**We negate.**

**We observe that that the Authorization for Use of Military Force, or AUMF, does not grant the president any unique power.**

Article II of the Constitution gives control of the military to the executive by granting him/her the title of “Commander-in-Chief.” Eric Posner of the University of Chicago explains that the AUMF does not grant the president any unique powers because Article II already allows the executive to intervene without congressional approval. Indeed, Stephen Griffin of Yale contextualizes that President Bush deliberately avoided the AUMF and relied completely on Article II for the War on Terror. Jack Goldsmith of Harvard confirms, writing “uses of military force around the globe [can be] justified entirely on the basis of…the President’s Article II powers.”

**With that, our only contention is streamlining authority.**

While it does not grant the president any new power, the AUMF allows him to use his power more effectively in two ways.

**First is through optimizing counterterror strategies.**

Targeted killings are specific strikes meant to eliminate the leaders of terrorist organizations like the 2011 operation that targeted Osama bin Laden. Charles Dunlap of the Small Wars Journal explains that the main legal justification for this type of warfare rests in Article II. However, while the AUMF itself doesn’t give the president the power to pursue targeted killings, it encourages their employment. Kristen Boon of Seton Hall University writes that, by bolstering the president with additional legislative support for targeted strikes, the AUMF increases the frequency of these operations. Indeed, according to Brian Jenkins of RAND, President Obama, who relied predominantly on the AUMF, oversaw a ten-fold increase in targeted killings compared to his predecessor, who relied on Article II. This is important because targeted killings are a crucial component of American counterterror strategy. Glenn Johnson of the Naval Postgraduate School warrants that because targeted strikes cause serious infighting, they reduce the effectiveness of terror organizations, decreasing the lethality rate of terrorist attacks from five-point-four deaths per attack to point-one-one deaths – a fifty-fold decrease. Thus, Michael Tiernay of New York University concludes that governments are three hundred ninety-eight percent more likely to defeat insurgencies following a targeted killing. Furthermore, the covert nature of targeted strikes protects civilians as Will Saletan of Slate quantifies that they are seven times safer than alternative options.

**Second is through receiving Congressional approval.**

Cornell University explains that because it was formally passed by Congress, the AUMF uniquely gives the president implied Congressional approval for military ventures. Without the AUMF, however, the president would be forced to justify military operations through Article II. This is problematic as Ivan Eland of the Huffington Post reports that presidents don’t ask for Congressional approval before evoking Article II. Examples include Bush’s 1989 invasion of Panama and Clinton’s 1999 bombing of Kosovo. Retaining Congress’s support is important as Ilya Somin of the Washington Post explains that a lack of Congressional authorization means that the president bears all the political risk should things go wrong, causing him to be overly cautious in his actions. The result, she finds, is a military intervention large enough to clearly involve the US in the fighting, but not effective enough to strike a decisive blow against the enemies. Thus, this kind of intervention greatly diminishes the chance of a successful outcome. The clearest example of an Article II-type intervention is the 2011 military operation in Libya. Somin writes that the reason why the intervention was such a failure was because the president bypassed Congress and thus exercised too much caution. The operation was strong enough to topple the Gadaffi regime, but not strong enough to prevent other, more dangerous groups from gaining power. She concludes that most of the time “a tepid, limited intervention is more dangerous than either [a] larger, more decisive one, or staying out of the conflict altogether.”

**Thus, we negate.**