

We negate; Resolved: the United States should accede to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea without reservations

Contention One is Arctic drilling

[Ryan](#) explains in 2010 that accession to UNCLOS "would maximize legal certainty regarding...energy resources in...the areas of the Arctic Ocean. American oil companies favor ratification, as it will allow them to explore oceans beyond 200 miles off the coast."

However, drilling releases potent greenhouse gasses as [Walsh](#) writes in 2012 that "Methane and black carbon, two greenhouse gasses, will be emitted in significant amounts [by drilling in the Arctic]."

The impact is exacerbating climate change.

[McKinnon](#) finds in 2015 that Arctic drilling "will lead to at least 5 degrees Celsius warming by 2100." Overall, [Staines](#) writes in 2009 that "[accelerating] climate change... could result in the premature death of billions of people."

Contention Two is the South China Sea

Currently, [Reuters](#) finds in 2018 that "[ASEAN] and China have reached a "milestone" in talks...over a code of conduct [or a rulebook of the South China Sea]...with a working text that will serve as a basis for future negotiations," which [UNTV](#) explains in 2018 "is meant to...ensure peace, stability, and confidence gets build, whilst [they] take time to resolve the territorial disputes." Importantly, [Gupta](#) finds in 2018 that "China has resolved numerous sovereignty-linked disputes...with countries large and small. A key feature in each instance is that the United States was neither an ally nor key defence partner of that country." Thus, [Bo](#) finds in 2018 that "the situation in the South China Sea is cooling down."

However, accession reverses progress in two ways

First is blinding America

Article 19 of UNCLOS states that ships exercising the rights of innocent passage shall not engage in "any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal State." This is essential as [Gaffney](#) explains in 2007 that "intelligence vital for American security has been collected on, below and above the oceans – including those considered to be "territorial waters."" Importantly, the [Federation of American Scientists](#) writes in 1996 that "intelligence provides information and insights that are unique, reducing the uncertainty of decision-making at all levels...With it, there is a better chance of avoiding crisis or war." Vitaly, the [CFR](#) finds in 2012 that "A miscalculation or misunderstanding could then result in a deadly exchange of fire, leading to further

military escalation and precipitating a major political crisis.” [Nagai](#) contextualizes this in 2018 that a collision or clash could cause miscalculation in the south china sea.

Second is empowering hardliners

[Mirasola](#) explains in 2015 that “[UNCLOS] provides [a] venue through which the U.S. could press its claims in the region.” Unfortunately, [Ibarra](#) concludes in 2017 that “[international pressure], especially from the US, might push Chinese foreign policy to a hardliner position lest...the Communist Party risk their domestic legitimacy.” This is because as the [U.S Naval Institute](#) writes in 2018 that “The [Chinese] People won’t tolerate it if [they] lose territory yet again” because of the memory of China’s century of humiliation at the hand of western powers. Vtally, [Allison](#) explains in 2017, “Xi told his Politburo colleagues that “winning or losing public support is an issue that concerns the [communist party’s] survival or extinction.””

Problematically, [Zhang](#) in 2016 writes that “[the hardliner strategy is expanding China’s] territorial and military reach in the South China Sea [through] building... mini-bases, [and] conquering...features currently under other countries’ control.”, [he](#) continues in 2017 that the “costs associated with [hardliner] strategy are enormous. China’s military occupation of the Vietnam- or Philippines-held islands may very well trigger a regional war. But the hard-liners believe that these costs will be transitory and bearable.”

The impact is War.

[Winn](#) explains in 2017 that in the case of a war, "vital [trade] traffic would slow to a trickle" which the [CSIS](#) in 2017 finds "would carry a considerable monthly cost of \$2.8 billion." Vtally , [Xu](#) finds in 2014 that "1.5 billion people rely heavily on the South China Sea for food and jobs."

Thus, we negate