

We negate the resolution: The United States should end arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

Our first contention is Yemen.

The current ceasefire has been effective for the peace process, but these talks only happen when the United States sells Saudi Arabia weapons for two reasons.

First, bringing Saudi Arabia to the diplomatic table.

**Reuters in 2018** outlines that when the United States applied pressure in the past, Saudi Arabia agreed to an initial ceasefire, which is an indication of how Saudi Arabia complies with American demands. Indeed, **Jeremy Hunt, the UK Foreign Secretary, last week** described the importance of arms sales, stressing that absent a robust strategic and military relationship, there would not have been adequate leverage to start the talks in the first place. Indeed, this pressure on Saudi Arabia has gotten significant concessions. **Chatham House in 2019** reports that although there have been accusations of violations, there have been a crucial and significant decrease in Saudi air strikes, indicating both a willingness to end the conflict and an actual reduction in violence.

Second, keeping the Houthis at the diplomatic table

**Alarasar in 2018** emphasizes that the only reason that the Houthis are willing to come to the table is when they feel as if they are losing, saying “the Houthis will have little incentive to negotiate in good faith absent continuing military pressure.” She concludes that “withdrawing US support for the Saudi led coalition will ease this pressure without doing anything to end Yemen’s war, [and instead] will exacerbate it.”

Diplomacy helps resolve the Yemen War, preventing famine.

**The United Nations in October** quantifies that over 13 million Yemenis are at risk of death by starvation with Yemen on the brink of the world’s worst famine in over one hundred years. **The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations in January** furthers that the hostilities and instability are preventing humanitarian operations from meaningfully helping those in need.

Our second contention is preventing Saudi proliferation

Arms sales prevent Saudi acquisition of nuclear weapons in two ways.

First, providing leverage.

Lippman [from the Carnegie Middle East Center writes in 2018](#) that Saudi Arabia has hesitated to develop nuclear weapons in turn because they believe that

**Any sign that [they were]** the kingdom was **moving toward nuclear weapons would end U.S. arms sales** and terminate the strategic relationship **that ha[ve] long ensured the kingdom's security.**

Second, proving the security guarantee.

**Gause 2010** writes that “if [Saudi Arabia is] confident of their American security guarantee, [which] big arms sales are warrants of, then] American advice not to obtain nuclear weapons will carry more weight.”

[Guzanski 2013](#) from the Institute for National Security Studies furthers that

For Saudi Arabia, the American nuclear umbrella seemed preferable over the years to an independent effort to obtain a nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the consequences of nuclear weapons in the hands of Iran for Saudi Arabia's security and the rising **doubt in Riyadh regarding the** willingness of the **US** to continue providing it with a **defense guarantee [is]** are **likely to tip the balance of Saudi considerations. If Riyadh feels that it may have to contend alone with a nuclear Iran, it may be the first to acquire nuclear capability.**

There are two impacts to nuclear proliferation.

First, preemptive war.

[Ditmmeir 2011 from the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill](#) writes that

**As nuclear weapons increase the military capabilities of a state, rivals seek to** exploit the momentary advantage in conventional capabilities to **prevent nuclearization through preemptive action** Without this protection, **the** natural **anticipation of changes to the distribution of power** not only **make preemptive war** possible, but **a rational choice by any state that stands to lose from** this successful instance of **proliferation**

Historically, Israel has conducted preemptive strikes against nascent nuclear programs in Iraq and Syria.

Bowman for the [Committee on Foreign Relations in a 2008 report](#) found that

**At some point in the** Saudi **process of developing** or acquiring **a nuclear weapon** capability, **Israel would likely detect the Saudi nuclear activity.** Israel **[and] might strike** a small number of Saudi targets **in order to eliminate the program in its infancy.** Even if the Saudis could obtain a nuclear weapon without Israeli knowledge, it is difficult to imagine a passive Israeli acceptance of a Saudi nuclear weapon, which the Israelis would likely view as an existential threat. If the Israeli response to a Saudi nuclear weapons program took the form of a military attack it would be seen in the Arab World in the context of an attack from the Jewish state against the Islamic holy land and home of the “two holy mosques.” **Such an Israeli attack on Saudi Arabia** would represent one of the greatest offenses to Muslims in history and **would incite an unprecedented level of radicalization** directed **against Israel** and the United States, possibly **resulting in a region-wide conflict between Arab States and Israel.**

Second, proxy war.

Having nuclear weapons can embolden Saudi Arabia to escalate conventional warfare, especially in proxy conflicts.

[Meyerle 2014 from the CNA writes that](#)

**Because nuclear weapons [deter larger powers from taking retaliatory action]** appear to take major war and regime change off the table, **they promise greater space for smaller powers to conduct proxy warfare,** violent provocations, and even limited military operations at lower levels of escalation... **nuclear powers have a greater tendency to escalate during international crises** and to explore a wider range of coercive tactics short of war. New nuclear powers will seek to leverage **[by leveraging] their nuclear deterrent to enable aggressive action.**

As a result, [Allison 2018 from Kent State University](#) quantifies that

In fact, **when either or both states in a dyad possess nuclear weapons, there is a 54% increase in the likelihood [of]** that they will engage in **proxy war.**

Thus we negate.