

Polarization

Blacks are first fired

Couch 2010 [Kenneth Couch is economics professor, “Last Hired, First Fired? Black-White Unemployment and the Business Cycle”, *Demography Journal*,
<<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3000014/>>] //CJC

Studies have tested the claim that **blacks are the last hired during periods of economic growth and the first fired in recessions** by examining the movement of relative unemployment rates over the business cycle. Any conclusion drawn from this type of analysis must be viewed as tentative because cyclical movements in the underlying transitions into and out of unemployment are not examined. Using Current Population Survey data matched across adjacent months from 1989–2004, this article provides the first detailed examination of labor market transitions for prime-age black and white men to test the last hired, first fired hypothesis. Considerable evidence is presented that **blacks are the first fired as the business cycle weakens**. However, no evidence is found that blacks are the last hired. Instead, blacks appear to be initially hired from the ranks of the unemployed early in the business cycle and later are drawn from nonparticipation. The narrowing of the racial unemployment gap near the peak of the business cycle is driven by a reduction in the rate of job loss for blacks rather than increases in hiring.

57% of Swing State Voters are Moderates

Peter Brodnitz, 2016 [“Swing Voters In Swing States Hold Balance In 2016,” *Progressive Policy Institute*
http://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/2016.04-PPI-Poll_Swing-Voters-in-Swing-States.pdf] JSM

All four of the states we polled are traditional Presidential battleground states, and this year, they feature competitive contests for Senate and Congress. (Interviews were conducted in Colorado, Florida, Nevada, and Ohio (800 interviews with general election voters and an oversample of 200 voters who do not always vote for one party). One-fifth (21%) of the electorate in these states is made up of voters who lend their support equally to Democrats and Republicans, do not strongly identify with either party, and did not vote for the same party in the last two elections. In 2012, this group sided with President Obama over Mitt Romney, and in 2014, they sided with Congressional Republicans over Congressional Democrats. Swing voters sometimes do not vote; a little more than half (55%) of this group voted in just one of the last two elections, but because this is a Presidential election year, when turnout is high, we estimate they will make up a fifth of this electorate. In each election cycle, political analysts identify specific demographics or sociological groups that supposedly hold the key to victory, but **Swing voters can’t be so neatly categorized. Their most defining characteristics, however, are**

independence and moderation. Fully 84% identify themselves as independent and 57% consider themselves moderates.

Most authors are wrong, polarization is not growing - data

Morris Fiorina, 6-23-2014 [Stanford political scientist, "Americans have not become more politically polarized," WashPO

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/06/23/americans-have-not-become-more-politically-polarized/?utm_term=.8e51074d7b01] MJS 3-17-2017

The Pew Research Center recently released a report describing two decades of change in American public opinion. Much of the data—especially the striking graphical presentations—will find their way into college classrooms in the fall, including my own. But the numerous calls and e-mails I have received from political journalists testify to widespread misunderstanding of the report's findings. Although the report bears the title "Political Polarization in the American Public," this is an inaccurate characterization of the findings. In common parlance polarization connotes a movement away from the center toward both extremes. This has not happened in the United States. If one thinks about polarization in partisan terms, one would expect to see an increase in the proportions of Democrats and Republicans and a decrease in the proportion of independents. But the American National Election Studies report that **the distribution of American partisanship has been constant since the reelection of Ronald Reagan in 1984.** Gallup had the proportion of independents at an all-time high in 2013. If one thinks about polarization in ideological terms, one would expect to see a decline in moderates and an increase in liberals and conservatives. But the General Social Survey reports that the **distribution of ideology in the United State has been stable since the early 1970s.** With occasional small exceptions, "moderate" remains the modal category today just as it was in the days of Jimmy Carter. If one thinks about polarization in terms of positions on specific policy issues, one would expect to see a decline in the center and a lumping up of people on the extremes. We do not have long time series of attitudes toward particular policy issues since they rise and fall on the national agenda, but **on most issues, attitudes continue to cluster in the middle rather than lump up on the extremes.** In sum, we can argue about the size of the political center in the United States since the answer depends on various ways of measuring it, but whichever measure one chooses, the conclusion is the same: **the country as a whole is no more polarized than it was a generation ago.**

Moderates are only 34% of the country

Gallup, Inc., 2015 [, "U.S. Liberals at Record 24%, but Still Trail Conservatives," Gallup, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/180452/liberals-record-trail-conservatives.aspx>] MJS 4-29-2017

PRINCETON, N.J. -- Conservatives continued to outnumber moderates and liberals in the U.S. population in 2014, as they have since 2009. However, their 14-percentage-point edge over

liberals last year, 38% vs. 24%, is the smallest in Gallup's trends since 1992. The percentage of U.S. adults identifying themselves as politically conservative **in 2014** was unchanged from 2013, as was **the percentage of moderates, at 34%**, while the percentage considering themselves liberal rose a percentage point for the third straight year.

1.75 million lost jobs due to economic uncertainty

Marina **Azzimonti**, September **2013** [Associate Professor at Stony Brook University (fields of study are Macroeconomics, Political Economy, and International finance) and a Research Associate at the NBER Economic Fluctuations and Growth (EFG) and Political Economy (POL) programs, "WORKING PAPER NO. 13-41," Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, <http://marina-azzimonti.com/papers/Polariz2.pdf>] MJS 4-29-2017

I then use the political polarization index to quantify the effects of an innovation in the PPI on the real economy. In particular, I analyze changes in employment, output, and investment that result **in a 64-point increase in the PPI** (equivalent to the increase in the index between 2007 and 2012). I find that **employment decreases as a result of the polarization shock, with a peak loss of 1.75 million jobs after six quarters**. Investment decreases up to 8.6% after five quarters, **and output shrinks about 2%. These declines are not only large, but also persistent**, which may help explain part of the slow recovery following the Great Recession. Intuitively, **a polarization shock increases the volatility of fiscal policy** (see Azzimonti and Talbert, 2013). **This in turn reduces economic activity because it increases economic policy uncertainty**, which has been shown to negatively affect the economy (see, for example, Baker, Bloom, and Davis, 2013 or Fern´andez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ram´irez, 2010). These effects are even more pronounced in periods preceding elections, as agents may choose to delay decisions subject to large reversibility costs, such as investment or hiring associated with large search costs (see Canes-Wrone and Park, 2011, or Schaal 2012). To test this hypothesis I study the behavior of de-trended employment, investment, and output in the quarter before a presidential election or a midterm election is held. These variables tended to be lower in pre-election quarters with greater-than-average PPI for both, Congressional elections, but I find no significant difference in quarters preceding presidential elections.

[...]

I follow a similar methodology to that in Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013) **in constructing the political polarization index (PPI)**. In particular, I use a search-based approach that measures the frequency of newspaper coverage of articles reporting political disagreement about government policy. The identification assumption underlying the index is that greater media-coverage of ideologically divisive issues or legislative gridlocks is associated with higher polarization episodes.

Trade-off between moderates and base voters

Daniel M. **Butler**, August **2009** [Yale University, "The Effect of the Size of Voting Blocs on Incumbents' Roll-Call Voting and the Asymmetric Polarization of Congress,"

http://www.danielmarkbutler.com/uploads/1/7/6/8/17688231/size_polarization.pdf] MJS
4-29-2017

Candidates face a trade-off in the general election between taking a more-moderate position that appeals to swing voters and a more-extreme position that appeals to voters in the party's base. The threat of abstention by voters in the party's base if their candidate takes a position too moderate for them moves candidates to take more-extreme positions. I discuss hypotheses regarding how this trade-off affects candidate positioning and describe my tests of those hypotheses using data on House members in the 107th Congress and Senate members for the period 1982–2004. I then present data on how the distribution of voters in the electorate has changed over the past three decades and discuss how, in light of my empirical findings, these changes might explain the observed pattern of asymmetric polarization in Congress in recent decades.

Win with only base vote

Johnson 2016 [Eliana Johnson is editor of the National Review, "Ted Cruz's Risky Bet on the Conservative Base", *National Review*,
<<http://www.nationalreview.com/article/430298/ted-cruzs-strategy-turn-out-conservative-base>>] //CJC

Cruz's top advisers have relied on the work of a handful of political scientists to shape their view of the 2016 race, though these scholars dispute some of their conclusions. Cruz's team points to the dozens of scholarly articles written by **Jim Campbell of the University at Buffalo**, who has spent decades measuring the impact of swing voters on presidential elections, and to the 2013 book *The Gamble*, a data-driven account of the 2012 election by the professors John Sides and Lynn Vavreck. (When I tell the Cruz adviser I'm not familiar with the book, which I have since read, he looks at me blankly and says, "It is an incredible disservice to you and your employer and anybody who does what you do, the fact that you haven't read that book.") Reading Campbell's academic work about the influence of swing voters, one can almost hear Cruz delivering one of his stem-winders. **Since 1972, the vast majority of winning presidential candidates could have lost the swing vote "by a landslide,"** Campbell wrote in *The Swing Voter in American Politics*, **and still won the popular vote. He argues that it's actually base voters who decide elections, meaning that candidates can win nationwide "with only a relatively small share of the swing vote."**

EC forces expansion toward middle because of swing states

Zycher, Benjamin. "The Electoral College Does It Better." Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times, 27 Oct. 2004. <<http://articles.latimes.com/2004/oct/27/opinion/oe-zycher27>>] //CJC

Another goal is to **provide candidates with incentives to broaden their geographic and political bases and to steer toward the center rather than the extremes of the political spectrum.** This, the founders felt, would help reduce the sources of political strife and, in the extreme case, avoid civil war. They understood that passions and irrationalities can afflict mass decision-making under direct democracy. **The Electoral College** system as we know it today **furtheres that goal.** The winner of a plurality in any given state (with two minor exceptions, Maine and Nebraska) gets all of that state's Electoral College votes; the candidate who wins a majority in the Electoral College (270 out of 538) is elected president. **Once a candidate determines that he will be able to win a plurality in a state, thus getting all the Electoral**

College votes, **there is no point in campaigning further in that state. The candidate is then driven** (by the pressure of the market, so to speak) **to develop plurality support in additional states. Thus are candidates forced to broaden their geographic bases;** those whose support is heavily regionalized are penalized implicitly.

The need for a geographically diverse coalition counters polarization

Jason Willick, 11-12-2016 [, "Four Theses on the Electoral College," American Interest, <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/11/12/four-theses-on-the-electoral-college/>] MJS 3-9-2017

Partisan agendas don't exist in isolation; they are responses to political institutions, like the Electoral College, that set the rules for attaining political power. Going forward, **the Electoral College might moderate the violence of the nationalist-cosmopolitan clash by forcing the Democratic Party to court blue collar states more aggressively, instead of doubling down on their already-sizable advantage in metropolitan areas.** In other words, **it gives the Democrats an incentive to build a more geographically diffuse political coalition (and increased competition from Democrats in rural exurban areas might in turn force Republicans to think more about how to compete in cities).** In this election, Trump's America and Clinton's America were unrecognizable to one another. **In a popular vote system, there would be no obstacles against the parties engaging in an arms race to widen this chasm for political gain.** It's possible that because of **the Electoral College** verdict this time around, the next Democrat to run against Trump will work to build more appeal outside of metropolitan areas, **blunting the trend toward the mutual ghettoization of today's red and blue communities.**

More radicalism under popular vote

Trent England, 10-1-2012 [, "Eliminating the Electoral College Would Corrupt Our Elections," US News & World Report, <https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2012/10/01/eliminating-the-electoral-college-would-corrupt-our-elections>] MJS 3-16-2017

Consider that both the Democratic and Republican parties have a presence in every state. Indeed the parties themselves are broad coalitions made up of millions of Americans. And each party enjoys strong support in a number of states. **With the Electoral College,** all this is essential. Presidential candidates have no choice but to reach out across the country. As the campaign wears on, attention focuses toward the most politically balanced "swing states." **Candidates cannot simply go where they are already popular and fan the flames of political radicalism.** Instead, they must make their case to voters in the most evenly divided states. **A national popular vote would eliminate any need for geographic balance. A candidate could win based on intense support from a narrow region.** It's happened before. In 1888, incumbent President Grover Cleveland won the most popular votes with huge margins in the Deep South, but lost the Electoral College and thus the presidency. Neither the nation nor

the Democratic Party would have been better off with a **popular vote system that rewarded and encouraged radical, regional politics.**

Polarization causes of income inequality

Didi Kuo, 10-10-2015 [research scholar at Stanford University, where she manages the Program on American Democracy in Comparative Perspective, "Polarization and Partisanship," The American Interest,

<http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/10/10/polarization-and-partisanship/>] MJS

3-16-2017

Polarization has accelerated problems with governance and accountability in the United

States, particularly when considering these trends comparatively. The institutions of the U.S. Federal government have always been relatively weaker than those in other advanced democracies. Most European and OECD countries have parliamentary systems and non-partisan bureaucracies; their methods of policy passage and implementation are more efficient than those in our presidential system. The World Bank, which measures government effectiveness by looking at a state's quality of public services and the degree to which its civil service is free from political pressures, finds that the United States is much less effective than West European democracies, and that its effectiveness has declined since the 1990s. The U.S. system also fares worse on indicators of voice and accountability, which measures the extent to which citizens can participate in selecting their government. One of the primary challenges posed by poor governance is that America also outranks its advanced democratic counterparts on various measures of economic inequality. While income inequality has been on the rise for many decades, it has now become more visible and politically salient. Just as American institutions have long been known to be weaker than unitary systems in other advanced democracies, America has also long had higher degrees of income inequality. However, American inequality has risen much more sharply than in countries like Canada, Britain, and Norway, which have also experienced a widening gap between rich and poor. The United States also now has the lowest rates of social and economic mobility among developed nations. Why are these comparative indicators important? Because **there is strong evidence that governance and economic**

outcomes are at least partly a consequence of worsening polarization. Our polarized political environment accommodates the preferences of those intense partisans and affluent individuals who participate. As a result, there is a striking correlation between

polarization and inequality—not just today, but also historically, with both polarization and inequality declining in the first few decades of the 20th century, then rising together after 1970. **While widening inequality has many**

causes—including poor and unequal educational opportunities and structural changes in global and national economies abetted by an array of technological shifts—**economic outcomes are also the product of policies that have reduced social safety nets and lowered taxes, the exact policies favored by the wealthy donor class.** Further, even if polarization has not directly contributed to income inequality, the two exacerbate one another in contemporary politics. Income inequality corresponds to inequality in participation and representation, and **a polarized Congress is in turn less likely to take on long-run economic policy challenges.**

In discussions of political solutions to polarization, the stakes are higher than simply bipartisanship in Congress. **A polarized political system makes it impossible for the Federal government to accomplish most of its policy objectives.** It also precludes the kinds of soul-searching deliberation necessary for our representative institutions to tackle important political issues. Polarization alienates moderate voters and candidates, further reducing the likelihood that political elites will take up the banner of reform. The task of mobilizing a

constituency for reform must appeal to more than a desire for functioning politics; it must appeal to a desire to restore the democratic principles of American government.

Means-testing has lifted millions out of poverty

Sharman, 2013 [July 2013, Arloc Sharman, Danilo Trisi, Sharon Parrott , “Various Supports for Low-Income Families Reduce Poverty and Have Long-Term Positive Effects On Families and Children,” *Center for Budget and Policy Priorities*, <http://www.cbpp.org/research/various-supports-for-low-income-families-reduce-poverty-and-have-long-term-positive-effects>] JSM

Arloc Rharman is a Senior Fellow at the CBPP, Danilo Trisi is a Senior Research Analyst at the CBPP and Sharon Parrot is the Vice President for Budget Policy and Economic Opportunity at the CBPP

“The EITC and SNAP are examples of “means-tested” programs, that is, programs that limit assistance to people with low or modest incomes. Other means-tested programs include Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for low-income seniors and people with disabilities; cash assistance programs funded by the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, and programs that provide non-cash benefits like housing assistance. **In 2011, means-tested benefits lifted 19.7 million people above the poverty line, including 8.5 million children.**[5] (See Appendix Table 2 for state-by-state figures.) **Medicaid and CHIP provided health insurance to 66 million Americans during 2010** — roughly 32 million children, 18 million parents, 10 million people with disabilities, and 6 million seniors. Medicaid and CHIP have greatly reduced the numbers of uninsured children and now provide coverage to most low-income children. Due to Medicaid and CHIP, children are much less likely than non-elderly adults to be uninsured. Some 9.4 percent of children were uninsured in 2011, compared to 21.2 percent of non-elderly adults.[6] To be sure, some critics question the effects of safety net programs on individual behavior, such as work effort, and how that affects poverty. **Several of the leading researchers in the field have conducted a comprehensive review of the available research and data on how safety net programs affect poverty, and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) has published their results. They found that, after accounting for what the research finds to be modest overall behavioral effects, the safety net lowers the poverty rate by about 14 percentage points. In other words, one of every seven Americans would be poor without the safety net but is above the poverty line because of it. That translates into more than 40 million people.**[7]”

2.7 million provisional ballots in 2012

Joshua **Field**, Charles Posner, and Anna Chu, 10-29-2014 [, "Uncounted Votes," Center for American Progress,

<https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/reports/2014/10/29/99886/uncounted-votes/>]

MJS 3-19-2017

In the wake of the troubled and deeply flawed 2000 presidential election in which between 4 million and 6 million votes were not counted, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act, or HAVA, to restore voters' confidence in the electoral process. One of HAVA's reforms was the establishment of the provisional ballot process, which was originally put in place as a fail-safe measure to ensure that voters who face issues when they arrive at the polls can still cast a ballot. Despite its best intentions, the process is not without serious problems. Of the **more than 2.7 million provisional ballots** that **were cast in 2012**, more than 30 percent were not fully counted or rejected all together. Moreover, according to this first-of-its-kind analysis, in 16 states, the use of provisional ballots is more frequent in counties with higher percentages of minority voters.

Warrant: popular vote is normally closer

DREW **DESILVER**, Dec **2016** ["Trump's victory another example of how Electoral College wins are bigger than popular vote ones," Pew Research Center, <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/12/20/why-electoral-college-landslides-are-easier-to-win-than-popular-vote-ones/>] MJS 3-27-2017

Even in the vast majority of U.S. elections, in which the same candidate won both the popular and **the electoral vote**, the system usually **makes the winner's victory margin** in the former **a lot wider** than in the latter. In 2012, for example, Barack Obama won 51% of the nationwide popular vote but nearly 62% of the electoral votes, or 332 out of 538. **Looking back at all presidential elections since 1828, the winner's electoral vote share has, on average, been 1.36 times his popular vote share** – what we'll call the electoral vote (EV) inflation factor. Trump's EV inflation factor, based on his winning 56.5% of the electoral votes (304 out of 538) is 1.22, similar to Obama's in 2012 (1.21).

Two Party

Popular vote will derail two party system - leads to closer and less legitimate elections

Von Spakovsky 2011 [Hans von Spakovsky Election Law Reform Initiative and Senior Legal Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, "Destroying the Electoral College: The Anti-Federalist National Popular Vote Scheme", *Heritage Foundation*, http://www.heritage.org/election-integrity/report/destroying-the-electoral-college-the-anti-federalist-national-popular?_ga=1.213754836.1522943971.1488386128#_ftn5] MJS

****Note:** NPV = National popular vote

In addition, **the NPV could destabilize America's two-party system**, leading to a higher incidence of close elections. The NPV awards the presidential election to whichever candidate receives the "largest" national vote, not the majority of the national popular vote. **In an electoral system defined by the NPV, numerous fringe parties and radical candidates, appealing solely to the largest population centers, would likely emerge**. Consequently: **Presidential campaigns would devolve into European-style, multi-candidate races. As more candidates enter the field, individual votes will necessarily be divided among an ever-increasing number of candidates**. The result will be lower vote totals per candidate and an increased likelihood that two or more candidates will have close popular vote totals.[49] **The winner-take-all allocation of electoral votes within 48 states necessitates that a candidate be popular enough to appeal to a broad electorate, including moderate voters**, and provides the winner of the presidential race with both finality and a mandate even if his popular vote total is slightly below 50 percent. With its plurality requirement, however, the NPV could lead to the election of presidential candidates by unprecedented, small margins. **These smaller victory margins, combined with the overall decrease in popular support for a single candidate, could trigger chaotic and contentious elections**. Furthermore, **a President elected by only 25 or 35 percent of the American people would not have a mandate to govern, and questions about his legitimacy could pose grave consequences both for the nation and for any actions he took as President**. The Electoral College requires a presidential candidate to win simultaneous elections across 50 states and the District of Columbia; the idea of concurrent majorities means that "the president gains a popular legitimacy that a single, narrow, national" election does not provide and emphasizes "the breadth of popular support for the winner." [50]

Dozens of candidates without electoral college — collapses presidential power

Guelzo 2016 [Allen Guelzo is Professor of the Civil War Era and Director of the Civil War Era Studies at Gettysburg College, "In defense of the electoral college", *Washington Post*, https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/11/15/in-defense-of-the-electoral-college/?utm_term=.676edcaea31c#comments] //CJC

None of that, ironically, is liable to produce a more democratic election system. There are plenty of democracies, like Great Britain, where no one ever votes directly for a head of the government. But more important, **the electoral college actually keeps presidential elections from going undemocratically awry because it makes unlikely the possibility that third-party candidates will garner enough votes to make it onto the electoral scoreboard. Without the electoral college, there would be no effective brake on the number of "viable" presidential candidates**. Abolish it, and it would not be difficult to imagine **a scenario where, in a field of a dozen micro-candidates, the "winner" only needs 10 percent of the vote, and represents less than 5 percent of the electorate. And presidents elected with smaller and smaller pluralities will only aggravate the sense that an elected president is governing without a real electoral mandate**.

Extremists are super bad — they're all racist xenophobes AND multiparty systems empower extremist parties

Downs 2013 [William Downs is political science professor at Georgia State University, "Democracy's New Normal: The Impact of Extremist Parties", *World Politics Review*, <<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12652/democracy-s-new-normal-the-impact-of-extremist-parties>>] //CJC

Political extremism has, in many places, become a kind of new normal. In most democratic political systems, whether firmly established or still early in their consolidations, we find parties deemed "extremist" by the mainstream that routinely enjoy sustained electoral success. **These political parties espouse rejectionist philosophies, proffer illiberal policies and promote intolerance of targeted groups.**

They typically do this, however, while playing within the rules of the democratic game. Putatively extremist parties therefore pose a bedeviling challenge to democracies, namely how to resolve the paradox of being asked to tolerate the intolerant. While scholars, journalists and watchdog groups expend much effort to expose and understand the rise and persistence of extremist parties, remarkably less attention is paid to the impact of extremist parties on democratic processes and systems. Addressing the latter task means examining three interrelated issues: first, the impact of extremist parties on political discourse in democracies; second, the range of responses by mainstream democratic parties in response to electorally successful party-based extremism; and third, the observed lifecycles of extremist parties after they emerge on the political scene. While few democracies appear immediately imperiled by the exclusivist and rejectionist parties that appear on their systems' outermost edges, it is nevertheless clear that these parties' gradual accretion of influence on everyday politics cannot be ignored. The Persistence of Extremism. Political extremism is most likely a normal pathology of all democracy. It exists in different forms and to varying magnitudes as a natural by-product of openness and pluralism.

Party-based extremism is just one of those forms, but it poses perhaps the most intractable strategic and policy dilemmas. **A quick tour of the global political horizon in 2012 serves to highlight how pervasive this form of extremism is. In**

Greece, a country wracked by economic and political instability, the once little-known Golden Dawn party used rabidly anti-immigrant rhetoric to exploit voter anxieties about unemployment and austerity en route to a stunning performance in that country's June 2012 national elections. Entering parliament for the first time with 21 legislative seats, Golden Dawn elicited alarm from observers alleging that the party employed neo-Nazi symbols, incited members to violence against minorities and propagated

anti-Semitism. **In France**, Marine Le Pen, the daughter of founder and former leader of the Front National, Jean-Marie Le Pen, garnered 6.4 million votes and a 17.9 percent vote share, the party's largest ever, for a third-place finish in that country's April 2012 presidential elections. The FN combines xenophobia and populist nationalism in a potent cocktail that inspires support from voters anxious about multiculturalism. To the east, **in Ukraine**, the radical nationalist Svoboda party continued its apparent breakthrough, entering the national parliament for the first time with 37 seats and 10.4 percent of the vote in October 2012 elections. Svoboda, or "Freedom," is routinely criticized for alleged connections to neo-Nazis and paramilitary groups and for fomenting racism, although its leaders unsurprisingly reject claims of extremism. In countries where elections were not on the calendar in 2012, parties labeled "extremist" by their mainstream counterparts occupied positions of varying prominence in their respective

political landscapes. Here the list is long, especially in Europe, but party systems **in Israel, Turkey, Japan, Australia, Russia and**

South Africa are likewise said to harbor extremist groups that have successfully institutionalized in order to contest elections. And in the United States, where electoral rules privilege a two-party system, the Tea Party movement within the Republican Party routinely draws charges of extremism from its detractors. While much of the attention devoted to extremist parties appears directed at those of the far-right variety, party-based extremism also exists on the left. While demonization of communist, Trotskyite, anarchist and other radical left parties has subsided in the post-Cold War era, democratic establishments still struggle with perceived extremism on this side of the ideological spectrum as well. In 2010, for instance, Czech authorities tried, and failed, to dissolve the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia on grounds that its political program does not disavow violence as a means of overturning capitalism and attaining power. "Extremism" is, of course, a pejorative and stigmatized term that some claim is also inherently subjective. Distinguishing which parties are genuinely extremist from those that are merely providing alternative voices is an important, albeit elusive, task. The academic world invests considerable effort toward this end. What clearly unites disparate extremist, radical and national-populist parties challenging elections in contemporary democracies, however, is that they receive a common label from the presumably more moderate party establishment: pariah. In general usage, a pariah is an outcast, despised and avoided by the majority. In political terms, the pariah party is ostensibly an untouchable, beyond the pale of political acceptability.

The pariah party is, at least initially, ostracized, demonized and rejected as unacceptable by most other actors in the system. **The pariah is an "anti-"**

party in some fashion: anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic, anti-system, anti-capitalist or

anti-establishment. Pariah parties come in left and right varieties, and they embody a diffuse alienation and distrust of the existing political system. While they seek to achieve their goals through conventional channels of electoral contestation, they may have parallel organizational structures -- such as paramilitary groups, youth organizations and online networks -- that pursue extra-parliamentary voice and pressure tactics. Pariah Parties: From the Margins to the Mainstream Given the prevalence of extremist pariah parties, it is essential that their actual impact be better understood. Too frequently, public discourse is dominated by laments and calls for countermobilizations, with their own risks of disproportionate -- or extreme -- response, rather than by neutral assessments of risk. Assessments of impact and risk must obviously take contextual considerations into account. History matters in important ways. A national past blemished by instances of democracy having been defeated or significantly compromised by political extremism may increase incentives to respond aggressively to contemporary threats from pariah parties. Where, instead, historical memories are not marked by crises of upstart parties using liberal institutions and processes against the democratic order, there is less pressure to respond defensively, or even militantly, to challengers on democracy's outer edges. Salience and severity are also shaped in part by the rules of the political game, primarily those governing electoral competition. A simple, but crucial, intervening factor here is whether a country's elections follow majoritarian principles, such as first past the post and winner take all, or those guided by proportionality. Political systems characterized by even a modicum of proportional representation tend to be

multiparty systems, with views across the full ideological spectrum having a reasonable chance to gain legislative seats. Proportional representation reduces the importance of party size, and even **the smallest fringe parties can**

wield disproportionate political power and become kingmakers when none of the other legislative parties constitutes a majority. **For pariah parties, achieving a “critical mass” in such systems may simply mean securing one or two seats in parliament. In multiparty systems that frequently rely on coalition government, parties once deemed untouchable may become the indispensable, if unsavory, partners that determine who governs -- and**

who does not. Access to ballots, media time and state funds to support campaigns are additional facilitating conditions that help embolden extremist movements to contest elections as parties. Where emboldened, and then where electorally successful, these parties pose vexing challenges for the traditional party establishments on whose flanks they have emerged. Outbidding the Extremes The signal characteristic of extremist parties in contemporary democratic systems is that they often tempt existing moderate parties into a game of policy co-optation. In competitive systems, moderate parties that find their support siphoned away by upstarts on the fringes confront the dilemma of whether to recoup those losses by adopting more extreme policy positions themselves. The success of far-right and far-left parties can remind mainstream conservatives, Christian democrats, social democrats and liberals of the strategic perils of having vacated their traditional positions in policy space for a share of the “new middle.” The phenomenon of center-seeking in the 1990s, especially by social democratic parties, left some voters who had no interest in relinquishing their positions on economic issues, social policy and national identity feeling abandoned. New parties on the extremes have adroitly colonized the vacuum left behind by such center-seeking

behavior. Outbidding the extremes through policy co-optation is, then, one possible but delicate enterprise. Indeed, it is this policy drift toward the extremes by traditional moderate parties that constitutes **the real threat of party-based extremism. Illiberal positions that are legitimated through the exigencies of election-minded repositioning can produce a slow but gradual undermining of core democratic values.**

This threat is significantly greater today than is the likelihood of a 20th century-style democratic defeat at the hands of chest-thumping ultranationalists bent on dissolving constitutional government. The clearest example of the temptation to outbid the extremes is in the domain of immigration policy. Reasonable people and parties can vigorously disagree on immigration policy and the associated issues of citizenship and asylum. Where **extremist parties depart from reasonable debate is in their xenophobia and racial chauvinism.**

“Anti-immigrant” is not the same thing as “anti-immigration,” and many of the most successful extremist parties gain their status as public pariahs because **they adopt anti-democratic ideologies that reject the fundamental principle of human equality.** Entrepreneurial leaders of such parties seek to blur the lines between anti-immigrant rhetoric and anti-immigration policy positions in order to make themselves more palatable for electorates. The latter, though, legitimates the former, and the popularity of anti-immigration positions during times of economic austerity helps parties package racial chauvinism as something that should be broadly acceptable. **Because xenophobia is so frequently part of extremism’s electoral appeal,** some moderate parties do expand their programmatic agenda rightward to more directly address popular angst over immigration and its presumed corollaries -- crime and threats to culture. Doing so may entice “protest voters” who had drifted to the fringe to return. It may also transform public rhetoric and policy over stringent immigration control to such an extent that what was once considered extreme becomes politically acceptable. Sometimes it works; sometimes it does not. The classic example here is France, where successive conservative presidents, Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy, grew strategically more draconian on immigration in their respective efforts to hold the Front National and the far right at bay. Chirac largely succeeded in this game of policy one-upmanship over the course of his political career, but in 2012 Sarkozy did not.

Electoral College → 2 Party → Compromise

Benjamin Zycher, 10-27-2004 [Benjamin Zycher is a senior fellow at the Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, “The Electoral College Does It Better,” *LA Times*, <http://articles.latimes.com/2004/oct/27/opinion/oe-zycher27>] JSM, accessed: 3-1-2017

Once a candidate determines that he will be able to win a plurality in a state, thus getting all the electoral college votes, there is no point in campaigning further in that state. **The candidate is then driven (by the pressure of the market, so to speak) to develop plurality support in additional states. Thus are candidates forced to broaden their geographic bases; those whose support is heavily regionalized are penalized implicitly.** This was particularly important in 2000: Al Gore piled up huge majorities on the West Coast and in the Northeast (hence his victory in the popular vote), but was not strong in the rest of the country (and so lost the electoral vote). **Because the plurality winner in a state gets all of that state’s electoral votes, third and fourth parties have little hope of winning important numbers of electoral college votes** (although they can deny a plurality to a candidate). **This means that the electoral college promotes the two-party system at the state level. The two-party system**

offers the important long-term benefit of forcing candidates and platforms toward the middle of the political spectrum, thus **increasing consensus and compromise and reducing political strife**. **A direct popular election under a plurality rule would tend to yield candidacies (and parties) with strong regional and ideological loyalties**, with a goal of simply piling up more raw votes than anyone else. **A runoff system would give disproportionate bargaining power to regional and ideological fringes**. A system of allocating electoral college votes in proportion to the popular vote (now proposed for Colorado) would induce candidates to shift their efforts and resources to uncompetitive states, where there are large numbers of electoral college votes to be had. Yes, the electoral college is easy to poke fun at. Yes, it occasionally frustrates the will of the plurality or majority. But the founding fathers understood the dangers of direct democracy and struggled to create a system that reflected the will of the people while constraining the majority. The electoral college serves those ends well.

Racist Campaigns influence National Opinion

MENDELBERG 1997 [Tali Mendelberg, Professor at Princeton University, *The American Association for Public Opinion Research*, 1997

https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/talim/files/executing_hortons_published_version_0.pdf] //WGC

“Contemporary historians of the South, following in the steps of Du Bois and Woodward, have recognized that **racial campaigns** can **affect far more than voters’ behavior at the ballot box**. Given the right conditions, **a racial campaign can reinforce a variety of racially conservative views and actions** (e.g., Lewis 1993). Scholars of public opinion have been slower to explore the possibility that elections have broad consequences for public opinion. This article seeks to remedy that neglect. It examines the way in which racial campaigns prime racial predispositions in whites’ views of government policies designed to ameliorate racial inequality.” [...]

“the impact of campaigns Both hypotheses share in common the assumption that what elites say during presidential campaigns may have important consequences for public opinion. **More than any other event, presidential elections are institutionalized, periodic opportunities to set the public agenda, to define collective problems, and to discuss publicly the future course of the nation**. More than at any other time in their elective cycle, politicians have strong incentives to be persuasive, to capture public attention, to mobilize voters’ sentiments, and to gain and maintain adherents. **Elections are a time in which the symbolic power of political ritual is at its height** (Edelman [1964] 1985). **What politicians say during their campaigns for office may, on average, prompt stronger and more far-reaching public reaction than what they say during any other time of the electoral cycle**. Carmines and Stimson put it this way: “Mass political involvement and issue discourse are episodic and discrete. Largely absent most of the time, they occur during political campaigns and particularly during presidential campaigns” (1989, p. 136)” [...]

“Furthermore, it is not as if politicians have abandoned the race card. The white public has certainly moved away from biological racism and segregation and toward endorsement of the principle of racial equality (Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985). But debate over implementation of that principle has, if anything, accelerated since the height of the civil rights movement (Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Candidates for office no longer promise to “fight relentlessly to prevent amalgamation of races,” as did J. Lindsay Almond of Virginia along with most southern gubernatorial candidates in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Black 1976). But they find a variety of ways to appeal to whites’ concerns about government attempts to ameliorate racial inequality. Metz and Tate (1995), for example, have documented the continuing use of racial appeals in urban campaigns. Others have begun to study ways in which candidates code their racial appeals, making implicit references to race while claiming no racial intent (Himelstein 1983; Jamieson 1992; Kinder et al. 1989; Mendelberg 1994). **Nor should we expect race to fade away from electoral politics anytime soon now that it has worked itself into the fabric of the party system (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Edsall and Edsall 1991; Huckfeldt and Kohfeldt 1989). Electoral campaigns, it seems, continue to rely on racial appeals for political advantage, and they do so because of the structural imperatives of American politics.** In that case, studying the impact of racial appeals on public opinion opens a window on the way in which the status of African Americans has been negotiated since the civil rights movement reintroduced race into party politics.”

[...]

“The Horton appeal was, judging by its effects in this study, about race rather than crime; it mobilized whites’ racial prejudice, not their worries about crime. The consequences of this mobilization were greater resistance to government efforts to address racial inequality, heightened perceptions of racial conflict, and greater resistance to policies perceived as illegitimately benefitting African Americans. The experiment I conducted has limitations, of course. It is unclear how long the effects lasted, whether the conclusions apply to cases other than the 1988 election, and whether a nonstudent sample would have yielded similar results. However, Kinder et al.’s (1989) analysis of the 1988 National Election Study corroborates my finding that the Horton message was an effective play of the race card. This replication is especially reassuring given its reliance on a national sample of voters and the fact that it documented effects not after a single exposure but over the course of the campaign. Iyengar and Kinder (1987) argued that stories about a given issue only affect views of that issue, partly as a by-product of the fragmentation of public opinion. When it comes to racial discourse, however, agenda setting and priming effects do not seem to operate normally, failing to reflect, contrary to Iyengar and Kinder’s findings, the surface content of the messages that spark them (1987). Without this specificity, television’s power in the domain of race may not be as limited as we might like to think. Whether or not violation of the specificity of priming reflects the special, integrative role of race in whites’ public opinion deserves further study. While the focus here has been on the Horton message in particular, given its prototypical profile, the results, though tentative, speak to racial communication more generally and to the institutional side of racial politics. **We are now in a position to conclude, albeit preliminarily, that racial messages probably do matter, that they activate racial prejudice, and that they have serious consequences for public preferences regarding racial inequality. By establishing a three-way link between individuals’ prejudice, their racial opinions, and racial appeals generated by the macrolevel dynamics of political campaigns, I have attempted to show how prejudice is activated in political contexts, transformed from an individual trait to collective obstacle.**

[...]

The 1988 presidential campaign had, on its face, little to do with race (the Democratic primaries were another matter, of course, due to Jesse Jackson’s candidacy). But closer attention to one of the more significant messages of that campaign reveals that race can operate even where it is absent on the surface: in a contest featuring white candidates, a large majority of white voters, and communication that carries few overt references to race. Attention to campaigns that seem to be devoid of race can reveal one way in which prejudice remains a potent political force among whites. It also demonstrates how racially modulated electoral strategies are implemented, and how they reinforce the gap between the opinions of African Americans and whites. One of the significant aspects of Goldwater’s 1964 candidacy was his success in conveying a racially conservative message without appearing to espouse segregation, and thus, without appearing to be a racist. But though the Horton appeal followed in the footsteps of the original southern strategy, it was nevertheless path breaking. It took place during a presidential election that was largely devoid of racial

issues, certainly more so than the 1964 election, which took place in the wake of the Civil Rights Act. The Horton communication was, in 1988, very much a deniable play of the race card. It netted more political capital than any of its predecessors with the possible exception of Nixon's appeals in 1968 (Mendelberg 1994). As a result, Drew was correct in predicting that the negative style of the 1988 presidential campaign—in particular, its racial component— would be emulated by future campaigns. The racial campaign style of 1988 was echoed in such statewide campaigns as the 1990 Helms-Gantt contest in North Carolina, the 1991 gubernatorial election in Mississippi, the 1991 Duke-Edwards gubernatorial contest in Louisiana, the 1992 presidential bid of Patrick Buchanan, and Wilson's and Huffington's 1994 campaigns in California. All these campaigns included racial symbols: discussions of the supposed rising welfare underclass, condemnation of unfair federal quota bills, or a less subtle discussion of the loss of white jobs to undeserving minorities. While the tactic of coded appeals may have emerged from a national-level struggle for the allegiance of racially conservative whites, it has become a routine tool in the arsenals of candidates at all levels and of both parties. **That a racial campaign message may powerfully shape opinion on issues underscores the scope of presidential campaigns. The influence of elections may extend well beyond voters' choice of parties or candidates to encompass citizens' views of significant national problems. Elections are the linchpin connecting elites and masses**, one that allows influence to flow not only from masses to elites, but from elites to masses. **When presidential candidates use racial appeals, they** raise racial stereotypes and resentments to the national agenda, **displacing white individuals' more democratically desirable considerations. Should whites rely on nonracial ideological guidance in response to appeals about issues that implicate subordinate groups**, the power of **racial appeals** may not lessen, but at least their **democratically troubling consequence would be muted**. But as long as racial appeals prime racial prejudice, we have cause to worry about the health of elections as an instrument of liberal democracy, with its requirement that citizens act out of tolerance rather than factional interests. **As long as racial appeals continue, electoral campaigns will be lost opportunities for bridging the nation's racial chasm."**

Special interests

Campaign costs rise 25% under the PV

Brett Gordon (Columbia) and Wesley Hartmann (Stanford), Apr 2013 ["Advertising Competition in Presidential Elections," <http://www.econ.ucla.edu/alumniconf/Hartmann.pdf>] MJS 3-27-2017

Presidential candidates in the U.S. compete by strategically placing their advertisements across markets based on each state's potential to tip the election. The winner-take-all nature of the Electoral College concentrates most advertising in battleground states, thereby ignoring the majority of voters. We evaluate the alternative of a direct vote which removes state-level contests and counts each vote equally in determining the president. Using data from 2000, we estimate an equilibrium model of advertising competition between presidential candidates. We solve for the equilibrium distribution of advertising under the direct vote to better evaluate the distortions of the Electoral College. We find that while states' political preferences drive competition in the Electoral College, competition in a direct vote focuses on finding the cheapest advertising targets. Nevertheless, **the inclusion of less contentious states in the direct vote increases total expenditures by 25%** and turnout by two million voters.

Nationwide campaign requires more private funding

USA Editorial Board, 11-10-2016 [, "Keep the Electoral College: Our view," USA TODAY, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/11/10/electoral-college-popular-vote-donald-trump-hillary-clinton-editorials-debates/93609562/>] MJS 3-1-2017

But those clamoring to dump the system cobbled together by the nation's Founders — which gives each state as many electoral votes as it has members of Congress — should be careful what they wish for. **Adopting a national popular vote would trade one set of problems for another.** Electoral College opponents argue that the system pushes candidates to ignore states that Republicans or Democrats consider sure things and focus on a dozen battleground states during the campaigns. But Tuesday's election showed that the Electoral College map is more fluid than many people believed. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, considered reliably Democratic, swung Republican. If the national popular vote were the ultimate decider, candidates would gravitate toward the voter-rich big cities and their suburbs and ignore everyone else. **If candidates felt obliged to blanket the entire country with visits and advertising, it would set off a scramble for even more campaign money, leaving candidates more beholden to special interests.**

Abolishing the EC would cause more desperation for big donors

Ryan Teague Beckwith 2016, 11-17-2016 [, "How Campaigns Would Work If We Ended the Electoral College," <http://time.com/4573821/electoral-college-popular-vote-campaigns/>] MJS 3-5-2017

For the fifth time in history, the U.S. has elected a president who lost the popular vote, renewing calls to abolish the Electoral College and move to a simpler system. But strategists who have worked on presidential campaigns say that would change the way elections run dramatically, possibly exacerbating some of the complaints Americans have about their current system. They say that **under a national popular vote, they would push their candidates to** spend more time in TV interviews; hold more rallies in big cities like New York, Houston and Los Angeles; **raise vastly more money for nationwide advertising, direct mail and voter outreach;** and focus more on their party base than swing voters. In short, **if you were unhappy with the 2016 election because it featured a charismatic celebrity holding big rallies and doing cable TV interviews facing off against a longtime politician raising hundreds of millions of dollars from major donors, you might not like how campaigns under a popular vote would turn out.**

[...]

That would exacerbate a trend that reached new heights this year, with Republican Donald Trump getting as much as \$5 billion in free publicity on TV, according to mediaQuant, which tracked media coverage of both candidates and came up with a dollar value based on

advertising rates. To compete, strategists say candidates would need to raise a lot more money to air ads in more expensive media markets in the country's top urban areas, instead of just the handful of battleground states each cycle. Fundraising would also have to increase to pay for more campaign offices across the country, especially in big cities with higher average rents, as well as direct mail and even online outreach for the entire country. That, too, would exacerbate a trend that accelerated this year, with the team backing Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton raising more than \$1 billion for her campaign, party and joint fundraising committees and super PACs supporting her. Sarah Isgur Flores, who advised Republican Carly Fiorina this year, said that would mean candidates would either be more beholden to fundraising or else they would need to be famous enough to kickstart a campaign on their own, as both Trump and Clinton did. "Celebrities would become much more viable candidates," she said. "You'd really need everyone to know your name right off the bat, since you wouldn't have time to build name ID."

Viewers in swing states see ads 24/7 - it's oversaturated

New York Times Editorial, 10-7-2012 ["The Cacophony of Money in Political Advertisements," <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/opinion/the-cacophony-of-money.html>] MJS 4-13-2017

Most of the approximately \$593 million that has been spent so far by outside groups during this election cycle has gone into television advertising, and it has oversaturated hundreds of markets in the important swing states, in combination with ads from the campaigns themselves. Iowans have had to endure an unending stream of political ads, in some cases six times as much as in 2008. The two presidential campaigns and associated "independent" groups have run more than 100,000 ads to win the state's six electoral votes, as many as six an hour in Sioux City. And that's nothing compared with Ohio, where ads run all day in the big markets, as many as 10 per half-hour. In many cases, reporters and campaign officials have found that the ads have reached the point of diminishing returns. Viewers are muting them, or mentally tuning them out. "People just aren't paying attention to political ads the way they used to," David Winston, a Republican pollster, told The Wall Street Journal.

Advertising also causes more motivation to donate among wealthy donors

Kevin Collins, 8-1-2011 [, "Who Gives? Where, When, How, and Why Television Advertising Stimulates Campaign Contributions" Princeton University, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1902321] MJS 3-27-2017

Which campaign messages mobilize activists? Which messengers? In other work, I leverage the experimental deployment of a single advertisement in the 2006 Texas gubernatorial campaign in order to establish that campaign messages can mobilize donors. However, that study examined just one ad by a single messenger in a single contest, and as such it cannot provide insight into how varied messages and messengers affect activist behavior. The present investigation poses a theory that describes how the intersection of message and messenger may matter. To test that theory, I turn to the 2004 presidential general election, leveraging the

strategic division by candidates of states into battleground and base regions in order to identify the effect of advertising on donation behavior and constructing a county-day time-series dataset of advertising and donation behavior, as observed in campaign finance records. **I find that negative advertising mobilizes contributions to both the candidate supported and the candidate opposed by the advertisement.** These “red meat” and “backlash” effects represent a behavioral response to advertising tone not observed in previous work focused on voter turnout. In doing so, **these results present consequences for the increasingly negative tone of advertising** not previously discussed in that extensive scholarly debate and our understanding of motivations underlying activist behavior.

[...]

By compiling a unique data set that matches advertising and campaign donations at the day-county-party level of observation, this paper presents a new view of the effect of campaign messages on costly political behavior. **Campaign donors are motivated** not by information, but **by negativity, including both by their preferred candidate in the short run and the opposing candidate over time, what one might think of as “red meat” and “backlash” effects.** Like sharks, activists are whipped to a frenzy by the smell of blood in the water, either their own that of their prey. Notably, this analysis provides a very different view of activist behavior than Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) and Kahn and Kenney (1999) do of voting behavior. For activists, negativity encourages participation.

[...]

This analysis is not without its weaknesses. I am making inferences about individual behavior from aggregate observations, and such cross-level inferences can provide misleading results depending on the variation in correlation across unit (Achen and Shively, 1995).¹⁹ However, using only non-battleground states for my analysis and including unit fixed effects, I believe that the predictor variables are genuinely exogenous, and as such we should expect these correlations to be equal across observations. Furthermore, the measurement of my outcome of interest is not without its problems. Using Federal Election Commission records, **I only observe donations from individuals who gave more than \$200 over the course of the campaign cycle.** This means that many small donors are likely not observed, and small donations are likely to be more susceptible to the impact of these messages, particularly in the short term. However, this biases the observed effect downward, and as such the true effects are likely much larger.

Less than 13% of campaign funds are from super PACs

Anu **Narayanswamy**, Dec 2016 [, "How much money is behind each campaign?," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/2016-election/campaign-finance/>] MJS 4-8-2017

Of the \$1.7 billion donated to support **Democratic** candidates, **13 percent was raised by super PACs** and other independent groups.

[...]

Of the \$621.4 million donated to support **Republican** candidates, **10 percent was raised by super PACs** and other independent groups.

Campaign spending has flatlined when you control for population and income - congres


Max **Galka**, 8-2-2015 [Galka teaches data wrangling / data visualization at the University of Pennsylvania (PennDesign), and writes about data visualization as a Guardian and Huffington Post contributor, "The History of Campaign Spending," Metrocosm, <http://metrocosm.com/the-history-of-campaign-spending/>] MJS 4-9-2017

Adjusting for inflation is not enough. When you do account for inflation, the trend is still upward, as shown in this chart from CNN. **It would be easy to stop here and conclude that campaign spending is higher than ever before. This conclusion would be incorrect.**

Here's why. **Population growth and income growth also matter.** Not only has the value of a dollar changed over time, the size of the population has also changed. More people = more donors. Household incomes have also increased, so the average person spends more today than they did in 1960. More income to spend = more income to donate. In the charts below, the campaign spending is normalized to 2014 by adjusting for all three factors: inflation, population, and income/spending (methods explained below).

[...]

Here is how Senate / House spending looks after applying these three adjustments.




For House and Senate races, the historical trend is flat. **When you remove the effects of inflation, rising population, and rising incomes, House and Senate campaigns are spending about as much today as they did in 1985.**

Campaign spending has flatlined when you control for population and income - presidents

Max Galka, 11-7-2016 [Galka teaches data wrangling / data visualization at the University of Pennsylvania (PennDesign), and writes about data visualization as a Guardian and Huffington Post contributor, [, "What Trump and Hillary Spent vs Every General Election Candidate Since 1960," Metrocosm, <http://metrocosm.com/2016-election-spending/>] MJS 4-9-2017

In early 2015, this election had all the makings of a record shattering spending race. The field included Jeb Bush, Chris Christie, Hillary Clinton and a host of other candidates with a proven track record of fundraising. Fresh off the 2012 Citizens United decision, the prospect of unlimited spending by super PACs loomed large (the Koch brothers alone intended to spend nearly \$900 million in the 2016 campaign). And the historical trend was pointing in one direction. In each of the last four presidential elections, the two general election candidates spent significantly more than in the election before. Surprisingly (or maybe not surprising at all considering both candidates' record-low approval ratings), **Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton have spent substantially less than Obama and Romney did in 2012.** To make the comparison to prior years apples-to-apples, **it's not enough to account for inflation only. Not only has the value of a dollar changed over time, but the population has grown (more potential donors) and so has the average household income (more money to donate).** When you adjust for all three factors — inflation, population growth and income growth — here is how the numbers shake out (exact calculation described further down).



By this measure, **spending in this election was a big drop-off from the recent upward trend.** But **in historical terms, 2016 looks pretty average.** It will be interesting to look back a few elections from now and see how 2016 looks in hindsight. Will 2016 turn out to be a blip in an

otherwise ever-increasing trend of campaign spending? Or were 2008 and 2012 the aberration, and is 2016 just a return to long-term normality?

FEC data is not reliable - we have no idea how much money there is

Derek Willis, 12-16-2014 ["Every Election Is the Most Expensive Election. Or Not.," New York Times,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/17/upshot/every-election-is-the-most-expensive-election-or-not.html>] MJS 4-9-2017

Was this election the most expensive midterm in history? It's possible, but nobody really knows for certain. That's because **we don't know the total cost of** the 2014 elections, or **pretty much any federal election**. Here's why: Despite the efforts of the Federal Election Commission, which has been faithfully disseminating campaign finance data since 1975, **there are limitations in the ways that data is collected and summarized that make generating totals and comparisons very difficult**. And there are other problems, too. In describing federal elections, users of the F.E.C.'s data — The New York Times among them — have regularly cited statistics that aren't strictly accurate or have made comparisons without regard to the impact of inflation or population. In a paper presented at the American Political Science Association conference this year, **Robin Kolodny, a political-science professor at Temple University, challenged the idea that we know each election is more expensive than previous ones, or that we even know how much campaigns really cost. This lack of knowledge fuels our perceptions of money in politics as an issue**, she concludes. "Perhaps **the feeling that campaign spending must be rising is not due to a significant increase in money coming into the political system, but rather a function of superior information obtained through disclosure and better understanding of how some groups circumvent legal barriers**," Ms. Kolodny writes. "However, **present understanding does NOT mean that current money flows are higher than those we understood less well in earlier times**." Ms. Kolodny's paper, "Do We Know the Cost of Campaigns in the U.S.?" is a reminder of how the oft-cited data compiled and published by the F.E.C. is not treated the way that, for example, official economic statistics are treated. Among the problems she cites: **The numbers aren't comparable across time**. The F.E.C., and most organizations that rely upon its data, report campaign finance figures in current dollars, not adjusting for inflation. In current dollars, almost every election is more expensive than the last. Some organizations account for this, but many journalists don't. **Totals don't account for population changes, either**. When the F.E.C. began publishing data, congressional districts had, on average, 469,088 people. Now they have an average population of 710,000, and the costs of communicating with a larger electorate aren't factored into comparisons between elections. **Some of the money is counted twice**. For example, House Speaker John Boehner raises millions of dollars through his own committee and transfers much of it to the National Republican Congressional Committee, the Republican Party's House organization. Both the transfers from Mr. Boehner's committee and the N.R.C.C.'s subsequent spending count as expenditures. The same is true when a corporate or labor union political action committee raises \$5,000 and gives it to a candidate, who then

spends it. The F.E.C. tracks donations and spending, but not specific money; if you gave \$200 to a candidate, there's no specific record of where that money went. Again, some organizations, such as the Center for Responsive Politics, account for this in their calculations, but not everyone does.

Strong diminishing returns on campaign spending

Chris W. **Bonneau** (University of Pittsburgh), Damon M. Cann, **2011** ["Campaign Spending, Diminishing Marginal Returns, and Campaign Finance Restrictions in Judicial Elections," Journal of Politics, <http://www.pitt.edu/~cwb7/assets/papers/JOP%2011%20article.pdf>] MJS 3-27-2017

The first hypothesis to be tested is that campaign spending in judicial elections has diminishing marginal returns. One simple way to test for diminishing marginal returns is to consider the estimated values of the shape parameters, I_1 and I_2 , for the Box-Cox transformations of incumbent and challenger spending, respectively. Recall that $I = 1$ signifies a linear relationship. Neither of the 95% HPDs for incumbent spending and challenger spending contain 1, allowing us to reject the hypothesis of a linear relationship between campaign spending and vote outcomes. Some example predicted values more concretely illustrate the effect of diminishing marginal returns. **Increasing spending at low levels (from \$100,000 of spending to \$200,000 of spending) improves the spender's vote share**; that specific increase for an incumbent increases incumbent vote share **by .999%** (95% HPD of .222, 1.84) while that level of spending by a challenger decreases incumbent vote share by 2.155 (95% HPD of -2.922 to -1.394). **In contrast, increasing spending from \$500,000 to \$600,000 for an incumbent increases incumbent vote share by only .218%** (95% HPD of .036, .538); the same increase in spending for a challenger decreases incumbent vote share by .242 (95% HPD of -.976, -.383). **The effectiveness of each additional unit of candidate spending decreases clearly for both incumbents and challengers.**

Campaign spending skews policy - data

John **Craig** and David Madland, **5-2-2014** [, "How Campaign Contributions and Lobbying Can Lead to Inefficient Economic Policy," Center for American Progress, <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2014/05/02/88917/how-campaign-contributions-and-lobbying-can-lead-to-inefficient-economic-policy/>] MJS 3-27-2017

Even worse, research indicates that **campaign contributions** and lobbying **often help shape policy outcomes**, which suggests that rent-seeking efforts are often successful. While disagreement exists about how much influence campaign contributions and lobbying have, money in politics seems to be most effective in shaping the outcomes of issues that are less visible and less ideological, exactly the type of special favors one would expect rent-seeking to target. Furthermore, there have been several findings that show a clear relationship between specific instances of lobbying or campaign contributions and government favors. To take just a

few examples: One study found that increasing lobbying reduces a corporation's effective tax rate, with an increase of 1 percent in lobbying expenditures expected to reduce a corporation's next-year tax rate between 0.5 percentage points and 1.6 percentage points. Another **study based on data from 48 different states found that a \$1 corporate campaign contribution is worth \$6.65 in lower state corporate taxes.** Finally, **federal contracts were more likely to be awarded to firms that have given federal campaigns higher contributions, even after controlling for previous contract awards. These findings are deeply troubling for our democracy and our economy.** And, unless actions are taken, the damage is likely to grow worse in the future. With recent court rulings knocking down important restrictions on money in politics, rent-seekers will have even greater opportunity to seek special favors, doing further harm to the economy.

[...]

The first inefficiency created by rent-seeking is that private resources are intentionally wasted on pursuing and competing for rents rather than producing economic gain. An important caveat of this waste is that it is irrelevant whether or not the rent-seeker achieves the sought-after policy goal. What triggers this waste is the fact that time, effort, and resources were diverted away from producing goods or rendering services that others are willing to pay for and instead used to influence policy for private gain. **The second economic concern of rent-seeking behavior is that the policy positions sought and protected create a misallocation of government or private resources.** In the case of government resources, it may be that scarce government revenue is used to create a special interest tax subsidy instead of investing in research or infrastructure that would be more beneficial to society as a whole. Private resources may also be misallocated. Without proper regulations, for example, banks may overleverage themselves if they believe that the federal government will bail them out. Finally, **rent-seeking could prove so harmful to the economy that not only are resources not used in the most efficient manner possible, but they are actually idle.** During a recession or its aftermath, for instance, workers are unemployed and significant capital remains on the sidelines. Indeed, some argue that the 2008 financial crisis—the effects of which we are still suffering from—was fueled by rent-seeking behavior.

[...]

Several researchers have found that campaign contributions can directly affect policy outcomes. In addition to the previously mentioned finding that **campaign donations play a role in winning government contracts and lowering tax rates,** scholars have found that campaign contributions influenced votes on trade policy and banking regulations and that contributions from the banking sector were associated with a greater likelihood to vote for the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which bailed out the largest U.S. banks.

Voting records show legislators match closer to their donors than their voters

Michael Barber, March 2016 [assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Brigham Young University, "REPRESENTING THE PREFERENCES OF DONORS,

PARTISANS, AND VOTERS IN THE US SENATE,” Public Opinion Quarterly,
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/51841c73e4b04fc5ce6e8f15/t/56e97017b09f951532074016/1458139160759/POQ_Early_Access.pdf] MJS

Who do legislators best represent? This paper addresses this question by investigating the degree of ideological congruence between senators and constituents on a unified scale. Specifically, I measure congruence between legislators and four constituent subsets—donors, co-partisans, supporters, and registered voters. To estimate the preferences of these groups, I use a large survey of voters and an original survey of campaign contributors that samples both in- and out-of-state contributors in the 2012 election cycle. **I find that senators’ preferences reflect the preferences of the average donor better than any other group.** Senators from both parties are slightly more ideologically extreme than the average co-partisan in their state and those who voted for them in 2012. **Finally, senators’ preferences diverge dramatically from the preference of the average voter in their state.** The degree of divergence is nearly as large as if voters were randomly assigned to a senator. **These results show that in the case of the Senate, there is a dearth of congruence between constituents and senators—unless these constituents are those who write checks and attend fund-raisers.**

Donor class is white and male

Sean Mcelwee, Jesse Rhodes, and Brian Schaffner, Feb 2017 [, "How the Skewed Demographics of the Donor Class Pull Our Politics to the Right," Slate Magazine, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2017/02/the_skewed_demographics_of_the_donor_class_arepulling_our_politics_to_the.html] MJS 3-27-2017

Our research suggests the donor class is a stratified group that does not represent the diversity of America and is politically to the right of the general population. Trump’s donors were incredibly white and extremely male: 95 percent were white, and 64 percent were white men. Hillary Clinton, who had more gender diversity among her donors, still had an overwhelmingly white donor pool. Though money in politics is normally considered to be an issue tied to class (and it is!) our new report, Whose Voice, Whose Choice?, shows that **the influence of a white, wealthy, and male donor class could impede progress on gender and racial equity.**

[...]

Money in politics tends to be thought of as a good government issue, something distinct from racial justice and gender equity. Part of this is because donors do not report their races and genders when contributing to campaigns. But our work suggests that **the rise of big money in politics could hamper progress on race and gender equity.** Research by political scientist Michael Barber shows that politicians are more responsive to the preferences of donors than nondonors, even nondonors who voted for them. Other research finds that donors who don’t live in representatives’ districts receive more representation than nondonor constituents.

Candidates of color struggle to raise money, and business interests tend to donate more heavily to white candidates. Powerful lobbies such as the private prison industry use their

influence to support policies that deepen mass incarceration, disproportionately affecting black and brown people. **The overwhelmingly white male skew of the donor class is distorting policy.** Money-in-politics organizations tend to be disproportionately white and tend to frame their work around good governance and preventing corruption. Instead, they should incorporate race and gender equity into their work and favor policies such as public financing that empower both candidates and donors of color.

Obama agenda was corrupted by donors

Sean Mcelwee, 12-8-2016 [, "Whose Voice, Whose Choice? The Distorting Influence of the Political Donor Class in Our Big-Money Elections," No Publication, <http://www.demos.org/publication/whose-voice-whose-choice-distorting-influence-political-donor-class-our-big-money-electi>] MJS 4-12-2017

When President Obama took office in 2009, it immediately became clear that many big donors were skeptical of his agenda. Obama called for stronger federal action on climate change, extensive regulation of big banks, expanded health insurance and a massive federal stimulus package. To many wealthy Americans, such an agenda is anathema. As political scientists Larry Bartels, Benjamin Page and Jason Seawright discuss in their pioneering study of the opinions of the wealthy, affluent Americans are "extremely active politically and... much more conservative than the American public as a whole with respect to important policies concerning taxation, economic regulation, and especially social welfare programs."³⁴ Though much of Obama's agenda passed because Democrats controlled the House, Presidency and Senate, contemporaneous reporting from journalist Lee Fang suggests that many powerful donors were gearing up to halt Obama's agenda. ³⁵ **There is evidence that the powerful donor class opposition shaped key pieces of Obama-era legislation.**³⁶

Donors are white and male - and they are more conservative than voters

Sean Mcelwee, 12-8-2016 [, "Whose Voice, Whose Choice? The Distorting Influence of the Political Donor Class in Our Big-Money Elections," No Publication, <http://www.demos.org/publication/whose-voice-whose-choice-distorting-influence-political-donor-class-our-big-money-electi>] MJS 4-12-2017

Though history will consider 2016 one of America's most extraordinary elections, one thing remained unchanged: presidential donors were white, male and wealthy. Although the voting age electorate was more diverse (26 percent people of color) than ever before, **91 percent of donors were white.**² A woman was on the ballot for the first time, yet only 47 percent of donors were women. **White men accounted for 48 percent of donors, but 35 percent of the adult population. Though only 3 percent of the population were millionaires, 17 percent of donors were.** Trump claims he will represent all Americans, but his donors certainly aren't representative of America—64 percent of the money he raised came from white men, who make up a bit more than a third of the population. People of color, who make up a quarter of the population, were responsible for only 3 percent of the contributions to the incoming president. [...]

As Figure 8 shows, people of color²⁶ and women make up a smaller share of donors than they do of the general population. In addition, they make up a far smaller share of contributions. White men represent approximately 35 percent of the population, but they comprise 45 percent of donors and account for 57 percent of money contributed.²⁷ These data likely understate the white male share of contributions, because CCES doesn't include the small share of major donors (such as those giving \$350,000), who make up a large portion of money raised.²⁸ These donors are nearly all white. In the CCES Cumulative sample, women of color account for 13 percent of the adult population, but only 6 percent of money contributed. Black women made up 6 percent of the adult population, but 3 percent of contributions. Latina women comprised 4 percent of the adult population, but 1 percent of total contributions. In the CCES sample, contributions of less than \$200 account for 10 percent of the total amount contributed, contributions between \$200 and \$999 account for 28 percent of money contributed, and contributions of more than \$1,000 account for 62 percent of the money contributed.

[...]

The majority of non-donors in the sample supported each of these reforms. The expansion of **SCHIP** was most popular, receiving more than three-quarters support, while the stimulus bill and healthcare reform law garnered a slight majority (the question focuses on the individual mandate, which is the least popular part of the law). Both Dodd-Frank and Waxman-Markey, which faced significant opposition from powerful interests, enjoyed more than 60 percent support among non-donors. But among donors who gave more than \$1,000, the story changes dramatically. All of these reforms except for strengthening SCHIP were opposed by the majority of this affluent group of donors.⁴¹ Only 39 percent of donors who contributed more than \$1,000 supported the Waxman-Markey clean energy bill, which would have instituted a cap and trade system aiming to reduce emissions to 17 percent of 2005 levels by 2050.⁴² Research suggests that the constituents of legislators who signed a "no climate tax" pledge overwhelmingly support action on climate change.⁴³ Similarly, only 35 percent of large donors supported the stimulus plan, which created or saved millions of American jobs.⁴⁴ Only 37% of large donors supported the Affordable Care Act, which has been successful in reducing the uninsured rate. Finally, just under half of large donors supported the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill, which established a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and helped restore stability to the financial system. As Figure 11 shows, large donors stood in firm opposition to the progressive agenda supported by a vast majority of Americans.

[...]

The 2011 political cycle was dominated by a dramatic debt-ceiling crisis and intense debates over federal finances. Republican politicians supported harsh cuts to federal spending on seniors and the poor to rein in the debt, while Democrats argued in favor of a mix of tax hikes and cuts to defense spending. The Republican position hardened, and eventually they said that they would not accept any tax hikes and pushed the nation to the edge of default to extract concessions.⁴⁸ Research suggests that the deficit is a higher ranking issue for the rich than it is for the middle class and for white people than for people of color. Since the largest donors are more likely to benefit from tax cuts and less supportive of higher spending, they are more likely than average Americans to support an austerity agenda. The 2012 and 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies allow us to explore some more recent data, particularly related to key economic issues like Bowles-Simpson, the Ryan budget and the Bush tax cuts.⁴⁹ These budgetary issues can help us explore how donors might influence debates about taxation, revenues, redistribution and inequality. (For full question wording, see Appendix D).

[...]

Donors Are More Supportive of the Austerity Agenda. Donors were more supportive than non-donors of the Ryan budget, Bowles-Simpson and the full extension of the Bush tax cuts. The donor class was also more supportive of cuts to domestic spending, and far

more opposed to cuts to defense spending than the general population. Moreover, larger contributors were generally more supportive of tax cuts and spending cuts (and more opposed to defense spending cuts) than were smaller donors. As Figure 17 shows, the differences between non-donors and donors of more than \$1,000 were especially large, frequently exceeding 10 percentage points.

[...]

Donors, particularly the biggest donors, are overwhelmingly white and male. OpenSecrets finds that **of the 500 largest donors in 2014, only 12 were people of color, and none of the top 100 donors were people of color.** Just one of the top 500 donors was black, and only one was Latino.⁵⁵ Only 22 percent of the top 500 donors were women.⁵⁶ When looking at the share of money coming from donors, the divide is even starker: **women accounted for only 8 percent of the top 500 donor contributions.**⁵⁷ To explore whether the fact that the donor class is overwhelmingly white and male might affect policy, we compare the preferences of donors across race and gender.

[...]

We combined the affirmative action questions from the CCES 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014 surveys and found that white donors were much less likely to support affirmative action than were black and Latino donors, as Figure 22 shows.⁶⁵ **Only 37 percent of white donors supported affirmative action,** compared with 88 percent of black donors and 56 percent of Latino donors and 65 percent of all donors of color.

[...]

While many claim that there are big donors on the left and right, the reality is that Independent and Republican donors are far more to the extreme right than Democratic donors are to the left. This divergence is clearly a key factor in the overall shift of our politics to the right in recent decades. **True democracy is not found in an ideological war between two billionaire donor classes. This “simulacrum” of democracy will only increase inequalities, because Independent and Republican donors are more extreme than Democratic donors.** Further, while Republicans make up 38 percent of the adult population, they make up 46 percent of donors giving more than \$1,000. Democrats make up 48 percent of the adult population, but 46 percent of donors giving more than \$1,000. Few have explored the policy consequences of America’s monochrome donor class. This report makes it clear: **donors are slowing progress on racial and reproductive justice.** In addition, our report makes it clear that **the donor class has been a champion of austerity and unrestrained markets, rather than a robust public sector.**

Well over half the money comes from 358 families

Nicholas Confessore, Sarah Cohen and Karen Yourish, 10-10-2015 [, "The Families Funding the 2016 Presidential Election," NYT, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/11/us/politics/2016-presidential-election-super-pac-donors.html?_r=0] MJS 4-12-2017

Just 158 families have provided nearly half of the early money for efforts to capture the White House. They are overwhelmingly white, rich, older and male, in a nation that is being remade by the young, by women, and by black and brown voters. Across a

sprawling country, they reside in an archipelago of wealth, exclusive neighborhoods dotting a handful of cities and towns. And in an economy that has minted billionaires in a dizzying array of industries, most made their fortunes in just two: finance and energy. Now they are deploying their vast wealth in the political arena, providing almost half of all the seed money raised to support Democratic and Republican presidential candidates. **Just 158 families, along with companies they own or control, contributed \$176 million in the first phase of the campaign**, a New York Times investigation found. Not since before Watergate have so few people and businesses provided so much early money in a campaign, most of it through channels legalized by the Supreme Court's Citizens United decision five years ago.

[...]

The 158 families each contributed \$250,000 or more in the campaign through June 30, according to the most recent available Federal Election Commission filings and other data, **while an additional 200 families gave more than \$100,000**. Together, **the two groups contributed well over half the money in the presidential election** -- the vast majority of it supporting Republicans.

Money is buying vetoes - studies can't pick up on it

U Chicago Stigler Center, 5-2-2016 [, "Historical Comparison Shows the Extent of Growth in Political Contributions from Big Donors," Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State,

<https://research.chicagobooth.edu/stigler/indexes/campaign-financing-capture-index/campaign-financing-capture-historical-comparisons>] MJS 4-12-2017

Many politicians who receive money from super PACs claim that large donations do not affect their decision making, and despite the immense growth in political spending in recent years, **many academic researchers encounter difficulties when they search for empirical evidence that campaign contributions influence legislation**. Some succeed (see Powell 2012), but overall, most scholars tend to see campaign contributions as having little influence over policy. According to Coates, **this is partly due to what he calls a "research design problem."** He adds: "Another thing is that **we have many, many vetoes in the political process. Some of the most effective money flows to people who are in a position to block something from happening, which is going to be harder to find evidence of, because by definition you're preserving the status quo.** You have to have some benchmark to measure what would have happened had the veto not been exercised. There are some studies that do find evidence of policy impact. These tend to be in places where the money is flowing to a committee chairman, or to specific influential members."

Campaign contributions empirically caused mass incarceration, subprime lending crisis, and prevent raising the minimum wage

Adam Lioz, 2014 [Counsel and Senior Advisor, Policy & Outreach, "Stacked Deck: How the Racial Bias in Our Big Money Political System Undermines Our Democracy and Our Economy," Demos,

<http://www.demos.org/publication/stacked-deck-how-racial-bias-our-big-money-political-system-undermines-our-democracy-a-0>] MJS 4-12-2017

Finally, **we examine the role that money in politics plays in five specific areas of policymaking that have profoundly and disproportionately affected people of color: 1) the growth of the private prison industrial complex; 2) the subprime lending crisis; 3) the stagnant minimum wage; 4) the recent passage of paid sick leave legislation in Connecticut after the enactment of publicly funded elections; and 5) the fight to protect basic voting rights.** **These case studies illustrate the distinct ways in which race intersects with our big money system. The first two examine how the power of big money combined with systemic racism has fueled two of the most destructive policies targeted toward people of color.** The third and fourth stories examine generally applicable policies that may not be a direct result of clear racial targeting and yet have had disproportionate impact on the lives of people of color, who are over-represented among the poor and working class. In addition, *the Connecticut paid sick days example shows what we can accomplish when our elected officials have the opportunity to run for office by appealing to ordinary voters, not just wealthy donors and special interests*; and the final story demonstrates how organizing in communities of color to protect the freedom to vote can build long-term power to address the role of money in politics. The goal is to connect the dots and make explicitly clear what many already suspect or feel: that **our political system underserves communities of color; that the outsized role of large campaign contributions from a small number of wealthy, white contributors is a key reason; and that solving this problem is a critical component in the larger drive for racial equity in America.**

[...]

As noted above, **the profound change in incarceration rates over the past thirty years is not due to more crime, but rather the result of specific policy decisions that have dramatically increased sentencing rates.** While recent comparative polling data is difficult to find, some research suggests that wealthier people are more likely to support building more prisons as a strategy to reduce crime. For example an analysis of political scientist Martin Gilens' data shows that **respondents in the highest income bracket polled were more likely than those in the lowest to favor building more prisons.**¹⁸³ These policy decisions have led to billions of dollars in profits for one special interest: **the private prison industry.** Private prison companies are an entire industry built around a profoundly perverse incentive: the more people our society puts in prison and the longer their sentences, the more money they make.¹⁸⁴ And these companies have not left this basic math to chance. **Over the past thirty years—the same period in which the number of people incarcerated in America has exploded—the industry has employed a deliberate and targeted strategy to shape public policy through campaign spending** and lobbying.¹⁸⁵ Under the rubric of public safety, private prison companies and special interest groups, like the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), spend millions of dollars to lobby for policies that create demand for their product: incarceration. A 2012 Associated Press review found that Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), The GEO Group, and a third privately-held company Management and Training Corp. spent at least \$45 million in combined lobbying and campaign contributions at the federal and state levels in the previous decade.¹⁸⁶ ALEC is a partnership between approximately 300 corporations and 2,000 conservative legislators in which corporate lobbyists vote alongside legislators on model bills to push in state legislatures across the country.¹⁸⁷ Together, they have successfully lobbied for harsher sentencing laws for non-violent offenses, "three-strikes" laws that incarcerate individuals for life, mandatory sentencing that removes the ability of judges

to consider any circumstances outside of the case, and so-called “truth in sentencing” laws that eliminate the option of parole.¹⁸⁸

Their work has paid off. Since securing their first contracts in the mid-1980s, private prison companies have experienced growth year after year. While the total number of inmates in federal and state prisons doubled between 1990 and 2009, the private prison population grew 17 times over the same period.¹⁸⁹ Substantial profits have followed. The two largest for-profit prison companies, CCA and GEO Group, saw their annual revenue double over the last decade due to the sharp rise in incarcerations.¹⁹⁰ Both are now billion-dollar companies.

[...]

The private prison industry’s undemocratic influence on public policy has contributed to historic rates of incarceration, particularly for people of color. Serving time in prison not only strips productive members from their communities, but the negative economic effects continue long after incarceration has ended, perpetuating cycles of poverty. Communities of color bear a disproportionate burden from our nation’s sky-high incarceration rates, and without significant changes in criminal justice policy the private prison industry’s profits will continue to flourish at the expense of so many young men of color.

[...]

The political power of mortgage lenders—through high-paid lobbyists and major campaign contributions—influenced Congress to deregulate the lending industry, loosen consumer protections, and convince regulators to look the other way. In the aftermath of the collapse of the housing market, it became clear that **banks and financial interests exacerbated the crisis by using their influence to water down legislation that would have protected consumers and communities.** Extensive lobbying and targeted campaign contributions gave banks and financial interests the leverage to fight consumer protections that could have prevented predatory targeting of communities of color.

[...]

Even through the housing crisis, homeownership continues to be a critical pathway to building wealth for low- and moderate-income households.²⁹⁰ Yet, **the outsized role of big money in politics has contributed to a significant erosion of the American dream in the past decade.** The subprime mortgage crisis is a textbook example of how corporate interests, backed by millions in campaign contributions and lobbying, were able to maximize their profits while households of color faced the greatest loss of wealth from their communities in modern history.

Raising the minimum wage would lift millions of workers out of poverty, including millions of workers of color.³⁰⁴ In total, **if the minimum wage were raised to \$10.10 an hour, more than 3.5 million workers of color would be lifted out of poverty.**³⁰⁵ Nearly 25 percent of all affected workers would be Latino, though Latinos comprise only 16 percent of the overall workforce.³⁰⁶ Likewise, more than 14 percent of workers affected would be African American,³⁰⁷ while African Americans comprise only 12 percent of the overall workforce.³⁰⁸ Twenty eight percent of all African American workers and 32 percent of all Latino workers would benefit from an increased minimum wage.³⁰⁹ Asian Americans could see their wages rise a collective \$2.4 billion if the wage were raised to just over \$10 per hour.³¹⁰ Critically, **raising the floor doesn’t just help workers earning the minimum, but creates upward pressure on wages that would boost earnings for more than 11 million workers** currently earning more than \$10 per hour.³¹¹

[...]

Increasing the minimum wage is widely popular with the general public and would help millions of struggling families. **Yet the minimum wage remains stagnant at the federal level** and in many states **because it is not a priority for the affluent**, and because business interests actively advocate against raising it. In contrast, **a low capital gains tax rate is generally unpopular among the public but continues to receive favorable treatment because affluent and corporate interest support keeping it low**. The result is that millions of workers, particularly workers of color, face increasing levels of economic insecurity.

[...]

Thousands of workers in fast food, retail, and other industries have risked their jobs and livelihoods over the past two years by striking for higher pay and the right to join a union.³²⁶ President Obama recently signed an executive order raising the minimum wage for federal contractors to \$10.10 per hour.³²⁷ And, Seattle recently enacted the nation's highest minimum wage, which will ultimately reach \$15 per hour.³²⁸ Yet in spite of this momentum, **Congress and many states have allowed the real value of the minimum wage to decline in recent decades**. Before it was increased in 2007, the federal minimum wage was stuck at \$5.15 per hour for ten years.³²⁹ It has now been more than five years since it was last increased.³³⁰ While troubling, **this is not surprising given** the recent study (noted above) by Princeton and Northwestern political scientists which found **that wealthy Americans and organized business interests have a strong impact on policy outcomes, while average voters have virtually none**.³³¹

[...]

Raising the minimum wage is popular with the public, but not the wealthy. **Candidates, who understand that fundraising is essential to a successful campaign, have a significant incentive to oppose raising the minimum wage and often little or no financial incentive to support it**. Unions have lobbied heavily for increasing the wage and are substantial players in election and advocacy campaigns—but they are consistently and substantially outspent by wealthy donors and corporate interests.³⁴¹ The opposite relationship is true with the capital gains tax rate—a low rate is unpopular with the public but enjoys strong support from the donor class. The result, **in our big money system, is economic policy that benefits the wealthy (largely white) minority, and leaves people of color the rest of low- and middle-income America behind**. Even though far fewer Americans benefit from capital gains than from an increased minimum wage, Congress maintains a special lower tax rate on capital gains but refuses to increase the wage. The real value of the minimum wage is lower now than it was in 1968, leaving millions of workers—who are disproportionately people of color—struggling to stay afloat.

[...]

Connecticut's paid sick day law is a testament to the power of public financing to swing the political pendulum towards voters and away from wealthy interests. **When elected officials are dependent on corporate donors to fund their campaigns, business interests enjoy disproportionate sway over the policymaking process**. They can block policies they perceive as against their interests and drown out opposing voices. **When candidates have access to public financing, they can run—and win—on policies that are supported by voters and benefit working- and middle-class families and people of color**. Changing the

way campaigns are funded can change the debate, ensuring that a wider range of voices is heard, and elevating candidates and policies that are better aligned with the preferences of the general public and more responsive to constituents' needs.

Just 10k from banks increases pro-bank policy votes by 8%

Thomas **Stratmann**, 2002 [George Mason University, "CAN SPECIAL INTERESTS BUY CONGRESSIONAL VOTES? EVIDENCE FROM FINANCIAL SERVICES LEGISLATION," The Journal of Law & Economics, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.1086/340091.pdf>] MJS

The challenge in the campaign contribution literature has been to overcome the simultaneous-equation bias that is inherent in the vote-contribution relationship. This paper proposes a new method to overcome this bias. It examines behavior at different points of time and relates it to contributions at different points of time. **This method is applied to legislators' voting decisions on financial services regulation.** Analyzing this type of legislation is of particular interest because it allows an analysis of the net influence of competing interest groups. Consistent with the proposed model's predictions, **I find evidence that changes in contribution levels determine changes in roll call voting behavior,** that contributions from competing groups are partially offsetting, and that junior legislators are more responsive to changes in contribution levels than are senior legislators.

[...]

Table 7, columns 4–6, examine legislators who are more junior, that is, legislators who have been in the 1991–92 Congress less than or equal to four election cycles, constituting about one-half of the entire sample size.³⁷ All the coefficients have the anticipated signs and are statistically significant. The pseudo-R² in column 5 indicates that 23 percent of the variation in the changing voting behavior can be explained by campaign contributions.³⁸ Column 4 shows that one extra dollar from banking contributions is more effective in changing legislators' voting behavior than an extra dollar received from insurance and investment interests combined. The difference in the coefficients' sizes is statistically significant at the 1 percent level and implies that if both opposing interests increase their contributions by \$10,000, the estimated index increases by .2. Most estimated values of the index range between 2 and 2, and given the nonlinearity of the logistic distribution function, **a \$10,000 contribution increase raises the probability of voting in banking interests by about 8 percent.** Comparison of the results for junior representatives with all representatives shows that contributions are more effective for junior members because the size of the coefficients tends to increase for junior members.³⁹ The results for junior legislators are consistent with the hypothesis that PACs attempt to sway junior legislators.⁴⁰ I also examined the voting behavior of more senior legislators (not reported in the tables) and found that the coefficient on investment contributions was statistically significant at the 5 percent level but that the coefficients on insurance and banking contributions were not significant.⁴

Most studies underestimate the effect - it's not about voting it's about what's on the agenda

Patrick **Flavin** (Baylor University) and William W. Franko (West Virginia University), 2015 ["Government's Unequal Attentiveness to Citizens' Political Priorities," https://blogs.baylor.edu/patrick_j_flavin/files/2010/09/Unequal_Priorities_8.2.16-tb9c13.pdf] MJS

An accumulation of evidence suggests citizens with low incomes have relatively little influence over the policy decisions made by lawmakers in the United States. However, **long before elected officials are asked to cast a final vote on a bill's passage, an equally important**

decision has already been made: the decision for government to focus its limited attention and agenda space on the issue at all. Therefore, it is possible that **political inequality is infused earlier in the policymaking process at the agenda setting** stage if the issues held important by some citizens are given attention while the issues held important by others are not. To investigate this question, we develop novel state-level measures of citizens' issue priorities and find sizable differences in which issues poor and rich citizens think are most important and deserving of government attention. We then use bill introduction data from state legislatures to measure government attention and uncover evidence that **state legislators are less likely to act on an issue when it is prioritized by low income citizens as compared to affluent citizens.** These findings have important implications for our understanding of political equality and the functioning of American democracy.

[...]

Our finding that **state legislators pay less attention to the priorities of the poor by leaving those issues off of the political agenda** also suggests the need for scholars to better understand the implications of this particular form of unresponsiveness. Seminal work in this area suggests an important aspect of political power is the ability to affect the types of policies considered by lawmakers (Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Schattschneider 1960). Indeed, **the issues that never enter the political arena can be just as important to the policymaking process as the creation of a new law.** Avoiding a debate or vote on an issue allows those in power to avoid taking a stance on a potentially dividing policy, while also limiting exposure of these issues to the public. From this perspective, it is likely that the **current literature on unequal political responsiveness actually underestimates the influence of wealth on policymaking because nearly all of this work focuses only on policy outcomes and neglects the agenda setting stage altogether.** By demonstrating that political inequality exists at the agenda setting stage as well, this study provides a more comprehensive understanding about the different ways in which inequality can enter into the American policymaking process.

Wealthy donors set the congressional agenda AND more reliance means more speech time

Peter K. Enns (Cornell University), Nathan J Kelly (University of Tennessee), Jana Morgan (University of Tennessee), Christopher Witko (University of South Carolina), June 2, 2016 ["The Power of Economic Interests and the Congressional Economic Policy Agenda,"

http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/sites/default/files/witko_the_power_of_economic_interests_and_the_congressional_economic_policy_agenda.pdf] MJS

There is an oft-noted "bias" toward upper income groups in the U.S. organized interest system, but based on existing research it is debatable whether this bias matters very much for policy outcomes. How bias may shape which economic problems are addressed or neglected in the first place has seldom been studied, however. We argue that **in order to receive resources from organized interests members of Congress must "signal" their support for these interests by discussing the economic problems that they prioritize, resulting in greater congressional attention to the economic problems of concern to upper income interests and a relative neglect of economic problems that concern other groups.** To examine this argument we develop measures of attention to various economic problems using congressional

speech in the Congressional Record from 1995-2012. We find that during this period of relatively high upper class bias in the interest system there was a great deal of attention to the concerns of the wealthy, and far less attention to some of the concerns of lower income groups. At the micro-level, using a difference-in-differences analysis we observe that **when individual MCs become more reliant on the resources of upper income interests they subsequently discuss the problems prioritized by these interests more.**

[...]

MCs rely on organized interest campaign contributions and lobbying assistance to achieve their goals (Fenno 1973, Hall & Deardorff 2006, Witko 2006) and **one way that MCs can attract interest group support is by discussing the problems they prioritize.** Indeed, speech about particular issues or problems is perhaps the broadest way to conceive of and measure the Congressional agenda.¹ While there is nothing necessarily wrong with these existing measures for certain purposes, since much of what elected policy makers do on a daily basis is speak, speech has good face validity as a measure of the priorities of various institutions (Edwards III & Wood 1999, Quinn, Monroe, Colaresi, Crespino & Radev 2010, Wood 2009). For issues that are not yet on the agenda, it is an important way to get them there (Rae 1998). Even within the context of legislative debates on “old” issues like abortion or food stamps MCs can emphasize certain problems rather than others, and this can influence the structure of policies that are enacted (Bessette 1997, Schonhardt-Bailey 2008). **What issues MCs discuss** and how they discuss them may also influence the President’s issue attention and media coverage (Eshbaugh-Soha & Peake 2005), which **can indirectly affect policy making by influencing public or elite opinion.** Thus, if **organized interests** shape the issues that MCs discuss, then they **are exerting control over the legislative agenda.**

[...]

We argued that organized interests can use their resources to shape which economic problems are addressed or neglected. **We found that an issue of concern to the wealthy but not lower and middle class actors, the deficit received a lot more attention as it increases,** but for inequality the same relationship was not found. We also found MClevel results consistent with the idea that **high bias in the interest system would produce more attention to “upper class problems”, in so far as aggregate bias translates into a greater reliance on business and wealthy individuals at the micro-level.** We are currently coding other issues and extending the analysis to cover more time.

1/3 of votes in congress are influenced by campaign spending

Douglas D. Roscoe and Shannon Jenkins, March 2005 “A Meta-Analysis of Campaign Contributions’ Impact on Roll Call Voting,” Social Science Quarterly,
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/42956049.pdf>] MJS

Objectives. Conventional wisdom about the link between campaign contributions and roll call votes is that contributions rarely matter because groups tend to give to like-minded legislators. **This meta-analysis** examines the conventional wisdom by **analyzing published research** on this topic. Methods. **More than 30 studies are pooled to produce more than 350 individual**

tests of the contributions-roll call link. Extending meta- regression (Stanley and Jarrell, 1989), a logit meta-analysis is conducted to summarize the literature and assess the importance of various modeling choices. Results. We find that some, but not all, model specifications have an impact on whether significant results are present. Models that control for friendly giving by including a measure of legislators' ideology and that include more than one contributions variable are less likely to produce significant results. Conclusions. After considering the impact of model choice on study results, **we conclude that one-third of roll call votes exhibit the impact of campaign contributions.**

1% more business interest group power → \$7.06 less welfare

Carl Klarner (Indiana State University), Xiaotong Mao (Indiana State University), Stan Buchanan (Indiana State University), 2007 ["Business Interest Group Power and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families," Social Studies Quarterly
<https://sci-hub.cc/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2007.00449.x>] MJS

Model 1 of Table 1 tests our expectations for the approach states have adopted toward the TANF guarantee. **BUSINESS INTEREST GROUP POWER is strongly associated with the amount of the TANF guarantee. For every 1 percent more business lobbyists that exist in a state, the monthly TANF guarantee for a family of four is \$7.06 lower.** The percent of business interest groups ranges from 31.9 to 60.2 among states (the mean is 44.6 with a standard deviation of 5.33). **This means that a change from a state with the lowest level of business power to one with the highest level of business power is associated with a \$199.65 decrease in monthly TANF benefits.** These findings are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Table 1, Model 1 reports the results from the strict definition of business interest groups, which excludes natural resources, transportation, and utility lobbyists. When an alternative indicator of business power is examined that includes these types of groups, it also attains statistical significance at the 0.05 level.¹⁶ This finding increases our confidence that the higher the concentration of business interest groups in a state, the lower the TANF guarantee. In Model 2 of Table 1, we turn to our ordered probit analysis of TANF provisions in the form of time limits. **The results suggest that a state's TANF time limits are shorter as the percent of business interest groups is greater, and attains statistical significance at the 0.05 level.** Ordered probit coefficients do not give one an intuitive grasp of the impact of independent variables. The impact of one independent variable is contingent on the values of the other independent variables. If all other independent variables are set at their means, the impact of BUSINESS INTEREST GROUP POWER can be assessed on the probability of observing a given time limit. Such a state with the lowest observed level of business power (see above) is predicted to have a 4.4 percent chance of having a two-year time limit. In contrast, such a state with the highest level of business power has a 60.2 percent chance of having a two-year limit. **The predicted probability of observing a five-year time limit goes from 79.7 to 20.4 percent when we go from the lowest to highest observed levels of business power.** These are substantial impacts. Again, when the alternative indicator of BUSINESS INTEREST GROUP POWER mentioned above is examined, findings are not appreciably different, although only attaining weak statistical significance (p > 0.10). Again, these findings indicate robust support for the hypothesis of business interest group influence.

[...]

The results of our cross-sectional analysis indicate that TANF benefit levels are lower in states where business is more strongly mobilized. Second, evidence was found that **states**

with more business lobbyists mandate shorter periods of time before TANF recipients lose their benefits.

Last, no evidence was found that states with stronger business interest groups are more likely to have TANF family caps. The findings are highly consistent with our expectations. State policies on maximum benefit and time limits have a direct impact on wealth redistribution and labor-market behavior, which are intimately related to business interests. The family cap, on the other hand, is arguably more of a symbolic policy that has to do with public attitudes about abuse of the welfare system by having more children. The family cap has less to do with control over labor markets because of the small impact this policy has on benefit levels and, therefore, caseloads. The previous literature has pointed out that family-cap policy is mostly related to issues of “dependency” and “illegitimacy.” These concerns are highly associated in the public mind with attitudes about African Americans (Gilens, 1999), which explains why that variable is a key determinant of family-cap policy.

Interests matter more in ¾ years. People just cater to voters in the publicized election year

Lee Drutman, 2012 [senior fellow at the Sunlight Foundation, adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University, senior fellow in the program on political reform at the New America Foundation, “What do rich political donors get for their contributions?,” *Sunlight Foundation*, August 15, 2012

<https://sunlightfoundation.com/2012/08/15/what-do-rich-political-donors-get-for-their-contribution/s/> //WGC

So it's good to read **Martin Gilens'** excellent work showing convincingly that where rich people and poor people disagree on policy, the federal government pretty much always sides with the rich people. Gilens (**a professor of politics at Princeton**) **has a new book out called Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America.** This week, he's got a three-part series (here, here, and here) up over at the Monkey Cage with a few killer charts, and a very good essay distilling his argument in the Boston Review.

[...]

Interestingly, Gilens notes that **in presidential election years, policy becomes more responsive to poor and middle-class voters. But these programs are also more likely to lose funding later, when the poor and middle-class voters are less important to politicians because they don't participate in the ongoing fundraising wars.** Along those lines, here's another killer figure from Gilens: Yes, rich people are more likely to vote, and more likely to volunteer on a political campaign. But where they really shine is in the giving of money. There's more to explore in the book and in Gilens' posts. And there are also some questions that go beyond his scope. As he notes, his data only looks at income by decile, and there are some interesting questions about whether **the top 1%** are even different from the top 10%. There is some evidence that indeed they do. They **tend to care significantly more about deficits than the overall economy, and they tend to be very bullish on the private-sector and down on the government.** None of this is surprising. Gilens' findings are an important part of the conversation about who is funding our campaigns and what they are getting. **If we rely on the wealthiest Americans to finance our elections,** is it any coincidence that our **politicians are highly responsive to the policy preferences of rich people, while the preferences of poor and middle-class voters have pretty much no effect?**”

Con Con

Democrats have no power to abolish the EC - it won't pass the Senate and House

Aaron **Blake**, 11-16-2016 ["Abolish the electoral college? Dream on, Democrats.," https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/09/getting-rid-of-the-electoral-college-dream-on-democrats/?utm_term=.3f60dcba44c1] MJS 3-16-2017

So you can bet that are a whole bunch of **Democrats right now that would like to put an end to this whole electoral college thing. The bad news: They have virtually no power to make that happen**-- and even they did have any power, it'd be immensely difficult. The electoral college, after all, is enshrined in our Constitution, which means getting rid of it requires a constitutional amendment. That's a two-thirds vote in both the House and the Senate and the ratification of three-fourths (38) of the 50 states. Democrats not only lost the presidency on Tuesday; they failed to win a majority in the Senate and didn't gain as much ground in the House as they had hoped. **The idea that this would even be brought up in a GOP-controlled Congress -- much less approved with a two-thirds majority in both chambers -- just isn't in the cards**. And even if it passed that congressional threshold, 38 states aren't going to ratify it. Red states won't like the idea because it's been a perceived boon to Republicans, and swing states won't like it because it means they lose their prized status in the presidential campaign.

Convention is the one way to pass reforms such as the EC

Lessig, Lawrence (2011-10-05). Harvard Political Science Professor. *Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress--and a Plan to Stop It* (pp. 292-294). Grand Central Publishing.

In addition to these extra-constitutional means of constitutional reform, however, **the Framers added two more tools that were internal to the Constitution itself**: First, a simpler method by which Congress could initiate amendments to the Constitution. **Second, a more complicated method by which "a convention" could propose amendments to the Constitution**. Under the first path, Congress proposes an amendment to the Constitution, if two-thirds of Congress agree. Under the second path, Congress calls "a convention for proposing Amendments" **if two-thirds of the state legislatures ask it to**. Amendments proposed either way get ratified if three-fourths of the states agree. The first path has been the exclusive path for all twenty-six amendments to our Constitution. Every amendment has been first proposed by Congress and then ratified by the states. The second path has never been used. Indeed, in the first one hundred years after the founding, there were only ten applications calling for a convention submitted by the states to Congress. ⁷ But even though no convention has been called, the calls for a convention have had an important reformatory effect, most famously in the context of the Seventeenth Amendment (making the Senate elected), when the states came within one vote of calling for a convention, and Congress quickly proposed the amendment the convention would have proposed. ⁸ Even though it has never happened, however, **a constitutional convention is the one final plausible strategy for forcing fundamental reform onto our Congress**. ⁹ It is also the most viable grass-roots strategy for forcing reform onto the system. **It's going to be easier to organize movements within the states to demand fundamental reform than it**

will be to organize Congress to vote for any particular amendment to the Constitution to effect that reform. And more important, it's going to be much easier to get a conversation about fundamental reform going in the context of a call for a convention than it will be through any other plausible political means. The reason is an important strategic opportunity that **a call for a convention would offer and that a demand for an amendment would not: different souls with different objectives could agree on the need for a convention** without agreeing on the particular proposals that a convention should recommend. Some might want an amendment to give the president line-item-veto power. Some might want a balanced-budget amendment. Some might want term limits. **Some might want to abolish the Electoral College**, or ban political gerrymandering. And some might want to demand a system for funding elections that restores integrity and independence to Congress (me!). All of these different souls could agree at least on the need to create the platform upon which their different ideas could be debated. **That platform is the convention**. And if the convention then recommended some of these changes, those changes would be sent to Congress to be sent to the states for the purpose of ratification. They would remain invalid, mere "propos[als]," until they were ratified by thirty-eight states.

Both the left and right want the Con Con - it's a real possibility

Ashley **Balcerzak**, 11-13-2015 [This story was published by the Center for Public Integrity, a nonprofit, nonpartisan investigative news organization in Washington, "Why Some Liberals and Conservatives Are Teaming Up to Rewrite the Constitution," Slate Magazine, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2016/01/liberals_and_conservatives_a_re_teaming_up_to_call_a_new_constitutional.html] MJS 3-16-2017

It's only a short phrase buried in the U.S. Constitution, but it enables an unprecedented mechanism to change the law of the land: If two-thirds of the states demand it, Congress "shall call a convention" for proposing constitutional amendments. A hopeless pipe dream? Actually, no. **Some 27 states have called for a convention** on a balanced budget amendment, which would force the federal government to pass budgets that do not enlarge the national debt. This means that theoretically just seven more states have to act for a constitutional convention to be called, at least on that subject. In just the first few weeks of this year's state legislative sessions, at least **10 states have bills pending that call for a convention**. So suddenly **such a meeting**, not held since the earliest days of this country, **is becoming a real possibility**. Even ***GOP presidential candidates are seizing on the burgeoning movement, with Florida Sen. Marco Rubio, former Arkansas Gov. Mike Huckabee, and Ohio Gov. John Kasich endorsing this unconventional process*** and rallying their supporters as legislative sessions start up again. While the legislation appears to be a grassroots effort bubbling up from the states, in reality it's quite the opposite. National groups have been holding workshops, publishing tips, and even crafting model legislation for years to persuade legislators to use their states to circumvent the logjam in Congress. **The push is led by** the American Legislative Exchange Council, the Virginia-headquartered conservative think tank known as **ALEC** made up of state lawmakers and corporations that advocate free-market policies in the states. It has a cadre of other like-minded national allies working on the controversial strategy to revise the country's supreme laws. But in a fight reflecting the broader schism within the Republican Party,

other national groups on the right such as the John Birch Society and Phyllis Schlafly's Eagle Forum are combating these efforts with their own legislative push to rescind those calls for what is called an Article V convention. **Working alongside unlikely liberal allies**, they say the country runs the risk of a runaway convention where delegates could change the complete makeup of the Constitution. "Once you open up the Constitution to change at a convention, then you can change anything in the Constitution," said Michael Leachman at the left-leaning Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, a think tank that has written about the dangers of a balanced budget amendment. "It's theoretically possible."

[...]

On one side, ALEC and its allies seek to persuade 34 states to pass resolutions to call the meeting, as well as parallel legislation that outlines the rules and structure of the convention. After the convention delegates meet, 38 states would still need to ratify any amendment that the attendees produce at the convention. **For bills to count toward the necessary 34 applications, though, they must seek the same amendment to discuss at the convention.** So far, a balanced budget amendment is the closest to that requirement. But bills have also called for conventions about a cornucopia of issues, ranging from reforming campaign finance to congressional term limits. Critics are concerned that other topics could be introduced once the convention begins.

[...]

The campaign for conventions, however one comes about, **is not solely led by a conservative bastion.** **Former Democratic presidential candidate Lawrence Lessig stands out as a major leader** in the movement. Lessig and ALEC are pushing for different final goals, though. **Lessig hopes to overturn** the U.S. Supreme Court campaign finance case **Citizens United** with a constitutional amendment. Still, they have united on using states to overcome congressional stagnation. "In my view, if you look at American government today, the fundamental state institution of Congress is crippled by the way congressmen are selected," Lessig told the Center for Public Integrity. "It produces a widely more polarized Congress than the population. An Article V convention is the only solution the framers gave us."

Pressure growing for Con-Con specifically bc of Electoral College—3 states away.

NTK Network 2016 [NTK Network, "Disgruntled Democrats Want A Constitutional Convention To Leave The Union," December 6, 2016

<http://ntknetwork.com/disgruntled-democrats-want-a-constitutional-convention-to-leave-the-union/>] //WGC

"On Tuesday, disgruntled Democrats held a forum to discuss the possibility of replacing the Electoral College. **Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) conceded that Democrats could not get rid of the Electoral College due to the way the United States Constitution is written.**

"I don't think we can sustain our American democracy by having the majority ruled by the minority. **And so the question is how to fix this** since the Constitution is written in such a way that it's almost impossible to amend," Lofgren said. **Lofgren went on to say she is open to a**

Constitutional Convention, “We are three states away from calling for a Constitutional Convention. It’s something I’ve always been opposed to, But I’ll say because, for the second time in sixteen years, people the American voters elected did not become president. **Rational people, not the fringe, are now talking about** whether states could be separated from the U.S., **whether we should have a Constitutional Convention. And I think as time goes on that is apt to become more the case** unless we here can figure an answer to preventing the majority from being ruled by the minority.”

Con con calls empirically after Bush-Gore, current con con calls are feasible way to abolish the EC

Nancy Thorner, 12-12-2016 [, "Thorner: Electoral college endangered with calls for Constitutional Convention," Illinois Review, <http://illinoisreview.typepad.com/illinoisreview/2016/12/thorner-electoral-college-endangered-with-calls-for-constitutional-convention.html>] MJS 3-16-2017

Calls to fundamentally change the Electoral College, as set forth in Article V of the Constitution to call a Constitutional convention (Con Con), reached a peak after Republican George W. Bush defeated Democrat Al Gore in the tightly contested 2000 election. Gore narrowly won the national popular vote, and many of his supporters howled that the system—even without the Supreme Court stepping in—was unfair. Over 220 years, various states have passed hundreds of resolutions asking Congress to call a Con Con to change aspects of the Constitution that they find objectionable, but no single topic ever passed in 2/3rds of the states. **In that Hillary won the popular vote in this year's presidential election sparked renewed interest in calling for an Article V Con Con. Eight states have already passed a resolution as set forth in Article V of the Constitution to call a Constitutional Convention (Con Con) under the guise that Washington D.C. is broken and it's time to take the power back from the political elites. There are those among the Republican ranks who believe they now have a mandate to use Article V to bring power back to "We the people." With Republicans now in control of 69 of the 99 state legislative chambers,** the assumption is that **securing the remaining 26 states needed to call a convention should be well within the realm of possibility.** Thirty-four state legislatures must be on board to call a Convention of the States. Andy Schlafly of Eagle Forum expects a big fight in Texas over calling a Convention of States, as well as in other states like Missouri, Utah, Wisconsin, and Michigan. The ConConners are sending out mass emails pretending to be anti-Establishment, when in fact they have secret globalists like George Soros funding their scheme. Now they have **Jeb Bush and his anti-Trump vendetta pushing the Con Con agenda.** The Constitution must be defended against this attack.

Interest groups will take over the convention and even if they don't it causes economic collapse

Super 2017 [David Super is a law professor at Georgetown University, “States Likely Could Not Control Constitutional Convention on Balanced Budget Amendment or Other Issues”, *Center for Budget and Policy Priorities*,

<http://www.cbpp.org/research/states-likely-could-not-control-constitutional-convention-on-balanced-budget-amendment-or>] //DNP + CJC\

In the coming months, a number of states are likely to consider resolutions that call for **a convention to propose amendments to the U.S. Constitution to require a balanced federal budget**, and possibly to shrink federal authority in other, often unspecified, ways. Proponents of these resolutions claim that 28 of the 34 states required to call a

constitutional convention already have passed such resolutions. State lawmakers considering such resolutions should be skeptical of claims being made by groups promoting the resolutions (such as the American Legislative Exchange Council, or ALEC) that states could control the actions or outcomes of a constitutional convention. A convention likely would be extremely contentious and highly politicized, and its results impossible to predict. A number of prominent jurists and legal

scholars have warned that **a constitutional convention could open up the Constitution to radical and harmful changes**. For instance, the late Justice Antonin Scalia said in 2014, “I certainly would not want a constitutional convention. Whoa! Who knows what would come out of it?”[2] Similarly, former Chief Justice of the United States Warren Burger wrote in 1988: **[T]here is no way to effectively limit or muzzle the actions of a Constitutional Convention.**

The Convention could make its own rules and set its own agenda. Congress might try to limit the Convention to one amendment or one issue, but there is no way to assure that the Convention would obey. After a Convention is convened, it will be too late to stop the Convention if we don't like its agenda.[3] Such serious concerns are justified, for several reasons: **A convention could write its own rules.** The

Constitution provides no guidance whatsoever on the ground rules for a convention. This leaves wide open to political considerations and pressures such fundamental questions as how the delegates would be chosen, how many delegates each state would have, and whether a supermajority vote would be required to approve amendments. To illustrate the importance of these issues, consider that if every state had one vote in the convention and the convention could approve amendments with a simple majority vote, the 26 least populous states — which contain less than 18 percent of the nation's people — could approve an amendment for ratification. **A convention could set its own agenda, possibly influenced by powerful interest groups.**

The only constitutional convention in U.S. history, in 1787, went far beyond its mandate. Charged with amending the Articles of Confederation to promote trade among the states, the convention instead wrote an entirely new governing document. **A convention held today could set its own agenda, too. There is no guarantee that a convention could be limited to a particular set of issues, such as those related to balancing the federal budget.** As a result, powerful, **well-funded interest groups would surely seek to influence the process and press for changes to the agenda, seeing a constitutional convention as an opportunity to enact major policy changes.** As former Chief Justice Burger wrote, **a “Constitutional Convention today would be a free-for-all for special interest groups.”** Further,

the broad language contained in many of the resolutions that states have passed recently might increase the likelihood of a convention enacting changes that are far more sweeping than many legislators supporting these resolutions envision. A convention could choose a new ratification process. The 1787 convention ignored the ratification process under which it was established and created a new process, lowering the number of states needed to approve the new Constitution and removing Congress from the approval process. The states then ignored the pre-existing ratification procedures and adopted the Constitution under the new ratification procedures that the convention proposed. Given these facts, it would be unwise to assume that ratification of the convention's proposals would necessarily require the approval of 38 states, as the Constitution currently specifies. For example, a convention might remove the states from the approval process entirely and propose a national referendum instead. Or it could follow the example of the 1787 convention and lower the required fraction of the states needed to approve its proposals from three-quarters to two-thirds.

No other body, including the courts, has clear authority over a convention. The Constitution provides for no authority above that of a constitutional convention, so it is not clear that the courts — or any other institution — could intervene if a convention did not limit itself to the language of the state resolutions calling for a convention. Article V contains no restrictions on the scope of constitutional

amendments (other than those denying states equal representation in the Senate), and the courts generally leave such “political questions” to the elected branches. Moreover, delegates to the 1787 convention ignored their state legislatures’ instructions. Thus, the courts likely would not intervene in a dispute between a state and a delegate and, if they did, they likely would not back state efforts to constrain delegates given that delegates to the 1787 convention ignored their state legislatures’ instructions.

[...]

Even if a constitutional convention could be limited to proposing a single amendment requiring the federal government to spend no more than it receives in a given year, such an amendment alone would likely do substantial damage.^a It would threaten significant economic harm. It also would raise significant problems for the operation of Social Security and certain other key federal functions. **By requiring a balanced budget every year, no matter the state of the economy, such an amendment would risk tipping weak economies into recession and making recessions longer and deeper, causing very large job losses.** Rather than allowing the “automatic stabilizers” of lower tax collections and higher unemployment and other benefits to cushion a weak economy, as they now do automatically, it would force policymakers to cut spending, raise taxes, or both when the economy turns down — the exact opposite of what sound economic policy would advise. **Such actions would launch a vicious spiral: budget cuts or tax increases in a recession would cause the economy to contract further, triggering still higher deficits and thereby forcing policymakers to institute additional austerity measures, which in turn, would cause still greater economic contraction.** The private economic forecasting firm Macroeconomic Advisors (MA) found in 2011 that **“recessions would be deeper and longer” under a constitutional balanced budget amendment.** If such an amendment had been ratified in 2011 and were being enforced for fiscal year 2012, “the effect on the economy would be catastrophic,” MA concluded, and would double the unemployment rate.

Republicans control status-quo state legislatures — they’ll use the ConCon to destroy the economy, end abortion rights, and gut the 14th amendment

Cobb 3/13/17 [Jelani Cobb is a journalist for the New Yorker, “REPUBLICANS AND THE CONSTITUTION”, *New Yorker*,
<<http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/13/republicans-and-the-constitution>>] //CJC

Amid the stunning Presidential-election results last November, a smaller, though perhaps equally consequential, development went relatively unnoticed: **the Republican Party now controls thirty-three state legislatures.** On its face, this development demonstrates the discrepancies between the Democratic and Republican farm teams. Not only does the G.O.P. control the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives; it has created a pipeline of candidates to fill those offices for the foreseeable future. But there are more immediate implications. Article V of the Constitution provides for amendments to the document when a proposed change has been approved by two-thirds of each chamber of Congress and is subsequently ratified by three-fourths of the states. **In 1995, under the leadership of Newt Gingrich, House Republicans alarmed by the federal debt approved an amendment that would have effectively barred the federal government from adopting a budget in which expenditures exceeded revenues. That was a bad idea—deficit spending is a tested way to stimulate a sluggish economy. The amendment stalled in the Senate, where it fell just short** of the sixty-seven votes required for it to be submitted to the states. In the years since, **a balanced-budget amendment—unlike faddish anti-flag-burning and defense-of-marriage amendments—has remained a lodestar of G.O.P. aspiration.** In January, Senators Chuck

Grassley, of Iowa, and Mike Lee, of Utah, introduced a new one. In the current Senate, **it is likely to meet the same fate as Gingrich's.** Even so, a balanced-budget amendment is not completely out of the question, owing to the fact that it is high on the agenda of many statehouse Republicans. That is where the state-level results of the November elections come into play. **Article V allows** an alternative method of proposing constitutional amendments, which cuts Congress out entirely: two-thirds of the state legislatures can call for **a constitutional convention.** To be in a position to do this, **the G.O.P. needs to gain control of just one more statehouse,** which could happen as soon as next year. (Last year, the Times reported that **twenty-eight states had already adopted resolutions calling for a constitutional convention on a balanced-budget amendment,** an effort supported by the American Legislative Exchange Council, which is funded by the Koch brothers, among others.) So far, this route to an amendment has not succeeded, but of late we are exploring a lot of novel territory in American democracy. And, as the events of 1787 show, these things have a way of taking on a life of their own. The original Constitutional Convention was intended only to recommend changes to the Articles of Confederation, not to do away with them, but **the delegates literally took the law into their own hands and drafted a new document.** It's easy to imagine that **an Article V convention would find it difficult to limit its agenda to the technicalities of budget finance. Abortion,** the most divisive social issue of the past forty years, has insinuated itself into nearly every discussion of nominees for the Supreme Court. Could **a gathering intoxicated by the possibility of imposing permanent change resist the urge to achieve by amendment what decades of lobbying, protesting, and the cultivation of sympathetic judicial candidates could not?** Similarly, **as the battle over immigration has intensified, conservatives have toyed with the idea of ending birthright citizenship, currently guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.** The allure of bypassing legislative stalemate on that issue might also prove tempting.

Balanced budget causes 2x unemployment, 15% worse growth crash during great recession

Kogan 2017 [Richard Kogan at the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, "Constitutional Balanced Budget Amendment Poses Serious Risks", *CBPP*, <http://www.cbpp.org/research/constitutional-balanced-budget-amendment-poses-serious-risks?fa=view&id=4166>] //CJC

Finally, Macroeconomic Advisers (MA), one of the nation's preeminent private economic forecasting firms, concluded in 2011 that **if a constitutional balanced budget amendment had been ratified and were being enforced for fiscal year 2012,** "the effect on the economy would be catastrophic." [7] If the 2012 budget were balanced through spending cuts, MA found, those cuts would total about \$1.5 trillion in 2012 alone — and would throw about **15 million more people out of work, double the unemployment rate from 9 percent to approximately 18 percent, and cause the economy to shrink by about 17 percent instead of growing by an expected 2 percent.** Such a budget cut would be radical in every sense; for example, **it could entail cutting all budget programs excluding Social Security by more than six of every ten dollars in 2012 alone:** Medicare, veterans' benefits, cancer research, national defense, and school lunches, to name just a few.

Black wealth fell more than white during recession

Pew, 2011 [RAKESH KOCHHAR, RICHARD FRY AND PAUL TAYLOR, economists at Pew, “Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs Between Whites, Blacks, Hispanics,” Pew Research Center, <http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/07/26/wealth-gaps-rise-to-record-highs-between-whites-blacks-hispanics/>] MJS

The median wealth of white households is 20 times that of black households and 18 times that of Hispanic households, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of newly available government data from 2009. These lopsided wealth ratios are the largest since the government began publishing such data a quarter century ago and roughly twice the size of the ratios that had prevailed between these three groups for the two decades prior to the Great Recession that ended in 2009. The Pew Research analysis finds that, in percentage terms, **the bursting of the housing market bubble in 2006 and the recession that followed from late 2007 to mid-2009 took a far greater toll on the wealth of minorities than whites.** From 2005 to 2009, inflation-adjusted median wealth fell by 66% among Hispanic households and **53% among black households, compared with just 16% among white households.**

Runaway conventions are possible and empirically proven- restrictions are often violated or facilitate the occurrence of a runaway convention

Thomas R. Eddlem, 14, a freelance writer and a former newspaper editor whose words have been reprinted in six books by four different publishers. He has been published in more than 20 publications and popular websites, 5/26/2014, “Is a Runaway Article V Convention a Myth? 1787 Proves Otherwise”,

<http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/18338-is-a-runaway-article-v-convention-a-myth-1787-proves-otherwise>

Is a runaway constitutional convention impossible?¶ Proponents of utilizing Article V of the U.S. Constitution to convene a convention of states to amend the U.S. Constitution claim that a well-worded resolution by state legislatures would not go awry because such a runaway convention is “unprecedented.”¶ Nick Dranias of the Goldwater Institute — one of the more energetic proponents of an Article V convention — published an on-line pamphlet called “10 Facts to Rebut the Mythology of a Runaway Convention.” His

leaflet is pretty typical of the [argumentation](#) addressing skeptics of a constitutional convention. It insists:¶ **There is zero precedent that any convention of the states has ever “runaway”** from its assigned agenda. There have been 12 interstate conventions in the history of our country. All of them stayed within their stated agenda. Even the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was not convened to “amend” the Articles of Confederation, but to “revise” and “alter” the Articles to establish an effective national government. This was fully consistent with the Articles of Confederation because the Articles authorized alterations — a term that had revolutionary significance because it echoed the language of the Declaration of Independence.¶ **The reality could not be further from the truth.** Most of the 12 interstate conventions mentioned by Dranias were small regional assemblies of a handful or fewer states, or regional military conventions during the War for Independence from Britain. They involved only a few states and were convened at a time when the nation was less interested in new constitutional governance than military survival. But **the 1787 convention was clearly a “runaway convention” in the sense that every single state delegation that had restrictions imposed on its delegates by their state legislature violated those instructions.**¶

The point is key to understanding how constitutional conventions would operate today, even if nearly every American is grateful that the delegates in 1787 ignored their state’s instructions. However, most politicians who would become delegates today would not likely be conversant in Montesquieu’s theories of separation of powers or John Locke’s idea of natural law as were James Madison, Elbridge Gerry, and George Mason. Indeed, today there are vigorous, outright moves by the political left to [repeal the freedom of speech and press](#) (protected by the First Amendment) and [abolish the right to keep and bear arms](#) (Second Amendment) by means of an Article V convention.¶ In 1787, only two states — [New Jersey and North Carolina](#) — sent delegates to Philadelphia without any restrictions on how they could revise the national government. All the other 10 states sending delegates (Rhode Island didn’t send any) put restrictions on what kind of government their delegates could design.¶ New York and Massachusetts limited their delegates to “revising” the Articles of Confederation only, and both Massachusetts and Delaware restricted their delegates from amending the rule under Article V of the Confederation that guaranteed each state the right of vetoing constitutional changes and the right to recall congressmen.¶ New Hampshire, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia put only one [restriction](#) on their delegates. These seven states simply required that the new Constitution would have to be ratified by the “several states” before going into force, a term of art referring back to the Confederation Constitution that meant ratification by all 13 states who were then members of the Confederation. The Confederation’s Article 13 [stated](#) of amendments to the Articles of Confederation:¶ nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards

confirmed by the legislatures of every State.¶ Of course, **the Constitution that emerged from the convention of the states in 1787 respected none of these restrictions** by state legislatures. The Confederation was not "revised"; it was thrown in the historical dumpster. The Congress of the Confederation did not approve the 1787 Constitution, nor did all 13 states ratify our current U.S. Constitution before it was put into force. Rhode Island didn't ratify the U.S. Constitution until May 29, 1790, almost two years after the Constitution took effect, and after a congressional election, the election of President Washington, and passage of the Judiciary Act setting up the U.S. Supreme Court, the first tariff act, and other legislation. ¶ The delegates in 1787 merely threw the rule of unanimity enshrined in America's first national Constitution into the dumpster and wrote new ratification rules in Article VII of the new Constitution (which said three-fourths of the state legislatures or state ratifying conventions was sufficient).¶ **A new convention would be empowered to do precisely the same thing in revising the ratification procedures enshrined in the current Constitution. Delegates could proclaim them ratified after adoption by a mere majority of state legislatures or even by a national popular vote.** ¶ The history of the 1787 convention proves that *the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC)* is wrong in stating that "there are far more political and legal constraints on a runaway convention than on a runaway Congress." Unlike the arduous procedures under the current U.S. Constitution, a convention can write the ratification procedures to fit what they expect will be approved. In other words, the convention could lower the bar to the point to where proponents would be guaranteed to be able to jump over it. ¶ **Some proponents of a constitutional convention, the [Compact for America group](#), hold out hope that imposing oaths upon delegates to follow their preferred restrictions would work. But, the virtue of fastidious delegates who steadfastly hold to the restrictions imposed upon them by their states may actually help a convention veer off the tracks and become runaway.** Consider that in 1787 New York delegates John Lansing and Robert Yates left the Philadelphia convention in protest when the convention exceeded the mandate of the New York legislature's resolution. But all their departure did was free up Alexander Hamilton — who had no such legalistic scruples — to adopt the Constitution for New York as the state's lone remaining delegate.¶ This is not to imply that the 1787 Constitution is "illegal" or that the American government today lacks legitimacy. To the contrary, the states have always held complete sovereignty — in the words of the Declaration of Independence — "to alter or abolish" government at a convention, whether that convention is the Continental Congress in 1776, the 1787 Philadelphia convention, or one convened under Article V of the U.S. Constitution today.¶ **The real question before going to a constitutional convention under Article V today is this: Do Americans trust politicians nominated by state legislatures today to keep to their instructions more closely — or to draw up a better system of government — than those nominated by the state legislatures in 1787?** Organizations such as ALEC and people such as Nick Dranias clearly do have that trust, while constitutionalist skeptics such as [The John Birch Society](#) and [Eagle Forum](#) do not see our current crop of politicians as more enlightened than the Founding Fathers.

US key to the global economy

Caploe 9 (David Caploe is CEO of the Singapore-incorporated American Centre for Applied Liberal Arts and Humanities in Asia., "Focus still on America to lead global recovery", April 7, The Strait Times, lexis)

IN THE aftermath of the G-20 summit, most observers seem to have missed perhaps the most crucial statement of the entire event, made by United States President Barack Obama at his pre-conference meeting with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown: 'The world has become accustomed to the US being a voracious consumer market, the engine that drives a lot of economic growth worldwide,' he said. 'If there is going to be renewed growth, it just can't be the US as the engine.' While superficially sensible, this view is deeply problematic. To begin with, it ignores the fact that the global economy has in fact been 'America-centred' for more than 60 years. **Countries** - China, Japan, Canada, Brazil, Korea, Mexico and so on - **either sell to the US or they sell to countries that sell to the US.** This system has generally been advantageous for all concerned. America gained certain historically unprecedented benefits, but the system also enabled participating countries - first in Western Europe and Japan, and later, many in the Third World - to achieve undreamt-of prosperity. At the same time, **this deep inter-connection**

between the US and the rest of the world also **explains how the collapse of a relatively small sector of the US economy** - 'sub-prime' housing, logarithmically exponentialised by Wall Street's ingenious chicanery - **has cascaded into the worst global economic crisis** since the Great Depression. To put it simply, Mr Obama doesn't seem to understand that **there is no other engine for the world economy** - and hasn't been for the last six decades. **If the US does not drive global economic growth, growth is not going to happen. Thus, US policies to deal with the current crisis are critical not just domestically, but also to the entire world.**

Consequently, it is a matter of global concern that the Obama administration seems to be following Japan's 'model' from the 1990s: allowing major banks to avoid declaring massive losses openly and transparently, and so perpetuating 'zombie' banks - technically alive but in reality dead. As analysts like Nobel laureates Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman have pointed out, the administration's unwillingness to confront US banks is the main reason why they are continuing their increasingly inexplicable credit freeze, thus ravaging the American and global economies. Team Obama seems reluctant to acknowledge the extent to which its policies at home are failing not just there but around the world as well. Which raises the question: If the US can't or won't or doesn't want to be the global economic engine, which country will? The obvious answer is China. But that is

unrealistic for three reasons. First, China's economic health is more tied to America's than practically any other country in the world. Indeed, the reason **China** has so many dollars to invest everywhere - whether in US Treasury bonds or in Africa - is precisely that it **has structured its own economy to complement America's**. The only way China can serve as the engine of the global economy is if the US starts pulling it first. Second, the US-centred system began at a time when its domestic demand far outstripped that of the rest of the world. The fundamental source of its economic power is its ability to act as the global consumer of last resort. China, however, is a poor country, with low per capita income, even though it will soon pass Japan as the world's second largest economy. There are real possibilities for growth in China's domestic demand. But given its structure as an export-oriented economy, it is doubtful if even a successful Chinese stimulus plan can pull the rest of the world along unless and until China can start selling again to the US on a massive scale. Finally, the key 'system' issue for China - or for the European Union - in thinking about becoming the engine of the world economy - is monetary: What are the implications of having your domestic currency become the global reserve currency? This is an extremely complex issue that the US has struggled with, not always successfully, from 1959 to the present. Without going into detail, it can safely be said that though having the US dollar as the world's medium of exchange has given the US some tremendous advantages, it has also created huge problems, both for America and the global economic system. The Chinese leadership is certainly familiar with this history. It will try to avoid the yuan becoming an international medium of exchange until it feels much

more confident in its ability to handle the manifold currency problems that the US has grappled with for decades. Given all this, **the US will remain the engine of global economic recovery for the foreseeable future, even though other countries must certainly help. This crisis began in the US - and it is going to have to be solved there too.**

Economic decline causes war

Tonnesson 15 (Stein, Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute in Oslo, Leader of the East Asia Peace program at Uppsala university, "Deterrence, interdependence and Sino-US peace," *International Area Studies Review*, Volume 18, Number 3, p. 297—311] //CJC

Several recent works on China and Sino-US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may *both inhibit and drive conflict* are right. **Interdependence raises the cost of conflict** for all sides **but** asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and *negative trade expectations* may **generate tensions** leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states **that** in turn **increase the risk of military conflict** (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global

system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. **If leaders** on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously **fear or anticipate their own nation's decline** then **they may blame** this on **external dependence** **appeal to anti-foreign sentiments** **contemplate the use of force to gain** respect or **credibility** **adopt protectionist policies** and ultimately **refuse to be deterred by** either **nuclear arms** or prospects

of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. **The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious.** If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. **Deterrence could lose its credibility**: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

Voter ID

State policy is key — national is doomed, too much polarization

Gerken 2014 [Heather Gerken is a law professor at Yale, “States Get Things Done, Affecting National Policy”, *New York Times*,

<<https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/07/16/state-politics-vs-the-federal-government/states-get-things-done-affecting-national-policy>>] //CJC

The federalist camp has the advantage right now of advocating for the one form of politics that is actually active. **Political polarization has paralyzed the national government, but it has catalyzed state policy making. When policy is implemented, rather than just debated, Congress is forced to take action.** But one segment of government is not more important than the other. National politics fuels state politics, and state politics helps ensure that national politics function properly. The question isn't which matters more; the question is when and how each matters in the first place. Those offering starry-eyed odes to the value of local participation underestimate how closely state politics are tied to national politics. As the important work of David Schleicher and others has shown, elections for state offices are as much referendums on the national politics as they are about anything else. Most people don't pay much attention to state politics. When they vote for a state legislator, they are voting based on something they know about: national politics. That's why we see a remarkably close connection between votes in most state races and votes in national ones. The close ties between state and federal parties can lead to all kinds of problems by keeping poor-performing state and local officials from getting voted out of office. But oddly enough, the connection can mitigate what ails national politics. **National politics are locked up. Our legislative process has too many obstacles when politics are highly polarized.** As a result, **issues that matter quite a bit to the American people – gay rights, abortion, immigration, guns -- don't get any traction in Congress. Ambitious members of both parties may not be able to get anything passed in Washington, but they can in the states.** That means **state officials can challenge national policy – or protest its absence – by passing laws at home. By making policy rather than merely debating it, groups on both sides of the aisle can seize the national agenda and shift the burden of inertia in Congress.** Usually all opponents of a policy need to do is kill the bill. **When a state passes the policy, however, that strategy doesn't work anymore. Opponents and proponents, then, suddenly agree on one thing – Congress should do something – and they will unite in pushing Congress to act. When national politics are the problem, then, state politics can be the solution.**

Meh card about state policy

Zimmerman 2012 [Robert Zimmerman is a writer at Behind the Black, “Why state regulation is better than federal regulation”, *Behind the Black*,
<<http://behindtheblack.com/behind-the-black/essays-and-commentaries/why-state-regulation-is-better-than-federal-regulation/>>] //CJC

Then there is the practical reason, which is also why the Founding Fathers designed this system this way. They understood that **it would be impractical in a large nation for all regulation to be managed from the central government. Better to leave the more mundane and detailed legalities to local and state governments, especially since these local and state governments are best placed to understand the problems themselves, being close to them.** Central governments are too big, too distant, too unwieldy, to handle local regulatory issues. Also, **local and state governments, being numerous and small, can be more flexible.** They can try different things, then compare their efforts and, far more easily than a big centralized government, adapt and adjust. Having the federal government do it means you only get one choice, which will be very difficult to change because of that government's huge size and inertia.

Turnout key to equality

McElwee, Sean. “WHY VOTING MATTERS: LARGE DISPARITIES IN TURNOUT BENEFIT THE DONOR CLASS.” Demos. 16 Sep 2015.
<<http://www.demos.org/publication/why-voting-matters-large-disparities-turnout-benefit-donor-class>>] //CJC

In America today, public policy is deeply biased towards affluent white people, as numerous scholars have discovered.¹⁴ In light of the income and race differences, and the differing views, of voters and nonvoters, **it seems logical and likely that voter turnout differences are a significant part of the problem of white-affluent bias in public policy.**¹⁵ While it is difficult to entirely disentangle how much of this policy bias can be explained by differences in turnout, in fact **there is strong evidence to suggest that more inclusive voting could help to shift public policy in a more inclusive and widely beneficial direction, particularly for working class and poor Americans and communities of color.**

[...]

The research on democracy and policy suggests three broad lessons. First, **those who vote have more representation than those who do not.**⁴³ Second, those who do not vote tend to have views that are more economically progressive than those who do vote. And third, **voting plays a significant role in the distribution of government resources as well as the size of government and who benefits from public policies.** **Increasing and equalizing voter turnout is not a panacea for reducing inequality and achieving racial equity in public policy; it is one important factor among others**, including the role of money in politics. But, as Robert Franzese argues, **where turnout is low and unequal, politicians who already**

cater to big donors have an even stronger incentive to do so.⁴⁴ He concludes that **whether or not democracies respond to rising inequality is conditioned by the political participation of poorer people in the electorate.**⁴⁵ After the wealth of a country, voter participation and income inequality are the most important determinants of tax and transfer progressivity.⁴⁶ As President Obama has argued, “It would be transformative if everybody voted. That would counteract money more than anything.”⁴⁷ He is correct.

ID is undemocratic

Lee 2016 [Erin Lee is communications manager for Project Vote, “New Study Confirms Worst Fear About Voter ID Laws”, *Project Vote*,
<<http://www.projectvote.org/blog/new-study-confirms-worst-fear-about-voter-id-laws/>>] //CJC

In case we forgot, the Voting Rights Act passed in 1965 to protect the voting rights of all citizens. Section 5 of the VRA required vetting of new voting laws in states or jurisdictions that had a recent history of voter discrimination. When the Supreme Court decided to remove this provision, states like North Carolina and Texas rushed to implement otherwise problematic (and currently challenged) voting laws. Based on the new UCSD study, it appears the rush to put strict voter ID in place was no accident. **Strict voter ID laws are undemocratic, and we need to restore the landmark Voting Rights Act so that it serves all eligible citizens, no matter their race, ethnicity, or income.**

Only 10 states have “strict” voter ID

Bradley Jones, Oct 2016 [, “Many Americans unaware of their states’ voter ID laws,” Pew Research Center,
<http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/24/many-americans-unaware-of-their-states-voter-id-laws/>] MJS 4-11-2017

The National Conference of State Legislatures classifies voter identification laws into three broad categories: There are 18 states plus the District of Columbia that have no identification requirement. Another **22 states “request” identification but provide conditions that permit voters without it to cast a ballot** with no additional action on the part of the voter to affirm identity (e.g., voting by provisional ballot, or signing an affidavit of identity). **The remaining 10 states have “strict” identification requirements.** In these “strict” states, voters who cast provisional ballots must take additional steps after voting to affirm their identity before their vote can be counted (e.g., a voter may return to an election office with an acceptable ID).

DPV → Uniform Federal Voter Qualifications

Derek T. **Muller**, 5-1-2012 [Pepperdine University - School of Law, "Invisible Federalism and the Electoral College," Arizona State Law Journal, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2049630] //WGC

"Federalism is not merely an inconvenient barrier to a national vote; it is, fundamentally, an asset. Theorizing what a federal voting standard would be, we see that it would need to set a ceiling, not simply a floor. And because a federal mandate would set that ceiling, states would be prevented from expanding the right to vote until the federal government could muster consensus to expand it. Although reform efforts so far resist calling for uniform voting standards,²⁶³ opponents of reform efforts as far back as 1816 cited this state-based administration of voter eligibility to oppose Electoral College reform.²⁶⁴ Occasional—and usually brief—acknowledgment of the need for federal standards or the potential of state gaming of the voting base has arisen from both proponents of reform and its opponents,²⁶⁵ and cited as a contrast to other reform proposals that did not call for a national aggregation of votes or direct election of the President.²⁶⁶"

[Footnote 265] "265. See, e.g., **BENNETT**, supra note 26, at 176 ("**[A]ny full move to a nationwide popular vote would have to take seriously the definition of eligibility to vote for president.**"); **DIXON**, supra note 82, at 571 ("In short, a natural next step in our developing 'one-man-one vote' theory would be **a constitutional amendment setting up a uniform and nationally policed system for presidential elections.**"); **MICHENER**, supra note 194, at 126–27 ("**To stop this kind of basement bargaining, federal laws would pretty surely be required, and they would dictate such things as voting age, registration procedures, and polling practices. Opponents of federal control hold that this is too high a price to pay for the admitted advantages that otherwise flow from direct popular voting.**"); **PEIRCE & LONGLEY**, supra note 32, at 233 ("**Senator Bayh stated the case in less formal language: 'If we see some mad scramble by the states to lower voter qualifications willy-nilly, then Congress can step in and establish uniform standards.'**"); **WALLACE S. SAYRE & JUDITH H. PARRIS**, VOTING FOR PRESIDENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 87, 145 (1970) ("**What is far more important is that the national government would intervene directly in the administration of presidential elections**, which is now a state function. . . . **National administration of presidential elections would probably be necessary.**"); Amar, supra note 110, at 252 ("If and when the NPVC comes into being, I would forcefully urge Congress to supplement it with a system of uniform rules for tallying sentiment in all fifty states."); Robert W. Bennett, Current Electoral College Reform Efforts Among the States, in ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM: CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES 188, 193 (Gary Bugh ed., 2010) ("Making the nationwide popular vote decisive also highlights state variations in who is eligible to vote, and might put pressure on states to expand that eligibility—for instance by lowering the voting age below eighteen. State variations in registration and other procedural requirements might also come under scrutiny."); Brian J. **Gaines**, Compact Risk: Some Downsides to Establishing National Plurality Presidential Elections by Contingent Legislation, in ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM:

CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES 113, 119–20 (Gary Bugh ed., 2010) (“*If the national vote total suddenly matters, however, expect a string of legal battles over efforts to impose uniform rules on a system never meant to be uniform.*”); Paul D. Schumaker, *The Good, the Better, the Best: Improving on the ‘Acceptable’ Electoral College*, in *ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM: CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES* 203, 207 (Gary Bugh ed., 2010) (“The compact allows somewhat more complexity than the popular plurality systems used to elect state officials, because states could set different rules regarding voter eligibility (such as voting rights of former felons) and adopt different procedures for casting votes (such as the extensive use of the mail ballot in Oregon).”).”

More evidence — true direct popular vote requires federal control and uniformity — 1970 bill proves — specifically applies to voter ID

Muller 2016 [Derek Muller is a law professor, “The National Popular Vote is a pretty terrible way to change our way of electing the president”, *Excess of Democracy*, <<http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2016/11/the-national-popular-vote-is-a-pretty-terrible-way-to-change-our-way-of-electing-the-president>>] //CJC

As a practical matter, the decision to change presidential elections at a state level without including a uniform national plan for elections, or empower Congress to do so, is deeply problematic. **A recent, and quite significant, effort to amend the Constitution** took place in 1970, and even it fell short of the likely required federal power we would need to regulate presidential elections. A nice summary from CQ Almanac shows some of the things a federal amendment was designed to do. For instance, the constitutional amendment **guaranteed some uniformity in voter**

qualifications: “The electors of President and Vice President in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature, except that for electors of President and Vice President, the legislature of any State may prescribe less restrictive residence qualifications and for electors of President and Vice President the Congress may establish uniform residence qualifications.” Additionally, **the proposed amendment provided a times, places, and manner provision** for presidential elections, similar to such a provision for congressional elections: “The times, places, and manner of holding such elections and entitlement to inclusion on the ballot shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations.” But there are no such provisions for the National Popular Vote. I’ve written about the “invisible federalism” that exists within the Electoral College. **Right now, fifty-one jurisdictions set their own rules. That means a true national popular vote would require some significant centralization of our electoral process**, some of which was baked into the 1970 proposed constitutional amendment. Consider some things that ought to be **nationalized in a presidential election: Uniform voter qualifications. States have some fairly dramatic differences in the qualifications for voters.** Some bar anyone ever convicted of a felony from voting, others permit felons imprisoned to vote. Some in the future may lower their voting age, as they have done in the past. Some have different standards for the mentally ill. When faced with such an option to the proposed amendment, Congress rejected it; but it would likely need to be an element of any future effort. **Uniform voting procedures.** States set different absentee and early voting requirements. They set different residency requirements. **Some have voter identification laws and others don’t.** Some open their polls at different hours. Some have all mail-in elections. Recount procedures trigger differently in different states. **The proposed constitutional amendment got part of the way there in permitting Congress to regulate such procedures if it deemed such laws necessary to preserve uniformity.**

NPV allows more voting restrictions/tampering/fraud — states have incentives and so does the federal government

Rosenthal 2015. [“You Are Here The Electoral College is Genius.” Sean Rosenthal, New York Attorney. November 15, 2016. Foundation for Economic Education.

<https://fee.org/articles/the-accidental-genius-of-the-electoral-college/>] GST

Regardless of the original intention, within a two-party system in a large nation, **the electoral college** has an important function: it **transforms elections from one national election into 51 local elections.** **With the elections managed locally, the federal government has little control over the voting process and cannot systemically tilt the election in favor of a party in power, preventing any party from systematically expanding its power through the voting system.** Thus, **the electoral college protects the voting system from potentially systemic federal corruption by dispersing it across the states.** Moreover, by having 51 local elections for electoral votes instead of 51 local elections that sum into a national popular vote, **local politicians do not have a powerful institutional incentive to tamper with the voting system and commit voter fraud to concentrate power in their political party, making the electoral college within a two-party system a means of restraining voter fraud and the potential resulting concentration of political power.** Consider by example. In Texas, Republicans control the Governorship and 2/3 or so of the state House and state Senate. Similarly, in California, Democrats control the Governorship and about 2/3 of both the California State Assembly and the California State Senate. In Presidential elections, Texas casts its electoral votes to the Republican, and California casts its electoral votes to the Democrat. **If presidential elections were based on the popular vote instead of electoral votes, though, then Republican Texas politicians would have a powerful incentive to manipulate the voting system in favor of the Republican presidential candidate because the additional votes could matter nationally, and politically powerless Texas Democrats would lack political recourse.** Democrats in California would have a similar incentive. Political tampering with the voting system could happen in various more and less seemingly legitimate ways. Since young people tend to vote Democrat, blue states would likely see their voting age fall to 17, 16, or lower, and red states would see it stay at 18. Similarly, since felons tend to vote Democrat, blue states would probably expand voting rights for felons, and red states would further restrict their voting rights. **Since voter identification laws tend to reduce minority turnout and hurt Democrats, red states would probably expand voter identification laws** and blue states would probably reduce them. I am surely overlooking other creative ways that partisan politicians could justify expanding or contracting voter suffrage. Whatever dispassionate reasons exist for such voting laws and restrictions, **the interaction of a nationwide popular vote and states with one party rule would create powerful institutional incentives for partisan rather than impartial reasoning to determine the voting rules, facilitating the concentration of political power among whichever party more successfully manipulates the voting process.** In addition to the above tampering with the voting system, politicians in red

and blue states could have both the political power and the incentive to engage in outright fraud to empower their party. Considering how creative and manipulative these politicians have been in gerrymandering, such as in Texas and California, politicians governing a one party state within a two party nation would likely manufacture many legal and illegal ways to enhance their party's national popular vote. Thus, by creating 51 contests instead of a national popular vote, **the electoral college deters red and blue states from tampering with the voting system and concentrating federal political power within their party.** Unlike Texas and California, "swing states" with close votes in presidential elections also more frequently either currently have or recently have had divided governments. **In these states, both parties likely have enough political power to restrain the other party's abuses.** For example, my home swing state of Pennsylvania has a Republican legislature and a Democrat Governor. **Additionally, since states like Pennsylvania are known to be swing states, people can monitor them more closely for systemic corruption, a much easier proposition than monitoring all voting booths in the country.** With political power divided between the two parties and more careful nationwide monitoring, **neither the Democrats nor the Republicans can likely systemically concentrate their party's political power through legal or illegal manipulation of the voting process in swing states.** The electoral college protects against politically corrupt voting systems by shifting elections to places with divided governments and more reliable voting.

Republicans uniformly support voter ID — and support is increasing
Wilson 2016 [Reid Wilson is a writer for The Hill, "GOP platform calls for tough voter ID laws", *The Hill*, <<http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/288302-gop-platform-calls-for-tough-voter-id-laws>>]
//CJC

The Republican Party's platform formally endorses laws requiring voters to show identification when they cast ballots. The new provision inserts the national party into a contentious debate over voter access at a time when several states are tightening identification requirements. **The party platform, adopted unanimously** by delegates in Cleveland on Monday, **goes farther than language that had been included in earlier years.** The party "support[s] legislation to require proof of citizenship when registering to vote and secure photo ID when voting," the document reads. **Four years ago, the GOP platform "applaud[ed] legislation to require photo identification for voting and to prevent election fraud."** **The stronger language** comes ahead of a presidential election in which 12 states — including swing states like Wisconsin, New Hampshire, North Carolina and Virginia — will enforce voter identification laws for the first time. **"This is part of a broader move to curtail voting rights,** which began after the 2010 election, when state lawmakers nationwide started introducing hundreds of harsh measures making it harder to vote," wrote the Brennan Center for Justice, which opposes many of the new laws. Thirty-three states will require voters to show proof of identification in November, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures. The laws vary widely by state: In Texas, a state with one of the stricter requirements, voters must show one of six types of government-issued photo identifications, ranging from a passport to a license to carry a concealed handgun. In Delaware, voters are asked to show documents ranging from a photo identification to a utility bill or paycheck; someone without proof of identity may still cast a ballot if he or she signs an affidavit affirming their identity. **The debate over laws requiring voters to show identification has deepened along partisan lines in recent years, after Republicans claimed control of a record number of state legislative chambers after the 2010 and 2014 elections.** **Democrats, who say identification laws disproportionately impact low-income, minority**

and elderly voters, have sued over newly restrictive laws in states like North Carolina, Virginia and Texas.

Abolishing electoral college causes more voting rights restrictions — states incentives

Derek T. Muller, 5-1-2012 [Pepperdine University - School of Law, "Invisible Federalism and the Electoral College," Arizona State Law Journal, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2049630] MJS 3-29-2017

What role do States have when the Electoral College disappears? With the enactment of the National Popular Vote on the horizon and an imminent presidential election in which a nationwide popular vote determines the winner, States would continue to do what they have done for hundreds of years — administer elections. The Constitution empowers States to decide who votes for president, and States choose who qualifies to vote based on factors like age or felon status. This power of States, a kind of "invisible federalism," is all but ignored in Electoral College reform efforts. In fact, the power of the States to distinguish between voters and non-voters precludes reform. Such barriers to reform are both theoretical and practical. Theoretical because the Constitution is committed to a government in which the president represents all citizens of the States, voters and non-voters alike — and the maxim "one person, one vote" reinforces the notion that the president represents voters and non-voters. And the United States is not a single constituency in which one ignores States borders, but a number of smaller constituencies administering elections and determining voter eligibility. Practical because **State decisions to enfranchise or disenfranchise a group of voters would no longer affect just that State, but would affect the national total — and States would have an incentive to manipulate voter eligibility laws to affect interstate vote totals. States would lower the voting age, disenfranchise felons, or redefine mental illness in order to add or subtract votes from a national vote tally.** And any efforts to create a uniform federal standard for voting would stifle potential expansion of enfranchisement and inevitably disenfranchise some citizens who, today, have the right to vote. Presidential elections need States to continue to decide who votes, which precludes Electoral College reform.

[...]

States have widely divergent laws on whether felons are permitted to vote. Some permanently disenfranchise essentially all felons and exfelons,²²¹ while others disenfranchise only a subset of felons and ex-felons.²²² Some restore voting rights after completing parole and probation,²²³ some allow probationers to vote,²²⁴ and some allow all parolees and probationers to vote.²²⁵ Two states permit felons to vote without qualification.²²⁶ In total, about 5.85 million felons and ex-felons are disenfranchised.²²⁷

[...]

Of course, the razor-thin margin of the Florida election and its decisiveness in a narrow Electoral College victory for Mr. Bush make it a prime choice for post hoc close scrutiny and reexamination. But for present purposes, the significance of felon or ex-felon voting status should not be glossed over as a one-time element of a rare Electoral College event. Instead, it should serve as an example of how modest adjustments to felon voter laws can affect the outcome of an election. **Political candidates might benefit from the enfranchisement or disenfranchisement of felons or exfelons, and when such voting decisions can affect a national pool, it is very possible that states would engage in further gamesmanship.**

Voter ID harms minorities and targets Dems — most recent EV, all your impact is about pre-2008 ID laws that weren't as bad

Ingraham 2016 [Christopher Ingraham is a writer for the Washington Post, "New evidence that voter ID laws 'skew democracy' in favor of white Republicans", *Washington Post*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/02/04/new-evidence-that-voter-id-laws-skew-democracy-in-favor-of-white-republicans/>] //CJC

But the results of a new working paper from political scientists at University of California, San Diego suggest folks may want to consider. The researchers analyzed turnout in recent elections

-- between 2008 and 2012 -- in states that did and did not implement **the strictest form of voter ID laws**. They found that **these laws consistently and significantly decreased turnout not just among traditionally Democratic-leaning groups, like blacks and Hispanics, but among Republican voters too.** **The findings are notable because they're some of the first using data in elections that took place after some states implemented photo ID requirements to vote.** Previous studies on the effects of these laws showed mixed results. A 2014 report by the Government Accountability Office examined 10 of these studies. Five showed no significant effect of voter ID laws on turnout, four found a significant decrease in turnout, and one found, paradoxically, that the laws increased turnout. But **each of these 10 studies was of general elections that took place before 2008.** **Most of the strictest ID laws were passed after that,** so the ability of earlier research to gauge the impact of these laws is extremely limited. That's what makes the current research so important. The study's authors controlled for a wide variety of factors known to affect voter turnout -- age, education, income, marital status, etc. They also controlled for other state laws that affect participation, like early voting. And they considered less-tangible aspects that influence turnout, like the competitiveness of races and whether the election was held during a presidential contest year or an off-year. After controlling for all these factors, they found **"substantial drops in turnout for minorities under strict voter ID laws."** Their analysis suggests that **turnout for Latino voters was suppressed by 10.8 points in states with strict photo ID laws,** compared to states without them. **For multiracial Americans, the drop was 12.8 points.** **The laws also increased the participation gap between whites and non-whites.** "For Latinos in the general election, **the predicted gap from whites doubled from 5.3 points in states without strict photo ID laws to 11.9 in states with strict photo ID laws,**" the study found. **For black voters in the primaries, the strict photo ID laws caused the gap with white voters to almost double to 8.5 points.** The net effect of all this? **"Democratic turnout drops by an estimated 7.7 percentage points in general elections when strict photo identification laws are in place."** Democrats weren't the only ones affected, either. The data showed that Republican turnout was depressed by 4.6 percentage points too. But the laws disproportionately affected Democratic voters. **"The turnout advantage of those on the right is three to five times larger in strict photo identification states, all else equal."** These results suggest that by instituting strict photo ID laws, states could minimize the influence of voters on the left and could dramatically alter the political leaning of the electorate." These are strong claims, and proponents of voter ID are likely to take issue with them. One common argument is that black voters actually turned out at a rate higher than whites in the 2012 election, after several states implemented strict ID laws. But this doesn't answer the question at all: turnout among black voters may have been even higher had the strict photo ID requirements not been put in place. Another common argument is that few people actually lack a drivers' license or other type of photo ID that some states requirement. This hinges partially on your definition of "few." Estimates of the percentage of registered voters without valid photo ID range from one to 11 percent. But regardless of your preferred metric, it's unquestionable that we're living in an era of razor-thin electoral margins. A one percentage point difference can be huge when you're talking about an election with a margin of victory of say, 0.3 percentage points. **"Strict photo identification laws have a differentially negative impact on the turnout of Hispanics, Blacks, and mixed-race Americans in primaries and general elections,"** the UCSD study concludes. **"Voter ID laws skew democracy in favor of whites and those on the political right."**

Voting restrictions push the country right and destroy minority voting power

Wendy **Weiser**, 10-1-2014 [, "In 22 States, a Wave of New Voting Restrictions Threatens to Shift Outcomes in Tight Races," American Prospect, <http://prospect.org/article/22-states-wave-new-voting-restrictions-threatens-shift-outcomes-tight-races>] MJS 3-2-2017

For the first time in decades, **voters in nearly half the country will find it harder to cast a ballot in the upcoming elections.** Voters in 22 states will face tougher rules than in the last midterms. In 15 states, 2014 is slated to be the first major election with new voting restrictions in place. These changes are the product of a **concerted push to restrict voting** by legislative majorities that swept into office in 2010. They represent a sharp reversal for a country whose historical trajectory has been to expand voting rights and make the process more convenient and accessible. Although some of these new laws are harsher than others, and some are still being fought in the courts, they have already dramatically altered the landscape for 2014. The outcomes of some of the tightest races this year could turn on the application of controversial new voting rules. **Strict voter ID laws** have gotten most of the attention, but **are only part of the story. Cutbacks to early voting and voter registration opportunities, and other idiosyncratic changes to voting rules, have the potential to do just as much damage.** Partisanship plays a key role. Of the 22 states with new restrictions, 18 passed them through entirely Republican-controlled bodies. A study by social scientists Keith Bentele and Erin O'Brien of the University of Massachusetts Boston found that **restrictions were more likely to pass "as the proportion of Republicans in the legislature increased or when a Republican governor was elected."** After Republicans took over state houses and governorships in 2010, **voting restrictions typically followed party lines. Race has been a significant factor.** In 2008, voter participation among African Americans and certain other groups surged. Then came backlash. The more a state saw increases in minority and low-income voter turnout, the more likely it was to push laws cutting back on voting rights, according to the University of Massachusetts study. The Brennan Center for Justice likewise found that of the 11 states with the highest African American turnout in 2008, seven passed laws making it harder to vote. Of the 12 states with the largest Hispanic population growth in the 2010 Census, nine have new restrictions in place. And of the 15 states that used to be monitored closely under the Voting Rights Act because of a history of racial discrimination in elections, nine passed new restrictions. Some laws are especially egregious in targeting how minorities vote. The push to shut down Sunday early voting in states where African American churches organized successful "Souls to the Polls" drives is a glaring example. **Laws restricting voter registration drives are another such tactic. African Americans and Latinos register through drives at twice the rate of white citizens,** and in recent years, civic groups have used drives to help close the racial registration gap—as they have for veterans, young people, and other less registered populations. Instead of embracing these efforts, Florida and several other states passed laws that make it difficult—and, before a court stepped in, impossible—for groups to help voters register. The result was a significant drop in registrations. **The push to trim early voting provides another clear example of how new voting restrictions target minorities.** For more than two decades, states have been increasing early voting opportunities. In fact, most states now offer early voting, and in the last two presidential elections, a full one-third of Americans

voted early. The reason for this expansion? Early voting works well—voters like it, election officials like it, and it improves the election system. It is so non-controversial that the bipartisan Presidential Commission on Election Administration recently recommended that all states adopt it to prevent long lines at the polls. Despite this consensus, after the 2008 election, support for early voting eroded among Republican legislators in the South and Midwest. What changed? For the first time, **African Americans had begun voting early at high rates. In Southern states, early voting by African Americans nearly tripled between 2004 and 2008, overtaking early voting by whites by a significant margin.** In North Carolina, for example, seven in ten African Americans voted early in 2008, as compared to half of white voters. And while Republicans have traditionally been more likely to vote early, **in 2008 Democratic early votes exceeded Republican ones.**

[...]

Ten states passed laws making it harder for citizens to register. These include laws curbing voter registration drives (in Florida, Illinois, Texas, and Virginia); rules requiring voters to provide documentary proof of citizenship when registering (in Alabama, Kansas, Tennessee, and previously in Arizona); **laws eliminating the highly popular same-day registration** (in Nebraska and North Carolina); and a law making it harder for people who move to stay registered (in Wisconsin). **Voter registration problems**, which tend to pass under the radar, **have long been the single greatest barrier to voting, causing millions of lost votes per year. Unless your state has same-day registration,** if you are not registered, you cannot vote. One in four eligible Americans is not registered, and millions more have outdated registrations.