Nihar and I negate Resolved: The United States should end its arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

#### Contention 1 is fighting terrorism

**State Department 10/18**/18 [Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, US Department of States. U.S. Security Cooperation With Saudi Arabia. October 16, 2018. https://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2018/279540.htm]

**Saudi Arabia plays a crucial role in** maintaining security in the Middle East, due to its economic, political, and cultural importance and its strategic location. Given the complex and dynamic security challenges facing the region, which include **countering violent extremism from** the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria **(ISIS) as well as other extremist groups**, **[the United States works with Saudi Arabia to support counterterrorism efforts** and our shared interest in regional stability. In addition, building on the May 2017 Riyadh Summit, we are working to increase cooperation on maritime security, military preparedness, **arms transfers,** and cybersecurity.

**As a result of U.S. security cooperation [and arms transfers], the Kingdom has foiled numerous terrorist** attempts against Saudi and foreign targets, and has been able to successfully **deter external attacks**. The United States remains committed to **providing** the **Saudi armed forces** with the **equipment**, **training**, and **follow-on support** necessary **to protect[ing] Saudi Arabia, and the region**, from the destabilizing effects of terrorism, countering Iranian influence, and other threats. Toward that end, the United States will continue to collaborate with Saudi Arabia to improve training for special operations and counterterrorism forces, integrate air and missile defense systems, strengthen cyber defenses, and bolster maritime security.

[Cordesman Center for Strategic and International Studies 18](https://www.csis.org/analysis/military-spending-other-side-saudi-security)

**Saudi** force developments and **military [purchases] have** had real benefits, **enabled Saudi Arabia to become a more effective strategic partner in dealing with terrorism and containing Iran**. Moreover, many of the arms purchases it has actually made do **improve Saudi security** and act as a deterrent to Iran—an effort reinforced by the Saudi partnership with the U.S. forces in the Gulf and the UAE.

[Andrea Shalal of Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-usa-arms-idUSKCN0T51NC20151116)

The agency said the **[arms] sales would help the Royal Saudi Air Force’s (RSAF) replenish weapons supplies that are becoming depleted due to high demand for multiple counter-terrorism operations, while providing reserves for future missions.**

**The impact is preventing a terrorism resurgence.**

**AQAP’s gains in Yemen could have disastrous consequences. AQAP was behind at least four major attempted attacks on U.S. interests outside of Yemen, and all of those occurred when the group was weaker than it is today. AQAP is also still a key asset for the global al-Qa`ida network, providing overall leadership guidance, sharing expertise, and coordinating transnational attacks. AQAP’s growing strength in Yemen could reverberate throughout the al-Qa`ida network, raising the stakes in the competition between al-Qa`ida and the Islamic State to lead the global jihadist movement.3**

[Romero 18](https://qz.com/1352602/terror-attacks-in-the-mideast-and-north-africa-fell-by-almost-40-in-2017/)

The number of attacks in the Middle East and North Africa dropped to 3,780 **in 2017,** from more than 6,110 the year prior. That’s a decrease of almost 40%. **And the number of deaths caused by terrorism in the [middle east] fell by almost half.**

The numbers, from the Global Terrorism Database, a compilation of attacks published yearly by the University of Maryland, show that **the steepest drops were in Iraq**, Turkey (due to fewer strikes by Kurdish rebels), Libya, **Yemen** (where incidents fell despite the civil war),**and Syria.**

However,

<https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/al-qaedas-resurrection>

**Allowing terrorist groups to take power**

Zawahiri has emerged as a powerful leader, with a strategic vision that he has systematically implemented. Forces loyal to al-Qaeda and its affiliates now number in the tens of thousands, with a capacity to **disrupt local and regional stability, as well as launch attacks** against their declared enemies in the **Middle East, Africa,** South Asia, Southeast Asia, **Europe**, and Russia. Indeed, from northwestern Africa to South Asia, al-Qaeda has knit together a global movement of more than two dozen franchises.\* In Syria alone, al-Qaeda now has upwards of twenty thousand men under arms, and it has perhaps another four thousand in Yemen and about seven thousand in Somalia.

The thousands of hardened al-Qaeda fighters freed from Egyptian prisons in 2012–2013 by President Mohammed Morsi galvanized the movement at a critical moment, when instability reigned and a handful of men well-versed in terrorism and subversion could **plunge a country or a region into chaos.** Whether in **[while causing fighting in] Libya, Turkey, Syria, or Yemen**, their arrival was providential in terms of advancing al-Qaeda’s interests or increasing its influence. The military coup that subsequently toppled Morsi validated Zawahiri’s repeated warnings not to believe Western promises about either the fruits of democracy or the sanctity of free and fair elections.

#### Contention 2 is Stopping Saudi Proliferation

Despite concerns over Iranian nuclearization, Lippman [from the Carnegie Middle East Center writes in 2018](https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/75723) that Saudi Arabia has hesitated to develop nuclear weapons in turn because they believe that

**Any sign that [they were]** the kingdom was **moving toward nuclear weapons would end U.S. arms sales** and terminate the strategic relationship **that has long ensured the kingdom’s security.**

But ending arm sales causes Saudi Arabia to develop nuclear weapons for 2 reasons.

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### Loss of Missile defence

Sales of new missile defence systems and upgrades to existing ones are critical to giving saudi arabia a sense of protection to stop them from developing nuclear weapons

#### Saudi Arabia relies on missile defense systems to shoot down Iranian missiles

**MDA** http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/intl-cooperation/saudi-arabia/

In 1991, **Saudi Arabia** became the first Middle East customer of the Patriot missile system and **maintains the largest missile defense force in the Middle East**.**Saudi Arabia’s ballistic missile defense capability is  designed to defend against its primary adversary: Iran**.

[Knight](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/u.s.-saudi-security-cooperation-part-1-conditioning-arms-sales-to-build-lev) Washington institute

The newest arms deal includes

**$24.3 billion on missile defense, including Patriot missiles and**a proposed $15 billion worth of **Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems**

#### Missile defense allows Saudi Arabia to protect itself without developing offensive nuclear weapons

**Anthony H. Cordesman**, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and

International Studies, **2010**, Is the Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea? https://www.cfr.org/expert-

roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea

Third, Iran already poses a missile and chemical weapons threat and may pose a nuclear one within the next three to five years. Upgrades of the Saudi Patriots create a base for an integrated approach to air and **missile defense**. They **lay[s] the groundwork for follow-on sales of advanced missile defense systems like THAAD, and an emphasis on defense (not Saudi purchases of missiles or nuclear systems)**. Coupled with recent U.S. offers of "extended regional deterrence" and the creation of a Saudi Air Force that is more of a threat to Iran than Iran’s conventional missiles are to Saudi Arabia, **they offer the best hope of both giving Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states security and stopping a nuclear arms race in the region.**

without developing nukes, which causes a regional race to proliferate.

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### 2. Losing the Nuclear Umbrella

https://worldview.**stratfor**.com/article/saudi-arabia-nuclear-deal-us-weapons-enrichment-fuel-iran-salman-processing

Ultimately, however, **the perceived threat of a nuclear-armed Iran underscores [saudi arabia’s] security concerns and compels Saudi leaders to pursue** a robust, wide-ranging defense policy that includes demands for the right to enrichment and, if necessary**, the right to develop atomic weapons** — even if the country has been a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for decades. [however], If Iran were to develop an atomic weapon, Saudi Arabia could **[or] seek safety under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.** Outsourcing protection to Washington presents risks for Riyadh, however, especially if strains emerge in their ties, as occurred during the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama. Saudi Arabia could also find itself out in the cold if a nuclear-armed Iran succeeded in normalizing its relations with the West. In such a scenario, the diminishing importance of Saudi Arabia's oil reserves amid the growth of energy alternatives could reduce Riyadh's significance in the eyes of the United States, compounding the kingdom's isolation.

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[Guzanski 2013](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324415961_Toward_a_Nuclear_Middle_East) from the Institute for National Security Studies warns that

For Saudi Arabia, the American nuclear umbrella seemed preferable over the years to an independent effort to obtain a nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the consequences of nuclear weapons in the hands of Iran for Saudi Arabia’s security and **the rising doubt in Riyadh regarding the willingness of the US to continue providing it with a defense guarantee are likely to tip the balance of Saudi considerations. If Riyadh feels that it may have to contend alone with a nuclear Iran, it may be the first to acquire nuclear capability.**

#### Cutting off arms sales breaks this relationship and gives saudi no choice but to proliferate

This leads [Knights 18](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/u.s.-saudi-security-cooperation-part-1-conditioning-arms-sales-to-build-lev) to conclude that

**The U.S.-Saudi strategic relationship is built on a simple premise: Washington provides physical security for the Saudi state, while Riyadh serves as a cooperative counterterrorism partner** and an apolitical, resp onsive supplier to global energy markets. **Arms sales are integral to this relationship: the task of maintaining the large Saudi military binds Washington and Riyadh together**, while the kingdom’s massive purchases of U.S. armaments and related services strengthen the American defense industry and general economy.

### Impact: Nuclear War

[Edelman 2011](http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/2010.12.27-The-Dangers-of-a-Nuclear-Iran.pdf) from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments writes that

**Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states,** and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the **interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation**

Normally, the fear of mutually assured destruction, or MAD, would prevent nuclear war, but [Bar](https://www.idc.ac.il/he/research/ips/Documents/2010/D7A0D799D799D7A8D795D7AA/Poly-Nuclear2010.pdf) 2010 from the Lauder School of Government writes that

**The essence of [MAD is]**MAD was **the existence of a credible second strike capability.** This was based on **[due to] large [weapon] stockpiles** in both Superpowers and the deployment of delivery capabilities that would survive a first strike (either due to their protection or their off-shore deployment) and assure mutual destruction. Indeed, the first years of the Cold War, before the two Superpowers developed the capabilities for mutual destruction and the command and control mechanism to prevent such a catastrophe, were the most dangerous and held the highest risk of both nuclear war and local conflicts under the umbrella of nuclear deterrence. For the foreseeable future

Because new nuclear countries in the Middle East will not be able to quickly acquire such large stockpiles, [Bar](https://www.idc.ac.il/he/research/ips/Documents/2010/D7A0D799D799D7A8D795D7AA/Poly-Nuclear2010.pdf) continues that

**there will be no balance of MAD in the Middle East**, **even assuming the maximum rate of acquisition of weapons**grade fissile material for building nuclear weapons, the new nuclear nations will not reach a level of MAD for some decades.

As a result, [Schlosser](https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-growing-dangers-of-the-new-nuclear-arms-race) 2018 writes that

He fears that **the chance of** accidents, **miscalculations**, and blunders with tactical weapons—as well as the pressure to “use them or lose them” in battle—**greatly increase the risk of an all-out nuclear war.**

Leading to regional or global extinction.

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## Frontline and other ext

### General

[Gause 2018](https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea) from the University of Vermont concludes that

**If [Saudi Arabia]** they are **[is] confident of their American security guarantee**--and these big **[especially] arms sales** [that] are warrants of the American commitmentto their security--**American advice not to obtain nuclear weapons will carry more weight.**

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1037969.pdf

The United States’ nuclear umbrella is a foreign policy tool to deter nuclear attacks against our allies or deter coercive behavior backed by the threat of nuclear attack.

### FIll in

https://www.timesofisrael.com/congress-bill-would-force-trump-to-report-on-saudi-nuclear-deal/

**US law forbids cooperation with nations that have not signed a so-called Section 123 Agreement, which limits nuclear work to peaceful uses only. Though Riyadh has said it does not seek a military program, it has said it seeks “self-sufficiency in producing nuclear fuel” and has in the past refused to sign an agreement that would limit its ability to enrich uranium.**

Us good

https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2018-04/risks-nuclear-cooperation-saudi-arabia-role-congress

**The United States has appropriately sought to deny the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not already possess them** through several avenues, including the terms of nuclear cooperation agreements.us

https://www.vox.com/world/2018/3/26/17144446/saud-arabia-nuclear-weapons-trump-iran-deal

But if that were to happen, it could ultimately backfire: The Saudis might turn to Russian or Chinese bidders for nuclear tech if they’re rebuffed by the US. And analysts say **the Russians and Chinese are less likely to be stringent about restricting Saudi Arabia’s enrichment or reprocessing ambitions**. For that reason, some analysts argue that Washington might have to consider a compromise with Riyadh.

### Umbrella

#### SA perspective - Nuke umbrella based on relations

**Guzansky ’13** Yoel Guzansky is a fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University. His main research area is Gulf security. He has also served as Iran coordinator at Israel's National Security Council. His recent publications include The Gulf States in a Changing Strategic Environment (2012), One Year of the Arab Spring: Global and Regional Implications, and The Gulf States: Between Iran and the West – Middle East Quarterly¶ Spring 2013, pp. 59-64 – available at: <http://www.meforum.org/3512/saudi-arabia-pakistan-nuclear-weapon>

**Riyadh's inclusion under a U.S. defense umbrella is not a given and depends** both on **the quality of relations between the two countries** and other Saudi considerations. Riyadh remains skeptical over Washington's willingness to come to its aid and may thus seek to purchase a nuclear deterrent,

#### No Arms sales = no relationship, breaking relationship gives saudi no choice but to prolif

This leads [Knights 18](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/u.s.-saudi-security-cooperation-part-1-conditioning-arms-sales-to-build-lev) to conclude that

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**Cho 13** "," No Publication, https://dc.uwm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&amp;httpsredir=1&amp;article=2132&amp;context=etd

All time-variant explanatory variables are lagged at t-1. Squared and cubed terms for temporal dependence are not reported. + p0.10,∗ p0.05,∗∗ p.01,∗∗∗ p.00140 Figure 2.1: U.S. IO sanctions and Predicted Probabilities of Nuclear Reversal Outcomes not statistically significant. The probability of adopting nuclear latency status climbs slightly to near 0.5 from near zero when a state becomes a target of U.S. multilateral IO sanctions. **In Figure 2.2, the predicted probability of continuing pursuit is highest (almost 1.0) at the lowest US aid ( GDP) and drops to a low level (near 0) at the highest level of US aid ( GDP) in a target state.**

### Missile Defence

https://www.defenseone.com/business/2017/10/iran-deal-jeopardy-us-clears-missile-interceptor-sale-saudi-arabia/141632/

President Trump announced the Saudi THAAD sale during a visit to the kingdom in May, however Congress was formally notified of the sale on Friday. In all, **the State Department approved the sale of 44 THAAD launchers, 360 interceptors,** 16 command-and-control stations, seven radars and 43 trucks to move move them around.

https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/19/russia-lures-buyers-as-s-400-missile-system-costs-less-than-us-models.html

Russian arms are generally considered less expensive than **American weapons**, in large part because they **come with**out **extensive maintenance support.**

“**When foreign militaries buy American, above and beyond the purchase, they are buying a partnership with the U.S. military,**” Andrew Hunter, director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told CNBC. “And that plus **the maintenance and technical assistance is a big part** of the cost difference.”

### CAN BUILD NUKES

#### Similarities

https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/saudi-arabia-nuclear-deal-us-weapons-enrichment-fuel-iran-salman-processing

Accordingly, Saudi Arabia is in no position to negotiate away its right to process its own nuclear fuel, even if it does intend to develop nuclear weapons as part of its short-term and medium-term goals. While **there is a significant distinction between a nuclear weapons program — which requires both the device and, frequently, a delivery system — and a civilian nuclear energy program, they share some of the same processes, such as the enrichment of uranium to varying degrees.** Some countries use a civilian nuclear energy program to conceal the research and production of highly enriched uranium needed for a nuclear weapon (as Iran is accused of doing).

#### Missiles

**The Saudis also** possess the missiles needed to deliver nuclear weapons, should they ever acquire them. In the 1980s, they **bought long-range DF-3 “East Wind” missiles from China — missiles that are designed to carry nuclear weapons** — [without informing](https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/30/why-did-saudi-arabia-buy-chinese-missiles/) the United States. Then, 10 years ago, they bought newer nuclear-capable Chinese missiles. They designated the Royal Saudi Strategic Missile Force as one of the five branches of the Royal Saudi Arabian Armed Forces, responsible for commissioning long-range missiles. **What is often left unsaid is that these missiles only make sense if armed with nuclear weapons.**

#### ]Dual Use

Unfortunately, [Nicholas Miller from the Washington Quarterly writes in 2018](https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2121/f/downloads/TWQ_Summer2018_MillerVolpe.pdf)

Academic studies have found that this sort of nuclear cooperation agreement can increase the odds of countries pursuing or acquiring nuclear weapons, particularly when they are in unstable security environments, which Saudi Arabia certainly is.60 **Nuclear technology is dual-use**, so **gaining technology or expertise in the civilian sector inherently increases a state’s capability to produce nuclear weapons**

https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy

This unpredictability characterizes even straightforward-seeming efforts to manage the balance of power. The most basic claim of arms sales advocates is that U.S. arms sales to friendly governments and allies should make them better able to deter adversaries. The best available evidence, however, suggests a more complicated reality. In a study of arms sales from 1950 to 1995, major-power arms sales to existing allies had no effect on the chance that the recipient would be the target of a military attack. Worse, recipients of U.S. arms that were not treaty allies were significantly more likely to become targets.[55](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#_idTextAnchor055)

### NUke war unlikely

#### Saudi prolif causes nuclear war and terrorism

**Edelman ‘11** [Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Former Undersecretary for Defense—AND—Andrew Krepinevich—President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments—AND—Evan Montgomery—Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Eric, The dangers of a nuclear Iran, FA 90;1, <http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/2010.12.27-The-Dangers-of-a-Nuclear-Iran.pdf>]

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia**. And if it did,** proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the CSS-2S, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This "Islamabad option" could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could selloperational nuclear weaponsand delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan**,** for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan's weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India's reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own**. And** it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. N-PLAYER COMPETITION Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalationthan a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multi-polar systems are generally considered to beless stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important,emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents' forcesand avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine-based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to "launch on warning"of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, wouldcreate a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially trigger**ing** a regional nuclear war**.** Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weaponsor nuclear materialand that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft.

#### Middle Eastern prolif causes nuclear war – outbreaks are likely and MAD doesn’t check

Bar 10 (Shmuel Bar is a senior research fellow at the Institute for Policy and Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya) “The ‘Poly-Nuclear’ Middle East and the Cold War Paradigm” Institute for Policy and Strategy, Lauder School of Government, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya Feb 2010 <https://www.idc.ac.il/he/research/ips/Documents/2010/D7A0D799D799D7A8D795D7AA/Poly-Nuclear2010.pdf> DOA 12/13/18 CW

Middle Eastern nuclear proliferation as described above may not remain restricted to states. **Weapons of mass destruction may filter down to non-state entities in such a scenario in two ways:** **to any of a plethora of quasi-states** with differing levels of control (Kurdistan, Palestine), **terrorist organizations** (al-Qaeda, Hamas, Islamic Jihad) and **rival ethnic groups** for whom the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a hostile state would be an incentive to acquire at least a limited WMD capability; and to "proxy" or "surrogate" terrorist groups (Hizballah). The Cold War experience that nuclear powers did not transfer to their allies or proxies nuclear weapons or technology to make them would not apply. The break in the dam gates of proliferation would make it easier for those entities to acquire the weapons, and the states may have an interest in providing them to keep control over their own proxies. One Strike and You're Out **If indeed the Middle East becomes "poly-nuclear",** the next question is whether the Cold War paradigm of MAD may apply to this region. Some prestigious Cold War experts (including Kenneth Waltz2 and Thomas Schelling3 ), accept the premise that a nuclear Iran will most probably lead to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, but draw on Cold War experience to argue that such an eventuality may not be as catastrophic as it seems. A nuclear Middle East, they argue, may even provide a more stable regional order based on the Cold War doctrine of "mutually assured destruction" or **MAD**. According to their line of thought, the very possession of nuclear weapons tempers military adventurism and inculcates a degree of strategic responsibility commensurate with the grave consequences that would result from nuclear conflict. These experts point at the fears that permeated the western military establishments of a nuclear China and the fact that a nuclear Indian sub- continent did not result in nuclear war, despite mutual hostility and frequent outbreaks of crisis. This **does not seem likely for two key reasons: the bi-polar paradigm of the Cold War differed fundamentally from the complexities of multi-polar deterrence that will emerge in the Middle East; and the existence of a credible "second strike" capability on both sides which characterized the Cold War from an early stage, and will be absent from the Middle East for the foreseeable future.** The Cold War was in essence a bilateral struggle between American and Soviet blocs, which simplified the signaling of intentions and prevention of misunderstandings. Scott Sagan4 has pointed out that the assumption that nuclear weapons are a stabilizing factor is a misreading of the history of the Cold War. The early stages of the Cold War were far less stable than our selective memories would like to believe. Stability that was achieved crisis after crisis convinced the two sides to install measures to prevent inadvertent catastrophe. Thus, t**he Cold War paradigm was based on a broad spectrum of means of communication: diplomatic relations and hotlines** on the strategic level and means to convey urgent messages on tactical levels, confidence of both sides in their ability to maintain escalation dominance in case of tension. In any case, the "bi-polar" nature of the conflict meant that each side knew that any actions of the other should be taken in the context of their relations. A "poly-nuclear" Middle East will be fundamentally different and less stable in this aspect**. Relations between the countries of the region are notoriously unstable. Between Israel and the two key candidates for nuclearization - Iran and Saudi Arabia - diplomatic relations do not exist at all.** This will make hotlines and sending of calming signals much more difficult. In these circumstances, no party will be have escalation dominance and **the potential for spiraling of tensions leading to nuclear confrontation is greater than ever in the Cold War.** Nuclear alerts by one party will not be interpreted only by the party it was intended for but by all other parties, which may react accordingly, contributing to spiraling multi-lateral escalation. **The essence of MAD was the existence of a credible "second strike" capability. This was based on large stockpiles in both Superpowers and the deployment of delivery capabilities that would survive a first strike (either due to their protection or their off-shore deployment) and assure mutual destructio**n. Indeed, the first years of the Cold War, before the two Superpowers developed the capabilities for mutual destruction and the command and control mechanism to prevent such a catastrophe, were the most dangerous and held the highest risk of both nuclear war and local conflicts under the "umbrella" of nuclear deterrence**. For the foreseeable future there will be no balance of MAD in the Middle East. Even assuming the maximum rate of acquisition of weapons grade fissile material for building nuclear weapons, the new nuclear nations will not reach a level of MAD for some decades**. For some time to come, the new nuclear powers will also not have a credible second strike capability based on a large enough stockpile of nuclear weapons and the ability to deploy them and their delivery systems in places (e.g. submarines or well protected silos) and in amounts large enough to mete out a fatal blow to the enemy, even after the country is attacked. Even if a regional nuclear power were able to retaliate effectively against one adversary, there would remain the possibility of retaliation by one of the allies of the attacked country. This will increase the inclination of a country which sees itself threatened to deliver the first strike. During the entire period of the Cold War, none of the nuclear powers provided their client states or proxy organizations with weapons of mass destruction. True, theories were raised in the early days of China having become a nuclear power, that it may use its nuclear weapons in "catalytic action" against the US or the USSR in order to provoke a nuclear war between those countries.5 In the absence of a credible second strike capability in the first stages of a nuclear Middle East, delay of the enemy second strike will be paramount. Since the origin of a nuclear attack with air-delivery systems (aircraft or missiles) would be easily identifiable, a country may attempt to obfuscate its direct responsibility for an attack by launching a weapon from inside a neighboring country or providing a trusted surrogate (such as Hizballah or Shiite groups inside Iraq) with a nuclear weapon and short range delivery means.

### 3. An Asia Pivot

#### America is uniquely able to stop saudi proliferation

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/07/us-must-build-saudi-arabias-first-nuclear-reactors/149914/

The Trump administration should use whatever influence it has with Saudi Arabia—particularly goodwill accrued from stepping away from the JCPOA—to secure reactor projects while pursuing these policies. Some country will supply the Kingdom with nuclear technology, but **America is most likely to prevent Saudi Arabia from pursuing weapon**s and can do so without prohibiting enrichment, a measure that would make Riyadh more likely to pursue weapons development in secret. The United States should instead seek Saudi adherence to the Additional Protocol in a 123 Agreement, which would grant IAEA access to Saudi nuclear sites and materials to guard against illicit activities. [But] **By** investing in innovative designs like SMRs and expediting their approval through **[using] proper regulatory channels, the United States can further work toward alleviating proliferation, safety, and security concerns** by design.

#### U.S. influence destroyed by ending arms sales

[**J.E. Peterson Professor at the University of Arizona in 2018**](https://books.google.com/books?id=WUVYDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA132&lpg=PA132&dq=the+KSA+undoubtedly+would+turn+to+other+suppliers+%5Bfor+nuclear+acquisition%5D+for+example,+France+for+reactors,+Russia+(and+the+European+Union)+for+arms,+and+China+for+missiles.+Riyadh+has+pursued+a+policy+of+diversification+in+economic+and+military+goods+and+services+for+quite+some+time+and+this+development+would+simply+accelerate+an+existing+trend.+As+a+consequence,+the+United+States+would+run+the+risk+of+losing+political+and+moral+influence+in+%5BSaudi+Arabia%5D+Riyadh+and+thus+its+ability+to+monitor+%5Btheir%5D+KSA+activities+would+be+degraded.&source=bl&ots=27OklSgYEd&sig=ACfU3U118qgYBiK-c-VijXTqQmvmlNgHQw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjKhbmipZvgAhUCKa0KHfYSA1QQ6AEwAHoECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q=the%20KSA%20undoubtedly%20would%20turn%20to%20other%20suppliers%20%5Bfor%20nuclear%20acquisition%5D%20for%20example%2C%20France%20for%20reactors%2C%20Russia%20(and%20the%20European%20Union)%20for%20arms%2C%20and%20China%20for%20missiles.%20Riyadh%20has%20pursued%20a%20policy%20of%20diversification%20in%20economic%20and%20military%20goods%20and%20services%20for%20quite%20some%20time%20and%20this%20development%20would%20simply%20accelerate%20an%20existing%20trend.%20As%20a%20consequence%2C%20the%20United%20States%20would%20run%20the%20risk%20of%20losing%20political%20and%20moral%20influence%20in%20%5BSaudi%20Arabia%5D%20Riyadh%20and%20thus%20its%20ability%20to%20monitor%20%5Btheir%5D%20KSA%20activities%20would%20be%20degraded.&f=false)

The least threatening move in an effort to dissuade the kingdom from nuclear acquisition may be presidential or (less provocatively) administration hints at US displeasure. But this tactic has featured in KSA-US relations for many years, dating back to the oil crisis of the 1970s and continuing in Arab-Israeli matters without much significant success. Such action is unlikely to have positive effect and it is more likely to stiffen KSA resolve. Similarly, the United States could take diplomatic action, such as not naming an ambassador to Riyadh. But this would probably result in a titfor-tat, thus resulting in some damage to relations without achieving a positive result. The United States could threaten to withdraw military support or announce its refusal to sell arms to the kingdom. In such a scenario, **[If the U.S. ended arm sales, Saudi Arabia]** the KSA **undoubtedly would turn to other suppliers [for nuclear acquisition]** for example, France for reactors, Russia (and the European Union) for arms, and China for missiles. Riyadh has pursued a policy of diversification in economic and military goods and services for quite some time and this development would simply accelerate an existing trend. **As a consequence, the United States would run the risk of losing political and moral influence in [Saudi Arabia]** Riyadh **and** thus **its ability to monitor [their]** KSA **activities would be degraded**.

#### Instead, U.S. influence would be replaced with other countries

10/25/18

https://www.france24.com/en/20181025-arms-sales-vs-taking-stand-wests-saudi-dilemma

Beyond the Khashoggi killing, a growing number of countries have been questioning more generally whether they should be selling to Saudi Arabia as well as the United Arab Emirates, also active in Yemen. "This debate has been very vocal in Germany, Sweden, Norway and Finland," said Tony Fortin of the Observatoire des Armements, a French research centre. "There have been legal cases filed against sales in Britain, Italy and the Netherlands," he added. "It has put our relations with Riyadh under the spotlight: can we allow ourselves to continue strategic relations with a regime which torments its opponents, starves civilians in Yemen and literally cut a journalist up into pieces?" Other countries -- particularly **Russia and China -- would be delighted to replace Riyadh's Western suppliers should they cut off exports en masse**, the Intelligence Online website pointed out.

#### Russia/China let Saudi Prolif

NYT Feb 25, 2018

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/25/opinion/americans-saudis-nuclear-weapon.html

Insisting on strict conditions could force the Saudis to buy instead from Russ**ia or China**, which **don’t impose such nonproliferation rules,** or from France and South Korea, thus penalizing a moribund American nuclear industry eager for the lucrative new business. Westinghouse and other American-based companies are discussing a consortium to bid on the multibillion-dollar project.

Stopping AR cuts relations

1. Nuclear umbrella
2. Pressure?
3. Fill-in -> willing to sell nukes