

A2 AFF

A2 China

Topshelf

1: Delink; Kim '12 of Hankuk University writes that after 2013, India could not afford to continue its quiet diplomacy with China, and sought to find ways to counterbalance China. Unfortunately, this attempt was a failure, which is why Sharma '18 of Bloomberg writes that because the asymmetry of power between China and India has grown so large, Modi doesn't want to counterbalance China in fears that a political confrontation like another Doklam standoff would humiliate him and ruin his electoral chances, and has thus sought a "reset" in relations with China. Overall, Dutt '19 of the Washington Post writes that aside from the catastrophic Doklam incident, Modi has consistently chosen to appease China rather than confront China.

A2 Multilat

1: Delink; (ASEAN) Rajagopalan '17 of Carnegie India writes that China is already too strong for a regional balancing strategy where India cooperates with ASEAN/Japan to stop them, as China outspends all of their militaries combined. More importantly, he finds that because China is growing faster economically and spending more on its military every year, this gap will only grow even further.

2: Delink; (ASEAN) Rajagopalan continues that ASEAN nations are the weakest link in a regional balancing strategy, and even with the help of Australia and Japan, geographic barriers ensure that China will always be a step ahead because of its better communication lines.

3: Delink; (IOR) Paul '18 of the War on the Rocks writes that India isn't able to form a multilateral coalition in the Indian Ocean because the nations in the region obtain higher levels of economic and military assistance than India can provide from China, which is why they have switched their allegiance to China.

A2 Hard Power

1: Delink; Yang '18 of the War on the Rocks writes that China has never viewed India's military as a threat, and it has always been incredibly dismissive towards India's modernization and nuclearization. That's because Stratfor Worldview '18 writes that modest tax revenues prevent India from ever competing militarily with China, concluding that India will be unable to counterbalance China outside of its own homeland.

2: Turn; Mastro '18 of the Lawfare Magazine writes that the CCP believes that reacting to the Indian military with signs of caution would undermine the government's legitimacy because it would be tacitly conceding that developing nations can rise under Western ideals. Thus, he continues that if India tries to counterbalance China, the CCP would be forced to dramatically escalate the crisis to convey its superior military might, making conflict much more likely.

A2 US Alliance

1: Delink; The Center for American Progress '18 writes that India does not like overly aggressive U.S. policies towards China and does not want to be pushed by the United States to side with the United States against China because India doesn't think aggressing against China is in its interest and doesn't trust the US government. Thus, Paul '18 of War on the Rocks writes that India will take a middle ground option of soft-balancing against China rather than allying with the U.S.

2: Turn; Mastro '18 of the Lawfare Magazine writes that the CCP believes that reacting to the Indian military with signs of caution would undermine the government's legitimacy because it would be tacitly conceding that developing nations can rise under Western ideals. Thus, he continues that if India tries to counterbalance China, the CCP would be forced to dramatically escalate the crisis to convey its superior military might, making conflict much more likely.

Kim, Chan-Wahn. "India's quiet diplomacy seeking a permanent UN Security Council seat." Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. 2012.

https://www.posri.re.kr/files/file_pdf/71/273/2881/71_273_2881_file_pdf_1201-06_03_Issue.pdf//RJ

There is a possibility that **India will soon face the dilemma of whether to continue or abandon its quiet diplomacy.** For India to be recognized as a responsible major power, it must express opinions on international issues. If India fails to comply with the demands of the international community, there will be little need or justification for India becoming a permanent member of the UNSC. With rebel groups controlling Libya, **India finds itself in a position where it will soon have to abandon its neutral stance for its own interests. If India deems that its election to a permanent UNSC seat will continue to be delayed and challenged for a long time, it might shift from quiet diplomacy to active diplomacy. India cannot afford to keep being pushed around by China in South Asia. Beginning in 2013, when India's term as a non-permanent UNSC member ends, India is expected to participate actively in expanding the security belt that was formed to contain China, connecting the USA, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, and Vietnam.**

Sharma, Mihir. "Asia's Imbalance of Power." Bloomberg. April 2018.

<https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-04-26/power-imbalance-between-india-and-china-has-grown-lopsided//RJ>

In fact, **there is an agenda -- a sobering one for anyone counting on India to serve as a "counterweight" to China. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's main goal for the summit is to get China to stop kicking sand in India's face. The last thing he can afford as his country approaches general elections next year is another confrontation similar to the India-China faceoff in the Himalayas last year. Any such dust-up would likely end in politically disastrous humiliation for India.** The tough words that accompanied last year's standoff are no longer heard in the halls of power in New Delhi. Indian officials have muted criticism of China's Belt and Road Initiative, although they still refuse to sign onto the plan. They've essentially entered the shadow trade war between the U.S. and China on China's side, offering to export more soybeans to keep up supply if the Chinese government does impose tariffs on U.S. agricultural products. China's shown few signs of reciprocating these concessions. Most embarrassingly for those of us who like to trumpet democratic India's commitment to liberal values, the government's top bureaucrat wrote to his peers in February warning them it was a "sensitive time" for bilateral relations and "advising" them to stay away from any function commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Dalai Lama's arrival in India as a refugee from Chinese persecution. The decision was made just as India's foreign secretary travelled to Beijing to lay the groundwork for this week's summit. Some might welcome India's new posture as plain realism. **The asymmetry of power and influence between the two Asian giants has rarely been so stark, especially in India's backyard.** Earlier this year, the Maldives -- once closely tied to India -- theatrically shifted allegiance to China and to an authoritarian political model that isolated the country's India-friendly democrats. India found it had few political levers in Male and even fewer economic incentives to offer. Most mortifyingly for a country accustomed to thinking of the Indian Ocean as its private lake, at the height of the crisis China sent a naval group into the region for the first time in four years. Indian policymakers are now faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, they have few resources with which to challenge China. But, if they step back, they are surrendering to a familiar Chinese strategy: a multi-layered effort to force other regional powers to abandon their spheres of influence. India's neighbors have long been targets for China's affections. As Aparna Pande of the Hudson Institute points out, for decades 60 percent of China's arms exports have gone to Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. **For India's partners across the world, the Modi government's pursuit of a "reset" with China should be a warning that the South Asian giant isn't anywhere near ready to counter China's rise.** Indian policymakers meanwhile must pragmatically evaluate the benefits and costs of placating China. Have similar efforts in the past by Japan or the U.S. paid off? If not, is there another option?

Dutt, Barkha. "Modi Likes to Project Muscular Nationalism -- Except When It Comes to China." Washington Post. Mar. 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/22/modi-likes-project-muscular-nationalism-except-when-it-comes-china/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.71f6b4bfeeb//RJ

At the end of its first term, **the outgoing Modi government's China policy has hit a bit of a dead end. India's economy can't afford to take on the Chinese behemoth. And, notwithstanding one military standoff between the armies of both countries in Bhutan, the government's instinct was still**

to seek conciliation with China, instead of confrontation or even competition. Modi's China policy has militated against his own self-declared muscular nationalism.

Rajagopalan, Rajesh. "India's Strategic Choices: China and the Balance of Power in Asia." Carnegie India. Sept. 2017. <https://carnegieindia.org/2017/09/14/india-s-strategic-choices-china-and-balance-of-power-in-asia-pub-73108> //RJ

Despite these important advantages, however, **there are some key drawbacks to a regional balancing strategy that also need to be considered.** The most important one is that **China is likely much too strong already for regional states to balance against it. Balancing becomes progressively more difficult as the power disparity between a leading power in a region and its neighbors grows.**³⁹ At a certain point, **when the leading power accrues close to a majority of the region's total military expenditures, balancing becomes nearly impossible.**⁴⁰ In short, other things being equal, the greater the disparity in power, the greater the difficulty of balancing. Based on the data presented in Figure 1, China's 2016 defense budget (approximately \$145 billion) was already almost as much as the combined 2016 budgets of Australia, India, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam (about \$147 billion).⁴¹ **For India to rely solely or predominantly on regional balancing to ensure its security, then, would be exceedingly difficult and risky. This pattern is likely to** hold or perhaps even become more **exacerbate, as time goes on.** After all, this same logic extends to the size of China's GDP relative to other countries, which can be seen as a rough barometer of potential capacity for future military spending. As Figure 2 shows, by 2014, China had already crossed well over the 50 percent threshold in terms of the total aggregate GDP of the countries listed above.⁴² Figure 2 also shows that **this gap is likely to get wider in the coming decades.** By 2030, for instance, China is projected to have a GDP of \$36.1 trillion, whereas the combined GDPs of Australia, India, Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam are likely to be only \$27.7 trillion.⁴³ If this pattern were to hold true, it would likely mean that **China's future capacity to fund its military would continue to outpace the capacities of these other countries for the next several decades.** In fact, **even if one charitably assumes that China's growth rate were to hypothetically drop by a couple of points and these other countries' growth rates were to be a couple points higher than expected, it is still unlikely that India and China's other neighbors would be able to keep up with Beijing's pace of growth.** This suggests that **even if these regional powers were to come together, they likely would not have the material capacity to balance China in and of themselves.** Second, **geography and the challenge of coordination add to the problem. India's potential regional partners against China are separated by vast swathes of water, which tends to be the most difficult geographical obstacle to military power projection.** Although a couple of the **Southeast Asian countries** are clustered closer together, they also **would be the weakest members of any such regional alliance.** On the other hand, **China has the benefit of internal lines of communication**, which would allow the Chinese military to swiftly shift land and air forces from one theater to another, while its naval forces could stay close to its shores. Geography thus represents a significant hurdle to such a regional balancing strategy. A third disadvantage of the regional balancing approach is that even an alliance with weaker powers does not solve some of the problems of alliance politics, such as burden sharing. There tends to be a temptation among weaker powers to let the stronger members of any alliance pull the most weight. So in a potential Asian regional alliance, Australia, Japan, and India would probably carry most of the burden of balancing China. This dynamic could lead to disputes within the alliance, weakening it further. A fourth disadvantage is another general problem of alliances—entrapment. Weaker powers could conceivably engage in military adventurism against China that could drag alliance members into an unnecessary conflict. Indian analysts have considered the entrapment problem only in the context of an Indian alignment with the United States, but this problem could affect a regional balancing strategy too.

Paul, T.V. "HOW INDIA WILL REACT TO THE RISE OF CHINA: THE SOFT-BALANCING STRATEGY RECONSIDERED." War on the Rocks. Sept. 2018.

<https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/india-and-the-rise-of-china-soft-balancing-strategy-reconsidered/>

// Everett Plante of the Saint Mary's Hall High School in San Antonio, Texas

Meanwhile, the smaller states of South Asia are increasingly playing smart games to hedge between China and India: They obtain high levels of economic and military assistance from China, forcing India to offer them increased aid as well. But the amount of Indian economic and infrastructure aid is nowhere near China offers. The Indian Ocean littoral is fast emerging

as [China's ocean](#) too, with a military base operational in Djibouti and one planned in Pakistan, and commercial ports under construction or planned in Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. **Small dependent states such as the Maldives are breaking away from India in a rare display of independence. China's Belt and Road Initiative, although largely built around economic and infrastructure development, has immense geopolitical significance. India is one of the most affected countries, especially given its unwillingness to join as a junior partner.**

Mastro, Oriana. "Can India Help the United States Against China?" Lawfare Magazine. Aug. 2018. <https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-india-help-united-states-against-china> //RJ

I argue that **concerns about regime legitimacy are the primary reason for China's lack of balancing: The Chinese Communist Party needs to interpret China's external environment in a way that supports its right to power at home.** As economic growth slows down, **the CCP is pushing the narrative that only with the Party in charge can China achieve its "national rejuvenation,"** in the words of current leader Xi Jinping. This narrative of return to a rightful place of regional preeminence contributes to Party legitimacy by appealing to the public's sense of Chinese exceptionalism and civilizational pride. **If the Indian military can present a challenge to the Chinese military, then the Chinese government must tacitly acknowledge the possibility that another country, and a democratic one at that, can rise successfully without the CCP at the helm. The Party fears that such an admission, even if not explicit, would undermine the government's legitimacy in the eyes of the people.** In short, internal stability depends on the Chinese people's continued belief in the often-heard argument that "there is no developing country in the world that achieves prosperity and stability under Western-style democracy."

Yang, Xiaoping. "WHEN INDIA'S STRATEGIC BACKYARD MEETS CHINA'S STRATEGIC PERIPHERY: THE VIEW FROM BEIJING." War on the Rocks. April 2018. <https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/when-indias-strategic-backyard-meets-chinas-strategic-periphery-the-view-from-beijing/> //RJ

Historically, China has not regarded India as a security threat. When the two countries went to war over various border disputes in 1962, India suffered what its diplomats have characterized as a "humiliating defeat." **China assumed India's multi-decade drive to acquire nuclear weapons was a result of its desire to elevate its status on the world stage, and, thus, did not interpret this development as a threat warranting a revised posture. China also has tended to take a dismissive attitude towards Indian military capabilities in general, and towards modernization efforts more specifically.**

Stratfor Worldview. "India Struggles With Its Strategy for Becoming a Great Power." Mar. 2018. <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/india-struggles-its-strategy-becoming-great-power> //RJ
India's four grand strategic pillars provide an unambiguous recipe on Pakistan — co-opt when possible and balance or contain if not — though the results have been decidedly mixed. However, on China the grand strategy itself leads to ambiguities. **India's power is perhaps sufficient to deter China and protect the homeland, but it is insufficient for anything more. Containing China is impossible; balancing it on India's terms is extremely difficult.** Engagement carries risks too. It's tricky to seek and accept membership in the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization but block full Chinese membership in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. **India's global integration strategy too doesn't provide ready answers on China,** which has become an economic behemoth. **Such a strategy requires that a capital-starved India attract Chinese investment and work with Beijing's gigantic Belt and Road Initiative where it can. But fears of Chinese encirclement militate against such a compromise, and India also has to be careful to not provoke excessive Chinese opposition to its global goals.** Thus, **India finds itself in an unenviable position on China.** For now, it will likely muster all the friends it can, with the United States and [Japan as key partners.](#) [The](#)

"Quad" — a counter to the Belt and Road Initiative being considered by Australia, the United States, India and Japan — is only an idea so far, but it has the potential to gel. Strategic ties with Vietnam and Taiwan also have a bright future. In the medium term, India's joint focus with its partners will primarily be on maritime and power projection activities in the region of the Indian Ocean.

Stratfor Worldview. "India Struggles With Its Strategy for Becoming a Great Power." Mar. 2018. <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/india-struggles-its-strategy-becoming-great-power> //RJ

Naval acquisitions spending, currently at 25 percent of India's defense acquisitions budget, is likely to increase, but overall defense spending is hamstrung by modest tax revenues.

Therefore, the South China Sea will remain an overstretch. The Bay of Bengal, northern and coastal Myanmar and East Africa are more plausible as future arenas for Indo-Chinese friction, as are Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh. However, New Delhi will likely try to separate its security competition with Beijing from areas of mutual convergence.

The Center for American Progress '18 - India does not want to side against China with the US

<https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2018/01/14/444786/united-states-india-forging-indispensable-democratic-partnership/>

However, India is highly skeptical of U.S. policy toward Pakistan, which does not treat Pakistan as the threat that India believes it is.

At the same time, India does not like overly aggressive U.S. policies towards China and does not want to be pushed by the United States to side with the United States against China. While

India may want a closer security partnership with the United States, **doubts remain as to whether the United States will be a reliable partner for India when the chips are down.** The United States often thinks that India is a free rider in the international system, but American officials fail to take into account how much India is doing to maintain peace and security in the Indo-Pacific, independent of any joint activities with the United States. This comprehensive set of Indian economic, diplomatic, and military actions is often undervalued. The United States could do more to advocate for Indian membership in key multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations Security Council or the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and for updating international institutions to reflect the growing size of Indian influence. **The United States too often expects India to take positions that are not in India's interests or that it does not have the capacity to take, such as more vocally supporting human rights abroad.** While U.S. officials often complain about the Indian bureaucracy, they too often fail to account for the difficulty in moving the American bureaucracy closer to India. The United States often extols the values of diversity, inclusivity, and human rights, but often fails to look at its own house and the strains of intolerance taking hold in America. Prime Minister Modi and the Indian government are looking to work with President Trump, primarily on economic and security cooperation. **But some in India believe that the current U.S. administration's policies are unpredictable and that "America-first" policies could potentially shut out Indian workers and harm Indian efforts to increase domestic manufacturing.**

Paul, T.V. "HOW INDIA WILL REACT TO THE RISE OF CHINA: THE SOFT-BALANCING STRATEGY RECONSIDERED." War on the Rocks. Sept. 2018. <https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/india-and-the-rise-of-china-soft-balancing-strategy-reconsidered/> //RJ

China's provocative behavior in the South China Sea and increasing economic and naval presence in the Indo-Pacific are among the reasons the United States has recently characterized China as a "strategic competitor." Some **analysts seem to assume New Delhi is a natural partner and will join the United States in this struggle as China becomes more powerful and threatening.** However,

while **these analysts** do acknowledge the constraints, they nonetheless **tend to overestimate India's willingness to serve as a counterweight to China,** while underestimating internal and external constraints on such explicit balancing behavior. My contention is that India is likely to form both a soft-balancing coalition, relying on diplomacy and institutional cooperation, and a limited hard-balancing coalition, that is, strategic partnerships short of formal alliances. But **an outright alliance with the United States is very improbable.** The recently concluded U.S.-India "two-plus-two" meeting of foreign and defense ministers and secretaries suggests that the path toward a limited hard-balancing coalition may be opening despite many remaining hurdles. Whether a limited U.S.-India hard-balancing coalition progresses toward an outright hard-balancing alliance will depend heavily on China's behavior, especially the threat level it poses to India in the years to come.

Mastro, Oriana. "It Takes Two to Tango: Autocratic underbalancing, regime legitimacy and China's responses to India's rise." *Journal of Strategic Studies*. Georgetown University. 2019. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2018.1485567> //RJ

In the case of contemporary China, **the CCP believes it needs the tacit agreement of the Chinese people to rule**. The CCP has relied on various factors over the past 67 years to ensure the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the people, and consequently social stability. In the 1950s and 1960s, Maoist communist ideology and its revolutionary fervor formed the core of the Party's legitimacy. After the 10 years of chaos during the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping came to power and changed course to rely on economic growth as the source of Party legitimacy. China's rise became a rallying point. Today, **as economic growth slows down, the Party is pushing the narrative that only with the Party in charge can China achieve its 'national rejuvenation,'** in the words of current leader Xi Jinping. Taking their lead from Xi, and likely inspired by the ninety-fifth anniversary of the Party's founding, many articles in official media expound on the CCP as the cornerstone of national rejuvenation, a necessary condition for the Chinese people's return to greatness. **This narrative of return to a rightful place of regional preeminence contributes to Party legitimacy by appealing to the public's sense of Chinese exceptionalism and civilizational pride.**⁵² **To guard jealously its carefully cultivated status as the sole savior of China and the Chinese people, the Party regularly warns the public of the perils of Western ideology and portrays the spread of Western constitutional democracy as a deliberate threat to Party leadership.** The most glaring example of this is a confidential internally circulated CCP communique that specifically identified the promotion of Western constitutional democracy as 'an attempt to undermine the current leadership and the socialism with Chinese characteristics system of governance.'⁵³ **Xi Jinping relies heavily on promoting the idea that without the Party, China cannot become a major power in the international system.** He has also made public statements to the effect that democracy would not be a good fit for China and that China 'needs to follow a development path that suits its own reality.'⁵⁴ Xi often argues that his proposed China dream depends on the Party's maintenance of complete control – the concentration of power in the system allows China to do important things quickly and efficiently.⁵⁵ To bring it back to underbalancing, the preservation of this stark choice – revitalization of the Chinese nation to its natural greatness or democracy and failure – lies at the foundation of regime legitimacy for the CCP. **Internal stability depends on the Chinese people's continued belief in the often-heard argument that 'there is no developing country in the world that achieves prosperity and stability under Western-style democracy.'**⁵⁶ **Any policy position that suggests that the arduous process of rising from a poor, weak country to a rich, powerful one can be managed equally well by a democracy presents a real threat to the Party's hold on power.**⁵⁷ **Therefore, to preserve regime legitimacy, China has to underestimate the progress India has made, to include the modernization of its military, which in turn encourages underbalancing.** This does not mean China cannot criticize India's intentions, but its leadership must make clear to its people that India does not have adequate capabilities to challenge China and the reasons for India's weakness lies at least in part in its democratic nature.

Mastro, Oriana. "It Takes Two to Tango: Autocratic underbalancing, regime legitimacy and China's responses to India's rise." *Journal of Strategic Studies*. Georgetown University. 2019. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2018.1485567> //RJ

The need to show military superiority to domestic audiences likely extends to any encounters with Indian forces. This could create some dangerous incentives for China to escalate in a crisis in an attempt to convey its superior military might instead of attempting to defuse the issue and offer off-ramps. These escalation pressures create a unique degree of crisis instability in which China may be tempted to resort to force instead of relying on diplomatic means to resolve the issue.¹³² **Even if China does not want to fight a war with India, displays and maneuvering of military forces to convey a strong message to India to back down could have the opposite effect. The 2-month military standoff at Doklam, sparked by the Chinese**

military's attempts to extend a road through territory disputed by China and Bhutan, demonstrates some of these problematic escalatory dynamics.

First, China's underestimation of the Indian military was likely a factor that led to Beijing's surprise when Indian troops entered the disputed territory, with at least the tacit consent of Bhutan, and physically impeded the construction of the road.¹³³ Second, China leveraged its government-controlled media to highlight its narrative and issue threats and warnings to India not underestimating Chinese resolve and the Chinese people's determination to protect their sovereignty just because China has restrained itself so far. The Chinese media was replete with such articles, warning India, for example, not to 'play with fire' lest it 'get burned.'¹³⁴ They cautioned the Indian government not to be driven by nationalism and arrogance, to avoid miscalculation and repeating the mistakes of the 1962 war.¹³⁵ This is not just a war of words; research shows that escalating threats in the media can be a precursor to China's use of force.¹³⁶ While in the case of Doklam both sides militarily disengaged from the area in the end, the episode demonstrates that China's response to India's military modernization causes it to miscalculate, and when crisis erupts, to escalate in part to convey its superior position to domestic audiences.

A2 PKOs

A2 Declining Commitment

1: Impact Defense; McGreal '15 of the Guardian writes that Indian peacekeepers respond to New Delhi commanders rather than UN commanders, completely preventing any successful peacekeeping operations because Indian peacekeepers refuse to act in risky situations.

2: Delink; Blah '17 of the Journal of Strategic Analysis writes that India has renewed its commitment to UN Peacekeeping despite its concerns with representation, indicating that India will not stop peacekeeping operations in the status quo.

3: Politicization DA; Mampilly '18 of the Journal of African Affairs writes that India has traditionally sought to weaponize its role in PKOs, leveraging its troops for political gain on the international stage. He continues that if India grows in power over peacekeepers, it will destabilize the boundary between funding and supplying peacekeepers, which harms peacekeeping operations by allowing India to coerce other nations for more power. For example, in the Congo, India withdrew its peacekeepers to force other nations to give it more power over peacekeeping, which led to the failure of the operation and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people.

Blah, Montgomery. "India's Stance and Renewed Commitment to UN Peacekeeping." *Journal of Strategic Analysis*. Mar. 2017.

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09700161.2017.1295605?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=rsan20> //RJ

During the Leaders' Summit in New York in 2015, several members of the UN pledged to renew their commitment to strengthen UN peacekeeping missions deployed around the globe. While China, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Nepal, Norway, Rwanda, Finland and the Netherlands pledged more troops, Italy pledged to contribute a helicopter squadron, an engineering company and a specialized battalion. Meanwhile, the UK will contribute 300 troops for the South Sudan mission and another 70 for the African Union-led mission in Somalia.⁶⁰ The UK's commitments are primarily meant to support the efforts of the UN and the African Union to usher in peace and stability in these countries

that have been plagued by prolonged conflicts.⁶¹ **India too joined these countries in pledging to strengthen its commitment to UN peacekeeping missions, which will not only enhance its image at the global level, but also promote its quest for a permanent membership in the UNSC.**⁶² **This pledge, however, does not signify India's deviation from its demand for a bigger role for the TCCs in the peacekeeping decision-making process.**⁶³ **India's new intended contribution to the UN peacekeeping operations includes an additional battalion of 850 troops,** in existing or new operations, and an additional 3 police units with a higher representation of female peacekeepers. **It will also provide critical enablers, deploy technical personnel in UN missions and provide additional training for peacekeepers at facilities in India and in the field.**⁶⁴ India also agreed on a joint initiative to train troops in six African countries before deploying to UN peacekeeping missions without specifying the African countries that would be involved. The initiative was taken in response to the growing need for effective, professional and international peacekeeping in regions of conflict.⁶⁵

McGreal, Chris. "What's the point of peacekeepers when they don't keep the peace?." *The Guardian*. Sept. 2015. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/17/un-united-nations-peacekeepers-rwanda-bosnia> //RJ

By then members of the wider UN mission in the DRC had come to look like bystanders to mass killing, rape and terror. Richard Gowan, until recently research director at the Centre on International Cooperation, a thinktank in New York that works closely with

the UN on peacekeeping, said **Indian forces** in Sierra Leone and the DRC **were taking orders from the defence ministry in New Delhi, not the UN commanders on the ground.** “It’s very clear that **there are directions from New Delhi to avoid all risk, and that there are parallel lines of command between New Delhi and their guys in the field.** That’s true of a lot of countries. A lot of field officers, **if they get any order to take a significant risk in a peace operation, they’ll immediately phone home.** That’s making it almost impossible for some force commanders to get anything done because **they have no true control over their own units,**” he said.

Mampilly, Zachariah. “Shifts in global power and UN peacekeeping performance: India’s rise and its impact on civilian protection in Africa.” *Journal of African Affairs*. April 2018.

<https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/117/467/171/4944475> //RJ

INDIA’S ASCENDANCE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR AFRICA has produced a substantial body of literature over the past decade.¹ Yet, few attempt to analyse how India’s rise impacts local political contexts in Africa, as is more common with studies on China.² This article seeks to fill this lacuna. It argues that **India’s machinations within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), where it completed a two-year term in 2011–2012, negatively impacted the performance of the UN’s peacekeeping force** in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (hereafter, Congo). **Through process tracing, it links India’s behavior on the UNSC, where it has raised several major challenges to the overarching global peacekeeping infrastructure, to the failure of the peacekeeping mission in Congo. As India seeks greater influence at the international level, it will destabilize the boundary between the relatively weak and poor countries that traditionally contribute troops to peacekeeping missions, and the wealthy, powerful permanent members of the UNSC that pay for them, with detrimental effects for peacekeeping performance.**

Mampilly, Zachariah. “Shifts in global power and UN peacekeeping performance: India’s rise and its impact on civilian protection in Africa.” *Journal of African Affairs*. April 2018.

<https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/117/467/171/4944475> //RJ

At the international level, the Indians pursued a distinct strategy. Specifically, **they sought to leverage the country’s capacity to deploy aerial power**, a key component of the missions in Sudan and Congo, **to push for a greater voice within the UNSC around peacekeeping missions.**⁷⁵ Towards this end, as the debate around Libya and R2P raged, India began threatening to withdraw its four remaining Mi-35 helicopters from MONUSCO (as well as helicopters delegated to the United Nations Mission in Sudan) when its LOA expired on 4 July 2011, unless TCCs were given a greater say in designing future peacekeeping missions, much to the chagrin of the P-3. One close observer of the UNSC noted that the debate was the ‘most acrimonious’ she had ever witnessed.⁷⁶ With few exceptions, notably South Africa and Ukraine, **no other TCC has the capacity or the will to provide helicopters for extended periods, hence making the Indian threat a substantive one.**⁷⁷ The government claimed that it faced a domestic need for the helicopters to fight its internal Maoist insurgency – a position bolstered by a damning Comptroller and Auditor General report that suggested that operational shortages faced by the Indian Army in its battle with domestic insurgents were directly linked to its participation in UN missions. Yet some perceived it as a power play by India to assert more influence over the direction of future peacekeeping mandates.⁷⁸ Leading voices have long called for leveraging India’s contributions to peacekeeping in order to ‘insist on adequate representation at the UN Headquarters and on decision-making mechanisms there’.⁷⁹ India’s Deputy Ambassador to the UN, Manjeev Singh Puri, also spoke openly about the need for ‘more consultation’ with key TCCs directly linking the provision of helicopters to the debate around the mandates of peacekeeping missions.⁸⁰ During India’s term as President, the UNSC was set to host an ‘Open Debate on Peacekeeping’ at the country’s urging, rendering its threat far more resonant.⁸¹ In addition, both Brazil and South Africa, India’s rising power allies through groupings such as IBSA and BRICS, were also rotating members of the council with similar misgivings about the Libyan intervention.⁸² With the IBSA countries in agreement, both China and Russia would feel compelled to agree.⁸³ Prior to the debate in August, India circulated a memo entitled, ‘Peacekeeping: taking stock and preparing for the future’. In the memo, India highlighted the importance of host government consent and R2P’s implications for state sovereignty, calling for peacekeeping missions to be treated as a ‘partnership’ between the UNSC, the General Assembly and the TCCs, rather than the preserve of the P-3. In addition, in a nod to the withering criticism it faced following the Kiwanja massacre, the memo repeated India’s long-standing concern that peacekeeping mandates continued to underestimate the resources necessary with TCCs bearing the bulk of the blame when missions failed.⁸⁴ Effects on peacekeeping in Congo **The effect of this debate at the local level was to weaken the capacity of the**

Indian contingent, and hence the overall missions in Congo (and Sudan). Stung by a non-committal response from the P-3 to its reform initiatives, the Indian government reduced its material support for the Congo mission while undercutting the capacity of commanders on the ground to have operational control over the mission.

The newly appointed MONUSCO Force Commander, Lt. Gen. Chander Prakash, began to withdraw support for foot patrols and other reforms designed to increase interaction between peacekeepers and civilians in late 2010.⁸⁵ In line with India's complaints about the mismatch between mandates and resources, Prakash put forth the official Indian position that resource shortages undermined the capacity of the mission to adequately fulfill its mandate of civilian protection.⁸⁶ This was despite the fact that most of the reforms instigated by Indian commanders in North Kivu did not require additional financial outlays. Most importantly, despite agreeing to return its helicopters to North Kivu, the Indian government decided to replace the 8 Mi-25/35 attack helicopters and 9 Mi-17 transport helicopters deployed to the missions in Congo and Sudan with six light utility helicopters manufactured in India (Chetak and Cheetah). Beyond the net reduction in number, the Indian made helicopters have less military capacity than the Russian made Mi-8 and can only undertake surveillance, observation, search and rescue,

medical and reconnaissance missions.⁸⁷ By late 2011, **the situation became so dire that Secretary General Ban Ki-**

Moon drafted a letter to the UNSC warning that the lack of helicopters made the situation 'critical' and calling for members to 'think outside the box' to cover the shortfall.⁸⁸

Ukraine offered four Mi-24 attack helicopters in March 2012 and South Africa provided some transport helicopters to cover the shortfall, but neither was willing to make the long-term commitment necessary to retain MONUSCO's aerial advantage. In March 2012, a group of ex-CNDP soldiers loyal to Bosco Ntaganda mutinied from the Congolese Army. Claiming that the government had failed to implement the 23 March 2009 peace agreement with the CNDP, the group adopted the moniker M23 for itself. Despite possessing significantly less military power than its predecessor, M23 quickly took control of large territories in North Kivu, including the towns of Bunagana on the Ugandan border and marching on to Rutshuru and Rugari despite the presence of an Indian contingent at the Kiwanja base.⁸⁹

M23's advance led to a massive humanitarian crisis. Both the rebels and government forces were accused of war crimes, including the summary executions of civilians, mass rapes, and forced recruitment including children, leading to the displacement of hundreds of thousands.⁹⁰ **The above evidence suggests that in its confrontation with M23, MONUSCO was hindered by the Indian decision to pull its helicopters and equally importantly, to cancel the reforms that improved relations between the mission**

and civilians. As the International Crisis Group noted, the failure to prevent M23's rise was related to the 'militarily passive' behavior of MONUSCO and demonstrated the 'ineffectiveness' of the mission.⁹¹ Relations with Congolese civilians also declined and both local and national political leaders criticized the mission's performance, a dramatic turnaround from the praise showered on it following the post-Kiwanja reforms.⁹² In July 2012, following the recapture of several towns by joint FARDC/MONUSCO teams, a ceasefire was agreed between M23 and the Congolese government. Yet fighting continued intermittently, leading the UN to announce the creation of a 3,000-strong 'Intervention Brigade' with the explicit intention of strengthening MONUSCO's offensive abilities for a limited period of time.⁹³ In a first for a UN peacekeeping mission, the brigade, staffed primarily with contributors from other African nations, was empowered to carry out targeted offensive operations against armed groups and successfully routed the forces of M23 in November 2013. But despite its success, the intervention brigade was never designed as a long-term solution. And four years later, eastern Congo remains a zone of violence. By tracing the performance of peacekeeping missions before and after India's ascension to the UNSC, this article demonstrates how **changes in the distribution of global power may affect**

peacekeeping performance. The on-going transformation of the international system is likely to have lasting impacts on the performance of future peacekeeping initiatives. Failing to consider the political motivations of troop-contributing countries inhibits our understanding of the determinants of peacekeeping success or failure. The rise of the BRICS countries in particular may require the P-3 to cede some control over the design of peacekeeping mandates, a position it is unlikely to accept. **As India's decision to withdraw its helicopters to protest the Libyan intervention demonstrates, the prior division between TCCs and those that pay for the missions in which the former cede any influence over the design of peacekeeping mandates is no longer stable.** Increasingly, **India and other rising powers not only demand a say in devising the mandates of peacekeeping operations, but also have the leverage to affect the**

performance of missions, for better or worse. Scholars that focus on the integration of rising powers into existing global arrangements generally conclude that the value of incorporation will trump any desire to break away completely. In other words, due to economic and political factors, they will be 'conservative' rather than 'radical reformers'.⁹⁴ Though several voices challenge this consensus,⁹⁵ India is often singled out as a constructive partner rather than a direct challenger to the existing international order. But an examination of India's behavior regarding peacekeeping raises doubts about whether this narrative will prevail. Focusing on peacekeeping provides a fuller picture of the challenges to the prevailing international order that will continue to arise as India, as well as other rising powers, demand a greater say in the decision making of international organizations. There are also implications for Indian foreign policy. Historically, Indian contributions to peacekeeping were praised as an integral demonstration of its support for the UN and the broader liberal order as well as serving to generate goodwill among African countries and beyond. For example, India's contributions have been recognized as an important argument in favor of granting the country a permanent seat on the UNSC. African countries have consistently supported India's ambitions. Even former US President Barack Obama cited the country's involvement in peacekeeping as a key reason for his support.⁹⁶ Yet, **by utilizing peacekeeping to compete with established powers, the country undercuts the ability of UN missions to fulfill their mandates. The victory of the Hindu nationalist BJP party in the 2014 national elections is likely to increase the politicization of**

India's role in African peacekeeping. The party calls for a muscular foreign policy in line with its belief that India deserves to be treated equally to other recognized powers, making it suspicious of extraneous peacekeeping commitments. Combined with the recent calls by the Trump administration to reduce United States support for the Congo mission, the net impact is likely to be increased suffering for Congolese civilians. The key lesson from India's behavior in Congo is that **the performance of peacekeeping missions, particularly in relation to civilian protection, is likely to be undermined when both rising and established powers treat peacekeeping only as a battleground through which to exert influence over the evolution of the international system**. For India, continuing to do so may undermine its own historic practice of using peacekeeping to generate goodwill in African countries, instead promoting animosity due to its weak performance on the ground.

A2 R2Ps

1: Nonunique; Russo '17 of the City University of New York writes that after the tragedy in Libya, Russia and China's views on R2Ps have prevented the UNSC from implementing any further R2P peacekeeping operations. For example, Russo continues that China has vetoed any resolution that mentions R2Ps.

2: Delink; Ganguly '16 of Indiana University Bloomington outlines that due to American pressure on India to conform to international norms and India's desire to establish itself in the international order, India has shifted to approval of R2Ps, approving R2P operations during the Libyan and Syrian crises.

3: Turn; India only rejects R2P operations because it doesn't have a permanent seat for two reasons:

A: Pai '13 of the Takshahila Institute argues that India doesn't want to concentrate power for the Permanent Members because India is not a permanent member. Giving India a permanent seat would incentivize India to support R2Ps because it has a say in its operations.

B: Ganguly '16 of Indiana University explains that India is afraid that approving R2P operations could have long-term repercussions on UN operations in Kashmir. However, the Khan evidence from our case indicates that India would be able to influence the UN over Kashmir, which removes the incentive for India to reject R2Ps.

4: Politicization DA; Mampilly '18 of the Journal of African Affairs writes that India has traditionally sought to weaponize its role in PKOs, leveraging its troops for political gain on the international stage. He continues that if India grows in power over peacekeepers, it will destabilize the boundary between funding and supplying peacekeepers, which harms peacekeeping operations by allowing India to coerce other nations for more power. For example, in the Congo, India withdrew its peacekeepers to force other nations to give it more power over peacekeeping, which led to the failure of the operation and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people.

Russo, Jenna. "The Politics of R2P and Inaction in Syria: U.S., Russian, and Chinese Responses." CUNY. 2017. <https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/ru/conf/2018/23012018/Russo.pdf> //RJ

Indeed, many have attributed the Security Council's stalemate over Syria as a reaction to the 2011 NATO operation in Libya, which marked the first time the Security Council authorized military intervention in the name of R2P without the consent of the host government. ⁹ The

way in which NATO toppled the Qaddafi regime was viewed by many as a gross mishandling of the mission's mandate, which was to be focused solely on the protection of civilians. Only three days after airstrikes began, China, Russia, and India began calling for an immediate ceasefire, claiming that NATO had abused the terms of its mandate and was instead pushing for regime change.¹⁰ **The perceived overstepping by NATO was confirmation to many, including Russia and China, that the West would use intervention in the name of R2P to achieve its own political agenda.** As described by Le Yuchang, the Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister, "Libya...has gone too far from the original intention of R2P...We should not forget the lessons we learned from Libya...It has been vividly described as 'a successful surgery with a dead patient' and it is patent that this kind of 'protection' is a failed and irresponsible one applying 'protect' as the cover of the brutal 'intervention.'" ¹¹

Russo, Jenna. "The Politics of R2P and Inaction in Syria: U.S., Russian, and Chinese Responses." CUNY. 2017. <https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/ru/conf/2018/23012018/Russo.pdf> //RJ

Nevertheless, **China has vetoed all Security Council resolutions invoking the third pillar of R2P, even non-military coercive measures, such as sanctions.** This voting pattern can largely be attributed to China's relationship with Russia in the Security Council. Though short of a formal alliance, **Russia and China have found mutual benefit from supporting one another, as they often have the most in common politically and ideologically.** This includes their mutual interest to shift away from the U.S.-led unipolar system, in which they view their partnership with one another as an important balance to U.S. hegemony. In addition, China has historically tended to take more of a low-profile approach to international affairs, preferring to let Russia take the lead and instead focus on matters related to its economic objectives.²¹ In this way, China has benefitted from Russia's vocal opposition to the West, which has spared it from being seen as a lone dissenter and has allowed China to maintain a delicate balance in its foreign affairs approach. While China is generally opposed to the notion of foreign interference in domestic issues, it is nevertheless concerned with cultivating a reputation as a responsible power. In addition, China's growing involvement in the global economy has led to a recognition that increased involvement in foreign affairs may be necessary to protect its own economic interests.²²

Ganguly, Sumit. "India and the Responsibility to Protect." Indiana University Bloomington. 2016. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0047117816659593?journalCode=ireb> //RJ

A congeries of factors led to the shift in the Indian position. Globally, India came under increased pressure from the United States to adopt a firm stance against the Assad regime. At a regional level, the levels of violence in Syria had increased and also India was loath to alienate the Gulf states. The consideration of the views of the Gulf states was far from trivial. Close to 6 million Indians are employed there and it is believed that Saudi Arabia had offered to make up India's lost energy imports from Iran as a consequence of US pressures.⁴³ Nevertheless, India worked diligently to try and weaken some of the more intrusive features of the resolution regarding possible sanctions, military intervention, and regime change.⁴⁴ It is also worth noting that **India chose to vote in favor of the resolution although some influential members of India's attentive public had expressed their opposition to a favorable vote.** Those opposed had highlighted the standard concern about the violation of national sovereignty (and its potential long-term repercussions for India in Kashmir), the danger of dragging the region into a wider sectarian conflict, and the possibility of finding some modus vivendi between the regime and the opposition forces.⁴⁵ India's position on R2P during the two crises and especially its third pillar is ably summed up in the following: **The Indian maneuvering during the Libyan and Syrian crises highlights a common dilemma it faces as an emerging power in the multipolar international system. From abstaining in the case of Libya to adopting a more accommodating approach on Syria, India's shift indicates that it is gradually adapting its traditional foreign policy stances to reflect the responsibilities and ambitions of a country intent on establishing itself in the contemporary international order,** although it retains serious concerns about RtoP's third pillar.⁴⁶

Pai, Nitin. "India and International Norms: R2P, Genocide Prevention, Human Rights, and Democracy." Takshashila Institution. Aug. 2013. <http://takshashila.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Nitin-Pai-R2P-Chapter-Preview.pdf> //RJ

The not-unfounded suspicion that freedom and democracy were and remain guises under which Western powers promote their interests is another major reason for India's reservations. To the extent that there is a divergence in interests between India and the West, these reservations become more acute. Furthermore, **given the handicap of not being a permanent member of the UNSC, India is prudent not to empower further a body of which it is not a**

member. New Delhi's reservations also arise from the risk that promoting international norms can backfire on India's own interests, especially if India needs the political support of other UN member-states or veto-wielding members of the UNSC. The experience of referring to the UN Pakistani aggression in J&K in 1947 and of pursuing nonproliferation negotiations in good faith, only to have lasting counterproductive outcomes, has made the Indian establishment suspicious of the motives of the great powers and generally defensive in its policy outlook.

[Simon **Chesterman**, 8-1-2018, "R2P and Humanitarian Intervention: From Apology to Utopia and Back Again by Simon Chesterman :: SSRN," No Publication, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3224116]//Rank

Despite clearly satisfying any notional threshold for action, the failure to respond meaningfully to the unfolding Syrian crisis can only partly be explained by Russian ties to Assad's regime. China joined with Russia in vetoing several resolutions, with Libya casting a shadow over these debates insofar as resolutions explicitly renouncing regime change as a goal had been used to achieve exactly that.⁴⁸ Perhaps of more interest for present purposes is that the states agitating for action tended not to use the language of R2P — either wary of raising the spectre of Libya or, perhaps, because that language tends to be used in support of foreign policy objectives rather than to create those objectives. If the latter is true, this would be consistent with the more cynical accounts of humanitarian intervention, which posit that the volume of a state's outrage at a humanitarian crisis varies directly with its willingness to act in response to that crisis. Much as triumphalism at R2P's influence in Libya tended to overstate the case, reports of the death of R2P after Syria were greatly exaggerated.⁴⁹ Subsequent years saw continued mixed blessings for R2P. Russia and China vetoed at least four resolutions with R2P language over Syria,⁵⁰ while the Council as a whole was manifestly unable to deal with the crises in Central African Republic, Yemen, and elsewhere. There were also some indications of a more principled opposition to R2P. Although China's former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Qian Qichen, was a commissioner on the body that came up with the concept of R2P, there are signs that it is rethinking its support. In a 2014 speech on the international rule of law, the current Foreign Minister Wang Yi highlighted some of the ongoing difficulties: 'Hegemonism, power politics and all forms of "new interventionism" pose a direct challenge to basic principles of international law including respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in other countries' internal affairs.'⁵¹ Though China's rise sometimes inspires fears that it will seek to establish an alternative model of international order — an 'Eastphalian' system,⁵² for example, opposed to the 'Westphalian' one that now dominates — such statements actually appear more consistent with a traditionally conservative approach to sovereignty that dominated for most of the twentieth century.⁵³ The preceding account is consistent with analysis of the foreign policy of China, Japan, and other states that continue to engage with the debates on R2P — with an eye, however, not to expanding its scope but containing its effects. Bae, Infanzon, and Abbe have termed this partial engagement 'active in not being active'.⁵⁴

Mampilly, Zachariah. "Shifts in global power and UN peacekeeping performance: India's rise and its impact on civilian protection in Africa." *Journal of African Affairs*. April 2018. <https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/117/467/171/4944475> //RJ

INDIA'S ASCENDANCE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR AFRICA has produced a substantial body of literature over the past decade.¹ Yet, few attempt to analyse how India's rise impacts local political contexts in Africa, as is more common with studies on China.² This article seeks to fill this lacuna. It argues that India's machinations within the United Nations Security

Council (UNSC), where it completed a two-year term in 2011–2012, negatively impacted the performance of the UN’s peacekeeping force in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (hereafter, Congo). Through process tracing, it links India’s behavior on the UNSC, where it has raised several major challenges to the overarching global peacekeeping infrastructure, to the failure of the peacekeeping mission in Congo. As India seeks greater influence at the international level, it will destabilize the boundary between the relatively weak and poor countries that traditionally contribute troops to peacekeeping missions, and the wealthy, powerful permanent members of the UNSC that pay for them, with detrimental effects for peacekeeping performance.

Mampilly, Zachariah. “Shifts in global power and UN peacekeeping performance: India’s rise and its impact on civilian protection in Africa.” *Journal of African Affairs*. April 2018.

<https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/117/467/171/4944475> //RJ

At the international level, the Indians pursued a distinct strategy. Specifically, they sought to leverage the country’s capacity to deploy aerial power, a key component of the missions in Sudan and Congo, to push for a greater voice within the UNSC around peacekeeping missions.⁷⁵ Towards this end, as the debate around Libya and R2P raged, India began threatening to withdraw its four remaining Mi-35 helicopters from MONUSCO (as well as helicopters delegated to the United Nations Mission in Sudan) when its LOA expired on 4 July 2011, unless TCCs were given a greater say in designing future peacekeeping missions, much to the chagrin of the P-3. One close observer of the UNSC noted that the debate was the ‘most acrimonious’ she had ever witnessed.⁷⁶ With few exceptions, notably South Africa and Ukraine, no other TCC has the capacity or the will to provide helicopters for extended periods, hence making the Indian threat a substantive one.⁷⁷ The government claimed that it faced a domestic need for the helicopters to fight its internal Maoist insurgency – a position bolstered by a damning Comptroller and Auditor General report that suggested that operational shortages faced by the Indian Army in its battle with domestic insurgents were directly linked to its participation in UN missions. Yet some perceived it as a power play by India to assert more influence over the direction of future peacekeeping mandates.⁷⁸ Leading voices have long called for leveraging India’s contributions to peacekeeping in order to ‘insist on adequate representation at the UN Headquarters and on decision-making mechanisms there’.⁷⁹ India’s Deputy Ambassador to the UN, Manjeev Singh Puri, also spoke openly about the need for ‘more consultation’ with key TCCs directly linking the provision of helicopters to the debate around the mandates of peacekeeping missions.⁸⁰ During India’s term as President, the UNSC was set to host an ‘Open Debate on Peacekeeping’ at the country’s urging, rendering its threat far more resonant.⁸¹ In addition, both Brazil and South Africa, India’s rising power allies through groupings such as IBSA and BRICS, were also rotating members of the council with similar misgivings about the Libyan intervention.⁸² With the IBSA countries in agreement, both China and Russia would feel compelled to agree.⁸³ Prior to the debate in August, India circulated a memo entitled, ‘Peacekeeping: taking stock and preparing for the future’. In the memo, India highlighted the importance of host government consent and R2P’s implications for state sovereignty, calling for peacekeeping missions to be treated as a ‘partnership’ between the UNSC, the General Assembly and the TCCs, rather than the preserve of the P-3. In addition, in a nod to the withering criticism it faced following the Kiwanja massacre, the memo repeated India’s long-standing concern that peacekeeping mandates continued to underestimate the resources necessary with TCCs bearing the bulk of the blame when missions failed.⁸⁴ Effects on peacekeeping in Congo The effect of this debate at the local level was to weaken the capacity of the Indian contingent, and hence the overall missions in Congo (and Sudan). Stung by a non-committal response from the P-3 to its reform initiatives, the Indian government reduced its material support for the Congo mission while undercutting the capacity of commanders on the ground to have operational control over the mission. The newly appointed MONUSCO Force Commander, Lt. Gen. Chander Prakash, began to withdraw support for foot patrols and other reforms designed to increase interaction between peacekeepers and civilians in late 2010.⁸⁵ In line with India’s complaints about the mismatch between mandates and resources, Prakash put forth the official Indian position that resource shortages undermined the capacity of the mission to adequately fulfill its mandate of civilian protection.⁸⁶ This was despite the fact that most of the reforms instigated by Indian commanders in North Kivu did not require additional financial outlays. Most importantly, despite agreeing to return its helicopters to North Kivu, the Indian government decided to replace the 8 Mi-25/35 attack helicopters and 9 Mi-17 transport helicopters deployed to the missions in Congo and Sudan with six light utility helicopters manufactured in India (Chetak and Cheetah). Beyond the net reduction in number, the Indian made helicopters have less military capacity than the Russian made Mi-8 and can only undertake surveillance, observation, search and rescue, medical and reconnaissance missions.⁸⁷ By late 2011, the situation became so dire that Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon drafted a letter to the UNSC warning that the lack of helicopters made the situation ‘critical’ and calling for members to ‘think outside the box’ to cover the shortfall.⁸⁸ Ukraine offered four Mi-24 attack helicopters in March 2012 and South Africa provided some transport helicopters to cover the shortfall, but neither

was willing to make the long-term commitment necessary to retain MONUSCO's aerial advantage. In March 2012, a group of ex-CNDP soldiers loyal to Bosco Ntaganda mutinied from the Congolese Army. Claiming that the government had failed to implement the 23 March 2009 peace agreement with the CNDP, the group adopted the moniker M23 for itself. Despite possessing significantly less military power than its predecessor, M23 quickly took control of large territories in North Kivu, including the towns of Bunagana on the Ugandan border and marching on to Rutshuru and Rugari despite the presence of an Indian contingent at the Kiwanja base.⁸⁹ **M23's advance led to a massive humanitarian crisis. Both the rebels and government forces were accused of war crimes, including the summary executions of civilians, mass rapes, and forced recruitment including children, leading to the displacement of hundreds of thousands.**⁹⁰ **The above evidence suggests that in its confrontation with M23, MONUSCO was hindered by the Indian decision to pull its helicopters and equally importantly, to cancel the reforms that improved relations between the mission and civilians.** As the International Crisis Group noted, the failure to prevent M23's rise was related to the 'militarily passive' behavior of MONUSCO and demonstrated the 'ineffectiveness' of the mission.⁹¹ Relations with Congolese civilians also declined and both local and national political leaders criticized the mission's performance, a dramatic turnaround from the praise showered on it following the post-Kiwanja reforms.⁹² In July 2012, following the recapture of several towns by joint FARDC/MONUSCO teams, a ceasefire was agreed between M23 and the Congolese government. Yet fighting continued intermittently, leading the UN to announce the creation of a 3,000-strong 'Intervention Brigade' with the explicit intention of strengthening MONUSCO's offensive abilities for a limited period of time.⁹³ In a first for a UN peacekeeping mission, the brigade, staffed primarily with contributors from other African nations, was empowered to carry out targeted offensive operations against armed groups and successfully routed the forces of M23 in November 2013. But despite its success, the intervention brigade was never designed as a long-term solution. And four years later, eastern Congo remains a zone of violence. By tracing the performance of peacekeeping missions before and after India's ascension to the UNSC, this article demonstrates how **changes in the distribution of global power may affect peacekeeping performance.** The on-going transformation of the international system is likely to have lasting impacts on the performance of future peacekeeping initiatives. Failing to consider the political motivations of troop-contributing countries inhibits our understanding of the determinants of peacekeeping success or failure. The rise of the BRICS countries in particular may require the P-3 to cede some control over the design of peacekeeping mandates, a position it is unlikely to accept. **As India's decision to withdraw its helicopters to protest the Libyan intervention demonstrates, the prior division between TCCs and those that pay for the missions in which the former cede any influence over the design of peacekeeping mandates is no longer stable.** Increasingly, **India and other rising powers not only demand a say in devising the mandates of peacekeeping operations, but also have the leverage to affect the performance of missions, for better or worse.** Scholars that focus on the integration of rising powers into existing global arrangements generally conclude that the value of incorporation will trump any desire to break away completely. In other words, due to economic and political factors, they will be 'conservative' rather than 'radical reformers'.⁹⁴ Though several voices challenge this consensus,⁹⁵ India is often singled out as a constructive partner rather than a direct challenger to the existing international order. But an examination of India's behavior regarding peacekeeping raises doubts about whether this narrative will prevail. Focusing on peacekeeping provides a fuller picture of the challenges to the prevailing international order that will continue to arise as India, as well as other rising powers, demand a greater say in the decision making of international organizations. There are also implications for Indian foreign policy. Historically, Indian contributions to peacekeeping were praised as an integral demonstration of its support for the UN and the broader liberal order as well as serving to generate goodwill among African countries and beyond. For example, India's contributions have been recognized as an important argument in favor of granting the country a permanent seat on the UNSC. African countries have consistently supported India's ambitions. Even former US President Barack Obama cited the country's involvement in peacekeeping as a key reason for his support.⁹⁶ Yet, **by utilizing peacekeeping to compete with established powers, the country undercuts the ability of UN missions to fulfill their mandates. The victory of the Hindu nationalist BJP party in the 2014 national elections is likely to increase the politicization of India's role in African peacekeeping.** The party calls for a muscular foreign policy in line with its belief that India deserves to be treated equally to other recognized powers, making it suspicious of extraneous peacekeeping commitments. Combined with the recent calls by the Trump administration to reduce United States support for the Congo mission, the net impact is likely to be increased suffering for Congolese civilians. The key lesson from India's behavior in Congo is that **the performance of peacekeeping missions, particularly in relation to civilian protection, is likely to be undermined when both rising and established powers treat peacekeeping only as a battleground through which to exert influence over the evolution of the international system.** For India, continuing to do so may undermine its own historic practice of using peacekeeping to generate goodwill in African countries, instead promoting animosity due to its weak performance on the ground.

A2 UNSC Collapse

A2 Representation

1: Delink; McDonald of the Council on Foreign Relations writes that the UNSC is not losing legitimacy in the status quo, with every nation still turning towards Security Council decisions and members prioritizing using the Council for decision-making.

2: Delink; Malhotra '15 of the Fair Observer writes that though India believes in representation and reform now, it will diverge from these interests once it attains a permanent seat in favor of protecting its own national interests. For example, prior to acquiring nuclear weapons, India was strongly opposed to nuclear proliferation, but after acquiring nuclear weapons, India changed its views on nuclear policy.

3: Delink; McDonald '10 of the Council on Foreign Relations continues that adding India to the Security Council wouldn't address issues with regional diversity because it would upset other regional rivals, who would continue to seek regional representation.

4: Turn; Macqueen '10 of the Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Affairs argues that granting India a permanent council would fracture non-aligned movements towards further representation on the UNSC, and would thus set back efforts towards equity. This is because Islamic nations that are opposed to India would be angered by its elevation to permanent status.

5: Turn; Chowdhary '15 of the Huffington Post argues that in the status quo, India is spearheading reform to remove the veto entirely from the UNSC in the General Assembly, already convincing 111 countries to support the reform, and with more pressure, India can push the reform to the necessary 128 votes to provide a $\frac{2}{3}$ majority to abolish the veto. However, Malhotra '15 of the Fair Observer writes that India would shift its position from supporting reform once it becomes a permanent member because it would want to protect its own interests. Abolishing the veto outweighs their case entirely-- Chowdhary '15 finalizes that the veto has entirely paralyzed UNSC action and will lead to the collapse of the Security Council. Indeed, Hosli '11 of Leiden University writes that abolishing the veto would lead to 27% more decisions than the status quo.

6: Turn; Chowdhary '15 of the Huffington Post continues that adding India would add an additional veto that would paralyze resolutions at the UNSC. Indeed, Hosli '11 of Leiden University writes that adding one more veto would reduce the number of resolutions passed by 18.5%.

Chowdhary, Abdul. Member of India's Parliament, 2015, Why India Should Seek Abolition Of UN Veto Rather Than Permanent Membership. Huffington Post, December 16, https://www.huffingtonpost.in/abdul-muheet-chowdhary/why-india-should-seek-abo_b_8809202.html //RJ

At the heart of all that is wrong with the Security Council, of all that has been responsible for its umpteen and endless failures across the world, there is no factor more responsible than the mechanism of the veto. It is this, more than any other aspect of the UNSC, that has made it into an inert and incapable body that watches helplessly as war, genocide, cultural destruction, unauthorised invasions and intra-state civil wars continue. It is [the veto mechanism], more than any other aspect of the UNSC, that has made it into an inert and incapable body... Broadly speaking, there are two main arguments against the veto: i) It is an anachronistic and undemocratic privilege. ii) It paralyses action, even when absolutely necessary. The undemocratic power of the veto has been opposed right since the UN's inception. There was outrage that any one of five nations would have the power to override the will of the majority of countries on earth. However despite such widespread opposition the veto was included as the choice for the member states was clear: either the Charter with the veto or no Charter at all. Senator Connally of the USA told the small states during the 1945 San Francisco conference, "You may, if you wish, go home from this Conference and say that you have defeated the veto. But what will be your answer when you are asked: 'Where is the Charter?' " The term "anachronistic" is also frequently used as an adjective because historically the veto (meaning "I forbid" in Latin) was used by the European monarchy to suppress emerging democratic institutions. King Charles I of England frequently used the veto to quash bills and even dissolve Parliament during the English Civil War. Closer to home, the Charter Act of 1786 as well as the Government of India Acts 1919 and 1935 gave the Governor General of India power to veto legislation. **The main flaw of the veto is its tendency to paralyse action**

even when it is desperately needed. In the case of Syria, between 2011 to 2015 Russia and China have jointly vetoed four proposals for sanctions against Bashar Al-Assad and a resolution that would have requested the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate crimes against humanity. Similarly from 2001 to 2006, the USA used the veto nine times to protect its ally Israel and block any action on Palestine. This has been part of a larger trend where conflicts involving the great powers have tended to be endlessly prolonged, resulting in unimaginable suffering for the people affected. During the Cold War (1947-1991), a staggering 68 and 61 vetoes were used by the USSR and USA respectively, leading to the worsening of then ongoing conflicts. **There is a very real danger that the expansion of the Security Council with the veto still in place will make it utterly dysfunctional. The proposal for increasing the number of seats along with regional representation will bring a far greater number of diverging interests to the table and if the veto is thrown into the mix it will be a lethal cocktail that will ensure the demise of the UN.**

One only has to look at the experience of the League of Nations to realise this. Under article 5 (1) of the Covenant of the League of Nations, decisions of the Council required the agreement of all the Members present. This made it virtually impossible for the 15-member Council to function and as a result it was unable to prevent World War II. **Extending the veto to new permanent members will ensure that the UN meets the same fate.** As second-class citizenship (permanent membership without veto) is unacceptable, the only remaining option is to press for the veto's abolition.

Chowdhary, Abdul, Member of India's Parliament, 2015, Why India Should Seek Abolition Of UN Veto Rather Than Permanent Membership. Huffington Post, December 16, https://www.huffingtonpost.in/abdul-muheet-chowdhary/why-india-should-seek-abo_b_8809202.html

It is for these reasons that **there is overwhelming support for abolishing or at least limiting the use of the veto.** Based on the submissions by member states, **approximately 109 nations, including the African Group and L.69, have outrightly called for its abolition. Eighteen countries, including the Netherlands, Vietnam, Peru and Ukraine, have called for its limited use** and restriction in the case of genocide and crimes against humanity. **Even France, a permanent member, has seen the light and has called for its limited use. Adding together the countries who support the veto's abolition/limited use results in a total of at least 111 member states. This is 17 short of the 2/3rds majority of 128 countries required for amending the UN Charter. It is here that India must put the bulk of its efforts. Abolishing the veto is a sine qua non for the efficacy, legitimacy and even survival of the UNSC.** Rather than hankering after the humiliating goal of second-class citizenship among the permanent members, **India can provide leadership to the rest of the world and focus on ensuring that the veto is abolished. With the right mobilisation, especially among the**

island states, the magic number of 128 can be reached. If accomplished, it would be an achievement whose ramifications cannot be fully imagined and India would have done the world a gargantuan favour. The removal of the veto will have one additional effect... the distinction between permanent and non-permanent members will become largely irrelevant. The P5 have made their opposition to any roll-back on the veto clear. However in the face of a united demand from the rest of the world, it will be very difficult for them to maintain such opposition. Even in the case of the decision to begin text-based negotiations, the only reason why the P5 did not oppose it was due to the overwhelming support the move had from the rest of the member states. Therefore India must seize this historic opportunity and press for the veto's abolition.

Hosli, Madeleine. "Squaring the Circle? Collective and Distributive Effects of United Nations Security Council Reform." Leiden University. 2011.

<https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11558-011-9101-1> //RJ

The proposal to abolish vetoes would strongly increase decision probability in the Council to more than 27%, given the vastly increased number of possible winning coalitions. Compared to the status quo, this amounts to a change in action probability of close to 950%. It would also reduce the a priori voting power of individual permanent members to just above 4% of the total. The balance of collective influence between permanent and non-permanent members, according to either index, would then be about 58% as compared to 42%. Hence, the latter proposal would generate the strongest re-balancing of power between the P-5 and non-permanent members, and would considerably increase decision probability within the Security Council.

Hosli, Madeleine. "Squaring the Circle? Collective and Distributive Effects of United Nations Security Council Reform." Leiden University. 2011.

<https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11558-011-9101-1> //RJ

According to the suggestions for reform incorporated into the report of the High-level panel, decision probability, at just above 2%, would decrease by 18.5% compared to the status quo. In distributive terms, a priori voting power would remain fairly constant, compared to the current situation (see Table 1), when assessed individually, for permanent members with veto power, permanent members without vetoes, and non-permanent members of the Security Council. Individual power is about 14% for permanent members with veto power according to the normalized Penrose-Banzhaf index, whereas new permanent members without vetoes and non-permanent members, in these scenarios, would each hold 1.7% of a priori power. Permanent members would lose little relative influence by increasing Security Council membership. Considered by groups, assessments are 68% (normalized Penrose-Banzhaf index) for the collectivity of permanent members and about 32% (normalized Penrose-Banzhaf index) for the non-permanent members evaluated as a group.

Macqueen, Benjamin. "Muslim States and Reform of the United Nations Security Council." Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies. 2010.

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/19370679.2010.12023161> //RJ

The regional wrangling over representation led to further spin-off plans for Council reforms from 2006. Disagreement within the AU over whether Nigeria, Egypt or South Africa represents the "genuine" African voice symbolized other divisions, particularly in Asia. Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, as Indonesia sternly opposed the likelihood of India's strong candidature for permanent membership under the G4 proposal, arguing that India's membership would lead to an unreasonable regional imbalance (United Nations, 2006).

Macqueen, Benjamin. "Muslim States and Reform of the United Nations Security Council." Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies. 2010.

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/19370679.2010.12023161> //RJ

The objections from Egypt, Indonesia and Pakistan are interesting to note as this proposal was the only plan by a Muslim member state that reached high level consideration. The plan was rejected by these key states as it did not go far enough in balancing the need for a Muslim voice with the competing interests of Muslim states. The plan ultimately came up against entrenched issues around securing a permanent seat for a Muslim state and deciding which one would be that representative state. Egypt pushed for the seat as representing both Muslim and African states, Pakistan staked its claim on representing Muslim states whilst balancing India's likely accession, while Indonesia based its claim on its status as the largest Muslim state and as a representative of South-East Asia. In this way, some have argued that suspending the Razali Plan served the interests of the Non-Aligned Movement more than its implementation. The promotion of particular developing countries to the Council, such as India, would have created irreparable damage to the unity of the movement (27-28). As for the Muslim states, this issue was less salient. Instead, inter-state competition seemed to

characterize the Muslim response. Egypt and Nigeria locked in over the single permanent seat for Africa (along with strong claims by South Africa, and to a lesser extent Senegal and Libya). Also contentious was the question of representing the Muslim world. It became more and more clear that the Muslim world did not act as a bloc but was riddled with inter-state rivalry and competition (Akbarzadeh & Conner, 2005). The reform plan brought to the fore divisions which had been hidden away by the rhetoric of Muslim unity.

Malhotra, Shairee. "India's Potential at the UN Security Council." Fair Observer. Sept. 2015.
https://www.fairobserver.com/region/central_south_asia/indias-potential-at-the-un-security-council-12050//RJ

Should it attain a permanent seat on the UNSC, the question is whether India would positively influence the ethos of the council, or if it would simply behave like the permanent members have historically done. The presence of more states, while rendering the Security Council more internationally representative, would not alter the fundamental structure and dysfunctional mechanism of the UNSC. The veto power thwarts the UN from tackling major international issues, while granting the permanent members disproportionate sway over its workings. Examining India's two-year presidency at the UNSC, which culminated at the end of 2012, reveals that Delhi has confidently amplified some pressing issues. On reforms, India's cooperation and outreach with African states reeks of pragmatic considerations to gain traction at the UN General Assembly for its permanent seat bid. A major victim of international terrorism itself, India persuaded the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee to adopt a document that emphasizes "zero tolerance" to terrorism. Furthermore, India has also pushed for efforts toward peacekeeping and anti-piracy, all of which augment the country's interests. Yet **through its unassertive stance** in 2011-12 over the Syrian crisis, **India lost an**

opportunity to underscore its democratic credentials and use its two-year term at the UNSC

positively, preferring to first and foremost maintain its autonomous decision-making. India's abstentions on the issue of Gaza—which the country has historically been supportive of—took place during a real peaking of Indo-Israeli ties, especially in the defense and military sectors. India's abstentions on human rights violations in several countries, including Sri Lanka, Ukraine and North Korea, are indicative of a selective approach to peace.

Let us also consider India's behavior in the global nuclear regime. Historically, India has been vociferously critical of the

international nuclear order, even famously coining the term "nuclear apartheid," and it has ardently proposed for global disarmament. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has encountered the most persistent resistance from India. The country refuses to sign on the grounds that it is an inherently "discriminatory" treaty, perpetuating the nuclear status of old powers while serving to inhibit new ones from emerging and preventing them from enhancing their security. However, since India conducted its nuclear tests in 1998—and the 2005 Indo-US nuclear deal, through which America bypassed the NPT to accommodate India in nuclear commerce—a major transformation has occurred in Delhi's attitude. As C. Raja Mohan states, **India's traditional and**

powerful stance on nuclear disarmament has moved to the less ambitious goal of nuclear restraint and arms control measures preventing the spread of nuclear technology. India's

normative opposition to the international nuclear order and the "discriminatory" regime

argument were suggestive of its relative power position in the international system and only lasted till Delhi developed nuclear weapons itself. Once this was achieved, India's attitude

altered from its traditional defiance of nuclear order to supporting it in countering states like

Iran, which Delhi voted against in 2005, 2006, 2009 and 2011 vis-à-vis its nuclear program. India, in consistency with the behavior of other powers on being part of the nuclear system, is

now inhibiting other states from becoming a part of it. NOT MUCH TO CHANGE The nature of international

relations, or IR, determines that **India's behavior will be consistent with the traditional behavior of the Security Council's permanent members, with strategic interests trumping institutional**

imperatives. While during the Cold War era, India attempted to make its presence relevant in the international realm by

pragmatically resorting to normative vocabulary, these were typical of the instruments employed by a weak state to secure its interests in the global hierarchy. **India is no longer attempting to set fresh criteria and establish**

alternative universalities in reshaping the world. Instead, in tandem with altering global

realities and its emergence as a major player, it is focusing on playing the game of realpolitik.

Institutions are not a mitigating factor where the interests of great powers are threatened, and they are only pertinent when there is no conflict between these. **Like the permanent members, India is satisfying its political interests first,**

while refusing to act in the face of massive brutality. As Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul assert, there is a "behavioral requirement of great power status: a great power is and becomes what a great power does." In the words of former Indian Prime Minister

Manmohan Singh: "We are living in a world of unequal power, and we have to use the available international system to promote our interests." While Singh stated this in the context of widening India's development options, there is no reason why the country would

not do exactly that if it gains a permanent seat on the UNSC. This would allow India to more substantially articulate and pursue its foreign policy choices and interests. In accordance with its rise in the international community, India is increasingly being expected

to take a stance on global issues. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi's enthusiastic and innovative emphasis on foreign policy, the likelihood is that India will do so—but only to secure and preserve its national interests, rather than any noble cause of maintaining

world peace. **India, or any other UNSC contender, cannot alter the fundamental interest and power that is based IR. It is unlikely that India will add some great “value” to the effectiveness of the Security Council. Ultimately, IR is dominated by securing a country’s self-interest, and India being a rational actor in the international system will predictably behave and operate no differently than other great powers.**

McDonald, Kara. “UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S. Interests.” Council on Foreign Relations. 2010.

[https://books.google.com/books?id=G5X4DaVZXdsC&pg=PA7&lpg=PA7&dq=%22Second,+designating+new+permanent+members+will+not+likely+sate+demand+for+greater+regional+representation.+Indeed,+opposition+to+the+main+aspirants+\(Brazil,+Germany,+India,+and+Japan\)+is+strongest+from+their+regional+rivals+\(Argentina,+Mexico,+Italy,+Pakistan,+and+South+Korea\).+Some+propose+that+each+regional+bloc+should+determine+its+own+permanent+representative,+but+such+decisions+are+more+properly+left+to+the+entire+world+body.+Regional+selection+could+result+in+the+seating+of+unexpected,+possibly+compromising+candidates.+Should+the+United+States+accept+Cuba+or+Venezuela+as+a+permanent+UNSC+member+if,+by+some+bizarre+twist+in+backroom+negotiations,+Brazil+or+Mexico+cannot+secure+Latin+American+support?+%22&source=bl&ots=4PAAodKR9n&sig=ACfU3U3YqY_roVPbv2PT78YKHfzVsYYpg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi4c-](https://books.google.com/books?id=G5X4DaVZXdsC&pg=PA7&lpg=PA7&dq=%22Second,+designating+new+permanent+members+will+not+likely+sate+demand+for+greater+regional+representation.+Indeed,+opposition+to+the+main+aspirants+(Brazil,+Germany,+India,+and+Japan)+is+strongest+from+their+regional+rivals+(Argentina,+Mexico,+Italy,+Pakistan,+and+South+Korea).+Some+propose+that+each+regional+bloc+should+determine+its+own+permanent+representative,+but+such+decisions+are+more+properly+left+to+the+entire+world+body.+Regional+selection+could+result+in+the+seating+of+unexpected,+possibly+compromising+candidates.+Should+the+United+States+accept+Cuba+or+Venezuela+as+a+permanent+UNSC+member+if,+by+some+bizarre+twist+in+backroom+negotiations,+Brazil+or+Mexico+cannot+secure+Latin+American+support?+%22&source=bl&ots=4PAAodKR9n&sig=ACfU3U3YqY_roVPbv2PT78YKHfzVsYYpg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi4c-wvezhAhXkjQKHYLTAEYQ6AEwAHoECAAQAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false)

[wvezhAhXkjQKHYLTAEYQ6AEwAHoECAAQAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=G5X4DaVZXdsC&pg=PA7&lpg=PA7&dq=%22Second,+designating+new+permanent+members+will+not+likely+sate+demand+for+greater+regional+representation.+Indeed,+opposition+to+the+main+aspirants+(Brazil,+Germany,+India,+and+Japan)+is+strongest+from+their+regional+rivals+(Argentina,+Mexico,+Italy,+Pakistan,+and+South+Korea).+Some+propose+that+each+regional+bloc+should+determine+its+own+permanent+representative,+but+such+decisions+are+more+properly+left+to+the+entire+world+body.+Regional+selection+could+result+in+the+seating+of+unexpected,+possibly+compromising+candidates.+Should+the+United+States+accept+Cuba+or+Venezuela+as+a+permanent+UNSC+member+if,+by+some+bizarre+twist+in+backroom+negotiations,+Brazil+or+Mexico+cannot+secure+Latin+American+support?+%22&source=bl&ots=4PAAodKR9n&sig=ACfU3U3YqY_roVPbv2PT78YKHfzVsYYpg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi4c-wvezhAhXkjQKHYLTAEYQ6AEwAHoECAAQAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false) //RJ

Such talking points pack a political punch in the developing world. But these arguments confront two inconvenient truths. First, regional representation and parity were never the basis for designating the UNSC’s permanent members, which were chosen primarily as guarantors of world peace. The same should be true, presumably, of any additional permanent seats. The charter suggests that the candidacies of emerging powers such as Brazil or India (as well as established ones like Germany and Japan) should be weighed not on their role as regional leaders, but on their ability to help safeguard international peace. The place to address regional balance is clearly in the UNSC’s elected seats, since

Article 23 of the UN Charter explicitly mentions “equitable geo- graphic distribution” as a secondary consideration. **Second, designating new permanent members will not likely sate demands for greater regional representation. Indeed, opposition to the main aspirants (Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan) is strongest from their regional rivals (Argentina, Mexico, Italy, Pakistan, and South Korea).** Some propose that each regional bloc should determine its own permanent representative, but such decisions are more properly left to the entire world body. Regional selection could result in the seating of unexpected, possibly compromising candidates. Should the United States accept Cuba or Venezuela as a permanent UNSC member if, by some bizarre twist in backroom negotiations, Brazil or Mexico cannot secure Latin American support?

McDonald, Kara. “UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S. Interests.” Council on Foreign Relations. 2010.

[https://books.google.com/books?id=G5X4DaVZXdsC&pg=PA7&lpg=PA7&dq=%22Second,+designating+new+permanent+members+will+not+likely+sate+demand+for+greater+regional+representation.+Indeed,+opposition+to+the+main+aspirants+\(Brazil,+Germany,+India,+and+Japan\)+is+strongest+from+their+regional+rivals+\(Argentina,+Mexico,+Italy,+Pakistan,+and+South+Korea\).+Some+propose+that+each+regional+bloc+should+determine+its+own+permanent+representative,+but+such+decisions+are+more+properly+left+to+the+entire+world+body.+Regional+selection+could+result+in+the+seating+of+unexpected,+possibly+compromising+candidates.+Should+the+United+States+accept+Cuba+or+Venezuela+as+a+permanent+UNSC+member+if,+by+some+bizarre+twist+in+backroom+negotiations,+Brazil+or+Mexico+cannot+secure+Latin+American+support?+%22&source=bl&ots=4PAAodKR9n&sig=ACfU3U3YqY_roVPbv2PT78YKHfzVsYYpg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi4c-](https://books.google.com/books?id=G5X4DaVZXdsC&pg=PA7&lpg=PA7&dq=%22Second,+designating+new+permanent+members+will+not+likely+sate+demand+for+greater+regional+representation.+Indeed,+opposition+to+the+main+aspirants+(Brazil,+Germany,+India,+and+Japan)+is+strongest+from+their+regional+rivals+(Argentina,+Mexico,+Italy,+Pakistan,+and+South+Korea).+Some+propose+that+each+regional+bloc+should+determine+its+own+permanent+representative,+but+such+decisions+are+more+properly+left+to+the+entire+world+body.+Regional+selection+could+result+in+the+seating+of+unexpected,+possibly+compromising+candidates.+Should+the+United+States+accept+Cuba+or+Venezuela+as+a+permanent+UNSC+member+if,+by+some+bizarre+twist+in+backroom+negotiations,+Brazil+or+Mexico+cannot+secure+Latin+American+support?+%22&source=bl&ots=4PAAodKR9n&sig=ACfU3U3YqY_roVPbv2PT78YKHfzVsYYpg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi4c-wvezhAhXkjQKHYLTAEYQ6AEwAHoECAAQAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false)

[wvezhAhXkjQKHYLTAEYQ6AEwAHoECAAQAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=G5X4DaVZXdsC&pg=PA7&lpg=PA7&dq=%22Second,+designating+new+permanent+members+will+not+likely+sate+demand+for+greater+regional+representation.+Indeed,+opposition+to+the+main+aspirants+(Brazil,+Germany,+India,+and+Japan)+is+strongest+from+their+regional+rivals+(Argentina,+Mexico,+Italy,+Pakistan,+and+South+Korea).+Some+propose+that+each+regional+bloc+should+determine+its+own+permanent+representative,+but+such+decisions+are+more+properly+left+to+the+entire+world+body.+Regional+selection+could+result+in+the+seating+of+unexpected,+possibly+compromising+candidates.+Should+the+United+States+accept+Cuba+or+Venezuela+as+a+permanent+UNSC+member+if,+by+some+bizarre+twist+in+backroom+negotiations,+Brazil+or+Mexico+cannot+secure+Latin+American+support?+%22&source=bl&ots=4PAAodKR9n&sig=ACfU3U3YqY_roVPbv2PT78YKHfzVsYYpg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi4c-wvezhAhXkjQKHYLTAEYQ6AEwAHoECAAQAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false) //RJ

The UNSC's relevance is not declining; it remains the premier multilateral institution for matters of international security. To be sure, UN member states exploit a range of frameworks—including regional organizations, ad hoc coalitions, and interest-based partnerships—to advance their national and collective security. Examples range from the African Union to the Six Party Talks on North Korea. But **in the last five years, the UNSC has spent comparatively less time rubber-stamping diplomatic agreements made outside its chambers and more time forging agreements within its own ranks.** UNSC Resolution 1701 to end the Lebanon war, the P5+ Germany negotiations on Iran, and the UNSC’s sanctions against North Korea are all examples. **The UNSC’s continued relevance is also illustrated by states’ desire to serve on it.** Every October, the UNGA is filled to capacity when delegations elect the new rotating UNSC members amid an orgy of vote-buying. **Even countries that make a profession of attacking the UNSC’s credibility nonetheless spend millions trying to gain a seat—suggesting that, at a minimum, it retains prestige.**

Next is the jackpot question of veto power, which is one of the major reasons for these persistent efforts made by G-4 countries, especially India, to gain a permanent UNSC seat. Given India’s policy of non-alignment in the past, veto power might complicate things further. A close look at voting patterns reveals that Russia and China are mostly on one side, while NATO partners are on the other. Given the strategic partnership that India maintains with each of these countries, taking a stance would not only adversely affect India’s relationship with them,

but would also give a severe blow to India's non-alignment stance. Hence, strained relations with these nations could lead to a possibility of exposing India to increased international pressure on issues like the Kashmir dispute, human rights abuse in the north east, and climate change reform.

A2 IMF Loans

1: Turn; Dreher '16 of the World Bank writes that because the aid given to nations is for geopolitical reasons, countries actually experience slower economic growth when they are on the Security Council overall. That's because this geopolitical aid comes in the form of specific aid packages that increase the risk of civil conflict and reduce necessary emergency aid.

2: Delink; Sharma '18 of the Outlook writes that India has refused aid historically because it needs to protect its image as an emerging market attractive to investors.

Dreher, Axel. "Geopolitics, Aid, and Growth: The Impact of UN Security Council Membership on the Effectiveness of Aid." World Bank. 2016. <http://twin.sci-hub.tw/6081/20c8bf6c5c3501b8b05963e9496a6aee/dreher2016.pdf#page=25>

Based on a sample of 54 countries over the 1974–2009 period, we find that the effect of aid on growth is reduced by UNSC membership (see section 4). This result holds when we restrict the sample to Africa, which follows the strictest norm of rotation on the UNSC and thus where UNSC membership can most reliably be regarded as exogenous (Vreeland and Dreher 2014) and is robust to a battery of other tests. Our results have at least two important implications. First, **to the extent that aid is given for geostrategic reasons, it should not be considered "development" aid. It might be effective in achieving the donors' geostrategic objectives, but it is less effective than other aid in promoting developmental outcomes such as growth.** Including such political aid in the category of development aid is likely to blur the potentially measurable effects of "true" development aid and is likely to add to frustration in the populations of donor countries granting the aid, ultimately reducing even those parts of aid that could be effective in raising growth. The second implication of our results concerns the instrumental variables scholars use to identify the effect of aid on growth. A large number of studies base their analysis on instruments that proxy the geopolitical importance of a recipient country to the donor, implicitly or explicitly generalizing the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) to be representative of all aid, rather than political aid exclusively.⁵ If geopolitical aid or aid given to recipients with political leverage more generally is less effective than other aid, the literature using political connections as instruments would not provide evidence of the ineffectiveness of overall aid, but rather of aid given to politically important countries. Their estimates would represent a lower bound for the effects of overall aid, which could explain the lack of a positive effect of aid on growth in a large number of studies (e.g., Rajan and Subramanian 2008). Figure 4 shows mean yearly growth rates of per capita GDP for different lags of UNSC membership. The first bar displays the growth rates for countries that are not members of the UNSC. The other bars show the growth rates for different lags of UNSC membership: Growth during UNSC membership, one period before, one period later, two periods later, and three periods later. The figure shows that **compared to countries not on the UNSC, temporary members subsequently experience lower growth rates.**¹³ As expected, growth is lowest two periods after UNSC membership. Also note that **growth rates are substantially higher one further period later** (table 1). This pattern is in line with our hypothesis that **the increased aid committed in period (t2) during temporary UNSC membership** (figure 2), which is disbursed in large parts in period (t1) (figure 3), **has an adverse effect on how aid affects growth in period (t)** (figure 4). While these descriptive statistics imply no causality, their pattern lends support to our story. Table 1 shows the main results, covering the 1974–2009 period. All data are averaged over four years. The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita; aid is measured as net Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a percentage of GDP.²² When we do not account for diminishing returns to aid by including aid squared, the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant at the five-percent level (column 1). When we include aid squared, the interaction becomes significant at the one-percent level (column 2).²³ According to column 2, for any increase in DAid, the effectiveness of this change in aid disbursements decreases with the share of the period the recipient country has spent on the UNSC two periods before (i.e., when the aid has been committed). The causal effect of a one percentage point increase in aid as a percentage of GDP on yearly economic growth is 0.64 percentage

points higher if the recipient has not served on the UNSC compared to if it has served two years (i.e., 1/2 of the four-year period). Compared to the average growth rate of about 1.34 percentage points in our sample, this is a substantial reduction of almost half the average growth rate. The results thus support our hypothesis that aid committed during times of short-term political importance is indeed less effective. Figure 5 shows the marginal effects for the model of column 2 and the corresponding 90%-confidence intervals. The marginal effect of changes in aid on changes in growth depends on the magnitude of the change in aid and on membership on the UNSC. As the marginal effects depend on DAid and D(Aid2), any quantitative interpretation obviously depends on whether the coefficients of these variables are estimated consistently, and thus on the identifying assumptions in Clemens et al. (2012). As can be seen, the effect declines for higher values of DAid, reflecting diminishing returns to aid.²⁴ The aid-growth relationship is positive for countries that have not served on the UNSC when aid has been committed,²⁵ while being largely insignificant for countries that have served one year, and significantly negative for those who served two years.

For a country receiving the median amount of aid (1.59 percent of GDP) the estimated effect of this aid on growth is 0.72 when the country has not served on the UNSC, but - 0.21 when the country has served one year on the UNSC, and - 0.30 when it has served two years. The negative consequences of the donors' political motivations are thus not only statistically but also economically

significant. We further test the robustness of our results in a number of ways. First, we replace the share of years a country has served on the UNSC with a binary indicator variable for a country's presence on the UNSC. Second, we first-difference the UNSC variable rather than including it in levels. Third, we lag all control variables by one period rather than including them contemporaneously. Fourth, we employ early-impact aid as defined in Clemens et al. (2012) instead of all aid. Fifth, in light of the identifying assumptions discussed above, we include a number of additional variables (as changes between (t2) and (t1)) which could potentially induce omitted variables bias. Most importantly, we control for changes in the institutional environment by including the International Country Risk Guide's (ICRG) variables measuring Bureaucracy Quality, Corruption, Democratic Accountability, Ethnic Tensions, External Conflict, Government Stability, Internal Conflict, Investment Profile, Law & Order, Military in Politics, Political Risk Rating, and Religious Tensions. One at the time, we also include imports of goods and services (as a share of GDP), trade (as a share of GDP), Foreign Direct Investment inflows (as a share of GDP), the recipient country's voting alignment with the United States in the UN General Assembly, and debt service (as share of GNI). Controlling for these additional influences considerably reduces any remaining risk of omitted variable bias. As our final test for robustness, we employ Clemens et al.'s (2012) permutations of Rajan and Subramanian (2008) instead of those of Burnside and Dollar (2000).²⁷ The results are shown in table 3. They show that our main result is unaffected by all of these additions. The robustness of our results to the inclusion of a large number of variables increases our confidence that the main specification above does not violate the identifying assumptions, so that the estimates above are consistent. Finally, we turn to explanations for our results. As we have discussed in Section 2, the previous literature identified a number of transmission channels for individual donors. Dreher et al. (2013) show that **political motives reduce the quality of World Bank projects**. Also for the World Bank, Kilby (2015) reports that **political allies are allowed to start projects with inferior preparation**. Stone (2008) finds that **political favoritism undermines the credibility of IMF conditionality**. In order to test these transmission channels in our broad sample of donors, we would require data on aid conditionality and compliance with these conditions, project success, and time and resources invested in project preparation. These data do not exist for a broad sample of donors. Data exist, however, on different aid modalities and the sectoral composition of aid across recipient countries that are on the UNSC and those that are not. Previous research argues that the effectiveness of aid depends on the sector the aid is given to and the modalities through which it is delivered (Bjørnskov 2013). To the extent that UNSC membership affects composition and modalities,²⁸ the effectiveness of aid would change. Table S6.1 in appendix S6 reports the amount of aid committed to individual sectors while countries have been temporary members of the UNSC compared to other times (in constant million 2011 US\$), for the 1973–2011 period. There are substantial differences between those countries on the UNSC and the rest. When we perform a simple t-test for equality of a certain category's share in total aid committed to UNSC members and nonmembers we find that the share increases significantly in 7 of the 26 sectors, and decreases in one sector. **For example, UNSC members receive larger general budget support (b46%), more aid for other social infrastructure (b105%), more food aid (b59%), but less emergency aid (39%).** According to Nunn and Qian (2013), **US food aid increases the risk of civil conflict.**

Bjørnskov (2013) shows that a category of aid that includes emergency aid increases growth. **Both increases in food aid and reductions in emergency aid are thus likely to reduce the effectiveness of aid.**

Sharma, Pranay. "Manmohan, Not Modi, Govt Put In Place Policy Of Refusing Foreign Aid During Natural Disasters." The Outlook. Aug. 2018.

<https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/analysis-why-modi-govts-decision-to-refuse-foreign-donations-for-kerala-floods-i/315418> //TP

The decision to refuse financial aid from outside evolved at a time when India was offering itself as an attractive market and investment destination to foreign investors. In addition, it was also keenly campaigning among member countries for reforms in the United Nations and enlisting support for its place as a permanent member in the UN Security Council. Moreover, much of the world was also looking at India as an emerging global player and were also preparing for the historic nuclear deal for the Indo-United States nuclear deal to accept it as a de facto nuclear weapons power.

“India’s emerging status at the international stage certainly played an important role in the change in the government’s policy on seeking foreign financial and other assistance to deal with natural disasters in the country,” admits Kanwal Sibal, who had succeeded Mansingh as foreign secretary. Much of this also has with the perception that countries have about India. “Earlier foreign agencies coming in with their sniffer dogs would get a lot of publicity every time they rescued 10 people. But at the same time when our workers and agencies rescued 10,000 people they would often go unnoticed,” he adds. **That image and perception about India both within the country and to the outside world has undergone a significant change over the past decade or so. Today, not only is India regarded as one of the fastest emerging economies, its capabilities in other areas are also taken note of, especially when it sends team to help other countries during disasters.**

A2 NEG

A2 Indo-Pak

A2 More Indian Aggression

1: Delink; MacDonald '19 of Politico writes that India's historic policy of strategic restraint has ended because Modi cannot tolerate consistent attacks by Pakistan-based militant groups. Indeed, Kim '12 of Hankuk University corroborates that India cannot hold its stance of quiet diplomacy to acquire a UNSC seat because it cannot afford to get pushed around in the region.

2: Terrorism DA: Smith '19 of the Diplomat writes that India has become increasingly more aggressive against Pakistan because the country as a whole has become significantly more nationalist, and India's tolerance towards state-sponsored terror attacks from Pakistan is diminishing rapidly. Ayoob '19 of the National Interest writes that Indian retaliation to a Pakistani terror attack is inevitable. Overall, Dalton '19 of the Dawn Herald writes that India and Pakistan are one terror attack away from war. Thus, Smith continues that Pakistan must be persuaded through increased international pressure to end backing of terror groups. Fortunately, giving India a permanent seat would enable India to push for pressure against Pakistan to end support of terror.

3: Delink; Stratfor '18 writes that India and Pakistan will inevitably have a conflict within the next decade.

4: Delink; Garrie '19 of Eurasia Future writes that India's actions in the Pakistani conflict has alienated its supporters for an UNSC seat and has pushed back reform to expand the UNSC for a decade as a result. This indicates that India clearly does not care about the UNSC seat relative to Kashmir.

MacDonald, Myra. "India and Pakistan Enter A New, Dangerous Era." Politico. Feb. 2019.
<https://www.politico.eu/article/india-and-pakistan-enter-a-new-dangerous-era-conflict-kashmir/> //RJ

Somewhat unexpectedly, the pattern established through these crises created a precarious equilibrium. India's policy of what became known as "strategic restraint" worked to its advantage. It allowed it to focus on growing its economy while gaining clout on the world stage. Pakistan as a country suffered. But the ongoing low-level conflict with India allowed Pakistan's military to maintain its position as the pre-eminent power domestically. It is that equilibrium which has now disappeared. India, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has clearly decided that the gains of strategic restraint are no longer worth the pain of tolerating sporadic attacks by Pakistan-based militant groups. Pakistan in turn can no longer assume its nuclear weapons protect it from Indian retaliation. In that sense, both countries are rewriting their own rules and assumptions at the same time.

Smith, Jeff. "India and Pakistan: Living on Borrowed Time." The Diplomat. Mar. 2019.
<https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/india-and-pakistan-living-on-borrowed-time/> //RJ

If there's one conclusion to draw from the recent crisis in India-Pakistan relations it's this: **We've been living on borrowed time.** The latest episode in their longstanding dispute over Kashmir confirms that we have entered a new, more volatile chapter in bilateral relations, one in which **the world can no longer expect India to respond with unquestioned restraint to future provocations from its neighbor.** To avoid a disastrous escalation in the future, the world will have to redouble its efforts to end the scourge of state-sponsored terrorism in Pakistan. On February 14, Indian forces suffered the deadliest-ever single attack in Kashmir, the territory disputed by the nuclear-armed antagonists since Partition in 1947. Delhi's response was unprecedented. On February 26, for the first time this century, Indian fighter jets struck deep inside Pakistani territory, targeting camps operated by the notorious terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The group, perpetrator of several prior attacks in India, had claimed responsibility for the bombing that killed over 40 Indian soldiers. The following day, the Pakistani military answered with its own airstrike in Indian-controlled Kashmir, prompting a dogfight between the two air forces that resulted in the downing of one aircraft from each side and threats of nuclear escalation. It appears cooler heads have prevailed since the pilot of the downed Indian aircraft was returned on March 1st. For now, a larger conflict has likely been averted, though there are reports of more commonplace skirmishes along the Line of Control. Both sides were given just enough space to declare victory and shape their own narratives. However, **this should come as little relief to the rest of the world, which must begin preparing for a new, more volatile dynamic between the two countries.** Critical details of the exchange remain obscured in the fog of war. Did the Indian airstrike actually hit the JeM compounds and were there any casualties? What happened to the pilot of the downed Pakistani jet? Was Pakistan's security establishment involved in the plotting and timing of the attack? **The long-term trends are more discernible.** Kashmir has been in a near perpetual state of conflict since a Pakistan-backed insurgency erupted in earnest 30 years ago. Since then, tens of thousands of lives have been lost in clashes and terrorist attacks. In the process, **the world has been lulled to complacency by a repetitive but unsustainable cycle.** It has become almost routine: **India suffers an attack in Kashmir perpetrated from or backed by Pakistan. The world raises the prospect of nuclear war and implores India to demonstrate restraint. Delhi complies. Islamabad is cosmetically reprimanded by the international community while India is applauded as the more mature and responsible party. Tensions cool until the cycle repeats itself. That cycle came to an end in 2016.** That year, heavily armed, Pakistani-backed militants conducted one of the deadliest attacks in Kashmir in two decades, killing 18 Indian soldiers at army base in Uri. The Indian response was different this time: a "surgical strike" on targets across the Line of Control. This set a new precedent, one that **the Modi government felt it could not walk back from this February** — not in response to an even deadlier terror attack and not in an election year. But **this isn't really about Indian elections. It's about India's evolution. The Narendra Modi-led government is more confident and more nationalist in character, but so is the Indian public at large.** Perhaps that should be expected from a country of India's history and proportions now hitting its geopolitical stride, ranking first in military imports, second in population, fifth in military spending, and sixth in Gross Domestic Product (or third when adjusted for purchasing power parity). Fortunately, unlike China, India's rise has not been accompanied by a proportional surge in external assertiveness. It has no major historical grievances in desperate need of redress, no major territorial ambitions beyond Kashmir, no authoritarian model to export to aspiring dictators, and no demonstrated animosity toward the rules-based order from which it has benefited tremendously. Critically, its foreign policy priorities aren't driven by the insecurities of an autocratic elite terrified of losing power. This is at least in part why the U.S. has invested so much time and energy into facilitating India's rise as a responsible democratic partner and a net provider of security and public goods in the Indian Ocean. There's a flipside: **The tolerance of the Indian government and the Indian public for absorbing successive waves of state-sponsored terror attacks has declined precipitously.** To be sure, America's tolerance for Pakistan's "double game" has declined too. Building frustration with Islamabad coalesced in the Trump administration's decision to suspend the vast majority of military aid to Pakistan in 2017. It has also worked with partners to have Pakistan "grey-listed" at the international terrorist finance watchdog, the Financial Action Task Force. Many on Capitol Hill would like to see an even more aggressive pressure campaign. Turning its back on the network of terror groups won't be easy, but Pakistan must confront an existential question: How has support for these fanatical groups actually helped Pakistan or advanced its national interest? It has alienated entire generations of Indians and Afghans, soured Pakistan's lucrative relationship with the U.S., and turned the international diplomatic and business communities against it. Tragically, arguably the greatest victims of Pakistan's double game have been its own people. Some 40,000 have been killed by domestic jihadi groups over the past 15 years. Women, homosexuals, and minority religious groups have fared the worst, but no Pakistani has been spared, including the military and ISI. Many educated Pakistanis, including some in the civilian

leadership, understand their country is charting a disastrous course. But they are powerless in the shadow of Pakistan's all-powerful military, fearful of the wrath of religious zealots, and lack support from a broader public inundated with conspiracy theories and military-backed propaganda that blames India, Israel, and the U.S. for all of Pakistan's ills. In theory the solution is simple: Pakistan's security establishment must be convinced the cost for using terrorism as an instrument of state policy outweighs the benefits. Showing Pakistan the tremendous economic and diplomatic benefits it would accrue from abandoning this misguided adventure is the easy part. Getting the U.S. government and international community to do a much more effective job imposing costs has proved more challenging. They will have to devote more time, energy, and diplomatic capital to the endeavor, including pressuring Pakistan's remaining patrons, China and Saudi Arabia, to help break the destructive cycle. It's a painful pill to swallow but one necessary to break an even deadlier fever.

Perkovich, George. "How India Can Motivate Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism." Carnegie Endowment. July 2016. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/07/28/how-india-can-motivate-pakistan-to-prevent-cross-border-terrorism-pub-64203> //RJ

From these diplomatic and economic effects, **Indian strategists can find the seeds of a strategy for non-violent "compellence": the martialing of state diplomatic, economic, and social resources to build and sustain international pressure on Pakistan to force changes in its behavior.** Through an anti-terrorism social media campaign that broadcasts the horrors of the terrorist attacks to the world, India could mobilize international public opinion against the actions of the Pakistani state. **To impose further political isolation, India could convince its partners to postpone bilateral meetings with Pakistan or delay visa processing.** In more tangible economic terms, India and its partners could seek to raise the prominence of anti-terrorism issues at the IMF to condition further financing for Pakistan on cracking down on terrorist groups that attack other states. Furthermore, **India could seek an advance commitment from the United States and other major powers to cut security assistance to Pakistan after another terrorist attack in India,** or to cease doing business with Pakistan Army-owned businesses. **Such targeted penalties would strike directly at the coffers of the Pakistan Army.** The punitive benefits of this strategy may be less direct than military action, but they also come with far lower risks of an escalating conflict that could result in damage to India far greater than the instigating event. **With a clear comparative advantage over Pakistan in economic clout and soft power, India can utilize these tools to isolate Pakistan internationally, which could in turn motivate meaningful counterterrorism action within Pakistan.**

Dalton, Toby. "Is a Pakistan-India War Just One Terrorist Attack Away?" The Dawn Herald. Mar. 2019. <https://herald.dawn.com/news/1153648> //RJ

At the risk of inviting further charges of bias for attempting balanced analysis, we are concerned that **the continued violence across the LoC, the lack of progress in redressing the suffering and the interests of Kashmiri Muslims and the absence of sustained serious diplomacy between India and Pakistan, leave the two countries one high-casualty terrorist attack away from war.** We are not naïve. **It is most likely that Indian and Pakistani leaders will continue with the same policies and tactics, seeking to score points internationally, letting the militaries punish each other around the LoC and using covert or sub-conventional means to destabilise the other side and sow violence where possible.**

Kim, Chan-Wahn. "India's quiet diplomacy seeking a permanent UN Security Council seat." Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. 2012.

https://www.posri.re.kr/files/file_pdf/71/273/2881/71_273_2881_file_pdf_1201-06_03_Issue.pdf //RJ

There is a possibility that **India will soon face the dilemma of whether to continue or abandon its quiet diplomacy**. For India to be recognized as a responsible major power, it must express opinions on international issues. If India fails to comply with the demands of the international community, there will be little need or justification for India becoming a permanent member of the UNSC. With rebel groups controlling Libya, **India finds itself in a position where it will soon have to abandon its neutral stance for its own interests. If India deems that its election to a permanent UNSC seat will continue to be delayed and challenged for a long time, it might shift from quiet diplomacy to active diplomacy**. India cannot afford to keep being pushed around by China in South Asia. Beginning in 2013, when India's term as a non-permanent UNSC member ends, India is expected to participate actively in expanding the security belt that was formed to contain China, connecting the USA, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, and Vietnam.

Ayoob, Mohammed. "This is How the Kashmir Terrorist Attack Could Start A Major War." National Interest. Feb. 2019. <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-kashmir-terrorist-attack-could-start-major-war-45017> //RJ

Third, **the atmosphere in India has turned highly jingoistic following the Pulwama attack, and public anger will not be assuaged without a dramatic retaliatory measure that does substantial damage to Pakistan's military infrastructure and not merely to the terrorist organizations that it has spawned**. Fourth, elections to India's parliament are barely two months away and the Hindu nationalist BJP government, which seems to be increasingly losing political ground, would probably like to use the incident to its electoral advantage by a major show of military strength by attacking military targets in Pakistan. **Indian retaliation is inevitable**, but its exact form and scope are difficult to predict. New Delhi has already begun to put diplomatic and economic pressure on Pakistan by, among other things, canvassing international opinion against the latter's support for terrorism. While this may bring verbal backing from most countries, it is unlikely to affect Pakistan in any major fashion. This is because of Chinese and Saudi financial and political support to Islamabad and due to America's unconcealed dependence on Islamabad to put pressure on the Taliban to allow a smooth and painless American pullout from Afghanistan. Moreover, **diplomatic and economic pressure on Pakistan is unlikely to satisfy public opinion in India and, therefore, military retaliation is very much in the cards. This time the military response is certain to be far more severe than the surgical strikes against terrorist group concentrations in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir that took place after a similar attack on Indian forces in Uri in September 2016 when four assailants attacked an Indian Army brigade headquarters killing nineteen soldiers**.

Stratfor Worldview. "India Struggles With Its Strategy for Becoming a Great Power." Mar. 2018. <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/india-struggles-its-strategy-becoming-great-power> //RJ

Despite having many cultural commonalities, **India's relationship with Pakistan is highly adversarial and has tremendously destructive potential**. The roots of the hostility go back to colonial politics. The clash is not just over territory but also over ideology and increasingly over religion. **Despite occasional bursts of progress toward a settlement, a vicious zero-sum game has come to characterize this cold war-like rivalry. Though nuclear deterrence is a powerful damper on escalation, paradoxically it also lets Pakistan use its unconventional warfare to aid militancy in Kashmir and conduct lethal attacks**, such as in Mumbai in 2008. India has generally failed to deter Pakistan in this area, and **the resultant frustration is leading to more assertive tactics by New Delhi. These in turn have lowered the Pakistani**

threshold for nuclear use. A new crisis is extremely likely within a decade, and a major conflict entirely plausible.

Garrie, Adam. "India's Aggression Against Pakistan Has Held Back the Prospect of UN Reform." Eurasia Future, a Global Policy and Analysis Think Tank. 2 March 2019.

<https://eurasiafuture.com/2019/03/02/indias-aggression-against-pakistan-has-held-back-the-prospect-of-un-reform/> //RJ

Due to India's own reckless behaviour, even supporters of a would-be permanent Indian seat on the Security Council will now think twice. It is simply not in the interests of the wider world for a nuclear power in a virtual state of war with its neighbour, to hold veto power over an international body charged with promoting peace and win-win conflict resolution. Ultimately, the only way that the Security Council could be fairly reformed is for the General Assembly to begin fulfilling the current functions of the much smaller Security Council. Under such a reformed system, every nation in the world would be able to vote on crucial security issues and in place of the existing Security Council veto mechanism, a resolution before the General Assembly that deals with security ought to require a majority of 75% to pass. This would disallow a 51% vs. 49% vote breakdown from holding the world hostage to any obviously contentious Resolution. But whilst this would clearly be an equitable solution, it remains highly unlikely that any of the permanent five would surrender their current veto powers in this way. This is the reason why **whenever any of the permanent five discuss UN reform, they prefer to entertain proposals which if implemented would modestly expand the permanent membership of the existing security council, rather than move to a fully democratic and accountable General Assembly in the realm of security issues.** Because of this, **India's aggressive antics have clearly set back the cause of UN reform, possibly for a decade.** This is so because it would be difficult to imagine an expanded Security Council that did not include India because of its size. **At the same time, because of India's reckless behaviour, it would be equally impossible to envisage an expanded Security Council that did include India.** Therefore, in order to skirt around the Indian elephant in the room of UN reform, most people are happy to allow the status quo to prevail based on the fact that the only realistic alternative could be far worse.

A2 Cutting Off Water

1: Delink; Guruswamy '19 of the Asian Age writes that India literally cannot cut off Pakistan's water because it doesn't have the infrastructure nor dams to store the water.

2: Delink; Thakker '19 of the International News writes that India cannot simply leverage Pakistan's water because it takes decades to build the dams to divert water, and it's a permanent endeavor they would not want to embark on.

Guruswamy, Mohan. "India Can't Turn Off Indus Water Flow to Pak." The Asian Age. Feb. 2019. <https://www.asianage.com/opinion/columnists/230219/india-cant-turn-off-indus-water-flow-to-pak.html> //RJ

After the Uri incident, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said: "Blood and water cannot flow together." Now the BJP's PM-in-waiting Nitin Gadkari has chipped in by saying that India will cut off water to Pakistan. This must be music to the shakha crowd, but it is far from reality. By implication Mr Gadkari was repeating the old threat that India would retaliate, this time for Pulwama, by turning off the spigots of the three western rivers of the Indus basin that flow unhindered into Pakistan and sustains most of its agriculture and power generation. The truth is that the flow of blood can be stopped, but water will continue to flow. **The Indus river**

system has a total drainage area exceeding 11,165,000 sq km. It is the 21st largest river in the world in terms of annual flow. It is also Pakistan's sole means of sustenance. The British had constructed a complex canal system to irrigate the Punjab region of Pakistan. Partition left a large part of this infrastructure in Pakistan, but the headwork dams remained in India, fuelling much insecurity among the Punjabi landowning elite in that country. The World Bank brokered the Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan after many years of intense negotiations to allocate the waters of the Indus river basin. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and President Ayub Khan signed the treaty in Karachi on September 19, 1960. According to the IWT, control over the three "eastern" rivers — the Beas, the Ravi and the Sutlej — was given to India, while control over the three "western" rivers — the Indus, the Chenab and the Jhelum — to Pakistan. Since Pakistan's rivers flow through India first, the treaty allowed India to use them for irrigation, transport and power generation, while laying down precise regulations for India building projects along the way. The treaty was a result of Pakistani fears that, since the source rivers of the Indus basin were in India, it could potentially create droughts and famines in Pakistan, especially at times of war. **Since the ratification of the treaty in 1960, India**

and Pakistan have fought three wars, but the flow of water as per the treaty was not hampered even for a single day. On the face of it the pact is seen as generous to Pakistan as it gives the lower riparian

state 80 per cent of the water of the western rivers. But **the reality is that IWT makes a virtue of a necessity, as it is the geography of the region that decides this rather than any altruism.** The main Kashmir Valley is just 100 km wide at its maximum and 15,520.30 sq km in area. While the Himalayas divide the Kashmir Valley from Ladakh, the Pir Panjal range, which encloses the Valley from the west and the south, separates it from the great plains of northern India. This picturesque and densely settled Valley has an average height of 1,850 meters above sea level but the surrounding Pir Panjal range has an average elevation of 5,000 meters. Thus, **the Pir Panjal range stands between the Kashmir Valley and the rest of the country and is an insurmountable barrier that precludes the transfer of water anywhere else. And neither do the contours of the Kashmir Valley allow for more waters to be stored in any part of it. Since the waters cannot be stored or used by diversion elsewhere, it has**

to keep flowing into Pakistan. Of the three western rivers "given" to Pakistan, the Indus, which debouches from Indian territory near Kargil, then flows almost entirely in Pakistan-controlled territory. The Jhelum originates near Verinag near Anantnag, and meanders for over 200 km in the Kashmir Valley before it enters Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. After flowing through Srinagar, it fills up the Wular Lake and then traverses past Baramulla and Uri into PoK. The hydel projects constructed on it supply most of the electricity to the Valley. The Chenab, also known as the Chandrabhaga, originates in Lahaul Spiti in Himachal Pradesh and flows through the Jammu region into the plains of Pakistani Punjab. The catchment area of the Chenab is elongated and narrow and is mostly in India. But the Chenab runs through deep valleys and the river drops by as much as 24 meters per km, imposing physical constraints and huge economic costs on harnessing it. The three eastern rivers allocated to India by the IWT are the Beas, Ravi and Sutlej. These waters sustain agriculture in Punjab and to some extent Haryana, and are substantially used. What enters Pakistan is usually just enough to keep the stream flushed. But nevertheless Pakistan has from time to time blamed India for its floods to the sudden and deliberate release of storage gates. Despite this, **the IWT has worked exceedingly well for both**

countries, and both are loathe to disturb it. Even when India and Pakistan went to war in 1965, 1971 and over Kargil in 1999, the waters flowed without interruption. The fact is that the IWT works because it suits both countries by making a virtue of the geography. The Pulwama incident has fuelled much anger within India and the Narendra Modi government, which rode to power promising to deter Pakistani-origin terrorism in India by threatening retribution is now hard pressed to deliver. After Uri, it discovered that there is a wide yawning gap between promise and reality. The PM's pre-election speeches are now being played back to him to taunt him. The Modi government is flailing for options short of the use of arms. Thus, the somewhat exasperated suggestion seemingly made by the Modi government that it would take a relook at the treaty. It can take a relook it till kingdom come, but the reality remains the same. As Dr Shakil Ahmad Romshoo, head of earth sciences at the geology and geophysics department of the University of Kashmir, recently said: **"Let us assume we stop the water supply for the sake of argument. Where would the water go? We do not have infrastructure to store this water. We have not built dams in J&K where we can store the water. And being a mountainous state, unlike Tamil Nadu or Karnataka, you cannot move water to another state. So you cannot stop the river technically."**

The International News citing Himanshu Thakker, Coordinator of the South Asian Network on Dams, Rivers, and People. "India Can't Squeeze Water Flow to Pakistan." Feb. 2019.
<https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/436393-india-can-t-squeeze-water-flow-to-pakistan> //RJ

On Friday, Nitin Gadkari, India's water resources minister, said that **there were calls for India to prevent even "a single drop of water" from going to Pakistan.** But such decisions would have to be taken at "higher levels" of government. India's rhetoric around water comes as its government is under intense public pressure to retaliate against Pakistan, and forms part of a pattern of "bombastic statements" over the past week, said Brahma Chellaney, a security expert and the author of two books on water and geopolitics. "India can argue from a legal standpoint that Pakistan's use of terrorism fundamentally changes the essential basis of the treaty," said Chellaney. As the upstream country, India could also unilaterally decide to withdraw from the treaty, he said. **To squeeze Pakistan, India would have to build dam-like infrastructure on the western rivers,** violating the treaty. **"These are not temporary projects to do for a few days until Pakistan behaves,"** said Himanshu Thakker, coordinator of the South Asian Network on Dams, Rivers and People. **"Any project to divert, use or stop water takes decades, and decades are not a canvas on which political tensions between the two nations last."**

A2 Pakistan Backlash

1: China DA: Krauthammer '10 of National Review writes that elevating India to a permanent member would anchor India as an ally to counterbalance China in the South China Sea. Indeed, Dabhade '17 of the Observer Research Foundation writes that providing India a permanent seat would serve as an equalizer to China in the region. That's critical, because Sareen '19 of the ORF writes that India can force the China-Pakistan axis apart by raising the stakes for China through hard power methods like counterbalancing with the Quad. Critically, Bana '19 of the Independent writes that Pakistan can only go to conflict if China has its back militarily.

2: Delink; Aamir '19 of the South China Morning Post writes that Pakistan cannot afford an intense confrontation with India because of its intense economic crisis, and thus does not have the ability to fund any war.

3: Terrorism DA: Smith '19 of the Diplomat writes that India has become increasingly more aggressive against Pakistan because the country as a whole has become significantly more nationalist, and India's tolerance towards state-sponsored terror attacks from Pakistan is diminishing rapidly. Ayoob '19 of the National Interest writes that Indian retaliation to a Pakistani terror attack is inevitable. Overall, Dalton '19 of the Dawn Herald writes that India and Pakistan are one terror attack away from war. Thus, Smith continues that Pakistan must be persuaded through increased international pressure to end backing of terror groups. Fortunately, giving India a permanent seat would enable India to push for pressure against Pakistan to end support of terror.

4: Delink; Carafano '19 of the Heritage Foundation writes that the Indian-US relationship is growing and China isn't a reliable ally for Pakistan in the region, which is why Pakistan has been anxious to de-escalate tensions with India such in the most recent incident.

5: Delink; Orchard '19 of the Geopolitical Futures writes that India has developed second strike capabilities that ensure that Pakistan would completely be annihilated if they attacked.

Krauthammer, Charles. "Why Obama is Right About India." National Review. Nov. 2010.
<https://www.nationalreview.com/2010/11/why-obama-right-about-india-charles-krauthammer/> //RJ

This hegemony is the growing source of tension in Asia today. Modern China is the Germany of a century ago — a rising, expanding, have-not power seeking its place in the sun. The story of the first half of the 20th century was Europe's attempt to manage Germany's rise. We know how that turned out. The story of the next half-century will be how

Asia accommodates and/or contains China's expansion. Nor is this some far-off concern. China's aggressive territorial claims on resource-rich waters claimed by Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Japan are already roiling the neighborhood. Traditionally, Japan has been the major regional counterbalance. But an aging, shrinking Japan cannot sustain that role. Symbolic of the dramatic shift in power balance between once-poor China and once-dominant Japan was the resolution of their recent maritime crisis. Japan had detained a Chinese captain in a territorial-waters dispute. China imposed an embargo on rare-earth minerals. Japan capitulated. That makes the traditional U.S. role as offshore balancer all the more important. **China's neighbors, from South Korea all the way around to India, are in need of U.S. support of their own efforts at resisting Chinese dominion.** And of all these countries, India, which has fought a border war with China, is the most natural anchor for such a U.S. partnership. It's not just our inherent affinities — democratic, English-speaking, free-market, dedicated to the rule of law. It is also the coincidence of our strategic imperatives: **We both face the threat of radical Islam and the longer-term challenge of a rising China.** Which is why Obama's dramatic call for India to be made a permanent member of the Security Council was so important. However useless and obsolete the U.N. may be, **a Security Council seat** carries totemic significance. It **would elevate India, while helping bind it to us as our most strategic and organic Third World ally.** China is no enemy, but it remains troublingly adversarial. Which is why India must be the center of our Asian diplomacy. And why Obama's trip — coconuts and all — was worth every penny.

Dabhade, Manish. "India's pursuit of United Nations Security Council reforms." Observer Research Foundation. Dec. 2017. <https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-pursuit-united-nations-security-council-reforms/> //RJ

Foremost in Indian calculus, however, lies the Indian aspiration of the institutionalised big power status the permanent seat in the Security Council would confer on India right away. **Being a "pen holder" as the permanent member of the Security Council, India would similarly assume the mantle of international peace and security decision-making.** India sees itself carrying the necessary abilities, actual and potential, which entitles it to a permanent seat at the Council. Further, **the seat on the high table, at the UN's premier, powerful body would provide it the much needed leverage to expand its global geo-political and geo-economic clout. It would serve as an equaliser to China, its rival and an emerging hegemon in Asia, and an ever increasing strategic and security concern in its immediate neighbourhood and beyond. India has always seen itself as a democratic alternative to the authoritarian China.** India's millennia old civilizational existence also demands it to be at the top of the international hierarchy of states. As India's international profile and capabilities rise due to its ever expanding global and regional footprint in diverse areas such as politics, development, economics, culture and science and technology, **India wishes to shift its international position from a rule taker (a constrained role) to a rule maker (a system shaping role).** The Indian attempts at joining various regimes like the MTCR and the ongoing, high-pitched campaign to join the NSG amply indicate that India is no more satisfied with being either the target or a mere follower of various international norms and rules, and now wants to shape and align them to suit Indian ideas and interests. In conclusion, and most significantly, Indian hopes significantly rest on an acknowledgement by the UN itself of the need to expand the UNSC. In an interview to The Guardian (2015), former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that the Security Council must either reform or risk becoming increasingly irrelevant: "If we don't change the council, we risk a situation where the primacy of the council may be challenged by some of the new emerging countries."

Scott, David. "India's Incremental Balancing in the South China Sea." Brunel University. 2015. <https://www.e-ir.info/2015/07/26/indias-incremental-balancing-in-the-south-china-sea/> //RJ

Admittedly, **India** is not really able to block China from appearing in the Indian Ocean, but it **can respond by going into China's backyard of the South China Sea, as an example of lateral pressure theory** (Weimar 2013). The Indian navy has been deploying through the South China since 2000, generally twice a year, which has involved its own unilateral practicing, as well as bilateral port calls and exercises with local actors, particularly Vietnam. Such deployments attract Chinese criticism, as with the so-called INS Shadul incident of July 2011, where the Indian ship was supposedly radioed from nearby Chinese vessels to vacate these "Chinese" waters. India though continues to deploy into such disputed waters, and China continues

to warn India about such appearances (Patranobis 2015). **India's balancing also consists of external balancing whereby India has been strengthening security links with other countries who are similarly concerned about China.** Such balancing is already noticeable in the South China Sea, primarily through strengthened military and maritime arrangements with Vietnam, and secondarily through strengthened military and maritime links with the Philippines. This China-centric balancing is also noticeable outside the South China Sea where India has established security partnerships with the US, Australia and Japan – with such wider partnerships starting to be applied to the South China Sea. This range of external balancing is not classic Cold War hard explicit containment alliances, but rather represent new post-Cold War soft implicit balancing partnerships. Nevertheless, **India's strategic-military arrangements with Vietnam, the US, Japan and Australia are implicitly China-centric, with an unstated but nevertheless apparent China-focus, and with increasing significance for the balance of power in the South China Sea.**

India's Partners for the South China Sea **With Vietnam, India's** "diamond on the South China Sea" (Brewster 2009), India's Cooperation Framework agreement of 2003 and strategic partnership proclaimed in 2007 has become strengthened in its military side, in the wake of China's growing strength in the South China Sea. This **partnership has been given teeth in recent years through military supplies**, especially maritime, **from India to Vietnam**, which has attracted Chinese criticism (Bagchi 2014). Port facilities have also been extended by Vietnam to India at Cam Ranh Bay. The pace of India-Vietnam relations have quickened under the Modi administration (Thayer 2014), with a "pivot" (Karnad 2014) to Vietnam on the part of India, leaving an "axis" (Patil 2014) that is now implicitly China-centric. A significant development under the Modi administration is how the South China Sea has featured in their Joint Statements drawn up in President Mukherjee's trip to Vietnam in September 2014 and the visit by Vietnam's Prime Minister to India in October 2014. These Joint Statements' formulaic reiteration of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and adherence to international law, are an implicit criticism of China. The October 2014 visit also saw a slew of increased military assistance programmes by India to the Vietnamese navy. **Geopolitically, Vietnam serves as a barrier to Chinese domination of the South China Sea, from where Beijing would be able to project power up through the Strait of Malacca into the Indian Ocean. From India's point of view, Vietnam can put pressure on China's southern flanks, and give China a two-front challenge. India's "Vietnam card" against China in the South China Sea serves as some counterpart to China's "Pakistan Card" against India in the Indian Ocean.**

Sareen, Sushant. "For Pakistan, China is the New America." Observer Research Foundation. Feb. 2019. <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/pakistan-china-new-america-48305/> //RJ

Even more importantly, **China is still not in a position to bail out** its 'iron brother' **Pakistan out of trouble frequently**, especially if the US is the source of trouble. Nor is China likely to go out on a limb for Pakistan every time it gets into crisis. **Pakistan is an important client state, but not a state critical for China's survival.** And **despite the fact that China has been doubling down in its support for Pakistan, there are some straws in the wind that suggest the beginning of a rethink in China on how much it should invest itself in Pakistan**, which could turn out to be a poor investment ultimately. Consequently, **India can** use to **force China to be more even-handed in its policy in South Asia**, especially on issues like designating and sanctioning terrorists like the Jaish-e-Mohammed chief, Masood Azhar, who China has been protecting for years. Until the Pulwama suicide attack on the CRPF bus, this was an irritant in Sino-Indian relations. It is going to become a core issue from now onwards for New Delhi. What **China will need to decide is whether the benefit it derives from its economic and strategic relationship with Pakistan is worth the economic and strategic cost of antagonising India and pushing it to a point where India reconsiders and reevaluates its policy of strategic caution in pushing ahead with the Quad and other initiatives aimed at containing China.** The fact that China makes more money out of India every year than it will out of its trade and investments in Pakistan is the economic side of things. **India**, instead of assuming that the depth of Sino-Pak ties is immutable, **needs to leverage its economic relationship with China and force China to understand the economic and political consequences of its support for a notorious Pakistani terrorist state.** **India has cards to play that can pry open the Sino-Pak nexus, provided it is willing to stare down the Chinese while playing these cards**

which include an active and intensive involvement in strengthening the Quad and more specifically in strategically engaging the US.

Bana, Sarosh, Independent UK, 27 February 2019,

<https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/pakistan-india-tension-war-planes-china-a8799111.html> // EK

To go to war against India, Islamabad will have to look to China. China's entry into the affray **would raise major questions for India**, which lacks the military power to wage a war on two fronts for any length of time. There are those in India who are interpreting the government's "non-military" pre-emptive action as a political move. The prime minister urged the public at a rally to vote for him to ensure the "safety and security" of their homeland. His ministers, too, upheld the aerial offensive as indicative of a strong and decisive leadership that provided security to all Indians. With Modi increasingly unsure of re-election, declaring a national emergency could potentially allow a delay to elections, extending the term of the incumbent regime for as long as the emergency continues. **The altercation between India and Pakistan is fraught with grave consequences.** An event of war will physically endanger civilians living along the borders and jeopardise the lives of all Indians and Pakistanis by devastating both country's economies. Scaling down the rhetoric to come to an understanding is the only way forward.

Aamir, Adnan, "Why India And Pakistan Will Not Go To War Any Time Soon." South China Morning Post. N. p., 2019. Web. 14 Apr. 2019.

<https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2188233/india-and-pakistan-are-not-going-war-any-time> // EK

Moreover, Pakistan cannot afford to be adventurous on its eastern border given its own state of crisis. Pakistan is in the midst of a severe economic crisis – the country is facing a severe devaluation of its currency and running out of foreign exchange reserves to pay for imports.

After assistance from China , **Pakistan has now turned to Saudi Arabia to keep its economy functioning.** Therefore, on the eve of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's visit to India , **Pakistan has no incentive to sanction an attack against Indian paramilitary forces. Pakistan cannot afford an intense confrontation with India due to its economic woes.** Meanwhile, the ongoing confrontation between the South Asian neighbours has had wider global repercussions. Hundreds of flights were disrupted and thousands of people were stranded at airports after Pakistan closed its airspace to pre-empt another Indian attack. **The tension between India and Pakistan also threatens the Afghan peace process, in which Pakistan is playing a leading role. China's current and Saudi Arabia's potential investments will be at risk if the current conflict escalates. Therefore, a concerted effort is being made by the global community to force both India and Pakistan to stand down.**

Carafano, James. "Problem-Plagued Pakistan Faces Incredible Challenges Beyond Its Rivalry With India." Heritage Foundation. Mar. 2019. <https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/problem-plagued-pakistan-faces-incredible-challenges-beyond-its-rivalry> //RJ

Pakistan fears two things more than war with India: pressure from Washington and indifference from Beijing. **In the latest round of tit-for-tat fighting with India, Pakistan saw a bit of both – more evidence that the country may be heading for the strategic dead-end of South Asia geo-politics.** That's not the best outcome for Pakistan or the United States. Islamabad and New Delhi have been rivals since the partition of India created Pakistan in 1947. Their enmity wasn't dampened when both sides got nuclear weapons in the 1980s. But some things have changed. **Today India sees Pakistan in its rearview mirror.** India is focused on its role as an Indo-Pacific power and a rising global

economic player. **Pakistan has long tried to prop up its regional relevance and influence, in part, by supporting insurgencies and tolerating terrorist groups that undermine stability in India, as well as neighboring Afghanistan. These tactics** have taken a terrible human toll – even in Pakistan, which has seen more than its share of extremist violence. Yet they **are no longer enough to turn India’s trajectory. Pakistan’s** other recourse for relevance has been to play “great power” politics. It **has looked to both the U.S. and China to balance Islamabad’s relationship with Delhi. And now that’s a problem. The India-U.S. strategic relationship is quickly outpacing relations between America and Pakistan.** This latest incident was a case in point. When terrorists struck in Kashmir, the message from the U.S. administration was pretty clear: India, we have your back. That’s not to say U.S.-India ties are frictionless. Washington just dropped India from its Generalized System of Preferences program. That will slap about \$5 billion in new tariffs on Indian goods heading to the U.S. But President Trump has a penchant for running economic, security and diplomatic policies on separate tracks. While Delhi and Washington may continue to spar over how to build better economic ties, the Trump team will continue to press forward to strengthen the strategic partnership with India. **Pakistan clearly lags India in importance as an American strategic ally in the region. But turning to Beijing doesn’t seem to offer Islamabad much of value. So far, what Pakistan has gotten from economic engagement with Beijing is mostly debt. Pakistan’s economy is so lackluster that Islamabad is seeking a \$12 billion bailout from the International Monetary Fund. If granted, it would be the 13th bailout the country has received since the 1980s. Nor does China appear to be delivering the diplomatic clout that Pakistan needs.** For example, Beijing couldn’t prevent the international Financial Action Task Force from “grey listing” Pakistan for its weakness in combating money laundering and terrorist financing. In fact, **under pressure from the U.S. and others, Pakistan may soon find itself “blacklisted” as a non-cooperative state. In the Pakistan-China relationship, Beijing seems primarily interested in helping itself. Over the long term, the strategic relationship could have little value beyond making Islamabad a tool of Chinese policy and perhaps, someday, a suburb of Beijing.** There is no easy exit for Pakistan. India won’t be cowed by terrorism. Further, as the latest incident on the frontier demonstrated, there are limits to intensifying conflict between the two nuclear-armed countries. It was not surprising that **Pakistan quickly returned a downed-Indian fighter pilot to deescalate the confrontation.** Further, it doesn’t look like Pakistan can leverage either the U.S. or China to pressure India. Yet dismantling the terrorist infrastructure and accompanying web of corruption that riddle Pakistan presents tremendous challenges as well. On the other hand, a Pakistan that muddles through in South Asia just risks being left further behind.

Orchard, Phillips. “Why India and Pakistan Avoided Nuclear War.” Geopolitical Futures. Mar. 2019.

https://www.realcworld.com/articles/2019/03/07/why_india_and_pakistan_avoided_nuclear_war_112984.html

To develop a more credible second-strike capability, India and Pakistan have been investing in submarines. **India is now believed to have a nuclear-armed submarine, the INS Arihant.** It’s unclear whether the Arihant is fully functional, but it is clear that India is close to having SLBM capability. Pakistan is developing a nuclear submarine too, but it’s not as far along as India. **An Indian nuclear-armed submarine guarantees a credible second strike against Pakistan, essentially ensuring Pakistan’s destruction if it strikes first. The rationale is that this decreases Pakistan’s willingness to use any nuclear weapons first, since doing so would be suicide.**

A2 UNSC Collapse

Alexopoulos and Bourantonis 07,

<http://www.arisalexopoulos.gr/files/Can%20expansion%20lead....pdf> //RJ

Nevertheless, we conducted both one and multi-dimensional spatial analysis, to take into account the different and competing suggestions of the relevant literature. In all cases, we come to the conclusion that **the proposed reform does not lead to a less efficient decision-making**. The core of such an expanded UNSC is always smaller if not the same with the core of the current Council, due to the fact that most of the potential new members belong to the middle or upper level of economic development. In this way, it has been shown that **it is misleading to connect expansion with less decision capacity in the UNSC**. IR scholars, who argue that it is better not to increase the number of the members of the UNSC, make the same mistake as those scholars of comparative politics. They express the view that potential veto points of a political system coincide with the actual number of veto players. **They pay attention only to the institutions of a political system, while omitting that the system consists of players who have preferences over policy outputs that might be convergent**. Hence, when we study the decision capacity of international organizations **we have to take into account not only the decision rule and the number of involved veto players but also their policy preference**.

Murphy, EQFM, 2011

<https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/08143.pdf> // iCW

It is worth noting in this connection that India has always preferred to be part of the democratic majority helping in the adoption of broadly acceptable decisions and resolutions. On the one hand, India went along with 59 per cent of the resolutions adopted either unanimously or without a vote during the previous six terms of its non-permanent membership prior to the current term in the UNSC. Even with regard to the aggregate of 113 adopted resolutions (41 per cent) which gave rise to division, India cast an affirmative vote on 101 (89 per cent) of them. On no more than a dozen occasions did it stand aside without joining the concurring majority. To be sure, India has not voted against any resolution, and has resorted to abstentions only to signal its reservations. Remarkably, moreover, India was never a loner as an abstaining country; it always had the company of other member countries, such as China, the former Soviet Union or fellow non-permanent member countries on many occasions.