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WEIGHING

A2A2 Aff

W Dev nation first

1. People in developing nations are the biggest impact in today's round for two reasons.
 - a. 1) These people have no social safety net when things go wrong. Impacts to people in developing nations will always hit harder.
 - b. 2) These people have been historically oppressed by colonizing powers. Deprioritizing developing nations entrenches a society with racialized inequality, creating an insurmountable white hegemony.

A2 No veto

1. Framers intent bruh this resolution is pointless without the veto power.
2. The G4 has said that in principle, they need to join with a veto, but claimed that they won't use it. However, we'd conted that India is saying whatever it takes to get a spot and wouldn't hesitate to use the veto. And because of durable fiat, the rest of the UNSC wouldn't be able to kick them off.
3. We don't even need to win the veto to win the argument because as long as India is on the UNSC in some form it can work with other developing nations to irreparably gridlock resolution that it doesn't like, triggering our impacts anyway.

A2 India afraid to use veto

India already opposes China so diametrically that it would be nbd for them to use vetoes and claim that it was just to counter China.

A2 India turn on poor

False. **The Diplomat** writes that India always has an incentive to help developing nations both for economic reasons and out of solidarity with other historically colonized countries. India differs from other countries, like China, through its respect for developing nations and non-predatory practices, something that wouldn't go away when it joins the UNSC. **Xavier of Foreign Policy in 2015** furthers that India's cooperation with Africa is purely "request-based, non-intrusive and non-prescriptive,"

A2 UN history oppress

The best shot the world has at the UN reforming from a colonial oppressor to a modern organization that promotes human rights for all nations is through India joining and reforming the system from within.

A2A2 Neg

W Peacekeeping

1. Prerequisite -

Zoe Marks of GSDCR in 2016:

Poverty and conflict are widely understood to be closely interconnected; with poverty making countries more prone to civil war, and armed conflict weakening governance and economic performance, thus increasing the risk of conflict relapse

1. We have the clearest uniqueness in today's round. At best, our opponents can only impact out to a marginal change in the size of the UN's peacekeeping force, whereas if you vote for us, you bring the probability of a IMF bailout not happening for Pakistan from 0 to 100%.

2. Magnitude. WaPo in 2017 - Doubling the number of peacekeepers deployed, which is way more than our opponents link into, would save 150,000 deaths. We impact out to 4 million Pakistanis getting pushed into poverty.

This ambitious but effective scenario wouldn't be exorbitantly expensive — according to our simulations, it would require maintaining an annual \$17 billion U.N. peacekeeping, approximately twice the current level. This is substantial, but given the cost of armed conflicts that can easily reach in the tens of billions of dollars each, it is clearly a cost-effective intervention. When politicians criticize U.N. peacekeeping for being expensive, they rarely consider the costs of war avoided through effective peacekeeping. A typical major conflict

causes about 2,500 direct battle-related deaths per year. Over the 2001 to 2013 period, ambitious PKO deployment could, according to our estimates, have saved about 150,000 direct deaths. Massive indirect deaths due to conflict violence would also have been averted. Of course, the countries that contribute to U.N. peacekeeping with troops or funds are not necessarily those who reap the direct benefits. The costs of war, however, are not born solely by the countries in conflict, as there is potential for contagion of the conflict itself. Both the negative impact of conflict as well as the potential contagion of the conflict reach well beyond the initial region.

W Colonialism

If we win any link in our case into India subjugating Pakistan through a seat on the UNSC, then our case functions as a direct turn on theirs. A developing nation joining the UNSC then abusing its position and creating more tensions in the world will set back other developing nations immeasurably when it comes to trying to gain a leadership role in any international organization.

A2 India won't cut off

Even right now India doesn't want Pakistan to get the bailout. **Latifa of the Express** writes on April 20 that "Indian officials warned the IMF against helping Pakistan, pointing out how the country was already "grey listed" under the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)".

A2 IMF won't give

The numbers have been finalized, deal is about to happen. **Malkham of Geo TV** notes two weeks ago that Pakistan "would sign a bailout agreement with International Monetary Fund (IMF) that would be worth \$6-8 billion" and that "an IMF mission will visit Islamabad during the last week of April, which is when the bailout package amount will be finalised."

A2 IMF bailout bad

Long term success. Empirically, **Balima and Amadou** conclude in January 2019 that "Although the adoption of an IMF-supported program can be perceived as having a short term political cost related to fiscal consolidation, the empirical results of this paper show that IMF interventions yield long term benefits by helping avoid the costs of sovereign default—such as reputational costs, international trade exclusion costs, costs to the domestic economy through the financial system, and political costs to the authorities"

INDICTS

I2 Fortna

1. Fortna concedes that her results are not statistically significant, meaning there

Observer missions appear to have the largest effect on the durability of peace, reducing the hazard of peace failing by 80%. Notice, however, the hazard ratio for enforcement missions (1.88). This means that in the post-WWII period, the risk of war was almost 90% higher when an enforcement mission was in place. If anything, enforcement missions are associated with unstable peace, **though this finding is not statistically significant.**

ANSWER TO PRO YOU ARE CON

A2/ India Deserves it (General)

1. UNSC is a colonialist system.
 - a. India would not get a veto
 - b. India should bypass and do its own thing
 - c. Tradeoff due to diplomatic resources
2. India doesn't even want it. **NDTV in 2018** reports India's Foreign Ministry says the G4 has the numbers to pass security council reform but hasn't acted because India wants complete consensus, which it doesn't have right now.

SINGH '18 Slow Step,, 10-3-2018, "Blog: Why India's Open Warning To The UN Will See No Action," NDTV,

<https://www.ndtv.com/blog/why-indias-open-warning-to-the-un-will-see-no-action-1925273>

This is perhaps a mystery. Sources within the G4 have said they have the numbers but as Ali Iftikhar, a UN Journalist since 1971, told me, "If they have the numbers, the support of the 130 members, then why are they waiting?" Top sources in India's Foreign Ministry told NDTV, "We have the numbers, but numbers alone are not enough; we need complete consensus". To the

question on how that will happen, the source told me, "We will continue to try. Independence also came about like this, a persistent effort."

A2/ Democratic Voting Record

1. India has had serious human rights violations in Kashmir. **Khan of the Naval Postgraduate School in 2015** finds that to silence the popular demand of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, India has deployed a huge military contingent, which is involved in the worst kind of human right violations, concluding that this behavior disqualifies them from permanent seat.
2. [Grant of the Center for European Reform](https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/bn_india_cg_26sept08-1132.pdf) writes that “At the United Nations, India has a reputation for being one of the less constructive members. It sometimes reacts in a negative or hostile manner to the initiatives of others, and does not often take its own initiatives.” The UN shouldn’t reward belligerent nations as a way to pacify them.

https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/bn_india_cg_26sept08-1132.pdf

At the United Nations, India has a reputation for being one of the less constructive members. It sometimes reacts in a negative or hostile manner to the initiatives of others, and does not often take its own initiatives. Evidently, so long as India is denied a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC), its officials will have an excuse for occasionally taking the UN less seriously than some others would wish.

Kahn of the Naval Postgraduate School in 2015

<https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632266.pdf>

Kashmir is the major dispute between Pakistan and India. Pakistan wants a just resolution of the Kashmir dispute in accordance with the spirit of UNSC resolutions—the UNSC resolution maintained the issue of Jammu and Kashmir be determined through plebiscite as per the wishes of the people of Kashmir. The U.N. HLP report also refers to the Kashmir dispute as one of the “oldest and unresolved disputes on the UNSC agenda.”²¹⁶ To silence the popular demand of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, India has deployed a huge military contingent, which is involved in the worst kind of human right violations. According to Noorani, “Indian Security Forces have systematically, and with impunity, perpetrated outrageous violations of human rights in the [Kashmir] valley.”²¹⁷ Today, Pakistan and India are nuclear power; even small conflict may conflagrate to nuclear exchange which will devastate the entire South Asian region. Without settlement of the Kashmir dispute, use of force cannot be ruled out. Noorani contends that, “It is reasonable to conclude that relations between India and Pakistan will never be normal until the Kashmir dispute is settled

A2/ Military Power

1. India's military is weak. For instance, **The Carnegie Endowment** in 2016 finds the Indian air force, which is crucial for deterrence, is struggling to find advanced equipment to operate.

https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_IAF_final.pdf

Despite being a world-class combat arm, the IAF's falling end strength and problematic force structure, combined with its troubled acquisition and development programs, threaten India's air superiority over its rapidly modernizing rivals, China and Pakistan. Indian air dominance is vital for deterrence stability in southern Asia and for preserving the strategic balance in the wider Indo-Pacific region. Resolving India's airpower crisis, therefore, should be a priority for New Delhi.

A2/ Economic Power

1. Of all the G20 nations, **Trading Economics in 2017** reports that India has the lowest GDP per capita. India hasn't reached the level of economic development necessary to become a member that can exert coercive economic force.
 - a. In fact, according to **Kandlakunta in 2016**, India is the 24th highest contributor to the UN budget, supplying only .737% of the budget, while for comparison, the United States funds 22%.

Aila Bandagi Kandlakunta, 12-13-2016, "How much do various countries contribute to the UN Budget?," FACTLY, <https://factly.in/united-nations-budget-contributions-by-member-countries/>
The United Nations is the foremost international organization with 193 member countries in its fold. The UN is funded by its member countries and the contribution of each member country is determined based on an assessment done every three years. The assessment takes into account the GNP, per capita income & external debt of countries for fixing the quantum of contribution. The USA contributes the most to the UN regular budget with 22% while India contributes the 24th highest with 0.737%

<https://tradingeconomics.com/india/gdp-per-capita>

Country	Last	Previous
Switzerland	76667.44	Dec/17
Australia	55925.93	Dec/17
Singapore	55235.51	Dec/17
Netherlands	53597.83	Dec/17
United States	53128.54	Dec/17
Canada	51315.89	Dec/17
Japan	48556.93	Dec/17
Germany	46747.19	Dec/17
France	42567.74	Dec/17
United Kingdom	42514.49	Dec/17
Euro Area	40088.65	Dec/17
Italy	34877.83	Dec/17
Spain	32405.75	Dec/17
South Korea	26152.03	Dec/17
Saudi Arabia	20796.32	Dec/17
Turkey	14933.27	Dec/17
Russia	11441.00	Dec/17

Brazil	10888.98	Dec/17
Argentina	10398.09	Dec/17
Mexico	9946.16	Dec/17
South Africa	7524.51	Dec/17
China	7329.09	Dec/17
Indonesia	4130.66	Dec/17
India	1963.55	Dec/17

A2/ Nuclear Weapons

1. Rewarding nuclearization is a bad idea. **O'Hanlon of Brookings in 2004** finds that granting India a permanent seat would reward nuclear proliferation which is a major threat to global security.
 - a. This really sucks, because **Kroenig of Georgetown in 2015** quantifies that when both sides are nuclear powers, the probability of conflict jumps by 952%, because each side becomes more confident in their capabilities.

Kroenig of Georgetown in 2015

http://www.roberttrager.com/Research_files/KT2012.pdf

Using Clarify, we assess the substantive effect of shifting from nuclear instability to nuclear stability on the probability of militarized conflict after accounting for possible confounding factors. We find that a shift from nuclear instability to nuclear stability is associated with a 952% increase in the probability of conflict. 12 The stability of the nuclear balance has a substantive, as well as a statistically, significant effect on conflict behavior

Michael E. O'Hanlon and ÖMer TaşPınar, 12-17-2004, "U.N. Reform Potential," Brookings,

<https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/u-n-reform-potential/>

To be sure, a new Security Council should have India within it. Representing one-fifth of humanity, and with a vibrant democracy, growing economy and great civilization, India deserves a central place in the world's security architecture. But to grant it a permanent seat without asking for any steps to cap its nuclear capabilities is in effect to reward the very kind of nuclear proliferation that both President Bush and Sen. John Kerry rightly called the greatest threat to global security during the recent presidential campaign debates. India will not abolish its nuclear arms. But it should renounce testing, stop producing fissile material that could be usable in weapons, and agree to cap the size of its arsenal at or near its current size of several dozen weapons.

A2/ Population

1. India's population is suffering and should not be held up as an international model. **Campbell of Foreign Affairs in 2017** writes that in India, 270 million live in extreme poverty, infrastructure lacks 1.5 trillion in investment, and discrimination is prevalent ranging from gender to caste differences.

John Campbell, xx-xx-xxxx, "Will India Start Acting Like a Global Power?," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2017-10-16/will-india-start-acting-global-power>
In fairness, for years, this assessment was not off the mark, and India's reality did not match up to its vaunted potential. And indeed, India still faces daunting developmental challenges. It is home to around 270 million people living in extreme poverty. Its infrastructure is in need of major investment—to the tune of \$1.5 trillion over a decade, according to India's finance minister. Discrimination among India's famously diverse population persists, whether on the basis of gender, caste, religion, or region.

A2/ Voice of the Poor

1. India will no longer represent the poor when it gets a seat. **Stuenkel of the Vargas Foundation in 2010** explains that India's effort to get a permanent seat would turn them into a status quo power unlikely to support the poor. That's why several poor countries in all regions of the world have actively sought to prevent India from entering the UNSC as a permanent member.
2. India empirically failed to represent the poor in the past. **Mukherjee of Princeton University in 2013** finds that in the second half of India's last tenure on the security council, it failed to act as a bridge between the West and developing world, with a subdued attitude towards crises in Mali and Syria.

Mukherjee of Princeton University in 2013

https://www.academia.edu/14463655/India_and_the_UN_Security_Council_An_Ambiguous_Tale

Reflecting on India's recent term on the UNSC, Puri, highly regarded at the UN, comments, "Our endeavour was to leave our footprint on the council's work, to act as a bridge builder and to further demonstrate India's credentials for permanent membership of the council".⁹ By this yardstick, India's record is mixed – although it was able to leave a footprint on some of the UNSC's work – particularly on counter-terrorism, piracy and peacekeeping – it enjoyed less success on the more high-profile crises in Africa and west Asia. Indeed, the second half of India's tenure was marked by a subdued attitude towards files such as Syria and the emerging crisis in Mali (Gowan 2013). On the whole, India did not succeed in acting as a bridge between the concerns of the western powers and the developing world, or between east and west. Frequently, Delhi's positions were out of line with those of regional actors such as the Arab League or the African Union. Most commentators do not believe that India's 2011-12 term materially advanced the country's credentials for permanent membership.

Stuenkel of the Vargas Foundation in 2010

<https://ri.fgv.br/sites/default/files/publicacoes/10d7bc9faa.pdf>

At the same time, Brazil and India are the most active advocates for UN Security Council expansion. This creates a dilemma for both actors. Allied to, and many times the leaders of, developing countries without any perspective to be included into a powerful international institution such as the UN Security Council, both Brazil and India profess to defend the disenfranchised. Their effort to become permanent members, however, is likely to turn them into status quo powers, and it is unclear in how far they would continue to support the voice of the poor once they form part of the ruling oligarchic class. In fact, several poor countries

in all regions of the world have actively sought to prevent Brazil and India from entering the UNSC as permanent members, and African countries –arguably the most disadvantaged and the least integrated into international structures – have been the most obstinate with regard to expansion

A2/ Colonial History

1. Delink - Insufficient influence. Just getting a seat doesn't mean getting a voice. Take China for instance. In addition to being labeled as a developing nation by the World Trade Organization, [Heath of RAND](#) reports China has assembled a global coalition of developing nations allies. China has had pretty much 100% opposition to policies enacted by the West, yet has not managed to stand up successfully for developing nations.
2. Delink - India will no longer represent the poor when it gets a seat. **Stuenkel of the Vargas Foundation in 2010** explains that India's effort to get a permanent seat would turn them into a status quo power unlikely to support the poor. That's why several poor countries in all regions of the world have actively sought to prevent India from entering the UNSC as a permanent member. [Bosco of Global Governance in 2014](#) gives the logic behind this, which is that members of the P5 currently interact more with each other than non-P5 major powers. The UNSC turns into a major power echo chamber.
 - a. Indeed, India empirically failed to represent the poor in the past. **Mukherjee of Princeton University in 2013** finds that in the second half of India's last tenure on the security council, it failed to act as a bridge between the West and developing world, with a subdued attitude towards crises in Mali and Syria.
3. Delink - India would align more closely with the US. [Rajesh of the Carnegie Endowment for India in 2019](#) reports that China is posing an increasing threat to India in the region turning into an alignment with the United States as India's best chance to counter China. India would have to betray developing nations if it joined the UNSC in order to counter a greater existential threat to its own security: China.
4. Turn - Colonial history is a reason for India to turn down the seat. The **UN History Project in 2017** reports that because the UNSC has forced India and other developing countries into postcolonial suffering, India should continue to ignore or bypass the UN and instead lead Afro-Asian governance networks apart from the UN.
5. Weighing - If we win any link in our case into India subjugating Pakistan through a seat on the UNSC, then our case functions as a direct turn on theirs. A developing nation joining the UNSC then abusing its position and creating more tensions in the world will set back other developing nations immeasurably when it comes to trying to gain a leadership role in any international organization.

Bosco of Global Governance in 2014

<https://acuns.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/05-GG204-Bosco.pdf>

Evidence that the P5 members interact more intensively with each other at high levels than with other major powers is notable. In other areas, scholars have suggested a relationship between

high-level contacts and peaceful outcomes. In the context of regional organizations, for example, Yoram Haftel has found evidence that “regular meetings among top-level policymakers . . . appear to promote a peaceful resolution of political tensions.”²⁷ Jennifer Mitzen argues that face-to-face conference diplomacy produces what she terms “forum effects” that in turn help avoid violence. ²⁸ These lines of research suggest that Council encouragement of more frequent high-level meetings may itself be an important contribution to P5 comity.

Heath, Timothy R., xx-xx-xxxx, "What Does China's Pursuit of a Global Coalition Mean for World Politics?," No Publication,

<https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/10/what-does-chinas-pursuit-of-a-global-coalition-mean.html>

s disputes between Beijing and Washington over trade and other issues intensify, analysts have highlighted domestic factors as reasons why President Xi Jinping may resist compromise. However, Beijing's pursuit of a greater international leadership role also likely plays an overlooked, but increasingly important role. In particular, China's assembly of a coalition of developing countries not only provides an incentive to resist compromise in disputes with the United States, it is also likely to make disputes between Western countries and their illiberal antagonists even more intractable.

As part of a foreign policy strategy designed to support the nation's arrival as a great power, Chinese authorities have prioritized development of a “global network of partnerships.” The shift stems from 2014 foreign policy work conference, at which Xi called on China to “make friends and form partnership networks throughout the world.” According to a 2017 article by State Councilor Yang Jiechi, partnerships are bilateral or multilateral relationships defined by convergent interests. Chinese authorities insist any country can become a partner, but a closer look at official statements makes clear that the real aim is to build a political coalition of developing countries.

https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_312_Rajesh_Strategic_Choices_FNL.pdf

India is a rising power, but its transformation is occurring in the shadow of China’s even more impressive ascent. Beijing’s influence will almost certainly continue to grow and has already upset Asia’s geopolitical balance. India must decide how to secure its interests in this unbalanced environment by choosing among six potential strategic options: staying unaligned, hedging, building indigenous military power, forming regional partnerships, aligning with China, or aligning with the United States. A closer alignment with Washington likely represents India’s best chance to counter China, while efforts to foster regional partnerships and cultivate domestic military capabilities, although insufficient by themselves, could play a complementary role.

Challenges Posed by China’s Rise • China is a direct military threat to India, particularly in light

of the two countries' border disputes. Though India has considerable military power, China's forces are already stronger and better-funded; Beijing's outsized wealth will likely allow it to outspend New Delhi for the foreseeable future.

Dr. Daniel, xx-xx-xxxx, "UN History Project," No Publication,

https://www.histecon.magd.cam.ac.uk/unhist/image-of-the_month/image_of_the_month_Apr17.html

While UNSC membership continues to preoccupy India's foreign policy elite, some Indian observers have recently declared the UNSC redundant. They have lobbied for India to instead pursue bilateral relations and membership in new sites of global governance outside the transatlantic orbit, such as the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Such views are a response to the UNSC's history of impasse and indecision, but also reflect India's historical involvement in "South-South" networks of international governance dating to Nehru's Asian Relations conference in 1947. **For India, the UNSC has at various times been an international venue which has accorded it international status and influence, a forum in which India and other developing countries have remained in postcolonial positions of sufferance, and an institution that could be ignored or bypassed as the country pursued a position of leadership in Afro-Asian governance networks.**

A2/ Keeping India in Peacekeeping

1. India will never fully pull out (Their evidence is at best from 2011) Uniqueness is on our side. **Blah of Shillong University 17** finds that India has had a renewed commitment to peacekeeping as in the 2015 summit, India's new intended contribution to the UN peacekeeping operations includes an additional battalion of 850 troops, an additional 3 police units and additional training.
 - a. Still hope in a seat on the UNSC. **Moller of Cologne University in 2014** finds that while India has voiced concerns on specific operations, they will never risk a pull out because India's rivals in acquiring a permanent seat are not disengaging from their support to the UN. India would be wasting their biggest bargaining chip. Turn - More complacent, no need to contribute to get influence
 - b. Public Diplomacy. **Axe of the Diplomat in 2010** finds that India has used peacekeeping in the Congo to build a trading relationship with the country to exploit its mineral riches.
 - c. China. **Williams of the Stanley Foundation in 2013** finds that China's recent upsurge in UN peacekeeping contributions will undoubtedly prevent any Indian pull-out in order to stay competitive for hegemony vis a vis China.
 - d. Helps reduce costs. **Axe of the Diplomat in 2010** finds that South Asian nations can keep 10,000 peacekeepers off their government payroll while the UN pays them 3-4x more than their domestic salary and that participation in UN peacekeeping provides the Indian military with training which provides lessons and strategies for use back home.
2. India will reduce offensive peacekeeping, which is a bad thing. **Mukherjee of Princeton University in 2013** explains that when India had a rotating seat on the UNSC in 2011-2012, it decried the increasingly ambitious mandates of UN peacekeeping operations which, it argued, made excessive use of Chapter VII (on coercive measures) of the UN Charter.
 - a. Here is why that [sucks](#)
3. India hates humanitarian intervention.
4. Decrease effectiveness
5. Bunch of studies abt pko bad
 - a. Roland Paris analyzed 11 UN missions in depth and found that only two were able to build a sustainable peace.
 - b. Jeremy Weinstein discovered that 75 percent of the civil wars in which the UN intervened resumed within ten years of stopping.

- c. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis studied 138 peace processes and found that roughly half of those that had peacekeepers failed to decrease the violence or further democracy.
- d. In a study of Liberia, Eric Mvukiyeh and Cyrus Samii showed that, despite some positive outcomes, peacekeeping deployments at the municipal level did not promote security or help restore local authority.

Roland Paris, Jeremy Weinstein, Michael Doyle, Nicholas Sambanis, Eric Mvukiyeh, Cyrus Samii

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-12-11/crisis-peacekeeping>

Despite all these supposed improvements, today, just like 20 years ago, peacekeepers often fail to meet the high expectations set for them. Experts all use different definitions of success and thus arrive at different conclusions, so whether or not a UN mission can be considered a failure is a matter of interpretation. Some scholars have arrived at positive assessments. Michael Gilligan and Ernest Sergenti, for instance, have calculated that 85 percent of UN operations have resulted in prolonged periods of peace or shortened periods of war. Page Fortna has determined that, all else being equal, the presence of peacekeepers decreases the risk of another war breaking out by 55–62 percent. Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon have shown that the deployment of UN troops reduces both battlefield deaths and civilian killings. Other scholars have come to more dispiriting conclusions. Jeremy Weinstein discovered that 75 percent of the civil wars in which the UN intervened resumed within ten years of stopping. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis studied 138 peace processes and found that roughly half of those that had peacekeepers failed to decrease the violence or further democracy. Roland Paris analyzed 11 UN missions in depth and found that only two were able to build a sustainable peace.

Mukherjee of Princeton University in 2013

https://www.academia.edu/14463655/India_and_the_UN_Security_Council_An_Ambiguous_Tale

The international community's second expectation of India was that it would engage constructively with the UNSC and its members to make the UN a more effective and legitimate organisation in world politics. From the Indian point of view, the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations had repeatedly been called into question by the UNSC's inability to provide clear mandates, sufficient resources, and adequate operational guidance to troops on the ground. India, having contributed more than 1,00,000 peacekeepers to various missions for over six decades (PMUN 2011d), made the improving effectiveness of peacekeeping a major plank of its diplomacy at the UN. In particular, it decried the increasingly ambitious mandates of UN peacekeeping operations which, it argued, made excessive use of Chapter VII (on coercive measures) of the UN Charter without first exhausting other diplomatic options. Moreover, India was critical of the manner in which the mandates of individual peacekeeping missions were

gradually expanded to include tasks that might be labelled as nation building, which was not historically the role peacekeepers played for the UN. In a speech made to the UNSC in August 2011, Hardeep Singh Puri, India's ambassador to the UN, summarised the problem, "Ambitious agendas are not being backed with the financial, operational, and logistical resources. This lack of resources tells on the operational effectiveness of peacekeeping and casts a shadow on the credibility of the council's mandates" (PMUN 2011d). The changes that India advocated on peacekeeping in the UNSC are ones that would take more than a two-year term to see to fruition. It is therefore difficult to evaluate its contribution to overall UNSC effectiveness so soon. On the question of legitimacy, M J Akbar high

Axe of the Diplomat in 2010 finds that South Asian nations...

<https://thediplomat.com/2010/12/why-south-asia-loves-peacekeeping/?allpages=yes>

What's more, while a soldier is deployed with the United Nations his respective defense ministry can remove him from the government payroll. In that sense, UN peacekeeping offers South Asian armies the opportunity to keep 10,000 troops apiece in their force structure at no cost to themselves. It's a tremendous bargain, provided the military can spare the troops. 'At some point it could become a burden on an over-stretched army,' Schaffer says.

But Pakistan, with its ongoing military operations in the tribal regions bordering Afghanistan, 'is the only country that would have to worry about that; so far it hasn't restricted Pakistan's contributions,' Schaffer adds.

Williams of the Stanley Foundation in 2013

<https://www.stanleyfoundation.org/articles.cfm?id=769&title=A%20Smarter%20Approach>

But a number of factors have kept India from pulling out—maybe the most important as a reaction to the resurgence of China as a world power. While Beijing was against any involvement in peacekeeping operations in the past, it has had a change of heart. The number of Chinese peacekeepers is nowhere near India's, but it is growing. Much like India in its early peacekeeping days, China was swayed by the opportunities that sending troops abroad provided such as training its soldiers and increasing its standing in the international community.

Axe of the Diplomat in 2010

<https://thediplomat.com/2010/12/why-south-asia-loves-peacekeeping/?allpages=yes>

South Asian countries benefit in other ways from their major peacekeeping roles. For example, peace missions have enabled South Asia to build economic and diplomatic ties with a large number of poorer developing countries. In this way, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh gain 'influence and credibility,' Katoch says. This seems particularly important to India, at least as far as Congo is concerned. With a billion people and nearly ten percent annual GDP growth, India is most in need of something Congo has in abundance: resources.

Copper, tin, coltan and uranium are just a few of the many rare minerals mined in Congo. A large proportion of Congo's mineral output ends up in Chinese refineries, with China processing the raw ore and selling it onward to the world's advanced economies. In exchange for a steady supply of rocks, Beijing invests heavily in Congolese enterprises and builds much of the country's new infrastructure.

Only a few countries possess the diplomatic clout to cut out the Chinese middle-man and forge direct deals with the Congolese government. However hobbled they are by the language barrier, India's peacekeepers in Congo have still helped open doors to New Delhi's business interests. The first Indians were deployed to Congo in 2003 and by 2008, Kinshasa and New Delhi were discussing greatly strengthened economic ties. In January of that year, Congo agreed to partner with India in the mining of copper, cobalt and industrial diamonds.

Moller of Cologne University in 2014

<https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14781158.2014.908836?src=recsys&journalCode=cpar20>

India's political ambitions can, thus, be seen as a major driver behind its engagement in UN peacekeeping. The question of whether the stalemate of UNSC reform will eventually cause India to disengage from UN peacekeeping is a different matter though. True, there have been episodes where Indian decision-makers withdraw contingents because of political differences. Abandoning UN peacekeeping altogether would, however, risk much more political capital. Another point worth mentioning is the fact that India is not alone in its demand for UNSC reform. Germany, Japan, Brazil and South Africa also strive for a permanent seat. None of these countries, which are all in various ways major supporters of UN programmes, is seriously debating a withdrawal. Why should India be any different? Without a plausible answer to this, we have no reason to predict an Indian disengagement in the foreseeable future

Blah of Shillong University 17

<https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09700161.2017.1295605?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=rsan20>

Pocess.63 India's new intended contribution to the UN peacekeeping operations includes an additional battalion of 850 troops, in existing or new operations, and an additional 3 police units with a higher representation of female peacekeepers. It will also provide critical enablers, deploy technical personnel in UN missions and provide additional training for peacekeepers at facilities in India and in the field.⁶⁴ India also agreed on a joint initiative to train troops in six African countries before deploying to UN peacekeeping missions without specifying the African

countries that would be involved. The initiative was taken in response to the growing need for effective, professional and international peacekeeping in regions of conflict.⁶⁵

A2/ Dec offensive peacekeeping

1. Non unique - The Diplomat in 2018 reports that China opposes the use of force in military intervention. There is already a veto present on the council for offensive missions. Adding India doesn't change that dynamic.
2. Delink - India would align more closely with the US. [Rajesh of the Carnegie Endowment for India in 2019](#) reports that China is posing an increasing threat to India in the region turning into an alignment with the United States as India's best chance to counter China. India would have to betray developing nations if it joined the UNSC in order to counter a greater existential threat to its own security: China. Has to side with US and not do the veto.
3. Defensive Measures never work. **Cammaert of the Strategic Studies Institute in 2014** explains that in most cases, UN peacekeepers have no peace to keep, being in areas with active military conflict.
 - a. As a result, confining peacekeepers to defensive operations is an impractical military strategy. **Sartre of the International Peace Institute in 2011** finds that "the root cause of all of the weaknesses [in peacekeeping] is physical vulnerability at the tactical level."
4. Offensive peacekeeping saves lives.
 - a. **Pepra of Ohio University in 2011** finds that robust peacekeeping decreases civilian casualties by 31 percent per year because peacekeepers are able to actively fight perpetrators.
5. Offensive peacekeeping creates long term peace.
 - a. **Sambanis of Yale in 2007** explains the longer a peace lasts, the more stable it becomes, so interventions that shore up the peace in the immediate postwar period can have a lasting effect. The best predictor of peace tomorrow is peace today." Luckily, by directly challenging militant groups, offensive peacekeeping achieves this success.
 - b. **Greene of Macalester College in 2013** finds empirically that peace enforcement missions increase the likelihood of ending civil war by 75 percent.
6. Offensive peacekeeping solves civil wars.
 - a. **Hultman of Columbia in 2015** quantifies that deploying 3000 armed troops decreases civil war recurrence by 85%, but specifically, that the more peacekeepers are allowed to use any means necessary to carry out their tasks, the more negative this relationship is.
7. Offensive operations solves genocides.

- a. **Krain of Wooster College in 2006** explains that actively challenging interventions force perpetrators to divert time and resources otherwise dedicated to a policy of genocide or politicide toward defense against the external challenge.
 - b. Thus, **Buckley of the Washington Post in 98** confirms that if the UN authorized offensive operations in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, it would have saved hundreds of thousands of lives.
8. Overall, **Sloan of the University of Glasgow in 2014** after studying 10 offensive peacekeeper missions concludes that on balance, the benefits of offensive peacekeepers outweigh the costs.

Sloan of the University of Glasgow in 2014

https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2014.921853?fbclid=IwAR1vmZlhXoyCs4s-ouXa5g9_P8bEGP7Rqs2dmAf5Syw-JfkFJwSzH9agDdk

Although criticisms remain, there appears to be a continued determination in the UN to authorize peacekeeping operations under Chapter VII, calling on them to use force beyond self-defense and beyond defense-of-mandate and appointing them as civilian protectors to the extent possible. As noted, a concern for the safety of civilians and a recognition that governments do not always serve their citizens well – as elaborated in the Responsibility to Protect doctrine – is, more than ever 110After a spate of kidnapping of UN peacekeepers, a UK military force was sent to Sierra Leone to assist UNAMSIL. Subsequently, the peacekeeping force was able to achieve many of its objectives. Unravelling a war involving nine countries and 40 rebel groups was never going to be easy. But there’s a glimmer of hope’, before, part of the ethos of the UN. For now, at any rate, it appears that the benefits of this modified approach to the use of force by peacekeepers are considered to outweigh the problems. Whether that will continue to be the case remains to be seen

<https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/china-takes-the-lead-in-un-peacekeeping/>

China’s emergence as a leading power in peacekeeping serves not only to foster favorable relations in Africa and elsewhere, but also to strengthen the Chinese military. At this year’s session of the National People’s Congress, Xi [called](#) for the PLA to develop a “modern combat system with Chinese characteristics” in order to adapt to burgeoning threats against its national security and sovereignty. While China is opposed in principle to the use of force and military intervention, deploying peacekeeping troops affords the PLA an opportunity to improve its “military operations other than war” (MOOTW) and modernize its security forces. By improving MOOTW and playing a greater role in peacekeeping, China stands to gain on three distinctive fronts. First, China is able to flex its military muscle without directly threatening any other world power. China does this by both [using](#) its own equipment — such as helicopters and tanks — and supplying equipment to other state forces. Second, China is able to strengthen

and modernize its military capacity through joint collaboration and knowledge transfer with other state actors in UN peacekeeping missions. And third, China is able to burnish its image as a concerned international stakeholder, appearing as a country more invested in the peace and reconstruction of fragile states, thereby lending to its relationships both with countries receiving assistance and with those contributing to peacekeeping missions. All together, these dividends help to promote an image of a China that is increasingly more involved and more invested in the welfare of countries and peoples in need, especially as the international community sees the United States step down.

Buckley of the Washington Post in 98

https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/02/26/mass-slaughter-was-avoidable-general-says/c844e78f-340f-478b-88a3-ea6d0a592b56/?noredirect%3Don%26utm_term%3D.074e1a6f9f7f&sa=D&ust=1556063777617000&usg=AFQjCNFKuwrkwr_cIMoKssWSRC2NhDrwCQ

The former commander of a peacekeeping force in Rwanda said today that the United Nations could have halted the 1994 genocide in that central African country had it committed sufficient troops and given them the authority to aggressively pursue those carrying out ethnic massacres.

In 5 1/2 hours of often emotional testimony before the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Canadian Maj. Gen. Romeo Dallaire, 51, insisted that if the United Nations had taken such steps, the peacekeepers "would have been able to save the lives of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans."

Krain of Wooster College in 2006

<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.611.4813&rep=rep1&type=pdf>

Moreover, genocide or politicide is typically carried out by the perpetrator against unarmed civilians, even when those include supporters of guerrilla forces (Valentino, 2004; Valentino, et al., 2004). Military support for targets or in opposition to perpetrators changes the murderous calculations of perpetrators by altering the almost complete vulnerability of unarmed civilian targets. Challenging interventions force perpetrators to divert time and resources otherwise dedicated to a policy of genocide or politicide toward defense against the external challenge. Such interventions make state-sponsored mass murder a more difficult project fraught with even more serious military and/or political consequences than had existed previously. This, even if only temporarily, should stem the violence, especially if the genocidal policy is being carried out by "thugs" or "opportunistic bullies" who are unlikely to put up too much of a fight against an outside force (Mueller, 2000). It could prevent the spread of and perhaps even lead to a cessation of the killing by raising the costs to the perpetrator of continuing the policy (Rothchild and Lake, 1998).

Hultman of Columbia in 2015

<https://sci-hub.tw/https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0738894215570425?journalCode=cmpb>

Figure 2 displays the estimated smoothed hazard function from the analysis reported in model 3, which limits the sample to conflicts that ended in a negotiated settlement or low activity. The hazard function is the rate at which a hypothetical post-conflict state is “failing”, or reverting back to civil war. Control variables are held at their mean or modal values. The figure presents the estimated hazard functions when zero troops are deployed, 1500 troops are deployed and 3000 troops are deployed. The hazard function is generally declining, indicating that, as peace endures, the chance of a state falling back to civil conflict decreases. The figure also shows that the presence of 3000 troops leads to an approximate 85% decrease in the estimated hazard rate compared with a deployment of zero troops, a substantial reduction in the likelihood of civil war recidivism that results from the deployment of a rather modestly composed mission

Greene of Macalester College in 2013

https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1044&context=poli_honors

While the first model examines contemporary peace enforcement’s impact on civil war termination across all conflicts, the second examines its relationship only within a subset of those conflicts featuring some type of third party intervention—in other words, model 56 2 compares contemporary peace enforcement’s effectiveness to that of traditional third party intervention. Neither of these models are statistically significant (Table 3.1), but the $1 < x$ hazard ratio indicates that in both models, peace enforcement (PE) positively increases the likelihood (risk) of civil war termination—by 75% in the first model and 72% in the second. The survival curves below nicely illustrate these relationships in a manner that is visually striking and relatively easy to understand:

Sambanis of Yale in 2007

<http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01241/WEB/IMAGES/PCP3779S.PDF>

There is no apriori clear relationship between different war outcomes and peace processes of different lengths: wars that end in peace treaties typically last longer than wars that end in victories, but treaties may clear the way for a faster transition to peace. UN peace operations differ in their length and mandate. There is also no apriori clear relationship between UN peace missions of different durations and the probability of peacebuilding success: both long and short UN missions could potentially be successful, depending on underlying conditions. A long UN mission may indicate that the peacebuilding ecology is more difficult (hence the need for the UN to stay longer) and the UN obviously has more opportunities to fail the longer it stays. But the opposite can also be true: the longer the peace is kept, the more likely it is that a stable peace will be

built partly because of the contribution of the UN mission. In all cases, we seek to evaluate the effect of the “therapy” on the eventual health of the “patient” country, two years after the therapy is complete. Treaties and victories are “therapies” with relatively obvious dates. A UN peace “therapy” ends when the military forces are withdrawn.

Pepra of Ohio University in 2011

<https://nsuworks.nova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1130&context=pcs>

Table 6. Marginal Effects of statistically significant variables on intentional civilian killings in UN Missions in civil conflicts, 1956- 2006

	<i>Approximate percentage change of probabilities of intentional civilian killings</i>
Robust peacekeeping	-0.31 (31%)
Democracy	0.29 (29%)
Troops composition	0.01 (10%)
Identity conflict	0.40 (40%)
Ethnic affinity	0.24(24%)

Sartre of the International Peace Institute in 2011

https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_epub_robustpeacekeeping.pdf

The root cause of all of these weaknesses is physical vulnerability at the tactical level. It has become worse as states have become weaker and thus less able to guarantee their consent. It has increased since terrorism has become global, even though this threat has remained more abstract than real with regard to peacekeeping. Any failure at the tactical level—a setback such as casualties among the local population or the peacekeeping force— filters upward and calls into question the robustness and the competence of the operational commander and headquarters in New York. Subsequently, the moral or legal responsibility of the main players in such a failure may be invoked

Cammaert of the Strategic Studies Institute in 2014

<https://iiss.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19445571.2014.1018501#.XL-hcJNKjOR>

UN peacekeepers today do far more than patrol a ceasefire line. In most cases, there is no frontline, no truce, numerous parties and among them some armed groups seeking to undermine a settlement. In short, the UN is attempting to conduct peacekeeping in places where there is no peace to keep. Unfortunately the UN has failed to adequately develop the instruments to identify armed groups, and then deal with the challenge they pose. This book is a policy guide for UN missions. It analyses the nature of non-permissive UN mission environments and argues that the UN should think afresh about its approach to missions in these settings. By embracing and

developing three concepts – robust peacekeeping, political processes, and the protection of civilians – the UN can arrive at a stabilisation doctrine.

A2/ Chinese fiat rhetoric

1. Argument is absurd. This is like saying on the gun control topic that affirming means you assume there are no Republicans in Congress and then you impact out to climate change. This debate is not educational because it is very counterfactual and we'd be better off just asking whether or not the consequences of the gun reform are good or bad than the way the stars would align to actually pass the policy.

A2/ Hedge Against China

1. India is currently improving relations with China in order to get a seat. **Stuenkel of the Vargas Foundation in 2010** finds that India's recent rapprochement with China is meant to assure that China won't block India's entry into the UNSC.
 - a. This approach is successful - **Laskar of the Hindustan Times in 2018** finds that over the course of last year, India and China had unprecedented meetings on security and economic concerns.
 - b. **Khanna of Foreign Policy in 2019** finds that after a skirmish at the India-China border in 2017, China was first to pull out its troops, showing that China cannot dominate India in the region.
2. India is not going to join any Western-dominated control of China. **Venkatachalam of the Japan Times in 2016** explains that the political leadership in India, has avoided aligning with the U.S. to counter China, as it feels such a strategy would antagonize China, which would not be in India's best interests.
 - a. Terminal defense on all the benefitting Western goals impacts.
3. Affirming an anti-China stance is terrible. **Mendis of the Harvard Kennedy School in 2018** finds that being anti-China would not serve India well, as only by working together can they secure stronger economic ties and a peaceful century for Asia.
4. China would get mad if you affirm. **Kaura of the Diplomat in 2015** explains that "Chinese support for India's quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) remains a distant dream." Beijing fears that India's entry into the UNSC would be a huge loss for China's current global status and prestige among the third world countries.
5. A2/ SCS.

- a. **Gupta of the SCMP in 2018** explains that New Delhi has not provided or conducted. It has not sold offensive weapon systems to a South China Sea littoral state (despite long-standing ties with Vietnam). It has not deployed its vessels to this contested waterway to defend its economic interests. It has not laid out an operational doctrine to defend sealines of communication east of Malacca.
 - b. **Zhou of South China Morning Post in 2018** finds that India does not see the Indo-Pacific region as containment strategy, specifically “India is limited in its capacity, and its primary focus will remain the Indian Ocean. It will not add to the direct rivalry between the US and China, particularly in the South China Sea.”
6. A2/ China gaining heg right now
- a. Through econ stuff, UNSC won't change that

Zhou of South China Morning Post in 2018

<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2149237/indian-leader-modi-wants-no-part-china-us-rivalry-still>

Before flying to Singapore, he also met newly elected Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in Kuala Lumpur, where he agreed a pact on logistical support for naval ships, submarines and military aircraft.

As for the dispute between China and the US in the South China Sea, where Mattis said the US would continue to confront what it sees as Beijing's militarisation in the contested waters, Chaturvedy said he believed India was unlikely to get involved.

“India is **limited in** its capacity, and its primary focus will remain the Indian Ocean,” he said.

“It will not add to the direct rivalry between the US and China, particularly in the South China Sea.”

Gupta of the SCMP in 2018

<https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2148867/indias-actions-south-china-sea-will-speak-louder-its-words>

As for its independent defence cooperation activities with the claimant states in the South China Sea, it is instructive to note what New Delhi has not **provided** or conducted. It has not sold offensive weapon systems to a South China Sea littoral state (despite long-standing ties with Vietnam). It has not deployed its vessels to this contested waterway to defend its economic interests. It has not laid out an operational doctrine to defend sealines of communication east of Malacca. And until earlier last month (when it conducted a maiden exercise with Vietnam), it had not engaged in a naval exercise – high-intensity or otherwise – with a South China Sea claimant state.

Kaura of the Diplomat in 2015

<https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/china-on-indias-uns-c-bid-neither-yes-nor-no/>

Chinese support for India's quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) remains a distant dream. While addressing the students of the Tsinghua University during his recent China visit, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi explicitly underlined the positive impact of China's support for a permanent seat for India at the UNSC. "China's support for India's permanent membership of a reformed UNSC and for India's membership of export control regimes like Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) will do more than just strengthen our international cooperation. It will take our relationship to a new level. It will give Asia a stronger voice in the world."

Patrick Mendis, xx-xx-xxxx, "A new start for China-India relations could transform Asia ," South China Morning Post,

<https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2144168/new-beginning-china-india-relations-could-transform-asia>

For India, a real alliance with the distant US is problematic, especially with the unreliable Trump administration. China and India not only need each other for economic reasons, but the two countries have also traditionally adhered to the "non-alignment principle" of Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of India, and Mao Zedong, sharing a vision of national sovereignty free of colonial and cold-war mentalities.

Just as Nixon triggered a domino effect that changed Sino-American relations, a reset of the China-India relationship could well be a new beginning that transforms the region, as it enters a peaceful Asian **century** in which power shifts from West to East.

K.S. Venkatachalam, 8-19-2016, "India adopts new approach to muscle-flexing China," Japan Times,

<https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/08/19/commentary/world-commentary/india-adopts-new-approach-muscle-flexing-china/#.XL-bdJNKjOR>

India needs to be aware of the changing realities in the region. The best response is to modernize its armed forces to be ready for any eventuality, but at the same time continue to engage with its neighbors. The political leadership in India, so far, has avoided aligning with the U.S. or Japan to counter China, as it feels such a strategy would antagonize China, which would not be in India's best interests. China, for its part, should not view India's restraint as a sign of weakness.

Parag Khanna, 11-14-2018, "China Couldn't Dominate Asia if It Wanted to," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/03/china-couldnt-dominate-asia-if-it-wanted-to/>

However, commentators who portray China as having a thousand-year vision and presume an unwavering path to its achievement both overstate China's wisdom and underestimate that of its neighbors, who have thousands of years of historical engagement with China. China today seems an unstoppable force—but Asia is full of immovable objects in the form of civilizational states such as Russia, Iran, and India, whose ancient histories allow them to stand up to China whenever it suits their interest to do so. China dares not trespass on Russian soil even as the two increasingly coordinate their military exercises, and Iran has shown little remorse in canceling Chinese oil contracts despite its dependence on China to withstand Western sanctions. The 2017 Doklam Plateau standoff between India and China was similarly instructive, for it was China that blinked first, withdrawing its army and suspending some of its controversial road construction activities in disputed Himalayan terrain. China is known to play the long game—now so, too, is everyone else.

Rezaul H Laskar, 4-24-2019, "2018: Indo-China relationship back on 'normal track', some concerns remain," <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/2018-indo-china-relationship-back-on-normal-track-some-concerns-remain/story-21MJdEL86Co9ktf5SWr9XL.html>

2018: Indo-China relationship back on 'normal track', some concerns remain

The two Asian giants have worked assiduously to restore their relationship to an even keel following last year's military standoff in Doklam, and the informal summit between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping at Wuhan in April served as a catalyst for these efforts

The return of the India-China relationship to the "normal track" was one of the key achievements of India's foreign policy, the people cited above said. They noted that the political relationship with China was "restored and heightened". In this regard, they pointed to the "unprecedented" four meetings between Modi and Xi within a year as well as visits by three Chinese state councillors, including foreign minister Wang Yi.

Stuenkel of the Vargas Foundation in 2010

<https://ri.fgv.br/sites/default/files/publicacoes/10d7bc9faa.pdf>

components: Garnering support in the UN General Assembly and reducing resistance in the UN Security Council. * rough India's continued leadership in the G77, India hopes to assure widespread support in the UN General Assembly. India's strong stance on defending sovereignty and criticizing "the responsibility to protect" can be understood in this context. At the same time, India's recent rapprochement with China, its historic deal with the United States, and its continued historic friendship with Russia are all meant to assure that none of the permanent members would block India's entry.

A2/ Indo-Pakistan Relations

- 1) **Sharif of Dawn News in 2015** explains a permanent seat for India on the UNSC will not be tolerated by Pakistan at any cost because India has not fulfilled any resolution passed by the UN to give the people of Kashmir the right of self-determination.
- 2) **Sarwar of the ISSI in 2014** explains a permanent seat for India on the UNSC would increase its influence on global financial institutions such as the IMF and IBRD, making it more difficult for Pakistan to acquire loans from these institutions.
 - a) This not only harms relations, but it also is a tangible reason to negate. **Ahmed of the CGD in 2018** writes that absent an IMF bailout from Pakistan's current recession, millions of Pakistanis will fall into poverty and suffer permanent damage to their living conditions.
- 3) **Khan of the Naval Postgraduate School in 2015** explains that as a permanent member of the UNSC, India would be able to favorably influence decisions over Kashmir, emboldening them to use military force in order to coerce Pakistan.
 - a) **Khan** furthers that because both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers, even a small conflict may escalate to a nuclear exchange that would devastate the entire South Asian region.
- 4) **Sarwar of the ISSI in 2014** furthers that as a permanent member of the UNSC, India could ask Pakistan to recognize the Line of Control as an international border, putting the entry points of all Pakistani rivers under Indian control, creating water scarcity in Pakistan.
 - a) The consequences would be dire, as because Pakistan relies on this river system for its agricultural economy, **Ghumroo of the Munich Institute in 2016** quantifies that the Indus river system provides food and energy to 21 million people of Pakistan.

Ghumroo of the Munich Institute in 2016

https://mpr.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70829/8/MPRA_paper_70829.pdf

Pakistan have one of the River Basin situated in Indus Bay of Sindh it flows directly from Kashmir to Sindh. Mostly areas of Indus River Basin are characterized by downstream. It is world's largest irrigation system of Water. By this River, it is being provided Energy security and food to more than 21 million people of Pakistan. The classification of net water deficit area through measuring arid to semiarid basin. Nonetheless, it devastating floods occur in this basin and suffered. According to high mountain catchments, Pakistan is most vulnerable in the sense of climate, global changes and socioeconomic that influence on both demand and supply. Pakistan is most dependent on water resources in high peak of earth.

Ayesha Siddiqi, 8-1-2011, "Kashmir and the politics of water," No Publication,
<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/kashmirtheforgottenconflict/2011/07/20117812154478992.html>

As a result, if the Line of Control (LoC) between India and Pakistan in Kashmir, were to move from being a defacto to a recognised international border, India would permanently become the upper riparian and Pakistan the lower riparian of the Indus River and all of its tributaries.

The Indus is a river system that sustains communities in both India and Pakistan. In Pakistan, it is the only river system supporting the country, where more than 92 per cent of the land is arid or semi-arid. In India, it is one of two main river systems supporting the country's northwest: Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan (generally considered to be water deficient areas).

Sarwar of the ISSI in 2014

http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/1328593104_35074620.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1mIdqn_hgk5izcuvlmRa-SfesQWT7Wz6yJ9rvAfnDLEyF7bDQKMqRbIckA

Also, being a permanent member, with the support of other Council members, India may be able to decide the Kashmir issue on its own terms. For example, it could ask Pakistan to turn the Line of Control (LoC) into a permanent and internationally recognised border. Such a resolution of the Kashmir issue would give most of the Kashmir region to India and a small part to Pakistan. This is unacceptable to Pakistan. As this is not in Pakistan's interests because the starting points of all major Pakistani rivers Any expansion in the permanent slot of seats in the Security Council would have serious implications for Pakistan because if there is any enlargement in the permanent category, India may get a permanent seat as it enjoys the support of more than 120 countries, including four out of the five current permanent members. Expansion of the United Nations Security Council 275 are in Kashmir and accepting the LoC as an international border would put them under Indian control. If that happens, Pakistan, which has an agriculture-based economy, will face serious consequences if Pakistani rivers come under Indian control. Pakistan could also face water scarcity or floods.

Khan of the Naval Postgraduate School in 2015

<https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632266.pdf>

Without resolution of the Kashmir dispute, India does not qualify to be a member of the UNSC. India has refused to implement the resolutions of the UNSC over settlement of the Kashmir dispute. It would be unjust to award membership of the council to a country that has violated its resolution. As a permanent member of the UNSC, India can influence favorable decisions at the UNSC over Kashmir. Furthermore, India, due to its strong conventional military, can resort to the use of force on the pretext of pre-emption or hot pursuit to coerce Pakistan to change its stance on Kashmir in favor of India. Today, Pakistan and India are nuclear power; even small

conflict may conflagrate to nuclear exchange which will devastate the entire South Asian region. Without settlement of the Kashmir dispute, use of force cannot be ruled out. Noorani contends that, "It is reasonable to conclude that relations between India and Pakistan will never be normal until the Kashmir dispute is settled."²

Masood Ahmed, 7-3-2018, "Why Does Pakistan Have Repeated Macroeconomic Crises?,"
Center For Global Development,

<https://www.cgdev.org/publication/why-does-pakistan-have-repeated-macroeconomic-crises>

Intellectually, it is true that deep crises can lead to deep reforms, but this is not inevitable in any given episode. Reforms are generated by a variety of factors and conditions, and each country context is different. It is equally possible that a deep crisis will simply result in a prolonged period of chaos and stagnation. On a moral plane, the cost of crisis is borne disproportionately by the poor and vulnerable. Millions would fall below the poverty line, and some would suffer permanent damage to welfare and living conditions. It is not evident that any policymaker or international institution has the right to willingly bring about a crisis with such severe consequences for the poor in the uncertain expectation that it will lead to a change in national behavior. On a purely practical level, the IMF was created to help its members facing an imminent financial and economic crisis, and it would not be realistic to expect its staff or board to refuse assistance to a member to teach it a lesson and change its behavior.

Sarwar of the ISSI in 2014

http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/1328593104_35074620.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1mIdqn_hgk5izcuvlmRa-SfesQWT7Wz6yJ9rvAfnDLEyF7bDQKMqRbIckA

Besides, as a permanent member of the Security Council, India will have a great say in global financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The current IMF chief has already acknowledged that countries like China and India "deserve increased IMF voting power commensurate with their growing economic clout, and a fair shot at the emergency lending institution's top decision-making posts."²³ So, a permanent seat for India in the Council would increase its influence on the United System, including the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and IBRD). And Pakistan, whose economy is already in a far from healthy state, could face problem in getting loans from these global financial institutions due to Indian influence.

Dawn, 2-12-2015, "Pakistan will not accept India as UNSC permanent member: Nawaz,"
DAWN,

<https://www.dawn.com/news/1163163/pakistan-will-not-accept-india-as-unsc-permanent-member-nawaz>

The spokesman said the prime minister made it clear upon the US president that permanent slot for India at the UNSC will not be tolerated at any cost as India has not fulfilled any resolution passed by UN aimed at assuring the right of self determination for the people of Kashmir.

During his visit to India last month, Obama had lent his support to India's bid for UN Security Council's membership which was seen in Pakistan as contempt of democracy and human rights.

A2/ Legitimizing UN (General)

1. Being solved in the status quo. **Varma of the Fair Observer explains that in late 2017**, 120 countries at the UN pledged support to improve transparency, efficiency, and accountability on the Security Council.
 - a. The UN security council is not at a point of existential crisis. **Binder of Berlin University in 2015** explains that the Council does not find itself in an intractable legitimacy crisis because it still enjoys a rudimentary degree of legitimacy among member states.
2. Affirming decreases the effectiveness of the UN. **Hurd of Northwestern in 2008** explains that more interests on the table necessarily means that it's harder to reach agreements. Comparatively, **Gould of the University of Westminster in 2017** statistically finds that "incremental expansions of the UNSC generate increasingly large efficiency losses, and increasingly small equity gains."
 - a. **Borger of the Guardian in 2015** does the weighing, "[T]he ultimate legitimacy of the council comes as well from the effectiveness of the council."
3. Affirming necessarily entails further delegitimization in the eyes of many states. **Hurd of Northwestern 2008** explains that the lack of consensus over metrics of representation and diversity means that privileging one interpretation over others will contribute to the delegitimation of an enlarged Council in the eyes of some states. Specific to India, **Burra of South Asian University in 2018** explains that simply adding India as a permanent member "would further reinforce the hegemonic role of a few at the expense of others. Therefore, India's permanent membership would remain as a demand with a democratic deficit."
 - a. It's easy to see countries this would affect → Pakistan, several Muslim nations who hate India, as well as Brazil/Japan (countries who believe they should have power)
4. Legitimization is an exceedingly short term impact, if it happens. **Popovski of the Stimson Center in 2015** explains that there are genuine concerns that the new permanent members will simply continue to do what the current P5 do, acting primarily guided by national interests, not by the interests of the world at-large.
5. Bosco → decrease legitimacy for P5, nuke war

Popovski of the Stimson Center in 2015

https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/Commission_BP_Popovski1.pdf

The SC reform has been long and painful with many efforts being made, but little achievements. What is still missing is the need to change the perception of the SC membership from a 'Club of Privileged' to 'Burden-Sharing Servants'. We call the Secretary General a 'Servant of the Member States', but the same should apply to the SC members, who act on behalf of all other member states, serving global needs, not narrow national interests. The Art. 24 of the UN Charter clearly requires the SC to act on behalf of all UN member-states. The states' compliance with the SC decisions should be based on the understanding that the SC acts on behalf of the member-states. Naturally, memberstates comply and carry out the decisions of the SC (Art. 25) taken on their behalf (Art. 24) in the same way as the citizens of a country would comply with the laws imposed by a parliament or a monarch, knowing that these are acted on their behalf. However, not only we see how the P5 take decisions irrespective of the expectations of the member states, but also how the candidates for permanent membership point 'privileges from the past', rather than 'responsibility for the future' and there are genuine concerns that the six new permanent members will simply continue to do what the current P5 do, acting primarily guided by national interests, not by the interests of the world at-large.

Burra of South Asian University in 2018

https://sci-hub.tw/https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-81-322-3580-4_3

India's desire to sit on the high table along with other permanent five States is neither fully consistent with its past position vis-à-vis the role of the Security Council nor is a demand which would democratize the Security Council. Democratization of the Security Council cannot happen by inclusion of a few more States with certain privileges but by removing the veto power and allowing equal participation of all States in the Security Council decisions. Therefore, any reform exercise, which does not address these issues, would further reinforce the hegemonic role of a few at the expense of other States. Therefore, India's aspiration for its permanent membership in the Security Council may be of significant value from its individual standpoint in international relations, but it would remain as a demand with a democratic deficit.

Julian Borger, 9-23-2015, "Russian vetoes are putting UN security council's legitimacy at risk, says US," Guardian,

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/23/russian-vetoes-putting-un-security-council-legitimacy-at-risk-says-us>

The other permanent members are more guarded, however. Power said the US was open to a limited expansion but cautioned: "[T]he ultimate legitimacy of the council comes as well from the effectiveness of the council... We've got to remember that any council reform is going to also have to enhance performance."

Gould of the University of Westminster in 2017

<https://sci-hub.tw/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-017-0468-2>

The effects of UNSC expansion are seen in Fig. 1 to be qualitatively similar under each of the different structural reforms: expansion improves equity, but worsens efficiency. Figure 1 indicates that equity is increasing, but at a decreasing rate, in the size of the UNSC. There are, thus, diminishing equity returns to expansion. Efficiency, however, is decreasing, and at an increasing rate, in the size of the UNSC. Thus, incremental expansions of the UNSC generate increasingly large efficiency losses, and increasingly small equity gains. In spite of these qualitative similarities, however, we do see some important quantitative differences in the way expansion interacts with each structural reform, as we shall discuss below.

Hurd of Northwestern in 2008

<https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800702>

First, each claim ultimately rests on a trade-off, and each trade-off involves a political decision regarding one's priorities about the Council that cannot be resolved except by each state according to its own values and interests. Several of the hypotheses⁵¹, H2, and H3⁵² set up a trade-off between increasing the Council's legitimacy for some states while necessarily reducing it for other states. We may not be able to predict which states will fall into each category, but we do know that the lack of consensus over metrics of representation and diversity means that privileging one interpretation over others will contribute to the delegitimation of an enlarged Council in the eyes of some states. This weakens H1 and H2. H3 can, at best, increase legitimacy in the eyes of the individual states that might be added to the Council while reducing it for those that are not. The deliberative models create a different kind of trade-off, one between increasing the range of voices and issues that can be raised in the Council (which is seen as the source of legitimacy) and reducing the possibility of consensus in decisions. More interests on the table will necessarily mean that it will be harder to reach an agreement. Finally, all legitimacy hypotheses involve a trade-off between increasing the Council's legitimacy and furthering other values, such as efficiency, effectiveness, or power.⁵⁴ It is generally accepted that the size of the Council is negatively correlated to its effectiveness, and some countries raise this frequently as a cost of larger membership.⁵⁵ A negative correlation here would mean that it was a fatal flaw for all legitimacy-through-enlargement arguments if, in fact, Council legitimacy was prim

Binder of Berlin University in 2015

https://research.reading.ac.uk/ungop/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/Binder_et_al-2015-International_Studies_Quarterly1.pdf

Existing research on the legitimacy of the UN Security Council is conceptual or theoretical, for the most part, as scholars tend to make legitimacy assessments with reference to objective standards. Whether UN member states perceive the Security Council as legitimate or illegitimate has yet to be investigated systematically; nor do we know whether states care primarily about the Council's compliance with its legal mandate, its procedures, or its effectiveness. To address this gap, our article analyzes evaluative statements made by states in UN General Assembly debates

on the Security Council, for the period 1991–2009. In making such statements, states confer legitimacy on the Council or withhold legitimacy from it. We conclude the following: First, the Security Council suffers from a legitimacy deficit because negative evaluations of the Council by UN member states far outweigh positive ones. Nevertheless, the Council does not find itself in an intractable legitimacy crisis because it still enjoys a rudimentary degree of legitimacy. Second, the Council's legitimacy deficit results primarily from states' concerns regarding the body's procedural shortcomings. Misgivings as regards shortcomings in performance rank second. Whether or not the Council complies with its legal mandate has failed to attract much attention at all.

Varma, 12-6-2017, "UN: Global Solutions to Global Problems," Fair Observer, https://www.fairobserver.com/more/global_change/united-nations-reform-transparency-accountability-general-assembly-world-news-10716/

According to critics, the United Nations has largely failed to maintain international peace and security, promote self-determination and fundamental human rights, and protect fundamental freedoms. The UN has also been accused of having undermined its own goals with negligent interventions. During the 72nd Session of the General Assembly in September, more than 120 countries declared their support for reforming the UN to tackle the longstanding criticisms the organization receives, among them lack of transparency, efficiency and accountability. There is still a question, however, of whether or not this support is just an expression of intent or a firm commitment to real change.

A2/ Poorer Countries Approve

1. India will no longer represent the poor when it gets a seat. **Stuenkel of the Vargas Foundation in 2010** explains that India's effort to get a permanent seat would turn them into a status quo power unlikely to support the poor. That's why several poor countries in all regions of the world (mainly African nations) have actively sought to prevent India from entering the UNSC as a permanent member.

Stuenkel of the Vargas Foundation in 2010

<https://ri.fgv.br/sites/default/files/publicacoes/10d7bc9faa.pdf>

At the same time, Brazil and India are the most active advocates for UN Security Council expansion. * is creates a dilemma for both actors. Allied to, and many times the leaders of, developing countries without any perspective to be included into a powerful international institution such as the UN Security Council, both Brazil and India profess to defend the disenfranchised. * eir e# ort to become permanent members, however, is likely to turn them into status quo powers, and it is unclear in how far they would 54 C I M continue to support the voice of the poor once they form part of the ruling oligarchic class. In fact, several poor countries in all regions of the world have actively sought to prevent Brazil and India from entering the UNSC as permanent members, and African countries –arguably the most disadvantaged and the least integrated into international structures – have been the most obstinate with regard to expansion.

A2/ Catalyst for more Reforms

1. Delink - Without aff's fiat power, UN reform is never going to pass. **Khalil of PassBlue in 2018** explains member states would rather curry favor with permanent members than put checks and balances on them through reform. Indeed, **Cristol of World Policy in 2015** explains while countries may agree reform is necessary, there is complete disagreement about the specifics, resulting in an infinite number potential changes and an impossibility of actual reform passing.

Jonathan Cristol, 9-21-2015, "Don't Reform the Security Council – World Policy," No Publication, <https://worldpolicy.org/2015/09/21/dont-reform-the-security-council/>
Every year, the opening of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is accompanied by predictable calls for UN Security Council (UNSC) reform. There is widespread agreement that reform is necessary, but complete disagreement about the specifics. The depth of this disagreement can be seen in the framework agreement for UNSC reform, adopted on Sept. 14. The agreement is 25 pages long, with 123 pages of addenda, and contains an almost infinite number of permutations of changes. It succeeds only in highlighting the impossibility of UNSC reform passing either the UNGA or the UNSC.

Mona Ali Khalil, 3-28-2018, "With UN Security Council Reform, Bigger Is Not Better," PassBlue, <https://www.passblue.com/2018/03/28/with-un-security-council-reform-bigger-is-not-better/>
Both inside and outside the Council, member states are more often inclined to curry favor with the permanent members than to work together to put checks and balances on them. In their effort to get and keep a comfortable, albeit consequentially useless Council seat, they become too complacent to demand that the Council fulfill its Article 24(1) obligation to take prompt, effective action; too divided to collectively veto unjust or insufficient Council resolutions by denying nine affirmative votes under Article 27(3); and too weak to invoke the Uniting for Peace resolution against any permanent member's use or threat to use the veto.

Jonathan Cristol, 9-21-2015, "Don't Reform the Security Council," World Policy, <https://worldpolicy.org/2015/09/21/dont-reform-the-security-council/>
Every year, the opening of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is accompanied by predictable calls for UN Security Council (UNSC) reform. There is widespread agreement that reform is necessary, but complete disagreement about the specifics. The depth of this disagreement can be seen in the framework agreement for UNSC reform, adopted on Sept. 14. The agreement is 25 pages long, with 123 pages of addenda, and contains an almost infinite

number of permutations of changes. It succeeds only in highlighting the impossibility of UNSC reform passing either the UNGA or the UNSC.

A2/ India's Diplomacy Will Improve

1. [Dabhade of the Observer Research Foundation in 2015](#) observes that India has worked to mutually obtain membership in the UNSC for all G4 members and that obtaining a seat for itself would undermine the group hurting their diplomacy.
2. India will no longer represent the poor when it gets a seat. **Stuenkel of the Vargas Foundation in 2010** explains that India's effort to get a permanent seat would turn them into a status quo power unlikely to support the poor. That's why several poor countries in all regions of the world have actively sought to prevent India from entering the UNSC as a permanent member.

A2/ Modi Gets Elected Good

1. Modi is gonna win anyway.
 - a. **Aljazeera in 2019** writes that the BJP (headed by Modi) is widely expected to retain power in India because of its success in Pakistan in February.
 - b. **Pillalamarri of the Diplomat in 2019** explains that the BJP will win despite the opposition of the INC as the Indian people see that Rahul Gandhi has no vision for Indian development.
2. **Kumar of the New York Times in 2019** explains that Modi has created a poisonous environment that has dehumanized minorities and inspired violence against Muslims.
3. **Jain of Vox in 2019** explains that Modi's economic policies have failed as unemployment has grown to 7.2%, the largest in 45 years and his demonetization policies have devastated small businesses.

Kalpana Jain, 4-11-2019, "4 key things to know about India's elections," Vox,
<https://www.vox.com/2019/4/11/18306006/india-elections-2019-modi-bjp-gandhi>

But those promises have not been met. Unemployment is reported to have grown to 7.2 percent in February this year. And a leaked government report on unemployment revealed that the numbers were the highest in 45 years.

Some of Modi's economic policies have also gone horribly wrong. In 2016, he introduced demonetization — meaning that in a surprise move, he pulled all 500- and 1,000-rupee currency notes out of circulation. He claimed it would get rid of corruption, as it would flush out unaccounted cash that had not been taxed. He also claimed that the move would check the circulation of fake currency that was being used to fund terrorist activities in India. But experts say it's had no effect on this type of money. Instead, small businesses were severely hit.

Jeffrey Gettleman, Kai Schultz, Suhasini Raj and Hari Kumar, 4-11-2019, "Under Modi, a Hindu Nationalist Surge Has Further Divided India," No Publication,
<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/11/world/asia/modi-india-elections.html>

Roving bands of self-proclaimed cow protectors began to appear, mostly in northern India, which is more socially conservative. Their targets were Muslim or lower-caste butchers and livestock traders, and dozens were beaten to death, sometimes with a crowd recording the macabre scene on their phones.

Many Indians complain that Mr. Modi and his party have created a poisonous atmosphere that has dehumanized minorities and inspired the violence.

Senior party members have rallied to the defense of people accused of those attacks, and at times even those few who have been convicted. In the vast majority of lynching cases, though, the suspects escaped punishment, often with the help of state officers.

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/modi-kicks-election-campaign-promise-india-190328174935308.html>

The ruling coalition led by Modi's Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party ([BJP](#)) is widely expected to retain power in the staggered election beginning on April 11. (after success w Pakistan in February)

<https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/indian-elections-2019-do-narendra-modi-and-the-bjp-deserve-a-second-term/>

According to the latest polling, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition of parties is on track to win a second term in parliamentary elections, though the opposition Indian National Congress (INC) led United Progressive Alliance is expected to win more seats than it did in 2014.

A2/ More FDI to India

1. **Shah of the Business Line in 2019** writes that India is the most restrictive when compared to similar markets. As such, India has not been able to get sizeable investments despite opportunities.
2. Uniqueness - Indian FDI already at a high. **Zhong of the WSJ in 2016** explains India's FDI jumped by 26% last year because the government has made structural changes to allow foreigners to own large stakes in Indian companies and increased foreign-investment limits in certain sectors of the economy, making India the "most open economy in the world."
3. Turn - FDI hurts local businesses. **De Backer of Vlerick in 2002** explains that the inflows of FDI causes prices to fall and discourages local entrepreneurs or business owners from entering the market. As a result, **Backer** concludes that a 10% increase in FDI inflow results in a 7% increase in failing domestic firms in the long term. Overall, **Nishat of the University of Karachi in 2017** finds that every 10% increase in foreign inflows increases poverty by 4%, at the end of the day
4. Better evidence on the impact. **Bueno de Mesquita of NYU in 2010** empirically finds that "there is no net effect of UNSC membership on growth for democratic nations." This is because the aid / FDI / projects aren't tailored to real development outcomes and countries sending don't care about the long-term results, just the short-term vote.
5. **Sengupta of the ORF in 2017** lays down the terminal defense for us.
 - a. the preferred destinations for FDI are Mumbai, New Delhi and Chennai but the rest of India hardly attracts much FDI and that is where the unemployed youth are.
 - b. Naturally, foreign investors are interested in quick returns. By attracting FDI, mainly to service and e-commerce sector, may lead to quick profits for investors, but it will not bring more jobs to the people.
6. Welcome to turn city. Each of these is gonna outweigh on specificity to India/UNSC style FDI.
 - a. Skill gap. **Agarwal of Research and Info Center in 2015** empirically finds that in India, FDI inflows are generating employment only for higher skilled workers. Furthermore, they are displacing local production that uses very low skilled labour thereby significantly increasing the poverty gap index.
 - b. Destroys Indian retail. **Pandya of the Washington Post in 2014** finds that the resulting influx of large western retailers would displace many of the 12 million Indians who own small stores in the retail sector.

- i. India cannot have the same revolution as China bc of these kirana shops, China just had baby farmers with no hope, no real manufacturing sector before FDI.
 - c. Destroys Indian farmers. **Pandey of the Wire in 2016** finds that FDI in agriculture might lead to greater consolidation of farmland in the hands of large corporations. This will make a majority of small farmers and farm-dependent families more vulnerable and accelerate distress migration. This outweighs on scope, as **Bayer 18** quantifies that India is home to 250 million small farmers.
 - d. Volatility. If the FDI is given to India based on voting decisions, it'll be volatile, subject to change based off of how India votes. Volatile FDI erodes economies, bc it makes it difficult to plan projects and stuff. This is bad, as **Neanidis of the University of Manchester in 2016** quantifies increasing the volatility of total capital flows by one standard deviation decreases the growth rate of GDP per capita by 3.108 percentage points.
7. Mikosch of the University of Gottingen **INDICT**. Study says “According to the 90 percent confidence interval, FDI is no longer significantly affected by membership in international organizations when the political risk index exceeds a level of about 60.” This is key because the **PRS Group notes in 2016** that India has a political risk of 70 (higher = more stable) thus they will get no significant FDI increase.

<https://www.prsgroup.com/regional-political-risk-index-3/>

Cent. & South Asia Avg.	66	67	67	65	65
Azerbaijan	71	75	76	71	72
Sri Lanka	71	71	72	68	69
India	70	70	69	68	69
Kazakhstan	67	69	70	67	67
Bangladesh	64	62	61	58	59
Pakistan	54	54	53	55	52

Kyriakos C.Neanidis, xx-xx-xxxx, "Volatile capital flows and economic growth: The role of banking supervision," No Publication,

<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1572308916301723>

To assess the economic significance of this effect, we use the coefficient estimates of total capital flows volatility and its interaction term in column (5) with data on their standard deviation described in Table 1. Specifically, we multiply each coefficient with the sample

standard deviation of the corresponding variable. To illustrate, increasing the volatility of total capital flows by one standard deviation decreases the growth rate of GDP per capita by 3.108 percentage points (-2.10×1.48), while increasing the interaction term by one standard deviation increases growth by 1.288 percentage points ($0.862 \times 1.48 \times 1.01$). This means that regulatory policies have the capacity to reduce the negative impact of total capital flows volatility on growth by over 40%. The same principle applies when calculating the quantitative effects for FDI (by 44%), equity (by 49%) and debt flows (by 40%).

Bayer 18, "Small Farms, Big Improvement," No Publication,

<https://www.cropscience.bayer.com/en/stories/2018/smallholder-farming-in-india-small-farms-big-improvements>

Chander and his colleagues have a massive audience to address: There are 250 million Indian farmers operating on approximately 140 million farms, with a total area of 160 million hectares. But the average Indian farmer is a smallholder with about 1.15 hectares of land. Still, their importance is indisputable, as Chander points out: They produce about 80 percent of India's food. "Small farmers are under huge pressure from their market situation and economic developments. This often leads to considerable distress," he says. And with India's national population of 1.3 billion, and growing, the number of smallholders is also increasing. Many of them, says Chander, share Pappu Singh's problems.

Rahul Pandey, xx-xx-xxxx, "The Modi Government's New FDI Policy Will Hurt Indian Interests," Wire,

<https://thewire.in/economy/governments-new-fdi-policy-will-hurt-indias-interests>

Agricultural economy and families dependent on it: Hundred percent FDI in animal husbandry, retail and trading of food products might lead to greater consolidation and control of farmland and other agricultural assets in the hands of large corporations. This will make a majority of small farmers and farm-dependent families more vulnerable and accelerate distress migration to cities. Alternately, the policy change should have been directed at improving economic security and technological skills of small farmers and farmers' cooperatives.

Pandya of the Washington Post in 2014

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/09/30/why-foreign-investment-still-polarizes-india/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a534f1c97707

The high profile controversy over FDI in multi-brand retailing illustrates the fundamental economic and political trade-offs that FDI presents. Large western retailers like Wal-Mart and Carrefour have been eager to tap into the growing prosperity of the Indian middle class. The country's retail sector is valued at over \$500 billion. These retailers have the expertise to establish sophisticated agricultural supply chains that can reduce food prices. In a country with one of the world's highest rates of malnutrition this is not a trivial matter. These innovations

however would displace many of the nearly 12 million Indians who own the small mom-and-pop stores that dominate India's retail sector today. In a democracy, economic displacements of this magnitude are, likewise, no trivial matter. Modi's party won May's national elections with an unprecedented majority. This victory was widely interpreted as a sweeping mandate in support of economic liberalization. Against this backdrop, the persistence of FDI restrictions testifies to how politically explosive foreign investment remains.

Agarwal of Research and Info Center in 2015

http://www.ris.org.in/pdf/DP200_Manmohan_Agarwal.pdf

What seems to be happening is that India is attracting FDI inflows which are generating employment only for higher skilled workers. Furthermore, they are displacing local production that uses very low skilled labour thereby significantly increasing the poverty gap index. However, other SAARC countries are getting FDI inflows which are generating employment for low skilled labour. So employment creation in SAARC 24 nations is getting reflected in poverty reduction. Hence, we witness a dissimilar poverty reduction effect of FDI inflows in India compared to other regional nations

Jayshree Sengupta, 11-10-2017, "Is India getting the kind of FDI it needs?," ORF,

<https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-getting-kind-fdi-needs/>

Most of the FDI is going to the service sector followed by pharmaceuticals, infrastructure and manufacturing. Foreign investors are interested in quick and remunerative returns. They are coming to India because of the high GDP growth path in recent years.

The FDI in India is highly concentrated and Mauritius is the top source of FDI into India in 2016-17. Singapore is next biggest source and together they account for 50 per cent of total capital inflows. In 2016-17, total FDI grew by 9 per cent to \$43.5 billion. Mauritius route is nothing but round tripping of Indian investment which prefers to go to Mauritius to avail of the Double Tax Avoidance Treaty which means it is going to 'brown field investments' in existing enterprises. The treaty has been amended but will come into force only from 2019. The preferred destinations are Mumbai, New Delhi and Chennai. But the rest of India hardly attracts much FDI and that is where the unemployed youth are.

Bueno de Mesquita of NYU in 2010

https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.jstor.org/stable/20773715?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

Election to the UNSC reduces economic growth in nondemocratic nations, as seen by the negative coefficient estimate for the UNSC dummy variable. However, since the coefficient estimate for UNSC interacted with democracy is positive and of similar magnitude, there is no net effect of UNSC membership on growth for democratic nations. With regard to the two-year comparison, a similar pattern emerges: election to UNSC reduces two-year growth by 3.2 percent but not in democratic nations. Although the significance

of these results is weak in the country fixed effects specification, in the two other fixed effects specifications, the results are highly significant. When coupled with the other approaches, there is robust evidence that UNSC membership significantly reduces economic growth. The pattern observed with respect to economic growth is repeated across the analyses of democracy and restrictions on press freedoms. The coefficient estimates on the UNSC variable show deleterious effects, but these effects are canceled out in democratic nations by the opposite sign on the interaction variable

Shah of the Business Line, 1-14-2019, "Strong case to revisit 'restrictive' FDI retail policy: ICRA,"

<https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/policy/strong-case-to-revisit-restrictive-fdi-retail-policy-icra/article25991812.ece>

The multi-brand retail sector remains "most restrictive" to FDI, with a cap of 51 per cent ownership and guidelines relating to mandatory investments in back-end infrastructure and local sourcing norms, it said. "There is a compelling case for the government to revisit its FDI policy. The investment requirements of the sector are sizeable," its Vice President and Co-Head for Corporate Sector Ratings Kinjal Shah said.

Raymond Zhong, 6-23-2016, "Foreign Direct Investment Into India Jumps 26%, U.N. Says," WSJ,

<https://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2016/06/23/foreign-direct-investment-into-india-jumps-26-u-n-says/>

India's fast-growing economy attracted \$44 billion in foreign direct investment in 2015, making it the 10th largest destination globally for such investment last year, according to United Nations figures released this week. That represents a 26% increase in foreign investment in India over the year before, according to the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, which published the data in its latest World Investment Report. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has touted the growing stream of overseas money entering India as a signal accomplishment of his two years in office. The latest U.N. figures suggest in particular that the Modi government's efforts to encourage more global companies to "Make in India" are reaping some success. Foreign investments worth \$28.7 billion in so-called "greenfield" manufacturing projects, or those that start from scratch, were announced in India last year—more than double the \$11 billion in investments that were announced in 2014. Electronics manufacturing saw an especially big boost, with \$13.5 billion invested in such projects in 2015, compared with \$1.1 billion the year before. The Modi administration has made changes to keep the money coming. Last year it began allowing foreigners to own larger stakes in Indian companies in insurance, construction, mining, manufacturing and others. This week the government announced increases in foreign-investment limits in defense, retail, civil aviation, pharmaceuticals and grocery

businesses. The changes, the official press release declared, make India “the most open economy in the world” for foreign direct investment.

De Backer. “Does Foreign Direct Investment Crowd Out Domestic Entrepreneurship?

VlerickLeuven Gent Management School. N.d.

<https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/85407/1/>

Vlgms-wp-2002-14.pdf

An inflow of foreign direct investment, which essentially entails new competition and the transfer of capital and technology exogenous to the conditions prevailing in the domestic market, changes the number of domestic firms in this economy. Since firm specific advantages transferable across borders enable MNEs to compete successfully in foreign countries with a ‘better’ production technology compared to local firms (OLI-paradigm (Dunning (1993)), **the corresponding higher wages paid by foreign firms² skim the domestic labor market and decrease the labor supply for domestic companies at least in the short term** (i.e. $dL/dFDI < 0$). Similar to Jovanovic’s result with respect to an increase in the capital stock, comparative statics results show that the derivative of m with respect to the labor supply L is positive^{3 4}, meaning that an are the second order derivatives of the production function F with respect to respectively k , l , and k and l **inflow of FDI causes the number of domestic entrepreneurs to fall ($dm/dFDI < 0$). The crowding out of local ventures by foreign firms on the labor market leads to a stronger rise in wages than in entrepreneurial income⁵, stimulating people to become worker instead of entrepreneur.**

De Backer. “Does Foreign Direct Investment Crowd Out Domestic Entrepreneurship?

VlerickLeuven Gent Management School. N.d.

<https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/85407/1/>

vlgms-wp-2002-14.pdf

The negative effect of foreign entry is significantly larger, suggesting that the inflow of FDI impedes the entry of domestic entrepreneurs because of stronger competition on the product market as well as skimming off the (best) workers on the labor market. The immediate effect of foreign entry is -0.214 ($= -0,237*0,921$), while the total response of domestic entry on foreign entry is -0.702 ($= -0,237*0,921/0,305$). As the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities, **an extra FDI inflow of 10% would cause then ceteris paribus the number of domestic firms to fall with 7% in the long run.** The insignificant coefficient of FOREXIT suggests that new domestic firms do not easily replace foreign firms leaving Belgium.

Muhammad Nishat. "Do Foreign Inflows Benefit Pakistani Poor?" 1I. INTRODUCTION

(n.d.): n. pag. University of Karachi. Web. 26 Jan. 2017.

<<http://pide.org.pk/psde/pdf/Day2/Muhammad%20Ali.pdf>>.

Pro-Public government expenditures are recognized in different categories in the literature. Verschoor (2002) identified the strongest candidates to be classified as pro-poor expenditures as the social sector expenditures (health, education and sanitation) while McGillivray (2004) included the expenditure on rural roads, micro-credit and agricultural extension and technology in the list of pro-public expenditures as they may also be beneficial to the poor. Literature gives us evidence that incidence of pro-public expenditures is progressive i.e. marginal pro- public spending is progressive. Thus, it can be said that expenditures, particularly on health and education, increases human welfare (Gomanee et al 2003). In addition to the impact on the welfare of the individuals, it is also necessary to make sure that distribution of such impacts is desirable. There is a possibility that rich quintile of the population gets the maximum out of public expenditures. Castro- Leal et al (1999) proved the same by showing that there is a least possibility that poor will benefit from education and health expenditures. In another research 1 , it is shown that there is a weak link between expenditures on health and education and poverty i.e. government social spending does not necessarily benefits the poor; hence such expenditures may not reduce poverty. On the other hand, this does not mean to reduce such expenditures as they may not benefit all the poor but the public as a whole do get the benefit (Gomanee et al 2005). **More specifically, in long-run one percent increase in foreign inflows bring about 0.6% increase in poverty while in short-run, 1% increase in foreign inflows brings about 0.4% increase in poverty.** We also found that remittances had insignificant impact on poverty reduction reason may be, as discussed by Jongwanish, (2007), the cost associated with migration due to which poor are not usually the beneficiaries if foreign remittances.

A2/ India Gets more IMF Support Good

1. Better evidence on the impact. **Bueno de Mesquita of NYU in 2010** empirically finds that “there is no net effect of UNSC membership on growth for democratic nations.” This is because the aid / FDI / projects aren’t tailored to real development outcomes and countries sending don’t care about the long-term results, just the short-term vote.
2. India won’t take that shit.

Kenneth Rapoza, xx-xx-xxxx, "India Central Banker Says No To IMF," Forbes, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2013/07/30/india-central-banker-says-no-to-imf/>
ndian Central Banker Duvvuri Subbarao said his country does not need any money from the International Monetary Fund, thank you very much.

"The answer is no! I don't believe that we are in a situation where we have to go to the IMF. We are fairly resilient," Subbarao told reporters in Mumbai on Tuesday.

India has a worsening current account deficit. More money going out and less money coming in. One reason is oil. Another, India's insatiable appetite for gold. But weak demand for India products abroad, and a slow economy has not helped the government's coffers.

Finance Ministry officials have said there are many ways to finance the current account deficit, which touched an all-time high of 4.8% of GDP this year. One of those was to issue dollar denominated debt to foreigners, bring in more cash. So far, nothing has been done.

India hasn't tapped the IMF since 1999, when it paid off a loan of about \$30 billion.

Bueno de Mesquita of NYU in 2010

https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.jstor.org/stable/20773715?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

Election to the UNSC reduces economic growth in nondemocratic nations, as seen by the negative coefficient estimate for the UNSC dummy variable. However, since the coefficient estimate for UNSC interacted with democracy is positive and of similar magnitude, there is no net effect of UNSC membership on growth for democratic nations. With regard to the two-year comparison, a similar pattern emerges: election to UNSC reduces two-year growth by 3.2 percent but not in democratic nations. Although the significance of these results is weak in the country fixed effects specification, in the two other fixed effects

specifications, the results are highly significant. When coupled with the other approaches, there is robust evidence that UNSC membership significantly reduces economic growth. The pattern observed with respect to economic growth is repeated across the analyses of democracy and restrictions on press freedoms. The coefficient estimates on the UNSC variable show deleterious effects, but these effects are canceled out in democratic nations by the opposite sign on the interaction variable

A2/ More World Bank Stuff for India

1. The World Bank stuff isn't effective when used for political reasons. Because the funding is handed out for short-term security cooperation, it isn't conducive to long-term development, and **Vreeland of Georgetown University in 2009** finds that countries that receive World Bank projects as UNSC members are more likely to receive negative project evaluations than non-members.
2. Better evidence on the impact. **Bueno de Mesquita of NYU in 2010** empirically finds that "there is no net effect of UNSC membership on growth for democratic nations." This is because the aid / FDI / projects aren't tailored to real development outcomes and countries sending don't care about the long-term results, just the short-term vote.

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https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.jstor.org/stable/20773715?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

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Vreeland, xx-xx-xxxx, "The costs of favoritism: Do international politics affect World Bank project quality? Axel Dreher (Georg-August University Göttingen), No Publication, <https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:ylpIarkbx8kJ:https://rppe.princeton.edu/file/801/download%3Ftoken%3DaLdIZv6H+&cd=9&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>

Table 1 presents some preliminary results with only statistically significant coefficients presented. As can be seen, ethnic fractionalization has a non-linear effect, with highly homogenous and highly diverse countries being the least likely to have unsatisfactory projects. As Dollar and Svensson (2000: 901) point out "the political economy

literaturesuggests that ethnic fractionalisation and length of tenure affect the probability of successful reform, but does not exactly identify the functional form of this relationship. The quadratic form chosen yields the best results.” What they find is that high degrees of fractionalization are bad for success. The same is true here. Turning to our main variable of interest, UNSC membership has a positive effect that is statistically significant at the five percent level. Countries that receive World Bank projects as UNSC members are more likely to receive negative project evaluations than non-members.

A2/ More Aid to India

<https://newint.org/sections/argument/2012/05/01/india-need-foreign-development-aid>

1. Delink - India isn't asking for foreign aid. **Kasturi of the Telegraph in 2013** finds that India routinely rejects bilateral assistance, increasingly attempting to showcase its economic power to the world.
 - a. Gilligan of the Telegraph in 2012 -> rejected UK aid
 - b. That's why **Sharmu of Indian Express in 2017** reports India has transferred from a recipient of aid to a provider, taking pride in providing more aid to nearby nations.
2. Better evidence on the impact. **Bueno de Mesquita of NYU in 2010** empirically finds that "there is no net effect of UNSC membership on growth for democratic nations." This is because the aid / FDI / projects aren't tailored to real development outcomes and countries sending don't care about the long-term results, just the short-term vote.
3. Foreign Aid to India trades off with the Indian government public spending. **Swaroop of Economic and Political Weekly 99** explains that for every rupee the Indian federal government gains in foreign aid, there is a 1.62 rupee drop in its assistance to states.
 - a. This is a turn because a) a net decrease in public assistance but b) **Ghosh of JNU in 2012** finds that aid projects to India is devoted to pushing economic and social policies that are not in the interests of the recipient.
4. Delink - Foreign aid doesn't work.
 - a. No economic growth. **Paldam of the University of Aarhus in 2007** finds in a meta-analysis of 40 years worth of research that foreign aid is ineffective at promoting economic growth.
 - b. No poverty reduction. **Keo explains in 2015** that foreign aid cant solve and spurs cycles of poverty. USAID itself has said that they've dotted international countries with "a growing phalanx of corrupt, meddling, and overpaid bureaucrats."
5. Turn - Foreign aid cripples recipient nations.
 - a. Predatory loans. **Malik of The Guardian in 2018** explains that a high proportion of foreign aid is given through loans, making the recipient nation become indebted, paying back more in interest payments to the US than they were given.
 - b. Corruption. **Angus Deaton, Princeton Economist and Nobel Prize Recipient in 2015** argues that foreign aid makes regimes less accountable to the people because they no longer rely on them as much as a source of revenue. As such, they hold no incentive to please their constituents, creating unrest and an incentive to revolt, citing Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Somalia as examples of countries where aid created a divide between the government and people,

facilitating conflict and oppression. Lyons thus concludes that empirically, there is a clear correlation between increased aid and increased corruption.

Bueno de Mesquita of NYU in 2010

https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.jstor.org/stable/20773715?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

Election to the UNSC reduces economic growth in nondemocratic nations, as seen by the negative coefficient estimate for the UNSC dummy variable. However, since the coefficient estimate for UNSC interacted with democracy is positive and of similar magnitude, there is no net effect of UNSC membership on growth for democratic nations. With regard to the two-year comparison, a similar pattern emerges: election to UNSC reduces two-year growth by 3.2 percent but not in democratic nations. Although the significance of these results is weak in the country fixed effects specification, in the two other fixed effects specifications, the results are highly significant. When coupled with the other approaches, there is robust evidence that UNSC membership significantly reduces economic growth. The pattern observed with respect to economic growth is repeated across the analyses of democracy and restrictions on press freedoms. The coefficient estimates on the UNSC variable show deleterious effects, but these effects are canceled out in democratic nations by the opposite sign on the interaction variable

Ghosh of JHU

https://www.bmj.com/bmj/section-pdf/187724?path=/bmj/346/7891/Head_to_Head.full.pdf

In any case, too much aid is devoted to pushing economic and social policies that are not in the interests of recipients or are driven by changing fashions. The international development “industry” is particularly prone to fads: thus we had the privatisation of basic services, followed by microcredit, followed by conditional cash transfers, as the flavours of the month, all within the broader context of market friendly policies that reduce regulation of private activity. These policies then get pushed down to all recipient countries, regardless of context, relevance, or applicability, until they are thwarted by their own contradictions or overtaken by the next fad. Thus the underlying adherence to market oriented policies that can reduce the access of the poor to basic goods and services reduces any micro-benefits of microfinance or cash transfers

Swaroop of Economic and Political Weekly 99

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4407935.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A4a22e509e972201563758be97ab60fb2>

projects. Data on transfers from central to state governments on account of external assistance is labelled as 'Additional Central Assistance' (ACA) in the Indian public finance statistics. The average share of ACA in total transfers over the period 1980 through 1992 was 6 per cent. Our results show that central government transfers on account of foreign aid are not truly additional and, at the margin, states do not benefit on account of externally-aided projects. These results are

based on data from 14 general category states, which account for nearly 98 per cent of the assistance given to all states on account of foreign aid. More specifically, we find that a rupee increase in central government transfers on account of foreign aid is associated with a reduction of Rs 1.62 in other transfers to states. Thus, states that are able to procure external assistance end up having less assistance from the central government. On the otherhand, there seems to be an incentive for revenue effort; a rupee increase in state government's spending financed by its own resources in the previous year leads to a 12 paise increase in central government transfers in the following year.

Kasturi, 7-7-2013, ", " No Publication,

<https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/foreign-aid-no-thanks/cid/278963>

However, New Delhi has turned down bilateral assistance from foreign countries for the Uttarakhand calamity, building on a quiet but assertive diplomatic aid policy that has coincided with its growing economic clout.

It's a policy that has seen India change from a country that happily accepted foreign aid to tide it over natural disasters just a decade ago to a nation that routinely rejects bilateral assistance to handle such crises.

Instead of taking aid, New Delhi has emerged a regular donor whenever natural disasters strike anywhere in the world, from impoverished Haiti to developed Japan.

Ritu Sharma, xx-xx-xxxx, "Emerging power India gives more aid than it receives," New Indian Express,

<http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2017/mar/22/emerging-power-india-gives-more-aid-than-it-receives-1584604.html>

NEW DELHI: From one of the highest recipient of multi-lateral development aid, India has quietly transitioned into the role of provider as in the last three years it has given more aid to foreign countries than it has received. This was informed by Minister of State for External Affairs General VK Singh in a written reply to the Parliament. "India is currently a net donor of foreign aid. In the last three years, India has provided more aid to foreign countries, than it has received," Singh said in response to a question on Wednesday.

Angus Deaton, 10-23-2015, "Does foreign aid always help the poor?," World Economic Forum, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/10/does-foreign-aid-always-help-the-poor/>

Think of it this way: In order to have the funding to run a country, a government needs to collect taxes from its people. Since the people ultimately hold the purse strings, they have a certain

amount of control over their government. If leaders don't deliver the basic services they promise, the people have the power to cut them off.

Deaton argued that foreign aid can weaken this relationship, leaving a government less accountable to its people, the congress or parliament, and the courts.

"My critique of aid has been more to do with countries where they get an enormous amount of aid relative to everything else that goes on in that country," Deaton said in an interview with Wonkblog. "For instance, most governments depend on their people for taxes in order to run themselves and provide services to their people. Governments that get all their money from aid don't have that at all, and I think of that as very corrosive."

Like revenue from oil or diamonds, wealth from foreign aid can be a corrupting influence on weak governments, "turning what should be beneficial political institutions into toxic ones," Deaton writes in his book "The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality." This wealth can make governments more despotic, and it can also increase the risk of civil war, since there is less power sharing, as well as a lucrative prize worth fighting for.

Deaton and his supporters offer dozens of examples of humanitarian aid being used to support despotic regimes and compounding misery, including in Zaire, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Somalia, Biafra, and the Khmer Rouge on the border of Cambodia and Thailand. Citing Africa researcher Alex de Waal, Deaton writes that "aid can only reach the victims of war by paying off the warlords, and sometimes extending the war."

Kenan Malik, 9-2-2018, "As a system, foreign aid is a fraud and does nothing for inequality," Guardian,

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/sep/02/as-a-system-foreign-aid-is-a-fraud-and-does-nothing-for-inequality>

Half of all international development aid is "tied", meaning that recipient countries must use it to buy goods and services from the donor nation. As the USAid website used to boast (until the paragraph became too embarrassing and was deleted in 2006): "The principal beneficiary of America's foreign assistance programmes has always been the United States. Close to 80% of the US Agency for International Development's contracts and grants go directly to American firms." Aid has "created new markets for American industrial exports and meant hundreds of thousands of jobs for Americans". Long before Trump entered the White House, USAid was "putting America first".

A high proportion of foreign aid is in the form of loans, which cripple developing countries through the accumulation of debt. Many rich nations receive more in interest payments from recipient countries than they give in "aid". Especially since the 2008 financial crash, western governments have exploited their ability to borrow money at low rates by setting up aid programmes lending to poor countries at much higher rates, minting money on the backs of the poor. This is not aid, it's a scandal.

Paldam 2007

<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.626.2579&rep=rep1&type=pdf>

The aid effectiveness literature (AEL) consists of empirical macro studies of the effects of development aid. By the end of 2004, it had reached 97 econometric studies of three families, which have been analyzed in one study for each family using meta-analysis. The AEL is an ideal subject for meta-analysis as it uses only a few formally similar models which try to catch precisely the same effects. Also, it is an area with strong beliefs – often generated by altruism – and interests. In this survey of the AEL, we show that when the whole of the literature is examined, a clear pattern emerges in the results: after 40 years of development aid, the evidence indicates that aid has not been effective. We show that the distribution of results is significantly asymmetrical in a way that reflects the reluctance of the research community to publish negative results. The Dutch Disease effect of aid has been ignored but is a plausible explanation for aid ineffectiveness.

Peter Tan Keo, The Diplomat, 11-5-2013, "The Dark Side of Foreign Aid," Diplomat,

<https://thediplomat.com/2013/11/the-dark-side-of-foreign-aid/>

As one example, Bovard writes, “[F]oreign aid has routinely failed to benefit the foreign poor...the U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID] has dotted the countryside with “white elephants”...the biggest...of them all – a growing phalanx of corrupt, meddling, and overpaid bureaucrats.” This trend is apparent in countries like Cambodia. Sophal Ear, an assistant professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, is among a handful of scholars to write persuasively about the dark underbelly of foreign aid in Cambodia. His argument, clearly presented in *Aid Dependence in Cambodia: How Foreign Assistance Undermines Democracy*, is this: “[E]ven though aid is meant to encourage development, aid dependence results in bad governance, stunting development.” Two pages later, he goes on to note, “I am convinced that, on balance

A2 India needed to stop further R2P interventions

1. With or without India, R2P will never be invoked. **David Rieff of the New York Times in 2011** writes that China and Russia have historically vetoed even lighter, non-military sanctions against countries like Syria. If the UNSC can't even approve sanctions, Rieff concludes that there is no chance a R2P based, Libya-like intervention will get approved in the future.
2. R2P was never used as a justification for the Libyan intervention. Two reasons:
 - a. First, **Mark Kersten of the Washington Post in 2015** explains that “key members of the NATO-led coalition that intervened in Libya declined to refer to their mission as an example of R2P. For example, Canada, refused to invoke the doctrine, instead justifying its intervention as the result to “a mandate of

- protection” and a “resolve to protect civilians.” Canada intervened because they thought it was the right thing to do, not because the UNSC told them to do it.
- b. Second, Kersten continues that “states on the Security Council did not actively contemplate R2P whilst negotiating an appropriate response to events in Libya: “The official record of the UNSC’s deliberations over Resolution 1973 gives little support to assertions that R2P was a major influencing factor on decisions over the most appropriate form of intervention.
3. Turn - Even if you buy that R2P was invoked in Libya, the intervention was a success though many people claim it wasn’t.
 - a. **Shadi Hamid of Brookings in 2016** notes that without an intervention the most likely outcome, then, was a Syria-like situation of indefinite, intensifying violence. The country is better off today than it would have been had the international community allowed dictator Muammar Qaddafi to continue his rampage across the country.
 - i. Hamid continues that opponents of the intervention never make clear how civilians could have been protected as long as Qaddafi was waging war on them.
 - b. [A2 Caused Civil War] Hamid goes on to say that the civil war had already started before the intervention began.

David Rieff, New York Times, Nov. 7 2011, “R2P, R.I.P.”

<https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/opinion/r2p-rip.html>

This should surprise no one. A doctrine of intervention that both claims the moral high ground and clamors its universality but under which the interveners are always from the Global North and the intervened upon always from the Global South is not moral progress; it is geopolitical business as usual. Last month, while officials in Paris, London, and Washington were congratulating one another for a job well done in Libya, **in the U.N. Security Council, China and Russia were vetoing, and Brazil and India were abstaining from, the imposition of far milder, nonmilitary sanctions against Syria. Clearly, no R2P-based, Libya-like**

interventions will get sanction from the U.N. in the foreseeable future. One would never know it from all the victory talk in the West, but instead of strengthening R2P as a new global norm, the NATO intervention in Libya may well serve as its high water mark.

Shadi Hamid, Brookings Institute, April 12 2016, “Everyone says the Libya intervention was a failure. They’re wrong.”

<<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/04/12/everyone-says-the-libya-intervention-was-a-failure-theyre-wrong/>>

Any Libyan who had opted to take up arms was liable to be captured, arrested, or killed if Qaddafi “won,” so the incentives to accept defeat were nonexistent, to say nothing of the understandable desire to not live under the rule of a brutal and maniacal strongman.

The most likely outcome, then, was a Syria-like situation of indefinite, intensifying violence. Even President Obama, who today seems unsure about the decision to intervene, acknowledged in an August 2014 interview with Thomas Friedman that **“had we not intervened, it’s likely that Libya would be Syria...And so there would be more death, more disruption, more destruction.”**

Shadi Hamid, Brookings Institute, April 12 2016, “Everyone says the Libya intervention was a failure. They’re wrong.”

<<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/04/12/everyone-says-the-libya-intervention-was-a-failure-theyre-wrong/>>

Even President Obama himself would eventually acknowledge the failure to stay engaged. As he put it to Friedman: “I think we [and] our European partners underestimated the need to come in full force if you’re going to do this.”

Yet it is worth emphasizing that even with a civil war, ISIS’s capture of territory, and as many as three competing “governments,” the destruction in Libya still does not come close to the level of death and destruction witnessed in Syria in the absence of intervention. In other words, even this “worst-case scenario” falls well short of actual worst-case scenarios.

According to the Libya Body Count, around 4,500 people have so far been killed over the course of 22 months of civil war. In Syria, the death toll is about 100 times that, with more than 400,000 killed, according to the Syrian Center for Policy Research.

Shadi Hamid, Brookings Institute, April 12 2016, “Everyone says the Libya intervention was a failure. They’re wrong.”

<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/04/12/everyone-says-the-libya-intervention-was-a-failure-theyre-wrong/>

Critics erroneously compare Libya today to any number of false ideals, but this is not the correct way to evaluate the success or failure of the intervention. **To do that, we should compare Libya today to what Libya would have looked like if we hadn't intervened. By that standard, the Libya intervention was successful: The country is better off today than it would have been had the international community allowed dictator Muammar Qaddafi to continue his rampage across the country.**

Critics further assert that the intervention caused, created, or somehow led to civil war. In fact, the civil war had already started before the intervention began. As for today's chaos, violence, and general instability, these are more plausibly tied not to the original intervention but to the international community's failures after intervention.

The very fact that the Libya intervention and its legacy have been either distorted or misunderstood is itself evidence of a warped foreign policy discourse in the U.S., where anything short of success—in this case, Libya quickly becoming a stable, relatively democratic country—is viewed as a failure.

Mark Kersten, The Washington Post, December 8, 2015, "The Responsibility to Protect doctrine is faltering. Here's why."

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/12/08/the-responsibility-to-protect-doctrine-is-failing-heres-why/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.456ae25c5a07

In both resolutions, the Security Council only invoked the first half of the R2P equation. The resolutions made clear that the international community accepted that Libya had a responsibility to protect its citizens. The council also agreed that, in the absence of doing so, a military intervention, i.e. "all necessary measures," was appropriate. However, as I have argued elsewhere, missing from either resolution was any suggestion that the international community itself bore responsibility for protecting Libyan citizens.

State decision-making further elucidates that a full invocation of R2P was not in the cards. **First, key members of the NATO-led coalition that intervened in Libya declined to refer to their mission as an example of R2P. For example, Canada, which had helped to spearhead R2P in the early 2000s, pointedly refused to invoke the doctrine, instead justifying its intervention as the result to "a mandate of protection" and a "resolve to protect civilians."**

Other states, like the U.K., affirmed Libya's responsibility to protect its civilians but no such responsibility on the part of the international community.

Second, as academic Justin Morris has found, **states on the Security Council did not actively contemplate R2P whilst negotiating an appropriate response to events in Libya: "The official record of the UNSC's deliberations over Resolution 1973 gives little support to assertions that R2P was a major influencing factor on decisions over the most appropriate form of intervention. Throughout the council's deliberations only France and Colombia referred to the concept, and even then only in respect of Libya's responsibility to protect its citizens."**

The refusal of Security Council states to confirm their responsibility to protect civilians in Libya should not be surprising. It was no accident. States have little appetite to pass resolutions or set precedents that would leave them legally bound to act similarly in future cases. As James Pattison, professor of politics at the University of Manchester, has observed: "States are seemingly reluctant to accept this responsibility for fear of being obliged to act robustly in response to similar cases." States are careful to maintain their ability to pick and choose the contexts in which they will intervene. Therefore, when scholars and observers ask: why did R2P apply to Libya but not Syria, the answer is simple: R2P wasn't applied in Libya, precisely so that it wouldn't have to be applied in cases like Syria.

ANSWER TO CON YOU ARE PRO

A2/ Pakistan Will Get Angry

1. Everything sucks rn. **Perrigo of Time Magazine in 2019** explains that following the exchange of airstrikes across ceasefire line in late February, tensions between Pakistan and India rose to its highest point in years.
 - a. **Sahi of the LATimes in 2019** furthers that the skirmish points to a changing security dynamic in South Asia, where India appears more willing to take military action against its neighbor. This is crucial, because [Perkovich of the Herald in 2016](#) reports that using diplomatic, economic, and other means of international censure would be a better way to motivate Pakistan than military options, which come with a far higher risk of escalating conflict. However, for this strategy to work, Perkovich writes that India needs to have a better international coalition, which joining the UNSC would give it
2. Getting India on the UNSC is a drop in the bucket. **Satish of the CSC in 2016** finds that this impact may not change the fundamental power balance that exists today. Pakistan is already overwhelmed by the military strength of India, and thus its primary defences are the threat of nuclear exchange or state disintegration – neither of which will definitely be undermined by rising Indian power
3. Turn - Greater incentives for diplomacy on both sides.
 - a. India. **David Bosco in 2014** writes that UNSC permanent members frequently interact more intensively with each other at high levels which is critical because “regular meetings among top-level policymakers promote peaceful resolutions of global political tensions.” India joining the P-5 would increase the incentive other permanent members to care about the tensions with Pakistan and peacefully intervene.
 - b. Pakistan. **Satish of the CSC in 2016** writes that with the rise of India as a great power would incentivize Pakistan to improve its bilateral cooperation with India and it would help Pakistan to attain its gradual economic development, something that it doesn't have an incentive to do in the squo due to the perception that the two countries have about equal international clout.

4. Stuff about China ditching em.
5. Only way to change is for Paki to take a stand on terror. **Raghavan of the Carnegie Endowment in 2019** explains that a significant change in the bilateral India-Pakistan relationship can only occur if Pakistan moves decisively against the terrorist organizations operating out of its territory. If terror attacks on India persist, it may be difficult for any Indian government to exercise restraint.
 - a. Insert card about how if India is in UNSC they improve antiterror
6. AFF = a more responsible india ? in J&K

Satish of the CSC in 2016

<https://www.omicsonline.org/open-access/india-s-major-power-status-and-its-impact-on-the-relations-with-theneighbors-pakistan-and-china-2151-6200-1000157.pdf>

Hopefully it would be the beginning of new era that both states will rely on the path of peaceful settlements of disputes and would be dependent on the diplomatic means to gain the mutual interests instead of conflicts, promoting the militants and terrorists. With the rise of India as a great power positive perception of Pakistan would help to improve its bilateral cooperation with India and it would help Pakistan to attain its gradual economic development.

<https://www.omicsonline.org/open-access/india-s-major-power-status-and-its-impact-on-the-relations-with-theneighbors-pakistan-and-china-2151-6200-1000157.php?aid=68460>

As elements within Pakistan continue to provoke India, this creates an extremely dangerous imbalance reliant on India's restraint to maintain peace.

<https://herald.dawn.com/news/1153532>

Contrary to military options, utilising diplomatic, economic and other means of international censure in a strategy of non-violent compellence may be a better way to motivate Pakistan. The punitive benefits of a non-violent strategy may be less direct than military action but it also comes with far lower risks of an escalating military conflict. With a clear comparative advantage over Pakistan in economic clout and soft power, India could utilise these tools to isolate Pakistan internationally in response to another major terrorist attack. However, in order to be successful with this strategy, India would have to develop greater deftness in international coalition-building.

I guess the warranting is like AFF means a globally respected india and a globally isolated pakistan

- India more likely to respect the rules

https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/bn_india_cg_26sept08-1132.pdf

At the United Nations, India has a reputation for being one of the less constructive members. It sometimes reacts in a negative or hostile manner to the initiatives of others, and does not often take its own initiatives. Evidently, so long as India is denied a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC), its officials will have an excuse for occasionally taking the UN less seriously than some others would wish.

- Pakistan more likely to give in

Satish of the CSC in 2016

<https://www.omicsonline.org/open-access/india-s-major-power-status-and-its-impact-on-the-relations-with-the-neighbors-pakistan-and-china-2151-6200-1000157.pdf>

India's rise as a great power in this region and major power status at the international level is quite clear aier the recognition and belief of US in India that it could help to maintain the global peace and balance of power. India projected its power beyond its borders especially in IOR which is the central stage of world politics now days. India successfully protected its interests against China's String of Pearl policy By Look East: and Act East policy Proclaimed by Indian officials. He ascending power score of India lays sure strategic impact on the neighbors, Pakistan and China. For contrasting reasons, however, this impact may not change the fundamental power balance that exists today. Pakistan is already overwhelmed by the military strength of India, and thus its primary defences are the threat of nuclear exchange or state disintegration – neither of which will definitely be undermined by rising Indian power.

Hopefully it would be the beginning of new era that both states will rely on the path of peaceful settlements of disputes and would be dependent on the diplomatic means to gain the mutual interests instead of conflicts, promoting the militants and terrorists. With the rise of India as a great power positive perception of Pakistan would help to improve its bilateral cooperation with India and it would help Pakistan to attain its gradual economic development.

Srinath Raghavan, 2-14-2019, "The India-Pakistan Crisis Is More Dangerous Than Ever," Carnegie India,

<https://carnegieindia.org/2019/03/06/india-pakistan-crisis-is-more-dangerous-than-ever-pub-78504>

A significant change in the bilateral India-Pakistan relationship can only occur if Pakistan moves decisively against the terrorist organizations operating out of its territory. If terror attacks on India persist, it may be difficult for any Indian government to exercise restraint, as in the past. Now that air strikes have been established as an acceptable use of force, it may become

politically difficult for any Indian government to refrain from using them or even to resist opting for deadlier strikes.

Shashank Bengali, Aoun Sahi, 3-4-2019, "Why the next round of India-Pakistan hostilities could be even scarier," latimes,

<https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-india-pakistan-analysis-20190304-story.html>

But analysts say the skirmish points to a changing security dynamic in South Asia, where India appears more willing to take military action against its neighbor, and Pakistan faces growing isolation internationally for failing to rein in militant groups based on its soil.

“I don’t think we’ll be back to business as usual for India,” said Brahma Chellaney, a professor of strategic studies at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi. “I see this as a potential game-changer.”

Billy Perrigo, xx-xx-xxxx, "What to Know About Rising Tensions Between India and Pakistan," Time, <http://time.com/5538756/india-pakistan-kashmir-tensions-airstrikes/>

With tit-for-tat airstrikes across a cease-fire line in late February, tensions between India and Pakistan rose to their highest point in years. The two nuclear-armed states have long clashed over the disputed Himalayan territory of Kashmir, which each claims as its own. But the situation deteriorated there after a Feb. 14 bombing by a Pakistan-based militant group, Jaish-e-Mohammed, killed 40 Indian paramilitaries in the Pulwama district of Kashmir. It was the deadliest attack in the insurgency that has raged for 30 years in the contested Himalayan region that borders the two countries.

A2/ Military spending bad

1. No link between the two. Chin of the Asia Institute in 2015 explains the quality of life in a country is more linked to the economy than high military spending. For instance, Both Pakistan and Singapore, for example, spend roughly \$10 billion per year on their militaries, roughly 3.5 percent of their GDPs. Yet Singapore, a city-state known as one of the world's safest societies, ranks 18th for Quality of Life, while Pakistan, wracked by terrorist violence and regional instability, is at 71.
 - a. Not necessarily even functioning as a tradeoff. Both India and Pakistan are running massive debt to GDP ratios of around 70 or 80%, so neither country is afraid to finance additional spending with debt instead of taking the funds from the budgets of social programs.
 - b. India specifically can't cut welfare programs as by their constitution, they're a social democracy with extensive provisions to ensure social and economic welfare of the people of India.
 - c. Pakistan on the other hand right now already has an empty treasury and no social welfare program that can be cut + their military is funded by the US, not by domestic spending.

Azeem Ibrahim, xx-xx-xxxx, "U.S. Aid to Pakistan—U.S. Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/us-aid-pakistan-us-taxpayers-have-funded-pakistani-corruption>

Since 1951, the United States has given significant funding to Pakistan. Since September 11, 2001, U.S. funding has been intended for the following five purposes: to cover the extra cost to Pakistan's military of fighting terrorism; provide Pakistan with military equipment to fight terrorism; to provide development and humanitarian assistance; covert funds (such as bounties or prize money); and cash transfers directly to the Pakistani government's budget.

Jawaid Bokhari, 1-7-2019, "Welfare state: Easier said than done," DAWN, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1455877>

With an 'empty treasury' (a term coined by PTI leadership), there is hardly any scope to initiate a meaningful socioeconomic uplift programme in the public sector. These days, even in the most developed economies, many cash-strapped governments, are reducing spending on their social safety nets.

It is also a challenging job for the PTI to forge a welfare state designed to 'lay the foundation of an egalitarian society' though doing so would be in-line with the times and worth struggling for.

The PTI manifesto can be seen as part of a worldwide search mounted since the Great Recession of 2007-08 to build an inclusive national model of economic growth that blends with the changing international economic landscape.

<https://www.nios.ac.in/media/documents/SecSocSciCour/English/Lesson-17.pdf>

When India attained independence, it had innumerable problems and challenges. The social and economic inequality was all pervasive. Economically, India's situation was miserable. Socially also India was having a number of problems. There were social inequalities and all the vulnerable sections of the society such as women, dalits, children were deprived of basic means of living. The Constitution makers were very much aware of the problems. That is why, they decided that India would be a welfare state. As you must have seen, India is described as a "sovereign socialist secular democratic republic" in the Preamble of the Indian Constitution. Accordingly, the Constitution has extensive provisions to ensure social and economic welfare of the people of India. In this regard two specific provisions have been made, one in the form of Fundamental Rights and the other as Directive Principles of State Policy

<https://tradingeconomics.com/india/government-debt-to-gdp>

India recorded a government debt equivalent to 68.70 percent of the country's Gross Domestic Product in 2017. Government Debt to GDP in India averaged 73.24 percent from 1991 until 2017, reaching an all time high of 84.20 percent in 2003 and a record low of 66 percent in 1996.

<https://tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/government-debt-to-gdp>

Government Debt to GDP in Pakistan is expected to be 73.50 percent by the end of this quarter, according to Trading Economics global macro models and analysts expectations. In the long-term, the Pakistan Government Debt to GDP is projected to trend around 75.00 percent in 2020, according to our econometric models.

Paul D., 4-17-2015, "Does a Country's Military Spending Improve Quality of Life?," US News & World Report,

<https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2018-08-02/does-a-countrys-military-spending-improve-quality-of-life>

"I suspect the link in terms of the high military spending is probably due to the state of the economy more than anything else," says James Chin, director of the University of Tasmania's Asia Institute in Australia. "If you spend a lot of money in the military, sustaining a large

military complex with salaries, et cetera, it's a large component of the economy in terms of consumer spending."

Both Pakistan and Singapore, for example, spend roughly \$10 billion per year on their militaries, roughly 3.5 percent of their GDPs. Yet Singapore, a city-state known as one of the world's safest societies, ranks 18th for Quality of Life, while Pakistan, wracked by terrorist violence and regional instability, is at 71.

These two countries employ their militaries in opposing ways. The Pakistani armed forces, particularly its highly influential Inter-Services Intelligence or ISI, is practically enmeshed in its civilian government, and has waged multiple coups during its 70-year history. However, Singapore founded its military off the British army and modeled it with heavy input from Israel. Like the Jewish state, it requires military service, meaning a military uniform is not out of place in any of its communities, unlike in Pakistan.

"In Pakistan people are concerned about the military. It plays a very active role in domestic politics," Chin says. "In Singapore, the military does not play a role in domestic politics. That's always been the case, from the British tradition. The civilians have the final say."

A2/ India Pakistan War

Three reasons why this won't happen:

1. Intl community. Yaqoob Khan Bangash, of the Information Technology University notes in 2019 that "It is unlikely that this will evolve into a full-scale war... Before the tensions lead to a full war the international community will step in and lead a cooling of tensions."
2. A full-scale war is not in the interests of either side as both prime ministers use small scale skirmishes to gain a larger political base. Shaun Gregory of the Durham Global Security Institute in 2019 explains that "If the past is a guide, there will be a limited escalation along the LoC with lots of fiery rhetoric as [Indian Prime Minister Narendra] Modi seeks to exploit the situation for the Indian election and Pakistan seeks to counter. However it is doubtful that these skirmishes will escalate into full-scale conflict.
3. Nuclear deterrence. Raza of Sputnik News in 2019 writes that "Both India and Pakistan do not want to risk a nuclear conflict." Such a conflict would be devastating to both sides.

A2/ China and Pakistan will get Tighter

1. No uniqueness - alliance super strong. **Haqqani of The Print in 2019** explains China views Pakistan as a a low-cost deterrent to India and Pakistan values China as a bulwark against international judgement when it lashes out against India. This manifests in a couple of ways.
 - a. UN Voting - **Pakistan** already votes in agreement with China over 90% of the time.

- b. China's stance on Azhar. **Kugelman of Foreign Policy in 2019** finds that even after the recent Pakistani terrorist attack on India, Beijing was willing to stick its neck out in support (within UN Forums) of a key terrorist asset of the Pakistani state who garners little sympathy outside Pakistan.
- 2. Only way to change that ^ is the aff fiat. **Kaura of the Diplomat in 2015** explains that Any accommodative shift in China's position on permanent seat is likely to recalibrate Beijing's ties with Islamabad, as the latter has been vociferous in opposing India's entry to the SC.
 - a. While they get farther apart, India and China get closer together. **Rudolf of Council on Foreign Relations in 2018** explains China accepting India as a permanent member on the UNSC would bond India to a more neutral foreign policy, therefore closer to China.

Rudolf of the Council on Foreign Relations

https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/the_united_nations_of_china_a_vision_of_the_world_order.pdf

The phrase "to some extent" is important, because many of the writings captured in this edition seem to take a disembodied view of China. Vetoes are not discussed, nor is persistent opposition to a permanent Security Council seat for Japan (and less obviously to India's – although one source takes the line that accepting India would bond the country to a neutral foreign policy, therefore closer to China). The role of the secretary-general does not even merit an allusion. And the true extent of China's longstanding fight against human rights action within the UN is hidden under criticism of the "politicisation" of human rights and the mention of Chinese NGOs – in fact, quasi-governmental organisations – showing up in Geneva to enrich collective thinking. How far speech can deviate from actual policy is even more elegantly revealed when one source reclaims the Republic of China's human rights spokesman in 1948, when nothing could have been farther from the politics of the actual winners

Vinay Kaura, The Diplomat, 6-3-2015, "China on India's UNSC Bid: Neither Yes Nor No,"

Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/china-on-indias-uns-c-bid-neither-yes-nor-no/>

Any accommodative shift in China's position on permanent seat is likely to recalibrate Beijing's ties with Islamabad, as the latter has been vociferous in opposing India's entry to the SC. Beijing is not likely to upset its "all weather friend" at this juncture, undermining the centrality of Pakistan in the China's geopolitical calculus. Beijing also fears that India's entry into the UNSC would be a huge loss for China's current global status and prestige among the third world countries. Another factor for China is India's solidarity with Japan, China's arch rival, in making a joint bid for the UNSC membership.

Kugelman

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/21/masood-azhar-is-chinas-favorite-terrorist/>

So important is the China-Pakistan partnership that Beijing was willing to stick its neck out in support of a key terrorist asset of the Pakistani state who garners little sympathy outside Pakistan. At home, Beijing has sent hundreds of thousands of innocent Chinese Muslims to detention centers under the guise of counterterrorism, but it has bent over backwards to protect an actual Islamist terrorist abroad.

<https://yiqinfu.github.io/posts/united-nations-general-assembly/>

United Nations General Assembly Resolutions (1971-2017) , Voting Patterns Compared to China's

Most Similar			Most Dissimilar		
Rank	Country	% in Agreement	Rank	Country	% in Agreement
1	North Korea	92.16	198	United States	20.09
2	Cambodia	91.14	197	Palau	26.88
3	Pakistan	90.67	196	Israel	26.91
4	Brunei	90.59	195	Micronesia	33.52
5	Somalia	90.50	194	West Germany	38.40
6	Djibouti	90.50	193	Marshall Islands	38.85
7	Zimbabwe	90.28	192	United Kingdom	40.48

Husain Haqqani, xx-xx-xxxx, "Alliance with Pakistan matters more to China than terrorism," ThePrint,

<https://theprint.in/opinion/alliance-with-pakistan-matters-more-to-china-than-terrorism/208397/>

China's outlook is strategic. It has invested a lot of time, energy, and resources in assuring Pakistan that Beijing is Islamabad's 'all-weather friend' and international partner of last resort. Pakistan's establishment viewed India as a permanent enemy long before assurances of China's support helped cement that hostility. From the perspective of Pakistan's establishment, it can continue to confront its 'permanent enemy' without risk of international isolation or significant retaliation as long as China remains on its side. For China, Pakistan serves as a low-cost secondary deterrent to India. Pakistan keeps hundreds of thousands of Indian troops tied down, making it difficult for India to join American-led efforts to contain China's growing power in the Indo-Pacific.

A2/ China will get mad

1. China is mad in the status quo. **Pant of King's College in 2017** explains that India and China continue to be at loggerheads on a range of bilateral issues. The stances on both sides have only hardened, with China showing no signs of budging on key issues that matter to India.
 - a. China is blocking India's counter terror efforts
 - b. India is boycotting the belt and road initiative
 - c. Disagreement about the India-Pakistan border
2. **Dabhade of the Observer Research Foundation in 2017** finds that granting India a seat on the UNSC would give it enough leverage and clout to act as an equalizer to China as an emerging hegemon as an alternative to authoritarian China.
 - a. This makes China take India more seriously in global affairs. **Madan of the Brookings Institute in 2013** explains that China wants to keep India tied up in South Asia and prevent its rise, and denying them a UNSC is a mechanism by which they do so.
3. **Malik of Duke University in 2005** explains China cannot afford to publicly oppose India's bid to the UNSC because it risks pushing India closer to Japan, and since China has long opposed Japan gaining leverage in Asia, China would prefer to live with India in an expanded UNSC.
4. **Rudolf of Council on Foreign Relations in 2018** explains China accepting India as a permanent member on the UNSC would bond India to a more neutral foreign policy, therefore closer to China.
 - a. This is good, because **Mendis of the Harvard Kennedy School in 2018** finds that being anti-China would not serve India well, as only by working together can they secure stronger economic ties and a peaceful century for Asia.

Mendis of the Harvard Kennedy School

<https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2144168/new-beginning-china-india-relations-could-transform-asia>

In the face of China's rising global influence, Washington has tried to revitalise its old Indo-Pacific region "quadrilateral" strategy, pitting the democracies of Australia, Japan, and India together against China's rise. Yet, this strategy would only work if the US has the economic maturity to address the increased defence expenditures and the much-needed infrastructure development to "make America great again".

For India, a real alliance with the distant US is problematic, especially with the unreliable Trump administration. China and India not only **need each** other for economic reasons, but the two countries have also traditionally adhered to the "non-alignment principle" of Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of India, and Mao Zedong, sharing a vision of national sovereignty free of colonial and cold-war mentalities.

Rudolf of the Council on Foreign Relations

https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/the_united_nations_of_china_a_vision_of_the_world_order.pdf

The phrase "to some extent" is important, because many of the writings captured in this edition seem to take a disembodied view of China. Vetoes are not discussed, nor is persistent opposition to a permanent Security Council seat for Japan (and less obviously to India's – although one source takes the line that accepting India would bond the country to a neutral foreign policy, therefore closer to China). The role of the secretary-general does not even merit an allusion. And the true extent of China's longstanding fight against human rights action within the UN is hidden under criticism of the "politicisation" of human rights and the mention of Chinese NGOs – in fact, quasi-governmental organisations – showing up in Geneva to enrich collective thinking. How far speech can deviate from actual policy is even more elegantly revealed when one source reclaims the Republic of China's human rights spokesman in 1948, when nothing could have been farther from the politics of the actual winners

Malik of Duke University in 2015

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40209946.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A985129c88b2cc2ff18cae73c8ff60671>

contesting) each other's candidature for permanent membership, followed closely by the formation of a united front on the reform issue by the G-4 nations in September 2004 - prompted a rethinking of China's policy on this subject.²⁰ Seen from Beijing's perspective, the formation of this "Gang of Four" was a major setback for China's diplomacy insofar as it brought together on a common platform two of China's rivals (India and Japan) that Beijing

wants to keep out, and two potential allies (Brazil and Germany) that it wants to bring into the council. In realpolitik terms, China can no longer afford to be seen as publicly opposing India's bid or ganging up with Pakistan, which would only push India toward Japan. Furthermore, since China has long opposed Japan's gaining leverage in Asia, it may prefer to live with India in an expanded Security Council

Tanvi Madan, 10-8-2013, "India's Relations with China: The Good, the Bad and the (Potentially) Ugly," Brookings,

<https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/indias-relations-with-china-the-good-the-bad-and-the-potentially-ugly/>

There is also an overall sense that China does not respect India and/or that it will seek to prevent India's rise. As evidence, critics point not only to China's relationship with Pakistan, which is seen as driven by a desire to keep India tied up in South Asia, but also note China's reluctance to endorse India's demand for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council or its objections to India being given membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Dabhade

https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ORF_Occasional_Paper_131_UNSC_Dabhade.pdf

Foremost in Indian calculus, however, lies the Indian aspiration of the institutionalised big power status the permanent seat in the Security Council would confer on India right away. Being a "pen holder" as the permanent member of the Security Council, India would similarly assume the mantle of international peace and security decision-making. India sees itself carrying the necessary abilities, actual and potential, which entitles it to a permanent seat at the Council. Further, the seat on the high table, at the UN's premier, powerful body would provide it the much needed leverage to expand its global geo-political and geoeconomic clout. It would serve as an equalizer to China, its rival and an emerging hegemon in Asia, and an ever increasing strategic and security concern in its immediate neighborhood and beyond. India has always seen itself as a democratic alternative to the authoritarian China. India's millennia old civilizational existence also demands it to be at the top of the international hierarchy of states.

Pant '17 - Macdonald-Laurier Institute, 11-2-2017, "Turbulence in Sino-Indian relations: Harsh Pant for Inside Policy,"

<https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/turbulence-sino-indian-relations-harsh-pant-inside-policy/>

Despite diplomatic engagements at the highest levels, the two countries continue to be at loggerheads on a range of bilateral issues. Indeed, the stances on both sides have only hardened, with China showing no signs of budging on key issues that matter to India.

China has also been largely obstructionist to India's effort to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

For instance, there has been no change in Beijing's policy of blocking efforts by India at the UN to get Pakistan-based militant Maulana Masood Azhar added to a UN Security Council terrorist group blacklist. New Delhi holds Azhar responsible for numerous terrorist acts in India, including the 13 December 2001 attack on its parliament.

A2/ Muslim Nations will get mad

1. Muslim nations are really happy with India in the status quo (even after the Pakistan conflict). **Dasgupta of the Straits Times** notes on March 1, 2019 that India was invited as a "guest of honour" to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This latest development indicates that the "balance of influence has now shifted away from Pakistan in favour of India" as there is now “ a fundamental shift in perceptions relating to India from the Islamic world mainly because India is a significant political and economic role player in regional and world affairs”.

Debarshi Dasgupta, 3-1-2019, "India-Pakistan tensions spill over to meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation," Straits Times,

<https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/south-asia/india-pakistan-tensions-spill-over-to-meeting-of-the-organisation-of-islamic>

UAE's decision not to rescind its invitation has been widely seen as a diplomatic triumph for India, whose clout has grown manifold since 1969. India has developed wide-ranging strategic ties with many OIC member countries, including the UAE and Saudi Arabia in recent years, moving beyond conventional areas of cooperation like energy and people-to-people links to defence and security.

Mr Talmiz Ahmad, a retired diplomat who served as India's ambassador to Saudi Arabia as well as the UAE, says the latest development indicates that the "balance of influence has now shifted away from Pakistan in favour of India".

"There is now a fundamental shift in perceptions relating to India from the Islamic world mainly because India is a significant political and economic role player in regional and world affairs," he told The Straits Times.

While some have advised caution as a secular India engages with a body formed on the basis of religion, Mr Ahmad has argued that India is well poised to have a substantial engagement with the OIC.

A2/ India will stop doing peacekeeping

1. **Cabuyao of Nanyang University in 2014** writes that participation in UN peacekeeping provides the Indian military with training which provides lessons and strategies for use back home.
2. Strategic foreign policy. **Axe of the Diplomat** in 2010 notes two key incentives that don't go away in the Aff world:
 - a. Peacekeeping is an inexpensive way to maintain large armies and boost the pay of select troops. UN peacekeeping offers India's army the opportunity to keep 10,000 troops apiece in their force structure at no cost to themselves a "tremendous bargain"
 - b. Building diplomatic inroads in poorer countries that might be rich in resources that India lacks. Axe gives the example of the Congo where "With a billion people and nearly ten percent annual GDP growth, India is most in need of something Congo has in abundance: resources." The first Indians were deployed to Congo in 2003 and by 2008, Congo agreed to partner with India in the mining of copper, cobalt and industrial diamonds.

David Axe, The Diplomat, 12-20-2010, "Why South Asia Loves Peacekeeping," Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2010/12/why-south-asia-loves-peacekeeping/?allpages=yes>
'The financial benefits to individuals who proceed on such missions are undeniable,' retired Indian general Dhruv Katoch, now an analyst with the Center for Land Warfare Studies in New Delhi, says. 'Very rarely will an individual turn down an offer for a UN assignment.'

What's more, while a soldier is deployed with the United Nations his respective defense ministry can remove him from the government payroll. **In that sense, UN peacekeeping offers South Asian armies the opportunity to keep 10,000 troops apiece in their force structure at no cost to themselves. It's a tremendous bargain, provided the military can spare the troops. At some point it could become a burden on an over-stretched army,' Schaffer says.**

But Pakistan, with its ongoing military operations in the tribal regions bordering Afghanistan, 'is the only country that would have to worry about that; so far it hasn't restricted Pakistan's contributions,' Schaffer adds.

South Asian countries benefit in other ways from their major peacekeeping roles. For example, peace missions have enabled South Asia to build economic and diplomatic ties with a large number of poorer developing countries. In this way, India, Pakistan and

Bangladesh gain ‘influence and credibility,’ Katoch says. This seems particularly important to India, at least as far as Congo is concerned. With a billion people and nearly ten percent annual GDP growth, India is most in need of something Congo has in abundance: resources.

Copper, tin, coltan and uranium are just a few of the many rare minerals mined in Congo. A large proportion of Congo’s mineral output ends up in Chinese refineries, with China processing the raw ore and selling it onward to the world’s advanced economies. In exchange for a steady supply of rocks, Beijing invests heavily in Congolese enterprises and builds much of the country’s new infrastructure.

A2/ Reaching out to South Pacific

1. **Chandramohan of the Diplomat in 2018** writes that India has a non-UN incentive to continue reaching out to the South Pacific in order to counter China's expansion in the South Pacific region.

Balaji Chandramohan , The Diplomat, 6-13-2018, "India's Strategic Expansion in the Pacific Islands," Diplomat,

<https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/indias-strategic-expansion-in-the-pacific-islands/>

The MSG is an alternative to the traditional Pacific Islands Forum, where India's engagement has been increasing economically and diplomatically over the years.

India is expected to seek membership in the MSG as a tactical move to counter China's expansion in the South Pacific region, especially in the Melanesian countries where its influence is increasing.

As China is contemplating a naval base in Vanuatu, India's maritime presence in the Pacific Islands may be welcomed by countries such as Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Indonesia, and even France

A2/ Reaching out to Africa

1. **Axe of the Diplomat in 2010** notes that India has an incentive to building diplomatic inroads in poorer countries that might be rich in resources that India lacks through peacekeeping. Axe gives the example of the Congo where “With a billion people and nearly ten percent annual GDP growth, India is most in need of something Congo has in abundance: resources.” The first Indians were deployed to Congo in 2003 and by 2008, Congo agreed to partner with India in the mining of copper, cobalt and industrial diamonds.

David Axe, The Diplomat, 12-20-2010, "Why South Asia Loves Peacekeeping," Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2010/12/why-south-asia-loves-peacekeeping/?allpages=yes> South Asian countries benefit in other ways from their major peacekeeping roles. For example, peace missions have enabled South Asia to build economic and diplomatic ties with a large number of poorer developing countries. In this way, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh gain ‘influence and credibility,’ Katoch says. This seems particularly important to India, at least as far as Congo is concerned. With a billion people and nearly ten percent annual GDP growth, India is most in need of something Congo has in abundance: resources.

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A2/ Bilateral diplomacy

1. There is actually no logical reason why the two are mutually exclusive. Similar to how the [US has pacts like NAFTA](#) and and foreign free trade agreements with over twenty nations, there is literally no reason why India joining the UN would mean it would cease to trade with other countries. Indeed, India has a lot to gain financially with trade with continents like Africa, where it currently has about [\\$64 billion dollars](#) worth of bilateral trade. The UNSC is a military decision making body, not a trade group.
2. Permanent seats increase high level P5 diplomacy and increase peaceful outcomes. **David Bosco in 2014** writes that “P5 members interact more intensively with each other at high levels” which is critical because “regular meetings among top-level policymakers promote peaceful resolutions of political tensions” and that face-to-face conference diplomacy produces “forum effects” that in turn help avoid violence.
3. Council membership encourages the strengthening of bilateral ties as well as encouraging multilateralism. **Farral of the Australian Journal of International affairs in 2016** explains that “Council membership can facilitate both the pursuit of multilateral action to advance priority national interests, as well as the strengthening of relations with key bilateral partners to advance long-term foreign policy objectives.”

<https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/india-proposes-pact-with-africa-to-enhance-bilateral-trade/article26561227.ece>

Speaking on the occasion, Commerce Secretary Anup Wadhawan said the Commerce Ministry was working on a “comprehensive strategy” to boost India-Africa trade. In 2017-18, India-Africa bilateral trade was about \$63 billion, higher than \$52 billion in the previous fiscal. The potential for trade and investment ties is much more and there is also need to diversify the bilateral trade basket, Wadhawan added.

A2/ UNSC Efficiency

1. The problem is not performance, it's the composition and the daily dealings of the UNSC. **Binder of Berlin University in 2015** explains that “the Security Council suffers from a legitimacy deficit in the eyes of UN member states. He furthers that specifically, “dissatisfaction with the Security Council’s performance therefore clearly pales in comparison with dissatisfaction with its procedural shortcomings.”
 - a. As such, **Hosli of Leiden University in 2011** concludes that the changes in geopolitics since the Second World War make clear the need for urgent reform of the UN Security Council, and could contribute to rendering UN actions more legitimate and more effective in the future.
2. A lack of reform is more risky to the council’s survival. **Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan explained in 2015** that without appropriate member reform, we risk a situation where the legitimacy of the council may be challenged by some of the new emerging countries.
 - a. This is happening in the squo. Stimson → More regional organizations taking leadership.
 - i. Bad because a) Tanner → UN only organization with global legitimacy for conflict resolution and b) Walter → UN peace operations comparatively better than non UN ones
3. **Bart of George Washington University in 2012** explains limited expansion of the UNSC to include only India would not risk increased gridlock as adding the two would increase representation without badly increasing deadlock.
4. Affirming improves response time. **Pollack of Seton Hall University in 2016** explains expanding the UNSC would increase response times to areas where the Council has been slow to act in such as the Central African Republic because the current members have little concern over those areas.
 - a. India specifically cares about Africa bc a) postcolonial bros and b) economic connections
5. Affirming improves the quality of response. **Pradhan of the Diplomat in 2014** explains that the world needs an expanded UNSC that includes countries like India to influence the very ethos of the council. If the UNSC includes India and other nations, it will enable a wiser response to the world’s crises, unlike the hasty and excessive militarism of the West.
 - a. Mil intervention bad, offensive peacekeeping bad, india push to stop both
 - b. <http://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/pkISO%20offprint.PDF> - 80%

Pradhan of the Diplomat in 2014

<https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/should-india-give-up-on-the-un-security-council/>

In fact, whether India should seek membership is a matter of debate within the country. Former colonial powers are not going to allow a change, nor will China allow other Asian countries, particularly Japan, to enter. But there is also the view that though India may not gain much from becoming a part of an archaic organisation, the world needs an expanded UNSC that includes countries like India to influence the very ethos of the council.

At a time when faster growing economies, more youthful populations, and the concentration of natural resources are mainly in the developing world, as are problems like the dispersion of capacity to build weapons of mass destruction, a reform of global political management systems to respond to crises and violence—such as the chaos in West Asia—is even more imperative.

If the UNSC includes India and Brazil, and also represents Africa and West Asia, it will infuse the council with a deeper understanding and enable a wiser response to the world's cascading political crises, unlike the hasty and excessive militarism of the West.


John Pollock, xx-xx-xxxx, "70 Years of Successful Security and Fatal Failures at the UNSC," International Policy Digest, <https://intpolicydigest.org/2016/01/11/70-years-of-successful-security-and-fatal-failures-at-the-uns/>

While a larger more inclusive Council would certainly be considered more equitable, it is debatable whether it would be more effective, or even as effective, as the present Council. The Security Council is a nimble institution—well, as nimble as an international organization such as itself can be. Still, a common complaint of the Council is that it is slow to act in certain situations where one of the permanent members has a political or economic interest that would be harmed by intervention. An expansion of the Council would only exacerbate this tendency. It might however speed up the response times in places that the Council has been accused of being slow to act in, such as the Central African Republic, due to the permanent members having little economic or political concern there. New membership, from areas of the world not currently permanently represented on the Council, might compel the Council to take swifter, deeper actions in these neglected areas that may hold more regional than global significance.

Bart of George Washington University

<https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=773124118097099122023018094099078065057081049043000029071006119069008074110099092085056017039010001111005113080095087104001004043087058092007071071091094008081095022071021048009064122091089102120116079064113123117110105110096005030091097097110111095125&EXT=pdf>

TABLE 5. POSSIBLE FUTURES FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL



Thus, given that its current problem has not been insufficient capacity, the Council is likely to continue this position in the future. To be sure, additional members would increase the Council's resource base and potential power, but most of these gains can be achieved by including only India and Japan; much lower benefits are available by expanding the Council to other members and would come at significant costs due to the increased risk of dissensus and deadlock.

Walter, 5-2-2018, "Most people think peacekeeping doesn't work. They're wrong.," dev4peace, <http://blogs.worldbank.org/dev4peace/most-people-think-peacekeeping-doesn-t-work-they-re-wrong>

Since 2016, the United States budget for United Nations peacekeeping has been reduced by 40 percent. This is a reflection of how many view the United Nations and its record on peacekeeping. Data on the effectiveness of UN peacekeepers, however, don't support this perception. In fact, they find that the opposite is true. Numerous statistical studies have explored the role of third-party peacekeeping in reducing violence around the world. They all come to the same conclusion: Peacekeeping works better than almost anything else we know. Using different datasets and statistical models, leveraging slightly different time periods, and measuring peacekeeping in somewhat different ways, the most rigorous studies have all found that peacekeeping has a large, positive, and statistically significant effect on containing the spread of civil war, increasing the success of negotiated settlements to civil wars, and increasing the duration of peace once a civil war has ended (see here, here, here, and here). More recent statistical studies have found an equally strong relationship between large-scale peace operations and the spread of civil wars, within and between states (see here, here, and here).

Fred Tanner, xx-xx-xxxx, "Conflict prevention and conflict resolution: limits of multilateralism," No Publication, <https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/article/other/57jqj2.htm>
Among the various players, the United Nations remains the only institution with global legitimacy for conflict prevention. Yet regional organizations have been gaining importance in security cooperation over the last few years. While this type of cooperation is invaluable, the division of labour between the UN and regional organizations has run into trouble. For example, with regard to the NATO military intervention in Kosovo, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that "conflict prevention, peace-keeping and peacemaking must not become an area of competition between the United Nations and regional organizations". [9]

Kofi Annan

https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ORF_Occasional_Paper_131_UNSC_Dabhade.pdf

In conclusion, and most significantly, Indian hopes significantly rest on an acknowledgement by the UN itself of the need to expand the UNSC. In an interview to The Guardian (2015), former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that the Security Council must either reform or INDIA'S PURSUIT OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORMS 12 risk becoming increasingly irrelevant: "If we don't change the council, we risk a situation where the primacy of the council may be challenged by some of the new emerging countries."

Hosli, 3-29-2011, "Squaring the circle? Collective and distributive effects of United Nations Security Council reform," SpringerLink,

<https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11558-011-9101-1>

Clearly, finding a suitable package that has the potential to overcome the various institutional hurdles for change, and to reform the Security Council, constitutes a considerable challenge to the international community. Essentially, the developments and changes in geopolitics that have occurred since the Second World War make clear the need for urgent reform of the UN—particularly the Security Council—but it is the myriad of effects, brought on by precisely these changes, that renders the task of reform so arduous. However, the desirability of change can not be overlooked. Reform of the Security Council, if successful in spite of the high institutional hurdles to be taken and the broad divergence in member states' preferences, could contribute to rendering UN actions and patterns of global governance more legitimate and more effective in the future.

Binder of Berlin University

https://research.reading.ac.uk/ungop/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/Binder_et_al-2015-International_Studies_Quarterly1.pdf

(1%, 15) and great power restraint (almost 0%, 3) fall off (see Figure 3). Dissatisfaction with the Security Council's performance therefore clearly pales in comparison with dissatisfaction with its procedural shortcomings (bearing in mind that negative statements on performance nevertheless outnumber positive ones). This finding challenges those who argue that performance or output is crucial for institutions such as the EU (Scharpf 1999) or that "performance is the path to legitimacy" for IOs more generally (Gutner and Thompson 2010:228). UN member states often do criticize the Council's failure to fulfill its mandate effectively. For instance, Kazakhstan has deplored the "inability on the part of the Council to respond in a timely and effective manner to emerging security concerns."²⁶ Yet, concerns about the Council acting inconsistently, violating human rights laws, and failing to restrain the great powers hardly carry any weight. This is astonishing given that issues like the Council's selective interventionism or the violation of due process rights of blacklisted individuals are among the most heatedly disputed matters in the public debate. Obviously, there is a discrepancy between how the Council is perceived by states and how it is perceived by societal actors.

A2/ G4 Countries Added

1. **Beri of the IDSA in 2014** explains that by any objective criteria including economic potential, population, diversity or contributions to the UN, India is eminently qualified for permanent membership of an expanded UNSC.
 - a. **Widmark of the University of Gothenburg in 2015** furthers that India is the most popular member of the G4.
2. **Widmark** explains that in order for India to have a chance to become a permanent member, they must be individually considered and there is no understanding that all four G4 countries will enter as a group onto the Security Council.
3. Most critically, **Pillalamarri of the Diplomat in 2015** the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France have all said that they support India's bid. Indeed, China had previously implied that it would support India's bid if it were de-linked from Japan's bid. In contrast, countries like Brazil and Japan all face regional opposition to their bid.

Pillalamarri of the Diplomat in 2015

<https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-should-back-india-for-a-permanent-un-security-council-seat/>

India and Brazil have long had the strongest bids, due to their sizes, populations, economies, and the fact that their regions (South Asia and Latin America) are unrepresented as Security Council permanent members. India's bid in particular is strong as it only faces significant opposition from Pakistan and some misgivings on the part of China. Brazil, on the other hand, faces opposition from other Latin American countries like Mexico and Argentina. Japan, in particular, has faced the opposition of its neighbors including China and both the Koreas. It is highly unlikely that Japan will join the Security Council as a permanent member anytime soon due to China's ability to veto such a proposal. Furthermore, as the recent Japanese hostage debacle in Syria has demonstrated, Japan is simply not ready to wield the diplomatic and military clout that comes with being a permanent member of the Security Council.

India, on the other hand, has the best chance of joining the Security Council. Whenever and however this proposal is made to India, India should accept it, even if it means joining the Security Council without the other G4 countries. That would be in India's long term interest and worth any short-term animosity with the other G4 powers, which would be brief at most. Indeed, China had previously implied that it would support India's bid if it were de-linked from Japan's bid. India is one of the largest contributors to the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces and as of 2014, had the second largest troop contribution to peacekeeping missions.

In order to attain a permanent seat, India would need the support of all five of the current permanent members. The United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France have all said that they support India's bid. With the notable exception of Pakistan (as to be expected), many U.N states would be unopposed to India's bid. Some states, however, remain wary of the overall reform this would require to the U.N. system. India should convince China that its presence on the U.N. Security Council is not only vital to India's long term interests but to China's as well. An agreement with China should then be quickly translated into an actual position at the Security Council, regardless of the bids of Brazil, Germany, Japan, or a member from Africa or the Arab world.

Widmark of the University of Gothenburg

http://openasia.org/en/g/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/1075_Issue_Brief-Indias_Aspiration_for_a_Permanent_Membership_at_the_Security_Council-An_Update.pdf

In line with this, the potential future complications of G4 collaboration should be considered. India's increasing tensions with China might be an obstacle but a greater cloud on the horizon for an Indian permanent seat is its alliance with Japan, whose candidacy is starkly opposed by Beijing.⁴⁹ While the G4, the L-69 and cooperation with the African Group all serve the purpose of creating pressure and "galvanize an opinion"⁵⁰, pushing for reform from below, India needs to be individually considered in order to have a chance; this is arguably understood by India. Ambassador Asoke Kumar Mukerji framed G4 cooperation in terms of strategy, stating that "[there] is no understanding that all the four

Widmark of the University of Gothenburg

http://openasia.org/en/g/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/1075_Issue_Brief-Indias_Aspiration_for_a_Permanent_Membership_at_the_Security_Council-An_Update.pdf

Brazil, Germany, India and Japan's common proposal suggests an extended Security Council constituting 25 members, adding six permanent and four non-permanent seats. The latter would be based on regional representation where Africa, in addition to the G4 countries, would be allocated two permanent seats. The G4 proposals have included veto rights to the new permanent members but with the possibility of a 15-year trial period during which they would refrain from using the veto. The group has to a lesser extent uttered the demand for a veto however. This has in turn distanced them from the African Group that still underlines the importance of extending the veto power to new permanent members as long as it is not abolished in its entirety. Among the G4 countries, India is potentially the most popular aspirant globally, likely followed by Brazil.⁷

Beri of the IDSA in 2014

<https://idsa.in/system/files/monograph/monograph38.pdf>

By any objective criteria, population, territorial size, GDP, economic potential, civilisational legacy, cultural diversity, political system and past and on-going contributions to the UN-especially UN peacekeeping operations, India is eminently qualified for the permanent membership of an expanded UN Security Council

A2/ Nothing will Get Done

1. The current P5 doesn't care about global security. **Iwanami of the University of Rochester in 2011** explains that if a current permanent member is not involved in a conflict, the chance of the conflict enters the Council's agenda is 5 percent.
2. Even if they do care, the probability of getting something done is low. **Hosli of the University of Erasmus in 2011** explains the current probability of forming a successful coalition in the Security Council is less than 3%.

Hosli, 3-29-2011, "Squaring the circle? Collective and distributive effects of United Nations Security Council reform," SpringerLink,

<https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11558-011-9101-1>

In the past and current configurations of Security Council membership, the (normalized) Banzhaf index indicates a clear asymmetry in favor of the P-5. O'Neill's slightly controversial assertion that actual power rests solely with the permanent members of the Security Council (O'Neill 1997) is hence corroborated by these power indices. In addition, respective figures on decision probability indicate that the probability of forming a winning coalition, within the current Security Council, is rather low (including less than 3% of all possible coalitions among members).⁶ In practice, decision probability may be higher, as votes may be aligned on specific dimensions on which the Security Council takes decisions. Nonetheless, this 'baseline scenario' provides some interesting insights concerning the general difficulty for the Security Council to act, notably as the P-5 can block decisions with individual vetoes.

Iwanami of the University of Rochester in 2011

<http://www.rochester.edu/College/gradstudents/yiwanami/agenda.pdf>

The coefficient estimates of P5 Involvement are both positive and statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level in Model I (a) and (b). This result suggests that the Security Council is more likely to intervene in conflicts in which a permanent member has already become involved as a party to the conflict or as a third party. This result supports Hypothesis 2. Table 2 suggests

	Model I	Model II	Agenda Resolutions	Agenda Resolutions	P5 Involvement = 0	P5 Involvement = 1
P5 Ally = 0	0.17	0.033	0.153	0.034	0.05	0.009
P5 Ally = 1	0.05	0.009	0.045	0.01	0.05	0.009
Former P5 Colony = 0	0.05	0.009	0.045	0.01	0.008	0.001
Former P5 Colony = 1	0.008	0.001	0.009	0.002	0.005	0.002
Democracy = 0	0.05	0.009	0.045	0.01	0.005	0.002
Democracy = 1	0.005	0.002	0.004	0.002	0.04	0.01
Internationalized = 0	0.04	0.01	0.098	0.02	0.512	0.110
Internationalized = 1	0.098	0.02	0.512	0.110	0.123	0.0479
Cold War = 0	0.05	0.009	0.045	0.01	0.05	0.009
Cold War = 1	0.05	0.009	0.045	0.01	0.05	0.009

Table 2: Fixed Effect that if a permanent member is not involved in a conflict, the likelihood that the conflict will enter the Council's agenda is 5 percent and the likelihood that the conflict will give rise to resolutions is only 1 percent.

However, the involvement of a permanent member raises the former likelihood to 22 percent and the latter to 3 percent. The small impact on passage of resolutions suggests that passing resolutions requires more political factors than setting the agenda.

A2/ P5 Nations will use it less

1. It's the opposite effect - when India joins, they heighten the benefits of the exclusive club because more powers are involved. **Bosco of Indiana University in 2014** explains that Council reform might be quite beneficial if it extends the benefits of consistent discourse with the P5 to other major powers.

Bosco of Indiana University in 2014

<https://acuns.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/05-GG204-Bosco.pdf>

cil, it is asserted, will command greater respect and ultimately be more effective. Arguments in favor of Council reform therefore lean heavily on a governance conception of the Council's role and usually pay little heed to its concert utility. From a concert perspective, Council reform might be quite beneficial if it extends the benefits outlined above to other major powers. Yet membership reform might also pose a danger to the concert dynamic. Some proposals would significantly expand the number of nonpermanent seats and produce a total membership of up to thirty members. Reform of this type might alter the diplomatic balance considerably and discourage major powers from using the Council as often as they do now. If so, the push for a more representative and effective Council could inadvertently undermine one of the institution's hidden values.

A2/ UNSC will stop in Kashmir

1. They are doing nothing right now. **United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in 2018** writes that the UN is not directly involved in the solutions to the Kashmir conflict.
2. **Sidhu of Livemint in 2009** explains that ever since 1971, India has been able to successfully block or deflect any UNSC resolution which was not in their interests. Indeed, India has been so successful in blocking UN resolutions in Kashmir that the UNSC has not passed a single resolution since 1972, and was even able to scuttle an informal meeting called by Pakistan.

A2/ India is against humanitarian intervention

1. India supports humanitarian intervention but goes about it cautiously due to its colonial past. As a result, **Park of Synergy in 2016** reports that India has a history of more thought out humanitarian intervention like that in Bangladesh and East Pakistan.

A2/ Modi - Hindu/Muslim Violence

1. Modi is gonna win.
 - a. **Aljazeera in 2019** writes that the BJP (headed by Modi) is widely expected to retain power in India because of its success in Pakistan in February.
 - b. **Pillalamarri of the Diplomat in 2019** explains that the BJP will win despite the opposition of the INC as the Indian people see that Rahul Gandhi has no vision for Indian development.
2. Modi's party, the BJP, is better than the alternative. **Pillalamarri** furthers that it has an overarching vision for development, and has taken steps toward achieving this vision. Rahul Gandhi, leader of Congress, the main opposition party, hardly has any vision, however nice his party's [manifesto](#) might look.
 - a. Importantly, **Pillalamarri** concludes that India's long-term economic problems can only be tackled through major structural changes.
3. Hindu Muslim violence has been a major issue ever since partition. Too hard to tell what'll actually happen to it just due to one election. **Mitra 18** : "So — and beginning with the violence unleashed in the state of Gujarat in 1992 — 21st century India is just more of the same"

Mitra 18

<https://debajray.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/MitraRayHMViolence2018.pdf>

Certainly, the country isn't a newcomer to religious violence by any means. Recurrent episodes of Hindu-Muslim conflict in India (going back to the Partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 and earlier) have continued through the second half of the twentieth century, accounting for over 7,000 deaths over 1950–2000, and many more at the time of Partition. So — and beginning with the violence unleashed in the state of Gujarat in 1992 — 21st century India is just more of the same, and in its pervading sense of menace and repression, possibly much more.

Pillalamarri of the Diplomat in 2019

<https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/indian-elections-2019-do-narendra-modi-and-the-bjp-deserve-a-second-term/>

India's 2019's general election, the world's largest election, in which 900 million individuals are eligible to vote, has just begun. According to the latest polling, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition of parties is on track to win a second term in parliamentary elections, though the opposition Indian National Congress (INC) led United Progressive Alliance is expected to win more seats than it did in 2014.

Rahul Gandhi, leader of Congress, the main opposition party, hardly has any vision, however nice his party's manifesto might look. His Congress Party governed India for most of its post-independence history. However, unlike many other states in Asia that were similarly dominated by a single party for decades, such as Singapore, Japan, and Malaysia, the conditions for rapid growth—investment in infrastructure, manufacturing, and primary education—were not laid by the Congress Party. In fact, the policies of the Congress party were, and are, a key factor in perpetuating India's structural difficulties, such as the party's protection of the agricultural sector, instead of being more business-friendly.

India's long-term economic problems can only be tackled through major structural change.

While I have pointed out previously, there has been a convergence in how both India's two major parties approach economic issues, the BJP should receive credit for what it has done. Yet for India's economic growth to reach its entire population, the growth of the private sector in manufacturing and services is most essential. India's governments and policy-makers cannot keep on promoting low-skilled work in the form of rural, and now urban, guaranteed employment schemes. Economic growth has to be channeled into the growth of private industry, in order to soak up India's large and growing pool of young, educated, talented individuals.

Aljazeera, 3-28-2019, "Modi kicks off election campaign with promise of 'new India'," No Publication,

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/modi-kicks-election-campaign-promise-india-190328174935308.html>

A recent escalation in tensions between India and its neighbour and rival Pakistan is expected to boost the BJP's chances of re-election.

A February poll by the Times of India said that 83 percent of more than 2,000 respondents said they would want the coalition to choose Modi as prime minister if they maintain a majority.

Tensions soared last month after a suicide attack in Indian-administered Kashmir killed more than 40 members of India's security forces. Shortly after the attack, a video of the bomber emerged in which he swore allegiance to Pakistan-based armed group Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM).

A2/ BJP is less powerful is good

1. **Marlow of the Washington Post in 2018** writes that less power for the BJP would imperil Modi's economic reforms and raise the likelihood of party infighting.

Investors see Modi as a relatively predictable pro-business leader dedicated to pushing through economic reforms -- even if those policies occasionally veer toward populist.

Marlow of the Washington Post in 2018

https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/your-guide-to-indias-upcoming-general-election/2018/12/26/ff525978-0951-11e9-8942-0ef442e59094_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8d89458717b6

Replicating the BJP's single-party majority in the lower house, the first such majority in 30 years, will be tough, judging by the polls. A reduced majority seems increasingly likely, an outcome that would probably imperil Modi's economic reforms, raise the likelihood of party infighting and strengthen his coalition partners' leverage. An August poll by India Today showed the BJP had lost popularity, but was still likely to win the election. However, much depends on whether India's myriad opposition parties can form a united front against Modi. If Congress can unite with big regional parties, the same poll showed the opposition was in striking distance of forming the government. However, the BJP has surprised on the upside before. And if the party gains a similar or larger mandate, Modi could be emboldened to tackle more controversial reforms such as making it easier for companies to acquire land and fire worker

A2/ India gets Aid Bad

1. Education Aid is good. **Chowdhury of the Borgen Project in 2018** writes that foreign aid has advanced education in India significantly over the years. For instance, the literacy rate increased to 65.4 percent in 2001, and currently sits at 74.04 percent.

A2/ India gets FDI Bad

1. **Mercy of the University of South Africa in 2017** writes that the positive contributions of FDI to poverty reduction are achieved through spillover effects, employment creation, and an increase in investment capital. Mercy furthers that the relationship between FDI and poverty *must* be studied on a case by case basis due to huge variances policies. And **Singh of the Indian Journal of Economics in 2018** says there existed a positive relationship between FDI inflows and poverty reduction in India.

A2/ India gets IMF support Bad

1. India not about that political favors life (Ayres)
2. Less conditions attached is a good thing. **Dreher 10** "UNSC members receive about 30 percent fewer conditions."
3. India does not want IMF assistance.
 - a. **Banking crisis solved by govt policy. Mathur 18** finds that in terms of the banking crisis, India's domestic current framework is appropriate to resolve the problem.
 - b. **Banking crisis solved through growth. Reuters 17** finds that even the IMF said recapitalisation costs to relieve India of the banking issues should be manageable even with negative growth rates.
 - c. **No loans in the 21st. Rapoza 13 of Forbes** finds that the last time India tapped the IMF was back in 1999.
 - d. India's debt is chilling. More recently, **Gasper 18** finds that India's debt (which is what the IMF helps deal with) is lower than the best emerging economies in the world.
4. Shout out some big daddy advantages fdi, aid, modi.

Recapitalization is a type of corporate reorganization involving substantial change in a company's capital structure. Recapitalization may be motivated by a number of reasons. Usually, the large part of equity is replaced with debt or vice versa.

Gasper '18 - Economic Times, 10-10-2018, "India's debt lower than best emerging market economies: IMF,"

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/finance/indias-debt-lower-than-best-emerg-ing-market-economies-imf/articleshow/66147583.cms>

India's debt is lower than the best or emerging market economies in the world, a top IMF official has said as he cautioned that the global debt has reached a new record high of USD 182 trillion in 2017.

Vitor Gasper, International Monetary Fund (IMF) Director of Fiscal Affairs Department, said India's debt was substantially less than the global debt as percentage of world Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

Read more at:

[//economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/66147583.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/66147583.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst)

Kenneth Rapoza, xx-xx-xxxx, "India Central Banker Says No To IMF," Forbes, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2013/07/30/india-central-banker-says-no-to-imf/#4c73a3677722>

Finance Ministry officials have said there are many ways to finance the current account deficit, which touched an all-time high of 4.8% of GDP this year. One of those was to issue dollar denominated debt to foreigners, bring in more cash. So far, nothing has been done.

India hasn't tapped the IMF since 1999, when it paid off a loan of about \$30 billion.

Today, the IMF is seen as a life line for ailing economies and needing that lifeline could send a negative signal to the market. As it is, India is one of the worst performing emerging markets around and sentiment remains poor.

Reuters Editorial, 2-22-2017, "India banking bailout cost "manageable"," U.S., <https://www.reuters.com/article/india-imf/india-banking-bailout-cost-manageable-imf-idUSL4N1G73YP>

The cost of recapitalising India's struggling banks would be affordable even under a negative scenario, the International Monetary Fund said on Wednesday, urging government steps to strengthen the financial system.

Weighing into a renewed debate on tackling India's \$130 billion in stressed loans, the IMF said "recapitalisation costs should be manageable" at between 1.5 and 2.4 percent of forecast GDP.

Of that total, the government's share would be between 1.0 and 1.6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) over the four years to March 2019, assuming that 40 percent of loans have to be provided against.

Mathur 18

<https://bluenotes.anz.com/posts/2018/09/india-will-solve-its-banking-crisis--but-what-happens-then->

The non-performing asset (NPA) problem in India's public-sector banks (PSB) is severe, yet the current debt resolution framework is appropriate for resolving the problem. The strict and time-bound bankruptcy resolution and recapitalisation framework should be enough.

" A return to sustained 8 per cent-plus growth - well within India's potential - is unlikely to be realised any time soon."

At the same time it would be overly optimistic to assume lending will return with vigour. The international experience suggests credit availability declines even after banks are fully recapitalised. The pace of economic growth is compromised as a result. India is unlikely to be an exception.

The recent improvement in credit growth is confined to the household and services sectors and the buoyancy in capital markets is not broad based. The composition of growth is also likely to be different from the pre-banking crisis period.

A2/ Will Legitimize Nuclearization

1. India would use its seat in the council to counter nuclearization. **Murthy of the FES in 2011** writes that India has become a prominent global power in terms of countering non-traditional threats like the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and would hold proliferation at the top of their new agenda.
2. **Gartzke of Columbia University in 2007** finds a couple different barriers for a ton of nuclearization to happen.
 - a. “Since it remains difficult to obtain nuclear weapons by trade, states that lack the requisite production capabilities have largely been precluded from proliferating.”
 - b. “Membership in the NPT tends modestly to encourage states to maintain pledges of nonproliferation”
 - c. Mostly for security concerns.

Gartzke of Columbia University in 2007

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/27638542.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A79313ccbb5ef80d7c407cb406ab1587f>

The complement to nuclear proliferation willingness is opportunity. Since it remains difficult to obtain nuclear weapons by trade, states that lack the requisite production capabilities have largely been precluded from proliferating. States that lack the ability to produce nuclear weapons are likely to seek other options such as enhancing their conventional forces or pursuing diplomatic solutions (Libya). (10) We find that latent nuclear production capabilities increase the predicted probability of having nuclear weapons programs but that latent production capabilities do not have any substantial impact on the conditional decision to produce nuclear weapons. Thus, latent nuclear capability is a critical factor early in proliferation but less so later on. (11) The diffusion of nuclear knowledge and technology

Other considerations appear only marginally to affect states' decisions to pursue proliferation. (7) Democracy turns out to deepen nuclear proliferation once a nuclear weapons infrastructure is in place, but there is no difference between democracy and autocracy in terms of a tendency to pursue nuclear weapons production programs. (8) Leaders facing domestic unrest or internal bureaucratic pressures to proliferate seldom activate the nuclear card for these reasons (India). (9) Membership in the NPT tends modestly to encourage states to maintain pledges of nonproliferation, while systemic normative constraints of the NPT regime do not exist or are counter acted by the other part of the NPT bargain, the dissemination of technology and nuclear know-how.

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Murthy of the FES in 2011

<https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/08143.pdf>

- India's election as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for 2011/2012 is an acknowledgement of its growing importance in global governance and was made possible by the mature support extended by regional rivals such as Pakistan and China.
- During its UNSC membership India will stick to its traditional foreign policy values and goals: the non-use of force; respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states; and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
- India will assist the Council in focusing on existing and emerging, non-traditional threats, such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and piracy.
- India has always preferred to be part of the democratic majority helping in the adoption of broadly acceptable decisions and resolutions. In the past, India has not voted against any resolution, but it has resorted to abstentions only to signal its reservations. Even when it abstained, India had the company of other member countries.
- The presence of India, Brazil, and South Africa in the Council this year may yield meaningful team work on Iran and other issues of shared concern. They could become the nucleus of a coalition on salient issues, notwithstanding some differences in emphasis between them on some issues and approaches.