

NEG BLOCKS 2.0



NEG BLOCKS 2.0	1
Framing	4
R/T Grant \neq Independence	4
R/T Crisis	4
R/T Crisis Continues	4
Generic	4
R/T Popular Support	7
R/T Separatists Won Referendum	8
R/T December Regional Election	8

R/T Puigdemont Election	9
R/T Cyclical tensions	9
R/T Independence Inevitable	11
R/T Left-Wing Politics	15
R/T Coalitions	15
R/T Austerity Impact	16
R/T Impacts	16
R/T Catalan Economic Uncertainty	16
R/T Spanish Economic Uncertainty	17
R/T Spanish Right-Wing Austerity	19
R/T Corruption	19
R/T Gridlock	20
R/T Civil War	21
R/T Siroky	23
R/T Terrorism	24
R/T Human Rights	24
R/T Settlement Negotiations	25
Autonomy Negotiations Solve	26
R/T Catalan Economy	27
R/T Catalan Poverty	27
R/T Tax Deficit	27
R/T Catalan Education Funding	28
R/T Spanish Economy	28
R/T Reform Tax System	28
R/T Self Governance (Good Policies)	28
R/T Energy poverty and housing laws	30
R/T Healthcare	31
(Europa 17) The EU has healthcare benefits. You lose access to those when you vote pro.	31
Catalonia's healthcare system is part of Spain, or at least under Spanish control. If Catalonia separates, it has to develop a new healthcare system. That's extremely expensive.	31
Catalonia is more likely to dedicate new funds to things like paying off debt. The pro can paint this picture of all of the money Catalonia has, but it can't pay its debt AND develop new infrastructure AND build new healthcare systems AND invest in energy poverty, etc. My opponents are exaggerating.	31
R/T Refugees	32
R/T Tasmin evidence (call for it)	36
R/T Impact: Keep them out of Refugee camps	36
R/T Self-Determination	36

R/T Referendum	36
R/T Climate Change	37
1. Catalonia has already reduced its emissions by 26% from 2005, and they passed a bill last August to reduce emissions by another 65%	37
2. No impact: Spain's emissions aren't even that large in the whole world—they have the 27th highest emissions, so cutting them wouldn't really make a dent	38
R/T Research	38

Framing

R/T Grant \neq Independence

1. Grant in this context necessarily means that a country gets independence. When colonial powers “granted” independence to their colonies, the colonies became their own countries
2. Even if “grant” simply gives Catalonia a choice, the region would chose to be independent.

R/T Crisis

R/T Crisis Continues

Generic

My opponents have framed this issue wrong. This isn't a battle between Catalonia and Spain, it's the political project of a couple separatist radicals who have never enjoyed popular support

1. Support for independence has actually decreased. Gunterman at the Washington Post finds: support peaked in 2013 at 49%, but since then, it has fallen to just 35%.

Gunterman 17 Eric Guntermann, 10-11-2017, "Analysis," Washington Post,

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/10/11/the-myth-of-massive-support-for-independence-in-catalonia/> //DF

These events — and particularly the disputed results of the referendum — give the impression that Catalans are clamoring for independence.

But this is wrong. **Before the referendum, a minority of Catalans supported independence.** The most recent survey by the Catalan government's Center for Opinion Studies (CEO), which was conducted in July, showed that only a minority of Catalans **(35 percent) supported independence.** The graph below plots the trend in support of independence based on CEO surveys going back to 2006. Before 2010, it was rare for more than 20 percent of Catalans to support independence. **After 2010, support increased** for two reasons. First, the Great Recession struck, leading to widespread unemployment. Second, the Constitutional Court struck down an overhaul of Catalonia's statute of autonomy — the equivalent of its constitution — at the request of Spain's conservative People's Party. **In 2013, support for independence peaked at 49 percent. But since then, support for independence has declined, falling below 40 percent last fall. In fact, in the most recent survey, 76 percent of Catalans actually identified with Spain.** In another survey, 56 percent of Catalans stated that they would never vote for the Catalan president's party. Support for Catalan secession is, thus, far from overwhelming.

2. The separatists have no mandate. Lublin at the Washington Post explains the election system is stacked in favor of the separatists, which is how the three pro-independence parties won a majority

while losing the popular vote. Catalonia's election system gives rural provinces, where separatist parties do well, more seats in parliament than cities. Had Catalonia allotted seats fairly among the provinces, pro-independence parties would have lost

Lublin 17 David Lublin [professor of government in the School of Public Affairs at American University], 12-22-2017, "Analysis," Washington Post,

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/12/22/how-a-bias-in-catalonias-elections-helped-the-separatists-win/> //DF

But here's the problem: **The separatist victory is a manufactured product of Catalonia's electoral system**, in which voters cast their ballots for a single party list and seats are awarded to parties proportionally using the d'Hondt formula within each of Catalonia's four provinces. As I've explained before, this system is stacked in favor of the separatists — **which is how the three pro-independence parties won a parliamentary majority while receiving just 47.7 percent of the vote.** **Three factors skewed the results. First, Catalonia gives the three more rural provinces, where separatist parties do well, 15 more of the 135 total deputies than they merit based on population. Conversely, Barcelona, the most unionist province, is underrepresented. This is known as "malapportionment."** Had Catalonia allotted seats fairly among the provinces, pro-independence parties would have fallen one seat short of a majority. Second, separatist parties benefit from the tendency of districts with fewer seats to give a bonus to stronger parties. The disproportionality between the share of votes and seats won by a party increases as the number of seats declines. In a district with just one seat — like in the U.S. House — it's possible to win with just 51 percent (or sometimes less) of the vote. The same thing is true even under proportional representation. In districts with just a few seats, you sometimes see similar disproportionality. In 2016, Spain's governing People's Party won two of the three seats in Cuenca province with just 46 percent of the vote. Had Catalonia held its elections in a single, regionwide district, separatist parties would have won just 66 seats — two short of a majority. Third, the d'Hondt formula used to allocate seats based on votes, while commonly used around the world, is biased in favor of larger parties. Another way of allocating seats, called the Ste. Laguë formula, is more proportional and not biased in favor of large or small parties. In Thursday's election, substituting Ste. Laguë for d'Hondt would have whittled the pro-independence majority from five seats down to one — even if all other aspects of the system, including malapportionment, had been retained. Switching to the fairer Ste. Laguë formula and either eliminating malapportionment or electing the Parliament from a single district would have awarded parties opposed to the UDI a five-seat majority over pro-independence parties. Electoral rules may seem like trivial details compared with the emotional debate over Catalonia's status. But these rules matter a lot. Thursday's **[the] outcome in Catalonia gives pro-independence forces a psychological boost and allows them to claim a popular mandate — even though they received fewer votes than their opponents.** The day after the election, separatist leader Carles Puigdemont claimed that the results showed that the desire for independence "is neither a fantasy nor a hologram" and demanded that Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy "accept the results of the ballot."

1. The separatists are moderating. Eyal at the Straits Times reports that the new parliament has already made concessions to Madrid by refusing to let exiled lawmakers vote in the parliament, and electing a moderate to the speaker's position. And even though Puigdemont wants to rule Catalonia from abroad, most separatist lawmakers don't think he should become President

Eyal 18 Jonathan Eyal, 1-19-2018, "Signs of moderation from Catalan nationalists," Straits Times, <http://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/signs-of-moderation-from-catalan-nationalists> //DF

The move again raises the spectre of a prolonged constitutional fight over Spain's territorial integrity. But **there are also indications that a new generation of Catalan nationalists may be anxious to avoid further constitutional showdowns by adopting a more moderate stance** in their disputes with Spain's central government. With its distinct language and history, Catalonia has enjoyed a large measure of autonomy for almost half a century, and the continuation of this status is not challenged by any Spanish politician. The dispute is instead over the intention of a motley collection of nationalist and far-left parties to obtain full independence, even if this means resorting to extra-legal means. Last year, they held a referendum on Catalonia's independence, despite the fact that Spain's highest courts declared the vote null and void. Turnout was just 42 per cent and the exercise lacked any safeguards of fair ballot counting. Nevertheless, Mr Carles Puigdemont, the then-President of the regional Catalan government, claimed that the Catalans "won the right to be an independent country" and used the referendum as a justification to declare independence unilaterally. The central government in Madrid

responded by dissolving the Catalan government and ordering new elections. Most of Catalonia's top officials have since been charged with sedition and abuse of office, although Mr Puigdemont and his closest associates fled to Belgium, where they are fighting a Spanish extradition warrant. New elections were held in Catalonia last month, and the chief winner was the Citizens' Party, a centrist movement strongly opposed to separatism. However, given the province's electoral system, the Citizens' Party secured only a quarter of the seats in Parliament, with a collection of separatist movements still being able to form a majority. The expectation was, therefore, that the confrontation between the government in Madrid and the separatists would resume. But as the newly elected Catalan Parliament met for the first time this week, there are signs that the nationalists are pulling back from the brink. They initially intended to allow Mr Puigdemont and four other fugitives from Spanish justice who have been re-elected to vote "through representatives" in the new legislature. But when Spain's central government threatened court proceedings to rule this illegal, the Catalan separatists accepted that those not present would not be able to vote. More significantly, the nationalists pushed through on Wednesday the election of Mr Roger Torrent, a 38-year-old moderate, as the new parliamentary speaker. Mr Torrent immediately struck a conciliatory tone, seeking to reassure those who oppose Catalan secession that the majority which the pro-independence parties enjoy would not be abused. "Absolute majority is not absolute truth," he said, quoting the words of a famous Spanish academic. "Majorities have to be taken for what they are: a stimulus that spurs us to work and not a blank cheque for the government." All eyes are now on the political machinations to create a new government. Mr Puigdemont wants to return to power as the head of the new Catalan Cabinet, notwithstanding the fact that he is in Brussels. His idea is that he could run Cabinet sessions through online Internet chat and messaging services such as Skype which, supposedly, would make him just as accountable to Parliament and officials as if he were physically in Barcelona, Catalonia's capital. But Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy has threatened a swift court challenge should Mr Puigdemont go down this route, arguing that "government by Skype" is "an absurd idea". And most of Catalonia's own nationalists privately agree. While they are loath to see Spain's central government prevail in this confrontation, they also fear that a further dispute over Mr Puigdemont's status will end in another legal defeat and may expose the nationalist movement to ridicule. The decision on a new government will come next week, and the outcome remains unpredictable.

2. De-link: Instability is not long term. Look to the Quebec secession movement as an example. Stein in 2006 explains that even though tensions in Canada were extremely high, including violent radical independence organizations, the situation calmed within a few years without Quebec gaining independence. Even though tensions are high that doesn't mean they will never be resolved. For example, it is more likely that Catalonia gain more control over their economy in order to quell the calls for independence.

Stein, Michael B. "Separatism in Canada." The Canadian Encyclopedia, 7 Feb. 2006, www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/separatism/.

The separatist movement re-emerged as a political force in modern Québec in the late 1950s and the 1960s, a time of great socioeconomic change and nationalist foment in that province. The most important early manifestation of this rejuvenation was the leftist Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale (RIN). The RIN began as a citizens' movement on 10 September 1960 and became a political party in March 1963. It first competed electorally in 1966, and together with other separatist groups garnered over 9% of the Québec vote. Some violent radical fringe movements committed to independence also operated during this decade, most notably the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ), which attained notoriety in the October Crisis of 1970. Two years later, when the new Constitution Act, 1982 was introduced – following months of heated negotiations on its terms by Ottawa and the provinces – Lévesque's PQ regime was the only provincial government not to have signed the deal, saying the terms were not acceptable to Québec. Although the new constitution still applied in the province, the absence of the Québec government's consent became a political sore that would fuel separatist sentiment there for years to come. (See Patriation of the Constitution.)

R/T Popular Support


1. The Washington Post finds in 2017 that empirically, support for independence is not even at its highest rate.

Eric Guntermann (Washington Post). "The myth of massive support for independence in Catalonia." October 11, 2017.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/10/11/the-myth-of-massive-support-for-independence-in-catalonia/?utm_term=.9f48f3a17513

The most recent survey by the Catalan government's Center for Opinion Studies (CEO), which was conducted in July, showed that **only a minority of Catalans (35 percent) supported independence**. The graph below plots the trend in support of independence based on CEO surveys going back to 2006.

Percent of Catalans who support independence from Spain



Source: Catalan Center for Opinion Studies

THE MONKEY CAGE

Before 2010, it was rare for more than 20 percent of Catalans to support independence. After 2010, support increased for two reasons. First, the Great Recession struck, leading to widespread unemployment. Second, the Constitutional Court struck down an overhaul of Catalonia's statute of autonomy — the equivalent of its constitution — at the request of Spain's conservative People's Party. **In 2013, support for independence peaked at 49 percent. But since then, support for independence has declined, falling below 40 percent last fall. In fact, in the most recent survey, 76 percent of Catalans actually identified with Spain.** In another survey, 56 percent of Catalans stated that they would never vote for the Catalan president's party. Support for Catalan secession is, thus, far from overwhelming.

2. According to Reuters on 24% of Catalans want to continue with the independence process while 71% says they would prefer an agreement based on Catalonia staying with Spain.

NA (Reuters Staff). "Barely a quarter of Catalans want to pursue split from Spain: poll." November 27, 2017.

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-politics-catalonia/barely-a-quarter-of-catalans-want-to-pursue-split-from-spain-poll-idUSKBN1DROXI>

MADRID (Reuters) - Barely a quarter of Catalans want to continue with a plan to claim independence from Spain in the wake of Dec. 21 regional elections, according to a poll published in El Pais newspaper on Monday. An illegal Catalan independence referendum on Oct. 1 plunged Spain

into its worst political crisis in decades. It eased after the sacking of the secessionist Catalan authorities by the Madrid government elicited little resistance. But uncertainty could return if the pro-independence camp wins in the Dec. 21 vote. **Just 24 percent of those polled by Metroscopia said they would like to continue with the independence process after the elections, whereas 71 percent said they would prefer politicians to find an agreement based on Catalonia staying part of Spain.** Pro-independence parties may fail to retain an absolute majority of seats in the Catalan parliament in next month's election, the first part of the poll published on Sunday showed. However, the survey's margin of error at 2.4 percent and the fact support was evenly split between the two sides makes reading conclusions from polls difficult. The telephone poll surveyed 1,800 Catalans between Nov. 20 and Nov. 22. Failure to capture a majority in the regional parliament would be a heavy blow for Catalan separatists who have billed the election as a plebiscite on Madrid's decision to impose direct rule on the region last month. The Oct. referendum produced a large majority in favor of independence, but turnout was only 43 percent because many who opposed the breakaway did not vote. Catalan separatist parties are forecast to win 46 percent of the vote, down slightly from 47.7 percent in a previous election in 2015. Unionist parties combined would account for another 46 percent of votes, up from less than 40 percent last time, according to the Metroscopia poll. Turnout for the election, which former Catalan leader Carles Puigdemont said on Saturday would be the most important in the region's history, is predicted to reach a record 80 percent.

R/T Separatists Won Referendum

1. Unionists didn't turnout to vote because they didn't want to legitimize the election and risk engaging with the police.

R/T December Regional Election

1. This is a false victory. Lublin at the Washington Post explains: the election system is stacked in favor of the separatists, which is how the three pro-independence parties won a majority while losing the popular vote. Catalonia's election system gives rural provinces, where separatist parties do well, more seats in parliament than cities. Had Catalonia allotted seats fairly among the provinces, pro-independence parties would have lost

Lublin 17 David Lublin [professor of government in the School of Public Affairs at American University], 12-22-2017, "Analysis," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/12/22/how-a-bias-in-catalonias-elections-helped-the-separatists-win/> //DF

But here's the problem: **The separatist victory is a manufactured product of Catalonia's electoral system**, in which voters cast their ballots for a single party list and seats are awarded to parties proportionally using the d'Hondt formula within each of Catalonia's four provinces. As I've explained before, this system is stacked in favor of the separatists — **which is how the three pro-independence parties won a parliamentary majority while receiving just 47.7 percent of the vote.** **Three factors skewed the results. First, Catalonia gives the three more rural provinces, where separatist parties do well, 15 more of the 135 total deputies than they merit based on population. Conversely, Barcelona, the most unionist province, is underrepresented. This is known as "malapportionment."** **Had Catalonia allotted seats fairly among the provinces, pro-independence parties would have fallen one seat short of a majority.** Second, separatist parties benefit from the tendency of districts with fewer seats to give a bonus to stronger parties. The disproportionality between the share of votes and seats won by a party increases as the number of seats declines. In a district with just one seat — like in the U.S. House — it's possible to win with just 51 percent (or sometimes less) of the vote. The same thing is true even under proportional representation. In districts with just a few seats, you sometimes see similar disproportionality. In 2016, Spain's governing People's Party won two of the three seats in Cuenca province with just 46 percent of the vote. Had Catalonia held its elections in a single, regionwide district, separatist parties would have won just 66 seats — two short of a majority. Third, the d'Hondt formula used to allocate seats based on votes, while commonly used around the world, is biased in favor of larger parties. Another way of allocating seats, called the Ste. Laguë formula, is more proportional and not biased in favor of large or small parties. In Thursday's election, substituting Ste. Laguë for d'Hondt would have whittled the pro-independence majority from five seats down to one — even if all other aspects of the system, including malapportionment, had been retained. Switching to the fairer Ste. Laguë formula and either eliminating

malapportionment or electing the Parliament from a single district would have awarded parties opposed to the UDI a five-seat majority over pro-independence parties. Electoral rules may seem like trivial details compared with the emotional debate over Catalonia's status. But these rules matter a lot. Thursday's **[the] outcome in Catalonia gives pro-independence forces a psychological boost and allows them to claim a popular mandate — even though they received fewer votes than their opponents.** The day after the election, separatist leader Carles Puigdemont claimed that the results showed that the desire for independence "is neither a fantasy nor a hologram" and demanded that Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy "accept the results of the ballot."

2. Pro-separatists lost seats in parliament according to the Spain Report in December.

NA (Spain Report). "Separatists Hold On To Majority In Catalan Election." December 21, 2017.

<https://www.thespainreport.com/articles/1276-171221232904-separatists-hold-on-to-majority-in-catalan-election>

The three Catalan separatist parties—Junts per Catalunya (previously PDeCat, previously CiU), Republican Catalan Left (Esquerra, ERC) and the CUP—held on to their small majority, as a block, in the regional parliament at the election held on Thursday. With 99.9% of the vote counted, **the block's 72 seats in 2015 had fallen by just two to 70 tonight**, weeks after Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy sacked the former First Minister, Carles Puigdemont, and his entire regional government after they and separatist MPs declared independence on October 27.

R/T Puigdemont Election

This can only continue until March, because the separatists don't want a new election that they would probably lose

Castillo 18 Jesus Castillo [Research Analyst at Natixis], 1-22-2018, "Catalonia: An intense political agenda until the end of January," FXStreet, <https://www.fxstreet.com/news/catalonia-an-intense-political-agenda-until-the-end-of-january-natixis-201801231130> //DF

"But from a regulatory side, the candidate to the confidence vote for the Presidency of the regional government needs to attend to the debate. Thus, according to legal experts, a remote conference does not comply with the functioning rules of the regional chamber. In such a case, the Spanish government has already warned that it will appeal the decision to the Constitutional Court in order to request the invalidation of the vote if needed." "The investiture vote should take place on January 31st at the latest. If Carles Puigdemont remains the candidate, this would be a new challenging stage for Mariano Rajoy's government. Indeed, **it might be obliged to request the cancelling of the**

illegal election of the regional President. And this might be politically very costly for his party and himself. Such an extreme situation might become dangerous for the political stability of the Spanish government if it loses the support of Ciudadanos in the national Congress or if all the opposition parties supports a vote of non-confidence to overthrow his cabinet (but this is not our baseline scenario)."

"Outlook: If the separatist's majority of the regional parliament is persisting in electing Carles Puigdemont without complying with the Parliament regulations sooner or later the Spanish Constitutional Court will invalidate its election. A new stage of uncertainties will then open.

Nevertheless, we continue to believe that **the separatist parties don't want new elections**. Therefore, we think that **they will finally find an agreement to elect a President accordingly to the Parliament's rules**. But this might take some time. **They can make last the decision until end of March**. During this time, the political situation might remain quite chaotic. Thereafter their strategy remains unknown since they have several options. But once again, **whatever their decision we believe that they would try to avoid new elections**."

R/T Cyclical tensions

The new speaker of the Catalan Parliament wants dialogue – admittedly not the best card

Jones 18 Sam Jones, 1-17-2018, "Puigdemont tweets video mixing clips of Rajoy and Hitler," Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/17/puigdemont-tweets-video-clips-rajoy-hitler> //DF

"It's absurd that someone may intend to be a candidate to be the head of the regional government while being in Brussels and running away from justice," he said on Monday. "This is no longer just a judicial and political problem, this a problem of pure common sense." On Wednesday morning, Roger Torrent, a member of the pro-independence Catalan Republican Left party, was elected the new parliamentary speaker. Torrent said he intended to focus on ending the Spanish government's direct rule and looking for "understanding and dialogue in Catalonia's political life". Puigdemont congratulated Torrent, tweeting: "I am sure you will exercise the role with nobility and bravery, protecting institutions and the country." The former Catalan vice-president, Oriol Junqueras, remains in prison facing possible charges over the push for independence, as do the region's former interior minister and two prominent pro-independence activists. Article 155 of the Spanish constitution – which permits Madrid to maintain direct rule over Catalonia – will stay in place until there is a new Catalan government. If no candidate is elected within two months of the first investiture vote, parliament will be dissolved and new elections held 54 days after the date of the first investiture vote.

1. **De-link:** Hackwill of EuroNews explains that the independence movement is struggling; Artur Mas, an historic figure for the independence party resigned because of divisions and warned that independence should be kept off of the agenda because they failed to get more than 50% of the vote.

2. **De-link:** Morato of Politico in 2017 explains that there are two reasons why the pro-independence party will become more moderate and decrease their push for independence after the December elections. First, the radical independence party lost influence in parliament which means the main-stream independence parties can be more moderate. Second, "Many on the secessionist side regard the perception of increasing economic risks as one of the main factors that could weaken support for independence in the next months or years. Thus it's a safe bet that things will calm down and that Catalonia will disappear from international headlines for a while."

3. **De-link:** Both sides want an end to the crisis. Catalan News in December reports that Rajoy said his party is willing to open dialogue with the new Catalan government, but not on independence.

Robert Hackwill (EuroNews). Mas quits party leadership and fires Catalan independence warning. Published 1/9/18.
<http://www.euronews.com/2018/01/09/mas-quits-party-leadership-and-fires-catalonian-independence-warning>.

One of the historic figures of the Catalan nationalist movement and a former president of Catalonia, **Artur Mas, is resigning from the leadership of the Separatist Party, citing "internal divisions...and personal legal problems"**. As a parting shot, he said that **in today's conditions, independence is not a possible option for Catalonia right now. "Not to have clearly exceeded 50% of the votes, obliges us to understand that accelerating the establishment of independence can not be done in the short term," he insisted.** Current Catalan leader Carles Puigdemont disagrees and believes Catalonia's nationalists have been given a mandate to govern, even if they are divided and cannot form a government.

Xavier Morato (Politico). 3 ways the election changed Catalan politics. Published 12/22/17.
<https://www.politico.eu/article/3-ways-election-changed-catalan-politics/>.

The second fundamental change regards the unionists. The party that received the most votes was Ciudadanos, a center-right, liberal upstart that opposed independence. Meanwhile, support for Mariano Rajoy's Popular Party plunged, cutting its seats in parliament from 11 to three. **The likelihood of Ciudadanos forming part of the next Catalan government is close to zero**, but the ascendance of a right-wing counterweight to the Popular Party has the potential to disrupt the balance of power nationally. **On the pro-independence side, the most important difference in this election is the decline of the radical, anti-capitalist Popular Unity Candidacy party, which saw its share of votes drop from 8.2 percent to 4.5 percent and its representation in parliament cut from 10 to four deputies. This is likely to be good**

news for the two more mainstream pro-independence parties, which are likely to form the new government. They will be now less dependent on a frequently very uncomfortable ally and probably enjoy more flexibility to negotiate with other parties in the regional parliament on many different issues. Don't expect them to take a confrontational approach to Madrid. One of the first priorities of the new government will be to insulate the performance of the Catalan economy from the political goings-on. Many on the secessionist side regard the perception of increasing economic risks as one of the main factors that could weaken support for independence in the next months or years. Thus it's a safe bet that things will calm down and that Catalonia will disappear from international headlines for a while. There is one wild card: One of the leaders of the main pro-independence parties is in jail. The other is in self-imposed exile in Brussels and would likely face arrest should he return. That makes whatever happens next highly dependent on the attitude of the Spanish government and judiciary.

(Catalan News). Parties call for dialogue in day 9 of election campaign. Published 12/13/17.

<http://www.catalannews.com/politics/item/parties-call-for-dialogue-in-day-9-of-election-campaign>.

Parties call for dialogue in day 9 of election campaign Despite general agreement that talks are needed each group defends its own priorities
SHARE 13 December 2017 07:52 PM byACN | Barcelona Wednesday was the ninth day of the election campaign, and with only a week to go until the Catalan ballot on December 21 there was a lot of talk about talking. 'Dialogue' was one of the keywords of the day, although it clearly means something different for each party. PPC willing to open dialogue but not on independence Spanish prime minister and leader of the People's Party, Mariano Rajoy, was in Badalona campaigning for the Catalan branch of his party and its leader and candidate, Xavier Garcia Albiol. **Rajoy said his party is willing to open dialogue with the new Catalan government, but not on independence.** The Spanish president said that his executive is "the best guarantee that Catalonia will continue to be part of Spain and Europe." ERC addresses Spanish president in a letter Rajoy's comments came after a letter addressed to him from ERC's main candidate, the still imprisoned Oriol Junqueras, was read out in the Spanish Parliament. Junqueras called on the Spanish president to respect the results of the election "whatever they might be". Criticizing the police brutality during the October 1 referendum, Junqueras said differences must be resolved with "dialogue and never with violence." Junqueras' number 2, Marta Rovira, branded today the possibility that she also be summoned to court over the independence case as coercion.

R/T Independence Inevitable

Spain has said that it is willing to use military force to keep Catalonia in Spain. This makes independence impossible for five reasons.

- 1. Forceful secessions have only happened 3 times in the last century— in Pakistan, Kosovo, and South Sudan—and all of those examples were preceded by literal ethnic cleansings. Catalonia's independence movement is nowhere near as severe.**
- 2. There is no support for independence among catalan parliament.**
 - a. Rincón of El País reports last week: key figures in the independence movement have said that they will not support attempts to resume a push for unilateral independence. Without parliament's support, there is no chance that Catalonia's resources will go towards the formation of a new state.**
 - b. Furthermore, Eyal at the Straits Times reports that the newly elected parliament has refused to let the exiled former leadership, i.e the independence movement's leadership, vote in the**

parliament. And even though Puigdemont wants to rule Catalonia from abroad, most lawmakers don't think he should become President.

4. Puigdemont was elected as a self professed pacifist who's said himself that violence has never been an option for them. If we understand him to represent the catalonian parliament, we can conclude that they don't want violence either.

5. Even if the Catalans did want to go to war for independence Uxo at Monash university explains: Catalonia lacks the army and trained personnel to launch a civil war. He concludes that civil unrest is the only likely outcome.

Higueruela 14 José Luis Feito Higueruela [President of the Instituto de Estudios Económicos], 1-2014, "THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CATALAN INDEPENDENCE," Instituto de Estudios Económicos,

<https://www.ieemadrid.es/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/2014-01-20-IEE-ESTUDIOS-ECONOMICOS-DE-CATALUÑA-EN-ESPANOL.pdf> //DF

For the purpose of this section it is important to state that Catalan secessionists have repeatedly cited the plundering to blame Spain for increases in the regional taxes and the hidden public debts accumulated by not paying their suppliers, not to mention the cuts in public investment and social spending carried out by the Catalan government. Encouraged by these assertions, widely disseminated by the Catalan media, many Catalan businesses and families have become convinced that their economic pains are not due to the lack of resources, especially severe in times of crisis, but rather to the contempt that Spanish governments have for Catalonia, diverting resources from there to other regions in the country. Likewise, most Catalan citizens do not blame successive Catalan governments for the particularly heavy tax increases they have had to endure but rather the Spanish government. It is therefore not surprising that persuaded by the ideas of secessionist politicians a significant part of Catalan society views independence, or at least the call for independence, as the only way to stop the adjustments and improve their living conditions. Given the persistent intensity and widespread dissemination of these proclamations, what is truly surprising and a source of hope for the future, is not that 40% and 60% of Catalans want independence, but rather that 60% or 40% do not want it. **It is**

difficult to overstate the strong influence of economic aspects in Catalan society's drift towards

secession. As fuel for the fire of independence, reference has occasionally been made to alleged or actual restrictions on the language policy of the Catalan government imposed by Madrid or appeals lodged against the Statute approved by the Catalan parliament and its subsequent repeal or revision by the Constitutional Court of part of its articles. However, if the majority of Catalan citizens who have switched to the pro-independence side in recent years were to be asked to list the inconveniences that they have suffered in using Catalan, or the statutory articles whose repeal or amendment turned them towards pro-independence, it is extremely unlikely that they would be able to provide precise answers. On the other hand, it is safe to say that **if these people were to be asked for their reasons for calling for independence their replies would be basically economic in nature**. In my opinion, part of the rise in **the pro-independence movement in Catalonia**, difficult to quantify but very significant, **based on those citizens who stated in the surveys** that they were in favour of independence prior to the economic crisis of 2008 and those who do so today, **is due to the widespread belief that their economic woes are down to the "Spanish State"** and that independence would enable them to improve their living conditions.

Johnson 17 Steven Johnson, 10-28-2017, "When Rich Places Want to Secede," Atlantic,

<https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/catalonia-secede-rich-region/544244/> //DF

A major reason cited for the crisis? As Catalan protesters cried, "Madrid nos roba"—"Madrid is robbing us"—by which they mean the federal government is taking more than it gives in transfer payments. Catalonia, the northeastern region that includes Barcelona and holds 16 percent of the Spanish population, accounts for about a fifth of Spain's \$1.2 trillion economy and about a quarter of all Spanish exports and industry.

Most crucially, it pays Madrid \$12 billion more in taxes per year than it gets back. **As a relatively rich region with its own independence movement, Catalonia's not alone: A small set of secession movements in historically productive areas**, most visibly in Europe, **say they'd be better off on their own**, and more are pointing to Catalonia's example to regain momentum. **Belgium's Flanders region**, one of the birthplaces of modern commerce and the host to a separatist party that made gains after the global financial crisis, boasts a GDP per capita 120 percent higher than the EU average. If **the German state of Bavaria** were its own country, as the Bavarian Party wishes, its economic output would crack the top 10 of EU member states, according to its government. And last weekend, two **deep-pocketed northern Italian regions that are home to each**

Milan and Venice, passed nonbinding referenda for greater autonomy. In Europe, resentments of paying to cover less productive countrymen are longstanding, but recently they seem to have intensified as a swirl of nationalist sentiments has swept the continent. **The common wisdom used to be that separatist movements mostly came from weak minorities that rallied around racial or ethnic injustices. “With globalization, that changed significantly,”** said Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, a professor of economic geography at the London School of Economics (LSE). **“Virtually everywhere in the world,” movements have swapped out the “identity card” for the “economic card.”** Erin Jenne, a professor of international relations at Central European University, agrees. Economic inequality is one of a few factors that can keep independence movements simmering, but they won’t boil over without a catalyst—usually some external circumstance like a major political crisis, or an offer from another country to provide military support to a region with separatist aspirations, she said. After all, inequality between regions is baked into the entire concept of modern nationhood—if subsidizing poorer parts of a country were motivation enough to split off, every region would have done it by now. Last weekend’s referenda in Italy’s regions of Lombardy and Veneto show how these economic tensions seldom come free of matters of ethnic identity. The initiatives, which more seek financial autonomy than outright secession, are sponsored by the Northern League, a populist anti-immigrant party. Paolo Grimaldi, a League official, said the regions were tired of “giving 80 billion euros [each year] to the state coffers.” Politico has argued that the votes were a symbolic tribute to a northern Italian dream of the ‘90s: a fully seceded, Celtic-inflected ethno-state called Padania that would cut the dead weight of “Roma ladrona”—“Thieving Rome.” But **movements to secede can be a gamble. Independence talk in places like Quebec and Catalonia has historically made businesses and consumers feel queasy**—after pro-secession parties took action, the regions have seen relocations of corporate headquarters, and even drops in home prices in Quebec and bank deposits in Catalonia. Plus, **there are economic perks to staying together: Trade is easier across internal borders, and diversified regions diffuse risk.** Catalonia, for example, has built up some of its own institutions, but it has a long way to go before it has all the systems of a national government, and the limited evidence that exists suggests secession doesn’t necessarily fling open the gates of economic growth. A huge portion of Catalonia’s trade is either domestic or with the European Union, says Rodríguez-Pose, of LSE. If the region were to break off, not only would Spain lose 20 percent of its GDP overnight—Catalonia could see, Rodríguez-Pose says, “rapid impoverishment” depending on the scale of conflict.

Rincón 18 Reyes Rincón, 1-15-2018, "Jailed Catalan independence leaders admit October referendum was illegal," EL PAÍS, https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/01/12/inenglish/1515751031_769444.html?rel=mas //DF

In a blow to former Catalan premier Carles Puigdemont, **key figures in the independence movement** who are currently in pre-trial custody over charges including rebellion and sedition **have said in court they will not support attempts to resume a push for unilateral independence for the region.** Former regional interior chief Joaquim Forn and the **leader of the pro-independence** civic group National Catalan Assembly (ANC), **Jordi Sànchez**, both members of Puigdemont’s Junts per Catalunya ticket, on Thursday told Spain’s Supreme Court they would give up their seats in the new regional parliament if it continued with the secession push that culminated in the chamber passing a unilateral declaration of independence in late October, in defiance of Spain’s Constitutional Court. Madrid responded to that declaration by using emergency constitutional powers to sack the regional government and call a snap election on December 21. Pro-independence parties then went on to win a combined majority of seats. Those parties are now negotiating the possible shape of a new government while Puigdemont is pushing to be sworn in remotely as regional premier despite the fact he is in Brussels and faces arrest in Spain over his own role in the independence push. But **Puigdemont now finds himself increasingly isolated after Sànchez, Forn and Jordi Cuixart, the head of another pro-independence civic association,** Òmnium, told the Supreme Court they **were stepping back from the precipice.** All three are in pre-trial custody over their role in the events of September 20 and September 21, when protestors outside the Catalan government’s department of economic affairs vandalized Civil Guard patrol cars and hindered the work of officers searching for material destined for the illegal October 1 independence referendum. **Forn and Sànchez said they still planned to take possession of their seats in the parliament but only if their party takes a less hardline approach to independence,** while Forn also said he would not take on any ministerial role in a new cabinet. According to sources in court, Forn drew lines between his desire for independence in Catalonia, the steps taken by the former government to achieve this aim, and the actions of the Catalan police force – the Mossos d’Esquadra, a force for which he was, as Catalan interior minister, ultimately responsible. The ousted minister said he had never given “orders” or “instructions” to the force intended to help facilitate the October 1 referendum. He also attempted to distance himself from the actions of the Mossos by saying he had not been directly involved in “operative” decisions.

Gonzalez 17 Ricard Gonzalez, 12-27-2017, "Catalonia's Crisis Is Just Getting Started," Foreign Policy, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/27/catalonias-crisis-is-just-getting-started/> //DF

The secessionist leaders are not without blame. The Catalan government's worst mistake was to promote a declaration of independence after a referendum with only a 43 percent turnout. The argument that this percentage would have been higher had the Spanish police not brutally repressed voters does not legitimize such a foolish move. The consequences of the unilateral declaration were easy to predict: No country recognized the new "republic," self-rule was suspended, and Catalan society became more bitterly divided between pro- and anti-independence citizens. In a rare show of self-criticism, pro-independence Catalan leaders recognized some of their mistakes during the electoral campaign. "The Catalan government was not ready to enforce independence," Clara Ponsati, former regional minister for education, declared from Brussels. **The two biggest secessionist coalitions, Together for Catalonia and Republican Left of Catalonia, which together got 66 seats and are expected to form the new regional government, have stated in their party platforms the need to negotiate with Madrid and have rejected the idea of a unilateral solution to the conflict.** While this is a positive development that may soothe tensions, a serious dialogue between the two sides remains unlikely. To begin with, the rise of Ciudadanos in opinion polls threatens the hegemony that Rajoy's People's Party has enjoyed within the Spanish right since the late 1980s, and this will probably lead to a nationalist bidding war between the two parties. In fact, Ciudadanos' leader, Albert Rivera, has already accused Rajoy of being too soft on secessionists. Stirring anti-Catalan feelings has always been a successful electoral strategy for Spanish right-wing politicians, so it is hard to imagine them abandoning it now.

Eyal 18 Jonathan Eyal, 1-19-2018, "Signs of moderation from Catalan nationalists," Straits Times, <http://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/signs-of-moderation-from-catalan-nationalists> //DF

The move again raises the spectre of a prolonged constitutional fight over Spain's territorial integrity. But **there are also indications that a new generation of Catalan nationalists may be anxious to avoid further constitutional showdowns by adopting a more moderate stance** in their disputes with Spain's central government. With its distinct language and history, Catalonia has enjoyed a large measure of autonomy for almost half a century, and the continuation of this status is not challenged by any Spanish politician. The dispute is instead over the intention of a motley collection of nationalist and far-left parties to obtain full independence, even if this means resorting to extra-legal means. Last year, they held a referendum on Catalonia's independence, despite the fact that Spain's highest courts declared the vote null and void. Turnout was just 42 per cent and the exercise lacked any safeguards of fair ballot counting. Nevertheless, Mr Carles Puigdemont, the then-President of the regional Catalan government, claimed that the Catalans "won the right to be an independent country" and used the referendum as a justification to declare independence unilaterally. The central government in Madrid responded by dissolving the Catalan government and ordering new elections. Most of Catalonia's top officials have since been charged with sedition and abuse of office, although Mr Puigdemont and his closest associates fled to Belgium, where they are fighting a Spanish extradition warrant. New elections were held in Catalonia last month, and the chief winner was the Citizens' Party, a centrist movement strongly opposed to separatism. However, given the province's electoral system, the Citizens' Party secured only a quarter of the seats in Parliament, with a collection of separatist movements still being able to form a majority. The expectation was, therefore, that the confrontation between the government in Madrid and the separatists would resume. But **as the newly elected Catalan Parliament met** for the first time this week, **there are signs that the nationalists are pulling back from the brink. They initially intended to allow** Mr Puigdemont and four other **fugitives from Spanish justice who have been re-elected to vote "through representatives"** in the new legislature. **But when Spain's central government threatened court proceedings to rule this illegal, the Catalan separatists accepted that those not present would not be able to vote.** More significantly, the nationalists pushed through on Wednesday the election of Mr Roger **Torrent, a 38-year-old moderate,** as the new parliamentary speaker. Mr **Torrent immediately struck a conciliatory tone, seeking to reassure those who oppose Catalan secession** that the majority which the pro-independence parties enjoy would not be abused. "Absolute majority is not absolute truth," he said, quoting the words of a famous Spanish academic. "Majorities have to be taken for what they are: a stimulus that spurs us to work and not a blank cheque for the government." All eyes are now on the political machinations to create a new government. Mr Puigdemont wants to return to power as the head of the new Catalan Cabinet, notwithstanding the fact that he is in Brussels. His idea is that he could run Cabinet sessions through online Internet chat and messaging services such as Skype which, supposedly, would make him just as accountable to Parliament and officials as if he were physically in Barcelona, Catalonia's capital. But Spanish Prime Minister Mariano **Rajoy has threatened a swift court challenge should Mr Puigdemont go down this route,** arguing that "government by Skype" is "an absurd idea". **And most of Catalonia's own nationalists privately agree.** While they are loath to see Spain's central government prevail in this confrontation, **they also fear that a further dispute over Mr Puigdemont's status will end in another legal defeat and may expose the nationalist movement to ridicule.** The decision on a new government will come next week, and the outcome remains unpredictable.

Sengezer 17 Eren Sengezer, 11-3-2017, "Catalonia's Puigdemont: Violence has never been an option for us," FXStreet, <https://www.fxstreet.com/news/catalonias-puigdemont-violence-has-never-been-an-option-for-us-201711031717> //DF

In an exclusive interview with Belgium's RTBF television, Catalonia's deposed president, **Carles Puigdemont, said that violence had never been an option for them**. Key quotes I haven't fled Spain, but it is impossible to prepare well for my defense there. What we want from Spain is recognition, respect. Haven't met with Belgian officials yet.

Uxo 17 Carlos Uxo [Spanish studies expert at Monash University], 10-5-2017, "Catalonia: What happens if it declares independence from Spain?," ABC News <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-10-05/what-happens-after-catalonia-declares-independence-from-spain/9013664> //DF

Dr Uxo believes this would have been the best option for the Spanish Government, because it's probable that Catalans would have voted in favour of remaining part of Spain. But the risk there would have been setting a dangerous precedent — he says the experience of Scotland shows independence movements don't just go away when a referendum is defeated. Going forward, Dr Uxo says he can't see how the movement towards independence can be stopped unless a fresh referendum is held. **This probably won't end in civil war or revolution Dr Uxo says civil unrest is much more likely than civil war, primarily because Catalonia doesn't have an army or trained personnel**, but also because civil unrest would be seen as a better path towards gaining international recognition for independence. As well, he says Catalonia would look very similar post-independence. There's already a high degree of self-rule in the region and the Catalan Government would remain the same — the main differences would be that Catalonia would control its own taxes and would be able to control its own foreign policy. Without Catalonia, Spain would be a very different country. When asked why Spain was so intent on keeping Catalonia, Dr Uxo said:

~~Instead, most separatist are moderating their stance Gonzalez at Foreign Policy magazine writes that after the December election, the two biggest secessionist coalitions want negotiations with Madrid, and have rejected unilateral secessions~~

R/T Left-Wing Politics

R/T Coalitions

Turn: Catalonia is a hub of left-wing power; independence would destroy that coalition. Studebaker at Cambridge explains that Catalonia was just one of two regions in Spain to deny Rajoy's party a plurality and force him into a minority government. Catalan independence would deprive left-wing Spanish movements of much-needed votes

Studebaker 17 Benjamin Studebaker [Cambridge University], 9-27-2017, "The Left-Wing Case Against Catalan Independence," <https://benjaminstudebaker.com/2017/09/22/the-left-wing-case-against-catalan-independence/> //DF

Whenever someone is making a case for independence or self-determination, we need to ask ourselves— is their situation more like the situation of the satyagrahi or the libertarian? Are they more of a Gandhi or an Ayn Rand? Independence movements are not always anti-imperialist. Sometimes they make oppression worse. In the Catalan case, an independent Catalonia would mean that the Spanish government would have less tax revenue to redistribute to poor and working people in places like Andalusia. It would aid and abet right-wing Spanish governments in their quest to shrink the Spanish welfare state and erode the hard-won rights of Spanish workers. **It would also deprive left-wing Spanish movements of much-needed votes. In the last Spanish election, Catalonia was one of just two regions in Spain to deny Rajoy's People's Party a plurality. Nationally the People's Party won 33% of the vote, but in Catalonia they managed just 13%.** The poor and working people of Spain need the solidarity of Catalonia if they are to rid themselves of Rajoy. They've been very close before—in 2015 Rajoy's party managed only 28% and was forced to form a minority government. And yet, at this pivotal moment, many in Catalonia want to bail. It's not their fault. They've lost the group identity that helped them care. They've stopped thinking of themselves as Spanish. But why should Spaniards find that satisfying? Why

should the poor and working people of Spain allow Catalonia to just walk out the door and abandon them? When rich libertarians claim that they don't owe us any of their wealth because they're sovereign individuals and taxation is theft, we don't just accept their identity as a credible excuse for disavowing their material obligations. The rich have a duty of justice to the poor. It doesn't matter what language they speak or how different they feel. Cultural differences are no excuse for ignoring material obligations to fellow citizens in need. When independence movements hurt the people in a country who need help the most, they are not left-wing. Andalusia matters. Poor and working Spaniards matter. We mustn't forget about them.

R/T Austerity Impact

Non-unique: Spain is moving away from austerity because Rajoy needs to compromise with left-wing parties. White at Reuters reports in 2017 that Rajoy's minority party increased pay for public workers and increased spending in a shift away from austerity as it tries to gain opposition support. Essentially, left-wing parties kept the right-wing parties in check

White 17 Sarah White, 3-31-2017, "Spain veers away from austerity in compromise budget," Reuters,

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-budget/spain-veers-away-from-austerity-in-compromise-budget-idUSKBN17222W> //DF

Spain's minority government unveiled a pay rise for public workers and more spending on social measures in a delayed draft budget for 2017 on Friday, **steering further away from years of austerity as it tries to**

win opposition support for the bill. The budget will test conservative Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy's chances of seeing out his four year mandate, after he was reinstated for a second term last October with the weakest grip on parliament in modern Spanish history. His prospects look improved on a few months ago after he secured support for the budget from the fourth biggest bloc and as he inches closer to a deal with some regional parties, with promises of spending on infrastructure and social measures. The draft budget - approved by Rajoy's cabinet eight months late after two inconclusive elections left the country without a government for much of 2016 - will now be subject to tweaks in parliament and then a vote. Robust job creation and exports have brightened the outlook over the past two months and could ease the slowdown in growth, as improving public finances give Rajoy more wriggle room on spending. It has earmarked more funds to combat child poverty and help the unemployed, with plans to grant some 250,000 permanent contracts to temporary workers in the public sector. It also targets 8,000 new jobs for teachers and police. Civil servants will get a 1 percent pay rise, though inflation this year is forecast at around 1.5 percent.

R/T Impacts

R/T Catalan Economic Uncertainty

1. Non-unique: investor confidence is returning to the region. Reuters reports this week: a major Spanish building company is going to offer an IPO on Barcelona's stock market. This offering is significant, because 1/3 of the company's assets are tied up in Catalonia, and their IPO is seen as a gauge of investor appetite in the region

Reuters 1/22/18, 1-22-2018, "Metrovacesa plans flotation valuing company at up to 2.95 billion euro," Reuters,

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-metrovacesa-ipo/metrovacesa-plans-flotation-valuing-company-at-up-to-2-95-billion-euro-s-idUSKBN1FB12D> //DF

Spanish builder Metrovacesa said it planned a February initial public offering at a price valuing the company at up to 2.95 billion euros (\$3.6 bln), **providing a test for investor appetite after a political crisis threatened to split the country**. The residential developer, which was taken over by creditors during the country's property crash, said **it would float on Spanish stock exchanges including Madrid and Barcelona** at a price range of 18 to 19.5 euros a share on Feb. 5.

Metrovacesa, whose main shareholders are Spanish banks Santander (SAN.MC) and BBVA (BBVA.MC), said the flotation was aimed at widening

its shareholder base to ease access to capital markets and financing for projects. **Metrovacesa has significant exposure to Catalonia and its IPO is seen as a gauge of investor appetite for Spain after a separatist drive** in the northeastern region spooked the business community and led to thousands of companies moving their registered headquarters away from Catalonia. Metrovacesa's flotation will be the first stock market listing in Spain since the central government fired the Catalan administration and took direct control of the region in an attempt to derail the independence movement. Housebuilder Aedas (AEDAS.MC) wobbled on its market debut at the height of the crisis on Oct. 20. Metrovacesa has a greater exposure to Catalonia than Aedas with **nearly a fifth of assets located in the region**. However, **Spain is one of the euro zone's fastest-growing economies and investor sentiment has bounced back after the Catalan secession drive knocked confidence**. Fitch upgraded its rating on Spain to 'A-' on Friday and the premium investors demand to hold Spanish bonds over their German equivalents fell to its lowest level in nearly eight years. Residential construction is thriving in Spain with foreign investment pouring into projects a decade after a property bubble burst and led to an international bailout of the country's banks that were exposed to developers' bad loans.

R/T Spanish Economic Uncertainty

1. The Bank of Spain has lowered projected economic growth for 2017 and 2018 by just .1% due to the Catalan Crisis (Tadeo - Bloomberg)

Maria Tadeo, 17, 12-15-2017, Bank of Spain Cuts GDP Forecasts for 2018, 2019 on Catalonia, Bloomberg, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-15/bank-of-spain-cuts-gdp-forecasts-for-2018-2019-on-catalonia> 1-11-2018, (NK)
The Bank of Spain cut its estimate for economic growth for 2018 and 2019 because of the impact of political uncertainty related to Catalonia's drive for independence. **Growth is set to slow to 2.4 percent next year from a previous estimate of 2.5 percent in September before the secession crisis erupted**. The economy will grow 2.1 percent in 2019 from a previous projection of 2.2 percent, the Bank of Spain said in updated economy estimates published on its website. The central bank estimated 2017 growth at 3.1 percent, matching a Bloomberg survey. The latest update on the Spanish economy comes as voters in the wealthy region of Catalonia prepare to go to the polls on Dec. 21 in an election called by Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy after its former government illegally declared independence. The downgrade in growth estimates for the next two years reflects uncertainty relating to Catalonia and the recent increase in oil prices, the Bank of Spain said.

The bank of Spain puts Spanish economic growth at .8% for the fourth quarter, .1% less than the last two quarters, but the same as 2017's first quarter. My opponents say uncertainty is wreaking havoc on the Spanish economy... this clearly isn't true (Xueqan - Xinhua Net)

Xinhua Net Pct, 17, 28, 12, 2017, Spain's economy grows by 3.1 pct in 2017: Bank of Spain, No Publication, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-12/28/c_136856018.htm 1-11-2018, (NK)

The Bank of Spain expects the country's economy to grow by 2.4 percent in 2018 and by 2.1 percent in 2019 and 2020. **In the fourth quarter of the year, the Spanish economy grew by 0.8 percent**, the bank said, especially thanks to exports that counteracted the uncertainty caused by political tensions in Spain's northeastern region of Catalonia. The bank said the negative economic impact of the political crisis focused on the region, especially affecting private consumption and exports related to the tourist sector.

2. Investors can live with the political strife in Catalonia as the movement has gained no traction recently. While the secessionist movement may not be going away it also isn't making any significant gains. For this reason, Spain is returning to its economic glory years as its growth has remained above 3% for the third consecutive year and their debts are getting paid at a fast rate. (Ashworth – Bloomberg)

Marcus Ashworth (Bloomberg). Catalonia Who? Spanish Debt Finally Basks in the Sun. Published 1/22/18.

<https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2018-01-22/spanish-bonds-are-finally-getting-their-day-in-the-sun>.

Spain is back. Regional strife with Catalonia held back gains for Spanish bonds and equities last year, but it seems now investors can happily live with political stalemate -- if the economy is booming and credit ratings are on the up. Fitch Ratings on Friday raised its rating on Spain to A- with a stable outlook, citing its "strong, relatively broad-based, economic recovery." **Spain now has a realistic prospect of recapturing its glory years in the early**

days of the euro, when talk of a continental breakup was on no-one's lips and investors traded the sovereign as though its riskiness was not all that different from that of Germany and France, the core of the region. So it's perfect timing to capitalize on growing investor interest by raising money. And as if on cue, Spain may now issue about 9 billion euros (\$11 billion) of 10-year debt as soon as Tuesday, Bloomberg News reported, as it has in every January for the last three years. Demand this time should be strong as it has 26 billion euros of maturing bonds and coupons to pay back at the end the month. And this week it will have the sovereign new issue field largely to itself, after its euro area peers found some success last week. Bar some long-dated supply from the European Financial Stability Facility, it is light on the regular government auction schedule as well. Moreover, there is good news to look forward to. S&P Global Ratings may also upgrade its current BBB+ rating at its next review, on March 23. The grade already has a positive outlook. Having two of the main rating companies designating Spain with a rating around single A will bolster its presence in investment-grade bond indexes. **Spain has made major progress from the rocky start to this decade. Gross domestic product rose 3.1 percent in 2017, according to a Bloomberg survey, making it the third year that growth exceeds 3 percent. Forecasts for a slowdown are only natural after such a decent run, and the expansion should soon pick back up again. And it still beats Germany.** The premium of 10-year Spanish bond yields to Germany is the narrowest since 2010 -- **and there is room for further gains.** In the early years of the euro, Spain traded at a small premium to Germany, reflecting prospects for strong growth and its "semi-core" status within the European Union. Those times are returning. The political turmoil in Catalonia kept Spanish debt from benefiting from healthy demand for fixed income in the second half of 2017 -- not so for Portugal and Greece, whose yields raced tighter. **While the independence movement is not going away, nor is it progressing. The secessionists' inability to make a substantive case for their cause has helped investors become more accepting of the risks of a breakup.** For evidence, look no further than the fact that on the day the leader of the independence movement, Carlos Puigdemont, makes an attention-grabbing trip to Denmark, Spain considers a benchmark bond deal, and yields fall. And Spain's normal point of comparison in the debt markets, Italy, faces a tough time. Investors are well aware of the risk that national elections in March could stoke populist fervor or produce no government at all. This makes Spain something of a haven in the short term. Curiously, its ruling People's Party and Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy aren't getting the political benefit that should be their due from the economic turnaround. They are totally opposed to Catalonia seceding, and weren't afraid to use substantial force against voters in the referendum last year. But the main opposition party, Ciudadanos, was the single most successful party at Catalan's regional elections in December, and is now leading in the national polls. That puts Rajoy under enormous pressure to tread far more softly than he did last year on the independence question. A more diplomatic approach could have many benefits, including lowering the temperature around the issue. That can only be good news for investors in Spanish debt and equity.

3. LINK TURN: an Independent Catalonia would cause uncertainty to skyrocket, as they would be out of the EU and Eurozone, and isolated from Spain, as well as the private sector also taking huge losses (Minne - ING).

End, 17, 8,20,2017, Catalonia: The cost of being single – ING, Forex Forum Asia - World News, Financial Magazine, Guest Blog, Social Authors, <https://forexforum.asia/news/2017/08/31/catalonia-the-cost-of-being-single-ing> , 1-1-2018, (NK)

"Over a 48 hour timeframe, the region that is larger than Finland or Ireland in terms of population could unilaterally declare its independence and take the risk of leaving Spain. Cultural and political motives have been put forward but the economic benefits are far from clear. As with Brexit, we believe that **any Catalexit would plunge the region into a long period of uncertainty and would most probably be negative for the private sector.** Economic costs seem to be a secondary issue in the current debate and the spotlight is more on the cultural and political motives. **Uncertainty and a drop of households' purchasing power would probably affect private consumption negatively. Exiting Spain automatically means leaving the EU and undermining foreign direct investment and external demand for exporting companies located in Catalonia.** 45% of Catalan "export" sales head to the rest of Spain and 65% of the rest are exported to the EU. In 2016 Catalonia exported more to Portugal than to the US, China and Japan together. Neither the use of the euro while being out of the Eurozone nor of a new currency would lead to an enviable situation for the private sector. Despite the fact that Catalonia is a net contributor to the Spanish budget, it remains doubtful that secession will lead to a better situation for taxpayers. All in all, from an economic perspective the independence project is costly, and uncertainty alone could already have an economic cost."

R/T Spanish Right-Wing Austerity

R/T Corruption

1. Non-unique: separatist parties literally stole money for independence. Hernandez at El País reports that €3 million euros in Spanish state funds intended to be used for regional debt relief were siphoned off for the independence cause

Hernandez 18 José Antonio Hernández, 1-10-2018, "Catalan police planned to burn evidence of diversion of €3 million to separatists," EL PAÍS, https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/01/10/inenglish/1515574330_704678.html?rel=mas //DF

A Barcelona judge investigating crimes related to the illegal Independence referendum in Catalonia on October 1 has found evidence that €3 million in state funds was siphoned off for the independence cause. The accounting details were discovered in the back of a van among 30 boxes of documents that the Catalan regional police force, the Mossos d'Esquadra, planned to burn in an incinerator in Sant Adrià de Besòs, according to sources close to the investigation. The van was intercepted by Spanish National Police on October 26, just one day before the regional Catalan parliament passed a unilateral declaration of independence in defiance of Constitutional Court rulings. Spanish National Police officers, who had been tipped off about the van full of boxes, seized the documents after tense talks with officers of the regional police force. Officers with the 'Mossos,' as they are known colloquially, demanded a court warrant before turning over the contents of the van. This order was delivered in a matter of hours with final sign-off coming from High Court judge Carmen Lamela, who is currently overseeing an investigation into the former head of the Catalan police force Josep Lluís Trapero. Preliminary evidence suggests that the €3 million proceed from the federal rescue funds (FLA) designed to help Spain's crisis-hit regions clear their debts. This money is distinct from the sums allegedly received in the form of regional government subsidies by civic organizations such as Òmnium Cultural and the National Catalan Assembly (ANC) from former premier Carles Puigdemont to carry out illicit pro-independence activities; these are currently being investigated by Civil Guard's Central Operations Unit. When Spanish finance minister Cristóbal Montoro moved to take over the accounts of the Catalan regional government last September, he announced that the destination of federal funds to the region would come in for special attention. Sources say information in the documents saved from the incinerator explain a €3 million imbalance in regional accounts already identified by the finance ministry after going through the Catalan books. And they argue that this money was diverted for use by the pro-independence movement.

2. This relies on the fact that the crisis in Catalonia is a distraction. However, this isn't true. The GLOBSEC Policy Institute explains that two weeks ago that a recent poll found Catalan independence now ranks fifth among Spain's problems.

Kinga Brudzińska (Fair Observer/a senior research fellow for the Future of Europe Programme at the GLOBSEC Policy Institute in Bratislava, Slovakia). "Catalonia Is Still in Limbo." 1/15/18.

<https://www.fairobserver.com/region/europe/catalonia-elections-independence-spain-europe-news-analysis-18000/>

Some misjudged decisions taken by Madrid, the post-referendum violence on the streets of Barcelona and short deadline for new regional elections are among the factors that also help to explain the unionist parties' underwhelming performance. In addition, their cause was hardly helped by those Spanish legal experts who defended the prosecution of separatists for civil disobedience but disagreed over whether charges should include rebellion, which carries a maximum prison sentence of 30 years. As a result, Rajoy saw Catalan support for his party plunge from 8.5% to 4.2%. This turn of events also strengthened Ciudadanos' claim that it is now best placed to take charge of the crisis and uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Spain. Additionally, if the general elections were to take place today, it would be Ciudadanos (27%), not PP (23%), that would be the most popular party. Yet, it's not all doom and gloom for the incumbent Spanish prime minister. The removal and imprisoning of former members of the Catalan government and other separatists sent a strong signal that Madrid will not tolerate any breach of the rule of law and Spanish constitutional order. It's a decision that's seemingly proved popular with the wider electorate after a recent opinion poll suggested that Catalan independence now ranks fifth (16.7%) among Spain's problems. From there, Rajoy must also seek to capitalize on the fact many Catalans remain reluctant to pursue the dream of full independence. A renewed approach to the Catalan question should be supported by fresh thinking on how to rebuild relations between Barcelona and Madrid. As recent history has amply demonstrated, the very fact that a political scenario seems absurd and irrational to

some commentators and observers doesn't mean that it won't happen. That's another reason why Madrid should rethink what it can offer Catalans, up to and including a legal referendum on independence. Otherwise, Catalonia and the rest of Spain will remain in a harmful state of limbo that's unwanted by separatists and unionists alike.

3. Econ recession is the link David Charter of The Times finds that economic recession in Europe has lead to corruption skyrocketing since people are more willing to accept shady money. That means if we win our case, we win this argument

David Charter, 12-6-2012, "Crisis breeds corruption across the eurozone," The Times,
<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/crisis-breeds-corruption-across-the-eurozone-lzpm78pxrjj>

Crisis breeds corruption across the eurozone Greece was branded the most corrupt country in Europe yesterday in an annual survey that reported levels of probity sinking in many countries hit most severely by the economic crisis. It slipped from 80th to 94th out of 176 countries in Transparency International's corruption perception index, sharing its place in the index with Benin, Colombia, Djibouti, India, Moldova, Mongolia and Senegal. The cash squeeze seems to have taken its toll even on the black economy, with the amount paid out in bribes at €554 million, a drop of €78 million on the previous year. Petty corruption and the payment of bribes were widespread in environments such as hospitals and tax offices. The report was issued as the family of George Papandreou, the former Greek Prime Minister, released a statement denying newspaper allegations that his mother had stashed more than €500 million in a Swiss bank account. Fellow strugglers in the eurozone also slipped in the rankings, with Italy down from 69th to 72nd, Portugal sliding from 32nd to 33rd and the Republic of Ireland from 19th to 25th. Spain — although it rose one place, from No 31 to No 30 — Portugal, Italy and Greece were perceived as having the most corrupt systems in the eurozone. Britain slipped one place to share seventeenth position with Japan. Edda Müller, the director of Transparency International in Germany, said that corruption levels were "closely linked to the economic stability" of a country, "therefore battling corruption is not

R/T Gridlock

1. Non-unique: Spain's parliament is gridlocked regardless of Catalonia. The Local, a Spanish newspaper, writes in 2017 that putting Catalonia aside, Spain's parliament is full of numerous squabbling political parties that don't agree. Since 2016, only 9 laws have been approved, compared to 48 in 2015

AFP 17 AFP, 12-6-2017, "How the Catalonia crisis has paralyzed Spanish politics," The Local,
<https://www.thelocal.es/20171206/how-the-catalonia-crisis-has-paralyzed-spanish> //DF

'Apathy' Then there is a Spanish territorial reform which is proving difficult to push ahead, even against the background of Catalan leaders wanting to break from the country. Spain is divided into 17 semi-autonomous regions, but some of them -- including Catalonia -- have grievances and are asking for financing that would be better suited to their needs. Any territorial reform would have to involve an improvement in the regional financing system, which varies from one part of Spain to another, or an ambitious overhaul of the 1978 Constitution. The Socialists got a pledge from Rajoy's PP that it would look into a constitutional reform in exchange for supporting Madrid's imposition of direct rule on Catalonia. But now, Rajoy is dragging his feet. "We can't talk of reforming the constitution without knowing exactly what reform is needed," he has repeatedly said. "The problem isn't that there aren't proposals to update our constitution, the problem is we have a government that is devoid of political initiative," said Socialist party leader Pedro Sanchez last month, accusing it of "apathy." For Fernandez, a constitutional reform will be hard to agree on. He considers it would be more realistic to "invest political capital in other solutions that don't involve a constitutional reform," such as legislating on inequalities or better access to basic rights. Fragmented parliament But that's just the problem. Putting Catalonia aside, Spain's parliament is full of squabbling political parties that don't agree. In the year since November 2016, when a new legislature began, a mere nine ordinary laws have been approved, compared to 48 in 2015 and 36 the year before that. Rajoy's minority government, which has promised the EU to reduce Spain's deficit to below 3 percent of GDP in 2018, has vetoed dozens of opposition-led initiatives, arguing they would involve more public spending. Formed after close to a year of political blockage after two inconclusive elections, Rajoy's PP only has 137 lawmakers out of 350, far from the absolute majority he enjoyed from 2011 to 2015. The arrival of two relatively new parties on the scene -- far-left Podemos and Ciudadanos -- has further divided a political scene once dominated by the PP and Socialists. And that's hurting the work of the parliament as parties disagree on various proposals.

2. This relies on the fact that the crisis in Catalonia is a distraction. However, this isn't true. The GLOBSEC Policy Institute explains that two weeks ago that a recent poll found Catalan independence now ranks fifth among Spain's problems.

Kinga Brudzińska (Fair Observer/a senior research fellow for the Future of Europe Programme at the GLOBSEC Policy Institute in Bratislava, Slovakia). "Catalonia Is Still in Limbo." 1/15/18.

<https://www.fairobserver.com/region/europe/catalonia-elections-independence-spain-europe-news-analysis-18000/>

Some misjudged decisions taken by Madrid, the post-referendum violence on the streets of Barcelona and short deadline for new regional elections are among the factors that also help to explain the unionist parties' underwhelming performance. In addition, their cause was hardly helped by those Spanish legal experts who defended the prosecution of separatists for civil disobedience but disagreed over whether charges should include rebellion, which carries a maximum prison sentence of 30 years. As a result, Rajoy saw Catalan support for his party plunge from 8.5% to 4.2%. This turn of events also strengthened Ciudadanos' claim that it is now best placed to take charge of the crisis and uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Spain. Additionally, if the general elections were to take place today, it would be Ciudadanos (27%), not PP (23%), that would be the most popular party. Yet, it's not all doom and gloom for the incumbent Spanish prime minister. The removal and imprisoning of former members of the Catalan government and other separatists sent a strong signal that Madrid will not tolerate any breach

of the rule of law and Spanish constitutional order. **It's a decision that's seemingly proved popular with the wider electorate after a recent opinion poll suggested that Catalan independence now ranks fifth (16.7%) among Spain's problems.** From there, Rajoy must also seek to capitalize on the fact many Catalans remain reluctant to pursue the dream of full independence. A renewed approach to the Catalan question should be supported by fresh thinking on how to rebuild relations between Barcelona and Madrid. As recent history has amply demonstrated, the very fact that a political scenario seems absurd and irrational to some commentators and observers doesn't mean that it won't happen. That's another reason why Madrid should rethink what it can offer Catalans, up to and including a legal referendum on independence. Otherwise, Catalonia and the rest of Spain will remain in a harmful state of limbo that's unwanted by separatists and unionists alike.

R/T Civil War

1. No impact: the chance of civil war is much lower for wealthy countries. Humphreys at Harvard University finds empirically: nations with a GDP per capita of over \$5000 have a less than 1% chance of experiencing civil conflicts. For reference, Catalonia has a GDP per capita of \$33,000.

Humphreys 03 Macartan Humphreys [Harvard University], 2003, "Economics and Violent Conflict," UNICEF,

https://www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/files/Economics_and_Violent_Conflict.pdf //DF

One might expect rich nations to be more violent than poor ones because the rich ones have more to fight over.¹⁰ The econometric evidence however suggests the opposite. Most research shows that **wealth reduces the likelihood of civil war**,¹¹ and that

economic growth also reduces risks while recessions worsen them. Figures derived from World Bank econometric

models (Figure 1) show a striking relationship between the wealth of a nation and its chances of having a civil war.¹² The figure suggests that

differences in wealth are most relevant among poorer countries. **A country with GDP per person of just \$250 has a**

predicted probability of war onset (at some point over the next five years) **of 15%**, even if it is otherwise considered an

"average" country. **This probability of war reduces by half for a country with GDP of just \$600 per person and**

is reduced by half again to below 4% for a country with income of \$1250. Countries with income per

person over \$5000 have a less than 1% chance of experiencing civil conflicts, all else being equal. There are various

explanations for why this is so. But so far little work has been undertaken to distinguish between them. The most common is that **wealthier**

societies are better able to protect assets, thus making violence less attractive for would-be rebels.¹³

Another explanation, given by political scientist Thomas Homer-Dixon argues that **poverty causes violence, and points to cases where scarcity leads to migrations that result in conflicts between identity groups over resources**.

Alternatively, the relationship could be spurious in the sense that there are other features of a country, such as a democratic culture, that make it at once more prosperous and less violent. And causality may in fact run in the opposite direction: rich countries may be rich in part because they have had little civil conflict in their recent past.¹⁴ Whatever the reason, the figures suggest that growth-oriented initiatives and conflict prevention initiatives are mutually reinforcing. And the figures provide a rationale for those who say that it is in the interest of wealthy nations to promote economic growth in poor countries in order to avoid the spillover effects of likely conflicts there. In terms of policy implications, the

analysis suggests that the greatest gains in conflict prevention are to be made by focusing development efforts on the very poor rather than on countries of intermediate wealth. 15

2. Jose Marti of Pompeu Fabra University writes in 2018 that both Spain and Catalonia have shied away from any confrontation that might have lead to any violence—that means it’s likely they’ll continue to do so

José Luis Martí, 1-2-2018, "Catalonia in deadlock, and why that is a European problem,"

Verfassungsblog,

<http://verfassungsblog.de/catalonia-in-deadlock-and-why-that-is-a-european-problem/> Pompeu Fabra University

It is important to say that in the days before the declaration of independence many were expecting the conflict to spiral out of control, with violence on the street and maybe even casualties. That this did not happen is a reason for gratitude and a token of responsibility on both sides – the comparatively mild response from Rajoy and the decision of Puigdemont and his cabinet to avoid an open confrontation, dissolve the crowds in the streets, and fly away. You can imagine how this deeply disappointed some secessionist citizens and organizations. It was a tough decision to be made.

3. Carlos Uxo of Monash University notes in 2017 that Catalonia would never fight a war for 2 reasons.

- a. They don’t have any army or trained force that could fight
- b. They’d much rather use peaceful mass protests because it would garner them more international support and legitimacy than picking up a gun

Interviewee: Carlos Uxo, a Spanish studies expert at Monash University ABC News, 10-5-2017,

"Catalonia: What happens if it declares independence from Spain?,"

<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-10-05/what-happens-after-catalonia-declares-independence-from-spain/9013664>

Going forward, Dr Uxo says he can't see how the movement towards independence can be stopped unless a fresh referendum is held. This probably won't end in civil war or revolution Dr Uxo says civil unrest is much more likely than civil war, primarily because Catalonia doesn't have an army or trained personnel, but also because civil unrest would be seen as a better path towards gaining international recognition for independence. As well, he says Catalonia would look very similar post-independence. There's already a high degree of self-rule in the region and the Catalan Government would remain the same — the main differences would be that Catalonia would control its own taxes and would be able to control its own foreign policy.

<https://medium.com/contratastic/homage-to-catalonia-all-the-best-bullfighters-were-fascists-8832655c129> Sep 23, 2017 Guise Bule Medium News The 2017 Catalan Referendum : An analysis of the situation & events leading up to it.

Something I deeply admire about the Catalans is that their independence movement has no paramilitary wing. Compared to the Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea whose paramilitary wing was called ETA, or the Sinn Féin who ran a paramilitary wing called the IRA, the Catalans are vulnerable in Spain.

IRA & ETA were classed internationally as terrorist groups, this is actually the primary reason that the Catalans decided a long time ago that they wanted no part of terrorism. They saw that violence achieves nothing, which is why theirs has historically been a peaceful and democratic movement. This is useful to know when reading about the massive demonstrations underway in

Barcelona right now, the people in those crowds have any intention of causing trouble, they sing songs of love at the police. This is useful to know when reading about the massive demonstrations underway in Barcelona right now, the people in those crowds have any intention of causing trouble, they sing songs of love at the police. But there are radical Spanish elements in the crowd though, waving Spanish flags and trying to provoke the locals. Groups of Spanish nationalists are walking around Barcelona spitting on Catalans, singing civil war fascist songs, attacking Catalans and making fascists salutes as as they march through Catalonia holding Spanish flags and saluting the Spanish police. The problem the Spanish have is that in looking for violence, they are finding none. The Catalans

don't have a black bloc equivalent and historically it's difficult to radicalize Catalans, even when the Spanish are killing them or when the Spanish killed the Catalan President, they never took up arms. Say what you like about the Catalans, Gandhi would have approved.

4. Guise Bule of Medium News writes in 2017 that the Catalan independence movement has no paramilitary wing unlike other secessionists groups, which means it wouldn't fight
<https://medium.com/contratastic/homage-to-catalonia-all-the-best-bullfighters-were-fascists-8832655c129> Sep 23, 2017 Guise Bule Medium News The 2017 Catalan Referendum : An analysis of the situation & events leading up to it.

Something I deeply admire about the Catalans is that their independence movement has no paramilitary wing. Compared to the Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea whose paramilitary wing was called ETA, or the Sinn Féin who ran a paramilitary wing called the IRA, the Catalans are vulnerable in Spain. IRA & ETA were classed internationally as terrorist groups, this is actually the primary reason **that the Catalans decided a long time ago that they wanted no part of terrorism. They saw that violence achieves nothing, which is why theirs has historically been a peaceful and democratic movement.** This is useful to know when reading about the massive demonstrations underway in Barcelona right now, the people in those crowds have any intention of causing trouble, they sing songs of love at the police. **This is useful to know when reading about the massive demonstrations underway in Barcelona right now, the people in those crowds have any intention of causing trouble.** they sing songs of love at the police. But there are radical Spanish elements in the crowd though, waving Spanish flags and trying to provoke the locals. Groups of Spanish nationalists are walking around Barcelona spitting on Catalans, singing civil war fascist songs, attacking Catalans and making fascists salutes as they march through Catalonia holding Spanish flags and saluting the Spanish police. The problem the Spanish have is that in looking for violence, they are finding none. **The Catalans don't have a black bloc equivalent and historically it's difficult to radicalize Catalans, even when the Spanish are killing them or when the Spanish killed the Catalan President, they never took up arms**. Say what you like about the Catalans, Gandhi would have approved.

5. No probability: literally no one has died from the current political divide—make them prove to you that somehow everyone's going to take up arms

R/T Siroky

1 - No link to Catalonia: Siroky outlines the traits of the countries that avoided any kind of conflict: they're wealthy, ethnically homogenous, and came from countries that had given them some autonomy → that literally fits Catalonia perfectly. This is big because a ton of his data is coming from ethnic secessions in former colonies or ethnically divisive states, so the data is way off from Catalonia David Siroky, Duke University. "Secession and Survival: Nations, States, and Conflict". 2009.
<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c637/60e3f257bf10372e8949bb5716920d5d843b.pdf>
When we look more closely at the cases that averted violence of any kind—for example, Andorra, Iceland, Montenegro, Norway, Slovakia—we see that they share a few characteristics: they tend to emerge from loose unions with the rump state through a gradual process of disassociation, that they are relatively wealthy, and for the most part ethnically homogeneous states.

2 - Siroky admits that autonomy can set the stage for further secessionism and conflict because it builds up the intellectual and political experience of governance that makes it more feasible to secede → Aff is the only solution in the long run, negotiations kick the can down the road and maintain uncertainty into the future

David Siroky, Duke University. "Secession and Survival: Nations, States, and Conflict". 2009.

<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c637/60e3f257bf10372e8949bb5716920d5d843b.pdf>

Another competing argument concerns the role of autonomy in generating the conditions for

conflict.²⁹ Indeed, prima facie, it is true that Abkhazia and South Ossetia both had some form of administrative autonomy during the Soviet period, and the other two ethno-regions, Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli, did not. The logic linking autonomy to secession is outlined most

powerfully in Svante Cornell's work, *Autonomy and Conflict*, where he argues in effect that **autonomy provided the intellectual and political experience and networks to pursue secession successfully when the opportunity arose.**³⁰

To be sure, **there is a strong logic of collective action and mobilization that underlies this argument and it needs to be taken seriously.** Despite these strengths, however, there are some important concerns that should cause pause. The

first is that South Ossetia possessed a lower level of autonomy than did Abkhazia - it was an autonomous 'district,' whereas Abkhazia was an autonomous region. According to Elise Giuliano, 'Russia's autonomous republics look considerably more like states than the lower-ranked autonomous oblasts and autonomous okrugs, insofar as they had their own legislatures, executives, and judiciaries....in addition, compared with lower-ranked territories, ASSRs were allowed greater, albeit symbolic, representation in the federal government...'.³¹ If the logic of autonomy is one of degree, then we should expect Abkhazia to have been the first one to secede, since it possessed the characteristics associated with argument in greater abundance, whereas South Ossetia possessed them only pro forma, but it was actually South Ossetia that pursued secessionist first, not Abkhazia.³² Consider the role of autonomy in a more comparative perspective. Looking to the other side of the mountain range, it will be noted that the Supreme Soviet elevated 4 of the 5 autonomous oblasts (Adygeya, Gorno-Altai, Karachai-Cherkessia and Khakassia) to the status of autonomous republics on 3 July 1991, yet not a single one of these subsequently sought secession.³³ **At best,**

autonomy is a background condition that makes recursive secession more likely, but even this is far from clear.

Autonomy is a completely static factor, unable therefore to illuminate the timing, the intensity or the course of the conflict, and therefore of limited use in predicting secessionist violence.

Siroky goes on to say that this previous autonomy concessions explain the majority of secessionism in Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia

David Siroky, Duke University. "Secession and Survival: Nations, States, and Conflict". 2009.

<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c637/60e3f257bf10372e8949bb5716920d5d843b.pdf>

Other scholars have looked at institutions, particularly **federal institutions**, arguing that they **that provide a measure of autonomy to regions and groups that serve as infrastructural focal points which facilitate various forms of collective action, such as secessionism.**¹⁸ **These explanations have considerable plausibility, particularly if we look at recent events in Eastern Europe. The majority of successful secessions in that region possessed some form of institutional autonomy - often federal arrangements - prior to their secession. The Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia are examples.**¹

R/T Terrorism

R/T Human Rights

R/T Settlement Negotiations

1. Turn: a settlement deal would be long and drawn out. Campanella at Foreign Affairs magazine writes in 2016: the endless negotiations over things like asset and liability sharing would destroy confidence in both countries economies and send investors fleeing.

Campanella 16 Edoardo Campanella, 12-14-2016, "Europe, Fracturing From Within," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2017-01-17/europe-fracturing-within> //DF

Similar dynamics are at play in Belgium, too. The more a region benefits from being part of a large open economy, the more it supports it, and vice versa. Last October, for example, the poorer Belgian region of Wallonia [9] blackmailed Brussels by voting against the free trade agreement with Canada and by temporarily blocking its ratification. Although the economic rationale for secession looks strong, the political consequences could be devastating for Europe. The breakup of a nation would imply endless negotiations to split assets and liabilities (such as the public debt), the emergence of tensions between the central government and other regions, and the loss of global influence, which is a function, at least to some extent, of the size of an economy. At the same time, although small jurisdictions tend to be more supportive of continental-wide policies than large nations, the proliferation of sovereign entities would create enormous coordination costs for the European Union. And financial investors, no matter how well the process is managed, would panic and fly away. That is why Europe should avoid creating dangerous precedents—but it should do so in an enlightened way. It might seem, then, that the best deterrent for irredentism would be threatening to deprive a secessionist region of its membership to the European bloc. That is probably why Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy continues to warn Catalonia that its access to the single market as an independent entity would not be guaranteed. The same goes for Scotland. And no European leaders want to open the Pandora's box and trigger an avalanche of secessionist movements in a continent containing 250 regions [10] with clear cultural, ethnic, or historical identities. But should Scotland or Catalonia successfully gain independence, Brussels would hardly be able to ignore their requests for membership, as doing so would isolate millions of people from the rest of the continent. Not surprisingly, Jean-Claude Juncker [11], president of the European Commission, imprudently stated that Scotland deserves a "hearing" in the aftermath of the Brexit vote.

Too much polarization for this to happen

Castells 14 Antoni Castells [visiting professor at the Johns Hopkins University], 10-29-2014, "Six comments on the economic viability of independence and two preliminary remarks," Comissió d'Economia Catalana, <http://www.coleconomistes.cat/pdf/the.economy.of.catalonia.pdf> //DF

But the effects obviously differ widely depending on whether independence is the result of an agreement between the two parties and its terms are negotiated in a friendly, or at least civilised, way (as is happening in the case of Scotland and the United Kingdom and happened, albeit to a lesser extent, in Quebec and Canada), or whether the secession is traumatic. «Traumatic» does not necessarily mean violent, but rather without dialogue, from highly polarised positions, with one side stubbornly refusing to sit down at the table and the other threatening to make unilateral declarations. This is the current situation in the conflict between Catalonia and Spain: not only has there been no hint of dialogue of any kind, but the positions of the two parties could not be further apart. The subject of controversy at present is not even independence but the referendum, and for the time being the doors seem tightly closed, not only to any agreement about its being held, but even to simple discussions about the proposal to hold it, which has the support of around 80% of Catalan citizens and their representatives. Neither in Quebec or Scotland, of course, has the referendum process been short or easy or stress-free, but even so these two cases are poles apart from the current situation in Catalonia. And the difference between them has a marked impact, in economic and financial terms, on all the fields we have examined.

Autonomy Negotiations Solve

Reuters reports that simply granting Catalonia more autonomy would diffuse the situation, as it did with the Basques even though the Basque crisis was much worse.

Reuters 10-19-17 10-19-2017, "The Basque Country: Spain's effective but expensive antidote to secession," Reuters,

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-politics-catalonia-basques-anal/the-basque-country-spains-effective-but-expensive-antidote-to-secession-idUSKBN1CE2G6> //DF

As Spain and Catalonia head toward a constitutional collision over the region's claim to independence, lawmakers on both sides of the crisis are pointing to a way out: north, to Basque Country. Among the verdant mountains of Basque Country, which borders France, a once-violent campaign for independence has petered out, with generous fiscal autonomy from Madrid helping to keep popular agitation for independence in check. "We don't have that economic resentment," Aitor Esteban, organizer for the Basque National Party in Spain's parliament, told Reuters in an interview at party headquarters in Bilbao. "People don't feel that need to act upon a grievance about money; that makes a big difference." The Catalan government is not calling for a Basque-style deal, insisting instead on independence after declaring overwhelming support for secession in an Oct. 1 referendum banned by Madrid. But the most moderate lawmakers in the region's ruling coalition privately say they could drop independence claims if they were given the tax autonomy that Basque Country enjoys. In Madrid, some socialists have suggested it could serve as a model for a compromise that would defuse Spain's biggest political crisis since a failed coup in 1981, although the cost to the central government would be significant. Basque staged modest protests over Madrid's violent crackdown on Catalonia's referendum, but the crisis has failed to rekindle secessionist fervor on the streets of Bilbao, the Basque capital nestled on the banks of the Nervion. Catalan flags hang from balconies alongside the Basque flag in a sign of solidarity, but Bilbao is prosperous and peaceful. Where once unionist politicians needed bodyguards and car bombings were a constant fear, tourists now crowd the taverns of the old town and the world-famous Guggenheim museum. Just 17 percent of Basques want independence and less than half would like to hold a referendum on the issue, according to a poll carried out by the university of Deusto. Basque militant group ETA, which killed more than 850 people in a decades-long campaign to carve out a separate state, effectively ended its armed resistance this year when it surrendered its weapons. The region now has one of the highest economic outputs per capita and one of the lowest unemployment rates in Spain. "The independence debate is on standby in Basque Country because of great fatigue after years of violence and uncertainty after the economic crisis," said Xabier Barandiaran, professor of sociology at Deusto University.

This is a proven success. Plana at MIT explains that support for separatism in Spain's Basque region plummeted after Spain gave it more financial autonomy.

Plana 17 Sara Plana [PhD student in the Department of Political Science at MIT, where her research focuses on structures of armed groups, civil-military relations, and civil war. Prior to MIT, Sara worked as a country analyst for the Department of Defense], 10-25-2017, "What Political Science Tells Us About the Risk of Civil War in Spain," War on the Rocks,

<https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/what-political-science-tells-us-about-the-risk-of-civil-war-in-spain/> //DF

Political science not only helps us predict conflict; it also offers insight on how to avoid it. The Catalan regional government has indicated that it prefers negotiations, giving Spain several opportunities to pump the brakes on the looming conflict. The Spanish government could negotiate some appeasement of Catalonia's economic grievance over redistribution (the major accelerant of the current independence push). Even many within Basque Country claim that separatist sentiment there has decreased in large part because Spain has successfully assuaged their economic resentment. The central government could also make amends for the recent forceful tactics and reverse the recent exclusionary legal verdicts that have fueled Catalans' political grievances. Spain could also forestall violence by avoiding actions that might enhance the security dilemma. Continued repression or heavy-handed governance would only increase Catalans' perception that they need to defend themselves, which would in turn inspire Spain to do the same, creating a spiral of confrontation that is often hard to reverse. To draw another comparison to the former Yugoslavia, in 1981 thousands of Kosovar Albanians gathered to call for more autonomy, but were met by a Serb crackdown, a

revocation of whatever autonomy they had had up to that point, and years of repression; this set the stage for the Kosovo rebellion and later civil war. .

R/T Catalan Economy

R/T Catalan Poverty

No impact: Catalans are well above the poverty. Olivas at the London School of Economics writes that Catalonia is the biggest economy in Spain and is one of the richest areas with some of the highest GDP per capita

Olivas 13 Jose Javier Olivas, 9-11-2013, "The independence of Catalonia: jumping on a bandwagon," London School of Economics, <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2013/09/30/the-independence-of-catalonia-jumping-on-a-bandwagon/> //DF

Catalan independence is gathering a noticeable amount of support among activists and political movements abroad. Many of them have a simplified and idealised vision of the situation in Catalonia and see this cause as another liberation movement in the line of the anti-colonial struggles in Africa or Asia during the 20th century. But are Catalans voiceless, oppressed and/or exploited by Spain? Would Catalan

independence contribute to a more egalitarian world? The answer is no. **Catalonia is one of the richest autonomous**

communities and the biggest economy in Spain. It displays better levels of public services, education,

industrial development and occupation than the majority of Spanish autonomous communities. It also has arguably the most vibrant cultural life in Spain. The tax revenues collected in Catalonia are crucial for the redistributive function of the

Spanish government. **The GDP per capita in Catalonia is 18% higher than that of Spain and 70% higher than that of Extremadura, the poorest region in the country.** One of the most popular arguments in the nationalist rhetoric is

'Spain steals from us' ('Espanya ens roba'). All Catalan nationalist parties including the left-wing ERC and ICV have claimed that there is excessive solidarity within Spain and that a much larger share of the taxes collected in Catalonia should stay in Catalonia This anti-redistribution argument is the most compelling among those used by Catalan nationalists and most Spaniards would be in favour of renegotiating the autonomous communities fiscal and redistribution model. However this argument does not justify the claim for outright independence and seems to resonate more with the stance of the Padanian Lega Nord and Flemish Vlaamse Beweging than with the anti-colonialist ideal many foreign sympathisers of the Catalan nationalist cause have in mind. Nationalist leaders claim that an independent Catalonia would be like the Sweden, Netherlands or Massachusetts of the south of Europe. Although Catalonia is a rich region, it is very far from these benchmark cases. According to an EU study, Catalonia has the worst regional government in Spain in terms of corruption, effectiveness and accountability, with a level comparable only to some regions in Greece, Italy and former Eastern Bloc countries. The area is suffering the consequences of economic crisis and scandals of political corruption as the rest of Spain. Its regional government is the most indebted in the country in absolute terms and the third most indebted relative to its GDP. The Catalan government has seen its credit rating slashed by all credit agencies and is unable to finance itself in the markets. In addition to this, an independent Catalonia would automatically exit the EU and would have to renegotiate membership with the threat of a Spanish veto. Indeed, several business associations are warning against independence and hundreds of companies are relocating to Madrid. Due to these problems and uncertainties it is extremely difficult to have an optimistic view about the scenario of an independent Catalonia. In fact, this process of secession seems a typical case of 'gambling for resurrection' where the Generalitat takes a highly questionable and risky path with the hope to divert people's attention away from internal problems such as corruption scandals, unpopular austerity cuts and loss of electoral support.

R/T Tax Deficit

R/T Catalan Education Funding

R/T Spanish Economy

R/T Reform Tax System

R/T Self Governance (Good Policies)

1. Dhruv Gaur of the Brown Political Review notes in 2017 that the Catalan governing coalition is a random grab-bag of hardcore socialists, capitalists, and anarchists united only by the goal of independence, which means the government would fall apart and be dysfunctional once independent.

Dhruv Gaur, "Catalonia Independence," Brown Political Review, <http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2017/12/catalonia-independence/> DECEMBER 9, 2017

However, the Catalan secessionist movement is not entirely homogeneous in its motives. While a combination of traditional conservative and liberal parties and the far more radical CUP were able to form a pro-independence coalition, these diverse members cite a variety of reasons behind their support of independence. Although the parties agree upon the common goal of independence today, they are likely to quickly fracture should Catalonia become independent due to their larger divergent and contradictory political, economic, and social opinions. Already, the CUP is threatening the leadership of Puigdemont if he does not declare independence immediately, foreshadowing the political turmoil into which Catalonia would be thrown as an infant state. Meanwhile, Spain's actions in the region are making it increasingly unpopular among Catalans.

2. Benjamin Studebaker of the University of Cambridge finds in 2017 that Catalonia is a much-needed liberal stronghold to counterbalance Spanish conservatives in national elections. In fact, while Spanish conservatives have been losing power in the past few years, he concludes that it is impossible for liberals to win without Catalonia. This is a net negative because all of Spain gets worse policy [This is bad because the conservative party supports harsh austerity measures that decimate social spending. The Center for Economic and Social Rights reports that these measures have put 3 million people into poverty]

Benjamin Studebaker, 2017/09/22/, "The Left-Wing Case Against Catalan Independence," <https://benjaminstudebaker.com/2017/09/22/the-left-wing-case-against-catalan-independence/> I am an American doing a PhD in Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge. My research focuses on economic inequality and democratic theory. I got my BA in Politics from the University of Warwick in 2013 and my MA from the University of Chicago in 2014.

Whenever someone is making a case for independence or self-determination, we need to ask ourselves—is their situation more like the situation of the satyagrahi or the libertarian? Are they more of a Gandhi or an Ayn Rand? Independence movements are not always anti-imperialist. Sometimes they make oppression worse. In the Catalan case, an independent Catalonia would mean that the Spanish government would have less tax revenue to redistribute to poor and working people in places like Andalusia. It would aid and abet right-wing Spanish governments in their quest to shrink the Spanish welfare state and erode the hard-won rights of Spanish workers. It would also deprive left-wing Spanish movements of much-needed votes. In the last Spanish election, Catalonia was one of just two regions in Spain to deny Rajoy's People's Party a plurality. Nationally the People's Party won 33% of the vote, but in Catalonia they managed just 13%. The poor and working people of Spain need the solidarity of Catalonia if they are to rid themselves of Rajoy. They've been very close before—in 2015 Rajoy's party managed only 28% and was forced to form a minority government. And yet, at this pivotal moment, many in Catalonia want to bail. It's not their fault. They've lost the group identity that helped them care. They've stopped thinking of themselves as Spanish. But why should Spaniards find that satisfying? Why should the poor and working people of Spain allow Catalonia to just walk out the door and abandon them? When rich libertarians claim that they don't owe us any of their wealth because they're sovereign individuals and taxation is theft, we don't just accept their identity as a credible excuse for disavowing their material obligations. The rich have a duty of justice to the poor. It doesn't matter what language they speak or how different they feel. Cultural differences are no excuse for ignoring material obligations to fellow citizens in need. When independence movements hurt the people in a country who need help the most, they are not left-wing. Andalusia matters. Poor and working Spaniards matter. We mustn't forget about them.

3. Ana Rico of Erasmus University writes that Spain's decentralized structure promotes policy innovation as Catalonia develops innovative new policies to deal with their regional problems. This innovation then spreads across the country as other regional governments feel political pressure to play catch up. For instance, Rico finds that Catalonia paved the way for major healthcare reforms across Spain. But independence jeopardizes this innovation, and leaves the whole of Spain worse off.

Vertical Competition in the Spanish National Health System (NHS) Author(s): Joan Costa-Font and Ana Rico 2006 Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25487569.pdf?loggedin=true>

4.2. Policy innovation and vertical competition As a result of the lack of clear-cut constitutional division of powers and the weak coordination role of the central state, some health policy responsibilities remained blurredly defined. Thus, if VC takes place, the Spanish institutional design would be expected to foster AC to take legislative action prior to the central state, and even substitute - and occasionally deter - central state responsibilities. As a result, this institution-building design leads to the promotion of a broad space for policy innovation. On the other hand, given that technology change is hard to foresee ex-ante - with a reasonable precision -, even in those health policy areas where the division of powers are accurately defined, one might expect new policy areas to appear as having no specific power assignment. **The role of decentralized regions was paramount in promoting**

policy innovation during the 1990s. As expected, this was particularly the case within the fields not explicitly contemplated by the 1986 Act, such as the organisational status of health care centres - such as the creation of (quasi) internal market for health care provision (Lopez-Casasnovas et al., 2005) -, management structures tools - such as the creation of activity indicators of health care activity - and payment systems - such as the implementation of prospective reimbursement contracts with providers-. By sub-sectors, preventive programmes, mental health care and long-term care were also subject to considerable regional experimentation, although often restricted to one or a few regions (Rico & Costa-Font, 2005). Although this has been interpreted as a source of potential territorial inequality in the accessibility and delivery of care, there is also evidence of a cross-regional diffusion processes lead to territorial convergence

(Rico et al., 1998).²⁶ Qualitative evidence from Spain reveals that once some specific policy innovation was successful (Table 2), it was disseminated to other regions - although often with regional specific adaptations. This was especially the case of policies integrating health and social care in those ACs where the ageing process is more prevalent, the contracting-out to the private

sector in those AC where private providers are the majority account for the majority of available health care providers,²⁷ the extension of dental coverage to children in those areas where significant inequalities were found or the rapid extension of the integration of primary care within the NHS network in those AC where primary care was relatively less developed. Overall, this evidence points towards the existence of inter-regional externalities, resulting from a process of policy imitation. Furthermore, **Table 2 suggests that some regions have played a front runner role in**

introducing innovations, and especially those that obtain health responsibilities in the early eighties (e.g., Catalonia and Andalusia), suggesting some evidence of 'first entrance advantage'

R/T Energy poverty and housing laws

1. **De-link:** A report from the University of Barcelona explains that not all of the laws are challenged which means that the Catalan Government can still implement the regional laws and articles that have not been challenged as well as the national laws in order to tackle the serious problems mentioned.

University of Barcelona. CONFLICTS OVER COMPETENCES AND THE NEED TO REDRESS THE SITUATION. THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF CATALONIA REGARDING THE REGIONAL LAWS ON THE FIGHT AGAINST ENERGY POVERTY AND IN THE FIELD OF HOUSING. Published 2016. <http://idpbarcelona.net/docs/blog/conflicts.pdf>. The large amount of conflicts regarding such relevant matters as energy poverty and the right to decent housing (which of course condition the necessary intervention of the public authorities) lead us to put forward two reflections. To start with, **challenging regional laws does not imply that they cannot be enforced, as in one case the suspension has been partially lifted and in the other case the central Government has only alleged Article 161.2 of the Constitution with respect to some articles of the challenged law. This means that the Catalan Government can still implement the regional laws and articles that have not been challenged as well as the national laws in order to tackle the serious problems mentioned.** One could criticize the excessive amount of conflicts and some judgments of the Constitutional Court. However, this is compatible with demanding that the Catalan Government act efficiently and diligently in the fight against the severe effects that the crisis has had upon the most disadvantaged citizens.

2. (James Badcock – BBC 16) Catalonia introduced a law to help combat energy poverty in 2015. Clearly, being a part of Spain is not stopping them from doing what they want to provide energy. Energy Poverty Laws (BBC) Accessed 1/5. Published 20 Nov 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38024374>.

A second anti-poverty law passed by the Catalan parliament in 2015 introduced the obligation on utility companies to inform social services before cutting off non-paying customers. The local authority can then effectively choose whether to allow the company to cut off gas, electricity or water, or decide to take over payment on behalf of a vulnerable household.

3. (Catalan News 16) According to the European Commission, energy poverty can only be solved with combined efforts by regional and national governments. If Catalonia is independent, it is not a regional government.

Regional Governments Solve (Catalan Views) Accessed 1/5. Published 14 Apr 2016. <http://www.catalannews.com/politics/item/ep-to-guarantee-energy-supply-amid-controversy-over-spanish-suspension-of-catalan-decree>.

The resolution also calls the Member States “to ensure a more efficient, targeted and more carefully monitored use of the European Structural and Investment Funds by national, regional and local authorities” in order to “tackle energy poverty, increasing living costs, social exclusion, housing deprivation, and the insufficient quality of the housing stock” and Meszerics believes that the Commission should “allow greater flexibility in this field”.

R/T Healthcare

(Europa 17) The EU has healthcare benefits. You lose access to those when you vote pro.

Catalonia's healthcare system is part of Spain, or at least under Spanish control. If Catalonia separates, it has to develop a new healthcare system. That's extremely expensive.

Catalonia is more likely to dedicate new funds to things like paying off debt. The pro can paint this picture of all of the money Catalonia has, but it can't pay its debt AND develop new infrastructure AND build new healthcare systems AND invest in energy poverty, etc. My opponents are exaggerating.

EU

Healthcare (Europa)

Accessed

1/9. Published 15 Nov 2017.

https://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/health/unplanned-healthcare/temporary-stays/index_en.htm.

As an EU

citizen, if you unexpectedly fall ill during a temporary stay abroad - whether on holiday, a business trip or studying abroad - you are entitled to any medical treatment that can't wait until you get home. You have the same rights to health care as people insured in the country you are in. You should always take your European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) with you on all trips abroad. This card is the proof that you are insured in an EU country. If you don't have a European Health Insurance Card (EHIC), or you can't use it (for instance, for private health care), you can't be refused treatment, but you might have to pay for your treatment upfront and claim reimbursement once you get home.

Feminism

6.

(Emanuela Lombardo – Europa 16) Until recently, Spain was making progress on gender inequality. Until 2008, Spain was making reforms, and the problem was therefore solving itself. The only reason reforms stopped was the 2008 financial crisis and recovery phase.

.

(Peter Goodman – NYT 17) Spain has finally recovered from the financial crisis. That means they can return to reform policies, and Catalan independence is no longer necessary.

Reforms

(Emanuela Lombardo – Europa)

Accessed

1/9. Published 2016.

[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/583112/IPOL_STU\(2016\)583112_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/583112/IPOL_STU(2016)583112_EN.pdf).

While

gender equality policies have been institutionalized and consolidated in Spain until 2008, the 2009-2016 period shows backlash provoked by austerity policies adopted in response to the economic crisis. Institutional dismantlement, budget cuts, legislative standstill, policy reforms with negative gender impacts, and problems of implementation indicate an uncertain future for gender equality policies in Spain. This study maps developments in Spanish gender equality institutions, laws, and policies, including employment, care, political and economic decision-making, gender-based violence, and sexual and reproductive rights.

Recovery

(Peter Goodman – NYT) Accessed 1/9. Published 28 Jul 2017.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/business/spain-europe-economy-recovery-unemployment.html>.

R/T Refugees

1 - Non-unique, Spanish Parliament passed a measure on October 10 of this year to speed up acceptance of refugee and review refugee policies

UN High Commission on Refugees. "Europe Monthly Report: October 2017". 30 November 2017.

<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/60980>

On 10 October, the Spanish Parliament passed a motion to urge the Government to accept all refugees within the next year who were supposed to be relocated and resettled to Spain since 2015.

Furthermore, **the motion called on the Government to undertake a series of refugee-related commitments which are consistent with UNHCR positions, including the review of the criteria for relocation from Greece and Italy, and measures to speed up the relocation process particularly of vulnerable groups and to open safe complementary legal pathways such as humanitarian visas.**

2 - De-link them, the majority of the incoming refugees are Moroccans and Algerians, peaceful countries. They don't gain access to the link on war refugees (75% of 16,000 arrivals, so 12K are peaceful).

UN High Commission on Refugees. "Europe Monthly Report: October 2017". 30 November 2017.

<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/60980>

By the end of October almost 21,300 refugees and migrants have arrived in Spain by land and sea, a 92% increase compared to the same period last year, but modest numbers compared to arrivals at other entry points in recent years. **Most arrivals in Spain this year (75%) have arrived by sea,** but the number of arrivals via the land borders has also increased 15% compared to the same period last year.

The majority of arrivals by sea in October continued to be Moroccans and Algerians while the largest group

entering via the land borders was Syrians. **The number of sea arrivals to Spain (16,000)**, is 144% higher than the same period last year.

3 - Countries routinely lie on moral issues in order to gain support or appear positively in the media. Multiple countries including European countries and America have lied about their commitments to refugees.

4- Hoffman of Vice finds in October of 2016 finds that Barcelona was not as prepared as it claimed, but may be using the refugee discussion as a way to push the independence of Catalonia.

Meredith Hoffman. "Thousands of Refugees Are Backlogged to Resettle in Spain." *Vice*. 12 Oct. 2016. Web. 13 Jan. 2018.
<https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/nnkem7/thousands-of-refugees-are-backlogged-to-resettle-in-spain>

"A lawyer told us we'd have to wait three or four years for the court to decide our asylum case," said the woman, who asked to remain anonymous to protect her identity. Other asylum seekers from Ukraine and Iraq said they were not sure if they wanted to stay in Spain. Serra also claimed that **Barcelona was not as prepared as it claimed, but may be using the refugee discussion as a way to push the independence of Catalonia.** Catalonia, which has long fought to be its own nation, will vote on an independence referendum next September, after growing separatist sentiment in the region. Both Calvo and Pastor, however, said that the issue was not about Catalonia's statehood, but rather addressing human rights concerns by citizens both in Catalonia and around Spain.

5- Once Catalonia becomes independent, they're going to be way too busy trying to figure out their way back into the EU and sustaining their global legitimacy. They won't have any time for refugee policies.

6- TURN: Studebaker explains that If Catalonia secedes from Spain, the Spanish left wing will lose a major source of votes, and the government will become more radically right. This means that voting pro will only embolden the Spanish far right making Spain more likely to roll back any sort of refugee policy because the Catalans aren't fighting it anymore. Unfortunately, almost 21,300 refugees and migrants have arrived in Spain and the UNHCR evidence shows progress towards taking in even more refugees..

Benjamin Studebaker. "The Left Wing Case Against Catalan Independence". 22 September 2017.
<https://benjaminstudebaker.com/2017/09/22/the-left-wing-case-against-catalan-independence/>

In the Catalan case, **an independent Catalonia would** mean that the Spanish government would have less tax revenue to redistribute to poor and working people in places like Andalusia. It would aid and abet right-wing Spanish governments in their quest to shrink the Spanish welfare state and erode the hard-won rights of Spanish workers. It would also **deprive left-wing Spanish movements of much-needed votes. In the last Spanish election, Catalonia was one of just two regions in Spain to deny Rajoy's People's Party a plurality. Nationally the People's Party won 33% of the vote, but in Catalonia they managed just 13%. The poor and working people of Spain need the solidarity of Catalonia if they are to rid themselves of Rajoy.** They've been very close before—in 2015 Rajoy's party managed only 28% and was forced to form a minority government.

2 - TURN: The independence movement has acted as a rallying point for the Spanish far right and given them a way to unite whereas they were previously fragmented and disorganized

Creede Newton. "How the Catalan crisis helps Spain's far right". Al-Jazeera. 28 November 2017.
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/catalan-crisis-helps-spain-171127165448828.html>

Scholars say it is a combination of the mainstream conservative ruling People's Party "capturing the nationalist vote" and "regionalist division" between Spain's minority regions that has put the far right in the spotlight, Mudde commented. "Their importance is overplayed in the media. They are much more visible than relevant," Mudde said. But **the political turmoil that has resulted from Catalonia's declaration of independence is bringing these groups, of which there are dozens, together.** Borrás told Al Jazeera that things have "changed quickly" in Spain, perhaps faster than many observers can track. Borrás explained that **the Spanish far right was previously a "constellation" of ultranationalist**

groups. Some are Neo-Nazis, some are "Falangists" or the remnants of the foremost paramilitary group under the dictatorship of Francisco Franco, who ruled Spain as a right-wing conservative, Catholic nation from 1939 until 1975. Others exist in their own groups. Though these groups have a history of infighting, Catalan independence has given the far right a reason to unite, Borras said.

7. Turn: Catalonia would have to build a national identity and culture if it became independent. This increases anti-refugee sentiment

Levanon 05 ASAF LEVANON [Cornell University], 2005, "National Identity and Xenophobia in an Ethnically Divided Society," International Journal on multicultural studies,
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001425/142588E.pdf> //DF

Recent studies have suggested that national identity is empirically related to negative sentiments of individuals towards foreigners. This type of analysis has hitherto been based on the notion that xenophobia is shaped by the specific nature of national identity in a given society. Representing a stronger and more exclusive perception of national identity, ethnic national identity (compared with civic

national identity) is expected in this line of research **to result in less favourable perceptions of immigrants.** In this paper we expand this approach by arguing that, in deeply divided societies, national identity itself may have different meanings among different social groups. Specifically, our analysis indicates that members of dominant ethnic groups ascribe higher importance to national identification than members of subordinate ethnic groups, and centre their perception of ethnic national identity on ancestral terms, while marginal ethnic groups tend to also associate this form of identity with affective and cultural elements. In addition, we propose a theoretical framework for the understanding of the relationship between national identity and xenophobia. In particular, we focus on the group threat model and the cultural affinity perspective, as both theories explain out-group hostility by focusing on group identity. Analysis of Israeli data from the ISSP module on national identity provides support primarily for the cultural affinity thesis, revealing that, in contrast to previous studies, ethnic national identity is negatively related to xenophobia among members of the Jewish ethnic group. This finding is discussed in terms of the distinctive features of Israeli society and its immigration context.

8- Turn – Immigrants to Catalonia face increased violence – as Stephen of the Guardian reports – they don't know the language, face conflict, and are denied access to health and other public services.

Burgen, Stephen. "Immigration complicates Catalonia's separatist picture." *the Guardian*. 20 Nov. 2012. Web. 13 Jan. 2018.
<<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/20/immigration-complicates-catalonia-separatist-picture>>

In 2000 there were just 900,000 foreign residents in Spain. By 2011 the figure had risen to close to 6 million, or 12% of the population. The biggest single group by nationality is from Romania, followed by Morocco, Ecuador and Great Britain. Those in Catalonia face an immediate problem: the language. This has put pressure on the education system as immigrant children have to learn Catalan before they can be taught anything else. **Inevitably the bulk of immigrants headed for Barcelona, but it is in some of the smaller towns, such as Vic, Badalona, Salt, El Vendrell and Tortosa, where the impact has been felt most and where there has been most conflict. In Vic, where 24% of the population are immigrants, the town council voted to prevent illegal immigrants from registering as residents as a means of denying them access to health and other public services.**

9- TURN: Catalonia will at most take in 4,500 refugees according to Catalan News. This pales in comparison to the 1.26 million asylum requests in other EU nations. Unfortunately, Catalan independence would have economic ramifications for Spain and the EU as a whole, limiting the amount of refugees they will be able to take in in the future. Foster of Kings College London explains that Catalonian independence could easily trigger a eurozone crisis. If the slowly recovering Spanish economy suddenly loses its most profitable region the Spanish economy will tumble. The consequence of a Spanish financial crisis - which could quickly spread to similarly debt-laden, weakened economies in Greece, Ireland, and an Italy preparing for its own fraught election - could be disastrous.

NA (Catalan News). "Puigdemont offers Brussels to host 4,500 refugees, Spain criticises "unilateral" action." March 18, 2016.

<http://www.catalannews.com/politics/item/puigdemont-offers-brussels-to-host-4500-refugees-spain-criticises-unilateral-action>

Catalan President, Carles Puigdemont expressed Catalonia's willingness to accommodate 4,500 refugees and provide "a solution for those millions of people running away from war". In a letter to the EU Commissioner for Migration,

Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, Catalan President **Carles Puigdemont stated that the Catalan**

government and institutions are "working to accommodate around 4,500 refugees" and assured that

Catalonia is "ready to receive up to 1,800 refugees" right now, "600 of which would be hosted directly by the Catalan government". On the other hand, the Spanish executive responded to Puigdemont's action and accused him of acting "unilaterally" and "adding more problems" to the existing situation. "A region in Europe wants to be the solution to the problem, this is impossible", stated current Spanish vice president, Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría.

AFP 17 3-13-2017, "Spain welcomed more refugees than ever before in 2016," The Local,

<https://www.thelocal.es/20170313/spain-welcomed-more-refugees-than-ever-before-in-2016> //DF

The figures released by the Spanish Refugee Council (CEAR) reveal that those fleeing the civil war in Syria have had the most success with asylum applications. Some 90 percent of all those applications accepted – amounting to 6,215 – were from Syrians. However, only 355 have actually been awarded full refugee status with the remaining 6,500 applicants given a form of "subsidiary" protection which is open to review.

While the figures reveal that Spain is welcoming more refugees than ever before, **the number of asylum seekers who make**

their home here is just a tiny percentage of those accepted into Europe as a whole. According to figures from

Eurostat, **EU nations received a total of 1.26 million asylum requests during 2016 with Spain receiving**

just 1.3 percent of that figure. Germany received by far the greatest number of asylum seekers in Europe, with close to three-quarter of a million applications. Of those asylum seekers who arrived in Spain, four in every ten people were female. The figures for how many children were among them were not released. Spain's refugee council insisted that more should be done to help asylum seekers and said that Spain was failing on its legal obligation to process applications rapidly as some 20,370 applications were pending by the end of 2016.

UN High Commission on Refugees. "Europe Monthly Report: October 2017". 30 November 2017.

<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/60980>

By the end of October almost 21,300 refugees and migrants have arrived in Spain by land and sea, a 92%

increase compared to the same period last year, but modest numbers compared to arrivals at other entry points in recent years. Most arrivals in Spain this year (75%) have arrived by sea, but the number of arrivals via the land borders has also increased 15% compared to the same period last year. The majority of arrivals by sea in October continued to be Moroccans and Algerians while the largest group entering via the land borders was Syrians. The number of sea arrivals to Spain (16,000), is 144% higher than the same period last year.

UN High Commission on Refugees. "Europe." <http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/europe.html>

The scale and fluidity of refugee movements in Europe have posed significant challenges for asylum systems and reception facilities in many countries. Faced with domestic pressure, numerous countries have responded by unilaterally imposing tighter legal and physical restrictions on access to their territory. UNHCR advocates for fair and effective asylum systems across Europe to ensure that asylum-seekers are able to access asylum and effective protection. We also advocate with governments to enhance opportunities and support for local integration of refugees. In the absence of fully functioning asylum systems in some European countries, UNHCR assists States in establishing fair and efficient asylum procedures. Among the millions of stateless people worldwide, **UNHCR estimates that around 570,000 live in Europe**. We are assisting European countries to identify and protect those who are stateless, as well as to prevent and reduce statelessness on the continent. UNHCR's Regional Bureau for Europe covers 49 countries. We work with a range of organizations and partners, including the European Union and its agencies, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, other UN agencies, civil society and NGOs. The Bureau also engages with supranational legal institutions, including the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union.

Foster 17 Dr. Russel Foster [Kings College London], 12-10-2017, "The Great Disappointment: Catalonia, Non-Independence, And The Future Of The European Union," HuffPost UK, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/dr-russell-foster/european-union_b_18235736.html //DF

First, Catalanian independence sets a precedent for dissatisfied Europeans elsewhere. A symbolic victory for local, ethnic nationalism over integrationist, European internationalism, goes against the founding principles of the European Union. As Ines Arrimadas, spokesperson for the anti-independence Citizens' Party, said in her immediate response to Puigdemont's non-declaration, Catalan independence represents "el peor nacionalismo que hay en Europa"; the worst nationalism in Europe. In a continent still facing rising Euroscepticism and lack of trust in centralised institutions and political elites, a victory for regionalism over internationalism sets a precedent for eurosceptic parties in dissatisfied

nations - especially debt-burdened Mediterranean nations who have borne the brunt of EU austerity and the Migration Crisis - to hijack Catalan independence and turn it into a rallying-point against the EU's internationalism. Second, **Catalonian independence could easily trigger a eurozone crisis.** Spain has record levels of debt, and the financial relationship between Spain and the EU has been tense since the beginning of the Great Recession. **If the slowly recovering Spanish economy suddenly loses its most profitable region,** and perhaps accrues the high debts of that region, **the Spanish economy will tumble. The consequence of a Spanish financial crisis - which could quickly spread to similarly debt-laden, weakened economies in Greece, Ireland, and an Italy preparing for its own fraught election - could be disastrous.** And unlike the Greek financial crisis, this time there will be no bailouts from Berlin.

R/T Tasmin evidence (call for it)

1 - It says that some politicians and one of the parties are calling for it, don't prove an actual consensus

R/T Impact: Keep them out of Refugee camps

1 - De-link them, they're not in camps, they just show up and don't have a status: 21,300 refugees arrived in Spain this way

UN High Commission on Refugees. "Europe Monthly Report: October 2017". 30 November 2017.

<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/60980>

By the end of October almost 21,300 refugees and migrants have arrived in Spain by land and sea, a 92% increase compared to the same period last year, but modest numbers compared to arrivals at other entry points in recent years. Most arrivals in Spain this year (75%) have arrived by sea, but the number of arrivals via the land borders has also increased 15% compared to the same period last year.

The majority of arrivals by sea in October continued to be Moroccans and Algerians while the largest group entering via the land borders was Syrians. The number of sea arrivals to Spain (16,000), is 144% higher than the same period last year.

R/T Self-Determination

R/T Referendum

The secession parties illegally declared independence. Iglesias explains that their declaration violated both the Spanish constitution and Catalan law. That law requires 2/3 of the parliament's approval to make a major change, like a declaration of independence. However, the separatists approved the referendum only after 51% of lawmakers, a slim majority, voted in favor

Iglesias 18 Miguel Otero-Iglesias [senior analyst in international political economy at Elcano Royal Institute], 1-18-2018, "A Compromise for Catalonia?," Project Syndicate,

[//DF">https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/catalonia-secession-constitutional-reform-by-miguel-otero-iglesias-2018-01](https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/catalonia-secession-constitutional-reform-by-miguel-otero-iglesias-2018-01) //DF

If only it were that simple. Among the biggest misconceptions is the belief that secessionist leaders are democratic; they are anything but. Not only did they violate Spain's constitution in launching their bid for independence; they also ignored the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, the region's highest law, when they rammed a secession law through the Catalan parliament in September 2017. To amend the statute, two-thirds of parliament must agree. This threshold exists in most constitutions in continental Europe. After centuries of political instability, Europeans have learned that a simple majority is insufficient to change the rules of the game. Broad consensus is essential; the requirement of a supermajority ensures that it exists. Catalonia's separatist leaders forged no such a consensus, and they didn't care. With their slim parliamentary majority, they initiated a "binding" referendum, proclaiming that 51% of the vote would be sufficient to establish a Catalan Republic. And this republic would be formed regardless of what the majority of Catalans, or Spaniards for that matter, wanted. Determining the movement's commitment to peace is trickier. It is true that leaders have always advocated restraint. It could even be argued that the only violence during the standoff last year was at the hands of the Spanish national police, who forcibly stopped people from voting in the illegal referendum

R/T Climate Change

1. Catalonia has already reduced its emissions by 26% from 2005, and they passed a bill last August to reduce emissions by another 65%

TCC 17 8-1-2017, "Catalonia passes climate change law to reduce emissions by 100% by 2050," Climate Group,

<https://www.theclimategroup.org/news/catalonia-passes-climate-change-law-reduce-emissions-100-2050> //DF

LONDON: The parliament of Catalonia has just passed the "Climate Change Bill", a law that will strengthen the region's climate efforts; the law aims to create a tax for large vessels and business activities that produce pollution. The autonomous community of Spain, which serves as co-chair for The Climate Group's States & Regions Alliance and is part of the Under2 Coalition, has an ambitious plan to reduce its emissions by 40% by 2030, based on 2005 levels. The new law aims to reduce emissions by 65% by 2040 and 100% by 2050. Carles Puigdemont, President of the Generalitat of Catalonia says, "This law reinforces the international positioning of Catalonia in line with that established by the Paris Agreement on climate change. "The struggle against climate change is not a project of the Government of Catalonia, but rather a national challenge ... It is something that has a direct impact on our prosperity and the economic model on which our country is based." TOWARDS A NET-ZERO ECONOMY As the first law of its kind in the south of Europe, the Climate Change Bill will tax businesses about \$10 for each ton of carbon dioxide emitted – a number that will raise to about \$30 in 2025. Large ships will be taxed about \$1,000 for each ton of nitrogen oxide emitted, and the bill will also reinforce the existing carbon tax on polluting cars. The money raised through these taxes will fund a host of climate actions, such as promoting renewable energy and energy-efficient houses. "Catalonia is showing how bold policies are necessary to shift towards a cleaner, healthier economy," says Libby Ferguson, States & Regions Director, The Climate Group. "As the European co-chair of our States & Regions Alliance, the Catalan government is picking up the challenge and the opportunity arising from climate change. "This law shows how collaboration between businesses and policymakers is crucial to achieve this ambitious goal, and how state and regional governments are at the forefront of climate action."

TRANSPARENT CLIMATE ACTION Catalonia has been at the forefront of transparent climate action, agreeing to voluntarily disclose its emissions and ambitious climate targets on an annual basis since 2014 as part of The Climate Group and CDP's Annual Disclosure initiative with states and regions. Between 2005 and 2014, CDP data shows the Catalonia reduced its emissions by 26% – exceeding the initial 25% reduction target by 2020, based on 2005 levels. By doing so, it was one of the seven governments who disclosed in 2016 that reached its 2020 target several years in advance.

2. No impact: Spain's emissions aren't even that large in the whole world—they have the 27th highest emissions, so cutting them wouldn't really make a dent

R/T Research

Catalonia already has the best research schools

CATALAN ECONOMY

Catalonia doubles the amount of foreign university students, compared to Spain

20.05.2016

Accio "Catalonia doubles the amount of foreign university students, compared to Spain." *Catalonia.com*. Web. 27 Jan. 2018. <http://www.catalonia.com/en/newsletter_news/news/2016/universities.jsp>// NS

There are 4.5 million students on the planet looking for a place to study and these figures are set to rise to 7 or 8 million by 2015, according to The Economist. What attracts students to study abroad? Getting international experience is high on their list, learning in a foreign language another, as well as enjoying quality of life while they study. For universities the returns are not just economic, they also benefit from having a more diverse and multicultural atmosphere, something which in turn then helps to fuel even more interest from students abroad. It is not just the climate and search for international experience that brings foreign students here. **Catalan universities have gradually scaled the rankings in terms of international academic reputation and**, for example, **specialised courses in areas such as biosciences, economics, engineering and humanities** are now **valued worldwide**. Other clearly international campuses are the institutions such as Esade and IESE, which **regularly feature in the lists of top global business schools**. Barcelona University and the Barcelona Autonomous University (UAB), **rank among the global top 200 in the QS World University Rankings®** for 2014/15. Additionally, Barcelona University and the Catalonia Tech University are **among the top 5 best Spanish universities**, while **the Pompeu Fabra University (UPF) in Barcelona is considered the most productive in terms of research and education**. Most students come to Catalonia to do postgraduate or doctorate studies, with less interested in graduate courses. As an example, in the academic year 2015/2015, 40% of the students studying Master's at the Barcelona Autonomous University came from abroad, with the figure at 50% in the Pompeu Fabra University's Doctorate courses. Apart from the specific contents and excellence of the courses given, there are some secrets all Catalan universities good at attracting students from abroad share: establishing agreements with other universities, classes in English, teachers from abroad or who have international experience, and providing specific attention to international students in areas ranging from administrative help to dietary needs.