

# TO DO

1. Terminalize/Quantify Arctic Drilling emissions. → NOT CC
2. Find leapfrog to GT card
3. Prewrite and practice FF/S Extensions (Due by 10/8)
4. Link weighing against GT (not just FDI prereq) - 10/7
  - a. Frontlines against GT AFF - 10/7
5. Write Dumping OV (for Junker)
6. Improve Junker OV
7. A2 AFF blocks (Better for Overcap)
8. MAKE THIS FLAY ASF

# LAYYY NEG

A&M Consolidated *negates*. Resolved: The European Union should join the Belt and Road initiative.

The thesis of our case is that China's BRI has massive negative environmental implications.

## Contention 1 is Perpetuation of Chinese Metal Consolidation

Rare earth metals, also known as REM's, are very uncommon elements found in the soil that are incredibly difficult and environmentally toxic to mine.

Right now, China is losing its monopoly on these materials.

**Dr. George Barakos** explains in 2018 that

*George Barakos (Institute of Mining and Special Civil Engineering, TU Bergakademie Freiberg), & Helmut Mischo, International Journal of Georesources and Environment, 2018 ["The Potentials of Scientific and Industrial Collaborations in the Field of REE through China's Belt and Road Initiative" 4(3), <https://ojs.library.dal.ca/IJGE/article/view/8566>, accessed 7-7-2019] // A&M SS*

As already mentioned, China plays host to a considerable amount of the world's proven rare earth reserves; nearly one third of them. **Due to their [domestic REM] depletion,** however, **China is constantly seeking to invest in foreign exploration RE[M] projects through the BRI.** The most typical example of China's policy is the purchase of Mountain Pass in California by a Chinese-led consortium in mid-2017, meaning that Beijing will have an influence over the development and direction of the biggest U.S. REE resource from now on (Roskill 2017). Similarly, Chinese companies tried in the past years to acquire the majority stake of Lynas

Corp. and Arafura Resources in Australia, but without success. Accordingly, it could be said that China will be mak[es]ing direct investments in some of the countries involved in the BRI in order to secure supply of RE[M]E resources that have been found in these countries. Truth be told, there are some remarkable rare earth resources through the Belt and Road routes as illustrated in Figure 1. Russia, Vietnam and India hold the biggest REE resources among the countries that are covered by the BRI, while there are significant ongoing REE exploration activities in Kyrgyzstan, South Africa and Turkey (Table 2). Including China, the REE resources found in BRI countries *exceed 50% of the world's total*. It should be repeated here that Greenland and Sweden are hosting notable amounts of REE resources as well, but are not (*yet*) part of the Belt and Road Initiative consortium. beneficial cooperation to explore and exploit potential rare earth resources in these lands. Besides, there is potential for discovering new REE resources, among other commodities in unexplored areas and countries covered by the Initiative. Afghanistan and Pakistan are such two countries, whose unexplored mineral resources could become the bone of contention between several nations in the near future. Nevertheless, China would and should never plunge into such battlefields alone, due to the foreseeable risks and costs, especially in the view of their possible defection to the U.S.-led camp in Afghanistan for example (Cheng 2016). **Collaboration with the EU in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative could ease[s] the access to these countries' [rare earth] resources.**

And the EU has immense REM deposits for China to exploit as **Chris Rhodes** finds in 2011 that they have 10% of the world market

Chris Rhodes, OilPrice, 09-08-2011 'European Union to Stockpile Rare Earth Elements', <https://oilprice.com/Commodities/European-Union-To-Stockpile-Rare-Earth-Elements.html>, accessed 7-23-2019/ A&M SS  
In response to this threat, the European Union (EU) is looking into building a stockpile of REEs, in the form of a mixed carbonate of these metals. This follows-on from the British government's recent 'strategic metals plan', in which securing supplies of key metals including REEs is perceived as critical to the future economy and in meeting carbon-emissions targets. It is proposed that an annual 3,000 tonnes of REE mixed carbonate be garnered. This amount is the stable output of the European Molycorp Silmet production of the material and is matched by that from the company's U.S.-based REE production, amounting to 10% of the world market following the imposition of quotas by China.

This is seen empirically because **Sanderson in 2019 notes**

Henry Sanderson 19, 1-25-2019, "China's mining M&A spree driven by fossil fuel transition," Financial Times, <https://www.ft.com/content/9fedca3e-bcf4-11e8-94b2-17176fbf93f5> \ \ OPF

Chinese companies have been the biggest buyers of overseas mining assets over the past year, in a concerted push to secure the metals and minerals required for the energy transition away from fossil fuels. **With more than \$7bn worth of deals** in 2018, according to Dealogic, **Chinese groups are now increasingly targeting minerals needed for electric car batteries and clean energy technology [consolidation as part of BRI]**. This has led them to buy stakes in copper, cobalt and lithium assets in countries as far afield as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Serbia and Chile. The buying spree is in contrast to previous overseas forays that largely focused on acquiring steelmaking iron ore assets, which led spending to hit \$17bn at the height of the last commodity boom a decade earlier. Their largest acquisition last year was the \$4.1bn purchase of a 24 percent stake in Chilean lithium miner SQM by China's Tianqi Lithium. This deal and others contrast with the more cautious approach by western mining companies such as Rio Tinto, Anglo American and BHP Billiton, which have resisted any large acquisitions reminiscent of that previous commodity boom that eventually led to \$109bn of write-offs.

Letting China have a stranglehold of the green tech industry exposes Europe to environmentally devastating REM mining.

Liu of EUJ finds that

*Hongqiao, Liu. "The Dark Side of Renewable Energy." The Dark Side of Renewable Energy | Earth Journalism Network, 25 Aug. 2016, <https://earthjournalism.net/stories/the-dark-side-of-renewable-energy>.*

And **rare earth mining**, whether legal or not, **entails shocking environmental costs**. Research has found that **producing one tonne of rare earth ore** (in terms of rare earth oxides) **produces 200 cubic metres of acidic waste water**. The production of the rare earths needed to meet China's demand for wind turbines up to 2050 (in a scenario of radical wind power expansion) will result in the release of 80 million cubic metres of waste water – enough to fill Hangzhou's West Lake eight times over. No to mention the emissions from the rest of the product lifecycle; smelting, separation, processing, transportation. Business, policy-makers and consumers all need to think again: what actions can we take to ensure we meet our low-carbon goals in a way which is friendlier to both the environment and the climate? It is after all both contradictory and unjust to sacrifice public health and the environment [to do this] in a resource-producing area for the sake of low-carbon development.

And water pollution is extremely deadly, as [Denchak in 2018](#) writes that water pollution kills 1.8 million people a year and sickens 1 billion worldwide.

Denchak 18:

To put it bluntly, [Water pollution](#) kills. In fact, it [caused 1.8 million deaths in 2015](#) according to a study published in [The Lancet](#). Contaminated water can also make you ill. Every year, unsafe water sickens [and sickened about 1 billion people](#). And low-income communities are disproportionately at risk because their homes are often closest to the most polluting industries. Waterborne pathogens, in the form of disease-causing bacteria and viruses from human and animal waste, are a [major cause of illness from contaminated drinking water](#). Diseases spread by unsafe water include cholera, giardia, and typhoid. [Even in wealthy nations](#), accidental or illegal releases from sewage treatment facilities, as well as runoff from farms and urban areas, [contribute harmful pathogens to waterways](#).

This wouldn't happen if EU developed on its own through the slower EURARE project.

The European Commission notes in 2017 that

*"Regulation of Environmental and Health Impacts in the Rare Earth Element Industry | EuRare Project | Home."*  
*Eurare.Eu, 2012, www.eurare.eu/regulation.html. Accessed 13 Sept. 2019.*

**The industrial processes developed within the EURARE project will [have] be examined in terms of their potential environmental impacts and the legislation [that] will be examined to ensure it covers the [environmental] potential hazards associated with the industry.**

Thus, by letting China have a massive monopoly over the Rare Earth Market in the EU, they hinder the development of cleaner techniques of mining these REMS, which the EU can do on its own.

## **Our Second Reason why joining the BRI hurts the environment is because of Dirty Chinese Investment**

Currently, the whole world is going green.

Taylor, a professor, of the Renewable Energy Agency, finds that by 2020, renewables will be cheaper than fossil fuels, and the green tech revolution will occur.

However, if the EU joining the BRI would destroy that possibility by drastically increasing dirty China's Foreign Direct Investment, or FDI, in that country.

Right now, **The Diplomat** finds in March that Chinese FDI in Europe is down 40% the last few years

<https://rhg.com/research/chinese-fdi-in-europe-2018-trends-and-impact-of-new-screening-policies/>  
The analysis shows that Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the European Union continued to decline in 2018. The combined value of completed Chinese FDI transactions in the EU fell to EUR 17.3 billion in 2018, down 40% from 2017 levels (EUR 29.1 billion). This represents the lowest investment level since 2014 and a drop of over 50% from the peak of EUR 37 billion in 2016.

The. "Mapping China's Investments in Europe." *The Diplomat*, 14 Mar. 2019, [thediplomat.com/2019/03/mapping-chinas-investments-in-europe/](http://thediplomat.com/2019/03/mapping-chinas-investments-in-europe/). Accessed 9 July 2019. // A&M LD

Of course, the share of Chinese FDI in Europe at 2.2 percent remains very low relative to the United States' market-leading 38 percent. Similarly, the EU countries held only 4 percent of the total FDI in China in 2016, versus 36 percent of the total FDI in the United States. [...] This view drives a diversified strategy of Chinese investments in Europe, with a focus on capital investments in the core EU countries, complemented by large infrastructure development projects on its periphery. In Western Europe, Chinese investors target Europe's strategic assets and research and development networks, with the largest and wealthiest European countries attracting the greatest investment.

However, affirming undoes this because BRI infrastructure serves as a catalyst for Chinese investors.

**Chen and Lin from the World Bank in 2018** quantify that

The BRI proposed transportation network can lead to a 4.97-percent increase in total FDI flows to BRI countries, a 4.36-percent increase in FDI flows within BRI, a 4.63-percent increase in FDI flows from OECD countries, and a 5.75-percent increase in FDI flows from non-BRI countries. Across BRI regions, the proposed **BRI transportation [infrastructure]** network **could increase FDI flows to** BRI's Middle East and North Africa region by 11.39 percent, the East Asia and Pacific region by 6.56 percent, and **Europe** and Central Asia **by 3.8 [4] percent [in the short term]** s. A 10-percent increase in construction contracts is associated with an increase in FDI by 7 percent in the same year, 11 percent the next year. **and 16 percent in two years.**

Ultimately, with all infrastructure considered, **The University of Birmingham in 2018** finds that joining the BRI increases China's FDI in that country by 46%

Harmony. "(PDF) Harmony in Diversity: Can the One Belt One Road Initiative Promote China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment?" *ResearchGate*, ResearchGate, 12 Sept. 2018, [www.researchgate.net/publication/327637673\\_Harmony\\_in\\_Diversity\\_Can\\_the\\_One\\_Belt\\_One\\_Road\\_Initiative\\_Promote\\_China's\\_Outward\\_Foreign\\_Direct\\_Investment](http://www.researchgate.net/publication/327637673_Harmony_in_Diversity_Can_the_One_Belt_One_Road_Initiative_Promote_China's_Outward_Foreign_Direct_Investment). Accessed 5 July 2019. // A&M SS

Table 2 presents the baseline results of the estimation using Equations (2)-(4). The first column is a simplified specification only including dummies of OBOR, OBOR\*post, and years. China's OFDI in the OBOR countries was about 40% higher than in the non-OBOR countries before the initiative, suggesting a good foundation of international investment in these countries. After joining the BRI initiative, increased China's OFDI by 46% in that the OBOR countries. These results revealed that the OBOR initiative has better stimulated China's OFDI in these related countries after the announcement in 2013 compared with other countries outside the OBOR group, which is consistent with the findings reported by Liu et al. [3] and Du and Zhang [1].

# This has a devastating coal lock-in effect

**Niall of Forbes** finds in March that coal has seen an 84% decline in the past few years.

*Niall McCarthy. "Report: New Coal Power Projects Are In Decline Across The World [Infographic]." Forbes, 28 Mar. 2019, www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2019/03/28/report-new-coal-power-projects-are-in-decline-across-the-world-infographic/#163acac66298. Accessed 24 Aug. 2019. // A&M LD*

The number of coal-fired power plants under development across the world fell sharply for the third year in a row in 2018. According to a new report from the Global Energy Monitor, Greenpeace India and the Sierra Club, there was a 20% drop in newly commissioned coal power capacity since 2017, a 24% drop in pre-construction activity and a 39% fall in new construction starts. **Since 2015, the number of newly-completed coal power plants fell 57% (globally) while the number of new construction starts plunged 84%.** The following infographic provides an overview of coal power's global decline with planned capacity in pre-construction status declining from 1090 GW in 2015 to just 339 GW in 2018. [...] **It isn't all good news in Asia, however, with new construction increasing 12% in China between 2017 and 2018.** This is largely due to work resuming on 50 GW of coal power capacity which had been postponed by central government restrictions. When it comes to decommissioning old coal power plants, the United States led the way with retired capacity amounting to 17.6 GW - the second highest year for retirements after 2015 which saw 21 GW put out service. In total, 50.2 GW of new coal capacity was commissioned worldwide in 2018 while total retirements amounted to 31 GW. Even though the trends in pre-construction are overwhelmingly positive, the report warns that global climate goals cannot be met without a full halt in new coal plants and the retirement of existing ones.

However, affirming reverses this trend as **Hilton from Yale in 2019** find that 80 percent of Chinese investment is dirty and goes into fossil fuels.

*How China's Big Overseas Initiative Threatens Global Climate Progress. "How China's Big Overseas Initiative Threatens Global Climate Progress." Yale E360, 2018, e360.yale.edu/features/how-chinas-big-overseas-initiative-threatens-climate-progress. Accessed 27 Aug. 2019. // A&M SS*

How much attention they pay to green guidelines may be judged by the result. So far, the majority of BRI projects are energy-related: Since 2000, Chinese-led policy banks have invested \$160 billion in overseas energy projects, almost as much as the World Bank and regional development banks. But unlike the World Bank, **80 percent of China's overseas energy investments went to fossil fuels** - \$54.6 billion to oil, \$43.5 billion to coal, and \$18.8 billion to natural gas - compared with only 3 percent to solar and wind and 17 percent to often-controversial hydro projects.

Which **Wright 18** of Climate Tracker finds is 100 times their renewable investments.

This is seen in BRI countries; **Ewing from the Hill finds in 2019** that the Belt and Road will lead to a quadrupling of emissions in Pakistan over the next decade. Moreover, they elaborate Pakistan is no outlier -- in 2018, Coal plants are being constructed in 14 BRI countries with no current coal power to speak of.

<https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/437564-chinas-foreign-energy-investments-can-swing-coal-and-climate>

When blackouts rolled Pakistan in 2016-17, China stepped in to help the country build a coal sector from scratch. At the time, Pakistan **generated less than 1 percent of its electricity from coal.** As part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China now steers major coal investment through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which plans to grow **Pakistan's coal production [is increasing] from 190 to 15,300 megawatts. This will help Pakistan meet its electricity needs and fuel the development that follows. It may also [the BRI will] lead to Pakistan's greenhouse gas emissions quadrupling between 2015 and 2030. Pakistan is no outlier.** The International Energy Agency just reported strong greenhouse gas growth from energy production in 2018, with an emerging fleet of Asian coal-fired power plants leading the way. Coal plants are being planned or constructed in 14 countries with no current coal power to speak of, and in 19 countries where new coal plants would more than double coal-fired capacity. These plants could bring more than 800 gigawatts of new capacity online in the next 15 years, and risk putting global climate targets truly out of reach. [...] While there are multiple **drivers** of coal investment, **China is the pivotal player. As its massive domestic coal sector is squeezed by a saturation of existing plants, economic transitions away from heavy industry and a 'war on pollution,' China's powerful state-owned companies look abroad. The Shanghai Electric Group will build coal plants in Egypt, Pakistan and Iran** with a combined capacity of 8,285 megawatts, that is nearly tenfold its planned constructions in China. The China Energy Engineering Corporation has no plans to build at home, but is constructing 2,200 megawatts of capacity in Vietnam and Malawi. Like Pakistan, the nascent coal sector in Malawi is being built essentially from scratch. Meanwhile, **China's public Development Bank and Export-Import Bank have provided more than \$43 billion in overseas coal financing since 2000. Other Chinese banks underwrite nearly 73 percent of global coal plant development. Eleven of the world's 20 largest coal developers are Chinese, and firms are involved across project contracting, equipment export, equity, construction and direct bank loans. The implications are clear: Coal plants will meet immediate electricity needs, but threaten to lock-in decades of conventional air pollution that will accelerate health care demands and have rippling social costs.** There are other viable paths, and China can be a change agent. Demand for non-fossil energy is high. For 31 BRI countries that have committed to specific emissions reductions there is a need for

This is proven in the EU as **Wang from the VE finds in April** that over 4.1 GW (2 million dollars worth) of coal is being built into Europe through the BRI right now, despite it breaching EU regulation.

<https://ve.dk/the-belt-and-road-initiative-how-chinese-coal-technologies-export-to-europe-and-the-world-undermines-global-climate-goals/>

To date, up to **4.1 GW of coal plants may be built in Europe with the BRI** with the state financing support from China, and by China's power generation state-owned enterprises (SOEs). These companies are fighting each other over environmentally harmful and legally questionable coal projects in Europe. As the international financial institutions phased out direct coal financing, and the OECD export credit group putting in place screening conditions for supporting coal-fired power plants[4], most of the coal projects in Southeast Europe are slated for loans from the China's state and policy-driven banks, namely, the Export-Import Bank of China (China Eximbank), China Development Bank (CDB) or other Chinese banks. All the meanwhile, Chinese policy makers and banks have yet to commit to the establishing of legally binding laws which regulate screening measures for its overseas projects. Under the cooperation framework between China and 16 Central and Eastern European Countries, questions have been raised about compliance with regulations.[5] [6]**And when examining the financed and planned coal projects with Chinese involvement in southeast Europe, all projects exhibit breaches of EU legislation on environment, state aid and/or procurement according to an European environmental watchdog group.**[7] This contravenes with the cornerstone in China's Guidance on Further Directing and Regulating Overseas Investment Direction,[8] which when adopted signaled the country's awareness of questionable compliances with environmental and social standards in many of its Belt and Road projects. Impacted by China's domestic regulatory grip on coal power and the decline in construction of coal power plant contracts, China's SOEs specializing in power generation and construction aided by the "Belt and Road" initiative has sought coal project opportunities in countries strategic to China's belt and road cooperation. One such company is the state-owned China Energy Engineering Corporation, which saw a dramatic increase of contract value for projects in the belt and road countries. The company's recent projects include the unit 7 of Tuzla coal-fired power station in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the first phase of coal-fired power station in Nanding, Vietnam. The cementing of the coal deals[9] by leading SOEs further consolidate the China's standing in the international coal power generation and construction market.

This is, in part, because China uses coal investment as a pressure relief system to satisfy domestic overcapacity.

This is primarily because China's foreign investment industry is vastly unregulated and favors coal use.

**Gallagher, a professor from the Taft University finds** the BRI is a pressure valve for Chinese Coal companies that are failing domestically, as abroad, there are no policies that restrict emissions from Chinese FDI.

That's why **Dr. Blanche from the MNC Center concludes that** Chinese FDI has a massive focus on fossil fuels; and has a lockin effect which **Zadec** reports that re-financed coal plants lead to decades of emissions

This is quantified by **Hamid in 2016** when he says that

Hamid, Kamran. (2016). Is Foreign Direct Investment a Cause of Environmental Degradation in Pakistan? An ARDL Approach to Cointegration. Journal of Management and Research. 3. 60-76. // A&M LD

Table 6 is showing the long run coefficients which depict FDI and GDP has direct relationship with CO2 emissions with significance level at 1% level. This means that when FDI increases it also increases the CO2 emissions and hence environmental degradation in long-run. If FDI will **[a] 1% increase [in FDI]** it will harm the environment **[increases carbon emissions] by 5%**. GDP per-capita also has positive relationship with CO2 emissions in long run which means that when percapita income increase, people now have better standard of living and thus have more businesses and use more vehicles. Inflation and Energy consumption do not have significant relationship with CO2 emissions.

## These carbon emissions are devastating as Vaughan from the Guardian notes

Vaughan of the Guardian, Adam Vaughan, 5-12-2009, "Cleaner air from reduced emissions could save millions of lives, says report," Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/may/12/emissions-pollution-premature-deaths//A&MSS>

Johannes Bollen, one of the authors of the report for the Netherlands Environment Agency, said the **100 million** early **deaths could be prevented by cutting** global **emissions by 50%** by 2050, a target consistent with those being considered internationally.

A 1% increase in emissions leads to 2 million deaths.

Thus, by allowing blank checks to be given to these fossil fuel companies, Chinese FDI locks in Investor demand into Fossil Fuels, which kills tens of millions.

This is one belt, one road, and one big mistake  
Don't let the world go up in flames, and negate.

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## Gallagher from the Taft University finds that

"China's Belt and Road Is Conduit for Polluting Investments." Financial Times, Financial Times, 9 Aug. 2018, [www.ft.com/content/f965fa22-9be4-11e8-9702-5946bae86e6d](http://www.ft.com/content/f965fa22-9be4-11e8-9702-5946bae86e6d). Accessed 29 Aug. 2019. // A&M SS

**The policies governing China's overseas investments remain inconsistent with the policies that govern domestic investments.**

Chinese companies and investors are solely required to adhere to the environmental policies and preferences of the recipient country governments, and even then, there do not appear to be serious enforcement consequences for companies or banks that fail to do so.

**Policies specifically aimed at limiting emissions** of climate-altering greenhouse gases **from China's FDI do not exist.**

Man Many observers have suspected that one **[Moreover, a main] purpose of the BRI is to provide a pressure relief valve for China's legacy industries [like**

**coal]**. On the other hand, the Chinese government's go-out strategy and industrial policies in support of strategic industries could result in a considerable amount of new "green" investment overseas given many of China's strategic industries are, in fact, green industries. The relatively recent solar investments in Pakistan are a good example of the alignment between strategic industry promotion and the provision of green finance. It is important to remember, however, that the predominance of China's global energy investments between 2000 and 2016 were in fossil fuels – \$54.6bn in oil, \$43.5bn in coal, \$18.8bn in natural gas – compared with \$2.4bn in solar, \$1.7bn in wind, and \$24.9bn in hydropower. Domestically, the Chinese government is making a tremendous effort to promote and unlock green finance, and there are undoubtedly spillovers from the domestic provision of green finance to BRI countries. The remarkable growth of China's green bond market, for example, provides evidence that there is a strong appetite for green growth inside China. International investors also appear eager to invest in green financial instruments within China. The question now is how to apply these same instruments to outbound investments, especially within the BRI. The first place for the Chinese govern

Thus, Dr Blanche from the MNC center finds in 2018 that

*"Dirty Foreign Direct Investment? Chinese Outward FDI and Pollution Pathologies | Wong MNC Center." Mnccenter.Org, 2018, mnccenter.org/blog/dirty-foreign-direct-investment-chinese-outward-fdi-and-pollution-pathologies. Accessed 5 July 2019. // A&M LD*

This OFDI imposed considerable negative environmental externalities on Southeast Asia and China where Japanese companies shifted their operations. In a provocative piece in the Financial Times earlier this month, Professor Kelly Sims Gallagher (Tufts University) suggested, though she is not the first, that **the Chinese O FDI (COFDI) associated with China's Belt and Road [has a]** Initiative (BRI) may, de facto, have similar environmental downsides. These negative effects tie to COFDI's **focus on** non-green (e.g., **fossil fuel** versus solar and wind) energy **projects** [which play a] its massive role in "dirty" power sector infrastructure projects (i.e., coal-fired power plants), **and [promotes] low environmental standards. All of this together will "lock in outdated, dirty, and inefficient technologies in [FDI] recipient countries."** These corporate pathologies are not likely to go away given they are associated with Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as well as the dearth of market and non-market mechanisms to moderate their poor environmental practices. Gallagher proposes Beijing step up to rein in bad environmental practices by SOEs and other Chinese firms. Host countries, though, also need to become choosier about the COFDI that they welcome, demand greener investments and operations, and ask for plant and technology that result in smaller environmental footprints. Unfortunately, there likely will be no purely green world when policymakers in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America prioritize economic development, industrialization, and infrastructure.

Ultimately, these emissions will be locked in for decades.

Zadek from Brookings finds that

Zadek, Simon. "The Critical Frontier: Reducing Emissions from China's Belt and Road." Brookings, Brookings, 25 Apr. 2019, www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2019/04/25/the-critical-frontier-reducing-emissions-from-chinas-belt-and-road/. Accessed 28 Aug. 2019. // A&M SS

However, they would still fall short by 77 percent of the reduction required to align with a 2DS, resulting in their carbon emissions still exceeding the 2DS budget by a huge margin (38 percent) by 2050. Making things harder, **carbon emissions are usually locked in at the contractual stage of an investment** indeed, **[Dirty] infrastructure development** planning involves long lead times that predetermine technology choices, which in turn shape[s] institutions, behavioral norms, **[locks in]** and outcomes, including **carbon emissions for decades** to come. This means that carbon emissions in BRI-involved countries could become largely locked in over the coming one or two decades. Considerable efforts over recent years in raising awareness of investors about climate risks are to be applauded. Yet these efforts are unlikely to be effective in preventing carbon-intensive investments in BRI-involved countries.

However, by joining the BRI, Europe would have a consolidated market controlled by China because **Lui of Capitalwatch** finds in 2018 that

[there is more to be cut from this card]

"The Belt and Road Initiative - From the Perspective of Overseas Direct Investments - Capitalwatch.Com - via @CapitalWatchCom." Capitalwatch.Com, 2018, www.capitalwatch.com/article-1887-1.html. Accessed 24 Aug. 2019. // A&M LD

There are signs that Chinese investment firms shifted a [large] portion of [investment] ODI from greenfield investment to acquisitions in the post-BRI years to capture the investment opportunities more quickly. [ . . . ] Du and Zhang also pay attention to the overseas acquisition activities of SOEs and non-SOEs. Both SOEs and non-SOEs, relative to their counterparts from other major acquirer countries, increased significantly in the two post-BRI years. Strikingly, SOEs played a leading part in acquisitions in infrastructure sectors in the belt-road countries. [This is because] **a large chunk of these acquisitions [are] part of the infrastructure investment plan embedded in the BRI** initiative. Non-SOEs were particularly active in acquiring targets in non-infrastructure sectors in the belt-road countries, probably encouraged by the expected improvements in infrastructure, expected free trade policy arrangements, expected government policy coordination, and political



# CX

C2:

China wants to make a profit right?

- Yep

Will china make a profit by making a bunch of their business go bankrupt and fail?

- IF they say anything except for no they dumb

So china will always outsource coal right?

# Extensions

## C1: REMs

### Flow

UQ:

**[Barakos 18]** EU doesn't have the ability to mine rare earth elements right now, however colab in BRI means Rare Earth mining.

Link:

They want to mine with own control bc

**[Sanderson 19]** They consolidate GT market.

! =

This is ultimately very deadly bc

**[Liu 19]** One ton of REM creates 200 tons of acidic wastewater

Waste water very deadly

**[Denchak]** kills 1.8 million per year

S- **[EU Commission]** EURARE is slower but better, bc China doesn't care about local environments

**[Wang 19]** proves this bc they are violating EU restrictions on a bunch of other projects

### Lay

## C2: FDI

Green tech is going to be cheaper by 2020 across the EU, and then people will turn to it. However, the only chance of reversing this is joining the BRI because **U Birmingham in 2018 in a MASSIVE empirical study** notes that Chinese FDI inc by 46% upon joining BRI. Sadly, this investment drastically favors dirty energy

because **Hilton from Yale finds in 2019** that 80% goes to Fossil Fuels. That's why **Hamid finds that** even a 1% inc in FDI inc emissions by 5%. Even a 1% inc in emissions is devastating bc **Vaughn from Guardian** finds that it leads to 2 million deaths.

They Say \*Insert Frontlines\*

This is the most important arg bc \*Insert Weighing here\*

And Emissions are more important than the economy because of 2 reasons

First, emissions are a prerequisite to addressing growth.

[**UCamb 18**] Huge carbon bubble is growing in Europe. With an influx of coal, this would pop the bubble and the economy would go into a recession. Thus, we need to look to reducing emissions first.

Second, scope

## FF

[**Taylor**] - by 2020 more people will turn to GT cuz prices.

China's FDI will kill this as **U Birmingham in 2018** notes that Chinese FDI inc by 46% upon joining BRI. Sadly, this investment drastically favors dirty energy because **Hilton from Yale finds in 2019** that 80% goes to Fossil Fuels. That's why **Hamid finds that** even a 1% inc in FDI inc emissions by 5%. Even a 1% inc in emissions is devastating bc **Vaughn from Guardian** finds that it leads to 2 million deaths.

## Junker OV

There is no need to put a hat on a hat. The Juncker Plan is the EU's own infrastructure investment, which already has Chinese Cooperation as **Valero in 2016** notes that China has invested nearly 10 billion into the initiatives. But this is

a unique benefit to negate as **Fernholz 17 explains that** China purposefully tries to create dependencies, hurting long term growth.

## Short Bits

## Neg Frontlines

### F2: Junker Plan

#### F2: Junker Too Small

1. Junker is large enough and already working in Europe. The [EU Commission](#) finds in 2019 that over 250 billion invested into Italy through the Junker plan has invested into clean fusion energy. This project is expected to create 2 billion worth of economic growth and 1500 new jobs.
2. In the long term, [EU Commission](#) expected a further 650 billion dollars worth of funding.

#### F2: Junker Failing

1. Not true. In the long term, [EU Commission](#) expected a further 650 billion dollars worth of funding to the junker plan in the next 20 years

#### F2: Joint cooperation

1. European Union cannot fund both at the same time. There is a clear trade-off -- [EU Commission](#) expected a further 650 billion dollars worth of funding to the junker plan in the next 20 years; this can not go to Junker AND BRI especially with decreasing domestic demand.

## UQ: BRI Green

### F2: “Think 2030” plan / China is trying to be green

- 1) This argument is rhetoric, not reality. China has consistently shown to be the nonrenewable leader as Hilton 19 in case finds 80% of their foreign energy investment is in FF.
- 2) Even if China becomes green by 2030, it will be too late because Zadek in case explains there is a generational, decade-long, lockin effect in emissions from pre-existing built coal plants happening within the next 2 years.

### F2: Biomass

AT: Biomass

Biomass is small-scale

Narasimhan Santhanam, Cleantech, 8-16-2016 ["Can biomass be used for small scale power plants?", <http://www.cleantech.guide/p/359/>, 7-19-2019] mjw

But how can we run biomass power plants on a small scale if the Steam Rankine Cycle is not efficient too run a small power plant that is just a few 10s of kW? This is where the concept of biomass gasification comes in. Through gasifying biomass into a synthetic mixture of gases, it is possible to run small scale biomass power plants. The way it works is as follows: Using equipments called Biomass Gasifiers, biomass is converted into an organic mixture of gases called Producer Gas. This producer gas can then be used in a gas engine (not very different from a diesel generator) to generate electricity. As gas engines can operate on very small scales (even 10 kW or lower), we can this generate electricity from biomass on a small scale too. For this reason, biomass gasification is quite popular for rural electrification schemes in many developing and underdeveloped countries. In the past many years, I have had the opportunity to visit some of these small scale gasifiers installed in rural locations. Technically, they work fine, and I am convinced that these gasifiers constitute one of the feasible solutions in the overall renewable energy basket for rural electrification. The only challenge I observed had to do with the gasifier maintenance. You see, while the gasifier itself might not require much of maintenance, the gas engine that uses the producer gas to generate power requires maintenance. In many rural areas, such maintenance was difficult owing to lack of trained personnel, and this had resulting in their mal-functioning or shut down.

Biomass is used on a small-scale in rural areas.

This has 3 implications.

1. Even if 1 unit of biomass is worse than 1 unit of coal, biomass is used on a small-scale so 100,000 units of coal is worse than 10 units of biomass
2. Pollution from coal is always going to be worse because it affects a lot higher concentrations of people in urban areas
3. The same amount of Biomass will exist in either world because the two energy sources aren't interchangeable=0-9

## **L: FDI**

### **F2: FDI Decreased Globally**

Not true. China pours most it's FDI in the BRI as, **Zhou of Boston University** finds in 2019 that while average Chinese FDI output declined by 20%, BRI nations received an average increase of FDI by 31.5%.

### **F2: FDI tripled in EU (Brattberg)**

## **I Link: Fossil Fuel Lockin**

F2: Global warming - only AFF has risk of solvency

F2: Khan - Coordinated response from Chinese Government (4 bil spent)

## **I Link: M&A**

### **F2: M&A increases SB access to markets**

- 1) This argument is non-responsive to our own. We say that businesses decrease R&D spending after a merger, decreasing critical green tech innovation and harming the environment in the long term.
- 2) Innovation outweighs a marginal access to markets. If there is no new product/innovation, why does a greater market matter?
- 3) Decreases seed funding

# Impact: Emissions

## F2: Green-tech unsustainable

1. This makes no sense. Green tech, is by definition, a much smaller carbon-emitter.
2. Not empirically true, look to South Africa and their massive green eco. Furthermore the [UN](#) reports that 7 poor African countries switching to green sustainable development. It's possible.

## F2: Prices

The lack of coal plants has led to an increase in coal prices. **Arezki 15 of the IMF** writes

*IMF Blog. "The Price of Oil and the Price of Carbon." IMF Blog, IMF Blog, 2014,*

*blogs.imf.org/2015/12/02/the-price-of-oil-and-the-price-of-carbon/. Accessed 28 Aug. 2019. // A&M SS*

Progress in the development of renewables could be fragile, however, if fossil fuel prices remain low for long. Renewables account for only a small share of global primary energy consumption, which is still dominated by fossil fuels—30 percent each for coal and oil, 25 percent for natural gas (see Table). But renewable energy will have to displace fossil fuels to a much greater extent in the future to avoid unacceptable climate risks. Unfortunately, the current **low prices for [Fossil Fuels]** oil, gas, and coal may provide scant

**[destroys] incentive[s] for research to find even cheaper substitutes**

for those fuels. **There is strong evidence that both innovation and adoption**

**of clean or technology are strongly encouraged by higher fossil fuel prices.** The same is true for new technologies for mitigating fossil fuel emissions. The current **low fossil-fuel price** environment

**will** thus certainly **delay the energy transition.** That transition—from fossil fuel to clean energy sources—is not the first one. Earlier transitions were those from wood/biomass to coal in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and from coal to petroleum in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. One important lesson is that these transitions take a long time to complete. But this time we cannot wait. We owe to electric lighting the fact that there are still whales in the sea. Unless renewables become cheap enough that substantial carbon deposits are left underground for a very long time, if not forever, the planet will likely be exposed to potentially catastrophic climate risks.

## F2: 1% inc trade decreases emissions

- 1) No warrant -- why would something as devastating as building large concrete structures help the environment?
- 2) Not true -- Even the [World Trade Organization](#) finds that “increase in the scale of economic activity and energy use [from increased trade] will lead to higher levels of greenhouse gas emissions.

## **F2: Poverty puts pressure on the environment**

1. This simply doesn't make sense, people who are poor don't randomly drive around in maseratis and do emissions, it is non responsive
2. This is reverse casual because the main reason why people go into poverty in dev world is Emissions