# 1AC

## TRIGGER WARNING: Contains Descriptions of Intimate Partner Violence/Abuse

**LMK if you would like any reasonable requests or modifications that would reduce stress**

## Framing

**The framework is structural violence**

#### Cognitive processes lead us to neglect the suffering of people we deem irrelevant which results in real and direct violence. It is key we target marginalization in discourse to fight its desensitizing effects.

**Winter and Leighton 01**

Christie, D. J., Wagner, R. V., & Winter, D. A. (Eds.). (2001). Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21st Century. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

While **structural violence** often **leads to direct violence**, the reverse is also true, **as brutality terrorizes bystanders, who** then **become** unwilling or **unable to confront social** **injustice**. Increasingly, **civilians pay enormous costs** of war, not only through death, but **through devastation of neighborhoods and ecosystems.** Ruling elites rarely suffer from armed conflict as much as civilian populations do, who endure decades of poverty and disease in war-tom societies. Recognizing the operation of structural violence forces us to ask questions about how and why we tolerate it, questions that often have painful answers. The first chapter in this section, "Social Injustice," by Susan Opotow, argues that our normal perceptual/**cognitive processes lead us to care about people inside our scope of justice, but rarely** care about those **people outside. Injustice that would be [instantly]** instantaneously **confronted if it occurred to someone we love or know is barely noticed if it occurs to** strangers or **those who are** invisible or **irrelevant to us.** We do not seem to be able to open our minds and our hearts to everyone; **[thus,] moral exclusion is a product of our** normal **cognitive processes**. But Opotow argues convincingly that **we can reduce its nefarious effects by becoming aware of our distorted perceptions.** Inclusionary thinking can be fostered by relationships, communication, and appreciation of diversity. One outcome of exclusionary thinking is the belief that victims of violence must in some way deserve their plight. But certainly it is easy to see that young children do not deserve to be victims. The next two chapters in this section address the violence experienced by children. In the first, "The War Close to Home: Children and Violence in the United States," Kathleen Kostelny and James Garbarino describe the direct and structural violence which children in Chicago and other urban areas of the United States endure, paralleling that experienced by children who live in countries at war. Children who endure these environments often become battle weary, numb, hopeless, and/or morally impaired. But children not only suffer directly from violence, they also suffer from the impaired parenting and communities which poverty inflicts. The authors describe how community and family support mechanisms can mitigate these effects. For example, home visitation and early childhood education programs provide crucial family and community support. While Kostelny and Garbarino focus on community intervention techniques, Milton Schwebel and Daniel Christie, in their article "Children and Structural Violence," extend the analysis of structural violence by examining how economic and psychological deprivation impairs at-risk children. Children living in poverty experience diminished intellectual development because parents are too overwhelmed to be able to provide crucial linguistic experiences. Schwebel and Christie's discussion concludes that economic structures must provide parents with living-wage employment, good prenatal medical care, and high-quality child-care ifwe are to see the next generation develop into the intelligent and caring citizens needed to create a peaceful world.

#### Women are common targets of structural issues - society is constructed to harm women and violence against women is structural.

**Sihna Et Al 17**

Parul Sinha & Uma Gupta & Jyotsna Singh & Anand Srivastava1, 8-xx-2017, "Structural Violence on Women: An Impediment to Women Empowerment," PubMed Central (PMC), <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5561688/?report=classic> [AK]

**Violence** **on** **women** **has** **been** **present** in our society **since** **times** **immemorial**. The **ethics**, the **values**, the **morals**, the **culture** of the society **has** **been framed** in such a way or we can say structured in such a way so as **to promote exploitation** of this segment **which is in reality the root of the society**. The concept of STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE was introduced by Johan Galtung in 1969. It refers to a form of violence wherein some social institution may harm people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs. **Violence** against women **has** **taken** the **form** **of** **a global epidemic** **which** **has taken its toll** **on the physical, psychological, sexual and economic life of the female**. Johan Galtung in “Violence, Peace and Peace Studies”, 1969 has rightly remarked “when one husband beats his wife, there is a clear case of personal violence, but when one million husbands keep one million wives in ignorance, there is structural violence”. India has been slow in its pace for action against violence on women, but the brutal gang- rape of a 23 year old Delhi girl on December 2012 aroused the Indians from their deep slumber on this issue. Structural violence is a demon against women that is devouring the society. The combined efforts of Government NGO's and most important, the sufferers of this violence, the women have to take a major step to fight this dragon. Keywords: Patriarchy, structural violence, women empowerment Go to: Introduction The Canadian Panel[1] on Violence Against Women, 1993 stated, “Women will not be free from violence until there is equality, and equality cannot be achieved until the violence and threat of violence are eliminated from women's lives.” Violence on women has been present in our society since times immemorial. The ethics, the values, the morals, and the culture of the society have been framed in such a way or we can say structured in such a way so as to promote exploitation of this segment. Which is in reality, the root of the society. There is ample evidence to suggest that women have been subordinated, subjugated, and exploited since the beginning of the civilization and is still facing the trauma of the day. Go to: What is Structural Violence? This concept was introduced by Johan Galtung in 1969. It refers to a form of violence wherein some social structure or social institution may harm people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs; according to Galtung, rather than conveying a physical image, structural violence is an “avoidable impairment of fundamental human needs.” This new term was coined to bring to the limelight the degree of damage and harm it may cause to the lives of people which is many fold greater than that caused by inter- and intra-nation wars and armed conflicts. Structural inequalities are especially harmful for women because of the intersection of gender with existing conditions such as poor health, inadequate education, and care.[2,3,4] Lack of good data on violence against women[5,6,7] and on the prevalence of the public/private divide leads to relative reversibility of structural violence. This encourages researchers to focus more on public, political violence rather than violence that occurs in the private sphere[8,9,10] where it is more prevalent. Violence against women has taken the form of a global epidemic which has taken its toll on the physical, psychological, sexual, and economic life of the female. A woman has to face violence in one form or the other throughout her entire lifespan, be it from her parents, her husband, later in life by her son and other relatives. Considering an alarming growth in the cases of violence against women all over the world, the General Assembly of UNO designated November 25th as the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against women, by resolution no 54/134 of December 199. Article of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women states that “violence against women means any act of gender-based violence that results in or is likely to result in physical or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion, or arbitrary deprivation of liberty whether occurring in public or private life.” **Violence** inter alia **is gendered**, **embodied**, **and institutionalized**. **Women** **are subjected to** “**structural violence**” **which** **results from** **sexism, rape, domestic violence, psychological violence**, and other acts of violence **resulting** **from** the **social structure**. Johan **Galtung** **in** “Violence, Peace and Peace Studies,” **1969**, has rightly **remarked** “**when one husband beats his wife**, **there** **is** a **clear** case of **personal violence**, **but** **when** **one million** **husbands** **keep** **one million wives in ignorance**, **there** **is structural violence**.”

## Advantage 1: Gendered violence

#### IPV is incredibly widespread and the survivors are overwhelmingly female-identifying.

**Marques 15**

Luana Marques,, xx-xx-2015, "Intimate Partner Violence – What Is It and What Does It Look Like?," Anxiety & Depression Association of America, <https://adaa.org/learn-from-us/from-the-experts/blog-posts/consumer/intimate-partner-violence-what-it-and-what-does> [AK] (Marques: Phd & Associate Professor of Psychology @ Harvard)

**Intimate partner violence** (IPV) **takes place** in all settings, **in all socioeconomic**, religious, ethnic, **and** **cultural groups. The overwhelming** global **burden** of IPV **is endured by women**, and the most common perpetrators of violence against women are male intimate partners or ex-partners. However, women who are experiencing IPV often do not see themselves as abused. IPV has long-lasting, serious effects on a woman’s physical and mental health. For example, a study found that **women** **were** up to **ten times more likely** **to report depression** **and seventeen times more likely to report** **anxiety** if they were **in violent relationships**. Because of this, it is important for women to understand what IPV looks like and what resources are available to someone experiencing IPV and looking for help. Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) – What is it, and What Does it Look Like? Sometimes called “domestic violence”, intimate partner violence (IPV) is a serious and widespread problem in which a current or former intimate partner engages in physical, sexual, verbal, or psychological violence or stalking (Breiding et al. 2015) . Although most people associate IPV with physical harm, IPV can present itself in many different ways. For example, as opposed to the bruise or black eye that can mark physical abuse, emotional violence is a less talked-about form of IPV that leaves no physical scar. This form of abuse includes humiliation, insults, or criticism, and can be just as harmful as physical violence to one’s sense of self-worth. Similarly, psychological violence is another less observable example of IPV that involves intimidation, threats, and causing fear in one’s partner. Sexual violence, another form of IPV, is far more common in relationships than people realize. Sexual violence can range from unwanted touching and sexual harassment to sexual assault or rape. Reproductive coercion is another type of sexual violence that many may not associate with IPV. This is when a partner tries to control the other’s reproductive choices, such as by banning their use of birth control. Another less-known form of IPV is financial violence. This type takes the shape of financial control. A person may attempt to control their partner’s money or access to school or to their job. In doing so, the person can lead their partner to become completely dependent on them. IPV is not always obvious, so it is important to be able to recognize its many faces. In fact, IPV is actually more common than one may think. In the United States, **intimate partner violence is widespread** (National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 2015): **1 in 3 women and 1 in 4 men have been physically abused by a partner in their lifetime**. 1 in 7 women and 1 in 18 men have been stalked by their partner during their lifetime. IPV accounts for 15% of all violent crime. 1 in 5 women and 1 in 59 men in the United States have been raped in their lifetime. Almost half of these women and a third of these men were raped by an intimate partner. 1 in 15 children are exposed to IPV every year. Nearly 50% of women and men in the U.S. report psychological abuse by their partner (Black et al., 2011).

#### UBI gives women more options which decreases IPV and mental illness- Canada proves

**Moore 15**

Dr. Kieran Moore, xx-xx-2015, "National Support for a Basic Income Guarantee," Canadian Medical Association, <https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/bicn/pages/164/attachments/original/1444323422/National_Support_for_a_Basic_Income_Guarantee_%28CDN_Medical_Association%29.pdf?1444323422> [AK]

**In** the **1970**s, **the** federal **government launched** a national review of **social policy with the aim of developing a program to ensure** an **adequate minimum income for all Canadians**. As part of this review, Manitoba agreed to serve as the pilot site for a federally funded basic income experiment. This initiative, commonly known as Mincome, was launched in Dauphin, Manitoba in 1974. Mincome compared low-income families enrolled in the experiment with a control group that did not receive the Mincome benefits. Three income support levels up to a maximum of $5,800 ($29,069.00 in 2015 dollars) for a family of four were tested, with adjustments for family size and structure (Hum and Simpson, 2001). These amounts were increased annually throughout the duration of the program due to the high rates of inflation throughout the latter half of the 1970s. Three tax back rates were then applied to all income the families received above the Mincome benefit rate: 35, 50 and 75 percent. The Mincome pilot was terminated without a final evaluation report in 1979. A **retrospective evaluation** conducted by Evelyn Forget, an economist at the University of Manitoba, was published in 2011. Forget **found that the disincentive to work**, a key concern expressed about a basic income guarantee, **was minimal** as only new mothers **and** teenagers worked substantially less during Mincome. **Mothers with newborns stopped working because they wanted to stay at home longer** with their babies, and teenagers worked less because they weren't under as much pressure to support their families. The latter trend resulted in more teenagers graduating high school. Moreover, recipients who continued to work had more opportunities to choose what type of work they did. Forget also found unanticipated associations between Mincome and positive health outcomes. Over the duration of Mincome, **hospital** **visits** **dropped by 8.5 percent**, **with fewer** incidents of work-related injuries, and fewer **emergency** **room** **visits** **from** motor vehicle accidents and **domestic violence.** **Additionally**, **there were reductions** **in** the rates of **psychiatric hospitalization** **and** the number of **mental illness-related consultations** with health professionals (Forget, 2011).

### Solvency

#### UBI equalizes power dynamics in abusive relationships and provides more autonomy

**Huws 17**

Ursula Huws is Professor of Labour and Globalisation at the University of Hertfordshire in the UK, and founder of Analytica Social and Economic Research. She is the author of The Making of a Cybertariat: Virtual Work in a Real World., "Universal Basic Income and Women’s Liberation," No Publication, 1-13-2017, https://www.compassonline.org.uk/universal-basic-income-and-womens-liberation/, ghsBZ

More than forty years later, some of the wounds inflicxted in those debates still fester. But could it be that the demand for a universal basic income might be a way of healing them? Instead of posing women with the option of, on the one hand, aiming for full participation in paid work supported by public (or market) services and, on the other, an income for staying at home and taking responsibility for caring, could it, perhaps, offer them a basis for greater choice and autonomy, substituting a form of ‘both/and’ for a false ‘either/or’ dichotomy? In order to do so, several important preconditions need to be in place. First, it is crucial that the basic income should be provided not just to women, or, more specifically, to people carrying out reproductive labour (parents or carers) but to everybody, regardless of gender or social status. Second, it should be provided as a right of citizenship or residency and not as a reward for carrying out work that would otherwise be unpaid. And third, it should not be seen as a substitute for the provision of public services. With all these conditions in place, **a universal basic income could become a means of offering** both **women** and men **freedom to choose how to divide their time** between reproductive work, paid work in the labour market and other activities, **and decide what** proportion of their income **to spend on** buying in services **rather than providing them** in kind, in **the knowledge that the** **welfare state is available as a safety net when things go wrong**. **It could also go** some way **towards addressing the** **less obvious bur more deeply corrosive personal effects of economic dependence**: the way that it can lead to ‘**breadwinners’** feeling trapped in their roles and resentful of their dependents’ apparent freedom from the constraints of the employer’s clock, as well as **leaving their dependents struggling with guilt, obligations to show gratitude or feelings of pressure to engage in coercive sex, or** even **put up with violence or abuse to keep a roof over their heads and those of their children. A u[BI]**niversal **b**asic **i**ncome **might**, in other words, actually **lead to better relationships as well as a more equitable society, providing a genuine basis for liberation.**

## Advantage 2: Welfare

#### Conditional welfare creates unreachable quotas for work and puts women of color into jobs where they have zero bargaining power - the plan solves by eliminating means tested welfare

**Burnham**

No date Linda Burnham, “Racism in United States Welfare Policy” Reimagine!Race Poverty and the EnvironmentRadioRPE <http://www.reimaginerpe.org/node/858>

The complex **interplay of race and class in the United States ensures that** certain areas **of domestic policy are suffused with racial bias**, bear the imprint of a more frankly racist past, are prone to political manipulation, and serve as touchstones for galvanizing key elements of a racist consensus. **Social welfare policy is one such area**. The 1996 passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), commonly know as “welfare reform,” underscored how deeply embedded are racial bias and xenophobia in United States domestic policy. But, of course, it is not racism alone that characterizes welfare reform. Researchers and advocates have carefully explored the profound gender bias of the welfare system as well.1,2 **The majority of people now receiving welfare benefits are poor women of color who face the “triple jeopardy” of belonging to a disempowered class, marginalized racial and ethnic groups, and a subordinated gender.** As others have cogently argued, **welfare policy is also labor policy**. Indeed, within months of the passage of PRWORA, evidence was already emerging that **workfare and Work First programs were depressing wages and displacing low-wage workers**. In the boom economy of the mid- to late-1990s, employers recognized that “Everyone has been raising wages to get people… and this [influx of welfare recipients] will make it possible to hold pay steady.”4 **Work requirements and time limits that coerce women into the paid labor force are not implemented in a gender- or race-neutral environment, and cannot be expected to be neutral in their impact.** Thus, while the surge of former welfare recipients into the low-wage sector of the economy worsens wages and working conditions for the poorest strata of the working class as a whole, some communities are hit harder than others. **Communities of color, with** traditionally **higher unemployment** andunderemployment rates**, higher proportions of very low-wage workers, and lower median incomes are** further **disadvantaged by PRWORA policies that force women into a labor market in which they have** virtually **no bargaining power.** There are substantial racial differences among working women. Full-time, year-round Latina workers earned a median annual income of $19,817 in 1998, considerably less than the $23,864 earned by African American women or the $27,304 earned by white women.5 All women are far more likely than white men to earn poverty level wages. But, again, racial differentials are substantial. More than half of Latina workers, 51.8 percent, earn poverty level wages, compared to 40.7 percent of Black women and 29.7 percent of white women. African American women with less than a high school education faced 1996 unemployment rates nearly twice as high as those of white women—20.9 percent vs. 10.8 percent—while 15.9 percent of Hispanic women at this educational level were unemployed. Underemployment rates were even higher.6 Analyzing the labor market conditions facing women receiving welfare benefits, one researcher concluded: “Such high rates of un- and underemployment, which persist in a labor market that has experienced overall unemployment rates below six percent for over two years, suggest that **it may be difficult for welfare recipients to meet the work requirements of** the new **welfare** **law**.”7 Former welfare recipients generally end up holding low-paid, entry-level jobs in the gender ghettos of service, sales, and clerical work. A study of the first two years of welfare reform in New Jersey found that the average hourly wage of those former welfare recipients who were working was only $7.31. More than one-third were holding jobs that paid less than $6.00 per hour.8 A 1997 national survey found that adults who left the welfare system and were employed had a median hourly wage of $6.61.9 This would bring a family just above the official poverty level, but fall far short of a “living wage.” Most former recipients who enter the labor force work at jobs that do not provide them with benefits. Less than one-quarter of these workers was covered by health benefits in one national survey.10 **Far too many families end up in worse economic circumstances than they endured while receiving welfare benefits.** For example, a study that tracked families who left Wisconsin’s welfare system found that during the first year off welfare, only half of the families had higher income than they had while receiving welfare benefits, even if they had been working while receiving welfare.11 An examination of seven state studies of former welfare recipients found that in only two of the states were families’ average annual earnings above the poverty line.12

#### Conditional support sustains poverty and create a permanent underclass that is based on race - UBI solves because it distributes the same amount to everybody. Welfare programs like this also disincentivize political participation because it creates a terrible perception of government.

**Santens 16**

Scott Santens (Writer and advocate of basic income for all; Citizen of Earth and New Orleans; Bachelor of Science in Psychology; Moderator of the /r/BasicIncome community on Reddit; Founder of the BIG Patreon Creator Pledge), 9-9-2016, "The progressive case for replacing the welfare state with basic income," TechCrunch,<https://techcrunch.com/2016/09/09/the-progressive-case-for-replacing-the-welfare-state-with-basic-income/hs>

But again, those numbers cannot be compared dollar for dollar. Welfare dollars disappear with work and basic income dollars are kept with work. That same parent receiving $45,000 for nothing, if they got a job paying $30,000 right now would receive $20,000 in benefits. That would be a gain of $30,000 combined with a loss of $25,000. That’s a gain of $5,000 for a $30,000 job, or in other words, an income tax of 83 percent. Who else is taxed at 83 percent? No one. In fact, **the richest are taxed the least because** **their income**, which **isn’t derived from work**, is special. It’s simply capital gains, which is taxed at 20 percent. Does this sound like a just and equitable system? Or does it sound more like a racist meat-grinder? Even more troubling, **welfare** **dollars** themselves **are not equivalent to each other. Despite it being against the law to vary welfare dollars along racial lines, that’s exactly what we do**. How? It’s again due to the nature of block grants for states. When Bill Clinton signed his welfare reform into law, he agreed to write checks to the states and let them handle how they dish out welfare. As a result, just five years after welfare was reformed into what it is today, 63 percent of those in the programs with the least-harsh conditions were white and 11 percent were black, while 63 percent of those in the programs with the most-harsh conditions were black and 29 percent were white. In other words, **a dollar in welfare** **has about three to five times** **as many strings for someone** **who** **is black** **than** someone who is **white**. **These strings** **absolutely** **affect end** **results**. Joe Soss, co-author of Disciplining the Poor: Neoliberal Paternalism and the Persistent Power of Race describes his findings thusly: “The stringency of the **rules matter tremendously for outcomes**. The tougher the rules — and **the more** frequently **people are punished for breaking them** — **the worse the outcomes are** for people after they finish the program. In fact, **in the toughest programs**, **people** actually **end up in worse shape** **after** **they get through them** than they were before they got the benefits to begin with. And remember, they were in such a bad situation that they had to turn to a welfare program that’s been so stigmatized that pretty much everyone wants to avoid it. We also found that **people who go through** **the** toughest **programs learn lessons** **about** **government that lead them to retreat from participating in politics**. They become less likely to make their voices heard, and less likely to participate in elections and community organizations.” The bare naked truth of **our present welfare system is a racially biased, overly paternalistic, unnecessarily controlling, grossly exclusionary system of punishment and blame that limits opportunity and taxes working beneficiaries more than any other worker in any income tax bracket**. It doesn’t abolish poverty. It helps sustain it. And this is the system establishment voices wish to improve upon in piecemeal fashion, possibly because they’re not the ones being chewed up and spit out by it, or even neglected by it entirely. However, even if all of the above is clearly understood, there is one absolutely vital thing remaining to understand about basic income that cannot be replicated in any other way, by any other means. **Because basic income lacks conditions and is paid regardless of work, it provides recipients** the **power to refuse** to work. This is the real fear of those who worry a basic income will result in people working less, but it is also its greatest strength. The ability to say no to an employer provides people the bargaining power and the choice to determine how they work, where they work, for how much and for how long. No other policy does that. A minimum wage certainly doesn’t. Wage subsidies certainly don’t. Without basic income, the labor market is coercive, and that means people accept what they can get. With basic income, wages for low-demand jobs must go up and/or hours must go down in order to attract people with incomes independent of work to do them, or those same jobs must be automated to be performed by machines instead, whichever is cheaper.

## 2AC

### Recession ≠ SV

**Structural violence is not just a blanket term. They are trying to link into fw by having a poverty impact - here’s why their recession triggered poverty is not structural.**

**Recessions are bad, but the reason that the numbers are so high for how many people they put into poverty is because it just pushes a on of people who are already suffering slightly past an arbitrary poverty line which is why their numbers are worthless prefer our poverty impacts here bc**

1. **The santens card here says the welfare that they sustain creates a PERMANENT underclass - that’s a structural issue that removes social mobility completely. Otherwise, you can get out of poverty after a recession that’s why the world recovered from the 2008 recession.**
2. **The warrants for why structural violence sustains suffering is because it never gets any attention- welfare making an underclass never gets any attention but every fucking day on CNN there is a new thing we have to do to prevent recession**

**AND FUCK YOUR RECESSION IMPACT - They read a long ass link chain and then end up with a giant impact the only reason their shit is narratively compelling is because they use fear to trigger an overestimation of their probability**

#### Worst-case thinking over-speculates and ignores half of the equation

Evans 12 (Dylan, “Nightmare Scenario: The Fallacy of Worst-Case Thinking”, Risk Mangament, http://www.rmmagazine.com/2012/04/02/nightmare-scenario-the-fallacy-of-worst-case-thinking

There’s something mesmerizing about apocalyptic scenarios. Like an alluring femme fatale, they exert an uncanny pull on the imagination. That is why what security expert Bruce Schneier calls “worst-case thinking” is so dangerous. It substitutes imagination for thinking, speculation for risk analysis and fear for reason. One of the clearest examples of worst-case thinking was the so-called “1% doctrine,” which Dick Cheney is said to have advocated while he was vice president in the George W. Bush administration. According to journalist Ron Suskind, Cheney first proposed the doctrine at a meeting with CIA Director George Tenet and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice in November 2001. Responding to the thought that Al Qaeda might want to acquire a nuclear weapon, Cheney apparently remarked: “If there’s a 1% chance that Pakistani scientists are helping Al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response. It’s not about our analysis…It’s about our response.” By transforming low-probability events into complete certainties whenever the events are particularly scary, worst-case thinking leads to terrible decision making. For one thing, it’s only half of the cost/benefit equation. “Every decision has costs and benefits, risks and rewards,” Schneier points out. “By speculating about what can possibly go wrong, and then acting as if that is likely to happen, worst-case thinking focuses only on the extreme but improbable risks and does a poor job at assessing outcomes.” An epidemic of worst-case thinking broke out in the United States in the aftermath of the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. A core meltdown in the nuclear power station there led to the release of radioactive gases. The Kemeny Commission Report, created by presidential order, concluded that “there will either be no case of cancer or the number of cases will be so small that it will never be possible to detect them,” but the public was not convinced. As a result of the furor, no new nuclear power plants were built in the United States for 30 years. The coal- and oil-fueled plants that were built instead, however, surely caused far more harm than the meltdown at Three Mile Island, both directly via air pollution and indirectly by contributing to global warming. The impact of the Three Mile Island accident was probably reinforced by the release, 12 days before the meltdown, of The China Syndrome, a movie in which a catastrophic accident at a nuclear power plant is averted by the courageous actions of the protagonists. The movie’s title is a direct reference to a worst-case scenario—the most dangerous kind of nuclear meltdown, where reactor components melt through their containment structures and into the underlying earth, “all the way to China.” The question of whether environmental impact statements should include discussion of worst-case scenarios is still the subject of intense debate. Environmental groups tend to advocate such discussion, in part to grab the attention of the general public. The U.S. government originally required discussion of worst-case scenarios but later changed its mind, apparently on the ground that such discussions tend to provoke overreactions. This is a move in the right direction; if the chance that the worst case will happen is extremely low, the benefits of considering it will be far outweighed by the unnecessary fear that such consideration would provoke. Like radiation, fear damages health and is costly to clear up. As Schneier observes, “Any fear that would make a good movie plot is amenable to worst-case thinking.” With that in mind, he runs an annual “Movie-Plot Threat Contest.” Entrants are invited to submit the most unlikely, yet still plausible, terrorist attack scenarios they can come up with. The purpose of this contest is “absurd humor,” but Schneier hopes that it also makes a point. He is critical of many homeland security measures, which seem designed to defend against specific “movie plots” instead of against the broad threats of terrorism. “We all do it,” admits Schneier. “Our imaginations run wild with detailed and specific threats. We imagine anthrax spread from crop dusters. Or a contaminated milk supply. Or terrorist scuba divers armed with almanacs. Before long, we’re envisioning an entire movie plot, without Bruce Willis saving the day. And we’re scared.” Psychologically, this all makes a certain basic sense. Worst-case scenarios are compelling because they evoke vivid mental images that overwhelm rational thinking. Box cutters and shoe bombs conjure up vivid mental images. “We must protect the Super Bowl” packs more emotional punch than the vague “We should defend ourselves against terrorism.” Fear alone is, however, not a sound basis on which to make policy. The long lines at airports caused by the introduction of new airport security procedures, for example, have led more people to drive rather than fly, and that in turn has led to thousands more road fatalities than would otherwise have occurred, because driving is so much more dangerous than flying. Fear of “stranger danger” has also led to huge changes in parental behavior over the past few decades, which may have a net cost for child welfare. That, at least, is what the sociologist Frank Furedi argues in his challenging book Paranoid Parenting. Parents have always been worried about their kids, of course, but Furedi argues that their concerns have intensified in a historically unprecedented way since the late 1970s, to the extent that these days virtually every childhood experience comes with a health warning. The result is that parents look at each experience from the point of view of a worst-case scenario and place increasing restrictions on what their kids can do; in the past few decades, for example, there has been a steep decline in the number of children who are allowed to bicycle to school and in the distance from home that kids are allowed to go to play unsupervised. There has also been an increase in the amount of time that parents spend on child rearing; contrary to the common wisdom that parents have less time for their children these days, a working mom today actually spends more time with her kids than a nonworking mom did in the 1970s. I am not aware of any studies that have attempted to measure the psychological changes that have driven this cultural shift. It would be interesting to measure the risk intelligence of parents by, for example, comparing their estimates of certain risks with objective data about the frequency of those risks. Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that it might be hard to gather such data. The problem with paranoid parenting is that, like other cases of worst-case thinking, it ignores half of the cost-benefit equation. In worrying about stranger danger, for example, parents focus on the extreme but improbable risk of a child molester attacking or abducting their children and fail to weigh it against the more mundane but far more likely benefits of exercise, socialization and independence that children gain from being allowed greater freedom. To put it another way, worried parents tend to focus on the risks of giving their children greater leeway and fail to consider the risks of not doing so. The long-term developmental consequences of paranoid parenting include isolation from peers, infantilism and loss of autonomy. Unlike the chance of abduction, though, those risks are highly probable.

**AND your impact is in the future - you don’t help a single instance of currently existing violence but we should prioritize present violence - the fear of future violence pushes current suffering to the backburner which means our impx get evaluated first**

**Olson 2015** – prof of geography @ UNC Chapel Hill (Elizabeth, ‘Geography and Ethics I: Waiting and Urgency,’ Progress in Human Geography, vol. 39 no. 4, pp. 517-526)

Though toileting might be thought of as a special case of bodily urgency, geographic research suggests that **the body is increasingly set at odds with** larger scale ethical concerns, especially **large-scale future events of forecasted suffering**. Emergency planning is a particularly good example in which the **large-scale threats of future suffering** can **distort moral reasoning**. Žižek (2006) lightly develops this point in the context of the war on terror, where in the presence of fictitious and real ticking clocks and warning systems, **the urgent body must be bypassed because there are bigger scales to worry about**: What does this all-pervasive sense of urgency mean ethically? The pressure of events is so overbearing, the stakes are so high, that they nec essitate a suspension of ordinary ethical concerns. After all, displaying moral qualms when the lives of millions are at stake plays into the hands of the enemy. (Žižek, 2006) In the presence of large-scale future emergency, the urgency to secure the state, the citizenry, the economy, or the climate creates new scales and new temporal orders of response (see Anderson, 2010; Baldwin, 2012; Dalby, 2013; Morrissey, 2012), many of which treat the urgent body as impulsive and thus requiring management. McDonald’s (2013) analysis of three interconnected discourses of ‘climate security’ illustrates how bodily urgency in climate change is also recast as a menacing impulse that might require exclusion from moral reckoning. The logics of climate security, especially those related to national security, ‘can encourage perverse political responses that not only fail to respond effectively to climate change but may present victims of it as a threat’ (McDonald, 2013: 49). **Bodies that are currently suffering cannot be urgent, because they are excluded from the potential collectivity that could be suffering everywhere in some future time.** Similar bypassing of existing bodily urgency is echoed in writing about violent securitization, such as drone warfare (Shaw and Akhter, 2012), and also in intimate scales like the street and the school, especially in relation to race (Mitchell, 2009; Young et al., 2014). As large-scale urgent concerns are institutionalized, **the urgent body is increasingly obscured through technical planning** and coordination (Anderson and Adey, 2012). **The predominant characteristic** of this institutionalization of large-scale emergency **is a ‘built-in bias for action’** (Wuthnow, 2010: 212) that circumvents contingencies. **The urgent body is at best an** assumed **eventuality**, one that will likely require another state of waiting, such as triage (e.g. Greatbach et al., 2005). Amin (2013) cautions that in much of the West, governmental need to provide evidence of laissez-faire governing on the one hand, and assurance of strength in facing a threatening future on the other, produces ‘just-in-case preparedness’ (Amin, 2013: 151) of neoliberal risk management policies. In the US, ‘personal ingenuity’ is built into emergency response at the expense of the poor and vulnerable for whom ‘[t]he difference between abjection and bearable survival’ (Amin, 2013: 153) will not be determined by emergency planning, but in the material infrastructure of the city. In short, the urgencies of the body provide justifications for social exclusion of the most marginalized based on impulse and perceived threat, while large-scale future emergencies effectively absorb the deliberative power of urgency into the institutions of preparedness and risk avoidance. Žižek references Arendt’s (2006) analysis of the banality of evil to explain the current state of ethical reasoning under the war on terror, noting that people who perform morally reprehensible actions under the conditions of urgency assume a ‘tragic-ethic grandeur’ (Žižek, 2006) by sacrificing their own morality for the good of the state. But his analysis fails to note that bodies are today so rarely legitimate sites for claiming urgency. In the context of the assumed priority of the large-scale future emergency, **the urgent body becomes** literally nonsense**, a non sequitur within societies**, states and worlds **that will always be more urgent**. If the important ethical work of urgency has been to identify that which must not wait, then the capture of the power and persuasiveness of urgency by large-scale future emergencies has consequences for the kinds of normative arguments we can raise on behalf of urgent bodies. How, then, might waiting compare as a normative description and critique in our own urgent time? Waiting can be categorized according to its purpose or outcome (see Corbridge, 2004; Gray, 2011), but it also modifies the place of the individual in society and her importance. As Ramdas (2012: 834) writes, ‘waiting … produces hierarchies which segregate people and places into those which matter and those which do not’. The segregation of waiting might produce effects that counteract suffering, however, and Jeffery (2008: 957) explains that though the ‘politics of waiting’ can be repressive, it can also engender creative political engagement. In his research with educated unemployed Jat youth who spend days and years waiting for desired employment, Jeffery finds that ‘the temporal suffering and sense of ambivalence experienced by young men can generate cultural and political experiments that, in turn, have marked social and spatial effects’ (Jeffery, 2010: 186). Though this is not the same as claiming normative neutrality for waiting, it does suggest that waiting is more ethically ambivalent and open than urgency. In other contexts, however, our descriptions of waiting indicate a strong condemnation of its effects upon the subjects of study. **Waiting can demobilize radical reform, depoliticizing ‘the insurrectionary possibilities of the present by delaying the revolutionary imperative to a future moment that is forever drifting towards infinity’** (Springer, 2014: 407). Yonucu’s (2011) analysis of the self-destructive activities of disrespected working-class youth in Istanbul suggests that this sense of infinite waiting can lead not only to depoliticization, but also to a disbelief in the possibility of a future self of any value. Waiting, like urgency, can undermine the possibility of self-care two-fold, first by making people wait for essential needs, and again by reinforcing that waiting is ‘[s]omething to be ashamed of because it may be noted or taken as evidence of indolence or low status, seen as a symptom of rejection or a signal to exclude’ (Bauman, 2004: 109). This is why Auyero (2012) suggests that waiting creates an ideal state subject, providing ‘temporal processes in and through which political subordination is produced’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 90; see also Secor, 2007). Furthermore, Auyero notes, it is not only political subordination, but the subjective effect of waiting that secures domination, as citizens and non-citizens find themselves ‘waiting hopefully and then frustratedly for others to make decisions, and in effect surrendering to the authority of others’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 123). **Waiting can** therefore **function as a** potentially important **spatial technology of the elite and powerful, mobilized not only for the purpose of governing individuals, but also to retain claims over moral urgency**. But there is growing resistance to the capture of claims of urgency by the elite, and it is important to note that even in cases where the material conditions of containment are currently impenetrable, arguments based on human value are at the forefront of reclaiming urgency for the body. In detention centers, clandestine prisons, state borders and refugee camps, geographers point to ongoing struggles against the ethical impossibility of bodily urgency and a rejection of states of waiting (see Conlon, 2011; Darling, 2009, 2011; Garmany, 2012; Mountz et al., 2013; Schuster, 2011). Ramakrishnan’s (2014) analysis of a Delhi resettlement colony and Shewly’s (2013) discussion of the enclave between India and Bangladesh describe people who refuse to give up their own status as legitimately urgent, even in the context of larger scale politics. Similarly, Tyler’s (2013) account of desperate female detainees stripping off their clothes to expose their humanness and suffering in the Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre in the UK suggests that demands for recognition are not just about politics, but also about the acknowledgement of humanness and the irrevocable possibility of being that which cannot wait. The continued existence of places like Yarl’s Wood and similar institutions in the USA nonetheless points to the challenge of exposing the urgent body as a moral priority when it is so easily hidden from view, and also reminds us that our research can help to explain the relationships between normative dimensions and the political and social conditions of struggle. In closing, geographic depictions of waiting do seem to evocatively describe otherwise obscured suffering (e.g. Bennett, 2011), but it is striking how rarely these descriptions also use the language of urgency. Given the discussion above, what might be accomplished – and risked – by incorporating urgency more overtly and deliberately into our discussions of waiting, surplus and abandoned bodies? Urgency can clarify the implicit but understated ethical consequences and normativity associated with waiting, and encourage explicit discussion about harmful suffering. Waiting can be productive or unproductive for radical praxis, but urgency compels and requires response. Geographers could be instrumental in reclaiming the ethical work of urgency in ways that leave it open for critique, clarifying common spatial misunderstandings and representations. There is good reason to be thoughtful in this process, since moral outrage towards inhumanity can itself obscure differentiated experiences of being human, dividing up ‘those for whom we feel urgent unreasoned concern and those whose lives and deaths simply do not touch us, or do not appear as lives at all’ (Butler, 2009: 50). But when the urgent body is rendered as only waiting, both materially and discursively, it is just as easily cast as impulsive, disgusting, animalistic (see also McKittrick, 2006). Feminist theory insists that the urgent body, whose encounters of violence are ‘usually framed as private, apolitical and mundane’ (Pain, 2014: 8), are as deeply political, public, and exceptional as other forms of violence (Phillips, 2008; Pratt, 2005). **Insisting that a suffering body**, now, is that which **cannot wait, has the ethical effect of drawing it into consideration alongside the** political, public and exceptional **scope of large-scale futures**. It may help us insist on the body, both as a single unit and a plurality, as a legitimate scale of normative priority and social care. In this report, I have explored old and new reflections on the ethical work of urgency and waiting. Geographic research suggests a contemporary popular bias towards the urgency of large-scale futures, institutionalized in ways that further obscure and discredit the urgencies of the body. This bias also justifies the production of new waiting places in our material landscape, places like the detention center and the waiting room. In some cases, waiting is normatively neutral, even providing opportunities for alternative politics. In others, the technologies of waiting serve to manage potentially problematic bodies, leading to suspended suffering and even to extermination (e.g. Wright, 2013). One of my aims has been to suggest that moral reasoning is important both because it exposes normative biases against subjugated people, and because it potentially provides routes toward struggle where claims to urgency seem to foreclose the possibilities of alleviation of suffering. **Saving the world** still **should require a debate about whose world is being saved, when, and at what cost – and this requires a debate about what really cannot wait**. My next report will extend some of these concerns by reviewing how feelings of urgency, as well as hope, fear, and other emotions, have played a role in geography and ethical reasoning. I conclude, however, by pulling together past and present. In 1972, Gilbert White asked why geographers were not engaging ‘the truly urgent questions’ (1972: 101) such as racial repression, decaying cities, economic inequality, and global environmental destruction. His question highlights just how much the discipline has changed, but it is also unnerving in its echoes of our contemporary problems. Since White’s writing, our moral reasoning has been stretched to consider the future body and the more-than-human, alongside the presently urgent body – topics and concerns that I have not taken up in this review but which will provide their own new possibilities for urgent concerns. My own hope presently is drawn from an acknowledgement that the temporal characteristics of contemporary capitalism can be interrupted in creative ways (Sharma, 2014), with the possibility of squaring the urgent body with our large-scale future concerns. Temporal alternatives already exist in ongoing and emerging revolutions and the disruption of claims of cycles and circular political processes (e.g. Lombard, 2013; Reyes, 2012). Though calls for urgency will certainly be used to obscure evasion of responsibility (e.g. Gilmore, 2008: 56, fn 6), they may also serve as fertile ground for radical critique, a truly fierce urgency for now.

### More cards

#### The myth of the welfare queen perpetuates a unique fear of black women “abusing the system” specifically CONDITIONAL welfare creates the divide between who is deserving or not of welfare - the plan solves what is bad about means tested welfare by replacing it

**Black 16**

Rachel Black, 9-22-2016, "The Rise and Reign of the Welfare Queen," New America, <https://www.newamerica.org/weekly/edition-135/rise-and-reign-welfare-queen/>    
Who the beneficiary of policy is perceived to be is of material consequence to how it is designed. **For the past forty years, U.S. welfare policy has been designed around Reagan’s mythical welfare queen—with very real consequences for the actual families urgently needing support.** Though it was Reagan who gave her the most salient identity, the welfare queen emerged from a long and deeply racialized history of suspicion of and resentment toward families receiving welfare in the United States. **Today, 20 years after welfare reform was enacted, this narrative continues to inform policy design by dictating who is “deserving” of support and under what conditions.** Ending the reign of the welfare queen over public policy will require recognizing this lineage, identifying how these stereotypes continue to manifest, and reorienting policy design around families as they are—not who they are perceived to be. Modern-day “welfare” originated from legislation to assist families destabilized by the Great Depression. Although the New Deal laid critical groundwork for future anti-poverty efforts in the U.S., the bifurcation of support along racial lines was present from the start. The 1935 Social Security Act specifically excluded domestic work and agricultural labor—industries that relied heavily on black men and women—from Social Security eligibility. Meanwhile, states had substantial discretion in determining eligibility for welfare, i.e. the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program—flexibility that southern states sometimes used to restrict access to benefits during harvesting seasons, effectively coercing poor, black families into working in the fields at whatever wages were offered. By 1939, the ADC caseload was 80 percent white, despite the disproportionate burden of poverty on black families. As black Americans moved north during the Great Migration, more black mothers began accessing ADC. This change in dynamics precipitated increasing hostility toward the program in north and south alike, which welfare advocates tried to counter by emphasizing “families,” and specifically white families, as the primary recipients of benefits. Indeed, the political rhetoric and imagery around the “War on Poverty” focused on the white, rural poor to maintain broad support. However, in the years following the reform, as civil rights struggles intensified, the media’s portrayal of poverty and its relationship to race dramatically shifted. In 1964, only 27 percent of the photos accompanying stories about poverty in three of the country’s top weekly news magazines featured black subjects; the following year, it rose to 49 percent. By 1967, 72 percent of photos accompanying stories about poverty featured black Americans. It wasn’t just photos that changed. In the late 1960s, the emerging welfare rights movement sought to shift the narrative around public assistance, drawing on the civil rights movement’s rhetoric about dignity, opportunity, and justice, and amplifying broader calls for economic rights as a critical complement to civil rights and a prerequisite for substantive equality. Members of the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO), who numbered over 100,000 at its peak, “claimed decent income as a right” without tying it to wage work, and, relatedly, also emphasized the work of caregiving. And though the NWRO plan included work incentives so that those who did work would be better off than those who did not, it did not define social citizenship in terms of wage work as prior movements had done. But, the movement never realized this goal. In fact, the advocacy of low-income black women for a guaranteed income that wasn’t tied to work—and against the backdrop of a national economic recession—triggered a new wave of backlash against welfare recipients and intensified racialized criticisms of the “undeserving” poor. By the time the “welfare queen” finally emerged on the national stage, the American public was primed for a face to be attached to the perceived waste, fraud, and abuse they saw as enabled by indulgent government programs and absent accountability. By 1989, 64 percent of Americans felt that “welfare benefits make poor people dependent and encourage them to stay poor,” shoring up the political support for reform. When President Bill Clinton declared an end to “welfare as we know it” in 1996, time limits, work requirements, and strict sanctions for noncompliance were presented as acts of repudiation against that system. **In fact, they had the opposite effect: rather than eliminating the myth of the welfare queen, these reforms codified it by shaping policy choices around the prevention of willful idleness and criminal behavior**. As a result, welfare reform created a system that expects the worst from families seeking assistance, and in so doing further entrenches a presumed link between poverty and poor character in popular discourse. This orientation is clear in the punitive policies that appear in response to non-existent problems.

#### The role of the ballot is to construct value in those marginalized. Classroom style pedagogy forms our realities and allows us to acknowledge oppression.

**Espinoza 02**

Carlos Tejada & Manuel Espinoza, “Toward a Decolonializing Pedagogy: Social Justice Reconsidered”, (PDF on request)

Critical **pedagogy has put forth the notion that classroom practice integrates** particular curriculum content and design, instructional strategies and techniques, and **forms of evaluation. [and]** It **argues that these specify a particular version about what knowledge is of most worth**, what it means to know something, **and how we might construct a representation of our world and our place within it** (McLaren 1998). **From this perspective, the pedagogical is inherently political.** For us a decolonizing pedagogy encompasses both an anticolonial and decolonizing notion of pedagogy and an anticolonial and decolonizing pedagogical praxis. It is an anticolonial and decolonizing theory and praxis that insists that colonial domination and its ideological frameworks operate and are reproduced in and through the curricular content and design, the instructional practices, the social organization of learning, and the forms of evaluation that inexorably sort and label students into enduring categories of success and failure of schooling. Thus, an anticolonial and decolonizing pedagogical praxis explicitly works to transform these dimensions of schooling so that schools become sites for the development of a critical decolonizing consciousness and activity that work to ameliorate and ultimately end the mutually constitutive forms of violence that characterize our internal neocolonial condition. For us, a decolonizing pedagogy addresses both the means and the ends of schooling.

#### UBI defies decades of paternalism by reducing intimate partner violence through giving survivors the autonomy to spend money as they see fit.

**Flanigan 18**

Jessica Flanigan, 6-25-2018, "The Feminist Case for a Universal Basic Income," Slate Magazine, <https://slate.com/human-interest/2018/01/the-feminist-case-for-universal-basic-income.html> [AK]

Furthermore, because a UBI aims to pay all individuals and not households, it allows people to make decisions about marriage and cohabitation based their intrinsic desires, not based on tax policies such as the “marriage penalty” that working couples currently face or means-tested welfare programs that withhold benefits from women when their household income increases after marriage. A further benefit for families? **With** an **added**, guaranteed **boost** **to their income**, **women** **in abusive relationships** **would have** the **financial security** **to leave**, even if they lack qualifications or credentials **that would enable them** **to support** **themselves** **and** their **families**. **UBI would do more** **than** almost **any** **other economic policy** **imaginable** **to** **make** **women** **less susceptible to abuse** both in the workplace and at home. 3. Respect: **Universal**, **Rather** **Than** **Targeted** Assistance, **Will Defy Stereotypes** Historically, **feminists** not only **critiqued** **outright sexism** **but also** the **paternalism** of **efforts** **to protect women** **from** **the world by robbing** **them** **of** their **autonomy**. Paternalism has long been used to justify policies that limit women’s and other marginalized people’s choices, like bans on abortion, or sex work, or women working in dangerous industries, on the grounds that they are incapable of deciding for themselves how to live their lives. Today, many **social** **policies** in the U.S. **are influenced** **by** **extremely paternalistic** **thinking** **that** **perpetuates discriminatory stereotypes about women’s abilities** to make informed and reasonable decisions for themselves. **Conservative** **complaints** about welfare recipients spending benefits on junk food and luxuries **have** **been part of a** more **general racialized narrative**, **which** has **informed** **existing** **welfare** **policy** **and** also **perpetuated** offensive and **stigmatizing stereotypes** **about** members **of** **marginalized** **groups**, especially women of color. But liberals who support limiting the provision of benefits to housing, food, and health care are subject to the same charges of paternalism when they advocate for in-kind benefit policies (such as food transfers and food vouchers) that perpetuate a politics of suspicion and mistrust, instead of supporting cash benefit programs. Most of the **arguments** **against** **UBI** also **ring of paternalism**. How could we trust that low-income women would use the money to do the things I’ve detailed here? Low-income people, like the rest of their fellow citizens, are generally the best judges of whether a profession or purchase is in their overall interest, and the evidence suggests that recipients of cash transfers generally spend their income on necessities. **Trusting women** and all people **with the right to spend their money** how they see fit, as UBI allows, **would push back against** decades of **paternalistic social policy**. UBI activists still disagree about whether UBI is a right or a benefit, whether it should be provided in addition to or instead of other benefits, and about how large the UBI should be. But the core case in favor of the UBI—that it has the potential to significantly alleviate poverty and liberate all citizens from many of the injustices associated with the current economic order—is a case that all feminists should get behind.