# SV – TOC Aff – Rd 5 [Encirclement]

## Our Sole Contention is the String of Pearls

#### Ved Nanda explained on Friday that:

Ved Nanda, 4-25-2019, "Nanda: U.S. support for Sri Lanka is smart foreign policy," Denver Post, https://www.denverpost.com/2019/04/26/sri-lanka-attack-isis-china-nanda/, Date Accessed 4-27-2019 // JM

As part of China’s “Belt and Road” initiative, designed to link the country through land corridors and sea routes to Asia, Africa, and Europe, China is investing heavily in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has been facing a debt crisis. Finding itself unable to pay back Chinese loans, in 2017 the country handed over its Hambantota port, lying next to one of the busiest East-West shipping routes, and 1,500 acres of land to China for 99 years. China is developing facilities around the Indian Ocean in a “string of pearls” strategy for a line of ports stretching from Chinese waters to the Persian Gulf to secure its economic and military interests, and to counter India’s influence. China has now embarked on a Port City project to be built outside Colombo on an artificial island reclaimed from the ocean. Last month, Sri Lanka signed a $989 million loan with China’s Exim Bank to build a highway linking its center to the Hambantota port.

#### Ajai Shukla explains in 2018 that:

Ajai Shukla, 11-24-2018, "In Maldives, India’s Modi sees the glint of a Chinese pearl," South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2174776/maldives-indias-modi-sees-glint-chinese-pearl, Date Accessed 4-27-2019 // JM

The Maldives remains an important component of New Delhi’s plan to preserve its influence in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy oversees the waters between Qatar – the forward headquarters of the United States Central Command (Centcom) – and the Strait of Malacca, beyond which lies the hotly contested and militarised South China Sea. Each year, more than 100,000 ships carrying oil, minerals and manufactured goods travel the international shipping lanes running through the northern Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy has dominated these waters, thanks to two Indian archipelagos: the Lakshadweep Islands to the west and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the eastern Indian Ocean. However, a Chinese base in the Maldives, not far from Lakshadweep, would enable a countervailing Chinese naval presence. New Delhi worries that Beijing – having obtained naval basing rights in Djibouti, in East Africa, while also building a port at Gwadar in Pakistan – is also flexing its financial and commercial muscle to create bases in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. These bases would be China’s vaunted “string of pearls” –[would create] a potential maritime chokehold on India. New Delhi has openly taken sides in the domestic politics of the Maldives. It welcomed Yameen being replaced by a more accommodating leader, evidenced by the joint statement released by Modi and Solih. “The two leaders, while noting the resilience of the relations between India and the Maldives, expressed confidence in the renewal of the close bonds of cooperation and friendship with the election of Mr Solih as the President of the Maldives,” it said. The statement also emphasised “the importance of maintaining peace and security in the Indian Ocean and being mindful of each other’s concerns and aspirations for the stability of the region”. Beijing’s influence over Yameen illustrates the raw power of financial incentives and how they can override physical proximity – the Maldives is barely 100 miles from the southern tip of Lakshadweep – traditional links and also long-standing security ties. India has long been the security guarantor for Indian Ocean island states – not just the Maldives, but also Seychelles and Mauritius – providing them patrol vessels, helicopters and training. Throughout the region, New Delhi has supported democracy but remained politically pragmatic. It backed the authoritarian Maldivian president Maumoon Abdul Gayoom for three decades, even flying in armed paratroopers to the Maldives in 1988 when Sri Lanka-based mercenaries launched a coup against Gayoom. But this influence waned in the face of a concerted Chinese push. In 2012, China did not even have an embassy in Male. Yet, that year, Indian construction firm GMR, which was building an airport at Hulhule, found its contract annulled and its personnel asked to leave. Chinese firms were awarded the contract instead. By early this year, India’s influence in Male was neutralised. In February, with the political opposition united and the Supreme Court ruling against the president, Yameen imposed a 15-day state of emergency and ignored New Delhi’s protests. Even as former president Mohamed Nasheed called for Indian military intervention, Yameen ordered an Indian Navy detachment operating two helicopters gifted by India to leave the country. An estimated 2,000 Indian workers were told their work visas would not be renewed. Foreign Policy magazine carried an article entitled: “Is Abdulla Yameen Handing Over the Maldives to China?”

#### Giridharadas indicated in 2019 that:

Akshobh Giridharadas, 1-19-2019, "As China expands, India contracts," ORF, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/as-china-expands-india-contracts-47484/, Date Accessed 4-27-2019 // JM

“India is a bit like Britain, a very closed system,” says the British diplomat who now finds a very distinct strategic foundation growing in New Delhi with its range of thinkers. “The Chinese hegemony is clearly not acceptable to the world and to India, but India is less clear about it wants than what it doesn’t want,” therein lies the problem echoes another diplomat. However, the core tenets of India’s foreign policy will always be consensus on non-intervention and sovereign equality of nationhood. “India needs to ask itself as what you do want as a country” reiterates my diplomat friend as India is increasingly worried about the [String of Pearls](https://www.indiatimes.com/news/india/here-is-all-you-should-know-about-string-of-pearls-china-s-policy-to-encircle-india-324315.html) in the Indian Ocean. The real question for India is with its non-confrontational and pacifist approach is will it be a great power or just a great presence?

#### Thus, there are two options on how India proceeds – the status quo and the world of the affirmative. The status quo, or a policy known as bilateral containment, forces India to join an unwanted alliance with the United States to survive in the region. Lisa Curtis indicates:

Dean Cheng & Lisa Curtis, 7-18-2011, "The China Challenge: A Strategic Vision for U.S.–India Relations," Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/the-china-challenge-strategic-vision-us-india-relations, Date Accessed 4-27-2019 // AS

India must include the potential threat of conflict erupting over its disputed borders with China in its security planning and projections. While Pakistan presents the most immediate threat to India, Indian strategists increasingly view China as the most important long-term security challenge. Long-standing China–Pakistan security ties are a continuing source of angst in New Delhi and reminder of a potential two-front war. While India seeks to avoid conflict with China, Indian military planners also assess that they need to develop sufficient capabilities to deter an increasingly powerful and assertive China. The U.S. should pursue robust strategic and military engagement with India in order to encourage a stable balance of power in Asia that prevents China from dominating the region and surrounding seas. New Delhi—not unlike many other capitals in Asia—balks at the idea of being part of an American-led China “containment” strategy. Some Indian strategists even favor a go-slow approach to the U.S.–Indian partnership in order to avoid raising Chinese ire. But China’s recent posturing on its border disputes with India leaves New Delhi few options other than to play all the strategic cards at its disposal, including deepening and expanding ties with the U.S. One must also calculate that Chinese alarms over “containment” may in part be a tactic to prevent closer Indian cooperation with nations in the Pacific, including the U.S.

#### Giridharadas concludes in 2019 that:

Akshobh Giridharadas, 1-19-2019, "As China expands, India contracts," ORF, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/as-china-expands-india-contracts-47484/, Date Accessed 4-27-2019 // JM

Bhutan is a good place to understand the recent geopolitical standoff between China and India — and trijunction of [Doklam](https://www.indiatoday.in/education-today/gk-current-affairs/story/where-doklam-why-important-india-china-bhutan-1198730-2018-03-27" \t "_blank) where two of the largest militaries had a standoff. Many would see this as part of China expanding its geopolitical sphere of influence. There is Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Maldives, Pakistan, the [Belt and Road initiative](https://www.theguardian.com/cities/ng-interactive/2018/jul/30/what-china-belt-road-initiative-silk-road-explainer) across Eurasia and then China’s first overseas military base in [Djibouti](https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/chinas-djibouti-base-a-one-year-update/) makes it a blue water naval power. My diplomat commentator noted that “Djibouti changes everything.” It has Indian defence commentators worried about China’s expanding spheres of influence in the Indian Ocean. Coming to India, many foreign policy watchers and historians state that the priority for India back during the country’s Independence in 1947 was strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the British. During 1947, Prime Minister Nehru was very clear on being [‘Non Aligned’](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/jawaharlal-nehru-the-architect-of-indias-foreign-policy/articleshow/58767014.cms) and not siding with any of the two major power blocs. This was to protect various former colonies from falling into a colonisation 2.0. That is the regressions they would face, if they were to side with either of the blocs. According to close confidantes of Mr. Nehru back then, he didn’t want to trade one set of western faces (British colonialists) for another set of western faces (the Americans or the Soviets). Hence the gravity towards a central Non-Aligned status. China from an early stage started to expand its diplomatic reach by opening a series of embassies in Africa, India however wasn’t as quick to join in. The Ministry of External Affairs in India till today has just has one desk overlooking thirty countries in West Africa. It is considered too Francophone and not within the republic’s main interest. One distinct commentator quickly noted the difference between China and India with regard to its geopolitical clout. He says “India, unlike its northern neighbour is not hunting for status. India is the wooed and not the wooer in geopolitics.” India’s geopolitical clout has however significantly expanded in the United States since the 1990s. United States continues to see India as a [key partner](https://scroll.in/latest/904447/responsible-nations-must-back-efforts-by-narendra-modi-and-others-to-ensure-peace-in-south-asia-us) in South Asia and within the wider framework of the Indo-Pacific. In the last two decades there has been an overarching consensus in DC to view India as a [democratic counterpart](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14799850902885114) to China. As a result of the strong Indian diaspora in the US, the Indian-American lobby is the second most powerful in the corridors of Washington DC after the Israeli lobby. India is vehement on its course of strategic autonomy, that to the extent that Evans stated that the philosophy is to keep everyone out. However, the commentator adds that is changing from strategic autonomy to strategic autonomy with operability. India recognises the vast power disparity with China and in order to have a stabilising framework in the neighbourhood, it has formed robust military alliances with the US and the UK. India is no longer averse to joint military exercises in the Indian Ocean, think namely [the Quad](https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/india-and-the-quad-forging-an-innovative-approach/). However, despite its proximity to the US, India is not keen on having the United States in [Diego Garcia](https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-backs-mauritiuss-sovereignty-claim-over-chagos-islands-at-icj), right at the Indian Ocean. A senior diplomat and a former US ambassador to India once regarded India on the lower end of the totem pole in terms of the State Department’s priority list. However, as India opened up its economy in the 1990s, India opened its strategic culture as well. In fact, some leading strategic thinkers at the RAND corporation once said that “India has no strategic culture and India doesn’t think about what it wants in the world.”

#### This is because the policy of bilateral containment sets the US and China up on a collision course that makes US-China war inevitable – Endy Bayuni argued earlier this month that:

Endy Bayuni, Jakarta Post, 4-4-2019, "Is multipolarism replacing containment of China?," https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2019/04/04/is-multipolarism-replacing-containment-of-china.html, Date Accessed 4-27-2019 // AS

Asia has been grappling with a changing strategic environment, and countries big and small in the region, as well as outsiders with vital interests, including the United States, are struggling to find their footing in this still largely uncertain world. The rise of China and the relative decline of the US’ role in this region have put the two countries on a collision course. The growing tension between them, over issues such as trade and maritime access in the South China Sea, is forcing countries in the region into joining one of the two blocs in this 21st century version of the Cold War. For much of the last two decades, containment was the buzzword in Washington and many Asian capitals as they warily watched China building its power economically, politically and militarily. Although the US has seen its power and influence in Asia waning, its traditional allies and many friends are aligning themselves with it, further reinforcing the trend toward a bipolar Asia. But containing China should not be the only game in town, for it would put Asia right at the center of this emerging cold war. Lest we forget, four Asian countries have nuclear weapons.

#### The impact to this war is huge as Hugh White indicates that:

Hugh White, 7-7-2016, "'The Pivot': Yes, it is all about China," No Publication, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/the-interpreter/pivot-yes-it-all-about-china, Date Accessed 4-27-2019 // AS

Moreover, as long as US-China rivalry in Asia is unresolved, the risk of war — including a major and even nuclear war — will remain high and perhaps continue to grow. This is by far the most serious risk that Asia faces, and Kurt is quite right to say that I take it very seriously. I believe that minimising this risk must be a first-order priority for everyone engaged in debating, deciding and executing strategic policy in Asia. And frankly, for all the talk of the Thucydides Trap, I do not think enough people in the US policy community recognise the scale of the risk or the imperative to avoid it.

#### Thankfully, granting India membership on the UN Security Council gives India more options in the Indian Ocean as it increases their leverage in the region as Rajesh Rajagopalan indicates in 2017:

Rajesh Rajagopalan, 9-14-2017, "India’s Strategic Choices: China and the Balance of Power in Asia," Carnegie India, https://carnegieindia.org/2017/09/14/india-s-strategic-choices-china-and-balance-of-power-in-asia-pub-73108, Date Accessed 4-4-2019 // WS

The third strategic tool at India’s disposal is multilateral diplomacy. India could potentially use multilateral institutions such as the United Nations to undermine the legitimacy of and constrain any aggressive Chinese behavior in the international arena. In addition, although India is not a permanent UNSC member, New Delhi could conceivably garner support on issues it deems important from other states, especially more powerful ones like the United States, in so doing, attempt to isolate Beijing and deter China from acting against India’s interests. Admittedly, China could opt to veto such proceedings in the UNSC, but it would likely pay a diplomatic cost for doing so, and such veto power does not extend to the UN General Assembly. Meanwhile, in some situations, New Delhi could also conceivably partner with Beijing in such venues, in order to give China an incentive to be more accommodating of India’s interests.

#### This leverage for India solves as Yang Xiaoping writes in 2018 that:

Yang Xiaoping, 4-20-2018, "When India’s Strategic Backyard Meets China’s Strategic Periphery: The View From Beijing," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/when-indias-strategic-backyard-meets-chinas-strategic-periphery-the-view-from-beijing/, Date Accessed 4-26-2019 // JM

Indeed, increased interactions in the region so far point to the possibility of mutual learning. Already, China has realized that India [maintains the tools](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-election-india-insight/indian-spys-role-alleged-in-sri-lankan-presidents-election-defeat-idUSKBN0KR03020150118) to compete with it for influence in its neighborhood and, possibly, to coerce or hedge against China’s presence. For example, India could compel [neighboring actors] Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh to change the nature of their cooperation with China, can deter Pakistan, and may aspire to deny China’s further presence in the Indian Ocean through cooperation with the United States and alliances with Japan and Australia. All of this is to say that India, despite its fears, has the potential to manage China in the emerging areas of overlap. But the dynamics of U.S.-India defense cooperation threaten to disrupt this balance, especially technology transfer such as the lately approved [electromagnetic aircraft launch system](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/us-to-release-emals-technology-to-india-for-aircraft-carriers/articleshow/61129874.cms). For Chinese observers, this has the potential to become dangerous if India regards America’s substantial defense cooperation as a commitment to come to India’s aid in a potential conflict with China. This could set up a moral hazard problem, potentially entrapping the United States in future India-China standoffs or conflicts.

#### Specifically, this idea of multipolarism is the best way to solve for the Indian Ocean Region –Bayuni concludes that:

Endy Bayuni, Jakarta Post, 4-4-2019, "Is multipolarism replacing containment of China?," https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2019/04/04/is-multipolarism-replacing-containment-of-china.html, Date Accessed 4-27-2019 // AS

Multipolarism, or the idea that the region is ruled or managed not by one or two powers, but several of them working in concert, offers an alternative proposition without antagonizing the big powers. While multipolarity is the desired outcome, bipolarity is what we are likely to get, given the growing China-US rivalry. There is the possibility of a “uni-multipolar” Asia, where a single power, meaning China, reigns but does not control the region, similar to the post-Cold War US, which controlled much of but not the entire world. India is pushing for multipolarism given its position as Asia’s second-biggest power. If power is measured by economic strength, India ranks fifth in the world. Independent predictions say China will replace the US as the largest economy before 2030, with India tailing second. India has aspirations to be a major power and wants to project itself as leading South Asia. However, it has seen its influence undermined by the building of ports in neighboring Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan with large Chinese investments. These ports give China access in the Indian Ocean, strategic to its economy and national security, India may have the military might to claim itself as an emerging power, but unlike China, it lacks the ability to dispense loans and aid. Sri Lanka turned to China to build the Hambantota deep-sea port after India said it did not have the US$1 billion needed to build it. China had no problem with money and now has full control over the port’s operation for the next 99 years. In Indonesia, multipolarism is not in its foreign policy lexicon, but as an aspiring middle power, it will find the concept appealing as it struggles to place itself between the two competing powers without being seen as aligning with either of them. It is back to the “rowing between two coral reefs” all over again as it did during the height of the Cold War. Today, it is in a much better position to keep its distance between the two powers. Indonesia is rising in world’s economic rankings, currently 16th-largest (seventh in purchasing power parity terms); it will become the fourth-largest economy by 2030, according to a Standard Chartered report. Most Asian countries count on China as their biggest trading partner but they rely on the US for security arrangements. But this is changing. Some initiatives appear to be clearly aimed at containing China. The Comprehensive and Progressive Trans Pacific Partnership, which took effect in December, involves 11 countries led by Japan but not the US after President Donald Trump pulled out of the deal. Most of the initial concepts for an Indo-Pacific security architecture addressed concerns about the rise of China. India, which is promoting its own Indo-Pacific concept, is part of the Quad security alliance with the US, Australia and Japan. Since Quad’s membership is based on shared values, it automatically excludes China. Asia needs a new security arrangement that takes into account the evolving geopolitical and geo-economic environments. The days of the US as the sole underwriter for the security umbrella in Asia are over. A new one must emerge that takes into account not only the rise of China, but also other Asian countries, mainly India and Indonesia, as well as the role of the US. A multipolar Asia is in the interests of all countries in the region, and also the US, which will continue to play a role in providing security in the region, but far less than it had done in the past. Multipolarism is less confrontational than the old game of containment. The question is how soon it will gain traction before everyone sits down and discuss Asia’s future for the benefit of its people.

# To-Do For Sunday Morning

Graham Allison, 3-5-18 , "War Between China and the United States Isn't Inevitable, But It's Likely: An Excerpt From Graham Allison's "Destined for War"," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/war-between-china-and-united-states-isnt-inevitable-its-likely-excerpt-graham-allisons, Date Accessed 4-28-2019 // WS

Yet many Americans are still in denial about what China’s transformation from agrarian backwater to “the biggest player in the history of the world” means for the United States. What is this book’s Big Idea? In a phrase, Thucydides’s Trap. When a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, alarm bells should sound: danger ahead. China and the United States are currently on a collision course for war — unless both parties take difficult and painful actions to avert it. As a rapidly ascending China challenges America’s accustomed predominance, these two nations risk falling into a deadly trap first identified by the ancient Greek historian Thucydides. Writing about a war that devastated the two leading city-states of classical Greece two and a half millennia ago, he explained: “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.” That primal insight describes a perilous historical pattern. Reviewing the record of the past five hundred years, the Thucydides’s Trap Project I direct at Harvard has found 16 cases in which a major nation’s rise has disrupted the position of a dominant state. In the most infamous example, an industrial Germany rattled Britain’s established position at the top of the pecking order a century ago. The catastrophic outcome of their competition necessitated a new category of violent conflict: world war. Our research finds that 12 of these rivalries ended in war and four did not — not a comforting ratio for the 21st-century’s most important geopolitical contest. That primal insight describes a perilous historical pattern. Reviewing the record of the past five hundred years, the Thucydides’s Trap Project I direct at Harvard has found 16 cases in which a major nation’s rise has disrupted the position of a dominant state. In the most infamous example, an industrial Germany rattled Britain’s established position at the top of the pecking order a century ago. The catastrophic outcome of their competition necessitated a new category of violent conflict: world war. Our research finds that 12 of these rivalries ended in war and four did not — not a comforting ratio for the 21st-century’s most important geopolitical contest.

## UNSC = Great Power Status

Jose Guzzardi, University of Arkansas, 2008

<https://uca.edu/politicalscience/files/2011/05/3_Guzzardi_and_Mullenbach.pdf>

The membership and structure of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) have been among the most controversial and intractable issues considered by UN member-states since the establishment of the organization in the mid-1940s. **The importance of the UNSC, particularly the council’s permanent seats, stems from the status and prestige associated with its decision-making authority on questions of global peace and security. In fact, permanent membership is equated with “great power” status in the international political system** (Tillema, 1989, 182). **As a consequence, it is perhaps not surprising that a number of emerging global and regional powers throughout the world – including** Japan, Germany, **India**, Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt – **have sought permanent seats on the UNSC during the past few decades.** Despite a tremendous amount of discussion and debate, there has been little consensus on the matter of UNSC restructuring, including to what extent the council ought to be enlarged, how many new permanent and non-permanent members ought to be added, whether the new members ought to be extended the veto privilege, and which specific countries ought to be added as permanent members (Malik, 2005, 19).