

Resolved: The United Nations should grant India permanent membership on the Security Council.

Our sole contention is stopping the failing ship:

Adding India to the UNSC would cripple its most deadly operations. [Muheet of the Huffington Post in 2015](#) writes that expanding the Security Council with the veto in place will make it utterly dysfunctional. Reform for this gridlock is not in sight as [Cristol of World Policy in 2015](#) finds that while every country agrees on the need for efficiency reform, but there are infinite permutations without any compromises between states.

Adding India would slow failing UNSC action to a halt, thus undermining the UNSC's history of colonial oppression and deadly intervention.

Subpoint A: Colonialism

[Mindaoudou of the UN Chronicle in 2015](#) writes that the UNSC promotes the interests of a few super-Powers and, more specifically, the former colonial powers. For instance, [Iwanami of the University of Rochester in 2011](#) finds if a permanent member is not involved in a conflict, there is only a 5 percent chance the UNSC will consider the issue and a 1 percent chance the UNSC will reach a resolution. India is the best actor to solve these problems as [Kumar of Indian Political Sciences in 2006](#) notes that India emphasises solving the root causes of war including economic and social injustices, and with this definitional framework they have worked for the protection of Third World security interests.

Subpoint B: Counterproductive intervention

[The World Heritage Encyclopedia in 2011](#) writes that “The Security Council has traditionally interpreted its mandate as covering only military security.” Specifically, Stapleton of the [Council on Foreign Relations in 2018](#) outlines that the UNSC responds to military conflict through defensive peacekeeping, sanctions, and offensive force. Unfortunately, [Sicard of Global India in 2018](#) writes that the UNSC is pivoting toward offensive peacekeeping.

These decisions cause more harm than good.

1. Economic sanctions. [Pape of MIT in 1997](#) quantifies that in 115 cases of economic sanctions, only five were successful. [Peksun of Foreign Policy in 2016](#) explains that the political elite in sanctioned countries exploit the poor to counter the negative economic effects on themselves. [Walker of the Australian in 2012](#) writes that overall, the poor suffer; the middle class, essential to building the foundations of democracy, shrinks; and the rich profit from monopoly controls over the illicit trade in banned goods. Overall, he concludes that “sanctions do more harm than good.” For instance, [Global Policy in 2000](#) quantifies that UN sanctions on Iraq lead to half a million to a million and a half deaths,

the majority of which were children. India would create gridlock over any possible UNSC sanctions as [Kumar of the Indian Journal of Political Science in 2006](#) notes that India prefers diplomatic and persuasive action over punitive ones, giving the example of when they opposed UNSC sanctions on Libya in the past.

2. Offensive force. [Klossek of Global India in 2018](#) finds India opposes the UN's increased reliance on Chapter 7 offensive missions. [Blair of Princeton in 2014](#) that offensive peacekeeping precludes peace as governments supported by the UN do not want negotiation once they gain military advantage. Fortna of Columbia furthers that "The risk of war was almost 90% higher when an enforcement mission was in place." Looking to the past, [Gibbs of the Guardian in 2011](#) writes that the Kosovo genocide bombing only caused the perpetrators to step up their campaign of brutal killings. And the most offensive UN operation to date was in the Congo, where [Rice of the Guardian in 2009](#) reports UN intervention caused more than 1,000 civilians deaths, 7,000 rapes, and displaced 900,000.

Luckily, in the presence of gridlock, the UNSC would be forced to turn to more defensive peacekeeping operations due to the lack of agreement over offensive missions. Indeed, [The Economic Times in 2018](#) explains India consistently advocates for a greater focus on peaceful peacebuilding at the UN, which right now constitutes only 1% of the budget. Luckily, [Fortna of Columbia in 2004](#) quantifies that observer peacekeeping missions increase the chance of sustained peace by 80%. [Di of Oxford in 2017](#) thus concludes that in an analysis of all literature on the topic that defensive peacekeeping has consistently beneficial impacts on all conflict outcomes, a better alternative to offensive missions which increases the intensity of genocides and politicides due to the perception of partiality.

Klossek of Global India in 2018

<http://globalindia.eu/is-india-a-neglected-partner-un-peacekeeping-in-a-changing-world/>

On the other hand, India has simultaneously been critical of more recent developments in the field of peace and security and the associated role of the UN, particularly the changing nature of peacekeeping missions, which has moved towards more robust mandates and to Chapter VII missions. Robust peacekeeping allows the use of force at a tactical level with the consent of the host state or parties to the conflict. Chapter VII missions, or 'peace enforcement' missions, allow the strategic use of force which does not require the host state's consent. This change occurred as a consequence of the surge of civil wars and inner-state conflicts post-1990, as well as to the international community's peacekeeping failures in Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Somalia

Jessica Di, xx-xx-xxxx, "Effectiveness of Peacekeeping Operations," No Publication,

<http://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-586>

Other operationalizations of peacekeeping have produced more consistent and comparable results. First, peace missions (especially UN missions) produce more durable peace (Fortna, 2004a, 2003, 2004b; Gilligan & Sergenti, 2008), produce comparatively geographically contained conflicts, shorter episodes of local violence (Ruggeri, Dorussen, & Gizelis, 2016b), improve the odds of peacebuilding success (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000), and lower the odds of genocide over the long term (Kathman & Wood, 2011). Importantly, some findings at the national level do not automatically translate at the local level. As mentioned, Gilligan and Sergenti's findings (2008) at the national level resonate with Diehl's; they find peacekeepers to be better at keeping peace than making it. A more disaggregated approach, however, tells a different story at the local level. At this scale, Ruggeri and colleagues (2016b) find that peacekeepers shorten conflict episodes, but the empirical results on the capacity to deter local conflict onset is inconclusive. With regard to mass killings, the effect of interventions appears conditional on whether the mission directly challenges and engages the perpetrators. While this would suggest that only some missions reduce large-scale civilian killings, Melander (2009) finds that, after controlling for unobservable

factors leading to deployment, peacekeeping does have a clear preventive effect on mass killings. Kathman and Wood (2011) also find that

third-party intervention can trigger more intense genocides and politicides in the months following the deployment. Over time, however, violence significantly decreases if the intervention is perceived as impartial. More recent studies measuring the size of deployment and the type of deployed personnel have further supported most of these results: large deployments of peacekeeping troops have consistently beneficial impacts on all conflict outcomes examined in the literature (Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon, 2013, 2014, 2015; Beardsley & Gleditsch, 2015; Ruggeri, Dorussen, & Gizelis, 2016b). One notable exception is peacebuilding, which does not seem to be affected by the actual number of deployed personnel (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000). Few studies include peacekeeping police and observer components, and they present mixed results. Hultman et al. (2014) find that larger deployment of UN peacekeeping troops

(but not UN police and observers) reduces the intensity of violence on the battlefield in ongoing civil wars on a monthly basis. With regard to one-sided violence, more UN troops and police also effectively decrease violence against civilians, although observers produce the opposite effect (Hultman et al., 2013). Interestingly, UN troops can still effectively protect civilians in the aftermath of conflict (Kathman & Wood, 2014). Hence, on the one hand, peacekeeping police reduce the number of civilian killings but do not contribute to longer peace spells or reduce the number of battle-related deaths (Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon, 2014). Even more worrisome, police seem to increase violence rather than contain it (Beardsley & Gleditsch, 2015). Furthermore, observers have no statistical impact on peace duration, battle-related violence, and geographic containment. Ultimately, the only significant effect found in the existing literature is that deployment of observers is associated with greater intensity of one-sided violence (Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon, 2013; Beardsley & Gleditsch, 2015). Unarmed observers do not pose a threat to perpetrators of violence; thus, cannot exert a significant deterrent effect against mass killings.

Fortna of Columbia in 2004

<http://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/pkISQ%20offprint.PDF>

In Table 8, four dummy variables indicate the effects of different types of peacekeeping missions relative to cases with no peacekeeping (the omitted category). Over the 50-year period, consent-based peacekeeping is associated with a drop in the risk of war and these effects are

jointly significant, but only at the 0.10 level (hence the single asterisk after the “js” notation).⁴⁶ Observer missions appear to have the largest effect on the durability of peace, reducing the hazard of peace failing by 80%. Notice, however, the hazard ratio for enforcement missions (1.88). This means that in the post-WWII period, the risk of war was almost 90% higher when an enforcement mission was in place. If anything, enforcement missions are associated with unstable peace, though this finding is not statistically significant.

Aurelie Sicard, 10-31-2018, "Is India a neglected partner? UN Peacekeeping in a changing world," Global India,

<http://globalindia.eu/is-india-a-neglected-partner-un-peacekeeping-in-a-changing-world/>

On the other hand, India has simultaneously been critical of more recent developments in the field of peace and security and the associated role of the UN, particularly the changing nature of peacekeeping missions, which has moved towards more robust mandates and to Chapter VII missions. Robust peacekeeping allows the use of force at a tactical level with the consent of the host state or parties to the conflict. Chapter VII missions, or ‘peace enforcement’ missions, allow the strategic use of force which does not require the host state’s consent. This change occurred as a consequence of the surge of civil wars and inner-state conflicts post-1990, as well as to the international community’s peacekeeping failures in Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Somalia. For India, these changes mean that the boundaries between peacekeeping and other forms of military intervention are becoming too fluid, which poses a challenge to its core principles of ‘non-intervention’, ‘non-use of force’ and ‘impartiality’. India has also argued that this approach puts the security of peacekeepers at risk and exposes them to difficult legal and political situations. India claims that the strong focus on the militarization of peacekeeping has distracted the international community from seeking political solutions to conflicts – solutions that emerge from negotiations that involve civilians, and are sensitive to pre-existing local conditions. This approach, India argues, enables successful peacekeeping by minimizing external interference and enhancing trust between peacekeepers and civilians.

David Gibbs, 3-21-2011, "Kosovo: a template for disaster," Guardian,

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/21/kosovo-template-for-disaster-libya>

Another myth regarding Kosovo is that bombing improved the human rights situation. In reality, it made things worse, and augmented the suffering. Prior to the Nato campaign, the total number of people killed on all sides in the Kosovo conflict was 2,000, approximately half of whom were killed by Serbian forces. After the bombing began, however, there was a huge spike in Serb-perpetrated atrocities, which caused almost 10,000 deaths, combined with widespread ethnic cleansing. The Serbian forces were furious that they could not stop the Nato air attacks, so they took out their frustration on the relatively defenceless Albanians, causing a huge increase in the number of killings. The Nato bombing itself directly killed at least 500 civilians. When viewed from a humanitarian standpoint, Nato intervention was a disaster.

Wood from the Journal of Peace Research in 2012

http://www.public.asu.edu/~rmwood4/woodkathgent_jpr.pdf

To examine the substantive significance of this relationship we simulate the expected level of one-sided rebel violence for changes in the balance of intervention forces. 15 As Figure 1 demonstrates, when the balance of intervention forces shifts to favor the rebels (positive movements along the x-axis toward “0” or parity), the group reduces its use of anti-civilian violence. Conversely, as the balance shifts against them, the rebels increase violence. Specifically, a one standard deviation decrease in the intervention variable from parity (i.e., an intervention of 1,293 troops in favor of the government in a conflict with no previous intervention) raises the expected number of civilians killed by insurgents from 107 to 134—an increase of 25%. Intervention clearly has a substantial effect on the scale of one-sided rebel violence

Now consider the analysis of government violence presented in the third column of Table 1. The intervention ratio variable has a positive and statistically significant effect on the level of one-sided government violence. Thus, as the size of a rebel intervention increases relative to the size of a government intervention, governments target civilians in greater numbers. This result also indicates that interventions favoring the government over rebel forces decrease the regime’s use of anti-civilian violence, providing further support for our hypothesis. Figure 2 reports simulation estimates to demonstrate the substantive effects of the relationship. From parity, a one standard deviation increase in the intervention variable (i.e., a 1,398 troop intervention in favor of the rebels in a conflict with no previous intervention) increases the expected number of annual civilian killings by government forces from 73 to 102, nearly a 40% increase in These results demonstrate that shifts in the power balance by external military interveners contribute to changes in the use of violence.

Blair of Princeton in 2014

http://wvs.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/591c_Adapting_and_Evolving_The_Implications_of_Transnational_Terrorism.pdf

Several UN observers have also pointed out the inconsistency in helping to broker a political settlement with groups that are simultaneously being attacked by forces nominally linked to the UN.⁹² In the language of negotiation strategy, this inconsistency eliminates any chance of offering spoiler groups credible assurances that offensive operations will stop if they negotiate in good faith. One academic observer, for example, notes that the Force Intervention Brigade in the DRC took the wind out of the negotiations by convincing M23 that the government and the UN was committed to a military victory.⁹³ Furthermore, interviews with host state officials in Mali and Nairobi (speaking with Somali officials) corroborated the claim that governments supported by UN missions feel less inclined to negotiate once the UN or UN-sanctioned parallel forces tip the military balance in their favor.⁹⁴

Global Policy, 6-21-2000, "The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions," No Publication, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/global-taxes/42501-the-adverse-consequences-of-economic-sanctions.html>

As has been documented by United Nations agencies, NGOs, humanitarian and human rights organizations, researchers and political leaders, the sanctions upon Iraq have produced a humanitarian disaster comparable to the worst catastrophes of the past decades. There is broad controversy and little hard evidence concerning the exact number of deaths directly attributable to the sanctions; estimates range from half a million to a million and a half, with the majority of the dead being children. It should be emphasized that much of the controversy around the number of deaths is only serving to obfuscate the fact that any deaths at all caused by the sanctions regime indicate grave breaches of humanitarian law and are unacceptable.

Jamie Walker, 1-3-2012, "Sanctions do more harm than good," No Publication, <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/sanctions-do-more-harm-than-good/news-story/22176c48457e943afa9197c7ed2ee846>

Sanctions offer an easy scapegoat for ruinous economic policies: economic pain is simply blamed on hostile and ill-intentioned foreigners. Sanctions create shortages and raise prices in conditions of scarcity. The poor suffer; the middle class, essential to building the foundations of democracy, shrinks; the ruling class extracts fatter rents from monopoly controls over the illicit trade in banned goods. Moreover, scarcity increases the dependence of the population on the distribution of necessities by the regime, giving leaders yet more leverage over their people.

Once imposed, ineffectual sanctions fall into a termination trap. Sanctions on Cuba remain in place, not because they serve any purpose, not because they are achieving their original goals, but because of the power of a domestic electoral lobby with a crucial swing vote in Florida.

Dursun Peksen, 2-2-2016, "How Do Target Leaders Survive Economic Sanctions? The Adverse Effect of Sanctions on Private Property and Wealth 1," OUP Academic, <https://academic.oup.com/fpa/article/13/1/215/2755398>

What domestic policies do targeted regimes pursue to survive economic sanctions? Despite an abundance of research on the use and effectiveness of sanctions, scant research has been conducted on the domestic sources of the target's defiance to foreign pressure. This study explores the extent to which sanctions prompt the target regime to manipulate the domestic economic conditions through arbitrary confiscation and redistribution of private property and wealth. It is argued that economic coercion as a direct threat to political survival and coercive capacity of the target government creates incentives for politically insecure elites to engage in the policy of predation to counter the negative economic effects of the coercion on themselves

and their constituency. Using time-series cross-national data from 1960 to 2005, the results indicate that as sanctions exact significant economic damage on the economy, the target government is more likely to pursue predatory policies. Further, the suggested impact of sanctions on property rights abuses does not appear to be conditioned by political regime type of the target and the involvement of the United States or multiple countries in the imposition of sanctions. Focusing on the government use of predatory policies to evade foreign pressure, this study expands the current understanding of sanction ineffectiveness in pressuring the government to acquiesce to external demands. It also shows that one major inadvertent consequence of sanctions is the deterioration of the economic security and private property rights of citizens in target countries.

Pape of MIT in 1997

<https://sci-hub.tw/http://muse.jhu.edu/article/446841/pdf>

To resolve this question, this article performs two main tasks. First, it reexamines the HSE database to determine whether sanctions worked as often as its authors claim. Second, it challenges the causal logic of the theory of economic sanctions, especially whether the nature of modern nation-states provides grounds for today's optimism. The article concludes that economic sanctions have little independent usefulness for pursuit of noneconomic goals. The HSE study is seriously flawed. Practically none of the claimed 40 successes of economic sanctions stands up to examination. Eighteen were actually settled by direct or indirect use of force; in 8 cases there is no evidence that the target made the demanded concessions; 6 do not qualify as instances of economic sanctions; and 3 are indeterminate. Of HSEs 115 cases, only 5 are appropriately considered successes

Shannon Stapleton, 9-24-2018, "The UN Security Council," Council on Foreign Relations,

<https://www.cfr.org/background/un-security-council>

The Security Council aims to peacefully resolve international disputes under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which authorizes the council to call on parties to seek solutions via negotiation, arbitration, or other peaceful means. Failing that, Chapter VII empowers the Security Council to take more assertive actions, such as imposing sanctions or authorizing the use of force "to maintain or restore international peace and security." Peacekeeping missions are the most visible face of the United Nations' conflict-management work; in mid-2018, following the completion of its mission in Liberia, the council was overseeing fourteen operations involving roughly ninety thousand uniformed personnel.

World Heritage Encyclopedia in 2011 Project Gutenberg, xx-xx-xxxx, "United Nations Security Council," No Publication,

http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/eng/United_Nations_Security_Council

The UN's role in international collective security is defined by the UN Charter, which authorizes the Security Council to investigate any situation threatening international peace; recommend procedures for peaceful resolution of a dispute; call upon other member nations to completely or partially interrupt economic relations as well as sea, air, postal, and radio communications, or to sever diplomatic relations; and enforce its decisions militarily, or by any means necessary. The Security Council also recommends the new Secretary-General to the General Assembly and recommends new states for admission as member states of the United Nations.[37][38] The Security Council has traditionally interpreted its mandate as covering only military security, though US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke controversially persuaded the body to pass a resolution on HIV/AIDS in Africa in 2000.[39]

Jonathan Cristol, 9-21-2015, "Don't Reform the Security Council – World Policy," No Publication, <https://worldpolicy.org/2015/09/21/dont-reform-the-security-council/>

Every year, the opening of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is accompanied by predictable calls for UN Security Council (UNSC) reform. There is widespread agreement that reform is necessary, but complete disagreement about the specifics. The depth of this disagreement can be seen in the framework agreement for UNSC reform, adopted on Sept. 14. The agreement is 25 pages long, with 123 pages of addenda, and contains an almost infinite number of permutations of changes. It succeeds only in highlighting the impossibility of UNSC reform passing either the UNGA or the UNSC.

IEP, xx-xx-xxxx, "Ethics of Economic Sanctions," No Publication,

<https://www.iep.utm.edu/eth-ec-s/>

Although economic sanctions have long been a feature of international relations, the end of the Cold War in the late 20th century saw significant proliferation of their use. The sanctions made concerted international action possible where previously any action by the West was countered by the U.S.S.R. and vice-versa. This meant that for the first time the United Nations Security Council could impose economic sanctions that, in theory at least, all member states were required to take part in. With this came the possibility to inflict serious damage. Most notable during this period were the comprehensive sanctions imposed on Haiti, the former Yugoslav republics and Iraq. The harms caused to Haiti and the former Yugoslav republics were severe, but the harms suffered by Iraq were the worst ever caused by the use of economic sanctions outside of a war situation. UNICEF, for example, estimated that the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq led to the deaths of 500,000 children aged under five from malnutrition and disease.

Rajan Menon, 4-4-2013, "India's Tough Road to the Security Council," National Interest, <<https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/indias-tough-road-the-security-council-8305>

Another problem is that India's entry into the Security Council can occur only as part of the Council's reform. Restructuring is certainly needed. The "P-5," China aside, reflects the balance of global influence and power circa 1945. Japan's not in the Security Council, but Britain is? France is a member, but Germany isn't? Brazil, the world's seventh-largest economy, doesn't deserve a seat?

Yet Security Council reform brings its own problems. China may be even more opposed to Japan's membership than to India's. France is the sole state from continental Europe. Won't that cachet evaporate if Germany, which already dominates the EU, joins the Security Council and comes to be seen by its other members as more consequential? Can Gallic pride handle that? And who will represent Latin America? The default answer: Brazil. Tell that to the Argentines. How about a spot for Africa? But who should get it? Perhaps South Africa, the continent's economic powerhouse. No, maybe Nigeria, its most populous country. Indonesia has more Muslims than any other nation. Shouldn't it have a seat?

Abdul Muheet, 12-16-2015, "Why India Should Seek Abolition Of UN Veto Rather Than Permanent Membership," HuffPost India, https://www.huffingtonpost.in/abdul-muheet-chowdhary/why-india-should-seek-abo_b_8809202.html

There is a very real danger that the expansion of the Security Council with the veto still in place will make it utterly dysfunctional. The proposal for increasing the number of seats along with regional representation will bring a far greater number of diverging interests to the table and if the veto is thrown into the mix it will be a lethal cocktail that will ensure the demise of the UN.

One only has to look at the experience of the League of Nations to realise this. Under article 5 (1) of the Covenant of the League of Nations, decisions of the Council required the agreement of all the Members present. This made it virtually impossible for the 15-member Council to function and as a result it was unable to prevent World War II. Extending the veto to new permanent members will ensure that the UN meets the same fate. As second-class citizenship (permanent membership without veto) is unacceptable, the only remaining option is to press for the veto's abolition.

Aïchatou Mindaoudou, September 2015, "From Independence to Long-term Stability: United Nations Efforts in Africa", Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire,

<<https://unchronicle.un.org/article/independence-long-term-stability-united-nations-efforts-africa>> Accessed 3/7/19 SS

In several parts of Africa, **the Security Council with its five permanent members has contributed to a perception of the United Nations as promoting the interests of a few super-Powers and, more specifically, the former colonial powers.** Large sections of the population in African countries feel somewhat detached from the United Nations. A few armed groups, of which Boko Haram is but one glaring example, display an increasingly defiant attitude vis-à-vis the United Nations. A Security Council in which African countries have a more entrenched role—if not a permanent seat—may help bridge the gap between the United Nations and the people whom it is called upon to assist. Alternatively, the United Nations should further enhance and institutionalize its cooperation with regional organizations, such as ECOWAS and the African Union, helping them to increasingly take the lead and responsibilities in resolving conflicts in Africa. The operationalization of the projected standby forces, early warning mechanisms and the existing infrastructures for peace for each of the five African regional groupings should be accelerated and resourced by concerned Member States.

YUKARI IWANAMI, August 12, 2011, “Setting the Agenda of the UN Security Council”, University of Rochester,

<<http://www.rochester.edu/College/gradstudents/yiwanami/agenda.pdf>> Accessed 3/7/19 SS

The coefficient estimates of P5 Involvement are both positive and statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level in Model I (a) and (b). **This result suggests that the Security Council is more likely to intervene in conflicts in which a permanent member has already become involved as a party to the conflict or as a third party. This result supports Hypothesis 2. Table 2 suggests that if a permanent member is not involved in a conflict, the likelihood that the conflict will enter the Council’s agenda is 5 percent and the likelihood that the conflict will give rise to resolutions is only 1 percent.** However, the involvement of a permanent member raises the former likelihood to 22 percent and the latter to 3 percent. The small impact on passage of resolutions suggests that passing resolutions requires more political factors than setting the agenda.

region has expressed certain reluctance to take up the causes Third World states. Speaking to top party cadres in 1990, Deng Xiaoping said, “Some developing countries would like China to become the leader of the Third World. But we absolutely cannot do that – this is one of our basic state policies. We cannot afford to do it and besides we are not strong enough. There is nothing to be gained by playing that role; we would only lose most of our initiative” (The Hindu, 2002). His reluctance has got a practical shape so far as Chinese contribution to the UN peacekeeping operations is concerned.

Sonia Rothwell, November 7, 2013, “Security Council reform: why it matters and why it's not happening”, OpenDemocracy,

<<https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opensecurity/security-council-reform-why-it-matters-and-why-its-not-happening/>>

The major criticism of the five permanent members (or P5) is that the panel lacks representation from Africa and Latin America, provides a platform for waning rather than rising powers and does not have a place for economically powerful nations such as India or Germany.

Overall global influence is now pivoting towards Asia and away from the West, meaning the composition of the UN Security Council reflects a post-World War II colonial system that is woefully outdated but still powerful.

Groups have formed to lobby for permanent positions on the UNSC or at least to make the council more representative. The G4—Brazil, Germany, India and Japan—want to expand the Security Council to 25 members, which would comprise an extra six permanent and four non-permanent members. The new permanent seats would guarantee two places for Africa, two for Asia, one for Latin America and the Caribbean (GULAC), and one for western Europe and other states.

Mishra, Manoj Kumar. "INDIA'S PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE U. N. SECURITY COUNCIL : CHANGING POWER REALITIES AND NOTIONS OF SECURITY." *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 67, no. 2, 2006, pp. 343–354. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/41856221.

During peacekeeping operations the socio-economic factors have to be taken into consideration. The Somalian case gives us the picture where India's role conformed to this notion of peace and was in complete contrast to the role of the US and West-European states. Secondly, the definition of peace for the Third World countries dumps the classical understanding of peace and security, which gives primacy to military factor and adores peace achieved through peaceful, negotiating and persuasive methods. **"While fully agreeing in the Security Council with the American and British contentions that international terrorism posed grave threat to international peace and security, India abstained in March 1992 on the resolution, which imposed air, arms and diplomatic sanctions against Libya. India correctly stated at that time, that punitive action was contemplated without exhausting the persuasive, diplomatic means"**

Mishra, Manoj Kumar. "INDIA'S PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE U. N. SECURITY COUNCIL : CHANGING POWER REALITIES AND NOTIONS OF SECURITY." *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 67, no. 2, 2006, pp. 343–354. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/41856221.

The definition of Third World security perspective was well articulated by Mudaliar who said that at a time when great emphasis was being laid on security and armed strength to prevent aggression, **"let us not forget for a moment" that the most emphasis has to be laid on "causes" that lead to war "economic and social injustices"**. It was perhaps in recognition of the contribution made by the Indian delegation to the deliberations on economic and social matters at San Francisco that Mudaliar was unanimously elected as the first President of 18-member Economic and Social Council at the first session of the UN General Assembly. **With this definitional framework India worked for the protection of Third World security interests.**

- Crippling the UN good
 - Adding India to the UNSC would cripple its operations → gridlock
 - Must add the G4 as well
 - No reform in sight (everyone has a plan, no one has a compromise)
 - Subpoint A: Philosophy (colonialism)
 - Founded on oppression or something
 - Only takes action when it concerns the P5 even tho “Developing nations provide the lion’s share of personnel.”
 - Subpoint B: UNSC action bad
 - *1) Defensive peacekeeping bad*
 - *Great power mediation cards bad*
 - *2) Economic sanctions bad*
 - Mainly hits citizens not wealthy political elites
 - *3) Offensive measures bad/R2P bad*
 - Cards from doc
 - Alt solvency - regional actors fill in when UNSC doesn’t [then give one blippy example of the African Union doing something in a conflict that the UNSC overlooked]

- C1 - helping Africa
 - Warrant 1 - UN legitimacy fading
 - Warrant 2 - sec council members don’t care about non major power conflicts (India invested in Africa??)
 - Warrant 3 - UNSC is military oriented/sanctions
 - India supports “peace building”
 - India opposes R2P
 - India opposes offensive interventions
 - Impact 1 - Helping Africa economically
 - Impact 2 - India trusted by Muslim nations.

- Impact 3 - Better conflict response?
- W - risk of offense