Nihar and I affirm Resolved: The United Nations should grant India permanent membership on the Security Council.

# Contention One is Rebuilding African Econs

[Nantulya 2019 from the Africa Center](https://africacenter.org/spotlight/implications-for-africa-china-one-belt-one-road-strategy/) finds that

**The revival of trade routes** along China’s ancient Silk Road **linking China to East Africa is being promoted by Chinese leaders [under the One Belt One Road policy, or OBOR]** as a symbol of China’s commitment to Africa. According to Xi, Africa stands to benefit from OBOR because “inadequate infrastructure is the biggest bottleneck to Africa’s development,” a view that is shared by many African leaders. Advocates of One Belt One Road also point to the potential for spinoffs, such as increased private Chinese **[through] investments in** tourism, real estate, and agriculture, alongside **infrastructure** projects. OBOR is also increasingly seen as a catalyst for African regional economic integration and competitiveness. A study funded by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa found that East Africa’s exports could increase by as much as $192 million annually if new OBOR projects are used profitably.

To be sure, OBOR faces many problems. First, debates on Chinese social media tools such as Weibo and Renren suggest that it does not enjoy broad domestic support. Second, **[but] concerns are growing about economic sustainability** in the countries where massive Chinese-funded infrastructure projects are being implemented**, as [African]** their **governments take on more debt** to pay for them**.** Third, hostility is rising in many countries toward **[China also implements] policies that favor [hiring] Chinese workers over locals** in construction and infrastructure contracts. This has been most prominent in African countries, such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia, to name a few. Fourth, some of Beijing’s rivals in Asia and around the world are increasingly uneasy about what they see as an effort to use OBOR to expand China’s military posture and political leverage.

To counter China,

[Panda 2017 from the ISDP writes](http://isdp.eu/publication/asia-africa-growth-corridor-aagc-india-japan/)

**India**’s **and Japan’s co-envisioned Asia-Africa Growth Corridor ([or] AAGC)** was announced at the 52nd Annual Meeting of the African Development Bank (AfDB) summit in Gandhinagar, India, on May 22-26, 2017. During the announcement, Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated that both India and Japan **aim[s] to achieve closer developmental cooperation in Africa.**

However, china’s permanent membership gives it an African influence asymmetry over india

[**Verma of BLC University in 2017**](http://sci-hub.tw/https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0116-y)

Scholars, policy makers and diplomats are also unanimous that **China’s permanent membership of the UNSC with veto power alleviates its political status and leverage [compared to] India**, **making the former more politically powerful from an African perspective.** According to former Foreign Secretary, Government of India, Ambassador M K Rasgotra (Interview, New Delhi, September 3, 2012), ‘The asymmetry in power favors China. China is perceived as a greater power by leaders globally especially in Africa. African leaders see how China uses its economic muscle against the US. Economic influence translates into political influence**. It is this perception which favors China relative to India in their interaction with African countries.’**

**Causing**

[Retika 2018 from the Chennai Center for Indian Studies](https://www.c3sindia.org/geopolitics-strategy/asia-africa-growth-corridor-aagc-an-initiative-strong-enough-to-balance-out-the-maritime-silk-road-msr-by-retika-v/) to conclude that

When both initiatives are weighed against each other, the Chinese pattern of investment and economic diplomacy seems to be at present paramount. Irrespective of the pitfalls in the MSR identified in this article, the fact remains that **China is currently better positioned to undertake the implementation of its grand scheme [compared to the AAGC],** both politically and financially. China is currently also enjoying a momentum in terms of co-operation from other developing countries in Asia and Africa. It is receiving due deference as the regional super power that it has turned out to be. Perception among the beneficiaries of Chinese economic diplomacy is also rather favourable.

The impact is spurring competition

However K[rishnan 2017](https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/the-big-story/story/20171120-one-belt-one-road-plan-china-delhi-india-xi-jinping-modi-obor-1082504-2017-11-12) from India Today writes that

The problems in Sri Lanka haven't stopped other **countries**, such as Nepal, from **[are forced to] seek**ing **China's economic embrace**, largely **because of the lack of alternatives.** A senior Nepal official says, "**There are simply no other viable options**. And we badly need these projects." Nepal certainly needs roads and domestic railways to facilitate its economic development. Yet it is an international cross-border railway to Tibet that the country is now pursuing as a 'national priority'.

Thus, [Richter 2018 from the Nikkei Asian Review concludes that](https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/The-alternative-to-Chinese-debt-for-Africa-from-Japan-and-India)

**The AAGC project** thus **provides an alternative development mechanism for Africa, potentially driving competition with the BRI that will benefit African businesses and trade in the long term.** The initiative could also take advantage of growing skepticism about the BRI and the associated heavy debt loads taken on by countries such as Angola, Republic of Congo and Ethiopia. According to figures published on Nov. 14 by Moody's Investors Service, annual Chinese lending to sub-Saharan governments is now more than $10 billion as compared with less than $1 billion as of 2001.

In

EXPLAIN THE LOGIC BEHIND THE CARD COMPETITION

Forcing China to improve the OBOR is crucial, as the Hurley 2018 from the [Center for Global Development](https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf) writes that

Given their current risk ratings, these **[For]** **23 countries** represent those for whom **the risk of debt distress due to additional BRI-related financing could be quite high**. To investigate this question in these countries, we next identify publicly reported projects under BRI, estimate a lending pipeline, and integrate this financing data into a country's debt. We then integrate the BRI lending pipeline into a country’s debt as of the end of 2016.30 In order to estimate those countries that may suffer from debt distress due to BRI-related financing, we use a debt threshold. There has been considerable research on debt thresholds, defined as a tipping point for public indebtedness beyond which economic growth drops off to such a degree that it leads to default or debt treatment. The evidence is mixed; some economies with relatively low debt levels have run into debt difficulties while others have been able to grow at relatively high levels of indebtedness for long periods without any apparent difficulty. That said, we base our analysis and judgments on recent research that shows a statistically significant threshold effect in the case of countries with rising debt-to -GDP ratios beyond 50-60 percent.31Using this threshold, we find that of the 23 countries identified above, there are 10-15 that could suffer from [debt-to -GDP ratios beyond 50-60 percent] debt distress due to future BRI-related financing, with eight countries of particular concern. These countries are Djibouti, the Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyzstan), Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Laos), the Maldives, Mongolia, Montenegro, Pakistan, and Tajikistan (Figure 3). **When government borrowing is not accompanied by enough economic growth and revenue generation to fully service the debt**, it can generate a downward spiral that inevitably ends in the need for debt restructuring or reduction.6 **Domestic spending on infrastructure and social services may be sacrificed in order to service the debt,** with the problem compounded when governments borrow additional funds just to meet debt servicing needs.7

This would directly harms the <https://www.worldhunger.org/africa-hunger-poverty-facts-2018/> 333.2 million people in africa and the 243 million undernourished individuals in africa

Global estimates of undernourishment rose from 777 million in 2015 to 821 million in 2017. Africa has the highest prevalence of undernourishment, estimated in 2016 to be 20% of the population. This is especially alarming in Eastern Africa, where it is suspected that one-third of the population is undernourished. Due primarily to its larger population size, Asia has the highest total number of undernourished individuals—520 million, versus Africa’s 243 million (FAO, 2017).

# Contention Two is Saving the System

India needs permanent membership to recognize its new power

[Mukherjee 2013](http://www.hkrdb.kar.nic.in/documents/Downloads/Good%20Reads/Waheguru%20Pal%20Singh%20Sidhu,%20Pratap%20Bhanu%20Mehta,%20Bruce%20Jones%20-%20Shaping%20the%20Emerging%20World.%20India%20and%20the%20Multilateral%20Order.pdf)

From New Delhi's perspective, **India's inability to obtain a permanent seat on the UNSC represents the overall inability of the global order to accommodate India's rise.** **Consequently, India's investment in a multilateral system that does not address its concerns or recognize its newfound status has diminished**, even in the realm of peacekeeping. 54 This has been evident across various negotiating forums, including trade, climate change, and nuclear proliferation, where India has opted either for bilateral partner-ships or for deals struck with small groups of influential countries such as the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) group in climate change negotiation

Switching to other forums stifles un effectiveness

[Ayres Oct 2017](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2017-10-16/will-india-start-acting-global-power)

While deepening its ties with the West, New Delhi has also shown a determination to invest in alternative international organizations over the course of the past decade. **India** does not seek to overturn the global order; rather, it merely **wants** such institutions as **the UN Security Council**, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the World Bank, the IMF, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and others **to expand to accommodate it. But as reform of these organizations drags on, New Delhi has put some of its eggs in other baskets.** In 2017, India also joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and it maintains an active presence in other institutions far outside the United States’ orbit, such as the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia. Although New Delhi’s top priority remains a seat commensurate with its size and heft within the traditional global organizations still dominated by the West, **India has shown that it is also willing to help build other arenas in order to have a greater voice.** India will likely continue to maintain this diverse array of relationships even as it strengthens its ties with the United States; regardless, granting New Delhi the place it deserves in major Western international forums would help, rather than hinder, U.S. interests. At a time when international coordination has become far more complex, **the increase in new organizations creates “forum-shopping” opportunities.**, as the political scientist Daniel Drezner and others have argued. **More forums and more options [that] make it harder to get things done internationally**—and also decrease Washington’s influence.

**Which is why**

**Gowan 19** Richard Gowan (senior fellow at the UN University’s Center for Policy Research, also teaches at Columbia). “Is the U.N. Security Council Marginalizing Itself Over Peacekeeping?” World Politics Review. February 25, 2019. https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/27500/is- the-u-n-security-council-marginalizing-itself-over-peacekeeping


While most elected members of the council backed the initiative, “other permanent members also raised questions about the need for a resolution on the mandating process,” resulting in the process being put on ice at the end of 2018. While the Netherlands has since left the council, Cote d’Ivoire could still revive its initiative with a new partner or partners. A number of other current council members, such as Belgium, Germany and Indonesia, were early endorsers of the A4P declaration and have questioned the P-5’s approach to mandating. German officials were reportedly irked when France refused to let them help draft mandates on Mali this year, even though Berlin is a major aid donor to Bamako. So the Dutch-Ivorian resolution may fly again with new sponsors, but it is not clear that it will have a much higher chance of success. Last December’s negotiations reaffirmed a basic truth about Security Council politics: For all their divisions over issues like Syria, the P-5 will not cede an iota of their institutional privileges to others. In a period of shifting geopolitics, Russia, China and their fellow veto-wielders gain a certain sense of security from their privileged place in the council. That doesn’t necessarily mean that the council cannot make incremental improvements to how it mandates and oversees peace operations. As I note in a short paper for the Challenges Forum—a peacekeeping-focused think tank—that also came out last week, Guterres could revitalize council negotiations by shaking up the U.N.’s uninspiring political reporting practices. If, as Adam Day noted in WPR last week, blue-helmet operations can get better at using data to track their performance and impact, they could make the P-5 think a bit harder about mandates. The elected council members that complain about the P-5’s behavior could also reconsider their own contributions to mandate negotiations. P-5 diplomats counter many criticisms by arguing that their temporary counterparts often talk more about process than substance, and often do not have concrete ideas about how to improve the mandates they criticize. If elected members could raise their game in talks on specific peace operations, they might gain leverage. Nonetheless, it is hard not to see December’s impasse over A4P in the Security Council as a sign that the body is unlikely to rejig the way it handles peace operations anytime soon. **And the more the P-5 refuse to share their authority over mandate issues, the more other powers will look for ways to respond to crises through mechanisms other than the U.N.**

**Reform is key to preserving the UNSC (SLOW DOWN AND EMPHASIZE)**

This Brave New World: India, China, and the United States

Book by Anja Manuel 2016

The next U.S. president should also push hard to reform the World Bank and other institutions to make more room for developing countries like China and India. **Over the next decade the UN Security Council will either be restructured to reflect the dramatic shift in world power or it will become obsolete.** President Obama has wisely proposed India for a seat, which China quietly opposes. Eventually we will have to agree to a solution that will give China, India, and other developing countries a bigger say at the expense of the United States and Europe. It is preferable to have China and India inside a larger tent even if we often disagree, rather than on the outside creating an alternative order. The new AIIB and BRICs development banks are warning shots: unless we reshape outdated postwar institutions, India and China will ignore or leave them. To build a positive vision for 2030, we need both of the world's largest countries engaged in international governance.

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Impact is stopping unilateral intervention

The UNSC is necessary to preserving multilateral cooperation -

[Newman 2006](https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:2470/pdf9280811290.pdf)

However, perfection – or even a close approximation thereto – is elusive in world politics. The issue is not whether multilateral institutions meet ideal standards – they do not – but whether they are superior to the alternative of unregulated state competition. For the moment, the legitimacy of multilateral institutions is protected less by their own merits than by the lack of attractive alternatives. **In the absence of [the UNSC]** an effective coalition of democracies, **the alternative** to the UN Security Council **is unilateralism [or one country acting alone without the support of the globe]** and ‘‘coalitions of the willing’’, **which epitomize the absence of effective institutional constraints on the exercise of power, .**For the time being, UN-based multilateralism on security affairs through the United Nations, whatever its flaws, retains a potential for input legitimacy that is superior to the currently available alternative of unilateralism and coalition-building. But it should not be beyond our capability to design superior multilateral institutions to protect the security of the world’s people

Unilateral Military Intervention is substantially worse than multilateral intervention

[**Lounsbery 2011**](https://cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/58411548_330583190961162_5621283111452016640_n.pdf/Unilateral-and-Multilateral-Military-Intervention-Effects-on-Stability-and-Security.pdf?_nc_cat=100&_nc_oc=AQmSs8X6HsLvdQIG5WllNKswqn8IS1K2Y14E1j6i9QjsyhveYNZsjyNyqFz_Gx_WfK4FFRMBqeKKmB9Vs4uhCv8a&_nc_ht=cdn.fbsbx.com&oh=56c430d56ccfe4b3ea3ba88f31c98f36&oe=5CC68EF0&dl=1)

The data also suggest caution regarding unilateral intervention and expec-tations of peacebuilding, social reconstruction, or nation-building. **Neither hostile nor supportive forms of unilateral involvement show consistent posi-tive outcomes on [peacebuilding, social reconstruction, or nation-building.]**the three dimensions of peacebuilding tested here. Democracy may be improved in many cases by multilateral missions and retarded by unilateral moves, but it does not appear that democracy is generally or nec-essarily firmly implanted by intervention, whether unilateral or multilateral,nor is economic growth generally the expected outcome in cases of unilateral involvement. Still, intervention variables were the only ones, aside from UKcolonial status, to materially affect or predict democratization outcomes inour analysis. Finally, positive results may be seen in the case of unilateral-ism opposing the existing government in terms of eventually improved qualityof life indicators. This could reflect tendencies to oppose corrupt practices andengender more equal distributions of wealthy

As we expected, **multilateral interventions do appear more likely to democratize**. According to our findings (Table 2), **the impacts of such interventions are felt as early as two years following onset**, and later again at four and seven years post intervention onset (Model 4). As well, by year four humanitarian multilateral operations have a positive liberalizing effect. These findings appear to be maintained as late as the seventh year. Interestingly, the positive impact of multilateral interventions seems limited to those acting without the presence of a western power (Model 5). Conversely, **unilateral governmentally supportive interventions appear to have a negative impact on** target state **democratization by** year two (Model 6), although this impact does not maintain itself in the following years. The main distinction, therefore, in our findings appears to be the generally positive impact of multilateralism on democratization as contrasted to the negative impact of unilateralism; indeed these basically are the only variables in the model, aside from UK colonial history,to be associated statistically with democratization outcomes

**For example, when the US bypassed the Security council and intervened in Iraq, it led to a decade long war that destabilized the region and claimed thousands of lives.**

Thus, Sambanis ‘08 of Yale concludes that civil wars with non-UN interventions are two times more likely to recur than with UN interventions.