We negate Resolved: The United Nations should grant India a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

## Contention 1 is Pakistan

There is no chance of a conflict between India and Pakistan now, only voting aff changes this for 2 reasons.

First, is Absence of Resolutions

**Rafiq writes in 2019** that resolutions are coming to resolve the dispute in Kashmir, with Pakistan and India willing to comply. Empirically these have worked, **Haegeland wrote in 2018** that they generated ceasefires in 1948 and 1965. This is the only way to resolve the conflict, **Reddy in 2016** writes that UN resolutions are the only fair and impartial actor that can be accepted by both sides. However, these only work with full support from the UNSC. **Billy Merck finds that** resolutions require enforcement and resources from all member states in order to be effective. Unfortunately, **Dawn wrote in 2015** an Indian veto destroys the possibility of a chance for the resolutions to be fair and balanced. In addition, Pakistan would not accept India as a permanent seat on the security council due to their non-compliance with recent resolutions.

Second, is India

**Dabhade in 2017** found that as a permanent member India would assume the mantle of security decision-making and would gain needed leverage for geo-political clout, moving from a rule taker to a rule maker. **Nawaz in 2019 reported** the harms finding that it would destabilize the region by fueling regional conflict, as countries like the US would always side with India in the security council, which only amplify India’s use of brutal force in the region. Indeed, **Mishra in 2017 writes that** if India joins Pakistan won’t be able to raise the issue in the UN, leaving Pakistan diplomatically isolated and Pakistan will never have the chance to raise their flag over Kashmir again.

The impact is war.

**Robertson in 2019 finds that** tensions are incredibly high in the region, meaning that war could spill over with an attack similar to the one in Pulwama, especially with nuclear weapons in the play. Dr**. Jeff Masters of the India Times reports** that an Indo-Pak conventional war could go nuclear immediately killing 45 million, killing hundreds of millions of more through disease and leading to a nuclear winter that could kill 2 billion. Thankfully, the current security council could get ceasefires to prevent the conflict from going nuclear, per the Reddy in 2016. **Kyle Mizokami concludes** that even conventional war between the 2 countries could lead to millions of deaths.

## Contention 2 is the responsibility to protect

India has consistently opposed the international doctrine of the responsibility to protect, or R2P. **Bellamy, Professor of International Security**, explains R2P as the notion that global superpowers have an obligation to intervene to prevent genocide and mass atrocities. The council plays a crucial role in these interventions. **Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect writes** that since 2005 the Security Council has adopted 70 resolutions that refer to R2P with regard to the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Syria and eight other country situations.

It is vital that India is not given veto power over these decisions. As **Bommakanti with the Observer Research Foundation, explained in 2017**: because R2P is largely supported by Western powers, India views them with cynicism and opposes actions such as the U.N.-supported intervention in Syria on the grounds that it constitutes imperialism. **He concludes** that had they been a permanent member during previous interventions, India could have stopped an international coalition from preventing potential genocides, and that if they were granted permanent membership today they would be sure to oppose the responsibility to protect.

There are two impacts to blocking R2P.

First is state instability. **Bellamy** again writes that implementing the doctrine has involved comprehensive efforts to reduce underlying sources of risk, building national resilience, and preventing the escalation of crises and conflicts into violence against civilian populations. This has meant comprehensive mediation, preventative diplomacy, and targeted sanctions to deter and challenge widespread violence. **Petty, a Senior U.S. Defense Official**, explains that genocide and mass civilian killings produce long-term regional instability. They feed other national security threats such as terrorist recruitment, human trafficking, prolonged civil strife, and millions of refugees flowing into already unstable countries.

Second is U.N. credibility. **Grover writes in the International Journal of Human Rights** that failure to implement R2P destroys the credibility of the U.N. because it’s seen as an ‘act of aggression’ against international sovereignty, and that R2P is a principle which goes to the heart of the international rule of law and the very authority of the UN as a mechanism of international peace. Upholding credibility is critical to preventing regional conflict escalation. **Former Defense Secretary Hagel wrote** that addressing terrorism, nuclear prolif, disease, and poverty require the U.N. It has played an essential role in peacekeeping that stabilized entire regions. It is the only organization that can resolve international conflicts. Which is why **Georgetown Law Professor Brooks** writes that it has singlehandedly prevented the spread of war and the magnitude of conflict, saving millions of lives since WWII by avoiding unprecedented disasters.

## Evidence

#### Rafiq

Arif Rafiq, 03/02/19, “India-Pakistan crisis: don’t be fooled, nuclear war is one step closer – and the stalemate has just begun,” https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2188316/india-pakistan-crisis-dont-be-fooled-nuclear-war-one-step-closer

Make no mistake. The India-Pakistan crisis prompted by the February 14 militant attack on Indian paramilitary forces in [Kashmir](https://www.scmp.com/topics/kashmir) is far from over. Even if the two countries have – for now – resisted escalating hostilities following air strikes on each other’s territories, the situation could scarcely be more serious. That two nuclear power states have engaged in military action against one another marks the first step along a path of escalation that – in a worst-case scenario – could result in the use of nuclear weapons. A quick resolution to the dispute is unlikely. Instead, what we are likely to see is a prolonged stalemate over the coming weeks and perhaps months, as India heads toward general elections in the spring and expects [Pakistan](https://www.scmp.com/topics/pakistan)to take action against Jaish-e Muhammad (JeM) leader Masood Azhar, whose group claimed responsibility for the suicide bombing. On Thursday, after Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan pledged to release a captured Indian air force pilot, Indian Prime Minister  [Narendra Modi](https://www.scmp.com/topics/narendra-modi) addressed a domestic audience and projected a willingness to take the conflict further. In apparent reference to an Indian air force incursion into Pakistani territory on Tuesday, he said: “After a pilot project is completed, it can be made scalable. A pilot project has been implemented. Now a real [project] must be done. The previous one was [just] practice.” These words may merely be part of a face-saving effort by a man whose party projected him as someone with a “56-inch chest” during the 2014 general elections. The myth of Modi as an economic reformer and strong leader has been dented, if not significantly damaged, in the aftermath of the demonetisation debacle and the February 14 attack. Indian escalatory actions, crossing into Pakistani air space for the first time in almost 50 years, indicate the reputational pressures Modi perceives he is under. Either New Delhi did not forecast serious Pakistani actions – misjudging its ability to prevent an air strike by the Indian air force and retaliate to the incursion – or Modi’s kitchen cabinet concluded that the risks were worth it, given the need to look strong as elections near.The exact role of the United States and other global and regional powers in preventing the crisis from worsening is unclear. But US President [Donald Trump](https://www.scmp.com/topics/donald-trump)  hinted at an American role during a press conference in Hanoi this week. And US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, as well some of his Gulf Arab counterparts, appear to have been in communication with Islamabad and New Delhi. Continued ad hoc crisis diplomacy by great and regional powers is likely. Western countries plan to push forward sanctions at the United Nations Security Council against terrorist leader Azhar, further constraining his group’s ability to operate in Pakistan. The US, France, Britain and India will press China not to block those sanctions. Regardless of whether the sanctions go ahead, Pakistan will have to take further action against JeM and other terrorist groups, given that it is currently on the grey list of the anti-terrorism Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and must implement its demands before another review this year. Pakistani moves to comply with FATF and potential UNSC requirements may ultimately trigger meaningful de-escalation in the subcontinent. But conditions in Indian-occupied Kashmir are likely to continue, making the volatility endure.

#### Haegland

Hannah Haegeland, 2018, “CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT,” http://crises.stimson.org/conflictresolution/

The Kashmir dispute lies at the heart of Pakistan-India tensions and conflict. Pakistan regards Kashmir as an unfinished agenda of the partition of British India and emphasizes the Kashmiris’ right to choose between the two successor states. India anchors its position in a controversial accession document.1 Immediately after independence, when fighting broke out over Kashmir, India took the matter to the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) which called for a ceasefire and plebiscite, followed by several U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions to sort out differences on procedure and conditions.2 Initially, the question of withdrawing troops as well as Pakistan-backed tribesmen from the state territory proved insurmountable. Later, India demurred on the resolutions and invoked circumstantial changes following Pakistan’s membership in U.S.sponsored alliances in the mid-1950s.3 During the intermittent negotiations over the years, India insisted on formalizing the status quo.Kashmir stirs deep emotions in Pakistan as a large segment of the population in eastern Punjab shares common ethnicity in addition to centuries old cultural links. On the other hand, India regards the part of Kashmir under its control as a symbol of India’s multi-religious and multicultural democratic persona.Efforts to resolve Kashmir gradually shifted from the UNSC-recommended plebiscite to focus on subregions of the erstwhile princely state, as evident in the 1950 Owen Dixon plan.4 This subregional approach — echoed five decades later in the four-point formula — evolved through back channel diplomacy initiated by President Pervez Musharaf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.5 The subregional approach implicitly concedes that a new political dispensation is required for areas of large Kashmiri demographics, especially the valley where political alienation and agitation is chronic and exerts constant pressure on New Delhi to look for an acceptable settlement.6 The 1948 and 1965 India-Pakistan Wars were centered on Kashmir and ended in a ceasefire through active UNSC intercession. The 1965 war prompted an ex-traregional mediation effort by the Soviet Union resulting in the 1966 Tashkent Declaration. The third ceasefire, formalized under UNSC Resolution 307, came in December 1971 when India took advantage of a civil war situation to intervene militarily to break up Pakistan. The episode was unrelated to Kashmir, but the cessation of hostilities on the western front established a new Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir and led to the bilaterally negotiated Simla Agreement, which is among the foundational documents meant to govern post-1971 relations between the two countries.

#### Reddy

B. Muralidhar Reddy, 07/10/16, “UN resolution only way to resolve Kashmir issue: Pakistan,” https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/south-asia/UN-resolution-only-way-to-resolve-Kashmir-issue-Pakistan/article14481621.ece

Since the signing of the 1972 Simla Agreement, India has contended that the U.N. Resolution has become redundant as both sides had agreed to resolve the Kashmir issue through mutual negotiations. “Pakistan reiterates that the resolution of the Kashmir dispute is only possible through the realisation of the right to self-determination of the people of Kashmir, as per UNSC resolutions, through a fair and impartial plebiscite under U.N. auspices”, the Pakistan Foreign Office said.

#### Merck

Billy Merck, https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1269&context=gjicl

India and Pakistan have been involved in a dispute over the Kashmir region for about fifty-six years. The conflict is a continuing threat to international peace and security. Upon the end of British colonial rule, each princely state decided to accede to either India or Pakistan, or to become an independent state. Kashmir initially opted for independence but then acceded to India in exchange for Indian military assistance against invading Pakistan, thus beginning a conflict over Kashmir that has lasted until the present day. In recent years, the tensions have heightened with increased engagements across the Line of Control and with the development and testing nuclear weapons by each nation. The nuclear aspect of the conflict makes it a matter of concern not only for the region but also for the entire world. The relationship of the conflict to terrorism also underscores its nature as a conflict of international concern. It is in the best interest of the entire world for the conflict to be resolved both quickly and finally. The use of nuclear weapons is generally illegal under international law except in cases of self-defense in which the very existence of a state is threatened. It is under precisely these circumstances that a nuclear exchange would be most likely between India and Pakistan. Since international law is an insufficient deterrent to nuclear conflict, and because there are political conditions which make it highly unlikely that both nations will sign the CTBT, the Kashmir conflict needs to be resolved to avert a possible nuclear show- down over Kashmir. The United Nations Security Council was asked to authorize the use of force against Iraq to enforce U.N.S.C. resolutions regarding its development of weapons of mass destruction. Kashmir is a greater threat to international peace and security than Iraq was prior to the 2003 U.S.-led war because both India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons, there is a more definite link between the Kashmir conflict and terrorism, there is an ongoing military conflict in the region, and the conflict contributes to current domestic political instability in the two countries. The U.N.S.C. was involved in the Iraq situation, and since the Kashmir situation poses a greater threat, the U.N.S.C. should move it to the forefront of its agenda, as should the United States. For action taken by the U.N.S.C. to be effective, it must be supported by resources and enforcement from member states. Since the end of the Cold War in 1990, a new custom has developed within the U.N.S.C. of authorizing a U.S.-led coalition to enforce major resolutions. The state practice that has established this custom include the Persian Gulf War, the humanitarian mission in Somalia, the enforcement of the no-fly zone in Bosnia, the action to replace the democratic government in Haiti, and the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo. Evidence of acceptance of this practice as a customary rule is found in U.N.S.C. votes, in participation in U.S.-led actions, and in acceptance of U.N.S.C. resolutions by affected states. The unique position of the United States as the world's sole superpower and the custom that has subsequently developed present a singular opportunity for the United Nations and the United States to work together to resolve the Kashmir dispute.

#### Dawn

Dawn, 02/22/15, https://www.dawn.com/news/1163163

Pakistan made it clear to the United States on Thursday it would not accept India as a permanent member of United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif expressed these reservations while speaking with US President Barack Obama on the phone, the PM House said in a statement. The prime minister said India cannot become a UNSC permanent member due to its non-compliance of all the resolutions passed by UN regarding Kashmir, added the spokesman. The US president called Nawaz in the evening where both the leaders discussed issues of mutual interest and those related to regional stability and peace for over half-an-hour, said the statement. The spokesman said the prime minister made it clear upon the US president that permanent slot for India at the UNSC will not be tolerated at any cost as India has not fulfilled any resolution passed by UN aimed at assuring the right of self determination for the people of Kashmir.

#### **Dabhade**

Dabhade 2017, Observer Research Foundation, Occasional Papers, 12/15/2017, “India’s Pursuit of United Nations Security Council Reforms,” <https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-pursuit-united-nations-security-council-reforms/> (Manish S. Dabhade is an Assistant Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament in the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and Convener of the Indian Diplomacy Research Group. His teaching and research interests include diplomacy history, theory and practice, with a special reference to India.)

Foremost in Indian calculus, however, lies the Indian aspiration of the institutionalised big power status the permanent seat in the Security Council would confer on India right away. Being a “pen holder” as the permanent member of the Security Council, India would similarly assume the mantle of international peace and security decision-making. India sees itself carrying the necessary abilities, actual and potential, which entitles it to a permanent seat at the Council. Further, the seat on the high table, at the UN’s premier, powerful body would provide it the much needed leverage to expand its global geo-political and geo-economic clout. It would serve as an equaliser to China, its rival and an emerging hegemon in Asia, and an ever increasing strategic and security concern in its immediate neighbourhood and beyond. India has always seen itself as a democratic alternative to the authoritarian China. India’s millennia old civilizational existence also demands it to be at the top of the international hierarchy of states.

As India’s international profile and capabilities rise due to its ever expanding global and regional footprint in diverse areas such as politics, development, economics, culture and science and technology, India wishes to shift its international position from a rule taker (a constrained role) to a rule maker (a system shaping role). The Indian attempts at joining various regimes like the MTCR and the ongoing, high-pitched campaign to join the NSG amply indicate that India is no more satisfied with being either the target or a mere follower of various international norms and rules, and now wants to shape and align them to suit Indian ideas and interests.

In conclusion, and most significantly, Indian hopes significantly rest on an acknowledgement by the UN itself of the need to expand the UNSC. In an interview to The Guardian (2015), former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that the Security Council must either reform or risk becoming increasingly irrelevant: “If we don’t change the council, we risk a situation where the primacy of the council may be challenged by some of the new emerging countries.”

#### Nawaz

Shamsa Nawaz, 07/11/19, “Violation of the UN Resolutions on Kashmir: India’s Quest for UNSC Permanent Membership,” http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/10-SS\_Shamsa\_Nawaz\_No-1\_2018.pdf

On the other hand, Pakistan advocates the UNSC resolutions for the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. It upholds an independent plebiscite a lawful procedure to determine the status of Jammu and Kashmir while considering the fact that the complaint on Kashmir was initiated by India to the UNSC. The UNSC itself decided on holding a free and independent plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir while rejecting India’s claims. The UNCIP has already mediated for the plebiscite agreed under specified conditions.

Shamsa Nawaz, 07/11/19, “Violation of the UN Resolutions on Kashmir: India’s Quest for UNSC Permanent Membership,” <http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/10-SS_Shamsa_Nawaz_No-1_2018.pdf>

In order to echo its significance as a major power of South Asia, India desires for permanent membership of the UNSC. It [and] is willing to let go of the veto power as well initially. So far, it has a support of 122 members out of 193 countries in the UN including the US.32 It has been blocked by China and Pakistan till now. The emerging strategic partnership between India and the US has the potential to change the course of events in Asia. The significance that the US assigns to India is primarily due to its burgeoning economy and trade-driven foreign policy. By the convergence of interests, both India and the US have evolved a strategic partnership since 2004, with the signing of civil-nuclear deal. It would help India in expanding its footprints in the region and the world to eventually get her a permanent seat in the UNSC. The permanent seat in the UNSC will also give India a formal status as a nuclear power with the greater legitimacy of initiatives, whether wrong or right. **This would certainly have a potential to destabilise the region by fuelling regional confrontation and conflicts**. Even the very existence of Pakistan would be endangered since the division of the Subcontinent remains a sore point in the Indian politics. The UNSC still upholds legitimacy for a worldwide action. It is crucial in maintaining the international order while looking after the super powers interests. However, it is difficult to see the role of the UN in such a world order more than a rubber-stamp. For example, the UN was emasculated when Iraq was invaded and Afghanistan was attacked. There is no doubt that the rise of China is very important and the rise of India is also noteworthy. Similarly, resurgence of Russia is also an important development. However, the US still remains a major power in the world in terms of military, economics and technology. It would not hesitate to use the UN by the help of its close allies and for their interests. Though, Pakistan is an important ally of the US, particularly in the War on Terrorism (WoT), yet, the US would steer clear of using the UN identically as it did in other parts of the world.

Shamsa Nawaz, 07/11/19, “Violation of the UN Resolutions on Kashmir: India’s Quest for UNSC Permanent Membership,” http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/10-SS\_Shamsa\_Nawaz\_No-1\_2018.pdf

The use of the brutal force by India is impertinence to an international organisation. It compounds vulnerability for peaceful world governance. The functions and the powers of the UNSC under the UN Charter are to maintain international peace and security and investigate the disputes, which eventually might lead to any international friction. The threats, which might violate peace, are also determined and terms of settlement are recommended. The UN needs to assume its role more assertively. Furthermore, the US support to India’s bid for a permanent seat in the UNSC would give a free rein to India to continue with the violation of international norms and further lead to the failure of yet another crisis management body.

#### Mishra

Kartikeya Mishra, 03/06/17, “Why is Pakistan opposing India to be a permanent member of the UNSC?” https://www.quora.com/Why-is-Pakistan-opposing-India-to-be-a-permanent-member-of-the-UNSC

First of all ,Pakistan’s say in International community is very limited so it can hardly oppose or effect any country’s candidature in UNSC alone. Since you have asked this question, I would assume you are asking why Pakistan does not “want” India to be a permanent member of UNSC. The points are really infinite but I will list down some major points. The pivot of Pakistan’s whole diplomacy, internal politics of leaders,foreign policy is Kashmir issue.Pakistan have been using its full energy in international forums like UNO, SAARC etc just only to draw attention of international community to Kashmir issue and at least make this issue “some “ relevant.The current position of India in international community irritates Pakistan because no country in the world want to deteriorate its relations with world’s fastest growing market. **If India becomes the permanent member of UNSC, Pakistan will not even be to able to raise Kashmir issue in UNO as India will veto all the matter to its own advantage**. Pakistan considers India its biggest enemy and have tried to check growing India’s influence in world by orchestrating state sponsored terrorist attacks ,circulating counterfeit currency in Indian market,opposing India’s each and every policy no matter it effect Pakistan or not. Pakistan fears if India becomes the permanent member it will not only use its position to cripple Pakistan’s already sinking economy but also [and] hamper its any further attempts to hurt India by threatening Pakistan to impose sanctions. Ever since the independence of Pakistan, elections are won ,democratic regimes have been suppressed and taken over my military just by creating of perception of having tough or soft instance on India and Kashmir issue. **If India becomes the permanent member of UNSC, Pakistan will have to painfully give away its lingering desire of one day hosting Pakistan flag in Kashmir forever.**

#### Robertson

<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-02-28/india-pakistan-brink-of-war/10856536> - **tensions high**

#### Masters

Jeff Masters, 03/01/19, https://weather.com/en-IN/india/news/news/2019-03-01-nuclear-winter-from-an-india-pakistan-war-could-kill-2-billion

As nuclear-armed India and Pakistan engage in military clashes over the disputed Kashmir region, consider that a “limited” nuclear war between them is capable of causing a catastrophic global nuclear winter that could kill two billion people. The inevitable wars and diseases that would break out could kill hundreds of millions more. A 2008 paper by Brian Toon of the University of Colorado, Alan Robock of Rutgers University, and Rich Turco of UCLA, "Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War", concluded that a war between India and Pakistan using fifty Hiroshima-sized weapons with 15-kiloton yield on each country, exploded on cities, would immediately kill or injure about forty-five million people. However, the final toll would be global and astronomically higher, according to recent research. The most recent study of the environmental aftermath of a nuclear conflict, Mills et al. 2014, Multidecadal global cooling and unprecedented ozone loss following a regional nuclear conflict, used an Earth system climate model including atmospheric chemistry, ocean dynamics, and interactive sea ice and land components, to investigate a limited nuclear war where each side detonates fifty 15-kiloton weapons over urban areas—less than half of the existing arsenals of the approximately 140 warheads each that India and Pakistan have. These urban explosions were assumed to start 100 firestorms. Firestorms are self-feeding fires that suck air into themselves and generate immense columns of rising smoke which lofts into the stratosphere, where it spreads globally. The model predicted the smoke would block enough sunlight for the Earth to experience the coldest temperatures since the last ice age, thousands of years ago.

#### **Mizokami**

Kyle Mizokami, 02/18/19, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/millions-could-perish-5-weapons-india-would-use-war-against-pakistan-44907

Millions could die.. Recently India alleged a series of ceasefire violations—in the form of automatic weapons fire—by Pakistan on the border between the two countries. According to India, it was the [sixth attack in just five days](http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Pakistan-fires-at-Indian-positions-on-LoC/articleshow/40247759.cms). Such events are a reminder that tension remains high on the Indian subcontinent. The nuclear arsenals of both sides—and the red lines that would trigger their use—have made conventional war much more risky to conduct. The 1999 Kargil War is considered the closest the world has come to a nuclear war since the Cuban Missile Crisis. If India were to use its superiority in ground forces to seize a sizable amount of Pakistani territory, Pakistan could respond with nuclear weapons. It’s distinctly possible that any future war between India and Pakistan would involve limited action on the ground and full-scale fighting at sea and in the air. India has the upper hand in both, particularly at sea where it would have the ability to blockade Pakistani ports. Pakistan imports 83% of its gasoline consumption, and without sizable reserves the economy would feel the effects of war very quickly. An economic victory, not a purely military one might be the best way to decisively end a war without the use of nuclear weapons. With that scenario in mind, let’s look at the five Indian weapons Pakistan would fear most in a war.

#### **Bellamy 13**

Alex J. Bellamy, Professor of International Security at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, Australia and Non-Resident Senior Adviser at the International Peace Institute, New York, September 2013, Date Accessed: 8-12-2018, "A Living Reality? The Responsibility to Protect and the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities" Building Peace, http://buildingpeaceforum.com/2013/09/a-living-reality-the-responsibility-to-protect-and-the-prevention-of-genocide-and-mass-atrocities/

Preventing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity—that is, genocide and mass atrocities—lies at the heart of R2P. With the global fixation on questions of armed intervention, it is often forgotten that R2P includes a specific commitment to prevent these crimes and their incitement. In the long term, the principal measure of the concept’s success should not be evidence of more effective armed interventions (though that is certainly part of the equation) but rather the overall reduction of crises involving the crimes or their imminent risk. Implementing R2P to prevent genocide and mass atrocities involves a comprehensive range of efforts to reduce underlying sources of risk, build national resilience to these risks, and prevent the escalation of crises and conflicts into violence against civilian populations. The strategies required for prevention are, in many respects, similar to those associated with peacebuilding, human rights action, and conflict resolution. Addressing underlying risk involves challenging discrimination in all its forms, addressing inequalities, and dealing with past crimes and injustices. Building national resilience involves establishing and maintaining the rule of law, reforming national security, establishing accountable institutions that can resolve disputes legitimately, and ensuring human rights. Preventing the escalation of crises can involve mediation, preventive diplomacy, and even targeted sanctions to deter would-be perpetrators. The prevention of genocide and mass atrocities is thus complex and multifaceted, involving partnerships between local actors and international agencies, and there is no one-size-fits-all approach to it.

#### Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect

June 2018, “2019-2020 UN Security Council Elections and the Responsibility to Protect,” http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/2019-2020-un-security-council-election-profiles.pdf

Since 2005 the Security Council has adopted 70 resolutions and 21 Presidential Statements that refer to the Responsibility to Protect, including with regard to Central African Republic, South Sudan, Syria and eight other country situations. It is our hope that the Security Council will consistently uphold their commitment to R2P by taking early preventive action to avert emerging crises and halt atrocities wherever they are threatened.

#### Bommakanti 2017

KARTIK BOMMAKANTI, December 2017, ORF, “India’s Evolving Views on Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Humanitarian Interventions: The Significance of Legitimacy,” <https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ORF_OccasionalPaper_133_R2P_FinalForUpload.pdf> (Kartik Bommakanti is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. The focus of his published work is most extensively in the areas of how, why and when force is used within and between states. He also works on military and strategic affairs in the Asia-Pacific.) kegs

Briefly, the R2P has three pillars. Pillar I calls for ‘The Protection Responsibilities of the State’ to prevent large-scale atrocities within its borders. Pillar II mandates ‘International assistance and capacity building’ [of the state] and finally Pillar III requires a ‘Timely and decisive [military] response’ to genocide and mass atrocities (UNGA 2009 pp. 10-22). Officially, India supports the first two pillars and not the third. Most recently, India supported, for the first time since the 2005 world Summit that a debate on the normative dimensions be conducted without a vote on the R2P at the UN General Assembly (PMINY 2017). Nevertheless, India made clear respect for sovereignty remains the ‘bedrock’ of ‘international politics’ and political and legal complexities of R2P also need to be examined thoroughly. The current Indian envoy to the UN also underlined the significance of ‘deliberation’ rather than ‘preemptive decision-making’ lest the effort to create a ‘just global order’ result in weakening the existing global order (Akbaruddin PMINY). The latter point highlighted the importance of the deep misgivings India had over the haste with which R2P was invoked against Libya in 2011 and UNSCR 1973 resolution passed without the consequences that followed. India only supports military intervention as a last resort (Puri PMINY 2012) (Saran 2014). Even in the case of India’s 1971 intervention, armed force was not the first policy preference for New Delhi, it was only a final recourse occasioned by extreme circumstances. Libya never met the test of mass atrocities and genocide, as was the case in Rwanda or the Balkans in the 1990s (Puri PMINY, 2012). India endorses the Brazilian principle of ‘Responsibility While Protecting’ (RwP) (Puri PMNY).

Within the Indian establishment, non-official views on R2P and HIs, including those of retired diplomats’, are variable—largely reflecting the diverse intellectual strands, ideational positions and values encompassing Indian society. At one end is the anti-colonial school, at the mid-end is the pragmatic-realist school and at the far end is the hard realist school, which sees cynical motivations and double standards behind the West’s interventions in conflicts, most recently in Libya by invoking R2P and Syria. However, we must maintain the differences between these schools as not distinct, but largely used as a heuristic device to delineate differences within the Indian polity. To be sure, there is an overlap in the views between these schools, as the succeeding analysis will show.

Let us begin with the anti-colonial school, which occupies the Left of the political spectrum. This school is not outrightly or reflexively opposed to any form of intervention, as long it has been strongly endorsed by the UNSC, enjoys deep and wide multilateral support among member states of the UN and follows considerable deliberation. Therefore, the Left in India places a higher premium on institutional legitimacy, but not one that is dominated and determined by the West. In this regard, R2P specifically came under sharp attack in the wake of the Libyan crisis in 2011 from the Indian left-leaning media. Vijay Prashad noted caustically, “…selectivity is a function of those who continue to exercise their power through the U.N. bodies — which is to say that the West sets the agenda for the use of the R2P doctrine” (Prashad 2013).

To some extent, this is true: three out of the five UNSC permanent members are Western countries, namely the US, the United Kingdom and France; the other veto-wielding members are Russia and China. The former’s combined political weight tends to drive the UNSC’s agenda for military intervention for humanitarian reasons or against it. Prashad’s criticism also extended to the sheer arbitrariness with which the UNSC declared the Gaddhafi regime’s crackdown as amounting to genocidal violence (Prashad 2013). On the Libyan crisis in 2011, a leading Leftist foreign policy commentator critically analysed the West’s precipitate decision to intervene in Libya noting the ‘motive’ was ‘political’ and ‘strategic’ and not ‘humanitarian’ (Varadarajan 2011).

This has some basis, as even prominent figures in the American establishment, such as Richard Haas recently concurred that it ‘morphed into regime change’ (Haas 2017 p. 8). R2P legitimised regime change in Libya rather than the protection of Libyan civilians against mass atrocities. Yet as Haas accurately maintained, armed humanitarian interventions are rarely ‘apolitical’ and ‘solely humanitarian’, contrary to Varadarajan’s claim (Haas 2017 p. 6). War, even for humanitarian ends, is ‘…a continuation of political intercourse, carried with other means’ (Clausewitz 1984, p. 99). Means can never be separated from their ends (Clausewitz 1984, p. 99). Further, the Indian Left has not fully considered the political dimension’s importance in legitimating an intervention; it is based on a political judgment (Claude Jr. 1966, p. 375). The intervention in Libya also enjoyed UN institutional legitimacy and the support of the Arab League. The Left’s opposition was merely because the intervention was driven by major Western powers, ignoring the Arab League’s support for UNSCR 1973. As one noted critic of the Indian Left-leaning elites observed prior to the Libyan crisis, they invariably condemn the West’s interventionist conduct as imperialism and adopt less condemnatory positions in regards to the Eastern imperialism of the Soviet Union and China, because the latter is better than the former (Aiyar 2007).

The emergence of R2P, however, has sharpened the focus of the Left’s critiques of the doctrine and the West’s motives in general. Yet these Left-oriented commentaries ignore the selectivity with which India mounted its own HIs at least regionally, because in instances such as New Delhi’s intervention in East Pakistan in 1971, the test of domestic political legitimacy in the defence of civilians assumed primacy and lacked the formal institutional legitimacy that India has frequently sought and supported extra-regionally. After all, India’s immediate neighbours accuse it of ‘hegemonic’ and ‘imperial’ ambitions too. The Indian Left overlooks that arbitrariness is highly subjective and common to a cross-section of states, when it comes to HIs in international politics. Motivations tend to be variable or mixed. Selectivity, as we have seen earlier is something even India has practiced, at least regionally. If political motives explain Western intervention in Libya, so it must explain India’s abstention on the Libyan crisis. Notwithstanding New Delhi’s deep reservations to vote in favour of UNSCR 1973, India did not frontally oppose the West and the Arab League. The League’s support for the intervention allowed New Delhi to justify its abstention (Mohan 2011 p. 6). Further, extra-regionally, India at an official level has supported Soviet interventions at a minimum tacitly, if not explicitly. Take the Soviet repression of the Hungarian revolt in 1956. The Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru actually noted in parliament that the facts about Soviet repression were “obscure”, despite a UN resolution condemning Soviet acts as repression and rejected calls for UN-supervised elections in the country (Kissinger 1994a p. 564). The facts were anything but unclear. New Delhi’s interests vis-à-vis Moscow meant that it would not antagonise the latter over some tiny and ‘…distant European country’ (Kissinger 1994a p. 564). Further, Russia’s brutal conduct in Chechnya and more recently in the Crimea have not received or evoked the same moral indignation as the West’s conduct from Indian Left-leaning foreign policy elites.

The objections to humanitarian interventions as conceived by the anti-colonial school ignores the role of institutional legitimacy, as Pai observes, ‘The selectivity in the choice of theaters in which to intervene leads to scepticism about the motives of the world’s major powers’ (Pai 2013 p. 308). Therefore, this group has not been consistently committed to legitimacy of the R2P and HIs even when it enjoys institutional support.

The second school can be broadly defined as ‘pragmatic-realist,’ in that power and interests matter, it is also “pragmatic” to the extent it is not cussedly opposed to R2P and humanitarian interventions nor is it obstinately tethered to the concept of sovereignty. Members of this school are realists who are ready to support the West and maintain that India strike balance between its interests and its values. This school does not fixate as much on Western motives for HIs, as it does Indian motives for opposing or remaining neutral in an intervention. Mohan, of the pragmatic school argued accurately, India’s record is ‘mixed’ when it comes to supporting humanitarian interventions. New Delhi’s abstention from voting for UNSC Resolution 1973 authorising military action to intercede in the Libyan civil war had little to do with the non-aligned status and non-Western identity of India or high principles, but more due to New Delhi’s risk-aversion borne out of its strategic culture (Mohan 2011a p. 7) (Mehta 2011 p. 102). Non-Indian observers, such as Pethiyigoda too have attributed India’s resistance or reservations about R2P to cultural motives. These cultural inhibitions towards R2P stem from India’s deep traditions of non-violence, pluralism and tolerance (Pethiyagoda 2013 pp.11-13). The first two pillars of R2P blended well with India’s notion of pluralism and non-violence respectively (Pethiyagoda 2013, pp. 16-18). The Third Pillar was activated through UNSCR 1973 mandating armed intervention and India’s abstention can be explained by its commitment to non-violence (Pethiyagoda 2013, p. 18). On the other hand, Mohan concluded that India’s abstention rested on cold calculation and the Indian national interest shorn of any ideological biases (Mohan 2011a p. 8). Nevertheless, Mohan’s writings predating the Libyan episode largely demonstrate that he is not a reflexive opponent of R2P and HIs, citing examples of India’s intervention in 1971 and its armed intervention in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s (Mohan 2008b). Joshi, another leading foreign policy commentator, saw the Indian abstention on UNSC 1973 as the typical fence-sitting that has characterised New Delhi’s foreign policy (Joshi 2011). Joshi went on to lament that given the atrocities being committed by the Libyan regime, there was a moral imperative for New Delhi to take a clear position and endorse the intervention. He noted India had a ‘…tendency to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds’ (Joshi 2011).

Others such as the scholar Pant, saw New Delhi’s approach to the Libyan conflict as jarring in that India claimed to be the world’s largest democracy, which contrasted favourably with China (Pant 2011). In doing so, New Delhi did not consider the gap between its aspirations to play a larger role in global affairs that contributes to peace and stability, and its national interests. Libya served, as is the case with the experts surveyed before about New Delhi’s attitude towards R2P and role as contributor to global security. For Pant, India came out the worst, because much like Joshi, he concludes that since New Delhi was a non-veto wielding member of UNSC at the time, its abstention amounted to an actual disapproval of the Libyan intervention, which he contrasted unfavourably with the two veto-wielding members, namely Russia and China who abstained. Their non-use of their veto actually amounted to approval (Pant 2011).

Writing in 2015, Mohan contended in the regional context, ‘New Delhi does not have the luxury of treating the principle of non-intervention as absolute’ (Mohan 2015c). Elaborating further, Mohan contended that there were demand and supply side issues in regards to intervention in the subcontinent. In South Asia, the supply side issue comes under critical and sharp scrutiny because of India’s putative ambitions and tendencies to be a regional hegemon and a great power (Mohan 2015c) (Jaganathan and Kurtz 2014 p. 466). This point is necessary but insufficient, as Mohan argued it was not as simple as New Delhi striving for regional hegemony, but equally a problem of political elites within the smaller neighbours bordering India seeking New Delhi’s intervention when it suits them domestically (Mohan 2015c). The pragmatic school has its merits and strives for some middle ground between intervention and state sovereignty and between values and interests. Yet one of the crucial weaknesses of this school is that many of its members do not fully consider the importance of neutrality in international politics. It is by any account a legitimate stance in some instances for any state, and common to the practice of statecraft. Neutrality is also a political judgment. After all, New Delhi’s neutrality or muted posture was equally evident in 2011 with regard to the crisis in Bahrain, which ran parallel to the humanitarian crisis in Libya, where a minority Sunni ruling clique was brutalising its Shia majority population. Bahrain is an apartheid state. Similarly, Canada adopted a neutral position before and during the Indian intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 (Raghavan 2013 p. 172-176). Is and was Canada entitled to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds and not India? In the case of Pant, more than New Delhi’s abstention amounting to disapproval of UNSCR 1973, it was more likely irrelevant. After all, the very Western states that participated in military action against the Gaddafi regime, circumvented the UNSC due to the prospect of a Russian veto in 1999 against Serbian atrocities against its Kosovar population. The UNSC cannot prevent military action, despite the threat of a veto, yet performs notwithstanding Kosovo, a legitimating function. The UNSC can also err in authorising military action under the R2P, as was the case with UNSCR 1973, because the outcome of the intervention produced very little or no humanitarian benefits for the Libyan people. Explaining India’s position on R2P by way of non-violence is simplistic as Pethiyagoda does because it underestimates the Indian insistence on post-intervention outcomes (Saran 2014).

The pragmatic school has its merits and strives for some middle ground between intervention and state sovereignty and between values and interests. Yet one of the crucial weaknesses of this school is that many of its members do not fully consider the importance of neutrality in international politics.

While Mohan as well as the other experts surveyed in the foregoing are right to contend, that sovereignty is not absolute, nor is intervention. When it comes specifically to HIs, local interests within countries also need to align with any armed Indian humanitarian intervention, which was exactly the case when India intervened in East Pakistan. Moreover, the pragmatic-realist school is also deficient in not considering the fact that the prime “concern” for states is to ask what costs are they prepared to pay for violating the principle of sovereignty in order to service humanitarian goals and ‘…how much of this is justifiable in terms of the outcomes that such intervention seeks’ (Ayoob 2004, pp. 100-101). Given the painful denouement Libya has experienced following the overthrow of Gaddafi, it is hard to justify support for the intervention. It may have been justifiable had it enjoyed legitimacy and the outcome was stabilising; thereby reinforcing legitimacy of the intervention, as was the case in 1971 and several other UN and non-UN sanctioned HIs. In the Libyan case, Pillar III of R2P was activated to topple Gaddafi, without the implementation of Pillars I and II that should have followed the overthrow. The Libyan people have suffered the deprivation of the complete humanitarian benefits of R2P robbing the intervention of its legitimacy. After all, Mohan conceded that Indian officials in their interactions with him opposed the intervention on prescient grounds that a Somalia-like conflict would ensue with the regime’s departure threatening regional stability (Mohan 2011 p. 8). It is not just the armed intervention for humanitarian reasons that matters, it is equally the peace that follows, which might not be perfectly democratic, but stabilising to the extent it puts an end to mass atrocities (Bellamyb 2008 p. 620-621). To be sure, Mohan concedes, New Delhi cannot be expected to support every single Western resort to force as a litmus test of its commitment to global order and governance. This is particularly true when it has no real institutional stake in determining the conduct of military operations and the political settlement that ensues (Mohan 2011 p. 8). Albeit unlikely, New Delhi might be more favourably disposed to R2P’s Third Pillar in particular if it “was granted a permanent membership in the UNSC…” (Moller 2017, p. 1924). Indeed, it may increase the legitimacy of R2P if the UNSC were more representative. However, under current conditions, states such as India or Brazil, another emerging power, will not extend comprehensive support for HIs under R2P (Moller 2017, 1924).

#### **Petty 13**

 Keith A. Petty, LL.M., 2012, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School; LL.M. with Distinction 2008, Georgetown University Law Center; J.D., 2002, Currently a Major in the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps, The Senior Defense Counsel at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, “Humanity And National Security: The Law of Mass Atrocity Response Operations” Michigan Journal of International Law, Volume 34, Issue 4, Summer 2013, https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=mjil

Today it is widely recognized that genocide and crimes against humanity are crimes that affect all of humanity, not simply the target population or the territory where the atrocity occurs.436 Still, the Genocide Prevention Task Force reported that “[a] core challenge for American leaders is to persuade others—in the U.S. government, across the United States, and around the world—that preventing genocide is more than just a humanitarian aspiration; it is a national and global imperative.”437 National policy and recent studies indicate that the United States is moving toward this perspective. Since at least 2006, the United States has concluded that mass killings are a threat to U.S. national security.438 Today, the President and Congress are in agreement about the threat posed to U.S. interests by atrocity crimes.439 The Genocide Task Force reported that atrocity crimes are a direct threat to core U.S. national interests,440 in addition to an assault on the universal right to life. These crimes fuel instability in weak states, which are often the source of other national security threats, such as “terrorist recruitment and training, human trafficking, and civil strife.”441 The spillover effects of these crimes also have long-term consequences in both the region where they occur and in the United States. When millions of refugees’ flow across porous borders, states provide humanitarian assistance ranging from assisting displaced people to bearing high economic costs for aid. In Bosnia, for example, because state action was ineffective at the early stages, “the United States has paid nearly $15 billion to support peacekeeping forces.”442 This is significant in a time of economic austerity in the United States and abroad.443

#### **Grover 15**

Sonja Grover, Associate Editor of the International Journal of Human Rights, Professor with the Northern Ontario School of Medicine in Thunder Bay, Ontario, Canada, Professor with the Faculty of Education, Lakehead University, PhD, OISE/ University of Toronto, 2015, “R2P and the Syrian Crisis: When Semantics Becomes a Matter of Life or Death,” The International Journal of Human Rights, 19:8, 1112-1128, Taylor & Francis, Access Provided by Minnesota Libraries

The proposition advanced here is that the failure of the international community to implement R2P respecting the Syrian situation is itself an ‘act of aggression’ against the sovereignty of the Syrian State which derives from the sovereignty of the people and does not reside in the Assad regime or any particular Syrian regime. The framing of the responsibility to protect (R2P) and its potential implementation in any particular context, such as Syria, is tragically most often reduced to a semantic game version of Roulette with life or death consequences, with the latter more probable the longer the members of the UN Security Council with veto power play the game and stall on action by force where no peaceful options can end the mass atrocities. Hence human rights advocates must play the semantic game more deftly if they are to be positioned to contribute to saving civilian lives. Here follows then a tentative, but perhaps in some ways audacious attempt at just such semantic gamesmanship in support of R2P as not only a viable principle; but one which goes to the heart of the international rule of law, the intent and meaning of the UN Charter and the very credibility of the UN as a mechanism for the promotion of human rights and the achievement of international peace and security.

#### **Hagel**

Hagel et al. 13 — Chuck Hagel, Secretary of Defense for President Obama from 2009—2015, Previously a Professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Previously Chairman of the Atlantic Council, Original Article is Posted by a Mark Leon Goldberg but consists of nearly all Hagel quotes, and only Hagel quotes are underlined/highlighted, 1/7/2013, UN Dispatch, https://www.undispatch.com/why-chuck-hagel-supports-the-united-nations/

The United Nations can play a central and critical role in forging connections. The global challenges of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, hunger, disease, and poverty require multilateral responses and initiatives. The United States should therefore take every opportunity to help strengthen global institutions and alliances, including the UN. Like all institutions, the United Nations has its limitations and problems. It needs reform. Too often, the UN, especially the General Assembly, succumbs to the worst forms of political posturing. Nevertheless, the United Nations has played an essential role throughout the world in postconflict transitions, supervising elections, providing humanitarian programs and assistance, 22 peacekeeping, and offering international legitimacy and expertise of the kind that have helped stabilize Korea, Haiti, Liberia, East Timor, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and a number of other regions. Helping bring security to those troubled areas required an 27 immense international effort. Although many of these hot spots are still troubled today, each is more stable than it was, reducing the risk of further violence and regional escalation. More importantly, each has some hope for a peaceful future—although it may take years before that hope is realized. No international conflict is simple or easy to deal with, but each requires attention and the United Nations is the only international organization that can help bring the consensus that is indispensable in finding solutions and resolving crises. One of UN detractors more consistant criticisms of the world body is that some members states are not liberal democracies; that is the UN is a club that includes monarchies, autocracies or effective dictatorships. Some people, like Senator John McCain have suggested that the UN be replaced with a more exclusive League of Democracies. In a 2008 New Yorker profile Senator Hagel’s offered a thoughtful defense of the United Nations, despite the flaws of its member states. He argues that the UN’s universal membership is a feature of the UN–not a bug. Critics have suggested that McCain’s League of Democracies could diminish the role of the United Nations. When I mentioned this to Hagel, he said, “What is the point of the United Nations? The whole point, as anyone who has taken any history knows, was to bring all nations of the world together in some kind of imperfect body, a forum that allows all governments of the world, regardless of what kinds of government, to work through their problems–versus attacking each other and going to war.

#### **Brooks**

Brooks 14 — Rosa Brooks, Law Professor at Georgetown University, Senior Fellow with the New America/Arizona State University Future of War Project, Previously Served as A Senior Advisor at the U.S. State Department, 11-14-2014, Date Accessed: 7-19-2018, "Embrace the Chaos" Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/14/embrace-the-chaos/

In numerous ways, life has gotten substantially better in this more crowded and interconnected era. Seventy years ago, global war killed scores of millions, but interstate conflict has declined sharply since the end of World War II, and the creation of the United Nations ushered in a far more egalitarian and democratic form of international governance than existed in any previous era. Today, militarily powerful states are far less free than in the pre-U.N. era to use overt force to accomplish their aims, and the world now has numerous transnational courts and dispute-resolution bodies that collectively offer states a viable alternative to the use of force. The modern international order is no global utopia, but it sure beats colonial domination and world wars. In the 50 years that followed World War II, medical and agricultural advances brought unprecedented health and prosperity to most parts of the globe. More recently, the communications revolution has enabled exciting new forms of nongovernmental cross-border alliances to emerge, empowering, for instance, global human rights and environmental movements. In just the last two decades, the near-universal penetration of mobile phones has had a powerful leveling effect: All over the globe, people at every age and income level can use these tiny but powerful computers to learn foreign languages, solve complex mathematical problems, create and share videos, watch the news, move money around, or communicate with far-flung friends. All this has had a dark side, of course. As access to knowledge has been democratized, so too has access to the tools of violence and destruction, and greater global interconnectedness enables disease, pollution, and conflict to spread quickly and easily beyond borders. A hundred years ago, no single individual or nonstate actor could do more than cause localized mayhem; today, we have to worry about massive bioengineered threats created by tiny terrorist cells and globally devastating cyberattacks devised by malevolent teen hackers. Even as many forms of power have grown more democratized and diffuse, other forms of power have grown more concentrated. A very small number of states control and consume a disproportionate share of the world’s resources, and a very small number of individuals control most of the world’s wealth. (According to a 2014 Oxfam report, the 85 richest individuals on Earth are worth more than the globe’s 3.5 billion poorest people). Indeed, from a species-survival perspective, the world has grown vastly more dangerous over the last century. Individual humans live longer than ever before, but a small number of states now possess the unprecedented ability to destroy large chunks of the human race and possibly the Earth itself — all in a matter of days or even hours. What’s more, though the near-term threat of interstate nuclear conflict has greatly diminished since the end of the Cold War, nuclear material and know-how are now both less controlled and less controllable. Amid all these changes, our world has also grown far more uncertain. We possess more information than ever before and vastly greater processing power, but the accelerating pace of global change has far exceeded our collective ability to understand it, much less manage it. This makes it increasingly difficult to make predictions or calculate risks. As I’ve written previously: We literally have no points of comparison for understanding the scale and scope of the risks faced by humanity today. Compared to the long, slow sweep of human history, the events of the last century have taken place in the blink of an eye. This should … give us pause when we’re tempted to conclude that today’s trends are likely to continue. Rising life expectancy? That’s great, but if climate change has consequences as nasty as some predict, a century of rising life expectancy could turn out to be a mere blip on the charts. A steep decline in interstate conflicts? Fantastic, but less than 70 years of human history isn’t much to go on…. That’s why one can’t dismiss the risk of catastrophic events [such as disastrous climate change or nuclear conflict] as “high consequence, low probability.” How do we compute the probability of catastrophic events of a type that has never happened? Does 70 years without nuclear annihilation tell us that there’s a low probability of nuclear catastrophe — or just tell us that we haven’t had a nuclear catastrophe yet?

#### Seavitt

Seavitt 14 — Brian Seavitt, M.Sc. in International/Global Studies from New York University “The Responsibility to Protect Applied to Climate Change” Consilience, Journal of Sustainable Development, https://consiliencejournal.org/2014/03/25/r2p\_and\_climatechange/

The case can be made that further large-scale greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions violate customary international law. Therefore, in order to protect human rights, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) can be used as a mechanism to ensure that each country’s external costs of energy production are accounted for. R2P is a growing “political concept” within the United Nations that enables the international community to enforce peremptory laws (jus cogens). Since the impacts of climate change are proving to be a clear and present danger to so many people, R2P is ripe to be applied to climate change. Although the international community traditionally aims to use R2P as a basis for military intervention, the concept should also be applied to climate change policy. By using R2P as an enforcement mechanism to account for the social costs of a country’s products, the free-market will drive the production of energy savings technologies and practices in a revolutionary way. The world has been transitioning from commercial primary energies, such as oil and coal, to non-commercial primary energies, such as solar and wind energies. However, the pace of this transition is slow – much too slow to prevent catastrophic climate change. In fact, the change in energy use may be very limited even in the future; according to a report by the U.S. Energy Information Administration: “[Fossil fuels] will continue to supply more than three-fourths of total world energy consumption in 2040” (2013, 11). Today, fossil fuels account for approximately 80 percent of world energy consumption. The Kyoto Protocol is one of the few multi-party GHG mitigation schemes in the world. However, even this treaty is not ambitious enough to effectively curb climate change. At the Seventeenth Conference of the Parties (COP 17) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) an extension of the Kyoto agreement was determined to last from 2013 to 2020. Negotiations are set to take place in 2015 to develop a new international climate change treaty. However, even if an effective emissions reduction system is adopted in 2015, these legally binding targets are not slated to come into force until 2020. The international community can use R2P to reduce emissions in this time. It is more effective to address climate change sooner than later for two reasons: first, the preventative costs mitigating the effects of climate change are multiplied when they are appropriated to a problem retroactively, and second, the threat of a ‘tipping point’ is approaching at an accelerating pace. In such a case, the buildup of greenhouse gases could lead to runaway warming, which would result in an increase of floods, drought, storms, diseases, and a possible permanent loss of world income of five to twenty percent per year (Buchan, 2010, viii). While the world waits for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report to be finalized over the next year, it will only serve to reinforce what we already know: a continuation of human-induced climate change leads to catastrophic damages of the environment. Therefore, the international community should not wait to analyze the full severity of these impacts, but rather, act now. Using R2P to intervene on behalf of climate change will legitimize this generation’s duty to protect future generations. State Responsibility and International Responsibility to Protect In 1999, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan summarized the need for new approaches to the evolving challenge of humanitarian intervention. While the UN Charter lists one of the foremost principles of international law as ‘the inviolability of territorial sovereignty’, it seems unthinkable for the international community to stand by and watch “insufferable atrocities” taking place (Newman, 2002, 102). Philosophers and political scientists had been developing a resolution to this paradox throughout the 1990s. During this time, they were able to shift the focus of the sovereignty debate from state security to human security (Evans, 2009, 9). Consistent with the Nuremberg Charter, sovereignty was not interpreted to be absolute – it was not a license to kill. This interpretation allowed for the concept of sovereignty to be viewed, “not just as protection from outside interference [as it had been] – rather, as a matter of States having positive responsibilities for the welfare of its citizens” (Evans, 2009, 9). The debate was turned on its head: “this reframed the argument so that it was not about the right to intervene, but about the responsibility to protect” (Evans, 2009, 9). The Canadian government used this novel idea to respond to Secretary Annan’s inquest; they developed the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). In 2001, the Commission released its Report arguing: “That sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe, but when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that the responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states” (Dunoff, Ratner, and Wippman, 2010, 903). The language of R2P attained world recognition in 2005, when the concept of R2P, specifically described in paragraphs 138 and 139 of UN Resolution 60/1, was adopted by the General Assembly at the World Summit Outcome. The International Court of Justice acknowledges international law is not static; norms are created both through action (state practice) and statements showing repeated state practice motivated by a sense of obligation (opinio juris) (Eaton, 2011, 767). In this way, state practice can become an international norm rather than exceptional behavior. R2P is therefore, suited to apply to climate change as measures to mitigate climate change meet the qualification criteria necessary for these actions to be considered international norms. They are: A) State practice to prevent environmental damages that harm people in other nations has been consistent for over 70 years (see for example, Trail Smelter, 1935; Stockholm Declaration, 1972; Rio Declaration, 1992; Rio+20 Summit, 2012). B) Actions to prevent climate change should be obligatory because scientific evidence has proven that the threat of a changing climate and its harmful consequences are valid and, on a scale, worse than mankind has ever seen (see for example, Ostro et al., 2006; Church et al., 2001; Meehl et al. 2007, Vermeer et al., 2009). In keeping with the principle of common, but differentiated responsibilities, R2P should work together with the UNFCCC to apply social costs to international trade law. The Solution The social costs of energy consumption have been exploited throughout history. The prolonged lack of consideration for negative externalities is now beginning to reveal the true disadvantages of these to our systems — namely, the climate system, public health, the economies of nations, and standards of living (Hewitt, 2013, 52). However, resistant ‘business-as-usual’ policies continue to predominate humanity’s long-term interests. To remedy this inconsistency, a variety of public initiatives can and must be legally enforced to steer the private sector towards meeting long-term energy service needs while maximizing social and economic benefits (Gellar, 2003, 172). The World Trade Organization (WTO) is one way the international community is able to force the internalization of these costs; by imposing carbon offsetting duties to the products each multi-national corporation sells, businesses would seek out and produce lower emission energy sources (Stiglitz, 2006, 179). This would further drive countries to develop and provide low emission energy sources to attract international investment, creating a race to the bottom in low emission energy demand. However, in order to effectively shift behavior and enforce these duties, a reformation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) will need to take place in order to bring accountability to member states actions. Author of The World Trade Organization Amrita Narlikar explains: “At the heart of the WTO lies a major and unsustainable discrepancy: extreme legalization, in the enforcement of the rules…and an inordinate reliance on de facto improvisation in the making of those rules” (2005, 42). In response to the inconsistencies inherent in the WTO, R2P can be used to ensure climate mitigation policies are enforced. The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which is the mechanism that provides guidelines for trade dispute settlements, should be backed by R2P so that dispute resolutions are enforceable in the same way an International Court of Justice ruling is enforceable. This would allow the market to drive our society towards adopting more clean energy practices. R2P can also be used to mitigate climate change by prescribing mechanisms that preserve the planet. For example, the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report calls for the enhancement of forest sinks to act as natural carbon sequestration systems. This idea was pioneered by the Rainforest Initiative, which is a group of countries that aims to sell carbon offsets, not just for new forests, but for avoided deforestation. In effect, countries would be compensated for maintaining the enormous environmental benefits their rainforests embody. R2P could require the largest emitting nations to help pay for the protection of forests through non-profit companies and initiatives, such as the Rainforest Alliance and REDD+.

#### Torres

Phil Torres 16, Affiliate Scholar at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, and founder of the X-Risks Institute, 7/22/16, “Op-ed: Climate Change Is the Most Urgent Existential Risk,” <https://futureoflife.org/2016/07/22/climate-change-is-the-most-urgent-existential-risk/>

Climate change and biodiversity loss may pose the **most immediate and important threat to human survival** given their indirect effects on other risk scenarios.

Humanity faces a number of formidable challenges this century. Threats to our collective survival stem from asteroids and comets, supervolcanoes, **global pandemics**, **climate change**, **biodiversity** loss, **nuclear weapons**, biotechnology, synthetic biology, nanotechnology, and artificial superintelligence.

With such threats in mind, an informal survey conducted by the Future of Humanity Institute placed the probability of human extinction this century at 19%. To put this in perspective, it means that the average American is more than a thousand times more likely to die in a human extinction event than a plane crash.\*

So, given limited resources, which risks should we prioritize? Many intellectual leaders, including Elon Musk, Stephen Hawking, and Bill Gates, have suggested that artificial superintelligence constitutes one of the most significant risks to humanity. And this may be correct in the long-term. But I would argue that two other risks, namely climate change and biodiveristy loss, should take priority right now over every other known threat.

Why? Because these ongoing catastrophes in slow-motion will **frame our existential predicament** on Earth not just for the rest of this century, but for literally thousands of years to come. As such, they have the capacity to **raise or lower the probability of other risks** scenarios unfolding.

Multiplying Threats

Ask yourself the following: are wars more or less likely in a world marked by extreme weather events, megadroughts, food supply disruptions, and sea-level rise? Are **terrorist attacks** more or less likely in a world beset by the **collapse of global ecosystems**, agricultural failures, economic uncertainty, and political instability?

Both government officials and scientists agree that the answer is “more likely.” For example, the current Director of the CIA, John Brennan, recently identified “the impact of climate change” as one of the “deeper causes of this rising instability” in countries like Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Ukraine. Similarly, the former Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, has described climate change as a “threat multiplier” with “the potential to exacerbate many of the challenges we are dealing with today — from infectious disease to terrorism.”

The Department of Defense has also affirmed a connection. In a 2015 report, it states, “Global climate change will aggravate problems such as poverty, social tensions, environmental degradation, ineffectual leadership and weak political institutions that threaten stability in a number of countries.”

Scientific studies have further shown a connection between the environmental crisis and violent conflicts. For example, a 2015 paper in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences argues that climate change was a causal factor behind the record-breaking 2007-2010 drought in Syria. This drought led to a mass migration of farmers into urban centers, which fueled the 2011 Syrian civil war. Some observers, including myself, have suggested that **this struggle could be the beginning of World War III**, given the complex tangle of international involvement and overlapping interests.

The study’s conclusion is also significant because the Syrian civil war was the Petri dish in which the Islamic State consolidated its forces, later emerging as the largest and most powerful terrorist organization in human history.