

We affirm Resolved: On balance, the current Authorization for Use of Military Force gives too much power to the president.

Commented [1]: he-gem-o-ny
[hə 'jɛmənē, 'heɪə mɒnē]
NOUN
leadership or dominance, especially by one country or social group over others:

Framework

- Kritik is a priority - if the opponents have a flawed ethical framework, we must vote them down as a rejection of that mindset.
- Fiat is illusory - nobody from the US Government is here, and nothing will happen as a result of you signing the ballot. The only things that matter after the round is the rhetoric used and the mindset instilled by the debaters.
- the role of the ballot is to vote for the team that best criticizes American exceptionalism.

Thesis

The negatives entire premise is grounded in the neoconservative mindset of American exceptionalism, believing that American power is the solution to every problem and further believing that America is exempt from following the rules. This mindset leads to a society that perpetrates endless war. The role of this debate round is to interrogate and criticize this mindset.

Links

The Negation's endorsement of the use of American military power in a sovereign nation without their consent, killing their own citizens, demonstrates a mindset of American exceptionalism, in which Americans don't have to follow rules that apply to everyone else.

Commented [2]: We have cards for this, but only bring them up if they ask

Impacts

The negation is always reaching for unattainable infinite hegemony that results in endless conflict

Chernus 6 (Ira, Professor of Religious Studies and Co-director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Colorado-Boulder, 2006, "Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin")

The end of **the** cold war spawned a tempting **fantasy of imperial omnipotence** on a global scale. The neocons want to turn that fantasy into reality. But reality will not conform to the fantasy; it won't stand still or keep any semblance of permanent order. So the neocons' efforts

inevitably backfire[s]. Political scientist Benjamin Barber explains that a nation with unprecedented power has "unprecedented vulnerability: **for**

it must repeatedly **extend the compass of its power to preserve what it already has, and so is**

almost by definition **always overextended**." Gary Dorrien sees insecurity coming at the neoconservatives in another way, too: "For the

empire, **every conflict is a local concern that threatens its control**. However secure it may be, it never feels secure enough. The

[neocon] unipolarists had an advanced case of this anxiety. . . . Just below the surface of the customary claim to toughness lurked persistent anxiety. This anxiety was inherent in the

problem of empire and, in the case of the neocons, heightened by ideological ardor."³⁹ **If the U.S. must control every event everywhere**, as

neocons assume, **every act of resistance looks like a threat to the very existence of the nation. There is no**

good way to distinguish between nations or forces that genuinely oppose U.S. interests and those that don't. Indeed, change of any kind, in any nation, becomes a potential threat. Everyone begins to look like a threatening monster that might have to be destroyed. It's no surprise that a nation imagined as an implacable enemy often turns into a real enemy. When the U.S. intervenes to prevent change, it is likely to provoke resistance. Faced with an aggressive U.S. stance, any nation might get tough in return. Of course, the U.S. can say that it is selfless by trying to serve the world. But why would other nations believe that? It is more likely that others will resist, making hegemony harder to achieve. To the neocons, though, resistance only proves that the enemy really is a threat that must be destroyed. So the likelihood of conflict grows, making everyone less secure.

Endless US intervention leads to massive death tolls.

Walt 11 (Stephen M., Ph.D. in political science from the University of California-Berkeley, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard, "The Myth of American Exceptionalism", Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/the_myth_of_american_exceptionalism)

For starters, the United States has been one of the most expansionist powers in modern history. It began as 13 small colonies clinging to the Eastern Seaboard, but eventually expanded across North America, seizing Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California from Mexico in 1846. Along the way, it eliminated most of the native population and confined the survivors to impoverished reservations. By the mid-19th century, it had pushed Britain out of the Pacific Northwest and consolidated its hegemony over the Western Hemisphere. The United States has fought numerous wars since then - starting several of them - and its wartime conduct has hardly been a model of restraint. The 1899-1902 conquest of the Philippines killed some 200,000 to 400,000 Filipinos, most of them civilians, and the United States and its allies did not hesitate to dispatch some 305,000 German and 330,000 Japanese civilians through aerial bombing during World War II, mostly through deliberate campaigns against enemy cities. No wonder Gen. Curtis LeMay, who directed the bombing campaign against Japan, told an aide, "If the U.S. lost the war, we would be prosecuted as war criminals". The United States dropped more than 6 million tons of bombs during the Indochina war, including tons of napalm and lethal defoliants like Agent Orange, and it is directly responsible for the deaths of many of the roughly 1 million civilians who died in that war. More recently, the U.S.-backed Contra war in Nicaragua killed some 30,000 Nicaraguans, a percentage of their population equivalent to 2 million dead Americans. U.S. military action has led directly or indirectly to the deaths of 250,000 Muslims over the past three decades (and that's a low-end estimate, not counting the deaths resulting from the sanctions against Iraq in the 1990s), including the more than 100,000 people who died following the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003.

The alternative is to vote in affirmation to reject the ironic nature of American exceptionalism.

We must criticize America in order to break hypocrisy – the negation is grounded in exclusion and closes the door for change

Greenwald 13 (Grant, J.D. from NYU Law School, B.A. in Philosophy from George Washington University, 2014 Pulitzer Prize for Public Service, former Guardian columnist, "The premises and purposes of American exceptionalism" Guardian, February 18th, 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/feb/18/american-exceptionalism-north-korea-nukes>)

Preserving this warped morality, this nationalistic prerogative, is, far and away, the primary objective of America's foreign policy community, composed of its political offices, media outlets, and (especially) think tanks. What Cooke expressed here - that the US, due to its objective superiority, is not bound by the same rules as others - is the most cherished and aggressively guarded principle in that circle. Conversely, the notion that the US should be bound by the same rules as everyone else is the most scorned and marginalized. Last week, the Princeton professor Cornel West denounced Presidents Nixon, Bush and Obama as "war criminals", saying that "they have killed innocent people in the name of the struggle for

freedom, but they're suspending the law, very much like Wall Street criminals". West specifically cited Obama's covert drone wars and killing of innocent people, including children. What West was doing there was rather straightforward: applying the same legal and moral rules to US aggression that he has applied to other countries and which the US applies to non-friendly, disobedient regimes. In other words, West did exactly that which is most scorned and taboo in DC policy circles. And thus he had to be attacked, belittled and dismissed as irrelevant. Andrew Exum, the Afghanistan War advocate and Senior Fellow at the Center for New American Security, eagerly volunteered for the task: Note that there's no effort to engage Professor West's arguments. It's pure ad hominem (in the classic sense of the logical fallacy): "who is "Cornell [sic] West" to think that anything he says should be even listened to by "national security professionals"? **It's a declaration of exclusion.** West is not a member in good standing of DC's Foreign Policy Community, and therefore his views can and should be ignored as Unserious and inconsequential. Leave aside the inane honorific of "national security professional" (is there a licensing agency for that?). Leave aside the noxious and pompous view that the views of non-national-security-professionals - whatever that means - should be ignored when it comes to militarism, US foreign policy and war crimes. And also leave aside the fact that **the vast majority of so-called "national security professionals" have been disastrously wrong about virtually everything of significance over the last decade at least,** including when most of them used their platforms and influence not only to persuade others to support the greatest crime of our generation - the aggressive attack on Iraq - but also to scorn war opponents as too Unserious to merit attention. As Samantha Power put it in 2007: "It was Washington's conventional wisdom that led us into the worst strategic blunder in the history of US foreign policy. The rush to invade Iraq was a position advocated by not only the Bush Administration, but also by editorial pages, the foreign policy establishment of both parties, and majorities in both houses of Congress." Given that history, if one wants to employ ad hominem: one should be listened to more, not less, if one is denied the title of "national security professional". **The key point is what constitutes West's transgression. His real crime is that he acutely assumed that the US should be subjected to the same rules and constraints as all other nations** in the world, that he rejected the notion that America has the right to do what other nations may not. **And this is the premise** - that there are any legal or moral constraints on the US's right to use force in the world - that **is the prime taboo** thought **in the circles of DC Seriousness.** That's why West, the Princeton professor, got mocked as someone too silly to pay attention to: because **he rejected that most cherished American license that is grounded in the self-loving exceptionalism** so purely distilled by Cooke. West made a moral and legal argument, and US "national security professionals" simply do not recognize morality or legality when it comes to US aggression. That's why our foreign policy discourse so rarely includes any discussion of those considerations. A US president can be a "war criminal" only if legal and moral rules apply to his actions on equal terms as all other world leaders, and that is precisely the idea that is completely anathema to everything "national security professionals" believe (it also happens to be the central principle the Nuremberg Tribunal sought to affirm: "while this law is first applied against German aggressors, the law includes, and if it is to serve a useful purpose it must condemn aggression by any other nations, including those which sit here now in judgment"). US foreign policy analysts are permitted to question the tactics of the US government and military (will bombing these places succeed in the goals?). They are permitted to argue that certain policies will not advance American interests (drones may be ineffective in stopping Terrorism). But **what they are absolutely barred from doing** - upon pain of being expelled from the circles of Seriousness - **is to argue that there are any legal or moral rules that restrict US aggression** and especially to argue that the US is bound by the same set of rules which it seeks to impose on others (recall the intense attacks on Howard Dean, led by John Kerry, when Dean suggested in 2003 that the US should support a system of universally applied rules because "we won't always have the strongest military": the very idea that the US should think of itself as subject to the same rules as the rest of the world is pure heresy). In 2009, Les Gelb - the former Pentagon and State Department official and Chairman Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations: the ultimate "national security professional" - wrote an extraordinary essay in the journal Democracy explaining why he and so many others in his circle supported the attack on Iraq. This is what he blamed it on: unfortunate tendencies within the foreign policy community, namely the disposition and incentives to support wars to retain political and professional credibility." That someone like Les Gelb says that "national security professionals" have career incentives to support US wars "to retain political and professional credibility" is amazing, yet clearly true. When I interviewed Gelb in 2010 regarding that quote, he elaborated that DC foreign policy experts - "national security professionals" - know that they can retain relevance in and access to key government circles only if they affirm the unfettered right of the US to use force whenever and however it wants. **They can question tactics, but never the supreme prerogative of the US, the unchallengeable truth of American exceptionalism** In sum, think tank "scholars" don't get invited to important meetings by "national security professionals" in DC if they point out that the US is committing war crimes and that the US president is a war criminal. They don't get invited to those meetings if they argue that the US should be bound by the same rules and laws it imposes on others when it comes to the use of force. They don't get invited if they ask US political officials to imagine how they would react if some other country were routinely bombing US soil with drones and cruise missiles and assassinating whatever Americans they wanted to in secret and without trial. As the reaction to Cornell West shows, **making those arguments triggers nothing but ridicule and exclusion** One gets invited to those meetings only if one blindly affirms the right of the US to do whatever it wants, and then devotes oneself to the pragmatic question of how that unfettered license can best be exploited to promote national interests. The culture of DC think tanks, "international relations" professionals, and foreign policy commentators breeds allegiance to these American prerogatives and US power centers - incentivizes reflexive defenses of US government actions - because, as Gelb says, that is the only way to advance one's careerist goals as a "national security professional". If you see a 20-something aspiring "foreign policy expert" or "international relations professional" in DC, what you'll view, with some rare exceptions, is a mindlessly loyal defender of US force and prerogatives. It's what that culture, by design, breeds and demands. In that crowd, Cooke's tweets aren't the slightest bit controversial. They're axioms, from which all valid conclusions flow. **This belief in the unfettered legal and moral right of the US to use force anywhere in the world for any reason it wants is sustained only by this belief in objective US superiority, this myth of American exceptionalism** And the results are exactly what one would expect from an approach grounded in a belief system so patently irrational.

Our alternative is to vote in affirmation to reject the Negative's notion of American exceptionalism – it's time to step out of our "superpower" pedestal

Lifton '3 (Robert Jay, Visiting Professor of Psychiatry @ Harvard Medical School, Superpower Syndrome, pgs. 190-192)

To renounce the claim to total power would bring relief not only to everyone else, but, soon enough, to citizens of the superpower itself. For **to live out superpower syndrome is to place oneself on a treadmill that eventually has to break down. In its efforts to rule the world and to determine history, the United States is**, in actuality, working against itself, **subjecting itself to constant failure**. It becomes a Sisyphus with bombs, able to set off explosions but unable to cope with its own burden, unable to roll its heavy stone to the top of the hill in Hades. Perhaps **the crucial step** in ridding ourselves of superpower syndrome **is recognizing that history cannot be controlled**, fluidly or otherwise. **Stepping off the superpower treadmill would enable us to cease being a nation ruled by fear. Renouncing omnipotence might make our leaders** or at least future leaders-themselves **less fearful of weakness, and diminish their inclination to instill fear** in their people as a means of enlisting them for military efforts at illusory world hegemony. Without the need for invulnerability, everyone would have much less to be afraid of. What we call **the historical process is largely unpredictable**, never completely manageable. **All the more so at a time of radical questioning of the phenomenon of nationalism and its nineteenth- and twentieth-century excesses**. In addition, **there has been a general decline in confidence in the nation state, and in its ability to protect** its people from larger world problems such as global warming or weapons of mass destruction. **The quick but dangerous substitute is the superpower**, which seeks to fill the void with a globalized, militarized extension of American nationalism. The traditional nation state, whatever its shortcomings, could at least claim to be grounded in a specific geographic area and a particular people or combination of peoples. **The superpower claims to "represent" everyone on earth, but it lacks legitimacy in the eyes of those it seeks to dominate, while its leaders must struggle to mask or suppress their own doubts about any such legitimacy. The American superpower is an artificial construct**, widely perceived as legitimate, whatever the acquiescence it coerces in others. **Its reign is therefore inherently unstable**. Indeed, its reach for full-scale world domination marks the beginning of its decline. A large task for the world, and for the Americans in particular, is the early recognition and humane management of its decline.

THUS WE AFFIRM. THANK YOU, AND VOTE AFF.

Blocks

Kritik

A2) Kritik's aren't allowed in Public Forum Debate

Nowhere in the Rules of Public Forum Debate does it mention Kritiks. In addition, while it's true that a Kritik of the resolution may not be topical, this isn't a kritik of the resolution. It's a kritik of the opponents and their implicit assumptions about the permissibility of US action on foreign soil.

A2) Must have a position of Advocacy

Our position of advocacy is against all war powers, which includes the AUMF.

A2) No Plans/Counterplans

A plan and counterplan is specific. In Public Forum Debate, the High School Unified Manual allows for generalized alternative solutions. That's what we're doing. Our position of advocacy is to simply reject our flawed mindset in search of legitimate solutions, ones that don't disregard international law and the basic human rights of other countries and their citizens.

Framework

A2) Fiat/Roleplaying Good

Standards like roleplaying promote a disinterested approach to argumentation where we sever ourselves from our in round representations and make it possible to advocate for ideas that are bad or ideas that we don't legitimately have an interest in solving. Interrogations of structures of power are key to challenge American exceptionalism. Professor William V. Spanos sat in on a policy debate round and stated that....

Spanos 6 [Spanos, William V. Prof of Comparative Literature at SUNY Binghamton. (quoted by Joe Miller in Cross-x, and posted on edebate and cross-x.com, <http://www.cross-x.com/vb/showthread.php?t=945110>)
Dear Joe Miller, Yes, the statement about the American debate circuit you refer to was made by me, though some years ago. I strongly believed then --and still do, even though a certain uneasiness about "objectivity" has crept into the "philosophy of debate" -- that debate in both the high schools and colleges in this country is assumed to take place nowhere, even though the issues that are debated are profoundly historical, which means that positions are always represented from the perspective of power, and a matter of life and death. **I find it grotesque that in the debate world, it doesn't matter which position you take on an issue -- say, the United States' unilateral wars of preemption -- as long as you "score points". The world we live in is a world entirely dominated by an "exceptionalist" America which has perennially claimed that it has been chosen by God or History to fulfill his/its "errand in the wilderness." That claim is powerful because American economic and military power lies behind it.** And any alternative position in such a world is virtually powerless. Given this inexorable historical reality, **to assume**, as the protocols of debate do, **that all positions are equal is to efface the imbalances of power that are the fundamental condition of history** and to annul the Moral authority inhering in the position of the oppressed. This is why I have said that the appropriation of my interested work on education and empire to this transcendental debate world constitute a travesty of my intentions. My scholarship is not "disinterested." It is militant and intended to ameliorate as much as possible the pain and suffering of those who have been oppressed by the "democratic" institutions that have power precisely by way of showing that their language if "truth," far from being "disinterested" or "objective" as it is always claimed, is informed by the will to power over all manner of "others." This is also why I told my interlocutor that he and those in the debate world who felt like him **[We] should call into question the traditional "objective" debate protocols** and the instrumentalist language they privilege **in favor of a concept of debate and of language in which life and death matter[s]**. I am very much aware that the **arrogant neocons who now saturate the government** of the Bush administration -- judges, pentagon planners, state department officials, etc. **learned their "disinterested" argumentative skills in** the high school and college **debate societies** **and** that, accordingly, **they have become masters at disarming the just causes of the oppressed.** This kind leadership will reproduce itself (along with the invisible oppression it perpetrates) as long as the training ground and the debate protocols from which it emerges remains in tact. **A revolution in the debate world must occur.** It must force that unworldly world down into the historical arena **where positions make a difference.** To invoke the late Edward Said, only such a revolution will be capable of "detering democracy" (in Noam Chomsky's ironic phrase), of instigating the secular critical consciousness that is, in my mind, the sine qua non for avoiding the immanent global disaster towards which the blind arrogance of Bush Administration and his neocon policy makers is leading.

Their form of detached roleplaying displaces individual identity to that of authority. When we imagine that we're the government, we turn people into statistics, and it becomes a legitimate practice to engage in apocalyptic or dehumanizing rhetoric—Stanford Prison Experiment proves this

Reed 5 (Reed et al, Director of Command and Leadership Studies, U.S. Army War College, 2005 [Professor George E., Guy B. Adams, Professor, Public Affairs, University of Missouri-Columbia, Danny L. Balfour, Professor, Public and Nonprofit Administration, Grand Valley State University, "Putting Cruelty First: Abu Ghraib, Administrative Evil and Moral Inversion," Paper prepared for presentation to "Ethics and Integrity of Governance: A Transatlantic Dialogue," Leuven, Belgium, June 2-5, 2005 http://soc.kuleuven.be/fo/ethics/paper/Paper%20WS5_pdf/Guy%20Adams.pdf, 24-28) Total guard aggression increased daily, even after prisoners had ceased any resistance and deterioration was visible. Prisoner rights were redefined as privileges, to be earned by obedient behavior. The experiment was planned for two weeks, but was terminated after six days. Five prisoners were released because of extreme emotional depression, crying, rage and/or acute anxiety. **Guards forced the prisoners to chant filthy songs, to defecate in buckets that were not emptied, and to clean toilets with their bare hands. They acted as if the prisoners were less than human and so did the prisoners** (Haney, Banks and Zimbardo, 1973, p.94): **At the end of only six days we had to close down our mock prison** because what we saw was frightening. **It was no longer apparent to us or most of the subjects where they ended and their roles began.** **The majority had indeed become "prisoners" or "guards," no longer able to clearly differentiate between role-playing and self. There were dramatic changes in virtually every aspect of their behavior, thinking and feeling.** In less than a week, the experience of imprisonment undid (temporarily) a lifetime of learning; human values were suspended, self-concepts were challenged, and the ugliest, most base, pathological side of human nature surfaced. We were horrified because **we saw some boys ("guards") treat other boys as if they were despicable animals, taking pleasure in cruelty, while other boys ("prisoners") became servile, dehumanized robots who thought only of escape, of their own individual survival,** and of their mounting hatred of the guards. This experiment suggests that group and **organizational roles and social structures play a far more powerful part in everyday human behavior** than most of us would consider. And we can see clearly how individual morality and **ethics can be swallowed and effectively erased by social roles and structures. One is rarely confronted with a clear, up-or-down decision on an ethical issue;** rather, **a series of small, usually ambiguous choices are made, and the weight of** commitments and of **habit drives out morality.** One does not have to be morally degenerate to become caught in a web of wrongdoing that may even cross the line into evil. **The skids are further greased if the situation is defined or presented as technical, or calling for expert judgment, or is legitimated,** either tacitly or explicitly, **by organizational authority,** as we shall see below. It becomes an even easier choice if the immoral behavior has itself been masked, redefined through a moral inversion as the "good" or "right" thing to do. Administrative Evil and Dehumanization **The Stanford prison experiment provides a fairly powerful explanation for** at least some of what happened at **Abu Ghraib.** But it also does not fully fit the specifics of the situation. Unlike the Stanford experiments, the guards did not act in an isolated and controlled environment, but were part of a larger organizational structure and political environment. They interacted regularly with all sorts of personnel, both directly and indirectly involved with the prisoners. They were in a remarkably chaotic environment, were by and large poorly prepared and trained for their roles, and were faced with both enormous danger and ambiguity. However, like the Stanford Prison Experiment, tacit permission was available to those who chose to accept it. In his ground-breaking book, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, Raul Hilberg observed that **a consensus for and the practice of mass murder coalesced among German bureaucrats in a manner** that (Hilberg, 1985, p.55), "...was not so much a product of laws and commands as it was a matter of spirit, of shared comprehension, of consonance and synchronization." In another study of mid-level bureaucrats and the Holocaust, Christopher Browning describes this process in some detail as he also found that direct orders were not needed for key functionaries to understand the direction that policy was to take (Browning, 1992, pp. 141-142): Instead, new signals and directions were given at the center, and with a ripple effect, these new signals set in motions waves that radiated outward... with the situations they found themselves in and the contacts they made, these three bureaucrats could not help but feel the ripples and be affected by the changing atmosphere and course of events. These were not stupid or inept people; they could read the signals, perceive what was expected of them, and adjust their behavior accordingly... It was their receptivity to such signals, and the speed with which they aligned themselves to the new policy, that allowed the Final Solution to emerge with so little internal friction and so little formal coordination. If something as horrific and

systematic as the Holocaust could be perpetrated **based more on a common understanding than upon direct orders**, it should not be difficult to imagine how abuse of detainees in Iraq and elsewhere occurred, with otherwise unacceptable behaviors substituting for ambiguous, standard operating procedures. **While the Nazi Holocaust was far, far worse** than anything that has happened during the American occupation of Iraq, **it has been amply demonstrated that Americans are not immune to the** types of social and **organizational conditions that make it possible** and seemingly permissible to violate the boundaries of morality and human decency, in at least some cases, without believing that they were doing anything wrong. It would be naïve to assume that the “few bad apples” acted alone, and that others in the system did not share and support the abuses as they went about their routines and did their jobs. Before and surrounding overt acts of evil, there are many more and much less obviously evil administrative activities that lead to and support the worst forms of human behavior. Moreover, without these instances of masked evil, the more overt and unmasked acts are less likely to occur (Staub, 1992, pp. 20-21). The apparent willingness and comfort level with taking photos and to be photographed while abusing prisoners seems to reflect the “normalcy” of the acts within the context of at least the night shift on Tiers 1A and 1B at Abu Ghraib (and is hauntingly similar to photos of atrocities sent home by SS personnel in World War II). In the camps and prisons run by the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan, orders and professional standards forbidding the abuse of prisoners and defining the boundaries of acceptable behavior for prison guards could be found in at least some locations posted on some walls, but were widely ignored by the perpetrators. Instead, we find a high stress situation, in which the expectation was to extract usable intelligence from detainees in order to help their comrades suppress a growing insurgency, find weapons of mass destruction, and prevent acts of terrorism. In this context, the power of group dynamics, social structures, and organizational ambiguities is readily seen. The normal inhibitions that might have prevented those who perpetrated the abuses from doing these evil deeds may have been further weakened by the shared belief that the prisoners were somehow less than human, and that getting information out of them was more important than protecting their rights and dignity as human beings. For example, in an interview with the BBC on June 15, 2004, Brig. General Janis Karpinski stated that she was told by General Geoffrey Miller – later placed in charge of Iraqi prisons and former commander at Guantanamo Bay – that the Iraqi prisoners, “...are like dogs and if you allow them to believe at any point that they are more than a dog then you’ve lost control of them.” Just as anti-Semitism was central to the attitudes of those who implemented the policy of mass murder in the Holocaust, the abuses **at Abu Ghraib** may have been facilitated by an atmosphere that dehumanized the detainees. In effect, these **detainees, with their ambiguous legal status, could be seen as a “surplus population,” living outside the protections of civilized society** (Rubenstein, 1983). **And when organizational dynamics combine with a tendency to dehumanize and/or demonize a vulnerable group, the stage is set for the mask of administrative evil.**

Links

A2) Other countries want our help

No they don't. In fact, the Iraqi government hasn't wanted our help since 2011

Sam **Dagher**, The Wall Street Journal, "Iraqi Prime Minister Says U.S. Forces Must Leave On Time - WSJ", December 28, 2010, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204685004576045700275218580>

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki ruled out the presence of any U.S. troops in Iraq after the end of 2011, saying his new government and the country's security forces were capable of confronting any remaining threats to Iraq's security, sovereignty and unity. WSJ Exclusive: Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki In his first

media interview since the Iraqi Parliament confirmed his new cabinet in December, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sat down for an exclusive conversation with The Wall Street Journal's Sam Dagher. Here are some excerpts. Mr. Maliki spoke with The Wall Street Journal in a two-hour interview, his first since Iraq ended nine months of stalemate and seated a new government after an inconclusive election, allowing Mr. Maliki to begin a second term as premier. A majority of Iraqis—and some Iraqi and U.S. officials—have assumed the U.S. troop presence would eventually be extended, especially after the long government limbo. But **Mr. Maliki was eager to draw a line in his most definitive remarks on the subject. "The last American soldier will leave Iraq" as agreed, he said, speaking at his office in a leafy section of Baghdad's protected Green Zone. "This agreement is not subject to extension, not subject to alteration. It is sealed."**

Syrians strongly oppose the United States Government Action

Doug Rivers, HuffPost, "Do Ordinary Syrians Want the U.S. to Intervene? | HuffPost", September 12, 2013,

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-rivers/syrian-public-opinion_b_3915550.html

Most of the reporting on the Syrian crisis, aside from occasional man-on-the-street interviews in Damascus, has come from outside Syria. The internet and mobile technology allow the voices of ordinary Syrians to be part of this debate. YouGov operates market research panels around the world and over the past week has interviewed 835 Syrians (500 mobile, 335 internet). **Many say their homes have been bombed and are displaced (one unlucky person four times!).** The sister of another respondent lost her eye. They all have stories to tell, including this one from a respondent with a poetic touch: The homeland is like the tender mother. As in life, when the mother gets sick — the pillar of the family — all other family members get affected with her sickness and their life changes... Everything changed for the worse of course and the smile was wiped of all faces. This is not a representative sample: three-quarters are male, over half are under 30 years old, and just under 50 percent say they have a university degree. Most are poor (with monthly incomes under \$266) and Sunni Muslims. But the sample also contains 248 supporters of the Assad regime, 152 opponents and a larger number who support neither side or prefer not to tell us. Through their differences and — perhaps more surprisingly — their points of agreement, these interviews provide a unique window on Syrian public opinion in a place where ordinary polling is impossible. **Most respondents, regardless of whom they support, are much more likely to think that chemical weapons were used than were not.** Even among supporters of the government 48 percent think that chemical weapons were used and only 31 percent think not. Who do these Syrians think used chemical weapons? Not surprisingly, most of the government supporters who think chemical weapons were used blame the opposition forces (by a 78-21 margin), while opponents believe the reverse by about the same margin (74-18). Those who are unaligned split about equally. Thus, without knowing the proportion of the population in each group, it's hard to say whom most Syrians believe is responsible. On other matters, YouGov's respondents exhibit remarkable agreement. **More opponents of the regime strongly disapprove of a U.S. military strike than favor it. 81 percent of government supporters, as well as 56 percent of those who prefer not to say. There's little evidence that ordinary Syrians favor an attack. In fact, distrust of America is nearly unanimous among Syrian poll-takers. Only 7 percent of those interviewed thought that the U.S. government was "a friend of the Syrian people."** There wasn't much disagreement on this point among supporters and opponents of Assad. 79 percent of supporters, 61 percent of opponents and 57 percent of non-aligned said the U.S. was "an enemy of the Syrian people." Who do they think is their ally? Nearly all (77 percent) think Russia is a friend of the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad. Supporters of the government tend to equate this with being a friend of the Syrian people (by about the same proportion). Opponents and non-aligned respondents are less likely to think Russia is a friend of the Syrian people, though only a few offer an explanation ("because they are not sending their people to kill my people" and "Russia is a historic friend of the Syrian people"). Opponents and those who support neither the government nor the rebels are often quite cynical about Russian motives: "Because they support the death machine," "The weapons that kill Syrians are Russian," **"They care only about their own financial, political, and economic interests" and "No one cares about the interests of the Syrian people." More of the regime opponents think Russia is their friend (39%) compared to those who think the U.S. is their friend (only 12 percent), but few seem to have confidence in any foreign power.**

General

A2) Other countries intervene, so why can't we?

The difference is that the American foreign policy machine, as explained in the Greenwald card, doesn't follow the rules. Everybody thinks that because America is the Greatest Country to Ever Exist in the History of Ever, they have no obligation to follow the rules. Other countries look to international law when deciding whether to intervene; the United States does not. Even if other countries also don't follow the rules, the impacts are still real. The US still gets involved in endless conflicts and still kills a lot of people.

Besides that, US Intervention is just not as helpful as other countries

Micah **Zenko** [Senior Fellow, Chatham House], "Terrorism Is Booming Almost Everywhere But in the United States," Foreign Policy Magazine, June 15 2015.

Available at: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/19/terrorism-is-booming-almost-everywhere-but-in-the-united-states-state-department-report/>

With that relatively limited definition of terrorism in mind, there are five significant findings that stand out from the latest report. First, the phenomenon of terrorism has significantly worsened, in terms of the number of attacks, their lethality, as well as the size of terrorist organizations. The number of attacks increased 39 percent from 9,707 in 2013 to 13,463 last year. There were 17,891 fatalities in 2013, growing 83 percent to 32,727 in 2014. To give you a fuller sense of how vastly contemporary terrorism has grown, just a little over a dozen years ago, in 2002, only 725 people were killed worldwide. During President Barack Obama's first full year in office, in 2010, it was 13,186. In other words, terrorist-related deaths grew by more than 4,000 percent from 2002 and by 148 percent from 2010 to 2014. The size of several groups grew in strength, in particular the self-declared Islamic State, which was estimated to include both between 1,000 and 2,000 members in Iraq and a "significant portion" of the 26,000 extremist fighters in Syria in 2013, and grew in strength to between 20,000 and 31,500 fighters in 2014. Boko Haram also expanded from "hundreds to a few thousand" to "several thousand" fighters. In addition, there were 33 new organizations identified as perpetrators of terrorist attacks in 2014, indicating that more groups are forming to employ this deadly tactic.

A2) Nothing will change

Finally on the alt, the k is purely pre-fiat: we admit that no US government policy changes will take place as a result of negating (or affirming), so it doesn't create that world at all.

A2) The United States needs to take preemptive measures

Preemptive measures come from US imperialism.

Kuang and Bonk in 5 (Xinnian and Jim, prof. of modern Chinese literature at Tsinghua University and prof. of East Asian studies at Princeton, Duke University, Preemptive War and a World Out of Control, 13(1), p. 160-161)pl

America's invasion of Iraq has damaged the authority of the United Nations and the principle of the inviolability of national sovereignty. Before the war broke out, Bush repeatedly sent out warnings in which he stated that if the Security Council refused to pass a resolution authorizing the use of force, the United Nations would become irrelevant. Some hawks in the administration and conservative newspapers even threatened that the United States could withdraw from the United

Nations, bringing it to an ignominious end. **The strategy of preemption as espoused by American neoconservatism, along with new interpretations of sovereignty, will bring about a revolution in the twenty-first century, and the war in Iraq will serve as a model. The United States will use its neo-imperialist imagination in an attempt to recreate the so-called rogue states and restore world order. The strategy of preemption is a sign of America's abandonment of both traditional Western international regulatory systems** and the principle of rule by law as established under the U.N. charter. Instead, **America is bringing about the**

return to an era where naked power takes preeminence. At a press conference held June 27, 2003, after talks with the French minister of foreign affairs, Dominique de Villepin, Nelson Mandela commented on this shift: "Since the establishment of the U.N., there have been no world wars; therefore, anybody, and particularly the leaders of the superpowers, who takes unilateral action outside the frame of the U.N. must receive the condemnation of all who love peace." On a visit to Ireland on June 20, 2003, he went on to say, "Any organization, any country, any movement that now decides to sideline the United Nations, that country and its leader are a danger to the world. We cannot allow the world to again degenerate into a place where the will of the powerful dominates over all other considerations."4 The strategy of preemption is not simply a military strategy, but is, in fact, a kind of barbaric politics, a serious attack against civilized humanity. It is ultimately tied to the question of whether the world is seeking civilization and order, or whether it is entering into a period of violence and chaos. The United States' adoption of this strategy provoked the intense opposition of Europe and, indeed, the entire world because many believe that a strategy of preemption would take the world in the latter direction. As a result of the IraqWar, a deep rift was opened up between America and its western European allies, to which the media now frequently affix the label "Old Europe." Modern history, beginning in 1492, has been a Eurocentric history of colonialism, imperialism, and expansion. However, **the United States has replaced Europe as imperialist colonizer. The imagination of American neoconservative politics has inspired the United States to become a tyrannical and self-appointed hegemon, willfully changing global boundaries, and a particularly intense force for the destruction of world order.** Europe, on the other hand, has become a force for rationality and civilization. The dispute that arose between Europe and America during the Iraq War was both a conflict of potential profit and a sign of civilizational disparity.

A2) American Exceptionalism isn't what you say it is

Obama's rhetorical use of American Exceptionalism was a ploy to hide his many misdeeds while president

Karen **Tumulty**, Washington Post, "American exceptionalism, explained - The Washington Post", September 12, 2013,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/09/12/american-exceptionalism-explained/?utm_term=.a7cf213cf88f

The first part of his answer has given ammunition to many of his critics on the right. "I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism," Obama said. **Quoted far less often is the**

rest of his answer. It was an affirmation of exceptionalism, though arguably a redefinition of the concept. In addition to the world's largest economy and military, Obama said: "We have a core set of values that are enshrined in our Constitution, in our body of law, in our democratic practices, in our belief in free speech and equality, **that, though imperfect, are exceptional!**.... I see no contradiction between believing that America has a continued

extraordinary role in leading the world towards peace and prosperity and recognizing that leadership is incumbent, depends on, our ability to create partnerships because we can't solve these problems alone." In his nationally televised speech on Syria Tuesday night, Obama turned to American exceptionalism as a call to action for an endeavor in which this country stands isolated in the world. "America is not the world's policeman. Terrible things happen across the globe, and it is beyond our means to right every wrong," Obama said. "But when, with modest

effort and risk, we can stop children from being gassed to death, and thereby make our own children safer over the long run, I believe we should act." He added: "That's what makes America different. That's what makes us exceptional." **Skeptics wrote off that passage of his speech as desperate and opportunistic. Obama employed American exceptionalism as "a useful rhetorical tool to help him escape the trap that he is in, and the trap is one of his own making," said conservative columnist Peter Wehner, a former George W. Bush White House official who is now a senior fellow at the conservative Ethics and Public Policy Center.**

EXTEND

Trump Bad

Trump's specific brand of American Exceptionalism is even more dangerous

Peter **Beinart**, The Atlantic, "Donald Trump's American Exceptionalism - The Atlantic", February 2, 20**17**, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/how-trump-wants-to-make-america-exceptional-again/515406/>
Trump and his aides, by contrast, **place[s] the primary blame** for non-integration **on Europe's Muslim immigrants** themselves. And Miller suggests that if current trends continue, American Muslims will prove just as dangerous and unassimilable as their European counterparts. **It's a deeply pessimistic vision. Neither Trump nor** any of **his aides**, as far as I know, **has proposed policies to help** American **Muslims embrace opportunity** and avoid radicalization. **All they've done is try to reduce the number coming into the country. The implication is that what will make America exceptional is** not its success in integrating Muslims but **its success in keeping them out.** Steve Bannon has all but said that. "If we didn't hit the pause button today, is it already locked up that we're going to be importing at least a couple of million Muslims whatever happens?" he asked a guest on his Breitbart show in December 2015. This is what truly differentiates Trump's exceptionalism story from its predecessors. For Lipset, Bell, Romney, Gingrich, and Obama, what made America exceptional were its people's habits and ideas. **For Trump, what makes America exceptional is the fact that its people are overwhelmingly Jewish and Christian.** For Obama, what made America exceptional was its ability to foster a national identity that transcended tribe and sect. And for Trump? Making America exceptional again requires abandoning that as a dangerous dream.

TURNS

Bubble

Turn their case: American Supremacy and Exceptionalism is a bubble waiting to pop, and if we ignore it and allow it to pop violently MORE violence will ensue as a result: We need a controlled deflation instead

George **Soros**, The Atlantic, "The Bubble of American Supremacy - The Atlantic", December 2003,

<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/12/the-bubble-of-american-supremacy/302851/>

To explain the significance of the transition, I should like to draw on my experience in the financial markets. **Stock markets often give rise to a boom-bust process, or bubble. Bubbles do not grow out of thin air. They have a basis in reality—but reality as distorted by a misconception.** Under normal conditions misconceptions are self-correcting, and the markets tend toward some kind of equilibrium. **Occasionally, a misconception is reinforced by a trend** prevailing in reality, and that is when a boom-bust process gets under way. **Eventually the gap between reality and its false interpretation becomes unsustainable, and the bubble bursts.** Exactly when the boom-bust process enters far-from-equilibrium territory can be established only in retrospect. During the self-reinforcing phase participants are under the spell of the prevailing bias. Events seem to confirm their beliefs, strengthening their misconceptions. This widens the gap and sets the stage for a moment of truth and an eventual reversal. When that reversal comes, it is liable to have devastating consequences. This course of events seems to have an inexorable quality, but a boom-bust process can be aborted at any stage, and the adverse effects can be reduced or avoided altogether. Few bubbles reach the extremes of the information-technology boom that ended in 2000. **The sooner the process is aborted, the better. The quest for American supremacy qualifies as a bubble. The dominant position the United States occupies in the world is the element of reality that is being distorted. The proposition that the United States will be better off if it uses its position to impose its values and interests everywhere is the misconception.** It is exactly by not abusing its power that America attained its current position. Where are we in this boom-bust process? **The deteriorating situation in Iraq is either the moment of truth** or a test that, if it is successfully overcome, will only reinforce the trend. Whatever the justification for removing Saddam Hussein, there can be no doubt that we invaded Iraq on false pretenses. Wittingly or unwittingly, President Bush deceived the American public and Congress and rode roughshod over the opinions of our allies. The gap between the Administration's expectations and the actual state of affairs could not be wider. It is difficult to think of a recent military operation that has gone so wrong. Our soldiers have been forced to do police duty in combat gear, and they continue to be killed. We have put at risk not only our soldiers' lives but the combat effectiveness of our armed forces. Their morale is impaired, and we are no longer in a position to properly project our power. Yet there are more places than ever before where we might have legitimate need to project that power. North Korea is openly building nuclear weapons, and Iran is clandestinely doing so. The Taliban is regrouping in Afghanistan. The costs of occupation and the prospect of permanent war are weighing heavily on our economy, and we are failing to address many festering problems—domestic and global. **If we ever needed proof that the dream of American supremacy is misconceived, the occupation of Iraq has provided it. If we fail to heed the evidence, we will have to pay a heavier price in the future.** Meanwhile, largely as a result of our preoccupation with supremacy, something has gone fundamentally wrong with the war on terrorism. Indeed, war is a false metaphor in this context. Terrorists do pose a threat to our national and personal security, and we must protect ourselves. Many of the measures we have taken are necessary and proper. It can even be argued that not enough has been done to prevent future attacks. But **the war being waged has little to do with ending terrorism or enhancing homeland security; on the contrary, it endangers our security by engendering a vicious circle of escalating violence.**