## AC 2.0

#### Ben and I affirm.

### Contention 1 is Better Safe than Sorry

Bruce Bennet reports this year that more and more North Korean elites think Kim Jong-un is a weak and ineffective leader. David Gilbert furthers this, finding in January that there is a growing sense of low-level dissent or criticism of the regime that would have been totally inconceivable only a few years ago. Unfortunately, Bennet confirms that the dictator is well aware of this growing resentment, and is growing intensely paranoid. Yong-ho, a high powered diplomat who defected from North Korea in 2017 explains that Kim Jong-un will launch a full scale attack and use his weapons of mass destruction if he feels threatened.

**Fortunately, THAAD would protect against a North Korean missile attack in 2 ways:**

**First by stopping a missile.**

THAAD is highly successful and would likely prevent a North Korean offensive attack. **Kazianis** from the National Interest quantifies in 2017 that THAAD has been successful in 100% of tests. Furthermore, according to **Christopher Woolf** in 2017, early success with THAAD was slow coming- causing THAAD to be sometimes listed with low success rates, but Billions of dollars of investment has made the system far more effective in its current form.

**Second by deterring a launch in the first place.**

Even if the systems aren’t 100% effective, Kim Jong-un would be unlikely to launch an attack. Goure (gouray) in 2015 explains that North Korea knows the consequences of a missile failure which is why he concludes that missile defenses provide an insoluble problem to North Korea, leading them to not attack.

**Stopping a missile launch is important, as the impact would be devastating.**

**Zack Beauchamp** of Vox confirms on July 5th that a conflict on the Korean peninsula such as a missile attack would cost hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of lives.

### Contention 2 is Diplomacy

The geopolitical climate in East Asia is perfect for Korean negotiations. Hyun-Jin Kim writes on August 16th that Moon considers negotiations between North and South Korea to be of the utmost importance. Additionally, Catherine Wong of the South China Morning Post writes in July that efforts to push negotiations between North and South Korea remain a priority for China.

Negotiations are really important for conflict resolution.

Choe Sang-Hun explains on July 7th that negotiations are in the best interest of both Koreas, considering the escalation of conflict that has been endured on the peninsula. This is important because Fuchs of the Guardian contends negotiations are the only way to ease tensions as the peninsula has been locked in a state of conflict for years. Unfortunately, the Japan Times finds that the United States is only willing to negotiate if the North halts its nuclear missile programs.

Fortunately, THAAD changes two nuclear stances, with either stance causing negotiations to occur.

**The First change is the United States’ stance.**

**Harry Sa** of the Diplomat writes that deploying THAAD encourages the United States to relax their nuclear precondition for the North to denuclearize before they negotiate as they know there is a safety net if negotiations break down or if North Korea decides to expand their nuclear program. Ultimately, this means that THAAD makes the United States feel safe to restart negotiations because they no longer fear attack, something they haven’t felt safe to do since the Bush era. This has already materialized as Raj 17 finds 2 weeks ago that we have opened diplomatic channels with the North after the deployment of THAAD. At the end of the day, THAAD is needed to make sure that talks actually occur.

**The Second change is North Korea’s nuclear stance.**

**Lankov** writes that THAAD was implemented to push China towards taking a harsher stance on North Korea. This harsher stance has begun to materialize, as the South China Morning Post reports that on September 7th, China moved for Sanctions just hours after THAAD was fully implemented and two weeks later, The Guardian reports the sanctions were put in place. Ultimately, these sanctions are very important as Albert writes on July 5th that China accounts for upwards of 90% of North Korea’s trade which is why ABC News reports that the recent sanctions are aimed to stop North Korea from fueling and funding its weapons program. Ultimately, this would stop North Korea’s nuclearization, leading to talks.

Because THAAD provides both a shortterm and longterm solution to the problem, we affirm.

## Cards

### Contention 1:

#### Bennett 17

[Evelyn Chang, 4-27-2017. "North Korean elites increasingly think Kim Jong Un is a weak leader, new study says." CNBC. http://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/26/north-korean-elites-increasingly-think-kim-jong-un-is-a-weak-leader-new-study-says.html?view=story&amp;%24DEVICE%24=native-android-mobile] //BH

More and more North Korean elites think dictator Kim Jong Un is a weak leader, according to new research published Thursday from Rand Corp. citing senior officials who have defected. "Kim Jong Un appears increasingly to the elites as ineffective and not a particularly good leader, which is likely how he's viewed now," said Bruce Bennett, senior defense analyst at research organization Rand. "Other than North Korea's weapons and [the] ballistic missiles of this regime, Kim Jong Un doesn't really have a lot to make him feel empowered," Bennett said, noting that recent events such as the murder of the dictator's older half brother show how the leader is "clearly paranoid." Moreover, if Kim were to die suddenly, North Korea's elites would probably not choose a successor from Kim's family, ending their dominance since the state's founding more than half a century ago, Bennett said, based on his interviews with defectors. "North Korea's elites have heavily gone into being entrepreneurs," Bennett said. "They would look to set up an economy like the Chinese which is what the Chinese have been asking them to do." More than two-thirds of North Korea's trade is with China, giving Beijing significant economic leverage on the rogue state. At the same time, Chinese authorities do not want North Korea to implode as it would likely spark a refugee crisis into China's economically struggling northeastern region. South Korean leaders have supported unification of the peninsula but have been ineffective — the North has strongly been against it. From his interviews and research, Rand's Bennett believes that both sides can effectively prepare for unification by improving policy in five areas. The key is winning over North Korea's ruling elites, who see less of a future under Kim. Rather than severely punishing all of the elites — estimated in the hundreds of thousands — for their participation in the dictatorship, Bennett said South Korea could show their support for the ruling class':

#### Gilbert 17

[David Gilbert, 1-25-2017. "North Korean defector predicts that the elite will turn against leader Kim Jong Un." No Publication. https://news.vice.com/story/north-korean-defector-predicts-that-the-elite-will-turn-against-leader-kim-jong-un] //BH

Here’s what we’ve learned about the secretive kingdom: Thae, speaking to Reuters, said that there is a growing sense of “low-level dissent or criticism of the regime” which, until recently, was unthinkable but is now becoming louder. Thae was unequivocal in his view that for North Korea to prosper, everything needs to change. “We have to spray gasoline on North Korea, and let the North Korean people set fire to it.” Thae ascribed the dissatisfaction among the country’s elite to what he called Kim’s “reign of terror,” which saw many of Thae’s colleagues purged as the dictator attempts to maintain absolute control. “The North Korean society is more than 70 years old, and if a society can only be maintained not by ideology or law but by the reign of terror, then the people do not trust the society,” Thae said. In an interview with South Korean TV station Arirang, broadcast Tuesday, Thae said he believed that the lack of any natural successor to Kim means that when his reign ends — however that may come about — the country will fall and the process of reunification will begin. He told Arirang he believed this would happen within five years. Asked about the possibility that Kim Jong Un’s brother – Kim Jong Chol – could take control, Thae told Reuters it was very unlikely. “Kim Jong Chol has no interest in politics. He is only interested in music. He’s only interested in Eric Clapton. If he was a normal man, I’m sure he’d be a very good professional guitarist.” Thae told the BBC that while he, his wife, and their children are living safely in South Korea, he suspects that the family he left behind in North Korea will have been punished for his defection. “I am sure that my relatives and my brother’s and sister’s families by now are all sent to remote closed areas or prison camps. It really breaks my heart.” Thae said the heartbreak of thinking about his family makes him “determined to do everything possible to pull down the North Korean regime.” He called on the international community to help bring about a reunification: “Korean reunification is not only a matter for Korean people but this is a matter for common prosperity for the whole of North East Asia,” he said. “Please join us together to reunify the country as soon as possible.”

#### Bennett 17

[Evelyn Chang, 4-27-2017. "North Korean elites increasingly think Kim Jong Un is a weak leader, new study says." CNBC. http://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/26/north-korean-elites-increasingly-think-kim-jong-un-is-a-weak-leader-new-study-says.html?view=story&amp;%24DEVICE%24=native-android-mobile] //BH

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#### Ho 17

[Hannah Al-Othman, 1-26-2017. "Kim Jong-un 'will launch a nuke at the US as soon as he is threatened'." Daily Mail. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4159480/Kim-Jong-launch-nuke-threatened.html] //BH

North Korea's most high profile defector has claimed Kim Jong-un would fire a suicidal nuclear weapon at Los Angeles if he felt his power was being threatened. Thae Yong-ho, the former deputy ambassador in London, and North Korea's most senior defector said the dictator would be prepared to 'press the button' despite the inevitable consequences. Mr Thae told the BBC's Victoria Derbyshire Show he believed the North Korean leader 'will press the button on these dangerous weapons when he thinks that his rule and his dynasty is threatened'. However, the defector has also said that he believes Kim Jong-un's regime 'one day would collapse by people's uprising'. When questioned as to whether he thought Kim would be prepared to launch a nuclear attack on the States even if meant his inevitable destriction, Mr Thae replied: 'Yes.' Mr Thae has previously said the country is aiming to complete its development of nuclear weapons by the end of this year. He claims the leader will stop at nothing to develop a nuclear programme - and would even turn down trillions of dollars if he was offered a pay-off to abandon the nuclear race.

#### Kazianis

[Harry J. Kazianis, 3-6-2017. "THAAD 101: The Ultimate Guide to the Missile Defense System China and North Korea Hate." National Interest. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/thaad-101-the-ultimate-guide-the-missile-defense-system-19684] //BH

"THAAD is the right solution today for improving ballistic-missile defense capabilities and architectures around the globe. THAAD’s unique endo & exo capability adds an essential layer of defense against current and emerging missile threats. THAAD complements existing ballistic-missile defenses by closing the battlespace gap between endo-only PAC-3 and exo-only Aegis BMD. THAAD is interoperable with all BMDS systems. As potential adversaries have continued to increase ballistic-missile inventories, THAAD provides an exceptional capability to defend against mass raids, a challenge for many ballistic-missile defense systems. THAAD is mobile and tactically transportable, providing for rapid repositioning, ensuring sustained protection against new threats while offering additional operational flexibility for high demand Aegis BMD and Patriot/PAC3 systems. THAAD has a 100 percent mission success rate in the last thirteen rigorous developmental and operational tests, including eleven for eleven successful intercepts. The most recent of these tests demonstrated the operational integration of THAAD Aegis and PAC-3 in simultaneous endo and exo atmospheric engagements of threat representative targets in an awesome display of the BMDS in action. While it is not appropriate for us to comment on other non-U.S. and non-Lockheed Martin systems, we believe that there is no other system in the world that can compare to THAAD’s unique capabilities..."

#### Woolf 17

[Christopher Woolf, 5-3-2017. "How good is the new missile defense system the US just deployed in South Korea?." Public Radio International. https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-05-03/how-good-new-missile-defense-system-us-just-deployed-south-korea] //BH

“It’s not an explosive warhead rocket,” Axe explains. “It’s just basically a solid warhead. They call it a kinetic warhead, or a kinetic munition. So rather than exploding it simply strikes its target.” In a sense, it’s like a very expensive slingshot that’s trying to hit an arrow in flight. Obviously it has to be accurate — close is just not good enough. THAAD has been operationally effective for about 10 years now, and the US has deployed it elsewhere in the world. The THAAD system was in development for decades, since the days when President Ronald Reagan wanted to deter the Soviet Union. Investment accelerated when the first Gulf War in 1991 revealed the threat posed by weapons like Saddam Hussein’s Scud missiles. But success was slow in coming, and dozens of tests failed in the early years. Billions of dollars of investment have made it much more effective. “It’s meant to defeat incoming short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles,” Axe says. “It does not defend against world-spanning intercontinental ballistic missiles,” he adds. These are the kind of missiles that could hit the United States, but which North Korea has not yet mastered.

#### Daniel Goure 15

Daniel Gouré, Ph.D., 15, U.S. Should Deploy THAAD Missile Defense To South Korea, Lexington Institute, http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/u-s-should-deploy-thaad-missile-defense-to-south-korea/ // ZS

**Deterring aggression requires, at a minimum, [the] creat[ion]ing [of] uncertainty in the mind of the aggressor state that it can win quickly, if at all**. Beyond this, the defender also must convince the would-be aggressor that he faces the certainty of suffering unacceptable costs, if not military defeat. This was the approach the U.S. and its allies took with respect to deterring the Soviet Union. Over decades, the West continually upgraded and shaped its conventional and nuclear forces so as to make it clear to Moscow that it couldn’t achieve a rapid conventional victory nor a disarming nuclear first strike. The essential elements of a deterrence strategy remain the same in the 21st Century. What has changed are the capabilities available both to the prospective aggressors in their efforts to develop a first strike advantage and the nations seeking to deter them. Nowhere are the challenges associated with deterring a prospective aggressor clearer than on the Korean peninsula. **The regime in Pyongyang [North Korea] knows better than most the consequences of failing to achieve its offensive objectives rapidly and decisively.** It has spent the 60-plus-years since the 1953 armistice developing and deploying capabilities expressly directed at ensuring, should war with its neighbor to the south come again, it can execute a decisive first strike. Some 60 percent of North Korea’s Army is deployed within easy striking distance of South Korea’s capitol, Seoul, along with approximately 13,000 pieces of artillery and rocket launchers. Pyongyang also has a 100,000-man-strong Special Operations Corps that could flood the South for the purpose of paralyzing communications and movement.

#### Daniel Goure (2)

Daniel Gouré, Ph.D., 15, U.S. Should Deploy THAAD Missile Defense To South Korea, Lexington Institute, http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/u-s-should-deploy-thaad-missile-defense-to-south-korea/ // ZS

In addition, it possesses nearly 200 medium-range Rodong missiles with a range of up to 1,500 kilometers. The North Korean military knows that it must neutralize South Korean and American advantages in airpower, precision weapons, intelligence and command and control if it is to win a new war on the peninsula. Armed with conventional and chemical warheads, this force could inflict a potentially devastating attack on South Korean targets, as well as strike Japanese and U.S. bases in the Western Pacific. Lest we forget, North Korea is also a nuclear power with as many as a dozen weapons in its inventory. It is believed to be working on warheads small enough to be carried on a ballistic missile. In recent testimony to Congress on worldwide threats to U.S. security, the Director of National Intelligence warned that North Korea was seeking to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile, the KN-08, capable of reaching the U.S. Deterring North Korea means, first and foremost, denying it the effective use of its growing arsenal of ballistic missiles**. To do so requires a mix of active defenses and passive measures such as hardening, camouflage, dispersal and redundancy. [Through] Missile defenses, particularly if employed preferentially to [as it] provide a high level of protection for a subset of all critical targets, [and] can present an almost insoluble problem to the attacker**. The most effective missile defense works in layers, allowing for multiple shots against incoming missiles. Currently, South Korea and U.S. forces on the peninsula rely on the Patriot air and missile defense system for primary protection against both aircraft and ballistic missile threats. This allows only for a single shot against an incoming target. To get two shots would require a different interceptor, either the Aegis ballistic missile defense currently operated by the U.S. and Japanese navies or the land-based Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD

#### Beauchamp 17

[Zack Beauchamp, 7-5-2017. "North Korea isn’t crazy. It’s insecure, poor, and extremely dangerous.." Vox. https://www.vox.com/world/2017/7/5/15922446/north-korea-nuclear-war-casualties] //BH

That isn’t because the country’s supreme leader, 33-year-old Kim Jong Un, is totally irrational — a “crazy fat kid,” as Sen. John McCain once termed him. Instead, it’s that the impoverished North Korean regime is deeply insecure, so worried about its own survival that it is willing to go to dangerously provocative lengths to scare the United States and South Korea out of any potential attack. When you combine this insecurity with the opaque nature of the North Korean regime, you have a situation that could easily spiral into outright conflict in the event that one of North Korea’s frequent military provocations (like the missile test) goes awry. Given North Korea’s massive conventional military and unknown number of nuclear weapons, conflict on the Korean Peninsula would cost hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of lives. That’s not to say that war between the US and North Korea is likely, even after the new missile test. It isn’t. Rather, it’s that the risk of a catastrophic conflict is much higher than anyone should feel comfortable with, arguably more likely than anywhere else in the world. Here at home, many are preoccupied with the fight against ISIS and, before that, the Iranian nuclear program. North Korea gets far less public attention, but it is a literally existential threat to two of America’s closest allies, Japan and South Korea. And it doesn’t seem like there’s any solution in sight.

### Contention 2:

#### Kim 17

[Hyun-Jin Kim and Kim Tong-Hyung, 8-16-2017. "Moon Jae-In: Not be Another War on the Korean Peninsula." Time. http://time.com/4904148/south-korea-moon-jae-in-north-korea/] //BH

The alternative would have been both catastrophic and unacceptable!" Trump wrote. Next week's start of annual U.S.-South Korean military exercises that enrage the North each year could make diplomacy even more difficult. Moon said he believes dialogue with North Korea can happen when North Korea halts missile and nuclear tests. Moon was elected in May after a near-decade of conservative rule that saw animosity deepen between the rival Koreas. Moon wants to engage the North. But his efforts have so far been met with a string of threats and missile tests as the North works to build nuclear-armed missiles that can reach the U.S. mainland. "A dialogue between South and North Korea must resume. But we don't need to be impatient," Moon said. "I think lots of effort and time could be necessary to overcome a decade of severed ties and to reopen a dialogue." Moon said Washington and Seoul are closely communicating over the North Korean nuclear problem and share the view that strong sanctions and pressure are needed against Pyongyang to stop its provocations and force it into negotiations to give up its nukes. Moon said he thinks Trump's belligerent words are intended to show a strong resolve for pressuring the North and don't necessarily display the willingness for military strikes.

#### Wong 17

[Catherine Wong, 7-6-2017. "China key in bringing North Korea back to negotiating table." South China Morning Post. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2086058/china-key-bringing-north-korea-back-negotiating-table] //BH

It is the second time Tillerson hinted that the US would take tough actions against Pyongyang. In March, he said the US could launch a “pre-emptive” military strike. Ahead of the summit, Trump also said the US was prepared to work on its own on North Korea. Foreign Minister Wang Yi said the issue should be resolved through negotiations, and reiterated Beijing’s opposition to the deployment of a US anti-missile system in South Korea, Xinhua reported. Foreign policy experts said it was vital for the US and China to come to a consensus before any breakthrough could be achieved. Wu Xinbo, director of the Centre for American Studies at Fudan University, said that despite the threats of a US “pre-emptive strike” against North Korea, efforts to push for negotiations would remain a priority in which Beijing had a key role to play. “It is still highly unlikely for the Trump administration to take unilateral actions before any major diplomatic efforts,” he said. “Trump appears to be still wanting to make a deal with North Korea.” China would need to do its part in increasing engagement with Pyongyang, Wu said. Although ties between Beijing and Pyongyang had deteriorated in recent years after the former’s decision to back United Nations sanctions against the reclusive regime, “China still has its channels to communicate with North Korea”, he said.

#### Sang-Hun 17

[Choe Sang-Hun, 7-7-2017. "Moon Keeps Door Open to North after ICBM Test." Honolulu Star. https://www.pressreader.com/usa/honolulu-star-advertiser/20170707/281621010366902] //BH

He added “If the North doesn’t stop its nuclear pursuit, there is no option but to enforce even stronger sanctions and pressure.” But Moon also reiterated that he was willing to meet Kim Jong-Un, the North Korean leader, “at any time and any place” if the circumstances were right and if he saw an opportunity to reverse the military standoff on the Korean Peninsula. He said North Korea should return to the negotiating table to discuss a “complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” If the North chooses that path, he said, great benefits wait for it: security guarantees like a peace treaty for Kim’s regime, as well as joint economic projects and other projects that would help rebuild the North Korean economy. Moon said that the need for dialogue with the North was stronger than ever, given a dangerous escalation of tensions on the peninsula in recent weeks. As one of the first steps toward easing tensions, Moon said that the two Koreas should start Red Cross talks to arrange temporary reunions of relatives in the North and South who have not seen each other since they were separated during the chaos of the 1950-53 Korean War.

#### Fuchs 17

[Michael H Fuchs, 9-5-2017. "The US must talk to North Korea – not threaten war." Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/05/america-north-korea-diplomacy-negotiation] //BH

Despite continuing provocations and saber-rattling, **the United States must continue to work with allies to strengthen deterrence and ramp up the pressure on North Korea – but it must also push for diplomacy. Negotiations are the only hope for easing tensions. The United States and North Korea are locked in a**[**dangerous cycle of escalation**](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/05/south-korea-minister-redeploying-us-nuclear-weapons-tensions-with-north)**, but one that’s not new: North Korea tests a nuclear weapon; the United States responds with sanctions and military exercises. Eventually, tensions ease, and diplomacy appears possible, only to be scuttled by another North Korean provocative act. Rinse and repeat.** The newest variable is the reckless rhetoric coming from the Trump administration – such as a threat of “[fire and fury](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/world/asia/north-korea-un-sanctions-nuclear-missile-united-nations.html?mcubz=3&_r=0)” and a claim that North Korea is “[begging for war](http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/04/politics/haley-north-korea-united-nations/index.html)” – which damages alliances and raises the risk of conflict. While the threat from North Korea is clearly growing, the United States knows how to keep its citizens safe and to ensure peace and stability in the region. For decades, the United States, South Korea, and Japan have deterred North Korea from starting a new war, and contained the North Korean threat.

#### Japan Times 17

[Japan Times, 7-10-2017. "U.S. and North Korea need to talk — but how?." . https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/07/10/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/u-s-north-korea-need-talk/#.WeDO2RNSzVp] //BH

But they also say talks are not only possible but really the only viable solution, whether talking directly or via third parties — including senior U.S. politicians outside the Trump administration. “The only way out here is diplomacy,” said James Clapper, who spent years as a U.S. intelligence chief in South Korea and was later director of National Intelligence under President Barack Obama. U**.S. President Donald Trump said in May that he would be “honored” to meet with Kim under what he called the right circumstances, in essence demanding North Korea first halts its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.** While the U.S. president promised a “pretty severe” retort to North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test, the response by his defense secretary, James Mattis, was to echo British wartime leader Winston Churchill’s famous mantra that it is “better to jaw-jaw than war-war.”

#### Sa 16

Harry Sa, 3/9/16, “Could THAAD Encourage Negotiations with North Korea?”, The Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2016/03/could-thaad-encourage-negotiations-with-north-korea/> //BB

It is evident that China will likely refrain from taking anylton measures that seriously threaten the integrity of the Kim regime. THAAD can also help reassure the United States should it choose to pursue negotiations. Under the Clinton and Bush administrations, the United States attempted serious negotiations with North Korea over its nuclear program. Though the U.S. offered attractive terms to the embattled regime, North Korea responded by being notoriously uncooperative during the verification process and, ultimately, cheated on the agreement by developing a clandestine uranium enrichment program. It is understandable then that the U.S. expects complete and verifiable denuclearization as a precondition for negotiations. Deploying THAAD may encourage the U.S. to relax this precondition, knowing that there exists a safety-net should negotiations break down or if North Korea decides to cheat and expand its nuclear and missile programs once more. Finally, THAAD adds value to the negotiation process as a future bargaining chip. Some analysts suggest deploying THAAD to shape China’s behavior.

#### Raj 17

Yashwant Raj, 10/1/17, “Donald Trump disagrees with Tillerson on negotiating with North Korea”, Hindustan Times, <http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/trump-disagrees-with-tillerson-on-negotiating-with-north-korea/story-UEhIoFYe0bWBglRTcSUYZN.html> //BB

Just a day after the US state department confirmed that it had opened channels of communication with North Korea, President Donald Trump publicly said he told his secretary of state Rex Tillerson to not waste his time trying to negotiate with Pyongyang. “I told Rex Tillerson, our wonderful Secretary of State, that he is wasting his time trying to negotiate with Little Rocket Man,” Trump tweeted, referring to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un by a derogatory phrase he had coined. “Save your energy Rex, we’ll do what has to be done!” Trump added, ominously.

#### Lankov 16

Andrei Lankov, 9/6/16, “After THAAD, could China sanction South Korea?”, NK News, <https://www.nknews.org/2016/09/after-thaad-could-china-sanction-south-korea/> //BB

It is not that difficult to surmise what reasons lay behind South Korea’s decision to deploy the anti-missile system. On the one hand, this decision is driven by purely military considerations: by default, the anti-missile system will be capable of intercepting the North Korean missiles in an unlikely but possible event of a full-scale North Korean nuclear/missile attack against South Korea. On the other hand, however, it’s obvious that many people in Washington and Seoul hoped that the THAAD deployment would push China towards taking a harsher stance on North Korea. Many people in the ROK and the U.S. expected that the Chinese government would realize that, at the end of the day, it was the North Korea’s continuous brinkmanship which made the THAAD deployment unavoidable, and thus, China would supposedly do something radical to solve the root cause of all complications: the North Korean nuclear and missile program, that is.

#### South China Morning Post 17

South China Morning Post, 9/7/17, “South Korea installs four more US THAAD launchers to counter missile threat from North”, <http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/2110106/south-korea-installs-four-more-us-thaad-launchers-counter> //BB

South Korea and the United States on Thursday completed the deployment of a US missile defence system to counter North Korean threats, sparking demonstrations by residents and a diplomatic protest from Beijing. South Korea had said already that Pyongyang may be gearing up for another rocket test in the aftermath of its nuclear detonation on Sunday, as it seeks to improve the capacity of its intercontinental ballistic missile programme. Prime Minister Lee Nak-yon said at a conference in Seoul that North Korea may launch its next missile on Saturday – the anniversary of its founding – adding there wasn’t much time until the regime became a fully nuclear-armed state.

#### South China Morning Post 17 (2)

Catherine Wong, 9/7/17, “China hints at tougher UN sanctions on North Korea”, South China Morning Post, <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2110214/china-hints-tougher-un-sanctions-north-korea> //BB

China has given its strongest sign yet that it will support tougher sanctions on North Korea, with Foreign Minister Wang Yi saying on Thursday that the United Nations Security Council had to take steps to rein in Pyongyang. Wang did not specify what measures China would take or whether China would agree to cut oil supplies to its neighbour. But he did say that “given the new development on the Korean peninsula, China agrees that the UN Security Council should make a further response by taking necessary measures”.

#### The Guardian 17

The Guardian, 9/23/17, “China to enforce UN sanctions against North Korea”, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/23/china-to-enforce-un-sanctions-against-north-korea> //BB

China has said it will ban exports of some petroleum products to North Korea, as well as imports of textiles from the isolated country, in line with a United Nations security council resolution passed after Pyongyang’s latest nuclear test. The announcement from Beijing came at the end of a week that saw tensions rise between the US and North Korea, with the leaders of both countries trading insults. The Chinese ministry of commerce said in a statement that exports of refined petroleum products would be limited from 1 October and exports of condensates and liquefied natural gas would be stopped immediately to comply with the UN sanctions.

#### Albert 17

[Eleanor Albert, July 5, 2017. “The China–North Korea Relationship.” Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north- korea-relationship] //SS

April 2017 editorial that China may be supportive of measures banning oil exports to North Korea should Pyongyang conduct further nuclear tests, echoing similar calls from some Chinese experts. State-owned oil giant China National Petroleum Corporation also suspended fuel sales to North Korea in June 2017, citing concerns that North Korea would fail to pay the company. Regional experts say such actions may suggest that the Chinese regime is “losing patience” with Pyongyang, while others say that these shifts by Beijing are merely tactical. Aid and Trade for Pyongyang China provides North Korea with most of its food and energy supplies and accounts for upwards of 90 percent of North Korea’s total trade volume. Conversely, China’s purchases from its neighbor include minerals, seafood, and manufactured garments. In the first quarter of 2017, China–North Korea trade was up 37.4 percent from the same period in 2016. “China is currently North Korea’s only economic backer of any importance,” writes Nicholas Eberstadt, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. In September 2015, the two countries opened a bulk cargo and container shipping route to boost North Korea’s export of coal to China and China established a high-speed rail route between the Chinese border city of Dandong and Shenyang, the provincial capital of China’s northeastern Liaoning province. In October 2015, the Guomenwan border trade zone opened in Dandong with the intention of boosting bilateral economic linkages, much like the Rason economic zone and the Sinujiu special administrative zone established in North Korea in the early 1990s and 2002, respectively. Dandong is a critical hub for trade, investment, and tourism for the two neighbors—exchanges with North Korea make up 40 percent of the city’s total trade and 70 percent of trade in and out of North Korea is conducted via Dandong and Sinujiu. However, a new $350 million bridge over the Yalu River to connect the two cities, intended to open in 2014,

#### ABC News 17

ABC News, 9/12/17, “North Korea sanctions: What impact will new export bans and import caps have?”, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-09-12/how-will-new-un-sanctions-impact-north-korea/8895844> //BB

How will these sanctions impact North Korea? US ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley said the resolution aimed to hit "North Korea's ability to fuel and fund its weapons program". The sanctions include a ban on condensates and natural gas liquids, a cap of 2 million barrels a year on refined petroleum products, and a cap on crude oil exports to North Korea at current levels. A US official, familiar with the council negotiations and speaking on condition of anonymity, said North Korea imported some 4.5 million barrels of refined petroleum products annually and 4 million barrels of crude oil. It also aimed to ban textile exports, end additional overseas labourer contracts, suppress smuggling efforts, stop join ventures with other nations and sanction designated North Korean government entities, a US source familiar with the negotiations told CNN.

#### Easley 17

Lief-Eric Easley, 8/15/17, “Time for ‘Implementation Diplomacy’ on North Korea”, The Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/time-for-implementation-diplomacy-on-north-korea/> //BB

The first myth is that sanctions don’t work. On 5 August, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2371 to reduce North Korea’s foreign currency earnings by banning its trade in coal, iron and seafood, and prohibiting countries from hiring additional North Korean laborers and investing in new ventures with Pyongyang. Those who advocate a rush to dialogue with North Korea tend to see sanctions as ineffective or counterproductive. But saying that sanctions haven’t achieved denuclearization mischaracterizes their purpose, and blaming sanctions for Pyongyang’s provocations discounts the Kim regime’s aggressive intentions and record of cheating. Sanctions aim to frustrate North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, punish its repeated violation of UN resolutions, and push Pyongyang back to the negotiating table. Returning to the table would involve suspending illegal tests, so that relevant parties can talk about security and economic incentives for a continued freeze and a capabilities cap, while maintaining denuclearization as the ultimate goal.

### Other Cards

#### Alternative for Raj 17 - SBS News 17

SBS Wires, 10/1/17, “'We do talk to them': US in direct dialogue with North Korea, says Tillerson”, <http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2017/10/01/we-do-talk-them-us-direct-dialogue-north-korea-says-tillerson> //BB

Washington has opened channels to North Korea to find out if the regime is ready to talk about giving up its nuclear weapons, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said. His office in Washington quickly clarified that North Korea has shown no interest in such discussions. Speaking after a day of talks with China's President Xi Jinping and top diplomats, Tillerson told reporters that US officials are in touch with Pyongyang. The disclosure follows an escalating war of words between US President Donald Trump and North Korean strongman Kim Jong-Un, and Tillerson issued a call for calm. Asked how he could know whether the North would even contemplate responding to new sanctions by coming to the table, the US envoy said: "We are probing, so stay tuned." Washington has no diplomatic ties with Kim's autocratic regime, and has been leaning on Beijing to rein in its neighbour's behaviour through tougher sanctions.

#### Casey 17

Michael Casey, 4/17/16, “Ignore China and Deploy THAAD to South Korea”, The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/ignore-china-deploy-thaad-south-korea-15810> //BB

The third and least likely option is to not increase U.S. or South Korean missile defense capabilities on the peninsula. The United States could refrain from such action in exchange for China moderating North Korean behavior. Such a policy would largely rely on sanctions, but international sanctions will only alter North Korea’s behavior if China fully cooperates in implementing them. China may be persuaded to more fully apply sanctions in exchange for the United States not strengthening South Korean missile defense capabilities. Moreover, refraining from such action would improve U.S. and South Korean relations with China and may moderate China’s behavior in East and Southeast Asia. Despite these possibilities, South Korea would remain susceptible to a North Korean ballistic missile attack. In addition, historically, and especially since Kim Jong-un came to power, China has been unable to meaningfully influence North Korean behavior. Thus, there is little evidence to show China could restrain North Korea—even if it wanted to.

#### McLeary 17

Paul McLeary, 6/7/17, “In Nod to China, South Korea Halts Deployment of THAAD Missile Defense”, Foreign Policy, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/07/in-nod-to-china-south-korea-halts-deployment-of-thaad-missile-defense/> //BB

North Korea fired four anti-ship cruise missiles into the waters between Korea and Japan on Thursday morning, just a day after the new president of South Korea put the brakes on an upcoming deployment of four American missile defense systems to his country. The administration of new president Moon Jae-in, a left-leaning politician who favors rapprochement with North Korea, suspended the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems (THAAD), in what has emerged as a contentious domestic fight over how Seoul juggles its relations with China, North Korea, and the United States. The move appears in part to be a concession to Chinese objections to the deployment. It is also in direct defiance of the American policy to confront North Korea’s growing ballistic and mid-range missile programs. South Korean military officials said they believe the surface-to-ship missiles flew about 125 miles after being launched near Wonsan on North Korea’s East coast, and come less than a week after the United Nations Security Council passed a new resolution widening existing sanctions against Pyongyang as punishment for its continued missile tests. Moon in some ways is inheriting a political headache from his disgraced predecessor, who greenlighted the deployment of the defense systems before being impeached and removed from office in early March, just as the first two THAAD systems were being installed on a golf course. Moon, who campaigned on the promise of opening a new era of engagement with North Korea, complained that the THAAD deployment was rushed through, giving his government no chance to take part in the decision making process. Still, he agreed that the two systems that had already arrived would stay, but wanted to pause further deployments. Seoul needs to “learn to say no” to Washington, Moon has said. But he has also acknowledged that he has to bring Washington along if he is to open talks with North Korea. “THAAD is a bargaining chip for President Moon,” said Patrick M. Cronin, senior director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. “His political base likes taking a Korea First stance on a military system rushed into deployment by the main opposition party of the previous government.” Moon and his new government reacted angrily when they discovered they had not been informed about the upcoming arrival of four more interceptors, and ordered an environmental assessment before they arrive. “My order for a probe on THAAD is purely a domestic measure and I want to be clear that it is not about trying to change the existing decision or sending a message to the United States,” Moon told visiting U.S. Senator Dick Durbin in Seoul last week. There is little indication that the new government is looking to significantly restructure relations with the United States, which is a major trading partner, maintains 23,000 troops in the country, and sells billions of dollars worth of advanced military technology to Seoul. Still, the halt on the THAAD deployment can be seen as a new wrinkle in an old relationship, and a significant win for Beijing, which has strongly objected to the radar and missile interceptor system being deployed on the peninsula. China is South Korea’s biggest trading partner, accounting for about a quarter of its exports, and has sought to make the THAAD deployment sting. Citing health and safety issues, China shut down 87 of 99 of South Korean conglomerate Lotte’s department stores in China in the days after THAAD arrived in South Korea, and stopped work on South Korean-funded theme park. In order to ease tensions, just days after his election Moon sent an envoy to Beijing to meet with Chinese president Xi Jinping. Upon his return, China stopped blocking Lotte’s web site, and walked back some other economic pressures. A spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry reiterated Beijing’s opposition to the missile-defense system, which China fears could be used to neuter its own strategic missile forces.

#### McKeown 17

Shannon McKeown, 6/5/17, “THAAD – A Necessary Measure?”, American Security Project, <https://www.americansecurityproject.org/thaad-a-necessary-measure/> //BB

In an ideal scenario, THAAD would not be necessary. While the possibility of a North Korean missile launch is still present, the THAAD system provides a reassurance for South Korea and a deterrence against North Korea. Once the Korean peninsula is free of nuclear weapons, the system should be removed. In addition, the US can use the THAAD system as a bargaining chip. The removal of the system could be used as leverage to encourage the North Korean government to engage in negotiations or further pressure China to utilize its leverage on North Korea. However, the US must weigh whether the THAAD system is worth the potential fractures to the crucial US-South Korean alliance.

#### Gurtov 17

Mel Gurtov, 3/15/17, “Diplomatic Remedies for THAAD Madness: The US, China and the Two Koreas”, The Asia- Pacific Journal, <http://apjjf.org/-Mel-Gurtov/5020/article.pdf> //BB

Instead, “I can tell you we’re not ruling out anything, and we’re considering every option,” Haley said.6 So who is not being rational? Constantly talking up the North Korean threat and using it to justify ever more sophisticated and expensive antimissile technologies to defend against it is foolish and self-defeating. Diplomacy with North Korea is much more cost-effective. If Washington were in more experienced hands, it would indefinitely delay full deployment of THAAD or, if requested by a new South Korean president, decide not to operationalize it. Secretary Tillerson might, as a result of discussions with ROK leaders, announce on his current trip that future USROK exercises would depend on the security situation on the peninsula—a half-step toward Wang Yi’s proposal. These moves would not resolve the nuclear issue with North Korea or turn around contentious relations with China. But sidelining THAAD would reassure China—it might even provide a bargaining chip to freeze Chinese weapons deployments in the South China Sea. It would certainly remove a volatile issue from South Korean politics at a time of a national leadership crisis. If a new decision on THAAD were accompanied by revival of talks with North Korea, which a Moon Jae-in administration in Seoul is likely to initiate and which the Trump administration should support, it might put a brake on the drift toward confrontation. Unless the Trump administration starts paying attention to THAAD’s liabilities, it will face a cold-war style crisis at the same time that the United States and Europe are in the midst of another cold war standoff with Russia over Ukraine. The multiple security issues in Northeast Asia are precisely why a regional multilateral security dialogue mechanism is essential, such as I’ve suggested in these pages. It would provide a venue for addressing common- security issues such as climate change, public health and economic development in North Korea, sustainable energy, and a peace treaty ending the Korean War guaranteed by the major powers. To be sure, nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles are worrisome not only for the United States, the two Koreas, and China but for all nations in the region: China has a legitimate concern about having its nuclear deterrent compromised by THAAD, and the United States certainly wants strategic stability with China. The United States has a legitimate desire to defend against North Korean missiles that can reach Japanese and South Korean targets and one day soon the US west coast. But North Korea has an equally legitimate objective to strengthen its deterrent in the face of US, Korean, Japanese, and now Chinese pressures. And so it goes. Arguing about “defensive” and “offensive” weapons is likely to be a non-starter, however, unless some degree of mutual trust can be achieved first. North Korea’s arsenal of perhaps twenty nuclear weapons and its formidable missile capability present a much different challenge from a decade ago. Previous regional diplomacy in Northeast Asia has produced results worth building on. The Six Party Talks in 2005 and 2007 created a reasonable menu of “action-for-action” steps, including economic and energy cooperation and normalization of diplomatic relations as well as denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. A dialogue mechanism can breathe new life into those talks, affording the opportunity to debate rather than fire away and consider small steps to defuse tensions. Absent such a mechanism, we can expect that the North Koreans will proceed with nuclear and missile development, China’s appeals to both North and South Korea will fall on deaf ears, and the US-ROK-Japan alliance will plot ways to pressure North Korea even more intensely rather than restart a dialogue with it.8 The consequences can be explosive.