis, AIDS, and other diseases in the past, **the government plans on broadening its focus on maternal and pediatric health.** “All aid has a diplomatic component,” Brautigam says. “The mutual benefit is all tied to Chinese companies and getting businesses started to foster Chinese exports. **Today, their soft power strategy is working pretty well. Soft power builds up positive aspects of their image**.” **And as medical aid is a vital component of China’s soft power strategy in Africa, it’s demonstrated itself as a very influential to**ol to pave the way for Chinese businesses to expand in one of the most potentially lucrative markets in the world.

**Nassiry and Nakhooda 16** [Darius, head of international cooperation department at Global Green Growth Institute, Director at Millennium Challenge Corporation where he led teams for development of investment programs in Asia, Smita, Climate finance fellow at World Resources Institute, “The AIIB and investment in action on climate change”, Working Paper 433, April 2016, <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/the_aiib_and_investment_in_action_final_20160413.pdf>]

**China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative**, involving port, railway, road, power and grid infrastructure, also **creates enormous opportunities and needs to ensure that new infrastructure will be sustainable** and withstand the foreseeable stresses and shocks resulting from a warming climate.34 China’s INDC summarizes the country’s achievements and highlights its future plans particularly with regard to low-carbon energy. By 2014 China had installed 300 GW of hydropower (2.57 times more than in 2005), 95.8 GW of wind power (90 times more than in 2005) and 28 GW of solar power (400 times more than 2005).35 China commits to “accelerate the transformation of energy production and consumption and continue to restructure its economy, optimize the energy mix, improve energy efficiency and increase its forest carbon sinks.”36 China’s INDC notes China’s “sense of responsibility to fully engage in global governance, to forge a community of shared destiny for humankind and to promote common development for all human beings.”37 Pressing concerns related to air pollution, citizen health, and energy security are prompting a re-assessment of the viability of continued investment in coal domestically. China recently announced it would halt construction of coal-fired power plants in 15 regions and would stop approving new projects in as many as 13 provinces and regions until 2018.38 As a result of China’s recent investments in renewable energy – 22 GW in hydroelectric, 21 GW in wind, and 11 GW in solar in 2014 alone – and its policy shift to a less emissions intensive, slower model of growth – the ‘new normal’ – China may outperform its target reduction of 40-45 percent in emissions per unit of GDP by 2020 and emissions may even peak before 2025, well before the country’s commitment to reach peak emissions by ‘around 2030.’40 China’s Thirteenth FYP emphasizes environmental sustainability as a key theme, specifies creation of an “ecological civilization” as a priority development target41 and supports expansion in the environmental protection sector.42 Green development,43 protection of the environment and pursuit of environmentally friendly growth44 are key elements that build on the progress of the previous FYP alongside new efforts to green China’s financial system as a way to help prevent and remediate environmental damage resulting from China’s earlier export-led growth.

China’s investment in Sri Lanka was actually an economic success, but the region’s perception supports the opposite interpretation

**Small 18** (Andrew Small, 2-16-2018, "The Backlash to Belt and Road," Foreign Affairs, [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-16/backlash-belt-and-road DoA 3/20/19](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-16/backlash-belt-and-road%20DoA%203/20/19))

But Sri Lanka’s case also offered a warning to India of the economic realities working against it. Colombo was forced back to the negotiating table with China for lack of any better options. India has since improved its efforts to offer countries appealing economic alternatives. But its various limitations—in its resources, its capacity for direct investment, its significant infrastructure needs at home—have necessitated partnerships with other concerned countries. The most important of these has been with Japan, which created in 2015 the new “Partnership for Quality Infrastructure,” an expansion of the infrastructure resources provided by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and in cooperation with India developed an “Asia-Africa Growth Corridor.” Perhaps the most telling Indo-Japanese intervention was in Bangladesh, which in 2015 was in the advanced stages of agreeing to a package of Chinese financing for a new deep-water port. But political pressure and economic incentives (including the largest yen loan that the Japan International Cooperation Agency has ever offered for developmental assistance) pushed Dhaka to opt for a Japanese deal instead. Almost as important, Sri Lanka handed India a propaganda coup. In Colombo, a convincing story has taken hold, one that paints OBOR as predatory, a debt trap, and a route to military expansionism. In reality, the new Chinese highways have been beneficial; and the expansion of the Colombo port has been an economic success, with the overwhelming majority of the port’s activity consisting of trans-shipment to India. Yet that more nuanced picture is overshadowed by the evocative sight of Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, a gleaming, fully staffed building with virtually no passengers, no planes, and an empty departures board, surrounded by sweeping highways on which cars are outnumbered by auto rickshaws, cows, and elephant dung. It is that image that has come to embody OBOR in Sri Lanka, much to India’s delight.

### AT: BRI Bad – Debt

1. **Delink:** This problem solves itself. **Chandran ’19 of CNBC** writes that those nations who can’t afford the high costs of BRI projects are learning from example and are already scaling down.

Nyshka Chandran, January 2019, “Fears of excessive debt drive more countries to cut down their Belt and Road investments,” CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/18/countries-are-reducing-belt-and-road-investments-over-financing-fears.html // JJ  
Amid worries over high project costs, nations including Pakistan, Myanmar and Malaysia have canceled or backed away from previously negotiated BRI commitments in recent months. Many of these governments want to avoid the same fate as Sri Lanka, which had to hand over a strategic port to Beijing in 2017 when it couldn’t pay off its debt to Chinese companies. Some countries are scaling down or scrapping entire projects that are part of China’s [Belt and Road Initiative](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/11/what-north-korea-really-wants-from-china-is-membership-in-the-belt-and-road.html) amid mounting financial concerns over the continent-spanning venture. In recent months, developing nations such as [Pakistan](https://www.cnbc.com/pakistan/), [Malaysia](https://www.cnbc.com/malaysia/), [Myanmar](https://www.cnbc.com/myanmar/), [Bangladesh](https://www.cnbc.com/bangladesh/) and Sierra Leone have either canceled or backed away from previously negotiated BRI commitments, citing worries over high project costs and their [impact on national debt and the economy.](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/14/china-must-do-more-to-tap-locals-in-belt-and-road-initiative-panel.html) That revised stance not only confirms [global fears over the terms of BRI financing](https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/22/one-belt-one-road-china-loans-are-debt-bondage-says-brahma-chellaney.html), it could also indicate that developing countries are now more willing to prioritize sovereign interests over their need for foreign investment.

### AT: Nepal

1. **alt causal:** Modi just doesn’t like Nepal it has nothing to do with the UNSC. **Sridharan 19** of the **South China Morning Post** finds that Modi just doesn’t like Nepal, in 2016 he randomly nullified 86% of the paper money in circulation in Nepal – meaning it’s literally not related to the UNSC at all. This outweighs on strength of link because they’ve been at a power imbalance forever and just cut off rupee funding in 2016.

[**Vasudevan Sridharan**](https://www.scmp.com/author/vasudevan-sridharan)How India’s neglect drives Nepal into China’s outstretched arms. (**2019**). South China Morning Post. Retrieved 28 April 2019, from [https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2185468/how-indias-neglect-drives-nepal-chinas-outstretched-arms //](https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2185468/how-indias-neglect-drives-nepal-chinas-outstretched-arms%20//) RM

**When Indian Prime Minister**[**Narendra Modi**](https://www.scmp.com/topics/narendra-modi) **announced in November 2016 the overnight removal of all 500 and 1,000 rupee notes from circulation, it was framed as a crackdown on the black market, illicit money and counterfeit cash. This decision to declare about 86 per cent of the paper money in circulation, by value, null and void was met with both opprobrium and applause at the time. It is still not clear, 27 months later,**[**if it has achieved its stated aims**](https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/south-asia/article/2162057/indian-currency-decree-does-little-root-out-black-money).

### AT: Green Energy

1. elections da:

**The Asia Times finds 5 days ago** that because of dissatisfaction of the younger generation and the overall Indian populous, analysts predict that Modi will lose the next elections. However, **Khan ’15** finds that the foreign policy victory of a UNSC seat would reverse that. Modi’s terrible for the environment. **DTE 18** explains that Modi’s so-called environmental policy has been rolling back regulations for the benefit of industry, such that even the supreme court has intervened once. As a result, Modi started his presidency with India at 141/180 on the global environmental index and is now at 177.

2. **nuq:** India has the resources to go green. **Anand 17** of the **NY Times** explains that because renewable energy is significantly decreasing in price right now, Indian companies can suffice to achieve their green energy goals through investment, and have already started taking steps towards the goal.

[**SACHI SATAPATHY**](https://www.asiatimes.com/author/sachi-satapathy/)“Why Modi may have already lost the election” April 23 2019. Asia Times. <https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/04/opinion/why-modi-may-have-already-lost-the-election/>

Indian voters are looking for authenticity, credibility, and viability in their leader. As people watch the present prime minister, they are now inevitably asking, does this person have the gravitas to withstand the pressure that comes with leading this secular and liberal country?

**India’s independent voters are more desperate to win than ever before. They’ll be willing to support a candidate who doesn’t agree with them on every issue – just so long as that candidate is capable of evicting Modi from the Prime Minister’s Office.**

**The present prime minister’s unpopularity is reflected in the undercurrent of dissatisfaction of voters** who are not convinced on what this government has done to address unemployment crisis, agriculture-sector distress and infrastructure development. **Many analysts believe that looking at Modi’s poor performance as prime minister, he will be an underdog in the ongoing national election.**

At least 85 million new voters are likely to participate in this election. **With unemployment at a 45-year high, these new voters, many of them younger job-seeking graduates, will make Modi’s re-election all the more difficult. So, on May 23 (vote-counting day), there is a widespread expectation that these new young voters will make sure to gift India a new prime minister.**

The UNSC is key to geopolitical action against Pakistan – a permanent seat boosts Modi’s perception. Khan 15

\*bracketed for clarity

Saif Ahmad Khan, Daily O, 8-14-2015 [Why India deserves a fixed UN Security Council seat, https://www.dailyo.in/politics/unsc-united-nations-security-council-p-5-india-united-states-narendra-modi-brics-kashmir-pakistan/story/1/5673.html, 3-22-2019]//rjs

Prime minister's foreign visits have been high on symbolism and soft power. He has been quick to sight old ties by invoking the teachings of Buddhism and Islam. He hasn't missed out on an opportunity to visit a temple or gurdwara and successfully steered the holding of the first ever International Yoga Day. **Predictably, foreign policy is one area where Modi has tasted relatively more success as compared to domestic issues**. The hateful rhetoric of the Hindu right concerning love jihad, ghar wapsi and forced sterilization definitely embarrassed the ruling establishment headed by Modi and the impasse in Parliament on the issue of Lalitgate has sent the much awaited reforms in cold storage. Amid all this gloom, Modi can stare at the horizon of foreign policy and give himself a pat on the back. But **Modi will have to do** a lot **more** if he wishes **to establish** **India's** position as a country wielding **global clout**. **The simplest way of achieving that objective would be by attaining a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) which Nehru allegedly turned down in the 1950s**. India has served seven terms as a non-permanent member of UNSC and has echoed the need for expansion and reform in the Security Council. **A permanent seat in UNSC would elevate India to the status of USA, UK, France, China and Russia in the diplomatic sphere and warrant India a critical say in all global matters that matter globally.** Interestingly, India is not the only country in the world eyeing a spot in UNSC. Other competing nations include the likes of Japan, Germany and Brazil. The very notion of a reform or expansion in UNSC leads to the rise of a few fundamental questions: How many countries will join the existing brigade of P-5? What will be the basis of inclusion of more countries in UNSC? Will it be economic status, regional parity or human development? If another Asian country is to be included in UNSC then will it be Japan or India? India commands three distinct characteristics which make its case for a permanent seat compelling. Currently having a population of 1.28 billion, India will become the most populous country in the world by 2022. Such a large portion of the planet's population cannot be altogether ignored or kept at a distance from the decision making table of UNSC which brings with itself the "veto" power. Secondly, India happens to be the second fastest growing economy in the world making it an ideal destination for foreign investment and future growth. Thirdly, India is ruled by a democratic, secular government which has never been upstaged by an army coup and can be labelled as a "responsible" nuclear power. India's last stint as a non permanent member of UNSC in 2011-12 was supported by regional rivals Pakistan and China but Pakistan might turn out to be a big thorn in India's way if a global consensus is reached in proving India with permanent membership. Pakistan is bound to raise the issue of regional **imbalance if India is in a position to acquire permanent membership and [would] draw the world's attention towards the persisting Indo-Pak conflict regarding Kashmir**. Despite prospects of a bright economic future, India has reasons to fear competing powers Japan, Germany and Brazil. India's GDP (nominal) makes it the ninth biggest economic power in the world. At present, Japan, Germany and Brazil's economic size is bigger than that of India with Japan being the third largest in the world and second largest in Asia after China, Germany being the largest in Europe and fourth globally, while Brazil commanding pole position in South America and seventh globally. As far as per capita income is concerned, India is nowhere on the list. As per International Monetary fund (2014), India ranks 125 globally with a per capita income of mere $5,855. Japan, Germany and Brazil rank much higher at 18, 28 and 74, respectively. Human Development Index Report (2014) of United Nations Development Program (UNDP) ranks India 114 in the category of "medium human development." Japan and Germany are countries with "very high human development" ranking 6 and 17, respectively whereas Brazil ranks 51 and is christened as a country with "high human development." Simplistic breakdown of facts and figures certainly lowers India's prospects of a permanent seat when compared with its rivals. But India has a silver lining when it comes to its track record in terms of its contribution to UN Peacekeeping forces which have played a pivotal role in combating violence and maintaining peace. India is the fourth largest contributor to UN Peacekeeping behind Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Pakistan. Though India has a large physical presence in UN Peacekeeping, it finances a minuscule 0.13 per cent of UN peacekeeping operations. The P-5 has lesser boots on the ground but rules the roost when it comes to financing peacekeeping operations with USA pitching in with over 28 per cent financial contribution. Japan comes in second with 10.83 per cent followed by other permanent members. It is a complex situation. India is growing economically but lags being when it comes to per capita indicators. Owing to its military strength, it is contributing in huge numbers to peacekeeping but cannot match up to the financing levels of P-5 or Japan in relation to peacekeeping operations. The story is a paradox. But the most important element of the story is yet to be spoken about ie P-5. A reform in UN Security Council would necessitate the need for an amendment in the UN Charter which is possible only when a resolution is adopted by two-third member nations in the UN General Assembly. It has to be further ratified by the constitutional process of two-third member nations including P-5.

Ajaz Ashraf, 2-25-2019, "‘People are a little unhappy but not angry with Modi’: Psephologist Sanjay Kumar on Lok Sabha polls," Scroll.in, https://scroll.in/article/914124/people-are-a-little-unhappy-but-not-angry-with-modi-psephologist-sanjay-kumar-on-lok-sabha-polls

The 2014 election was largely contested on perception. Indeed, perception is the biggest of all factors influencing elections in India. Once a perception is created, people do not engage in a careful analysis of the government’s performance before casting their votes.

Big rallies and hoardings are aimed at creating a perception that a candidate or a party is winning. Conversely, if the party does not hold rallies, it is seen as having already accepted defeat.

**DTE** **Staff**, Environmental Governance, 9-27-**2018**, "Is PM Modi really a ‘Champion of the Earth’?," No Publication, [https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/forests/is-pm-modi-really-a-champion-of-the-earth--61739 //](https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/forests/is-pm-modi-really-a-champion-of-the-earth--61739%20//) RM

However, is the Prime Minister really deserving of such an honour, critics might ask. **Throughout his regime of 4 years and 4 months, his ministers have diluted laws without public consultation, undermined institutions and tried everything in their power to make it easier for corporates to exploit natural resources ranging from forests, wildlife, coasts and made the air pollution and waste scenario worse. In fact, in April-May 2014, at the height of the election campaign, then-candidate Modi had made his views clear about where he intended to take the country were he to become Prime Minister. To quote from a piece**[**written**](https://www.downtoearth.org.in/coverage/election-2014-how-green-are-our-political-parties-43998)**in Down To Earth at the time, “The BJP's guide for environmental management, interestingly, finds mention under the subject 'industry' instead of 'Flora, Fauna and Environment'. The emphasis on framing of environmental laws in a manner that encourages speedy clearances, removal of red tape and bottlenecks, is a sure indicator of diluted scrutiny of development projects at the time of clearance.” In its first year of governance between August 2014 and April 2015, the Prime Minister’s Office under Modi considered and**[**implemented**](https://news.mongabay.com/2018/07/indias-pre-election-changes-to-green-laws-draw-criticism/)**“a list of 60 urgent action points submitted by the Confederation of Indian Industry, meant to remove hurdles of environment clearances for industry.”**Also during that year, the Modi government formed a high-level committee led by former cabinet secretary T S R Subramanian to “review and suggest amendments” in the six main environmental laws of the country—Environment (Protection) Act, 1986; Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980; Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972; Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974; Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981; and Indian Forest Act 1927. Due to intense opposition to the committee’s findings, the government never implemented them fully. **In 2018: The Modi government’s “dilution spree” of laws pertaining to India’s forests, coasts, wildlife, air and waste has continued this year**. In October 2017, the Centre [finalised](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/india-unveils-third-national-wildlife-action-plan-for-2017-2031/articleshow/60913019.cms) the third [National Wildlife Action Plan](http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/file/nwap_2017_31.pdf) (2017-31) of India. However, **the state of wildlife protection during the Modi regime has been lacklustre**. A recent [piece](http://www.indiaspend.com/indias-fast-tracked-wildlife-clearances-threaten-last-wild-areas-water-sources-and-hasten-climate-change/) in the data news portal IndiaSpend detailed how the regime has made awarding wildlife clearances easier in its more than 4-year stint and how corporate interests now threaten some of India’s last protected wilderness areas. Ditto for forests and coasts. In March this year, the Union Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF&CC) [proposed](https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/moef-releases-draft-national-forest-policy-2018-59898) major changes to the [draft National Forest Policy (NFP) 2018](http://www.moef.nic.in/sites/default/files/Inviting%20comments%20from%20all%20concerned%20stakeholders%20on%20Draft%20National%20Forest%20Policy%202018_1.pdf). The [draft](http://www.moef.nic.in/sites/default/files/Draft%20National%20Forest%20Policy%2C%202018.pdf) has been criticised for favouring corporate interests in the forestry sector. In April this year, the MoEF&CC made public the [draft CRZ notification 2018](http://envfor.nic.in/sites/default/files/press-releases/DRAFT%20CRZ%20NOTIFICATION%2020181.pdf). Critics say that the draft will open up India’s coasts to industry and help in aiding the government’s ambitious Sagarmala programme. Also in April, the government unveiled another troubling scheme, the National Clean Air Programme (NCAP), to tackle toxic levels of air pollution across most major Indian cities, as well as rural areas. Experts say that the proposal is a toothless and directionless plan as it [sets no targets](https://www.downtoearth.org.in/video/what-is-the-national-clean-air-program-ncap--60261)for reducing pollution from cities. Again, in the same month, the MoEF&CC notified the [new Plastic Waste Management (Amendment) Rules, 2018](http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2018/184349.pdf). The new rules, an amended version of the environment-friendly Plastic Waste Management Rules 2016, contain [new clauses](https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/centre-amends-plastic-waste-rules-2016-but-still-60084) that benefit industries manufacturing and using plastic. Weakening of institutions: Besides diluting laws, the government is also weakening institutions. For instance, the Union Ministry of Tribal Affairs has pointed out that its authority as the nodal agency for the Forest Rights Act (2006), has been [diluted](https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/ministries-battle-over-applicability-of-forest-rights-act-48107) by unilateral policy decisions and enactments proposed by the MoEF&CC without any consultation with it. In 2014, the Modi government had constituted the National Board for Wildlife (NBWL) without the required number of non-profit representatives and eminent ecologists as its members. The government’s move was challenged in court, and it was subsequently forced to reconstitute the NBWL with the required number of experts. Last year, the Modi government had disempowered the National Green Tribunal (NGT). The NGT, which was set up by the Congress-led UPA government in 2010 to adjudicate on environmental litigations, was the third such tribunal in the world after Australia and New Zealand. However, instead of empowering the NGT, the Modi government [misused the provision of a "money bill”](https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/centre-s-new-tribunal-rules-likely-to-change-ngt-composition-58274) to make changes to the appointment system of judges to the NGT. However, the Supreme Court subsequently [stayed](https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/supreme-court-stays-centre-s-amendment-to-ngt-appointment-rules-59672) the government’s amendment to NGT appointment rules. India's performance in the world vis-a-vis other nations: **The government’s policies have taken their toll. For instance, India stands 177 (out of 180 countries) on the**[**Environmental Performance Index, 2018**](https://www.cseindia.org/india-at-the-bottom-of-2018-global-environmental-performance-index-epi-rankings-says-yale-university-study-analysed-by-cse-8780)**. In 2016, India was ranked 141 on the same index.**

Anand, **Geeta**. “India, Once a Coal Goliath, Is Fast Turning Green.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 2 June **2017**, [www.nytimes.com/2017/06/02/world/asia/india-coal-green-energy-climate.html. //](http://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/02/world/asia/india-coal-green-energy-climate.html.%20//) RM

“The train has left the station. Mr. **Trump has come too late” to slow the transition to renewable energy**, said Ajay Mathur, director general of [the Energy Resources Institute](http://www.teriin.org/), a New Delhi policy center closely associated with the government. “**By the time the coal-fired plants come up to full capacity because of increasing demand, the price of renewables will be lower than the price of coal**.” Based on [December data](http://www.cea.nic.in/reports/committee/nep/nep_dec.pdf) from the Central Electric Authority, Mr. Mathur’s institute reported in March **that India might be able to meet its additional power needs in the future with renewable energy. It based that prediction on the remarkable drop in the cost of solar power. In approving proposals for new solar power plants, the Indian government seeks bids from prospective builders who compete to pledge the lowest price at which they anticipate selling power.**

## Indicts

### sI2: Blum - Smaller Nations Good for Peacekeeping

It literally admits it’s not objective – it calls itself a “glass half full approach” – prefer statistical analyses/warranting. Also it’s old as shit.

Andrew **Blum**, Journal of Conflict Studies, **2000**, "Blue Helmets From the South: Accounting for the Participation of Weaker States in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," No Publication, [https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/4334/4970 //](https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/4334/4970%20//) RM

**Admittedly, this study has taken a glass-is-half-full approach by focusing on why states do participate, while not directly confronting the myriad of cases where states have refused to cooperate**. I believe this is valid, however, as an understanding of why states participate at all seems necessary before confronting the question of why more support has not materialized.