

High military spending means large military and more wars and aggression

Potter 2016 [Thomas Potter at Gettysburg College, "Racing to War: Arms Competitions, Military Spending, and the Tendency of Nations to Engage in Armed Conflict", *Gettysburg College*, <http://cupola.gettysburg.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1542&context=student_scholarship.] //CJC

Some scholars of International Relations have long hypothesized on **the negative effects on military spending**. The association between large standing armies and a hostile environment for global peace has been prominent since at least the 1700's, when influential philosopher Immanuel Kant theorized that "**Standing armies** (miles perpetuus) excite the States to outrival each other in the number of their armed men. Peace becomes in the long run even more oppressive than a short war; and **Standing Armies are thus the cause of aggressive wars undertaken in order to get rid of this burden**" (Kant [1795] 2010, 3) Kant's initial proposal was one of the first arguments that **a large standing army, and the implied heavy defense spending necessary to create such a force, could exacerbate or even create wars instead of deterring them**. Modern scholars take the argument further, as according to Fordham and Walker scholars of liberal theory state that "Liberals claim that states can avoid conflict spirals and provide more resources for domestic needs by spending less on their militaries" (Fordham and Walker 2005). While liberal theory makes note of domestic factors such as improving discretionary investments as a major reason for lowering military spending, the implications of military expenditures on the international system are more crucial to the overall development of the hypothesis.

Doubling down on spending will create arms race, new cold war, kills coop

Michael Swaine, Joseph Prueher, J. Stapleton Roy, Paul Heer, David Lampton, Ezra Vogel, December 12, 2016 [Swaine is a senior fellow, "How America Can Lead in Asia," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/12/12/how-america-can-lead-in-asia-pub-66428>] MJS 12-22-2016

The security imperatives of China and the United States are potentially, but not inherently, incompatible. They become incompatible only if neither side is willing to accommodate, in some fashion, to the other's fundamental interests.

The solution is not for the United States to double down militarily, spending vast amounts of money in a futile attempt to remain militarily predominant across all of maritime East Asia. Such an approach would be virtually certain to result in an intensifying arms race and political rivalry with Beijing that would undermine the basis for vital Sino-U.S. cooperation in other areas. At worst, **it could generate a new Cold War** that benefits no one.

Washington also needs to adapt its security posture in the region to one that the U.S. economy can sustain, and the U.S. polity can endorse, especially given America's myriad domestic priorities.

Failure of US China relations results in intensifying international problems – multiple factors. Only a cooperative relationship between the US and China can avoid great power wars, resource scarcity, economic collapse, environmental degradation, and increased carbon emissions

Fingar and Garrett 13 (Thomas Fingar, Stanford University and Banning Garrett, Atlantic Council, September 2013, "China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future," Atlantic Council, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/China-US_Cooperation_Key_to_the_Global_Future_WEB.pdf) DDI – JT

As the megatrends and uncertainties evolve over the coming two decades and beyond, China and the United States, along with the rest of the world, will face unprecedented challenges and unpredictable, disruptive change. We offer three global scenarios to illustrate how the complex megatrends, key uncertainties, and disruptive changes could play out, **depending in large part on whether the relationship between China and the United States is primarily cooperative or conflictual.**

• **Global Drift and Erosion:** This scenario is characterized by the inability of China and the United States to work together effectively, if at all, to address key global challenges and to resolve regional conflicts. Problems created or exacerbated by the megatrends, key uncertainties, and their interactions worsen, creating a world that is less peaceful, less stable, and less prosperous. The debacle of the 2009 Copenhagen UN climate change conference demonstrated the global impact of the failure of the United States and China to agree on far-reaching steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In this future, **the US and China again fail to respond adequately to continuing problems** such as economic imbalances associated with the efforts of many countries to break into and then move from middle income status to that of high income. **There is disruptive socio-political change related in part to both economic and demographic transitions, and environmental problems involving inadequate energy, water, and food resources.** Washington and Beijing could be too preoccupied with political and military competition and territorial disputes in the Western Pacific, as well as by bilateral differences over intellectual property and other trade issues, to tackle these pressing problems. Among possible developments, **US-China tensions could adversely affect global responses to energy challenges. These range from threats to security of supplies resulting from conflict in the Middle East and Persian Gulf to the need for a global energy transition away from fossil fuels to minimize carbon emissions and the impact of energy price volatility on global economic growth. Further, China and the United States also could fail to cooperate in efforts to mitigate the potentially disruptive impact of greatly increased demand for food, water, and other resources created by the addition of more than one billion people to the global population by 2030 as well as possibly two billion or more people to the developing world middle class. Without adequate international cooperation and**

global governmental mechanisms, this could lead to deeper economic crises, unresolved political conflicts, and worsening environmental conditions. • Zero-Sum World: A second possible trajectory could lead to the emergence of an even more competitive and dangerous zerosum world, in which nations pursue narrow national interests. For example, the world could experience intense monetary and trade protectionism, with countries seeking geopolitical advantage at the expense of international cooperation for the common good. It could see intensifying rivalries, creating hostilities and rendering cooperation on global challenges nearly impossible as global governmental mechanisms break down or are marginalized. In this scenario, the impact of megatrends and critical challenges on global developments is overwhelmingly negative. The world economy is in a tailspin, brought on, perhaps, by a deepening European recession followed by a new meltdown of the global financial system and then a worse recession than that sparked by the 2008 financial crisis. Regional conflicts and disputes in East Asia intensify suspicions and threaten to ignite conflict among the major powers. The United States and China not only fail to cooperate on longer-term global issues but also fail to work together to resolve immediate regional tensions which spin out of control, leading to military conflict that threatens to drag the US and China into direct confrontation. • Global Revitalization and Cooperation: A third possible trajectory could lead to a world in which sustained and effective cooperation builds/rebuilds key institutions to address old and emerging challenges as well as “black swans.” Globalization and global integration continue apace with more successful efforts to mitigate or prepare for negative consequences. This scenario is characterized by greater strategic stability among major powers and by sustained prosperity and economic growth in China, the United States, and most other countries. Through cooperative development and deployment of new technologies countries implement effective measures to manage energy, water, governance, and other challenges. The result would be a wide range of win-win outcomes for all nations. It is difficult to find any credible path to such “global revitalization and cooperation” that does not include a cooperative US-China relationship. This makes efforts to achieve such an outcome imperative for the leaders of both countries, despite the differences and suspicions between them.

US-China co-operation is crucial to solving all global threats and crises – war, warming, resource wars, and more – most qualled

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Preface: ***Global Future Depends on Depth of China-US Cooperation***

The world has achieved unprecedented peace, prosperity, and inter-dependence, but past achievements — and further progress — are threatened by a host of looming

challenges. Global institutions that served us well and transformed the world are becoming victims of their own success and must be reformed or replaced to deal with new challenges and take advantage of new opportunities. Governments everywhere face rising expectations and increasing demands but find themselves less able to manage the challenges they face.

The next round of challenges can only be managed successfully if nations, especially major powers, cooperate. Moreover, **the most difficult and most consequential challenges cannot be managed effectively without sustained cooperation between the largest developing country, China, and the largest developed country, the United States.** Stated another way, **the ability of China and the United States to work together on critical global challenges will determine whether the world is able to sustain and enhance mutually beneficial developments or fails to cope with the issues critical to the global future** and to the security and prosperity of the United States and China.

This shared conviction persuades us that we must do more than just hope that our countries will find ways to cooperate. This report represents a joint effort to develop both the rationale and concrete mechanisms for sustained, proactive collaboration to address challenges resulting from long-term global trends and consequential uncertainties. It builds on the findings of independent efforts to identify megatrends and potential game-changers with the goal of developing a framework for the US-China relationship that will better enable us to meet the challenges facing the global community and the strategic needs of both countries.

The Joint Working Group recognizes that China and the United States hold different views on many bilateral and international issues, and that our relationship is constrained by mutual suspicion and strategic mistrust. Nevertheless, our common strategic interests and responsibility as major powers are more important than the specific issues that divide us; we must not make cooperation on critical global issues contingent on prior resolution of bilateral disputes. Our disagreements on bilateral issues are important, but they are not as important to our long-term security and prosperity as is our ability to cooperate on key challenges to global security and our increasingly intertwined futures. We must cooperate on global challenges not as a favor to one another or because other nations expect us to exercise leadership in the international system. We must do it because failure to cooperate on key global challenges will have profoundly negative consequences for the citizens of our own countries.

The Joint Working Group has no illusions about how difficult the task ahead will be. Leaders in both countries face relentless domestic pressures to focus on near-term issues, often to the detriment of long-term interests, as well as on looming US-China bilateral differences and mutual suspicions. This report seeks to illustrate why it is imperative and how it is possible to pursue long- and short-term interests at the same time.

How We Reached Key Assessments and Recommendations

Generous support from the China-United States Exchange Foundation enabled the Atlantic Council and the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) to establish a Joint Working Group of experts from both countries. The members of the group met in Beijing and Washington in the spring and summer of 2012 to compare and integrate the findings of separate Chinese and US draft reports on global trends. The Chinese projection of trends, entitled *Global Trends 2030 and the Prospects for China-US Relations*, was prepared by CIIS with contributions from the School of International Studies at Peking University. The US report, *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds*, was prepared by the US National Intelligence Council (NIC).^[1] The Atlantic Council contributed to the NIC report and members of the NIC team attended (as observers) the joint assessment meetings.

This review confirmed that the independently developed reports were generally consistent in their assessments of global trends and provided a solid basis for development of scenarios to illustrate what might happen under different assumptions about cooperation between China and the United States. The scenarios in both analyses depict markedly different outcomes for China, the United States, and the world. When China and the United States cooperate to meet looming challenges, both countries benefit. When they fail to cooperate and pursue narrow interests or win-lose or zero-sum outcomes, both countries lose. Continuing down the path of drift and episodic cooperation that we are on now also leads to lose-lose outcomes.

The obvious advantages of win-win outcomes and dangerous implications of behaviors that eschew or minimize cooperation create strong incentives to focus on megatrends, critical challenges, and enhancing the likelihood of success and mutual benefit through close and continuous collaboration. This report outlines the case for collaboration and makes several specific recommendations to make cooperation both possible and fruitful. It was drafted and circulated among group members for revisions and to ensure consensus.

China and the United States have different interests, objectives, and perspectives on many matters, and the number of issues in dispute may well grow as we broaden our bilateral relationship and at times disagree with one another on the world stage. Resolving some of these issues will be difficult and require much time and effort.

The resolution of these contentious issues in the US-China relationship, however, must not be made a prerequisite for cooperation on a limited but arguably more important set of issues with the clear potential to harm both of our interests. Continued drift toward strategic competition and failure to find a balance of interests on core issues will undermine support in both countries for cooperation on major global issues of mutual interest and benefit. Cooperation on shared global challenges may build trust and make it easier to resolve nettlesome bilateral issues. But that would be an ancillary benefit and should not be the primary reason for collaboration on the global challenges identified in the independently prepared studies and summarized elsewhere in this report.

The primary reasons we need to work together on the global challenges are that they cannot be addressed successfully unless we do, and that failure to deal effectively with

consequential megatrends will have deleterious consequences for China, the United States, and the world. **It is difficult to envision a stable, prosperous global system absent a US-China relationship that is largely a cooperative**

one.

Forces and megatrends that are visible but not well understood today will shape the futures of people everywhere. The list includes consequences of globalization that increase prosperity but also increase demand for water, food, and energy. It also includes demographic change and effects of climate change that will intensify the consequences of other megatrends and make them more difficult to manage. Some of the megatrends and the way they interact will threaten social and political stability unless managed effectively. All have profound implications for governance and global stability. How effectively governments meet and manage these challenges in the next ten to twenty years will determine how beneficial or detrimental they will be for our countries and our children.

Successfully navigating the turbulent waters ahead will require understanding the challenges we face and foresight about the implications of alternative paths. Our common goal must be to avert or ameliorate negative outcomes, and to maximize the chances of achieving desirable outcomes. To accomplish this goal, China and the United States must establish and draw on a continuing dialogue on the evolution, implications, and possible policy responses to the most consequential megatrends, key uncertainties, and disruptive change. The framework and policy recommendations of this report seek to jumpstart that process by suggesting mechanisms for collaboration that begin bilaterally but eventually include other nations critical to finding paths to a better future for all.

I. Critical Importance of China-US Cooperation

The global future is likely to be increasingly volatile and uncertain. The rate of **change is increasing**, driven by the accelerating pace of technological development, unprecedented urbanization and growth of the global middle class, and a wide range of challenges beyond the control of any one country but potentially affecting the prosperity and security of all countries. Disruptive **change in one geographic or functional area will spread** quickly.. **No country**, and certainly not those with the largest populations and largest economies, **will be immune**. Global challenges like ***climate change, food and water shortages, and resource scarcities will shape the strategic context for all nations and require reconsideration of traditional national concerns*** such as sovereignty and *maximizing the ability of national leaders to control their country's destiny*.

What **China and the United States** do, individually and together, **will have a major impact on the future of the global system**. As importantly, our individual fates will be inextricably linked to how that future plays out. The three illustrative **scenarios** sketched out below **underscore how *critical the future of the US-China relationship is to each country and to the world***.

- Global Drift and Erosion (the present world trajectory): In a world in which nations fail to resolve global problems and strengthen mechanisms of global cooperation, **governments gradually turn inward**. Each nation seeks to protect and advance **its own narrow national interests** or to preserve an unsustainable status quo that is rapidly changing in ways that erode the international order. **The international community's lack of ability to cooperate** to meet global challenges **leads to international crises and instability**.

- Zero-Sum World: Unsustainable drift leads to **a world of predominantly zero-sum competition and conflict in the face of severe resource constraints**. **The result is economic crises and internal instability** as well as interstate confrontation. There is risk of **military conflict between major powers**, which increases global mistrust and uncertainty and fosters an "each nation for itself" mentality that **further undermines the ability of states to cooperate** in the face of growing common challenges.

- Global Revitalization and Cooperation: To escape the perils of drift or zero-sum competition, leaders in countries with the most to lose work together to manage and take advantage of global challenges and megatrends. Cooperation makes it possible to achieve win-win outcomes that avoid or mitigate negative consequences of *increased demand for resources and the impact of climate change* as well as to harness new technologies to improve living conditions through sustainable development.

Cooperation creates and utilizes new transnational institutions to prevent conflict

and enhance security for all. China and the United States become more prosperous as we work together.

The possible futures sketched out above (and developed at greater length below) are intended to stimulate thinking about how current trends and uncertainties could lead to very different global and national outcomes. For many reasons, **the United States and China will have greater ability and incentives than other countries to cooperate in determining and shaping developments over the next two decades.** Indeed, **it is very difficult to imagine a pathway to “global revitalization and cooperation” in which China and the United States do not cooperate and provide critical international leadership.**

Many factors will shape the future, some of which are beyond the control of any nation state, but **China and the United States — and the character of the US-China relationship — will be critical.**

The mutual dependence on each other's economic performance and the success of the global economy as a whole was demonstrated during the 2008 financial crisis that began in the United States but quickly spread around the world. US and Chinese leaders recognized that they were in the “same boat” strategically and engaged in a closely coordinated response to the crisis, which played a key—if not decisive—role in preventing the situation from becoming much worse. The need for joint and coordinated responses to economic crises and to mounting economic challenges and threats is certain to increase as globalization continues and interdependence deepens.

Relations high, recent progress proves—Iran, Ebola, Military, Exports, Paris, NoKo

Blinken 4/27/2016 (Anthony J, Deputy Secretary of State, “US-China relations: strategic challenges and opportunities,” US department of state, 4/27/2016, <http://www.state.gov/s/d/2016d/256657.htm>) //CJC

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Members of the Committee, thank you. It is very good to be back before this Committee and have the opportunity to discuss our relationship with China, which as you have outlined very well, Mr. Chairman, is complicated indeed. I just got back this past weekend from what was my sixth visit to the Asia-Pacific in a little over a year. I have seen with each trip that the rebalance efforts we have been making to Asia have in fact advanced our interests and helped shape Asia's upward trajectory by bolstering our alliances, building new partnerships with emerging countries, strengthening regional institutions and rule of law, advancing our economic ties, and engaging with China. I am pleased to discuss this last pillar of our rebalance with you today. Secretary Kerry has called our relationship with China our “most consequential” relationship. And it is indeed crucial that we try to get it right. The approach that we've taken to China seeks to do three things: broaden and deepen practical cooperation on issues of shared concern; it directly confronts and then tries to resolve or narrow our differences wherever we can; and where we can't to manage those differences peaceably. Over the past year, we believe **we have seen real progress on important issues that do advance our interests.** **The relationship that we have been working on with China paved the way for** a landmark joint announcement on climate change that galvanized the international community to reach **a global climate agreement in Paris** last December and sign it in New York just last week. **We engaged China in the global response to Ebola with positive effect.** **We grounded our work together to craft a deal that prevents Iran from developing a nuclear weapon** far into the future.

we produced new confidence-building measures between our militaries, and we sparked growing collaboration to meet development challenges from Afghanistan to Sierra Leone. From top to bottom, this Administration has worked to expand and deepen our diplomatic, military, economic, and people-to-people links with China. Since the President took office, **our exports to China have nearly doubled, and China is now the largest market for American-made goods outside of North America. It is also one of the top markets for U.S. agricultural exports and a large and growing market for U.S. services.** These efforts to deepen bilateral ties have been designed to turn a challenging rivalry into healthy competition and to try break out of a zero-sum thinking on both sides. We have seen results of this approach in our collaboration on some of the most difficult issues, including most recently **North Korea and** the provocative, destabilizing, and internationally unlawful actions it continues to take to advance **its proscribed missile and nuclear programs.** While we have taken significant steps to make it more difficult for North Korea to acquire technology and equipment for those programs or the resources to pay for them, the fact remains that their development continues. As a result, they get closer to the day when they have the capacity to strike at our allies, at our partners, and at the United States with a ballistic missile armed with a miniaturized nuclear warhead. That is simply unacceptable. This threat—combined with an inexperienced leader who acts rashly—makes it an urgent priority not only for us but increasingly for China. While the United States and China share an interest in ensuring that North Korea does not retain a nuclear weapons capability, we have not always agreed on the best way to reach that objective. **But in the last few months we have worked together to draft and pass the toughest UN Security Council Resolution in a generation to try to compel the leadership of the DPRK to rethink its pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.** If fully and effectively implemented, UNSCR 2270 will significantly reduce the North Korean regime's ability to procure, pay for, or produce weapons of mass destruction and will challenge the calculus of the leadership in North Korea.

Trump's increase in military spending will be offset by less welfare

David Morris, 10-21-2016 [, "The wasteful truth about military spending if Trump were to become president," Salon, <http://www.salon.com/2016/10/21/the-wasteful-truth-about-military-spending-if-trump-were-to-become-president/>] MJS 1-4-2017

In September 2016, as the Republican nominee, **Donald Trump** the politician dramatically reversed his position. **He now proposes a massive increase in military spending.** And instead of making the military more efficient by cutting Pentagon waste, **Trump will "fully offset" the increase in military spending by reducing spending on non-defense programs through reducing their "government waste and budget gimmicks."**

For an idea of what that might entail for non-defense spending, consider the Republican budget blueprint passed by the House in early 2015 (no Democrat voted in favor). **To offset a significant increase in military spending, the New York Times reports, Medicaid would be cut by \$900 billion. Spending on the food stamp program would be shrunk by hundreds of billions of dollars. Spending for Pell Grants for college, job training and housing assistance would be slashed.**

Means-testing has lifted millions out of poverty

Sharman, 2013 [July 2013, Arloc Sharman, Danilo Trisi, Sharon Parrott , "Various Supports for Low-Income Families Reduce Poverty and Have Long-Term Positive Effects On Families and Children," *Center for Budget and Policy Priorities*, <http://www.cbpp.org/research/various->

[supports-for-low-income-families-reduce-poverty-and-have-long-term-positive-effects\]](#) JSM

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“The EITC and SNAP are examples of “means-tested” programs, that is, programs that limit assistance to people with low or modest incomes. Other means-tested programs include Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for low-income seniors and people with disabilities; cash assistance programs funded by the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, and programs that provide non-cash benefits like housing assistance. **In 2011, means-tested benefits lifted 19.7 million people above the poverty line, including 8.5 million children.**[5] (See Appendix Table 2 for state-by-state figures.) **Medicaid and CHIP provided health insurance to 66 million Americans during 2010** — roughly 32 million children, 18 million parents, 10 million people with disabilities, and 6 million seniors. Medicaid and CHIP have greatly reduced the numbers of uninsured children and now provide coverage to most low-income children. Due to Medicaid and CHIP, children are much less likely than non-elderly adults to be uninsured. Some 9.4 percent of children were uninsured in 2011, compared to 21.2 percent of non-elderly adults.[6] To be sure, some critics question the effects of safety net programs on individual behavior, such as work effort, and how that affects poverty. **Several of the leading researchers in the field have conducted a comprehensive review of the available research and data on how safety net programs affect poverty, and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) has published their results. They found that, after accounting for what the research finds to be modest overall behavioral effects, the safety net lowers the poverty rate by about 14 percentage points.** In other words, one of every seven Americans would be poor without the safety net but is above the poverty line because of it. That translates into more than 40 million people.[7]”

Unilateralism and the focus on military power causes American arrogance and trades of with cooperation on terrorism, climate change, disease

H.D.S. Greenway, Columnist at the Boston Globe, Boston Globe, January 25, 2002,

https://www.hks.harvard.edu/FS/jnye/reviews/greenway_globe.pdf //CJC

Nye articulated the concept of "soft power," arguing that America's real strength lay not only in military prowess but in the attractions of its open society, its universities, its popular culture, and economic opportunities that had become a world magnet. Then, at century's end, when the United States had reached a zenith of power and authority, Nye started a new book to warn against hubris and unilateralism - the soon-to-be-published "The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone." Before the book was finished the events of Sept. 11 came along and underscored his thesis. As the 21st century dawned, Americans had forgotten their fears of being overtaken by the Far East and instead had become "arrogant about our power, arguing that we did not need to heed other nations," according to Nye. "We seemed both invincible and invulnerable." Then came September to put paid to all that. To some, the very freedoms that make up our soft power are "repulsive," particularly to fundamentalists. But "hard nuggets of hate are unlikely to catalyze broader hatred unless we abandon our values and pursue arrogant and overbearing policies that let the extremists appeal to the majority in the middle," Nye argues. There are world problems that simply cannot be tackled by one country alone, no matter how powerful: financial instability, climate change, drugs, infectious diseases, and

terrorism. If the United States is bound to lead, it is also **bound to cooperate**, Nye writes. With the end of the Cold War America went too quickly from **declinism to triumphalism**. All the trends of **globalization and the information age favor** the growing **soft power** of the United States, **"but only if we avoid stepping on our own message."** Nye writes that "isolationists who think we can avoid vulnerability to terrorism by drawing inward fail to understand the realities of a global information age." As for going it alone, **unilateralism** is not a viable option; it **risks undermining** our **soft power and invites coalitions to form against us, which would eventually limit our hard power.**

Pursuing unipolar hegemony directly trades off with cooperation and multilateralism

Adams 2015 - professor of international relations at American University's School of International Service

Gordon and Richard Sokolsky, "The GOP Plan to Bring Back a Unipolar World," Dec 30, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/30/rubio-bush-republican-presidential-politics/> //CJC

Preserving the unipolar moment Republican rhetoric is replete with calls to restore the leadership of the United States, as the most powerful, indispensable, and exceptional nation. Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) captures this view well, though he is not alone. For Rubio, the United States is the natural, inevitable, and indispensable leader. "America plays a part on the world stage for which there is no understudy. When we fail to lead with strength and principle, no other country, friend or foe, is willing or able to take our place. And the result is chaos," Rubio says on his campaign website. "While America did not intend to become the world's indispensable power, that is exactly what our economic and political freedoms have made us. The free nations of the world still look to America to champion our shared ideals," he adds. For Sen. Ted Cruz, this standing gives the United States a dominant position. "It is dangerous to dictators like [Vladimir] Putin when Americans remember their exceptionalism," Cruz wrote in an opinion piece for CNN. "The unique combination of power and principle that has made the United States the greatest force for good on the planet has historically posed a grave threat to repressive bullies." **The call to restore American leadership and its dominant international role is a consistent theme for Republican presidential candidates.** It is a dangerous one, because the world has changed in a fundamental way. **The United States is simply no longer a global goliath bestriding a unipolar world.** Turkey no longer jumps when America says frog. Putin is unmoved by U.S. demands. China is clearly expanding its own role, creating international economic organizations that include most of its closest allies but not the United States. **The raw measures of military and economic power that are typically invoked to rebut the relative change in global power are not easily converted into the currency of diplomatic leverage.** In contrast to the Republican message, in today's world, power is often "situational," assembled by coalitions of like-minded countries with the capacity, resolve, and resources, to take effective action to advance shared interests. **American leadership looks different in this world; it is most effective when the United States helps mobilizes these multilateral partnerships,** and allows others to take ownership of the solution. **Insisting that the United States take the lead in international events, crises, and conflicts, would be counter-productive. An elusive quest to restore a unipolar world order run from Washington leads to behavior at odds with the requirements of effective diplomacy in a rebalanced, multipolar world.** Moreover, asserting U.S. control, as **the GOP field suggests, vastly overstates the degree to which we are responsible for or could change global realities and problems.** To recognize this reality is not declinism or abandoning the field, as Rubio suggests — it is realism. His view, in addition, is inconsistent with popular opinion: while Americans support a strong military, they are reluctant to incur the risks and costs of being a global cop. Indeed, according to opinion surveys, the public prefers disengagement from or avoidance of arenas of military conflict. And **it overlooks the extent to which overreaction and hegemonic overreach over the past 15 years — the invasion of Iraq, CIA renditions to other countries for interrogation, expanded NSA global surveillance,** to name but a few — has undermined the willingness of other countries to welcome U.S. leadership. Military power is not the answer The key ingredient of Republican national security policy is the "restoration" of U.S. military power, and its more vigorous assertion abroad. In a March 2015 column he authored with Sen. Tom Cotton, Rubio linked force reductions directly to diminished U.S. leadership. "Our force reductions have been felt throughout the world — by our friends and our enemies. They have presented not just a crisis of readiness for America, but also a perilous strategic weakness. Our adversaries have been

emboldened by what they perceive as our diminished military presence." Similarly, Jeb Bush has argued that any sound plan to defeat IS and other threats hinges on our military strength. "Let that slip away, and what would America be in world affairs, except one more well-intentioned voice at the United Nations? In any effort of ours to overcome violence and secure peace, a winning strategy depends on maintaining unequalled strength, and we can never take it for granted." Chris Christie offers an argument of pre-emption: "A strong military doesn't just help us to deal with the threats we face. It helps eliminate them before we even see them." The argument that U.S. military power has declined and that its revival is the key to restoring our global leadership is false. This is because this idea deliberately understates current U.S. military capabilities. The Republicans conveniently avoid the reality that U.S. defense spending is greater than the combined defense budgets of the next eight countries with the highest levels of defense spending. Today, U.S. defense budgets are \$150 billion higher than the Cold War average (in constant dollars). This spending buys an impressive, incomparable military. Unlike any other country, the United States maintains a network of globe-girdling alliances and more than 800 military facilities overseas. The United States is the only country in the world that can deploy troops, fly aircraft, and sail naval ships around the world, supported by a truly global network of communications, logistics, transportation, and intelligence agencies. No other country has such a capability. **The Republican argument is also misleading. It substitutes measures of military capability and the assertive use of military force for sound foreign policy judgment.** U.S. military power is useful and necessary for many good things: it can help maintain a favorable balance of global power, support freedom of navigation, deter aggression against allies and friends, demonstrate the credibility of U.S. security commitments, respond to humanitarian disasters, provide critical support for American diplomacy, and, embedded in a broader policy context, contribute to the struggle with terrorist organizations.

Multilat best for conflict response — legitimacy

Calkins 2007 [Audrey Calkins at Wake Forest University, "Multilateralism in International Conflict: Recipe for Success or Failure, *Wake Forest University*,

<http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/Calkins/Calkins.pdf>] //CJC

According to the results of these three interventions, **multilateralism, thanks to its opportunity for increased legitimacy, results in a higher level of success in international conflict.** Although multilateralism requires states to forgo their personal interests for the greater global good, **this sacrifice grants legitimacy to military action. That legitimacy has become a requirement for a successful conflict due to the greater interaction of the global**

community. While multilateralism facilitates the acquisition of the requirements for a successful conflict as outlined in this paper, situations exist in which unilateral action can attain the same level of success. For example, if a sovereign state invaded a neighboring sovereign state's borders and the invaded state struck back against its aggressor both militarily and economically before consulting any international organization, that military action would most likely be granted international legitimacy. In this case, unilateral action could be taken quickly without facing the constraints placed on a multinational force with language or equipment barriers. **However, the cases in which unilateral military action would receive international legitimacy and be deemed a success in both the eyes of the world and the country performing the action are far fewer than those which could be deemed successes if multilateralism was pursued.** Multilateralism's developing prominence and importance raises several important questions. If it is the preferred method of pursuing interventions, which type of organization should do the work of multilateralism: regional bodies such as the EU or AU or international bodies such as the UN or NATO? Due to the rise of these multilateral institutions, is unilateral action even relevant in today's world? While these questions have no immediate answers, future leaders should consider the positive impact of multilateralism before beginning military action.

Military spending causes equipment surpluses

Anthony Fisher, May 2016 [Associate Editor at Reason.com, "Feds Gave \$2.2 Billion Worth of Military Gear to Local Police Departments Since 2006," Reason, <http://reason.com/blog/2016/05/11/22-billion-military-gear-local-police>] MJS 12-8-2016

Since 1997, surplus military equipment has been transferred to local PDs under the Department of Defense (DoD)'s 1033 Program, but with the increase in military spending post-9/11/01, and the subsequent scaling back of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military has far more equipment than it needs, which means police in cities big and small can load up on state-of-the-art war machines, tactical gear, guns, and explosives.

Pentagon militarizes police by giving away surplus equipment, DHS and DOJ give massive grants to militarize, militarization removes the trust aspect of policing and turns it into us vs. them

Harwood 2014 [Matthew Harwood is a writer for Mother Jones, "How Did America's Police Get So Militarized?", *Mother Jones*, <<http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/08/america-police-military-swat-ferguson-westcott-tampa>>] //CJC

Lucky for Federspiel, his exercise in paranoid disaster preparedness didn't cost his office a penny. That \$425,000 MRAP came as a gift, courtesy of Uncle Sam, from one of our far-flung counterinsurgency wars. **The nasty little secret of policing's militarization is that taxpayers are subsidizing it through programs overseen by the Pentagon, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Justice Department.** Take the 1033 program. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) may be an obscure agency within the Department of Defense, but through **the 1033 program**, which it oversees, **it's one of the core enablers of American policing's excessive militarization.** Beginning in 1990, **Congress authorized the Pentagon to transfer its surplus property free of charge to federal, state, and local police departments** to wage the war on drugs. In 1997, Congress expanded the purpose of the program to include counterterrorism in section 1033 of the defense authorization bill. In one single page of a 450-page law, Congress helped sow the seeds of today's warrior cops. The amount of military hardware transferred through the program has grown astronomically over the years. **In 1990, the Pentagon gave \$1 million worth of equipment to US law enforcement. That number had jumped to nearly \$450 million in 2013. Overall, the program has shipped off more than \$4.3 billion worth of materiel to state and local cops,** according to the DLA. In its recent report, the ACLU found a disturbing range of military gear being transferred to civilian police departments nationwide. **Police in North Little Rock, Arkansas, for instance, received 34 automatic and semi-automatic rifles, two robots that can be armed, military helmets, and a Mamba tactical vehicle. Police in Gwinnet County, Georgia, received 57 semi-automatic rifles, mostly M-16s and M-14s. The Utah Highway Patrol, according to a Salt Lake City Tribune investigation, got an MRAP from the 1033 program, and Utah police received 1,230 rifles and four grenade launchers. After South Carolina's Columbia Police Department received its very own MRAP worth \$658,000, its SWAT Commander Captain E.M. Marsh noted that 500 similar vehicles had been distributed to law enforcement organizations across the country. Astoundingly, one-third of all war materiel parceled out to state, local, and tribal police agencies is brand new.** This raises further disconcerting questions: Is the Pentagon simply wasteful when it purchases military weapons and equipment with taxpayer dollars? Or could this be another downstream, subsidized market for defense contractors? Whatever the answer, the Pentagon is actively distributing weaponry and equipment made for US counterinsurgency campaigns abroad to police who patrol American streets and this is considered sound policy in Washington. The message seems striking enough: what might be necessary for Kabul might also be necessary for DeKalb County. **In other words, the twenty-first-century war on terror has melded thoroughly with the twentieth-century war on drugs, and the result couldn't be anymore disturbing: police forces that increasingly look and act like occupying armies.** How the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice Are Up-Arming the Police When police departments look to muscle up their arms and tactics, the Pentagon isn't the only game in town. Civilian agencies are in on it, too. During a 2011 investigation, reporters Andrew Becker and G.W. Schulz discovered that, **since 9/11, police departments watching over some of the safest places in America have used \$34 billion in grant funding from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to militarize in the name of counterterrorism.** In Fargo, North Dakota, for example, the city and its surrounding county went on an \$8 million spending spree with federal money, according to

Becker and Schulz. Although the area averaged less than two murders a year since 2005, every squad car is now armed with an assault rifle. Police also have access to Kevlar helmets that can stop heavy firepower as well as an armored truck worth approximately \$250,000. In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1,500 beat cops have been trained to use AR-15 assault rifles with homeland security grant funding. As with the 1033 program, **neither DHS nor state and local governments account for how the equipment, including body armor and drones, is used.** While the rationale behind stocking up on these military-grade supplies is invariably the possibility of a terrorist attack, school shooting, or some other horrific event, the gear is normally used to conduct paramilitary drug raids, as Balko notes. Still, **the most startling source of police militarization is the Department of Justice,** the very agency officially dedicated to spreading the community policing model through its Community Oriented Policing Services office. In 1988, Congress authorized the **Byrne grant programs** in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which **gave state and local police federal funds to enlist in the government's drug war.** That grant program, according to Balko, led to the creation of regional and multi-jurisdictional narcotics task forces, which gorged themselves on federal money and, with little federal, state, or local oversight, spent it beefing up their weapons and tactics. In 2011, **585 of these task forces operated off of Byrne grant funding. The grants,** Balko reports, also **incentivized the type of policing that has made the war on drugs such a destructive force** in American society. The Justice Department doled out Byrne grants based on how many arrests officers made, how much property they seized, and how many warrants they served. The very things these narcotics task forces did very well. "As a result," Balko writes, "we have roving squads of drug cops, loaded with SWAT gear, who get money if they conduct more raids, make more arrests, and seize more property, and they are virtually immune to accountability if they get out of line." Regardless of whether this militarization has occurred due to federal incentives or executive decision-making in police departments or both, police across the nation are up-arming with little or no public debate. In fact, when the ACLU requested SWAT records from 255 law enforcement agencies as part of its investigation, 114 denied them. The justifications for such denials varied, but included arguments that the documents contained "trade secrets" or that the cost of complying with the request would be prohibitive. Communities have a right to know how the police do their jobs, but more often than not, police departments think otherwise. **Being the Police Means Never Having to Say You're Sorry** Report by report, **evidence is mounting that America's militarized police are a threat to public safety.** But in a country where the cops increasingly look upon themselves as soldiers doing battle day in, day out, there's no need for public accountability or even an apology when things go grievously wrong. **If community policing rests on mutual trust between the police and the people, militarized policing operates on the assumption of "officer safety" at all costs** and contempt for anyone who sees things differently. **The result is an "us versus them" mentality.**

Militarization directly causes police brutality—feel invincible, stimuli of violence, perceive public as enemy, it's unique to military weapons, kills free speech

Jesse Singal, a senior editor at the New York Magazine, 8-14-2014, ["How Militarizing Police Can Increase Violence", New York Magazine, <http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2014/08/how-militarizing-police-can-increase-violence.html>] //IRM 12-8-16

At the most specific level, these questions haven't been studied empirically. But a great deal of social-psychological research, as well as important anecdotal evidence from law-enforcement specialists themselves, suggests that **militarized policing can greatly inflame situations that might otherwise end peacefully. The so-called "weapons effect" can partly explain what's going on in Ferguson and elsewhere. The mere presence of weapons, in short, appears to prime more aggressive behavior. This has been shown in a variety of experiments in different lab and real-world settings.** "Theory underlying the weapons effect or similar kinds of phenomena would suggest that **the more you fill the environment with stimuli that are associated with violence, the more likely violence is to occur,**" said Bruce Bartholow, a University of Missouri social psychologist who has studied the weapons effect. Brad Bushman, a psychologist at Ohio State, agreed. "**I would expect a bigger effect if you see military weapons than if you see normal weapons,**" he said. This isn't just about a link between visual stimuli like guns and violence, however. **It also has to do with the roles people adopt, with how they respond to the presence of others who may — or may not — mean them harm. To a certain extent, if you dress and treat people like soldiers facing a deadly enemy, they'll act like it.** "This process isn't necessarily good or bad, but depends on the extent to which the more militaristic role fits the situation," said Craig Anderson, a psychologist at Iowa State, in an email. "When it doesn't fit well, **it is likely to lead to more judgment and behavior errors.**" Maria Haberfeld, a professor at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice who has studied how police departments outfit themselves, said **the dynamic could be particularly dangerous in the context of nonviolent protests like Ferguson** (there was rioting and looting earlier this week, but there have also been widespread reports of nonviolent protests being broken up by police aggression). "**Military equipment is used against an enemy,**" said Haberfeld. "**So if you give the same equipment to local police, by default you create an environment in which the public is perceived as an enemy.**" On the other side of these confrontations, **this could have a negative effect on protesters.** "We live in a democratic country, and we believe that this is our right to go out and exercise the **right to [free speech]**," she said. "And **when you go out there and exercise that right and suddenly you are faced with soldiers** — even though these are not soldiers, but police officers looking like soldiers — then **something is triggered, definitely.**" Bushman said that meeting nonviolent protests with a militarized response is "really a bad idea. I can't believe they're doing it." "It's just really bad for **the officers because they feel more powerful, more invincible, more militaristic, ready to attack,**" he said. "And also, I think **it elicits a response from the observers that, hey, this is war, and people become defensive and they have a fight/flight response.**" The adoption of masks themselves in a militarized setting, on the part of police or protesters, **can also contribute to violence by triggering senses of anonymity** and what psychologists call deindividuation. "There's all kinds of evidence in social psychology that that will lead people to do things that they wouldn't do if they could be identified," said Bartholow.

Militarized police escalate otherwise peaceful tensions

Amanda Taub, 8-19-2014 [staff writer, "The roots of America's militarized-police crisis," Vox, <http://www.vox.com/2014/8/14/6003239/police-militarization-in-ferguson>] MJS 12-9-2016

Although shocking, what is happening in Ferguson is merely a particularly severe example of a much broader and long-running phenomenon: the militarization of police weaponry and tactics in the US. In part thanks to federal programs that provide military equipment to local police (though not military training), and encourage its use as part of ordinary law enforcement, police are increasingly using SWAT-style tactics in routine policing. However, experts say, **this phenomenon is extremely dangerous, and can make otherwise peaceful situations dangerous — as police appear to have done in Ferguson.** While the 1033 program's intent may have been to equip specialized units for extreme, dangerous situations, fighting al-Qaeda sleeper cells, or powerful drug cartels, **the effect has been to incorporate SWAT-style raids into ordinary police operations.** That includes, but is certainly not limited to, the serving of search warrants. This may partly be **because the program requires that all equipment issued through the 1033 program be used within one year of the date it is granted. That means that if police departments want to keep their new gear, they can't wait for a rare emergency like an active shooter or hostage situation in order to use it.**

All this equipment is provided to police departments with little accompanying training or supervision. The ACLU's Kara Dansky, who authored their report on the rising militarization of law enforcement, said that she was "not aware of any training that the government provides in terms of use of the equipment," or of "any oversight in terms of safeguards regarding the use of the equipment by the Defense Department." **The lack of formal training, or often even full documentation, leaves police departments to improvise. That can be true in police departments of all sizes that receive military equipment, but smaller departments can be especially susceptible to poor or limited training. Training** does a lot more than just tell people how to safely use the equipment. **It teaches them when and how to responsibly bring that gear into tense situations,** like the one in Ferguson, in a way that will de-escalate tensions rather than escalate them, **and how a police officer should change his or her behavior when upgrading from a regular uniform and sidearm to camo fatigues and an assault rifle.** **"When cops,** just like other human beings, **are frightened** — and sometimes they are! — **there's a tendency to act impulsively.** Which is to say: to do exactly the opposite of what they need to be doing," former Seattle police chief Norman Stamper told me. **That risk is heightened significantly when cops roll heavy equipment into suburban streets.**

Militarized policing disproportionately occurs in black communities

Clifton B Parker, 8-27-2014, ["Militarized Policing is Counterproductive", Stanford News, <http://news.stanford.edu/news/2014/august/police-militarization-sklansky.html>] //IRM 12-8-16

Does police militarization have a disparate effect on communities of color? Absolutely. In this respect the militarization of policing follows the same pattern as the war on drugs. You don't tend to hear about police using battering rams and stun grenades to execute search warrants in white neighborhoods. Earlier this year **the ACLU reviewed SWAT deployments in hundreds of police departments across the country and found that members of racial minorities were significantly more likely than whites to be affected.** In some places the disparity was truly astounding. **In Allentown, Pa., blacks were 24 times more likely than**

whites to be impacted by a SWAT deployment. In Ogden, Utah, the ratio was 40:1. In Burlingame, N.C., it was close to 50:1.

Blacks are shot at 2.5x the rate of whites, police shootings are up 6%, and 10 city study proves the police use force on minorities more

BBC 7/18/16 [BBC, "US police shootings: How many die each year?", BBC, <<http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-36826297>>] //CJC

Although the FBI does gather some data on fatal shootings, police forces are not obliged to provide it, and only some of them do. This led the Washington Post to start tracking civilian deaths itself after the shooting of Michael Brown by police in Ferguson in August 2014, by monitoring reports in the media. "We looked at the FBI database, since that was the official government accounting for things. And saw that over the past decade, the average number of shootings that they counted was about 400. **By the end of last year, we had almost 1,000 fatal shootings that we had captured,**" says Kimberly Kindy, an investigative reporter at the newspaper. "What we didn't know though, of course, as we went into this year and did it a second year was - was last year a normal year? Is 990 people being killed by police in a single year about what you would expect year in and year out?" **So far, 2016 appears to be roughly on track with 2015,** Kindy says. "In fact **there's been an increase, a 6% increase in fatal shootings when we compare the first six months of last year to the first six months of this year...** So that's about **three people are dying a day, who are being fatally shot by officers.**" The Guardian has recorded **even more deaths in 2015 and 2016, including deaths as a result of tasering, collisions with police vehicles and altercations in police custody.** The Washington Post journalists also collect information about the race of those shot by police. According to Kindy, about half are white, and about half are from minorities, but adjusting for the size of the populations, Kindy says, "**minorities are definitely being shot at a higher rate than whites**". **This is particularly noticeable in the case of the black population. "Blacks are being shot at a rate that's 2.5 times higher than whites,"** Kindy says. The big question is whether that is evidence that the police are discriminating against African Americans. There's an obvious argument that it is: **African Americans are just 13% of the US population, and yet 26% of the people killed by the police.** But there's another way to look at these numbers. Nearly 50% of convicted murderers in the US are African Americans. Why that number is so high is a difficult question to answer. So is the question why African Americans are also far more likely than whites to be murder victims. The point is that if African Americans are more likely to be involved in violent crime - both as perpetrators and victims - then the higher rate of police shootings may not be surprising. The truth is that the raw statistics can't tell us whether the police are treating African Americans differently from white people. To understand that, we'd need to look at more details about what happened in each incident. There's a big difference between a case where someone was shooting at the police, and a case where someone was passive and unarmed.

One person who has tried to do that is an economist from Harvard University called Roland Fryer, the first ever African American to win the prestigious John Bates Clark medal in economics. This month Fryer released a preliminary study examining records from 10 cities and counties, with the best data coming from Houston - it's not yet peer-reviewed, but it has received a lot of attention in the press. Fryer's research suggests that **African Americans and Hispanics are substantially more likely to experience force in their interactions with the police - such as having a gun pointed at them, being handcuffed without arrest, or being pepper-sprayed or hit with a baton.** This racial difference is reduced, but doesn't completely disappear, when Fryer adds all sorts of statistical controls such as whether the incident was indoors or outdoors, in a high-crime area, took place at night, and so on.

Threats get constructed, Spending gets justified to public by starting wars

Hossein 2006 [Ismael Hossein-Zadeh, "The Political Economy of US Militarism," *Palgrave Macmillan*. Accessed at:http://www.kritisches-netzwerk.de/sites/default/files/ismael_hossein-zadeh_the_political_economy_of_u.s._militarism_palgrave-macmillan_2006_303_pages.pdf.] //DNP

In a similar fashion, **the U.S. military-industrial complex** has proven quite resourceful in frequently **inventing new "external threats to our national interests,"** or **"the interests of our allies,"** in order to stifle opposition to its militaristic plans that are often designed to **justify its colossal apparatus and its lion's share of national resources**. During the Cold War years, the "threat of communism" served this purpose. Since then new substitutes for the threat of communism have been discovered **in order to rationalize continued expansion of military spending**. These have included **"rogue states, global terrorism, axis of evil, militant Islam,"** and, more recently, **"enemies of democracy."** Scrutiny of the claims of such threats to the national security or interests of the United States is the focus of this chapter. Due to its far-reaching importance, "threat of militant Islam" and/or "the clash of civilizations" will be discussed in the next chapter.

[...]

Debates over the pros and cons of military spending frequently tend to focus on such economic effects of military expenditures as job creation, technological innovation, and productivity enhancement. Critics also often point to waste, inefficiency, and corruption that are nurtured by overextended military establishments. While an understanding of such economic consequences of large military apparatuses is, of course, important, it is even more important not to lose sight of the fact that **maintaining and/or justifying disproportionately large military budgets tends to be conducive to war and militarism**. What usually gets lost in the debate over the economic effects of military spending by a superpower is the fact that **overgrown military establishments (beyond legitimate needs of defending one's borders or national sovereignty) breed war and international convulsion;** they are often geared to death and destruction as they tend to **instigate international tensions and wars in order to justify continued increases in military spending**. Of course, wars have almost always been accompanied by war profiteers. Current or contemporary war profiteers in the United States are, however, of a new and different breed—a new variety or pattern that makes them more dangerous than those of the eras of empires past. For one thing, beneficiaries of war dividends in the United States, the military-industrial complex, have evolved in recent years increasingly as major determinants of U.S. foreign policy, especially of crucial decisions on war and peace. As Howard Swint, Democratic candidate for Congress in West Virginia, put it: **"The seat of power for formulating foreign policy and defense strategy is . . . in the Pentagon** The political engineering by special interests on Capitol Hill is so complete that the Pentagon serves as little more than a conduit for defense appropriations."

[...]

Discussions of waste and inefficiency surrounding the Pentagon and its arms producing clients often tend to focus almost exclusively on the economic or financial losses to the tax payers. While this is, of course, important, it overlooks an even more ominous consequence of the arms industry's substandard and inefficient products: death and destruction of innocent lives and targets in countries labeled as "our enemies." There are indications that **the Pentagon often embarks on theatrical bombardments and melodramatic military operations that seem to be designed to camouflage and rehabilitate the deficiencies of the military hardware** in the plumes of

smoke, the blaze of fire, and the blitz of the acquiescent corporate media. **To justify their appropriation of the lion's share of the public money, the Pentagon and its major contractors have strong incentives to show that they use taxpayers' money efficiently—often as measured in terms of actual or potential deaths and destruction per dollar.** The massive display of hightech military hardware in Iraq and Afghanistan that has killed or maimed tens of thousands of people is an indication of this cynical military strategy.

Link: Increased military spending pushes US foreign policy towards an aggressive posture

Institute for Policy Studies 2012 [Center for American Progress, “Rebalancing our National Security,” *Institute for Policy Studies*. Accessed at:

<https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/UnifiedSecurityBudget.pdf>.] //DNP

Since the mid-1990s, **the mission set of our armed forces has, for the most part, grown dramatically in scope and ambition along with the size of the defense budget.** In reviewing the changes in the Pentagon's mission set, we discerned several strategic trends. Specifically: **Mission objectives grew much more ambitious.** The **geographic scope for intensive U.S. military efforts widened** significantly. The focus of U.S. military activity became less discriminate across the globe. **Missions that put U.S. “boots on the ground” in foreign nations grew more prominent.** The United States played a more prominent role as the convener, governor, and quartermaster of joint action.

Mission goals trended from an early emphasis on **standard deterrence and crisis response** (including defense, conflict resolution, and conflict containment) **to more proactive and transformative goals.** These latter trends included efforts to **block the emergence of threats, remove or weaken adversarial regimes, and shape the global strategic environment.** Examples of this latter trend include changing the regime in Iraq through force, leaving thousands of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait after the first Gulf War, and deploying U.S. Special Forces aggressively throughout much of the greater Middle East and East Africa.

[...]

The U.S. military entered the post-Cold War period focusing its efforts on a discrete set of acute problems and outstanding adversaries. But beginning in the late 1990s, the **Pentagon sought** (in partnership with others) a more consistent and **“positive” control over the global security environment.** This sometimes included **“securing the global commons”** and **stabilizing the ungoverned and weakly governed areas** of the earth. These broad “area control” tasks are well beyond the capacity of any single state or group of states. But to help achieve these goals, the **U.S. military invested substantially in assembling and provisioning a global web of**

security “partnerships” with countries such as Singapore, Australia, Vietnam, and the Philippines.

[...]

During the past decade the **Pentagon has shifted emphasis from standard “peace operations” to much larger counterinsurgency and nation-building tasks**, mostly as a consequence of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Similarly and until recently, the war on terrorism evolved from a standard counterterrorism campaign targeting Al Qaeda into a global counterinsurgency effort, aiming to stymie militant anti-Western groups worldwide. Plans for future security and stability operations now foresee U.S. forces playing a less direct and intensive role than they did in Iraq and Afghanistan, and emphasize finding local partners and building their indigenous security capacity. Nonetheless, this may make the **United States party to a wide range of foreign civil conflicts**. One example of this is already evident in sub-Saharan Africa, where the United States has deployed 100 Special Forces to aid Ugandan forces in the hunt for Joseph Kony and his Lord’s Resistance Army.

[...]

In theory, U.S. security policy recognizes the importance of international cooperation as a force multiplier, a source of legitimacy, and a means of burden-sharing. In the course of the past 20 years, however, **efforts at military cooperation have often trended away from an emphasis on inclusive multilateral institutions and toward more exclusive, ad hoc, and bilateral arrangements**, such as the “coalition of the willing” that supported the war in Iraq. Although this more ad hoc security trend has granted the United States more sway and freedom of action, **it conveys less legitimacy, can be polarizing, and leaves the United States carrying more of the costs of action**, as it did in Iraq. But, if Libya becomes the model for future wars of choice—where the United States led an international coalition, the burden on the U.S. military (and taxpayer) will be significantly less, and our force posture can be adjusted accordingly. Similarly, the **Pentagon’s military-to-military engagement activities** presently rival or **surpass regular diplomatic relations conducted by the State Department** in many nations, and the Pentagon’s regional commanders serve routinely in a front-and-center diplomatic role. No State Department mission can rival the resources of the military due to the Pentagon’s vastly superior funding. For example, AFRICOM already has more personnel than USAID working in Africa, even though it was only established in 2007 and despite the fact that we have no congressionally-authorized ongoing contingency (military) operations on the continent. Then there’s the issue of development aid. The Pentagon is directly responsible for the delivery of about 20 percent of all development aid today; prior to 9/11, the Department of Defense accounted for only 5 percent of development aid.⁶¹ In addition, the revival and spread of political-military operations—that is, counterinsurgency—has reframed development assistance. **Security rationales are playing a bigger role in the distribution of aid and its use, which increasingly gives the upper hand to military strategy when it comes to diplomatic or development strategies.**

[...]

But such action carries risks of its own. **Treating potential threats as though they are imminent ones can exacerbate interstate tensions and precipitate the outcome that “prevention” is meant to preclude.** Thus, in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq war, **coercive efforts and threats fed the “bunker-mentality” of Saddam Hussein’s regime, making war more likely,** not less. Generally, the **declaration of “regime change” objectives undermines diplomacy** and **helps to harden uncooperative behavior of potential adversaries.** The Iraq case also suggests that preventive uses of military force rest on unrealistic assumptions about our capacity to control outcomes and a **serious underestimation of the potential costs and consequences of toppling regimes.**

US Unable to Fight Two Wars

Diem Salmon et al. "Executive Summary - 2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength." Heritage Foundation. N.p., 2015. Web. 22 Mar. 2015. <<http://index.heritage.org/militarystrength/about/executive-summary/>>. [Senior Policy Analyst for Defense Budgeting at The Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy]

Overall, the *Index* concludes that the **current U.S. military force is adequate to meeting the demands of a single major regional conflict** while also attending to various presence and engagement activities. Clearly, this is what the military is doing now and has done for the past two decades, **but it would be very hard-pressed to do more** and **certainly** would be **ill-equipped to handle two, near-simultaneous major regional contingencies.** The consistent decline in funding and the consequent shrinking of the force are putting it under significant pressure. Essential maintenance is being deferred; fewer units (mostly the Navy’s platforms and the Special Operations Forces community) are being cycled through operational deployments more often and for longer periods; and old equipment is being extended while programmed replacements are problematic. The cumulative effect of such factors has result[s]ed in a U.S. military that is marginally able to meet the demands of defending America’s vital national interests.

US interventions cause weak governments, more violence, political instability, and the US is more likely to intervene when its military is stronger

Aslam 2010 [Rabia Aslam at Forman Christian College, “U.S. Military Interventions and the Risk

of Civil Conflict”, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*,

<<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10576100903555788>>] //CJC

The historical record of the majority of inter- and intra-state conflicts indicates frequent third-party interventions in these conflicts. In the decades following World War II, **the United States has been one of the most frequent interveners in third world internal wars.** This study focuses on the repercussions of U.S. military interventions on the intensity of civil conflict and political violence in the targeted nations. **A comprehensive empirical analysis suggests that in addition to low per capita income, large populations, high religious fractionalization, and weak**

governance, the direct and indirect involvement of the U.S. military may also lead to increased civil strife and political violence in the targeted nations. U.S. military involvement increases the probability of political instability and unrest and hence could be one of the many conditions that favor insurgency. Internal conflicts can pose a threat to the regional or global stability. According to the Correlates of War (COW) project (Singer and Small 1994), during the period 1816–1992 there have been 152 civil wars compared to 75 interstate wars. The historical record of the majority of interstate and civil wars indicates frequent overt and covert third party interventions in these wars. Based on the COW project's strict definition of overt intervention, 22 percent (33/152) of the civil wars during the period 1816–1992 involved military intervention by the third parties (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000). In the analysis of ethnic protest and rebellion in the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project, Gurr (1993) found that regional and global powers have repeatedly intervened on behalf of communal rebels or the states that they challenge. Of the 138 intrastate conflicts identified by Regan (1996) for the post World War II period, 62% (85/138) involved some form of covert economic or military intervention by a third party.

[...]

Other analysts, such as Kramer and Bauser (1972) and Art and Jervis (1973), view the U.S. interventions as motivated by economic rather than strategic interests. They emphasize that the United States frequently intervenes in the areas where such interests are threatened and a conflict situation in the area has always been seen as a threat to those interests. One study shows that **the possession of greater military capability has made the U.S. decision makers more likely to use force and intervene in third-world internal conflicts. The possession of a very sharp sword in the form of greater military strength serves as a source of temptation to intervene in inter- and intra-state conflicts** (Fordham 2004). The following section outlines a brief overview of U.S. military interventions and highlights several reasons for which they have received considerable media attention during the last several decades.

The US will always intervene in intrastate conflicts to pursue its interests—and it's more likely to intervene when the power differential is greater

Bennett 2015 [Hailey Bennett is a BA in political science from James Madison University, "Causes of Third Party Military Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts", *James Madison University*, <<http://commons.lib.jmu.edu/honors201019/7/>>] //CJC

Since the conclusion of World War II, **the number of expansive interstate wars has decreased while devastating intrastate wars and conflicts have increased exponentially.** The Cold War ushered in an era of international stability in the bipolar balance of power, but proxy wars, wars of succession and independence, genocide and civil war made the era anything but peaceful. These conflicts proved to be breeding grounds for third party military interventions, which increased simultaneously. In this thesis, I attempted to

determine what factors encouraged third party states to intervene militarily in the affairs of other states in the post-World War II era. I conducted a mixed methods approach, incorporating statistical analyses and case studies to identify global and specific trends in intervention. The cross-national statistical analyses include logit and ordered probit analyses and support the role of threat to influence in the international system, power discrepancy, alliance capability and economic conditions of the crisis actor as significant factors to decision-making. On the other hand, the case studies focus on three cases of U.S. intervention (or lack of) across time. They are Lebanon from 1982-1984, Algeria in 1992 and Libya in 2011. The results of the case studies support

factors such as threat to influence, media attention and previous successful interventions in the crisis state as causes of U.S. military intervention. Ultimately, I establish that the United States will pursue interventions for the sake of its national interests abroad.

The two statistical analyses depict that three of the seven tested independent variables were significant indicators of violence/intervention for both the four-point and binary dependent variables—power discrepancy, alliance capability and economic conditions. In the logit analysis **power discrepancy suggests that as its value increases, the chances of intervention increase; alliance capability suggests that as it is greater, intervention increases; economic conditions suggests that improving domestic economies increase**

chances of intervention. Gravity was not significant in the ordered probit analysis, but in the logistic regression analysis, it was significant and indicates that a threat to influence encourages intervention. Since the logistic regression analysis is the true measure of my research question of whether or not intervention occurs, as opposed to the level at which it occurs, it is fair to say that four of my variables were significant in explaining intervention; however two of the four results rejected my established hypotheses. 123 These results poorly align with the results of the case studies examined. In those cases, only gravity or threat to the balance of power/influence appeared as important to the U.S. decision-making process at the international level of analysis. Alliance capability and power discrepancy were not overly significant factors for the United States. Rather, several of the variables that were not tested statistically were of importance and significance for the United States in addition to gravity: humanitarian crisis as illustrated in the mass media and history of previous successful intervention in the conflict state. For the significant statistical results, gravity and power discrepancy supported my hypotheses, whereas my hypotheses for alliance capability and economic conditions were 125 rejected. I predicted a positive relationship for all four variables (because economic conditions is coded differently, I anticipated a negative relationship). My hypothesis for gravity suggested that if there were an increasing threat to a state's influence or balance of power, then there would be an increased likelihood of military intervention on behalf of the potential third party (Waltz 1967; Finnemore 2003; Shirkey 2012;

Werner 2000; Saunders 2009). The positive direction of the coefficient for the logistic regression analysis suggests that an increase from there not being a threat to influence to there being a threat to influence in the international system indicates there is a shift from no violence/minor clashes to major clashes/full-scale war. This result is in support of my hypothesis since I consider the use of violence on the dichotomous scale to be synonymous with intervention. However, this variable was not significant in the ordered probit analysis accounting for the four-point dependent variable. The same relationship is true for power discrepancy. I predicted that as the difference in power between a potential third party and a state in conflict increases, then so too do the chances of military intervention (Shirkey 2012; Parenti 2002). Again, a positive coefficient for power discrepancy indicates a positive relationship, supporting my established hypothesis.

[...]

Table 9: Power Discrepancy Predicted Probabilities—Logit Results

	Power Discrepancy- 10 th Percentile	Power Discrepancy- 90 th Percentile	Change
No Violence/Minor Clashes	0.598	0.207	-0.391
Serious Clashes/Full-scale War	0.402	0.793	0.391

**Math: $.793/.402 = 1.972$ or 97.2% increase

Even if US intervention causes a peace deal it still increases the risk of future conflict by 94% — AND no sample bias — only intervene in small conflicts

Kenwick 2014 [Michael Kenwick at Pennsylvania State University. "Military Intervention and Settlement Durability in Civil Conflicts." Pennsylvania State University, 2014. Web. 1 Dec. 2016 <http://sites.psu.edu/mikekenwick/wp-content/uploads/sites/19790/2014/10/kenwick_intervention_july141.pdf>] //CJC

Furthermore, **military interventions prior to peace agreements increase the hazard of conflict recurrence**. The Intervention coefficient summed with the interaction between the Intervention and Negotiated settlement ($\beta_{\text{Intervention}} + \beta_{\text{Intervention}} \times \text{Negotiated Settlement}$) is statistically significant with a value of 0.662, and a two-tailed, 95% confidence interval [0.007, 1.317]. Substantively, these results indicate that **civil conflicts that end in negotiated settlements with interveners present are 94% more likely to experience peace failure than conflicts ending in negotiated settlements that do not feature third party interveners**. The two-tailed 95% confidence interval around this effect is [0.7%, 273%]. As predicted by the Intervention Hypothesis, intervention decreases peace duration when civil conflicts end in a negotiated settlement.”

[...]

Civil War codes whether a conflict produced at least one thousand battle-related deaths in at least one year of its duration (Gleditsch et al. 2002). **Empirical evidence has shown that third party interventions may be less likely in conflicts that have produced a large number of fatalities** (Regan 1998). Increasing fatalities may also reduce both the likelihood that a civil conflict will end in a negotiated settlement (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline & Joyce 2008). Like conflict duration, fatalities may also function to disseminate information between combatants, which then reduces uncertainty and increases settlement durability. For these reasons, an indicator of whether a conflict episode resulted in a civil war is also included.

Civil war is 90% of deaths and most common

Lacina 2006 [Bethany Lacina at the Stanford Political Science Department, “Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars”, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, <http://www.bethanylacina.com/Lacina_civilwar_severity.pdf>] //CJC

Civil conflict is the most common form of warfare, accounting for all but three of the wars that broke out from 1990 to 20021 and 90 percent of civilian and combatant battle deaths during the same period.² As greater academic attention has been paid to internal warfare, scholars concentrating on large-n statistical work have begun to converge on a handful of factors that seem most important in explaining civil conflict onset and duration (for reviews of the quantitative literature, see Lacina 2004; Sambanis 2002, 2004).

The US military has killed 20-30 million SINCE WW2

Lucas, 2016. “US Has Killed More Than 20 Million People in 37 “Victim Nations” Since World War II.” By James A. Lucas. Global Research, March 07, 2016

<http://www.globalresearch.ca/us-has-killed-more-than-20-million-people-in-37-victim-nations-since-world-war-ii/5492051> GST.

The thesis of this is that more spending means that the **US government views military power as the only viable foreign policy strategy, which causes it to go to war, in turn creating new enemies. This study reveals that U.S. military forces were directly responsible** for about 10 to 15 million deaths during the Korean and Vietnam Wars and the two Iraq Wars. The Korean War also includes Chinese deaths while the Vietnam War also includes fatalities in Cambodia and Laos. The American public probably is not aware of these numbers and knows even less about the proxy wars for which the United States is also responsible. In the latter wars there were between nine and 14 million deaths in Afghanistan, Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, East Timor, Guatemala, Indonesia, Pakistan and Sudan. But the victims are not just from big nations or one part of the world. The remaining deaths were in smaller ones which constitute over half the total number of nations. Virtually all parts of the world have been the target of U.S. intervention. The overall conclusion reached is that **the United States most likely has been responsible since WWII for the deaths of between 20 and 30 million people in wars and conflicts scattered over the world.** To the families and friends of these victims it makes little difference whether the causes were U.S. military action, proxy military forces, the provision of U.S. military supplies or advisors, or other ways, such as economic pressures applied by our nation. They had to make decisions about other things such as finding lost loved ones, whether to become refugees, and how to survive. And the pain and anger is spread even further. Some authorities estimate that there are as many as 10 wounded for each person who dies in wars. Their visible, continued suffering is a continuing reminder to their fellow countrymen. It is essential that Americans learn more about this topic so that they can begin to understand the pain that others feel. Someone once observed that the Germans during WWII "chose not to know." We cannot allow history to say this about our country. The question posed above was **"How many September 11ths has the United States caused in other nations since WWII?"** The answer is: possibly 10,000.