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A2 Pakistan-India Uniqueness

The Status quo is already really ready for war and more escalation.

- a) The TOI 19' ev shows that over 5 years there's been a 177% inc. in terrorism, squo obviously isn't getting better. Prefer the long term trend rather than short term decrease in tension.
- b) Chaudury of the IISS 19' writes that tensions are at the worst in 2 decades.

TOI in '19 who finds that

On the face of it, there can't be two more different personalities than former PM Manmohan Singh and PM Modi. The former is the self-effacing soft spoken technocrat, the latter a popular, swaggering, muscular nationalist. Yet in Kashmir, India's most complex conflict zone, there are lessons that muscular nationalists can learn from the softer more nuanced approach. A careful examination of the Manmohan years shows how the softer touch is always more successful in Kashmir than a hard-fisted ideological offensive, focused on zero tolerance of stone pelters and well-publicized surgical strikes. It must be recalled here that just two months after the surgical strikes there was a terror strike on the army base at Nagrota.

In the last five years there's been a 94% increase in number of security forces killed and a 177% increase in terrorist incidents. [because] State

violence inevitably normalizes and legitimizes extreme violence in _society. [and] **Overwhelming use of force by the government tends to erode the boundaries between law and crime, thus normalizing violence in society, inevitably [and] paving the way for** the next step in unrestrained violence, namely **terrorism.** Manmohan Singh's approach to Kashmir was to soften India-Pakistan borders by opening cross-border trade and implementing the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service in 2005, a landmark move which has stood the test of time. By working closely with first Mufti Mohammed Sayeed and then Omar Abdullah, Singh ensured the political process in J&K didn't flag. By sending a team of interlocutors headed by former editor Nileep Padgaonkar to Kashmir, Singh signaled New Delhi's doors were open for all Kashmiris.

<https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/02/only-india-and-pakistan-can-solve-current-crisis>

India–Pakistan tensions have reached their worst level in nearly two decades. It is time for both sides to show restraint, argues Rahul Roy-Chaudhury. For the first time since both countries became nuclear-weapons states, India has launched an airstrike within mainland Pakistan. The target was a terror camp of the Jaysh-e-Mohammad (JeM) in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, beyond Pakistan-administered Kashmir. On the morning of 26 February, 12 Indian Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft reportedly crossed the Line of Control (LoC) dividing Kashmir between India and Pakistan, and launched multiple 1,000kg precision-guided Spice 2000 missiles, destroying the camp. While this was stated to be a pre-emptive strike in self-defence against a prospective JeM terror attack against India, it served as retaliation for **the worst attack in three decades in Jammu and Kashmir that took place less than a fortnight earlier, killing 40 Indian paramilitary personnel in Pulwama.** The Pakistan-based JeM claimed responsibility for the attack.

A2 Embolden India (Push Own Agenda)

1. [Sidhu of LiveMint](#) reports that India has been successful in blocking the UNSC from taking action on Kashmir and stopping them from reprimanding India. India has been so successful to the point where [Sidhu](#) reports that the UNSC has not passed a single resolution on Kashmir since 1972 and India has blocked even *informal* meetings of the UNSC called by Pakistan to try and stop India. This is crucial, because it means India already has heavy power and political clout to stop anyone from backlashing on its actions and they should've been at least slightly emboldened already to cause conflict. However war or small scale conventional conflict has literally never escalated and India has never started war which proves their argument wrong.
2. Their impact should have already happened, India has been really involved with Kashmir tensions at the UN level for a while. In fact, the [Times of India in 2019](#) finds is that India has tried moving proposals that target Pakistan nationals in 2009, 2016, and 2017. In all three of those scenarios we saw nothing happen.
3. [The Express Tribune 19](#)' writes that India is currently violating UN resolutions on Kashmir. This delinks them in two ways-
 - a) Pakistan should feel violated by India's overreach of power already but they've taken no action.
 - b) India is going to feel emboldened and in a position of power in Kashmir either way- there's no real materialization of impact.
4. **[If link is Modi Backlash]** [CNN in 2019](#) finds that even considering that it is election time both sides, are just trying to show strength, and that Modi's airstrikes and so called "tension escalation" is pretty much over, and that de-escalation will start soon.
 - a. That's why the [Guardian in 2019](#) concludes that Modi was simply forced to respond strongly bc of the election, but bringing India into a war would ultimately hurt his election chances so he won't do anything.

timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/us-uk-and-france-move-uns-c-proposal-to-ban-masood-azhar/articleshow/68210871.cms.

The Security Council Sanctions Committee will have 10 working days to consider the fresh proposal submitted by the three members. The

proposal is the fourth such bid at the UN in the last 10 years to list Azhar as a global terrorist. In **2009, India had moved a proposal to designate Azhar, whose UN-proscribed JeM claimed responsibility for the suicide attack in Pulwama on February 14 in which 40 CRPF personnel were killed. In 2016, India again moved the proposal along with the US, the UK and France in the UN's 1267 Sanctions Committee to ban Azhar**, also the mastermind of the attack on the Pathankot air base in January 2016. **In 2017, the P3 nations moved a similar proposal again.** **However, on all occasions, China, a veto-wielding permanent member of the Security Council, blocked the proposal from being adopted by the Sanctions Committee.** India has strongly reiterated its appeal to all members of the international community to support the proposal to list terrorists, including Azhar, as designated terrorists under the 1267 Sanctions Committee of the UNSC, and to ban terrorist organisations operating from territories controlled by Pakistan.

www.livemint.com/Opinion/z2TqN6Xfr6aO9GAMSDh4UL/India-and-its-entry-into-UN-Security-Council.html.

Finally, most states elected to the UNSC start preparing years in advance for their role on the centre of the world stage and draw up ambitious plans of action. If they are fortunate and extremely dedicated, they might be rewarded by their action plan being partially accomplished. It is not clear whether India has even contemplated such a plan of action, let alone articulate it. Given these challenges, does being on UNSC as an elected member advance India's national security in any way? The short answer is "no". **Ever since 1971, India has been able to successfully block or deflect any UNSC resolution which was not in its favour. Indeed, so successful has India been in blocking UNSC on Kashmir that not only has the council not passed a single resolution on Kashmir since 1972, but even an informal meeting of UNSC (under the so-called Arria Formula) called for by Pakistan during its tenure as a security council member a couple of years ago was effectively scuttled by India.** Similarly, India was able to not only deflect but also use UNSC resolution 1172 to its advantage and began nuclear talks with all the five original nuclear weapon states to its advantage. Indeed, it could be argued that the origin of the India-US nuclear deal can be traced to UNSC resolution 1172.

<https://tribune.com.pk/story/1913743/1-new-delhi-continuously-violating-un-resolutions-kashmir-mazari/>

Human Rights Minister Shireen Mazari criticised India on Tuesday and said **New Delhi has continuously violated United Nations' resolutions on occupied Kashmir and Indian security forces are committing state terrorism in the region.** Radio Pakistan. She added that Indian forces committing human rights violations in the valley will not be able to suppress the freedom movement of the innocent Kashmiri people. **"New Delhi is continuously violating United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions on Kashmir and attempting to change the demography of the held valley."** "India is escalating tension in the region," said Mazari, adding that, New Delhi is resorting to Pulwama incident to divert attention from the upcoming elections in the country.

A2 Pakistan Perception

1. The argument that India is going to be emboldened as a "new status of a nuclear power" just isn't true. Modi has already taken a very hardline stance against Pakistan in the status quo, he has
 - a. Conducted many LOC attacks such as in 2016, and the airstrikes and been generally aggressive to the Kashmir region with nationalism.
 - b. India is already seen as a nuclear power by the whole world, there is no reason as to why Pakistan will just all of a sudden be like "oh wait this guy has nukes"- got approved in 90s.
2. The UN isn't the only thing that is changing Pakistan's perception of rising influence in the region. India is growing political influence in 2 ways that should have already triggered their link if it was true
 - a. CNBC '18 finds that previously southeast Asian nations used to look to China or the US as influence, but in the status quo the region is increasingly seeking alternative alliances and is going to India because they are a legit forceful counterweight to China and the US. In fact, they continue to say that every ASEAN leader wants India to play a more assertive role in the Indo-Pacific region.
 - b. India is a relatively stronger, more economically popular, and more politically powerful nation with positions in many international organizations Pakistan does not have such as the G4 and BRICS. India even gives aid to literally every country and has high international acceptance and appeal compared to an isolated Pakistan. This should have meant at least *some semblance* of their impact should have triggered.
3. Ultimately, Pakistan is never going to be threatened enough to trigger their link because they know that China is going to back them through the UN or unilaterally. The Washington Examiner

'19 writes that while India is on the rise to become a world power, a nationalistic China wants to keep them in a relative position of weakness. The Diplomat '18 furthers that China has now started to see India as a major rising power, and "won't sit around" to let them become a threat. With such a big an incentive to check India, China will always thwart indian influence by propping its pakistani ally, it already does this on the council. Asia Times '19 writes that China has consistently vetoed efforts to crack down on pakistani terrorists, and has done so for 4 consecutive years.

- a. The weighing here is simple Pakistan knows it has China on its side on the UNSC to block any harmful resolutions to them. They would never risk any sort of serious escalation, that could greatly endanger their future as a country, against India, over a small chance they might get hurt by some future action on the council. They are a rational actor, they know provocations against a much larger military under modi will not be beneficial for them.
- b. The perception does not matter to Pakistan as much as materialistic actions do. If the perception mattered to Pakistan then every action by India such as making more short range missile and mobilizing troops near the border would cause Pakistan to attack. Their country is too unstable in the status quo for them to take any provocative action, without any basis of action, the UNSC has too actually do something extremely harmful to Pakistan to make them drastically escalate the situation.
- c. The International community is already against Pakistan. The Hudson Institute '19 finds that there almost unanimous international support against Pakistan after the recent Pulwama attack. With the recent greylisting of Pakistan and countries such as Iran and the US who never agree on anything are changing their stance against Pakistan. They conclude that India can now count on its influence with the international community to pressure Pakistan. Pakistan already faces the perception that India is now legitimized in the eyes of the international community, the only major power who actively supports Pakistan is China. Even if India gets UNSC membership the international community already has accepted India's actions in the region.

<https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/03/article/china-again-vetoes-masood-azhars-terror-tag/>

China once again blocked the blacklisting of the chief of the Pakistan-based terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Masood Azhar, as a "global terrorist" at the United Nations on Wednesday. The resolution, spearheaded by France and backed by the United States and Britain, was vetoed by Beijing on the last day before the proposal was to be ratified by the 1267 Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council. The proposal was initiated after [last month's suicide bombing](#) in Indian-administered Kashmir, which killed 40 Indian police officials. JeM claimed responsibility for the terror attack, which later led to cross-border [military exchanges between India and Pakistan](#).

This is the fourth time, and the third successive year, that China has blocked a motion to blacklist Azhar at the UN. Beijing also vetoed the move in 2009, a year after the Mumbai terror attack was carried out by militants affiliated with the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba.

<https://outline.com/x4VWd4>

Yet, it is only now and under Modi, as India's stature in global politics has risen, that China has suddenly realized that — unlike Japan — India is a nuclear weapon state. Finally, thanks to the Modi government's uncharitable stance, it has dawned upon China's strategic affairs community that Beijing's Belt and Road strategy is bound to produce more and more structural contradictions between the two neighbors, already rapidly becoming hostile. No wonder, if the media reports from Beijing are true, that the Peoples Republic of China for the first time keenly awaited the outcome of this year's assembly elections in India. Following the Gujarat elections, the mandarins watching India in the Chinese foreign affairs ministry, it is believed, have predicted in their dossier that Modi will enjoy a second term as the prime minister in 2019. **Going by the current Chinese discourse, Beijing is certainly not going to just sit and watch and let India become a threat. The question that looms large, then, is what China is going to do about it.**

<https://outline.com/Y6uuFX>

China and India are also engaged in a [stand-off](#) over a mountainous area bordering Bhutan. Tensions here have declined recently, but they will eventually boil over again. That speaks to the ultimate challenge for China-India relations: conflicting nationalist ambition. **Ultimately, where Modi seeks to forge the world's largest democracy into an economic superpower and leading power on the international stage, China wants to keep India in a position of relative weakness. With both nations' populations possessing deep nationalist pride, their leaders are encouraged to pursue bold and, if necessary, aggressive policies. In turn, as India seeks more influence in Southeast Asia and China more influence in the Indian Ocean rim, the two nations will come into increasing tension.**

<https://www.hudson.org/research/14849-pakistan-s-moment-of-international-isolation-has-arrived>

Almost every major country, as well as the United Nations Security Council, have been unequivocal in condemning the terrorist attack and most have not minced words in assigning the blame to Pakistan. Even China disregarded Pakistan's usual ploy of linking terrorism to the situation in Jammu and Kashmir or demanding more evidence about those who orchestrated the attack in Pulwama. **This global condemnation was also visible at the February 17 meeting of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) where Pakistan was kept on the grey list** — meant for countries that have not done enough against money laundering and terrorist financing. Pakistan has reacted to global opprobrium with predictable denials but there seem to be no takers for the disavowal outside Pakistan. In the eyes of the world, there is no question that terrorist groups continue to freely operate, recruit, and obtain financial support in Pakistan and the country's government is not doing enough to control them. Even after the Mumbai terror attacks of 2008, statements by countries that used to be allies of Pakistan — the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union, as well as Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates — provided some leeway to Pakistan. Words such as “non-state actors” were sometimes used alongside expressions of faith in Pakistan's promises of acting against the terrorists. That seems to have changed. No one is now willing to praise the Pakistan government's actions against domestic terrorists while asking for action against terrorists targeting India and Afghanistan. **Iran has joined Pakistan's other two neighbours in alleging that Pakistan serves as a safe haven for terrorists, including those operating in Iran. The US and Iran seldom agree on foreign policy these days but they are speaking in the same voice in terms of criticising Pakistan's behaviour.** Even after the Indian punitive raid on Balakot, the US State Department did not equate Indian and Pakistani conduct. Its statement stated, “We reiterate our call for Pakistan to abide by its United Nations Security Council commitments to deny terrorists safe haven and block their access to funds.” **The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs went farther when it said, “France recognises India's legitimacy to ensure its security against cross-border terrorism and asks Pakistan to put an end to the operations of terrorist groups established on its territory.”** Statements by the Germans and Russians were no different. When Pakistan attempted to use the heightened India-Pakistan tensions to argue that Indian actions would hurt the Afghan peace process, Afghan leaders and the government called out Pakistan's bluff and openly supported India. **India can now count on its economic and strategic partnerships to pressure Pakistan with the help of the international community. Pakistan is increasingly isolated in a world that is regionally integrated, economically interconnected, and has reduced tolerance for terrorism. That is India's victory.**

[Southeast Asia going to India Instead of China – CNBC ‘18](#)

Beijing and Washington have long been the dominant powers in Southeast Asia, home to some of the world’s fastest-growing economies. But the region is increasingly seeking alternative alliances amid unease over China’s rising influence and perceptions of an unpredictable White House. “Specific Southeast Asian states are now seeking to diversify their strategic partnerships, beyond a binary choice between Beijing and Washington,” the Council on Foreign Relations, a U.S. think tank, said in a note this week. **A key element of those diversification efforts is working with India “as a more forceful counterweight to China and hedge against a declining United States.”** the note said. Southeast Asian nations are also looking at Australia as another potential

partner. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Canberra are holding a special summit between from March 16 to 18, a sign that the 10-nation bloc is exploring various hedging strategies against Beijing, said Geoff Raby, former Australian ambassador to China. Trade deals such as the newly inked Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans Pacific Partnership as well as intelligence sharing efforts on terrorism are also indicative of Southeast Asian leaders seeking greater regional cooperation. US “increasingly unreliable” Certain countries, such as Cambodia and Thailand, haven’t signaled opposition to Beijing’s growing clout in the area, which is reflected by an influx of Chinese-funded infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative and man-made Chinese islands in the South China Sea. But others, including Vietnam, have publicly come out against China’s behavior in the region. Previously, those nations could turn to Washington for leadership, but President Donald Trump’s controversial measures — from tariffs on foreign aluminum and steel imports to firing Secretary of State Rex Tillerson — has unnerved America’s Asian allies, according to strategists. “The manner in which Donald Trump handled Tillerson’s dismissal, combined with his snap decision to meet Kim Jong Un and other recent actions, reinforce the perception of the U.S. in Asia that the U.S. is increasingly unreliable,” said Philip Yun, executive director of Ploughshares Fund, an anti-nuclear weapons group. People in the region are paying attention to the fact that Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, “who had touted his close relationship with Trump, was blindsided by Trump’s agreement to a U.S.-North Korea summit,” Yun said. Also telling are recent comments from Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, Yun said. This week, Lee said ASEAN must adjust to a new power balance in Asia, suggesting the bloc look more to China and India. The U.S. is still widely expected to continue strong defense ties with Southeast Asian countries on matters such as freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. India’s rise in Southeast Asia

Widespread apprehension over China’s ambitions has helped Prime Minister Narendra Modi enhance political and economic ties with Southeast Asian economies under a policy known as “Act East.” Hanoi, for example, is partnering with New Delhi on South China Sea issues. In a meeting earlier this month, Modi and Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang committed to more defense equipment deals and joint exploration in the international waterway, prompting criticism from Beijing. “The two sides may, in the future, want to be close partners to some other future regional alternative, or at least, partial alternative, to Belt and Road,” according to the Council on Foreign Relations. Vietnam is also strengthening relations with other regional powers that are skeptical of or outright hostile to China, the organization said. And in January, India invited all 10 ASEAN leaders as chief

guests to its annual Republic Day celebrations — a historic first. The same month, New Delhi also invited those politicians to a summit aimed at promoting maritime security. **Every ASEAN leader wants New Delhi to play a more assertive role in the Indo-Pacific region.** Preeti Saran, secretary at India’s Ministry of External Affairs, was quoted as claiming at the time. **India is also a major player in a newly resurrected informal defense alliance known as “the Quad,” which is aimed at offsetting Chinese maritime expansion.** while **Vietnam, Singapore and Indonesia are gradually embracing the concept of a more assertive Indian role in Southeast Asia,** others like the Philippines and Malaysia remain silent on the matter, Manoj Joshi, distinguished fellow at Indian think tank Observer Research Foundation, said in a February report.

[China promotes national image unless it compromises interests – The Diplomat ‘14](#)

In short, **China does make genuine efforts to promote its national image to the international community as long as such efforts do not compromise China’s core national interests.** At the same time, China should also realize that there is room for improvement when it comes to the way China handles its national image. More transparency and quicker responses to crises could go a long way in improving China’s communication with other countries.

A2 Indian Economic Pressure

1. The SCMP ‘18 writes that the US has already shown extreme opposition to any Indian IMF loan that would be used to bailout Pakistan. This is because they see IMF loans going to Pakistan as just a way to back China. This is crucial as they find that since the US is a major power broker in the IMF they will effectively stop any bailout package- Indian economic pressure makes no difference if the aid isn’t going to come anyways.
2. Even if India stays out of the council they can just get their allies to block any proposal anyways, the US/France/UK could take those actions anyways.
- 3.

<https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2158663/how-us-policy-turning-pakistan-chinese-colony>

Ever since the inception of the economic corridor in April 2015, there were concerns that the US government would oppose the project under some pretext. The moment came on July 30 when US

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo vowed to block an International Monetary Fund bailout package for Pakistan if it is used to repay Chinese loans borrowed under CPEC.

Pakistan held its general elections on July 25, which were not free from claims of irregularities. However, election results confirmed that cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan will form the government. It was revealed that finance ministry officials have already presented an option for the new government to borrow US\$12 billion from the IMF to ease pressure on dwindling foreign reserves and repay overseas loans. Pakistan's economy is struggling and its remaining reserves of just US\$9 billion can only cover the country's imports for the next two months. Therefore, an IMF bailout is inevitable if Pakistan's economy is to survive. **Unexpectedly, just five days after Pakistan's elections, Pompeo opposed an IMF bailout**

package to Pakistan. He argued that American taxpayer dollars are part of IMF funding and therefore the US government would not allow a bailout package for Pakistan that could be used to repay Chinese creditors or the government of China. This is the first time the US government has openly made a move that is tantamount to attacking Pakistan-China economic cooperation.

Given that the US is a major power broker in the IMF, its opposition will effectively thwart a bailout package for Pakistan.

The country will have to explore other options to secure the funds needed to stimulate its economy. Unfortunately, there are not many countries or funding organisations that can offer Pakistan a generous financial bailout. Thus, Pakistan would be left with no choice but to ask for help from its all-weather friend – China.

A2 Indo-Pakistan War

1. **[If they read nuke war]**- Orchard of The RCW 19' explains that India and Pakistan will never nuke each other because of mutually assured destruction due to both sides having a nuclear deterrent and threat. Orchard furthers that no side is going to risk international backlash and their own country over small spikes in tensions.
2. Foreign Affairs '19 finds that history proves that nuclear escalation is unlikely between India and Pakistan. During the Kargil war both sides fought with little risk of nuclear escalation, two years later both countries came to a extremely tense standoff with the mass mobilization of forces, and both countries seemingly ready for assault, but there was no nuke war. Even though Pakistan's military holds an extreme view of India, it is not irrational and know the risks of war. Indeed, with the recent attacks after Pulwama both sides kept the possible use of nuclear weapons off the table.
 - a. Prefer the historical example, because the countries were actually in or coming close to situations of war but there still was no escalation. Make them prove to you why joining an international peacemaking council will trigger the use of nuclear weapons.
3. SCMP '19 finds that Pakistan's economy is in shambles right now, it cannot afford to be in direct confrontation with India especially during a severe recession. It would not only destroy any economy they had, but any future chance of building that economy back up again.
4. Kadir of The Globe Post 19' explains that the Indo-Pakistan relationship will never boil into conflict because both sides rely on each other and act as a counterbalance. For example, Kadir finds that the Pakistan military party and Indian governments rely continued acts aggression to secure the popular vote and stay in power. Even if tensions spike, it'll never go to actual conflict because politics come before nationalist beliefs.
5. All of this is why Sile of CNBC 16' finds that almost all experts agree any war between the two states is unlikely due to international and domestic backlash.

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2019-03-05/why-india-pakistan-crisis-isnt-likely-turn-nuclear>

No one can say for sure, but history suggests that there is cause for optimism. During the Kargil War, India worked to contain the fighting to the regions around Pakistan's original incursions and the war concluded with no real threat of nuclear escalation. Less than two years later, the two countries plunged into crisis once again. In December 2001, five terrorists from the Pakistan-based groups Lashkar-e-Tabia and Jaish-e-Mohammed attacked the parliament building in New Delhi with AK-47s, grenades, and homemade bombs, killing eight security guards and a gardener. **In response, India launched a mass military mobilization designed to induce Pakistan to crack down on terrorist groups. As Indian troops deployed to the border, terrorists from Pakistan struck again. In May 2002, three men killed 34 people in the residential area of an Indian army camp in Kaluchak, in Jammu and Kashmir. Tensions spiked. India seemed poised to unleash a military assault on Pakistan. Several embassies in New Delhi and Islamabad withdrew their nonessential personnel and issued travel advisories. The standoff lasted for several months, but dissipated when it became apparent that India lacked viable military options and that the long mobilization was taking a toll on the Indian military's men and materiel.** The United States also helped ease tensions by urging both sides to start talking. India claimed victory, but it was a Pyrrhic one, as Pakistan failed to sever its ties with a range of terrorist organizations.

There's reason to believe that the current situation is similar. **Pakistan's overweening military establishment undoubtedly harbors an extreme view of India and determines Pakistan's policy toward its neighbor. The military, however, is not irrational. In India, although Prime Minister Narendra Modi has a jingoistic disposition, he, too, understands the risks of escalation, and he has a firm grip on the Indian military.** Another source of optimism comes from what political scientists call the "nuclear revolution," the idea that the invention of nuclear weapons fundamentally changed the nature of war. **Many strategists argue that nuclear weapons' destructive power is so great that states understand the awful consequences that would result from using them—and avoid doing so at all costs. Indian and Pakistani strategists are no different from their counterparts elsewhere. Even Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, a political neophyte, underscored the dangers of nuclear weapons in his speech addressing the crisis last week. And Modi, for all his chauvinism, has scrupulously avoided referring to India's nuclear capabilities.**

<https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2188233/india-and-pakistan-are-not-going-war-any-time>

It is likely that had the Pulwama attack taken place at a time when elections in India were not around the corner, the Indian government would have never gone to the extent of conducting a raid inside Pakistani territory. Moreover, **Pakistan cannot afford to be adventurous on its eastern border given its own state of crisis. Pakistan is in the midst of a severe economic crisis – the country is facing a severe devaluation of its currency and running out of foreign exchange reserves to pay for imports. After assistance from China, Pakistan has now turned to Saudi Arabia to keep its economy functioning.**

Therefore, on the eve of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's visit to India, Pakistan has no incentive to sanction an attack against Indian paramilitary forces. Pakistan cannot afford an intense confrontation with India due to its economic woes.

https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2019/03/07/why_india_and_pakistan_avoided_nuclear_war_112984.html

Tensions have been high in South Asia, to say the least. India and Pakistan are nuclear powers, and any time one nuclear power attacks another it reminds us how easy it would be to trigger nuclear annihilation. All it takes is one miscalculation or mistaken intention for none of us to be here anymore. Though these concerns are valid, they are sometimes overblown. **The laws of deterrence that have governed nuclear brinkmanship since the advent of nuclear weapons are still in place today. And since India and Pakistan are constrained by these laws too, they were always unlikely to nuke each other into oblivion.** Still, the fact that they do occasionally engage in skirmishes makes the situation in South Asia unique among all territorial disputes and nuclear war games. Because the stakes are so high, it's important to understand how India and Pakistan got to this point and why nuclear weapons are likely to prevent a major conventional conflict, even if nuclear war can't be ruled out altogether.

<https://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/05/india-could-use-indus-river-water-treaty-to-pressure-pakistan-over-loc-tensions.html>

Experts largely agree that a full-blown war between the two nuclear-armed states is unlikely, as it would damage India's international reputation and Modi's efforts to turn the populous nation into an economic powerhouse.

Jawad Kadir, 4-3-2019, "India and Pakistan Won't Fight to Death Because They Need Each Other," Globe Post, <https://theglobepost.com/2019/03/06/india-pakistan-conflict/>

Suicide bombings, air strikes, and pilots being held captive are events that would, in any other circumstance, pre-empt a war on the horizon, **but Pakistan and India's complex relationship is unlikely to trigger such an event. Why? The two need each other alive.** Last month's suicide bombing in Indian-administered Kashmir that killed over 40 Indian soldiers was the deadliest militant attack on Indian forces since the insurgency against Indian rule in the region began three decades ago. A Pakistan-based terrorist organization claimed responsibility, which has once again escalated tension between the nuclear-armed rivals. The incident in Kashmir was followed by an Indian air strike on Pakistani territory claiming to kill over 300 terrorists. Pakistan denied this claim and said the attack only destroyed a few trees near the border. The very next day, Pakistani air force gunned down two Indian jets and captured one of the pilots.

Jawad Kadir, 4-3-2019, "India and Pakistan Won't Fight to Death Because They Need Each Other," Globe Post, <https://theglobepost.com/2019/03/06/india-pakistan-conflict/>

These developments have the international community worried about the possibility of an all-out conflict, which would seriously challenge security in the Asian subcontinent. **However, there also prevails a popular narrative that the elites in both countries use the flare-ups to serve their political agenda.** A recent book, **written by the former intelligence chiefs of India and Pakistan, goes further and claims that the governments sometimes accommodate each other. At times Pakistan has even allowed India to drop a couple of bombs at harmless places in Pakistan, just to satisfy the Indian public's opinion.** Since the violent 1947 partition of British India in India and Pakistan, both countries have pursued policies that diametrically oppose each other. **Pakistan's military even owes its powerful role in politics to the popular "desire" for competing/defeating India at any cost. The majority of Pakistanis see the military as the only powerful institution that can compete with India. To secure the popular votes, all the political parties in Pakistan currently seem to be on the same**

anti-Indian page. The scenario is not much different in India, where Prime Minister Narendra Modi is said to have ignited anti-Pakistani sentiments in light of the upcoming elections.

A2 Proxy Terrorism

1. The incentive to use proxy terrorism is always going to be immense. It is the only way for Pakistan to aggressively check India's geopolitical influence without crossing the line into all out war. Indeed the Times of India '19 writes that Pakistan will always use proxies no matter what because the goal of using proxies is long term perpetual resistance no matter what. Indeed, the ORF writes that Pakistan believes the only way to maintain its security is by ensuring India is weak and in a constant state of chaos. Pakistan is going to use proxies no matter what, especially with Modi being extremely aggressive in the Kashmir region, the UNSC would just be a marginal increase in the intensity of the conflict.
2. There will be not outright huge proxy war with Pakistan, the responses to the Pulwama attack recently were not very significant, with the only attack being an airstrike and then a quick de escalation afterwards. It's very hard to garner a big impact, this is just a conflict with short back and forth skirmishes. In fact, the last 5 years Modi has ramped aggression in the Kashmir region significantly with no extreme blowback in terms of escalation.
3. Pakistan won't be able to do it anymore. This is because [DW '19](#) finds that the UNSC recently unanimously passed a binding resolution that makes terrorism financing legally or illegally a serious crime, and will be responded to by sanctions. They further that although this has been addressed by the UN before, this is the first comprehensive measure ever passed with many regulations that must be followed.
 - a. We O/W on Strength of Link - Pakistan's economy is already bad so even if they want to make India seem weak, if all the major powers in the world sanction them they will look a lot weaker geopolitically.
4. Masood of The New York Times 19' explains that because Pakistan has been threatened to be blacklisted by the Financial Task Force due to terrorism but need an IMF bailout soon, they are cutting off ties to proxy terrorism by freeing assets of militant groups, stopping money laundering, and isolating terrorists. This is why Gettleman of The New York Times 19' reports this month that the Pakistani government is taking active steps to stop armed militias and will end them.

Shah of the ORF '18 reports that

Pakistan uses jihad, conducted by subnational groups (with state support) as an instrument that allows it to punch above its geopolitical weight.^[1] Part of the country's strategic thinking is believing in the false idea that the only way to preserve its own security is by ensuring India is weak, defeated or kept in a constant state of chaos. Pakistan believes it can achieve this imperative by supporting militant actors, thereby

ensuring the Pakistani State has plausible deniability when the militant group strikes. Pakistan's strategy of 'bleeding India by a thousand cuts' has been implemented by exploiting religious sentiments and whipping up passions on communal and sectarian lines. Before launching its proxy war in Kashmir in 1989, it exploited the tribal areas in Northeast India, and exploited discontented youth in Punjab to fight for the creation of Khalistan, a new Sikh nation-state. By supporting the Sikh militancy in Punjab, it hoped to tie down Indian security forces and divert them from the defence of Kashmir. When India crushed the Khalistani separatist movement, Pakistan turned its attention once again to Kashmir, fomenting instability in the state to check India's power.

The Economic Times '19

Transforming this Pakistani behaviour fundamentally would require India to either engineer its own failure (so as to cease unnerving Pakistan through its strength), or surrender to Pakistani extortion over J&K. Because neither outcome is plausible -- and the prospect of a civilian government in Pakistan truly controlling the deep State is a pipedream -- India has to accept that Pakistan's efforts at strategic coercion through terrorism will persist well into the future. **Pak[istan] may occasionally change tactics. It may sporadically restrain its proxies to permit the realisation of certain ends, such as encouraging bilateral negotiations or demonstrating Pakistan's credentials as a responsible State. But such pauses will always be ephemeral, [temporary] because the overriding objective remains perpetual resistance to India. And there is no better instrument of defiance today than terrorism by proxy.**

<https://www.dw.com/en/un-security-council-binding-resolution-makes-terror-financing-a-serious-crime/a-48105141>

The **United Nations Security Council on Thursday unanimously passed a French resolution making terrorism financing a serious crime. The binding resolution**, drafted under chapter 7 of the UN Charter, **can be backed with sanctions for countries that do not comply.** Although the topic of terror financing has been addressed in a number of resolutions since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, Thursday's **measure is the first comprehensive terror financing resolution the body has ever passed. The resolution demands that individual countries "ensure that their domestic laws and regulations establish [terror financing as] serious criminal offenses.**" Vladimir Voronkov, the UN's counterterrorism chief, said the resolution "comes at a critical time" as it is clear to all that terrorists are funded through both illegal and legal channels.

www.nytimes.com/2019/03/05/world/asia/pakistan-terrorism-blacklist-sanctions.html?module=inline.

Pakistan said on Tuesday that **it would take new steps to seize and freeze the assets of people and militant groups** who are on the United Nations' list of designated terrorists, after months of international criticism. The announcement came as India and Pakistan were still on edge after a suicide bombing in Kashmir last month led to a military clash between the two. And last month, a financial watchdog group, **the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force, said Pakistan was still not taking enough concrete steps to curb financing and money laundering by terrorist groups. Pakistan risks being blacklisted by the task force, which would open the door to international sanctions that would be devastating** to the country's already teetering economy. Pakistan's military has long been accused by its neighbors and Western countries of cultivating militant groups to use as proxies, including the Afghan Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba, which was widely accused of orchestrating the 2008 Mumbai attacks that killed more than 160 people. The financial task force demanded more action in particular against Lashkar-e-Taiba and against Jaish-e-Muhammad, a militant group that claimed responsibility for the Feb. 14 bombing in Kashmir that killed 40 Indian paramilitary soldiers. "There is a total consensus across all state institutions that these religious militias of all kinds represent a liability from the 1990s, a baggage of the past," Moeed Pirzada, an analyst and television news host who has been briefed by civilian and military officials, said in an interview on Tuesday. "They don't serve any purpose and need to be absorbed into mainstream society through alternate job creation." Mr. Pirzada said **the main challenge was to make inroads against such groups by taking over the religious schools, hospitals and relief organizations that they operate as fronts. Prime Minister Imran Khan's government made some budgetary allowances for those action** S in December, he said. Sign up for The Interpreter Subscribe for original insights, commentary and discussions on the major news stories of the week, from columnists Max Fisher and Amanda Taub. But **Pakistani officials say that there is greater urgency now, and that Mr. Khan's administration is worried about becoming an international pariah if it fails to act** On Monday evening, Mr. Khan gave a rare background briefing to news show hosts in which he reportedly emphasized that the time had come to do more to crack down on militant groups. **Pakistani officials say they plan to freeze the assets of more groups, and to take control of religious seminaries that are affiliated with them.** The officials said that more travel restrictions would also be imposed on militant leaders. In an initial sign of a crackdown, the Pakistani authorities have detained 44 people, including the brother and son of Masood Azhar, the chief of Jaish-e-Muhammad. Shehryar Afridi, the state minister for interior, who announced the move during a news conference in Islamabad, did not specify any charges and said the detentions were meant for investigations.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/09/world/asia/imran-khan-pakistan.html>

A2 Break Chinese Paki Relations

Need to look through:

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/03/pakistan-cant-afford-chinas-friendship/>

1. Pakistan would never break off relations, they need them too much. [Economic Times writes in 2019](#) that Pakistan clutched loans from China, which were barely enough to cover their shortfall. If they break off rels, they lose the money, along with a ton of other support China provides. Literally suicide.
 2. Zero contextualization on the exact impact of joining council. [Economic Times in 2018](#) writes that India and China have signed the first joint-intel treaty between the two, and yet Pakistan never responded back with damaging their relationship with China. Make them give you any example of where China and India have grown closer and the result is backlash from Pakistan. Insofar as intel sharing is probably much more direct of a threat to Pakistan than India joining the sec-council, their link isn't true.
 3. Breaking off relations wouldn't be that bad. [Crisis Group in 2018](#) analysing China's promised development of energy plants in Pakistan found that the obligations China's attached would essentially cause a net deficit gain from agreeing. Moreover, China's plans for development would widen income inequality and flame internal tensions, as most of the development would happen in the richest of areas, and would involve foreigners coming and seizing land that has been held by families for generations. China isn't here to help Pakistan, they're here to take over.
 4. Breaking off relations would open the door to talks. [India Today in 2018](#) writes how India doesn't want to have talks with Pakistan with a third party involved. Unfortunately, as long as Pakistan and China are friends, Paki will demand China be involved. Keeping third parties away is key to solving this crisis, the reason why shit didn't get fixed earlier was bc ppl like the UN and US got involved and messed shit up.
-
1. Joining council doesn't do anything
 2. T: China bad for paki
 3. T: would lead to more talk w india, reduce tensions

Economic Times 2019

New Delhi: Pakistan's financial woes are far from over despite support from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, forcing Islamabad to turn to its all-weather ally China for a loan of \$2.5 billion (nearly Rs 18,000 crore).

China has agreed to provide the money to help Pakistan boost its official foreign exchange reserves, which are not sufficient to provide cover for even two months of imports despite receiving \$4 billion of loans from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, ET has learnt.

China has em ..

Read more at:

[//economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/67891009.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/67891009.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst)

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/297-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-opportunities-and-risks>

While it is too early to assess if CPEC can deliver the economic gains Islamabad promises, the project risks inflaming longstanding tensions between the centre and smaller federal units and within provinces over inequitable economic development and resource distribution. Less-developed federal units such as Balochistan and Sindh contend that the corridor's route, infrastructure and industrial projects will mostly benefit Punjab, already the country's wealthiest and politically powerful province. Yet, even in Punjab, locals could forcibly resist the state's acquisition of land for CPEC's agricultural projects. **In Balochistan, CPEC is exacerbating existing grievances among a population whose perceptions of exploitation and neglect by the centre, together with authorities' suppression of dissent, have long fuelled an insurgency.** The province will receive no direct financial benefits from Gwadar port, a key CPEC project, which means local anger at Islamabad is likely to intensify. Instead of developing a sleepy fishing village into a bustling commercial hub as pledged by Islamabad and Beijing, the project is producing a heavily militarised zone, displacing locals and depriving them of economic lifelines. **In Sindh's Tharparkar district, coal-based CPEC power projects are not only damaging the environment, but are also displacing locals from their homes and could destroy livelihoods.** Islamabad has encouraged CPEC investment in power production, with power projects included in its first ("early harvest") phase. To attract Chinese investment, most plants are being built with Chinese equipment and many will be Chinese-owned. More wattage for the national grid will certainly help reverse the decline in economic productivity caused by long power outages. Yet the pace of implementation has been slow at best. Moreover, International Monetary Fund (IMF) assessments show that Pakistan's repayment obligations, including the payment of debts and guaranteed rates of return on equity for investors (17 per cent for power projects), **"will likely offset a significant share of these [foreign direct investment and other external funding] inflows, such that the current account deficit would widen"**. It warned, **"Pakistan's capacity to repay could deteriorate at a faster pace, with faster depletion of foreign exchange reserves and significant implications for economic growth"**.

Yet however pleasing these headline-making, big-ticket infrastructure projects may sound, the insiders—those tediously absorbed in these projects, and well versed in their finer details—reveal a completely different picture. And **history**, **gives plenty of reason to believe that the China-Pakistan commercial and political association is more a publicity stunt than a serious partnership. Policy experts in Pakistan believe that these ambitious commercial pledges from China**—stocked with promises of pipelines, ports, energy corridors, railway lines, and transport networks—**will never fully materialize in the way they are presented in the media**. The bilateral relationship is marred by a number of complexities and is driven mainly by strategic objectives and the persistent desire to contain India. Indeed, **it is really the failure to handle India's growing geo-strategic designs that brought Pakistan and China together in**

the first place, paving the way for a superficial collaboration that has never run deep China and Pakistan's opportunistic

partnership goes back to March 1959, when the Tibetan uprising grew to staggering proportions, forcing Mao Zedong to deploy the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to subdue the unrest in the region. Through credible intelligence, Mao soon discovered India's hand in stirring the Tibetan guerrillas, who had been armed with the help of the CIA. Tensions reached a boil in the early 1960s, when China built a 750-mile long military road linking Xinjiang province with Lhasa, the capital of the Tibet province. The road meandered through a flat plateau in the south of Tibet, 112 miles of which were claimed by Delhi. Mao initially fumed but then proposed a settlement, which Nehru quite readily and without any reserve rejected. Worse, Nehru in November 1961 pursued a "forward policy" deploying Indian troops across the disputed landscape, which Mao and his senior generals found intolerable. An aggravated Mao then ordered the Chief of the PLA to launch a decisive blow, storming through Indian positions and devastating her army's morale. A ceasefire was ordered in November 1962. Indian forces were terribly jolted, as they began their long retreat. Nehru was mentally spent. Three years later, India's war with Pakistan clearly defined the course that the region's strategic politics were going to take. The deteriorating India-Pakistan relationship that followed the 1965 war created an atmosphere of great distrust in the region, at a time when Sino-Indian tensions still simmered after their border war. Thus began Pakistan's long and convoluted alliance with China, based on a mutual recognition of India as their common adversary. The Pakistanis, led by former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for many years after the Indian conflict, used the Sino-Indian territorial bickering to their advantage. The development of Pakistan's nuclear bomb was a direct result of this long strategic linkage. Dr. A. Q. Khan, the instigator of Pakistan's nuclear research, teamed up with leading Chinese nuclear scientists, setting up a state-of-the-art nuclear plant and research center in Kahuta, a lovely green hamlet roughly 30 miles south of Islamabad. Chinese engineers lodged at Kahuta's palatial guesthouse where together they studied American and Russian bomb designs. There were also regular Islamabad-bound flights from Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, bringing in useful material for the bomb. The United States intelligence community knew about Pakistan's camouflaged nuclear build-up and considered it an irritant, yet they tolerantly looked the other way, given the role of the Pakistan Army in

the Cold War alliance forged to contain the Soviets. **Despite this Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation, though, China never declared or boasted of its military alliance with Pakistan, preferring to keep the association as incubated and indifferent as possible. That is why the Chinese have never subscribed to any joint defense pacts or treaties with Pakistan, and never committed its soldiers to Pakistani border brawls with India.** When Bhutto

proposed a defense agreement to the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai in 1974, it was tactfully and gently brushed off. **So although the Chinese have kept the supply of guns, tanks, small arms, rockets, and other ammunition flowing profusely to Pakistan, they've drawn a line by publicly declaring that they won't extend any nuclear umbrella to any state, including Pakistan. This polite indifference towards Pakistan complicates the friendship narrative that the Islamic Republic intermittently brags about. On the economic front, the relations between the two countries have historically been promising in theory but weak in reality. The great irony of this commercial relationship has been that despite a spate of free trade agreements over the past several decades, bilateral trade has never genuinely taken off. Moreover, Pakistan has never had any comparative advantage over China, as over 75 percent of their trade is composed of Pakistani imports, tipping the trade balance in China's favor by a huge margin, and putting extra pressure on the Pakistani rupee.** Andrew Small, a leading expert on the Pakistan-China relationship, has argued that their economic ties are underwhelming. There is ample statistical evidence to make the case. **Pakistani**

exports to China in the past fiscal year declined to \$1.62 billion. By contrast, imports from China ballooned to a mammoth \$10.53 billion, a 123 percent surge over the previous four years. This means that Pakistani bazaars are literally swamped with Chinese goods and a large majority of small and medium enterprises are rapidly going out of work. Worse, the actual financial assistance that China recurrently pledges to Pakistan has never been all that generous. A fact-finding RAND study found that of the \$66 billion in aid pledged by China between 2001 and 2011, only 6 percent of it ever came through. In the light of this history, then, **the highly touted announcements about the transformative potential of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor should be treated with due skepticism.** It is safe to say that the

benefits of these projects to Chinese companies and China's GNP are far greater than the benefits to Pakistan. **Moreover, the actual picture on the ground is inauspicious, as the ability of the Pakistani state to provide a safe passage to Chinese money remains open to question. Scores of Chinese engineers attached to various infrastructure projects have been killed over the past few years by embittered Baloch tribes or by diehard religious zealots, both of whom view China's expanding influence as another form of foreign occupation that guarantees little prosperity for the local public. A growing Chinese presence can** therefore **be either a blessing or a curse for Pakistan.** It may

prove a blessing, provided Pakistan's fickle, faithless and corruption-loving leaders can avoid being consumed by their crusade against inborn terrorists and seize the opportunities stemming from a growing Chinese commitment to the region. But **it may yet prove a curse, if China continues to view Pakistan through a purely instrumental lens and average Pakistanis continue to resent and reject Beijing's influence.** For now, the future of this much advertised corridor remains deeply mired in uncertainty.

A2 Modi reelection bad

1. Reuters '19 finds 2 things

- a. There are a bunch other things that are “key” issues besides security and nationalism in this election such as farmer distress, jobs, and religion. They have to prove why getting a win in foreign policy is enough to overshadow these other issues and help Modi win.
 - b. The issue of muscular nationalism is more about the idea of being aggressive towards Pakistan and terrorism rather than getting accession to organizations. If anything if Modi gets onto to the UNSC he would just be even more aggressive towards Pakistan and trigger our impact on Pakistani backlash even more.
2. [Forbes '19](#) finds that Modi is already on track for repeat victory this year and the BJP will still hover around a majority in Lok Sabha. This is why [Rusell of Express News](#) this week reports that most experts and polls believe Modi will win the slim majority. He doesn't need the UNSC to propel him to victory.
 3. [Bloomberg '18](#) notes that Modi accomplished the three major voting issues in the previous election: landmark economic reform, a lack of scandal and a more agile government. This shows that he not only has the trust of the electorate but the proven power to affect change in India.
 4. Finally, because Modi winning is crucial to solving the conflict in Kashmir. [India Today '19](#) explains that because Modi has the credibility to make a deal with Pakistan and still appear strong, he has the best probability of forcing a settlement. That's why the Prime Minister of Pakistan explicitly said there would be a better chance of peace talks if he won and not the INC.

A2 IMF loans bad

1. India already has enough geopolitical clout to influence institutions like the IMF for more bailouts, it has the world's second biggest population and is the biggest democracy, that's why India was bailed out in '91. Their evidence is just analyzing non permanent members who
 - a. Are most of the time smaller countries who don't have much international clout
 - b. Who aren't strong allies of Western European nations and the US like India is, who are the biggest influencers in the IMF.
2. Reuters '18 finds that after India gave a 32 billion bailout package, India is stopping any other bailout packages in the future and leaving the banks to fix themselves. Even if they prove the probability increases they have to prove intent to get loans.
 - a. Not going to happen- IMF Loans meant to restructure economy, but India has high economic growth now meaning they won't get ask.
3. The Economic Times '17 finds that a bailout for India's banking problem will be manageable with the IMF saying that recapitalization will be affordable even under a negative consequence, with costs being from 1.5 to 2.4% of the forecasted GDP.
4. The Economic Times '19 finds that the IMF in the status quo is just recommending India to make reforms of its banks, it has not made it out to be a huge full blown crisis. If what they are saying is true then India should be at the IMF's doorsteps demanding loans.

Noting that the level of non-performing loans in India remains high, the International Monetary Fund has favoured bolstering the level of capitalisation of some banks, particularly government-owned banks.

Anna Ilyina, Division Chief of IMF Monetary and Capital Markets Department, said Wednesday that bolstering the level of capitalisation was one of the recommendations of the Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) for India.

"The level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in India remains high. And the level of the capitalization of some banks, particularly government-owned banks, should be bolstered," said Ilyina. **"There were some steps that were taken by the authorities to boost capital buffers in banks and also to improve governance in state-owned banks that have had some positive impact," Ilyina said.** The institutional mechanisms for resolution and the recognition of NPLs are, of course, an extremely important part of the process of cleaning up the banking system of non-performing loans, she said adding that the authorities should continue working along these lines.

<https://in.reuters.com/article/us-india-banks/india-pushes-state-banks-to-find-own-funding-sources-after-32-billion-bailout-idINKCN1H91FJ>

A massive \$32 billion bailout package for India's dominant state-run banks will not happen again and lenders will have to find their own funding by selling non-core assets and merging with each other, a senior government official said on Monday.

Twenty-one banks, majority owned by New Delhi, account for more than two-thirds of the banking assets in Asia's third-biggest economy. These lenders also account for close to 90 percent of soured loans in the banking sector. Last October, the finance ministry announced a state-bank rescue plan worth 2.11 trillion rupees (\$32.41 billion) - \$14 billion of which it is in the process of injecting as a first tranche - to help banks set aside enough for their bad loans and boost credit growth in an economy where banks are the main source of funding.

"My message is no more recapitalization. Whatever has happened, has happened. Clean up on your own," the official who oversees the state banking sector told Reuters.

<https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/imf-leadership-what-the-united-states-should-do/>

An even more basic problem at the IMF and World Bank needs attention. **Because of historical and political inertia, Western European nations and even the United States exert voting influence and control of Executive Board constituencies disproportionate to those of developing nations.**

If the IMF and World Bank are to be perceived as legitimate, responding equitably to all the world's people, adjustments in the relative sizes of countries' quotas and voting powers to mitigate those imbalances

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/india-banking-bailout-cost-manageable-imf/articleshow/57296801.cms>

The cost of recapitalising India's struggling banks would be affordable even under a negative scenario, the International Monetary Fund said on Wednesday, urging government steps to strengthen the financial system. **Weighing into a renewed debate on tackling India's \$130 billion in stressed loans, the IMF said "recapitalisation costs should be manageable" at between 1.5 and 2.4 percent of forecast GDP. Of that total, the government's share would be between 1.0 and 1.6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) over the four years to March 2019,** assuming that 40 percent of loans have to be provided against. India's finance ministry earlier backed a call by the Reserve Bank of India to set up a "bad bank", saying urgency was needed to address troubled loans weighing on the banking sector.

A2 Aid Bad (Giving)

1. The Diplomat '18 finds that due to "budgetary constraints" India has decreased its aid budget by 22%. This is crucial as India is extremely tight with its ability to give out assistance especially as India's economy grows slower and slower. This puts them in a double bind
 - a. India does not have the capability to send aid so their impact doesn't materialize

- b. India does end up sending aid to countries but does it through cutting aid from existing places meaning they have no net impact.
2. They have to prove India gets into a situation where they have actually to use their aid to buy votes. Rather the ORF '17 finds that India has voted affirmative on resolutions 89% of the time, and not more than 12 times did they stand without a majority. That's why ORF concludes that India is making effort for democratic majority building.
 - a. This means that India won't have to use aid to get buy other votes because usually their votes are with the majority
 - b. They probably have other p5 members like the US or China sending foreign aid to buy votes anyways.
3. The [GPJ in '16](#) finds that indian aid is directly structured to the needs of the specific country, leading to more productive investments. In fact [Piccio of Devex '13](#) finds that indian aid has built dams in places like Afghanistan and Bhutan, and created investments in internet infrastructure, schools, and hospitals in places like Nepal and Africa, rather than simply handing over money. That's why overall, WMU finds that for every 1% increase in aid the average income shortfall of the poor drops by 3%, and the amount of people below the poverty line drops by .018%.

<https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/preserving-indias-diplomatic-influence-on-a-shoestring-budget/>

On paper, India, which used to be the highest recipient of the multilateral development aid, has made the transition into the role of a provider. In the financial year 2015-16, India gave Rs 77.19 billion (~\$1.2 billion) in aid while it received Rs 21.44 billion (~\$350 million) in aid from foreign countries and global banks. In 2016, the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) was merged with the MEA to enhance diplomatic back-up and coordination and increase efficiency. What grabbed this budget's headlines was MEA receiving an increase of Rs 2.13 billion (~\$35 million) from the past year. It has been allocated Rs 15.01 billion (~\$230 million). **However, a closer view from the GDP standpoint reveals**

a steady decline in MEA budget allocation since 2015-2016. The Parliamentary committee in a report in 2017 had noted the “problem of budgetary constraints which has resulted in the lack of coherence in foreign policy implementation.” There has been a decline in the share of India’s external loans and assistance. The government had allocated a total of Rs 76.59 billion (~\$1.2 billion) in the budget estimates for foreign aid. However, the revised estimates for this year has been further cut down to Rs 58.20 billion (~\$900 million) — a drop of 22 percent.

<https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-pursuit-united-nations-security-council-reforms/>

The typical Indian preferences in the UNSC has always been to be a part of the democratic majority contributing to the adoption of broadly acceptable resolutions and decisions. **Analysing all terms of India in the SC barring the last one, Murthy (2011, p.3) points out that India joined 59 percent of the resolutions adopted either unanimously or without a vote. With regard to aggregate of 113 adopted resolutions (41 percent) that gave rise to a division, India cast an affirmative vote on 101 (89 percent) of them. Significantly, on not more than a dozen times did India stand aside without joining the concurrent majority, and has not voted against any resolution,** and resorted to abstentions only to express its reservations. Remarkably, India was never a loner in abstaining as it always had the company of other Council members on many occasions. The **Indian behaviour herein clearly points to a systematic effort to display a constructive, rule of law abiding and a democratic majority building state in a global, multilateral setting like the Security Council.**

Indian aid perfectly fills this space as it provides untied aid in the form of concessional grants and loans to her neighbours, targeted at infrastructure development. India provides aid to her neighbours in sectors that

hold mutual economic-strategic interest, such as transport, energy and democracy. In this manner, India acknowledges the development needs of her neighbours, especially smaller landlocked countries like Bhutan and Nepal. Development cooperation is encouraged in areas with vast potential such as hydropower electricity in Bhutan, road and rail connectivity projects in Nepal. **Indian aid programs also do not interfere with recipient's domestic policies and respect their sovereignty.** These programs thus are incongruent to western aid strategy as they have a direct impact on development of the recipient via targeted investment in sectors like energy, manufacturing, connectivity, trade infrastructure etc. Teresa Hayter succinctly describes foreign aid as an instrument for promoting imperialism because it sustains the unequal relationship between donor and recipient. Foreign assistance from India however does not promote a culture of pauperization (or absolute dependence) in the recipient country as advocated by traditional foreign aid theorists. India's aid strategy in South Asia rests on tenets of common development, equality and mutual benefit. In addition, Indian aid projects provide autonomy to the recipients as these are based on a demand-driven approach wherein aid-receiving countries identify priority sectors for investment and development cooperation. These sectors are predominantly energy and transport, which are pivotal to development of the entire South Asian region. India's aid strategy in South Asia is focused on enhancing the export potential of the recipients' priority sectors by providing them support in the form of technical knowledge, capital resources, capacity building etc. **India does not follow 'one size fits all' approach** while providing aid to South Asian economies. **It formulates an aid package specific to interests of the recipient country. For instance – in Afghanistan, India's development assistance projects cater to stabilising the war-prone country, with looming security threats from extremist groups, by building the democratic capacity of the Afghan government and its institutions.** This is quite different from India's aid projects in countries like Bhutan, Bangladesh and Nepal where the majority of aid is concentrated in developing infrastructure for trade and transport connectivity. It can be concluded that aid from India to South Asian economies, although contradicting the western approach, is potentially more beneficial and effective in achieving development goals because it is targeted at relevant productive sectors. An effective foreign aid strategy requires that donor nations respect recipients' sovereignty and development needs. This is aptly demonstrated by India's aid programs in South Asia that are based on common development goals and are guided by recipients' needs and demand.

The negative and significant estimates of the aid parameter in columns (3) through (6) suggest that aid helps even the poorest of the poor who survive on a dollar a day or less. The estimate in column (3) indicates **that a one percentage point increase in aid reduces the average income shortfall of the poor by 3 percent.** Another interesting finding is the effect of finance on poverty. We find consistently negative and significant estimates for finance, suggesting a prominent role that financial sector development can play in poverty reduction. This finding is in line with that of Beck et al. (2007) who argue that financial development raises incomes of the poor more than proportionately.

and

When we use the headcount index, **a one percentage point increase in aid to a recipient country reduces the proportion of people living below the poverty line by 0.018 percent.** This result is consistent with the findings of Mosley & Suleiman (2007) who find that aid reduces headcount poverty by a similar magnitude in cross-country analysis of 49 countries. Hence, taking into account this direct effect of aid on poverty, poverty-efficient allocation of aid calculated by Collier & Dollar (2002) could have an even stronger poverty reduction effect.

A2 Aid Bad (Receiving)

1. India does not rely on aid. Devex '14 finds that India has emerged as a significant aid donor, with a 55% difference in total aid given and received. As countries see India as a country that is diverging away from aid, the incentive to buy their vote using aid significantly decreases.
2. India has spent 20+ years trying to get on the UNSC, once they get onto the council they won't just sit back and let people buy their vote. Rather Mukherjee '13 finds that Indian policymakers see the UN as place to expand the country's influence and national interests. The p5 would see India, especially under Modi, as a country with its own agenda that is not easily influenced and susceptible to economic incentives. There is a reason why the p5 doesn't send aid to a country like China who still uses developmental assistance, because they know it will never take the bite on aid.
3. The New York Times '12 finds that India has now felt it has reached a position of global power and is now looking to reject the idea of "rich countries giving aid to poorer ones". India will never become reliant on aid on the council, it is fundamentally against its ideologies. Indeed, the Hindu '18 writes that India has increasingly become paranoid about foreign aid coming with strings attached and trying to undermine the Indian state. That's why the find India has been defunding thousands of foreign NGOs.
4. USAID reports that aid in India is specifically targeted and on a community basis, allowing it to be uniquely successful. In fact, the UN writes that foreign aid in India has lifted millions out of poverty. This is why WMU finds that for every 1% increase in aid the average income shortfall of the poor drops by 3%, and the amount of people below the poverty line drops by .018%.

This paper examines the effect of official development aid (ODA) on income inequality in developing countries. Using data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, we use a country fixed-effects approach to address endogeneity issues. **We find no significant effect of ODA per capita on inequality in developing countries. We therefore conclude that, consistent with previous research in the field, ODA does not significantly contribute to the economic growth and development of developing nations, nor does it appear to decrease income disparity. This analysis adds to the body of literature by using a county fixed-effects approach to analyze the effect of ODA per capita on GINI, something not common in the literature, to obtain our result showing no significant effects.** <https://www.devex.com/news/in-latest-indian-budget-aid-spending-dwarfs-aid-receipts-82915> **The budget reveals that the Indian government's foreign aid expenditures will reach \$1.3 billion in 2014-15 — more than double New Delhi's anticipated net foreign aid receipts of \$655 million that financial year.** According to Indian government figures, the South Asian country has been giving more aid than it has been receiving since 2012-13. **The gap between New Delhi's foreign aid expenditures and receipts has widened significantly, from just 1 percent in 2012-13 to 55 percent in 2013-14.** (Based on figures from the [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development](#), however, India remains a net ODA recipient).

Mukherjee '13

<https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.epw.in/journal/2013/29/special-articles/india-and-un-security-council.html> Shyam Saran lays out the simple logic behind this observation, "India sees its interest best served in a rule-based, multilaterally structured and democratically governed international system. The UN is obviously the logical platform for such a system, although its limitations and infirmities are all too evident".¹² Whereas Nehru's faith in the UN might have been utopian (to the detriment of Indian interests), Indian policymakers today are far more pragmatic, viewing the UN as one avenue among others through which to advance India's international interests. In this sense, India has matured into a responsible stakeholder in principle, though it is a long way off from navigating the multilateral system for its own benefit as other major powers do

<https://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/a-global-shift-in-foreign-aid-starting-in-india/> **Sixty years later, Britain's decision to pull the plug on funding to India was met with little more than a shrug by India's political class. "We don't really need the aid," P. Chidambaram, the finance minister, said last week. "We have accepted it in the past, but I think both countries have agreed that we can emphasize on trade rather than aid."** Part of the reason for such nonchalance, analysts say, is that British aid to India, which amounts to \$450 million per year and is used primarily in health care and education, is small. Last year, the finance minister at the time, Pranab Mukherjee, reportedly dismissed the funds as "peanuts" compared to India's own spending. (Mr. Mukherjee is now the president of India.) Indeed, in recent years, India has ramped up its spending on social welfare programs, including a large rural employment scheme and a food subsidy system, aimed at lifting its millions out of poverty. **But perhaps more significant is the fact that India now sees – and projects – itself as a global power and a partner to developed nations like Britain, rejecting the traditional model of rich nations aiding poor ones. "Aid is past, trade is future,"** Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid recently said.

Building on decades of experience promoting an effective health system in India, USAID supports the National AIDS Control Plan (NACP) for prevention, care, and treatment programs for people living with HIV/AIDS. **The combined efforts of USAID, the Government of India (GOI) and other partners resulted in a reduction of new HIV infections by 66 percent since 2000,** and today nearly one million people living with AIDS are currently on antiretroviral therapy. **Targeted interventions based on close collaboration with and empowerment of communities and civil society**...helped deliver key

life-saving services to the affected population,” Health Minister J.P. Nadda said in his address to the U.N. General Assembly in June 2016.

The negative and significant estimates of the aid parameter in columns (3) through (6) suggest that aid helps even the poorest of the poor who survive on a dollar a day or less. The estimate in column (3) indicates **that a one percentage point increase in aid reduces the average income shortfall of the poor by 3 percent.** Another interesting finding is the effect of finance on poverty. We find consistently negative and significant estimates for finance, suggesting a prominent role that financial sector development can play in poverty reduction. This finding is in line with that of Beck et al. (2007) who argue that financial development raises incomes of the poor more that proportionately.


and

When we use the headcount index, **a one percentage point increase in aid to a recipient country reduces the proportion of people living below the poverty line by 0.018 percent.** This result is consistent with the findings of Mosley & Suleiman (2007) who find that aid reduces headcount poverty by a similar magnitude in cross-country analysis of 49 countries. Hence, taking into account this direct effect of aid on poverty, poverty-efficient allocation of aid calculated by Collier & Dollar (2002) could have an even stronger poverty reduction

A2 World Bank Bad

1. India already has enough geopolitical clout to influence institutions like the world bank for more loans, it has the world’s second biggest population and is the biggest democracy. That’s why the Times of India ‘18 finds that in the status quo India is the second biggest receiver for world bank loans.
2. **Times of India ‘18** reports that India specifically uses World Bank Loans to finance rural projects. For example, **Times of India ‘18** also notes that the last loan that India received from the World Bank was 500 million dollars, which built 7000 roads. Every single cent in road development is crucial. **International Food Policy Research Institute ‘08** analyzes that for every rupee, or 1.5 cents, of spending on roads, there is 5 rupees of agricultural output. Furthermore, for every million rupees, or 15,000 dollars spent, 124 people escape poverty in India.

<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-second-largest-recipient-of-world-banks-loans/articleshow/64536636.cms>



A2 Chinese Militarization/Backlash

1. Affirming the resolution means that China either a) abstained b) or voted to let India on the council. It doesn’t make sense that China would all of a sudden just escalate against India, if according to the topic they let them onto the council.

- a. Backlash would also look hypocritical on China's part- militarizing in response to their own actions that gave Indian power would cause other nations to accuse China of purposely escalating tensions and hurt China's reputation.
2. China is also a veto holding member on the security council, instead of completely militarizing against India they could just simply veto the resolutions they put up. For example in the status quo India has consistently been pushing the resolution to blacklist the pulwama terrorist, but China has just vetoed the resolutions, they didn't go nuclear.
 - a. If anything China will rather use the veto power, because it would paint India as a country who achieved "some sort of great power status" but did little to nothing.
3. China's existence as the biggest power in the region is already being challenged, CNBC '18 finds that apprehension over China's motives has lead to Southeast Asian countries finding alternative leaders coming India. In fact, they see India as a counterweight to China in the region and routinely making strong alliances with them. India is already taking a more assertive role in the region, the conflict should have been triggered.
 - a. This is especially true as the discourse on India becoming a permanent member is so high and India has gained so much relevance on international organizations such as BRICS and G4, some part of the impact should've happened.

[Southeast Asia going to India Instead of China – CNBC '18](#)

Beijing and Washington have long been the dominant powers in Southeast Asia, home to some of the world's fastest-growing economies. But the region is increasingly seeking alternative alliances

amid unease over China's rising influence and perceptions of an unpredictable White House. "Specific Southeast Asian states are now seeking to diversify their strategic partnerships, beyond a binary choice between Beijing and Washington," the Council on Foreign Relations, a U.S. think tank, said in a note this week.

A key element of those diversification efforts is working with India "as a more forceful counterweight to China and hedge against a declining United States"

"the note said. Southeast Asian nations are also looking at Australia as another potential partner. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Canberra are holding a special summit between from March 16 to 18, a sign that the 10-nation bloc is exploring various hedging strategies against Beijing, said Geoff Raby, former Australian ambassador to China. Trade deals such as the newly inked Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans Pacific Partnership as well as intelligence sharing efforts on terrorism are also indicative of Southeast Asian leaders seeking greater regional cooperation. US' increasingly unreliable" Certain countries, such as Cambodia and Thailand, haven't signaled opposition to Beijing's growing shout in the area, which is reflected by an influx of Chinese-funded infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative and man-made Chinese islands in the South China Sea. But others, including Vietnam, have publicly come out against China's behavior in the region. Previously, those nations could turn to Washington for leadership, but President Donald Trump's controversial measures — from tariffs on foreign aluminum and steel imports to firing Secretary of State Rex Tillerson — has unnerved America's Asian allies, according to strategists. "The manner in which Donald Trump handled Tillerson's dismissal, combined with his snap decision to meet Kim Jong Un and other recent actions, reinforce the perception of the U.S. in Asia that the U.S. is increasingly unreliable," said Philip Yun, executive director of Ploughshares Fund, an anti-nuclear weapons group. People in the region are paying attention to the fact that Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, "who had touted his close relationship with Trump, was blindsided by Trump's agreement to a U.S.-North Korea summit," Yun said. Also telling are recent comments from Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, Yun said. This week, Lee said ASEAN must adjust to a new power balance in Asia, suggesting the bloc look more to China and India. The U.S. is still widely expected to continue strong defense ties with Southeast Asian countries on matters such as freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. India's rise in Southeast Asia

Widespread apprehension over China's ambitions has helped Prime Minister Narendra Modi enhance political and economic ties with Southeast Asian economies under a policy known as "Act East."

Hanoi, for example, is partnering with New Delhi on South China Sea issues. In a meeting earlier this month, Modi and Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang committed to more defense equipment deals and joint exploration in the international waterway, prompting criticism from Beijing. "The two sides may, in the future, want to be close partners to some other future regional alternative, or at least, partial alternative, to Belt and Road," according to the Council on Foreign Relations. Vietnam is also strengthening relations with other regional powers that are skeptical of or outright hostile to China, the organization said. And in January, India invited all 10 ASEAN leaders as chief guests to its annual Republic Day celebrations — a historic first. The same month, New Delhi also invited those politicians to a summit aimed at promoting maritime security.

Every ASEAN leader wants New Delhi to play a more assertive role in the Indo-Pacific region. India is also a major player in a newly resurrected informal defense alliance known as "the Quad," which is aimed at offsetting Chinese maritime expansion. Vietnam, Singapore and Indonesia are gradually embracing the concept of a more assertive Indian role in Southeast Asia

others like the Philippines and Malaysia remain silent on the matter, Manoj Joshi, distinguished fellow at Indian think tank Observer Research Foundation, said in a February report.

wwA2 India-China War

1. NN '19 finds quoting the leading expert on sino-indian relations in india, that war between india and china is extremely unlikely. China is a rationale actor and realizes India's growing conventional and nuclear strength. Both india and china will try to control tensions when they spill out in order to prevent conflict. Furthermore the treaty of peace signed in '93 gives clear provisions to avoid war.
 - a. Historically everytime tensions have escalated they eventually escalated. India and China have multiple border disputes that ended up leading to nothing significant. No unique reason why China will launch a random attack now.
2. Logical reasons why this will never happen.
 - a. Trade- india and China are huge trading partners at around 70 billion for China- they're not going to sacrifice what the value most, their economy, when there's other ways to check back India
 - b. There's both diplomacy and direct hotline of communications today. That's why the last China-India standoff lead to literally nothing.

<https://nenow.in/neighbour/india-china-war-unlikely-says-nations-best-known-sinologist-kondapalli.html>

He said it was highly unlikely that, despite much global pressure, the Chinese would back off and agree to brand Masood Azhar as a 'global terrorist'. **Kondapalli, however, feels that any conventional or nuclear war between India and China is unlikely , though China sees India's military ties with US and Japan with much suspicion as an effort to contain its rise and India's sees China port building in her neighborhood as a 'string of pearls' strategy to contain her influence. China is a rationale actor and it is aware of India's growing military strength, both in conventional and nuclear sphere."Therefore it will try and control tensions when they threaten to spill out of control and India will do the same because it cannot afford a conflict with China," Kondapalli said. He pointed to an effective military deterrence that India has already build up against China both in conventional military capabilities and in the nuclear domain adding that that is what will prevent a war like 1962.** To a proposal by some speakers at the seminar that India and China would do well to consider a No-War pact , Kondapalli said the 1993 Treaty of Peace and Tranquility signed by the Narasimha Rao government with China contains clear provisions to prevent a war between the two countries.

A2 Peacekeepers Bad

1. Every criticism they read is something that is addressed by India joining the council. The POR in 2018 writes that in past missions the UN has never had the adequate size or financial obligations, along with the council not being supportive of taking the charge on PKO missions. Our entire

case indicates that India joining would increase size, resources, and leadership on PKO Missions, pre-reqs their arg.

2. Their evidence is flawed in nature - The UN intervenes in areas that already have a natural trajectory of conflict; it is not a result of UN intervention that conflict increases. Don't allow them show a correlative trajectory, instead make them show a causal relationship with a warrant
 - a. An Oxford meta study in 2017 found that large deployments have peacekeeping troops empirically have consistently beneficial impacts on all conflict outcomes by promoting durable peace, shorter episodes of violence, and lower the odds of genocide over the long term. You prefer our evidence because it's been proven historically and because it focuses on the exact causal relationship as opposed to this nebulous correlation they talk about.

First, the UN has never been given the adequate financial and military means to make a difference in such challenging environments. Member States' contributions to UN peacekeeping are small as it rarely comes out of their defense budgets.

This severely limits the number of troops and the amount of equipment that can be sent to UN peacekeeping operations. In [a recent press conference](#), the outgoing Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Hervé Ladsous, told reporters the current total budget of peacekeeping operations is equivalent to 0.4 per cent of world's military expenditures. A blue helmet annually costs \$20,000, where as a US soldier is \$800,000. Such limited budget always requires the leadership of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and of the various missions on the ground to make hard choices and set priorities in terms of operations to launch as well as protection equipment for the personnel and technological assets to procure. - Operations are deployed in vast countries and remote areas in relatively small numbers. NATO sent 50,000 troops to Kosovo, which is half the size of New York State, whereas the UN sent 11,000 blue helmets to the north of Mali, which is twice the size of Afghanistan, 12,000 troops to South Sudan, which is the size of France, and that is in a state of war. In the DRC, there are 16,000 UN personnel deployed in a country that is of the size of continental Europe. In those circumstances, there is always a limit to the protection UN peacekeepers can provide to populations in disarray.

- Peace operations often lack support from their political creators, in particular the powerful states of the Security Council that are the ones that can have leverage on the parties to the conflict. In 2000, the Brahimi report wrote "Member States must summon the political will to support the United Nations politically, financially and operationally — once they have decided to act as the United Nations — if the Organization is to be credible as a force for peace."

But when a UN mission fails, nobody is there to defend it or even to defend its personnel that are being attacked or kidnapped. And host governments can denigrate them without impunity.

Conclusive Evidence shows that PKOs relatively effective - Salvatore of Oxford University (Huge ass Meta Study) '17

Other operationalizations of peacekeeping have produced more consistent and comparable results. **First, peace missions (especially UN missions) produce more durable peace** (Fortna, 2004a, 2003, 2004b; Gilligan & Sergenti, 2008), **produce comparatively geographically contained conflicts, shorter episodes of local violence** (Ruggeri, Dorussen, & Gizelis, 2016b), **improve the odds of peacebuilding success** (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000), **and lower the odds of genocide over the long term** (Kathman & Wood, 2011). Importantly, some findings at the national level do not automatically translate at the local level. As mentioned, Gilligan and Sergenti's findings (2008) at the national level resonate with Diehl's; they find peacekeepers to be better at keeping peace than making it. A more disaggregated approach, however, tells a different story at the local level. At this scale, Ruggeri and colleagues (2016b) find that peacekeepers shorten conflict episodes, but the empirical results on the capacity to deter local conflict onset is inconclusive. With regard to mass killings, the effect of interventions appears conditional on whether the mission directly challenges and engages the perpetrators. While this would suggest that only some missions reduce large-scale civilian killings, Melander (2009) finds that, after controlling for unobservable factors leading to deployment, peacekeeping does have a clear preventive effect on mass killings. Kathman and Wood (2011) also find that third-party intervention can trigger more intense genocides and politicides in the months following the deployment. Over time, however, violence significantly decreases if the intervention is perceived as impartial. **More recent studies measuring the size of deployment and the type of deployed personnel have further supported most of these results: large deployments of peacekeeping troops have consistently beneficial impacts on all conflict outcomes examined in the**

literature (Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon, 2013, 2014, 2015; Beardsley & Gleditsch, 2015; Ruggeri, Dorussen, & Gizelis, 2016b). One notable exception is peacebuilding, which does not seem to be affected by the actual number of deployed personnel (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000).

A2 Peacekeeping Bad (Women)

1. Kenney of CGDEV 16' explains that increasing funding for peacekeeping would also allow for financial incentives to bring more women in peacekeeping- this would equalize the gender gap and increase discourse on equality, which is why Kenney finds that increasing women in peacekeeping operations empirically decreases sexual misconduct. This literally was proposed in 09' but was blocked due to a lack of funding.
2. Deen of IPS News 18' reports that the UN started cracking down on humanitarian abuse through DNA testing and firings. That's why Lederer for ABC News 19' reports that PKO abuse has nearly been halved in the past couple years.
3. India is prob the best country for women.
 - a. [The ORF](#) finds that amongst all PKO troops, india's troops have the lowest level of sexual abuse due to more severe disciplinary actions taken
 - b. [The Economic Times](#) writes that India has voiced support for deploying more women peacekeepers.
4. The PCR finds that rape is a significant weapon of war and has been heavily used in many recent interstate conflicts. Here is the weighing, even if pkos do increase rapes the alternative is too let the conflict go on and on with no intervention at all. The amount of sexual violence will be significantly more worse. As long as we win our argument on pkos, we win the argument about rape.

https://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/653/c_653796-l_1-k_pko_prediction_preprint_main.pdf

More than ten years after the commencement of wars in the former Yugoslavia, and almost a decade after the Rwandan genocide—conflicts notorious for attacks on women and girls—combatants continue to use sexual violence as a tactic of war to terrorize and control civilian populations. Sexual violence targeting women and girls has been used in all recent conflicts, including in the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, India (Kashmir), Rwanda, Sri Lanka, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Angola, Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire, East Timor, Liberia, Algeria, the Russian Federation (Chechnya), and northern Uganda. Rape has always meant direct physical harm, trauma, and social ostracism for the victim. Now, it may also be a death sentence for many women. Women are increasingly, and sometimes deliberately, being infected with HIV through wartime rape. By disrupting normal economic activity and destroying bases of economic support, armed conflict also puts women at risk for trafficking and at greater risk for having to engage in “survival” sex or sexual bartering, through which many women are becoming infected with HIV.

<https://www.cgdev.org/publication/using-financial-incentives-increase-number-women-un-peacekeeping>

Second, women peacekeepers have unique access to women in host countries, particularly in gender-segregated societies. This has benefits from an intelligence-gathering perspective and in assisting particular demographics in conflict-affected contexts – including survivors of gender-based violence and those at risk of being trafficked (Karim and Beardsley 2013). Perhaps as a result, **there is some evidence that missions with more women personnel are more likely to meet their mandate and bring sustainable peace** (Strickland and Duvvury, 2003), although this may be associated with the types of missions where women personnel are more likely to be sent. In particular, **a greater presence of women in peacekeeping operations appears to be associated with lower rates of sexual misconduct by peacekeepers themselves.**

One model for a financial incentive would be to provide a percentage supplement to countries that provide women peacekeepers above the base compensation of \$1,410 per month. Table 3 lays out the annual costs of such a supplement at various levels of total female share of peacekeeping forces from five to 50 percent and at supplement ranges from five to 100 percent of base compensation at 2015 levels of peacekeeper deployment (106,286 personnel). One level to set the incentive would be at \$303 per month – the same rate as the specialist supplement. The last line of the table lays out annual costs of such a supplement. Supplemental financing could be targeted at operations with characteristics that suggest they are likely to have particularly low participation by women and/or where greater participation by women might be seen as particularly valuable – operations in low income countries or countries with a worse history of sexual violence, for example. **Additional financial incentives could be provided to countries which provided women officers as part of contingent forces, potentially on a sliding scale dependent on rank.**

<http://www.ipsnews.net/2018/04/un-cracks-peacekeeping-troops-human-rights-abuses/>

The UN Standards of Conduct are based on three key principles: highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity; **zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and accountability of those in command and/or leadership who fail to enforce the standards of conduct,** according to DPKO. Meanwhile, as sexual abuse and paternity claims continue to rise against UN peacekeepers, the United Nations is actively collaborating with **troop contributing countries in collecting DNA samples: a protocol introduced back in 2014.**

<https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/report-sex-abuse-peacekeeping-drops-61760106>

According to the report, **the number of cases in U.N. peacekeeping and political missions dropped to 54 in 2018 from 62 in 2017, and from 104 reported cases in 2016.** It said 74 percent of the allegations in 2018 came from the U.N. peacekeeping forces in Central African Republic and Congo, and the remaining 24 percent from the peacekeeping missions in Mali, Haiti, Liberia and South Sudan.

“Sexual Exploitation and Abuse among Peacekeeping Forces, and India's Response.” ORF, ORF, 21 Feb. 2018, www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-among-peacekeeping-forces-and-indias-response/

Terrorists and militias are not the only perpetrators of sexual violence. United Nations (UN) peacekeepers have also taken advantage of conflict zones and routinely exploit vulnerable populations by engaging in sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). It is abhorrent that the blue helmets, who are seen as symbols of peace, become another source of insecurity for those they are mandated to protect. **Statistical analysis demonstrates that SEA is a constant and endemic problem within UN peacekeeping,** with an average of 50 cases a year since 2010, and 31 cases filed between July and September 2017 itself. This is particularly alarming since only a fraction of cases are reported, given most victims do not feel comfortable to seek redress. **Indian UN peacekeepers have not been immune from allegations of SEA,** with three cases of SEA registered against them between 2010 and 2013. **However, it is**

important to note that while being the one of the largest contributor of troops, with almost 200,000 troops spanning 50 missions, India has one of the lowest cases of SEA and has not faced any allegations after 2013. This has been achieved by ensuring a strict adherence to the UN's 'zero tolerance policy' against SEA and making considerable changes to the way Indian peacekeepers are recruited, trained and prosecuted. This suggests that the Indian experience may indeed have much to offer by way of lessons to the rest of the world.

A2 CPEC

1. Pakistan more incentivized to join CPEC once India is on the council. The reason is that they want to equalize the perceived economic and political clout between their rival, meaning they become more conducive to help from China.
2. The SCMP '18 finds 3 reasons as to why Pakistan is rolling back cpec in the status quo
 - a. All the money that was sent to Pakistan was just funnelled into Chinese companies to buy items from China so none of the benefits go to Pakistan. Rather the loans are just running up debts and increase the chance of fiscal deficit.
 - b. It was an old initiative for a political predecessor, Khan has no incentive to continue the program - their economy still shit
 - c. IMF is threatening Pakistan to not give help unless it gives plan details, which were secret
3. Forbes '18 finds that corruption in the agreement has pushed up costs significantly to the point at which Pakistan is at the door of the IMF and not CPEC.

New Administration scaling back CPEC – Aamir SCMP '18

In April 2015, Pakistan, led by the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, signed agreements aimed at establishing a China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The collection of infrastructure projects, the flagship of China's global Belt and Road Initiative, was called a "game changer" for Pakistan. Some 3½ years on, however, a new government in Pakistan, led by Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf party, is taking steps to scale it back. During the tenure of former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, criticising the economic corridor project was almost akin to criticising Pakistan itself. Now, members of the new cabinet are openly critical of the huge project. Abdul Razak Dawood, a scion of a business family and the minister for commerce and industry, told the Financial Times that the new government would review all CPEC projects. He said that the agreements were unfair to Pakistani companies and should be put on hold for a year, so they could be revised if necessary. The move and Dawood's comments echo the growing resentment against CPEC in Pakistani power circles, although Dawood later said his quotes had been taken out of context. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi also met his Pakistani counterpart, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, in New York and maintained that "China and Pakistan are all-weather strategic partners". However, the Pakistani government has gone on to suspend 455 development projects, some of which are part of CPEC, on the flimsy pretext of austerity. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is a US\$62 billion collection of projects funded by Beijing. How could Pakistan achieve its goal of reducing public expenditure by suspending Chinese-funded projects? More likely, it is a way to scale down CPEC without raising the ire of its all-weather friend. In another unexpected move, Pakistan invited Saudi Arabia to become part of the CPEC programme and to develop a massive refinery complex near the Chinese-funded Gwadar port. Tellingly, Khan chose Saudi Arabia, not China, as the first country to visit after taking office. Later, Pakistan said Saudi Arabia would not

become a "collateral strategic partner" in the CPEC programme, but its intention to dilute the influence of China is unmistakable. **Why is Khan's government intent on scaling down CPEC and China's influence? One** aforementioned **reason is the growing feeling among the decision-making elite in Pakistan that the agreements are unfair. Such concerns have been raised over the past three years, but the new government is taking them seriously. According to the few financial details of CPEC that are available, Pakistan is not benefiting significantly from the programme. Reportedly, although China has lent Pakistan US\$26 billion-US\$30 billion for power and transport projects that are part of the economic corridor, not a single dollar has entered Pakistani banking channels. Instead, Chinese banks give the loans to Chinese companies, which buy equipment in China and use it in Pakistan. Consequently, instead of gaining economic benefits, Pakistan is running up huge debts and risking fiscal default. The new government has another reason to roll back CPEC: namely, this is not its baby. Rather, it was a project started under the old government, which got a lot of political mileage from it. Politically, it makes no sense for the**

current administration to actively pursue its predecessor's project. Meanwhile, Pakistan's foreign reserves are dwindling and it has asked the International Monetary Fund for help, after neither China nor Saudi Arabia gave it financial help. **Pakistan is hoping for up to US\$15 billion in IMF loans, but faces another CPEC-related problem. The IMF says it requires "absolute transparency" about Pakistan's Chinese loans before it bails the country out. Yet the financial details of CPEC were closely guarded secrets under the previous government. If the current government makes the details public, the programme is likely to come under more fire in Pakistan.** The direction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor will become clearer once Khan visits China in the first week of November. If Beijing manages to earn Khan's full support, he may stop scaling down the project. However, given the developments of the past few months – from China's lack of interest in bailing out Pakistan to allegations of unfairness – there is unlikely to be any change in government thinking.

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdukoutas/2018/11/19/malaysia-india-and-imf-could-spoil-china-s-cpec-and-malaysia-mega-projects/#514c22e1849f>

That's certainly a big setback for a project that catered to wealthy foreigners, especially to wealthy Chinese. In the case of CPEC, Chinese and Pakistani governments' miscalculation has two parts. One of them is corruption on both sides of the partnership. That's why the two countries announced the creation of a "transparency" commission last year. But such commissions rarely help solve corruption – especially when it comes to construction. **Construction projects are executed by the governments of the two countries that rank high in corruption. Meanwhile, corruption keeps on pushing the costs of the project higher by the day, sending Pakistan knocking at the door of the International Fund. That's an American-controlled institution, which could either bring transparency to the project or kill it altogether.**

Economic diversification is the most important issue for Pakistan's economy- CPEC won't solve **Qureshi 5/2/16**— Nadeem M Qureshi is the Chairman and founder of the political party Mustaqbil Pakistan, Nadeem has a business background and has studied engineering at M.I.T. in Cambridge Mass. and business. He also went to Harvard Business School in Boston ("Is Pakistan ready to diversify its economy?"), Accessed 7/13/16, Available online at

<http://www.khaleejtimes.com/editorials-columns/is-pakistan-ready-to-diversify-its-economy>, JRR)

The Gulf States have responded with unprecedented speed and daring to the possible impact of the oil crisis on their economies. Led by a new generation of leaders - especially in Saudi Arabia - they have crafted a sweeping new vision for the country as it seeks to wean itself away from its addiction to oil. The question we have to ask here in Pakistan is: Have we done anything? Many will say: Why should we? It's not our problem. If oil prices fall from \$120 per barrel to \$30, why should we worry? In fact, we benefit from the windfall savings in our oil import bill? True. But not the whole truth. Consider the following: **The mainstay of Pakistan's economy is the remittances it gets from its overseas workers** A

total of about \$18 billion were sent home by our workers abroad. Of this some \$11 billion was sent by workers in the Gulf countries. Saudi Arabia alone accounted for \$5 billion in annual remittances. Let's be clear. **It is these remittances that are propping up Pakistan's stumbling economy. Industries have shut down. Value creation is virtually non-existent. Unemployment and poverty are rampant. Yet our imports far exceed our exports** Last year, according to the State Bank of Pakistan, we imported goods worth \$41 billion, and exported goods worth \$24 billion. The difference between the two numbers, our trade deficit of \$17 billion, is made up entirely by the \$18 billion in remittances from overseas workers. **Take away these remittances and our economy would no longer be able to finance our trade balance** A wrenching downward adjustment would need to be made in a

very short time. And what is happening in the Gulf today suggests that this day of reckoning may not be far away. The Gulf States are taking a range of measures to deal with the crisis. Non-essential projects are being cancelled. Efforts are being made to replace foreign labour with a local labour force. Taxes are being contemplated. These would be on remittances by foreigners and possibly on their incomes. The Consultative Assembly of Saudi Arabia known as the Shoura Council is taking up a proposal to tax expatriate remittances. Fees on residence permits and other licenses will rise. Subsidies on utilities are being axed. Fuel prices have already tripled in the Kingdom. All of these steps will have an impact on Pakistan. The most serious of these will result from job losses as marginal projects are cut. Already, last week, one of the largest construction companies in Saudi Arabia, the Bin Laden Group, culled 50,000 workers - the vast majority from Pakistan. And this is just the beginning. There are an estimated four million Pakistani workers in the Gulf countries. Saudi Arabia alone is host to some two million of them. In just one week, one company has decided to send three per cent of all Pakistani workers in the Kingdom home. As the new reforms take hold more and more of them will start to come home. If taxes are imposed on their remittances, many Pakistani workers will find it difficult to support their families at home and might well opt to return voluntarily. This applies especially to blue-collar workers who represent the vast majority - some 90 per cent - of Pakistanis in the Gulf. The upshot is that Pakistan will start to see a reverse exodus of workers returning from the Gulf. This will impact Pakistan's economy in two ways. First, remittances will take a hit. And, second, hundreds of thousands of able-bodied returning workers will add to the millions of the already unemployed in Pakistan. This is the classic double whammy that may deal the deathblow to our already floundering economy.

So it is surprising that this issue is not even being discussed in government or political circles. Instead, the corridors of power seem infatuated with the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It is seen as some kind of rejuvenating elixir for our dying economy - a 'game changer' as it is often called. This is a dangerous illusion Yes, CPEC is useful. But let's not forget that **it is a single project. And that too a Chinese project whose benefits will flow more to them than to us. A single project, however grand, can never be a substitute for an integrated and focused economic development plan and strategy for the country. And this is precisely what Pakistan lacks today.** The government thrashes about randomly implementing mega projects - a rail transit scheme here, a metro bus there, a coal fired power plant elsewhere, and so on. **All this without an overarching strategy or plan to pull Pakistan's people out of their misery and put them on the path of sustained**

economic development. We got away with this as long as the money flowed from the Gulf. But that tap is about to be turned off. And this reality, not CPEC, will be the 'gamechanger' that will matter.

A2 General Deadlock

1. The ORF '17 finds that India has voted affirmative on resolutions 89% of the time, and not more than 12 times did they stand without a majority when they were a non permanent member on the security council. That's why ORF concludes that India is making effort for democratic majority building. They have to prove what specific resolutions India will "deadlock" the council historically they have lead to constructive consensus making. In fact they are taking active steps to remove deadlock in the status quo. The Economic Times '18 finds that India is looking to create ways to override the deadlock in security council reform through changing the general assembly's rules.
2. The ORF '18 finds that India wants to streamline the decision making process of peacekeeping operations to within 30 days or less.
 - a. Prefer this evidence over all their vague gridlock evidence cause its a specific contextualization of how India will make the legislative process quicker.

<https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/70-years-of-peacekeeping-achievements-challenges-and-need-for-reforms-46135/>

It is against the idea of a more robust peacekeeping and wants greater allocation of funds. India wants that the UNSC should decide peacekeeping operations within 30 days or a maximum period of 90 days in order to avoid tragedies because of delays. India also wants the involvement of experts from various fields in peacekeeping in order to better deal with emerging challenges. There should also be a

sound exit policy for peacekeepers. **New Delhi has a huge role to play when it comes to introducing reforms to peacekeeping.** The Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN Peacekeeping Operations, part of the A4P initiative, has highlighted the crucial areas for reforms. For instance, improving the safety of peacekeepers, holding them accountable for their actions, strengthening protection provided by peacekeeping forces, and finding political solutions to conflicts and enhancing the political impact of peacekeeping. India should take advantage of its rising global stature and should take a lead in order to make this arm of the UN more effective.

<https://outline.com/yg7GLd>

To break the decade-long deadlock in the negotiations for Security Council reform, India has suggested adopting the General Assembly's rules of procedure with voting to deny "naysayers" their virtual veto under the current process. India's Permanent Representative [Syed Akbaruddin](#) told the General Assembly on Tuesday: "Naysayers cannot be allowed to cast a dark shadow over the entire membership and hold the overwhelming majority back. "Some amongst us cannot hold the entire process hostage by bending the rules of negotiations." **The reform process has stalled during almost ten rounds of negotiations primarily because 'United for Consensus', a 12-member group that opposes adding permanent members, has used the procedural gambit of preventing the adoption of a negotiating text to be the basis of the talks and move it forward.**

<https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-pursuit-united-nations-security-council-reforms/>

The typical Indian preferences in the UNSC has always been to be a part of the democratic majority contributing to the adoption of broadly acceptable resolutions and decisions. **Analysing all terms of**

India in the SC barring the last one, Murthy (2011, p.3) points out that India joined 59 percent of the resolutions adopted either unanimously or without a vote. With regard to aggregate of 113 adopted resolutions (41 percent) that gave rise to a division, India cast an affirmative vote on 101 (89 percent) of them. Significantly, on not more than a dozen times did India stand aside without joining the concurrent majority, and has not voted against any resolution, and resorted to abstentions only to express its reservations. Remarkably, India was never a loner in abstaining as it always had the company of other Council members on many occasions. The **Indian behaviour herein clearly points to a systematic effort to display a constructive, rule of law abiding and a democratic majority building state in a global, multilateral setting like the Security Council.**

A2 Deadlock----> Less legitimacy

1. In the status quo the UN is already losing legitimacy. Only risk of solvency is aff on reform, as Grant of The Guardian 15' explains that as the world evolves, the council's representation is being questioned and will be challenged by emerging countries. This is because even if policy is passed in the status quo, it will be just seen as passed by an unrepresentative council.
2. Our link on additionally legitimacy for the UN by getting India on the council is more significant than deadlock.
 - a. because the reason as to why countries see the UNSC as legitimate according to our case, is because they feel consistently excluded from the decision making process of the UN in terms of the peace making process. Even if deadlock is created the countries care a lot more about being able to have someone who can vouch for their needs, in things like peacekeeping, than less policy.
 - b. Currently every single p5 member is an industrialized nation who in the eyes of the rest of the world "don't risk their own lives for peace" or a Western nation. This dynamic create a sense of exclusion for the rest of the world, and makes the UN's actions less legitimate. By adding a country like India you
 - i. Signal that the UN is finally representative of the rest of the world
 - ii. Put someone on the council who actively is involved in the parts of the UN where these countries actively participate in, peacekeeping.
 - c. This is why overall, UN representatives report that 90% of the general assembly is supportive of democratic expansion in the council in any form, non-permanent or permanent. They care more about the UN being up to date with the 21st century than some vague harmful impact of potentially less policy. Indeed, the International Studies Quarterly '15 finds that after analyzing general assembly proceedings, that in the eyes of the UN the council suffers from a considerable legitimacy deficits and that, qualms about a lack of procedural ability such as transparency, participation, and accountability are more were more important than issues about the performance of the security council.

https://research.reading.ac.uk/ungop/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/Binder_et_al-2015-International_Studies_Quarterly1.pdf

As regards the different indicators for the procedural legitimacy dimension, concerns about transparency shortcomings carry the greatest weight, with 20% (229) of all negative statements referring to transparency. Of all negative statements, 19% (212) relate to participation and 16%

(175) to accountability. Negative statements on great power dominance (10%, 115) fall off somewhat (see Figure 3). That states take issue with the Council's procedures is exemplified in many contributions. Nicaragua for instance claims that "[t]here is a need for working methods that transform the Council into a more transparent, inclusive and participatory organ, and which render it accountable to the General Assembly in an effective way."²⁴ We impute the prevalence of concerns about procedural shortcomings to some extent to broader changes in the international normative fabric. Scholars have started to argue that a global norm of democratic governance has emerged (Dingwerth 2010). Not only states, but also other sites of authority such as IOs are nowadays widely expected to guarantee that those affected by the rules have an opportunity to have an impact on rulemaking. Other statements suggest, however, that strategic calculations are also important. It is not solely or predominantly democracies but, to an even greater extent, non democracies as well, which object to Council procedures and call for more democratic decision making.²⁵ However, it is unlikely that non democracies invoke democratic principles in this case because they generally appreciate democratic values; rather, it is more likely that they do so because they seek to increase their influence on the Council. **Concerns about the Security Council's performance are less pronounced, given that only 24% (268) of all negative statements refer to this dimension.**

<https://www.news18.com/news/india/majority-of-members-wants-un-security-council-permanent-membership-expanded-india-2049465.html>

Participating in the informal meeting of the Plenary on the Intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council, **India's Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador Syed Akbaruddin said, "We have heard many refer to the need for respect for democratic expressions. Will those who are speaking of democracy be ready to accept this democratic expression listed in a GA (General Assembly) document. On the issue of Categories of Membership, a total of 113 Member States, out of 122 who submitted their positions in the Framework Document, support expansion in both of the existing categories,** he said. "In short, **more than 90 per cent of the written submissions in the document are in favour of expansion in both permanent and non-permanent categories of membership of the Council.**" "We have heard many refer to the need for respect for democratic expressions. Will those who are speaking of democracy be ready to accept this democratic expression listed in a GA (General Assembly) document," he said.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/23/un-security-council-must-be-revamped-or-risk-irrelevance-kofi-annan-warns>

"I firmly believe that the council should be reformed: it cannot continue as it is. The world has changed and the UN should change and adapt. If we don't change the council, we risk a situation where the primacy of the council may be challenged by some of the new emerging countries. "I think those in privileged positions will have to think hard and decide what amount of power they are prepared to release to make the participation of the newcomers meaningful. If they do that, they will get cooperation; if they don't, we risk confrontation."

A2 Collapse of the UN

1. During the cold war in the 1990s, there was 0 participation on anything. All of the members were stuck into cold war rivalries which mean little to no progress was made on any issues. If the collapse didn't happen then they have to prove why it is gonna happen now.
2. If anything adding India to the council would make the UN even more strong. This is because by adding India you show the rest of the world that you can be developing country, contribute significantly to maintain the international order and make it onto the most powerful council in the world. This would Incentive other countries to maintain or contribute even more resources in order to try to become more powerful in the organization like India. This is why Deo of The

Diplomat 14' writes that adding India would increase UN representation and create a council that would have more effective, well thought out responses to global issues.

<https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/should-india-give-up-on-the-un-security-council/>

In fact, whether India should seek membership is a matter of debate within the country. Former colonial powers are not going to allow a change, nor will China allow other Asian countries, particularly Japan, to enter. But there is also the view that though India may not gain much from becoming a part of an archaic organisation, the world needs an expanded UNSC that includes countries like India to influence the very ethos of the council. At a time when faster growing economies, more youthful populations, and the concentration of natural resources are mainly in the developing world, as are problems like the dispersion of capacity to build weapons of mass destruction, a reform of global political management systems to respond to crises and violence—such as the chaos in West Asia—is even more imperative. **If the UNSC includes India and Brazil, and also represents Africa and West Asia, it will infuse the council with a deeper understanding and enable a wiser response to the world's cascading political crises, unlike the hasty and excessive militarism of the West.**

A2 R2Ps Good

1. The ET '18 finds 2 things
 - a. Much of the international community has lost faith in the doctrine of R2P following in, as Russia and China saw the interventions in Libya as a disguise for state building initiatives. That's why Bajora of The Council on Foreign Relations 13' writes that Russia has vowed to block any future R2Ps. Foreign Policy '18 looks into the future writing there is little to no likelihood of an R2P intervention in the future, proved by the lack of intervention in Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar. India won't be blocking any doctrines, other p5 members are already keen to do that. That's why their ev just says that R2P was invoked as a justification more often, but not necessarily used
 - b. Even without a R2P doctrine countries will took military actions. After failing to get authorization of the UNSC, the UK, France, and the US conducted the biggest intervention yet against Assad. The conversation '14 furthers that that these strikes have shown that states are increasingly becoming comfortable with the idea of force without UN authority, and with the strikes gaining lots of international support, is way on its way to become accepted. Even if India does initiate any new blocks to r2ps the rest of the p5 will take actions they deem, fit. Thats why their Cody ev about the US intervening regardless concedes entirely arg NU, they'll always intervene
2. This argument does not take out our argument on peacekeepers. According to Mukherjee India's opposition of R2P is more in line with the the fact it has internal insurgencies and its huge importance of sovereignty of states coming first. Peacekeeping is a way for India to help resolve conflicts without violating those beliefs and that's why India has used over 160,000 troops for missions the largest amount from any country.
3. The Belfer Center '13 find that humanitarian intervention can actually be bad because of the fact it incentivizes sub groups to provoke retaliation from the state in order to achieve goals of regime change. That's why they find that after UN intervention in Libya directly emboldened ISIS

combatants to take over the whole region of Mali, and furthermore encouraged protestors to turn to violence magnifying the countries killing rate ten-fold.

<https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/48725/R2P-The-dead-weight-on-the-shoulders-of-the-West>

Second came refusal; and with refusal comes reversal. Much of the international community lost its trust in NATO and the R2P doctrine following the intervention in Libya. Russia and China vowed to not permit the violation of state sovereignty again; they refused the notion of R2P and advocating

“all necessary measures”. While human rights atrocities have unfolded across the likes of Syria, Yemen, Libya and Burma, certain states are concertedly unwinding the fabric which forms our global consciousness. As revolution unraveled into civil war, many actors began to voice their discontent with NATO’s mandate over-reach and the removal of Gaddafi. Together, permanent UNSC members China and Russia vetoed an initial Security Council draft resolution on Oct. 4, 2011, which aimed to hold the Assad government liable for the atrocities committed. Russian representative Vitaly Churkin would sum-up the Russian attitude toward Syria during this meeting, arguing that “the situation in Syria cannot be considered in the Council separately from the Libyan experience,” and declaring a “conflict of political approaches.” **This attitude would transpire to have wide-reaching implications; Russia viewed Syria as an entirely different battlefield to Libya.**

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/09/the-end-of-human-rights-genocide-united-nations-r2p-terrorism/>

Regardless of whether it was right or wrong, there is very little likelihood of another R2P intervention in the foreseeable future. Syria, Yemen, and the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya in Myanmar have demonstrated that all too painfully.

Second part

When, over the night of April 13, the U.S., UK and France struck Syrian infrastructure purported to host the Syrian government chemical weapons program, the future of R2P was squashed. The **attacks**, the biggest intervention by western powers against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad since war broke out in 2011, **failed to get the support of the UN Security Council and was conducted unilaterally. But, they were conducted under the guise of humanitarian intervention**

<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/dilemma-humanitarian-intervention>

Russian officials have vowed to block further efforts at Security Council-endorsed interventions even amid humanitarian suffering.

"The international community unfortunately did take sides in Libya and we would never allow the Security Council to authorize anything similar to what happened in Libya," Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov told Australian TV in January 2012. Increasingly the intervention in Libya is becoming regarded as unique, and there appears to be less of an appetite for destroying the baseline order in states, regardless of how odious a state may be, says Stewart M. Patrick, CFR senior fellow and director of the program on international institutions and global governance. "Libya has exposed fissures within the international community and brought to the fore conflict not only in the Security Council permanent members but also among many developing countries that have long been lukewarm about the concept" of R2P, Patrick says.

<https://theconversation.com/syria-strikes-violated-international-law-are-the-rules-of-foreign-intervention-changing-95184>

Despite having no justification under existing international law, last weekend’s strikes were welcomed by the EU and NATO as well as a number of other countries, among them Germany, Spain, Canada, Australia and Turkey.

This time, the US did not act alone, but together with France and the UK, both permanent members of the UN Security

CouncilThe statements of the three countries show that this is not about a group of states simply ignoring international law. Rather, they believe that in carefully defined circumstances, the limited use of force can be justified even without UN authorisation.

Whether these strikes have actually diminished or destroyed Assad's chemical weapons capability remains unclear. But what is certain is **that the response to this armed intervention has shown that where chemical weapons are concerned, states are getting increasingly comfortable with the idea of limited use of force without UN authority. Perhaps this is a response to the establishment of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine at the 2005 World Summit.**

While that principle was never meant to justify action without Security Council approval, it has established the idea that state sovereignty is not unlimited when it comes to the protection of civilians. Together with the limited nature of the strikes and their focus on chemical weapons, that makes it possible to see them within the framework of international law while technically breaking the UN Charter. **This new norm is unlikely to ever be put into a treaty – but the response to last weekend's airstrikes has shown that it is well on its way to being accepted.**

www.jstor.org/stable/23528511.

The frequent association of India with China and Russia in western discourse on humanitarian intervention and R2P (the responsibility to protect) is telling of both, India's reflexive abstention on these issues and the West's lack of disposition to understand the constraints of a democratic state with multiple internal challenges to its authority such as India, which hosts a number of insurgencies (Muckherjee 13). It is no surprise therefore that humanitarian intervention and R2p were the biggest bones of contention between India and the western powers on the unsc in 2011-12. India abstained on two crucial votes - on Libya in March 2011 and Syria in October 2011 - while repeatedly sounding alarm bells on sovereignty and the need for domestic resolution of domestic conflicts even when voting in favour of taking action.

<https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/lessons-libya-how-not-intervene>

NATO's intervention in Libya offers at least three important lessons for implementing the responsibility to protect. First, potential interveners should beware both misinformation and rebel propaganda. If Western countries had accurately perceived Libya's initial civil conflict—as Qaddafi using discriminate force against violent tribal, regional, and radical Islamist rebels—NATO would have been much less likely to launch its counterproductive intervention. The second lesson is that **humanitarian intervention can backfire by escalating rebellion. This is because some substate groups believe that by violently provoking state retaliation, they can attract such intervention to help achieve their political objectives, including regime change. The resulting escalation, however, magnifies the threat to noncombatants before any potential intervention can protect them. Thus, the prospect of humanitarian intervention, which is intended to protect civilians, may instead imperil them via a moral hazard dynamic.** To mitigate this pathology, it is essential to avoid intervening on humanitarian grounds in ways that reward rebels, unless the state is targeting noncombatants.

Among neighboring countries, **Mali, which previously had been the region's exceptional example of peace and democracy, has suffered the worst consequences from the intervention. After Gaddafi's defeat,** his ethnic Tuareg soldiers of Malian descent fled home and launched a rebellion in their country's north, prompting the Malian army to overthrow the president. The rebellion soon was hijacked by local Islamist forces and al-Qaeda, which together imposed sharia and declared the vast north an independent country. **By December 2012, the northern half of Mali had become "the largest territory controlled by Islamic extremists in the world," according to the chairman of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Africa.** This chaos also spurred massive displacement of hundreds of thousands of Malian civilians, which Amnesty International characterized as "Mali's worst human rights situation in 50 years." Sophisticated weapons from Gaddafi's arsenal—including up to 15,000 man-portable, surface-to-air missiles unaccounted for as of 2012—leaked to radical Islamists throughout the region. **[Furthermore], NATO's intervention on behalf of Libya's rebels also encouraged Syria's formerly peaceful protesters to switch to violence in mid-2011, in hopes of attracting a similar intervention. The resulting escalation in Syria magnified that country's killing rate by tenfold.**

A2 Indus River Treaty

1. Modi in 2016 and 2017 threatened to cut water after Pakistani actions but didn't follow through. This is because even if they have access to the sources of the river, they lack the technological capability to actually block the rivers and handle the water. [Guruswamy of The Asian Age '19](#) finds confirms India does not have the capability to stop water immediately, due to their being no dams or infrastructure at all to stop the water.
2. Water is more of a bargaining chip to India- they use it to threaten Pakistan into taking actions to cool tensions and check back terrorism. Guruswamy of The Economic Times 18' writes that India needs to hold a credible threat of dissolving Pakistan's water source to check back Pakistan's behavior and use of terrorism. This is why Sile of CNBC 16' reports that the treaty has survived 5 decades of war and not deviated.
3. Pavariz of QZ 16' explains that ending the Indus Water Treaty would lead to major international backlash and give India a bad image in the global community with other allies- this is why they won't risk cutting it off.

<https://www.asianage.com/opinion/columnists/230219/india-cant-turn-off-indus-water-flow-to-pak.html>

The Pulwama incident has fuelled much anger within India and the Narendra Modi government, which rode to power promising to deter Pakistani-origin terrorism in India by threatening retribution is now hard pressed to deliver. After Uri, it discovered that there is a wide yawning gap between promise and reality. The PM's pre-election speeches are now being played back to him to taunt him. The Modi government is flailing for options short of the use of arms. Thus, the somewhat exasperated suggestion seemingly made by the Modi government that it would take a relook at the treaty. It can take a relook it till kingdom come, but the reality remains the same. As Dr Shakil Ahmad Romshoo, head of earth sciences at the geology and geophysics department of the University of Kashmir, recently said: "Let us assume we stop the water supply for the sake of argument. **Where would the water go? We do not have infrastructure to store this water. We have not built dams in J&K where we can store the water. And being a mountainous state, unlike Tamil Nadu or Karnataka, you cannot move water to another state.**

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-can-effectively-use-a-56-year-old-treaty-to-make-pakistan-behave/articleshow/54493686.cms>

Pakistan actively pursuing its strategy could force India to act. "The Indus is Pakistan's jugular vein. **If India wishes to improve Pakistan's behaviour and dissuade it from exporting more terrorists, it should hold out a credible threat of dissolving the Indus Water Treaty,** drawing a clear linkage between Pakistan's right to unimpeded water inflows and its responsibility not to cause harm to its upper riparian. A failure to respect that linkage should free India, for example, to link the Chenab (which has the largest transboundary flow) with the Ravi-Beas-Sutlej system to address water scarcity in its north," says Chellaney, adding that the **"water card is probably the most potent instrument India has in its arsenal – more powerful than the nuclear option"**

<https://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/05/india-could-use-indus-river-water-treaty-to-pressure-pakistan-over-loc-tensions.html>

"The Indus Water Treaty has survived hostilities and even wars over the five decades since it was inked ...Breaking an international treaty would be a dangerous precedent for a country aspiring to be a major global economic power," Leghari, member of the Pakistan Senate, told CNBC.

<https://qz.com/india/790885/narendra-modi-led-india-simply-cannot-afford-to-scrap-the-indus-water-treaty-with-pakistan/>

“Scrapping the treaty would rather act against our own interests and international standing as it would cause anxiety among our other neighbours like Bangladesh and Nepal with which we have

water-sharing treaties, apart from **earning us a bad image in the global community.”** Azeem Ali Shah, a Lahore-based researcher with the International Water Management Institute (IWMI), said, “A unilateral withdrawal from the Treaty will bring World Bank into the dispute. **It will also incite further anxiety among Pakistani people and might lead to violence.”** Despite the huge media debate, the silence of the principal parties—be it the Indian government or the World Bank—seems to indicate that the treaty is safe for the time being.

A2 Losing Aid (US)

1. Kim of The Heritage Foundation 10’ writes that most major recipients of US foreign aid vote against the US more often they vote with. The US really doesn’t care about how votes correlate to their foreign aid.
2. **[If they read Yemen]** The only example of this every happening is literally just Yemen, India in terms of geopolitical interests is way above Yemen, Trump would never take such a drastic step such as cutting 70 million in aid to India.
3. **[If they don’t read Yemen]** 0 contextualization on what the US actually has done to take action on this- tons of major countries have gone against the UNSC and literally relations have never been damaged and aid has never been cut.

<https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/us-foreign-aid-recipients-and-voting-the-united-nations>
As a result, **most major recipients of U.S. foreign assistance vote against the U.S. more often than they vote with the U.S.**[11]

A2 Modi Climate Change

1. [Anand of The New York Times](#) 19’ writes that Modi has made several moves to solve climate change such as moving India towards fossil fuel free and taking a lead at the Paris Agreements. Anand concludes that Modi has a longstanding commitment to taking India in a greener direction and needs it to keep power in office.
2. [Nelson of QZ ’18](#) reports that climate change is one of modi’s biggest priorities. Modi described as the “greatest threat to the survival and human civilization as we know it.” Failing to address it shows an “alarming glimpse of our own selfishness,” he said. This article goes on to say that he was calling Trump on his lack of action which proves the warrant in our case that India will consistently go against the US if their views don’t go along with it, if anything this turns case because having India on the council will serve to counterbalance the US who doesn’t believe in CC.

With India’s power needs expected to grow substantially as its economy continues to expand, its energy use will heavily influence the world’s chances of containing the greenhouse gases that scientists believe are driving global warming. Much attention at the time of the signing of the

Paris agreement was focused on the role President Barack Obama played in pushing **India's prime minister, Narendra Modi, to sign. In doing so, Mr. Modi committed India to achieving 40 percent of its electricity capacity from nonfossil-fuel sources by 2030. Less understood was Mr. Modi's longstanding personal commitment to taking India in a greener direction.** That has been strengthened in recent years by growing evidence that a greener path makes political and economic sense as well, says Harsh Pant, a fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, a New Delhi-based research organization.

One is climate change, which Modi described as the "greatest threat to the survival and human civilization as we know it." Failing to address it shows an "alarming glimpse of our own selfishness," he said. "If we are all children of the earth, why is there today a war between us and the earth?" Rich countries should do more to help emerging markets pollute less without sacrificing economic growth, he added. "Everyone talks about reducing carbon emissions but there are very few people or countries who back their words with their resources to help developing countries to adopt appropriate technology," Modi said. He touted India's pledge to produce 175 gigawatts of renewable energy by 2022, and said 60 gigawatts have been produced in the past three years. Trump pulled the US out of the Paris Climate Accord last summer, making the US the only country that isn't pledging to reduce its carbon emissions in the coming years. Trump has stacked his cabinet with climate-change deniers and [former coal executives](#).

Ross Koningstein, November 18, 2014, "What It Would Really Take to Reverse Climate Change", IEEE Spectrum,
<https://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/renewables/what-it-would-really-take-to-reverse-climate-change>,
accessed July 13, 2018. AM

"A 2008 paper by James Hansen [PDF], former director of NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies and one of the world's foremost experts on climate change, showed the true gravity of the situation. In it, Hansen set out to determine what level of atmospheric CO2 society should aim for "if humanity wishes to preserve a planet similar to that on which civilization developed and to which life on Earth is adapted." His climate models showed that exceeding 350 parts per million CO2 in the atmosphere would likely have catastrophic effects. We've already blown past that limit. Right now, environmental monitoring shows concentrations around 400 ppm. That's particularly problematic because CO2 remains in the atmosphere for more than a century; even if we shut down every fossil-fueled power plant today, existing CO2 will continue to warm the planet."

A2 India will block Paki IMF Loans

1. **Dreher of Yale** writes that the US controls veto power, and that basically if the US approves of something then it'll happen. This is important as **Reuters in 2018** writes that the US is in favor of Pakistan getting an IMF loan. NU
2. IMF Loans hurt Pakistan. **Brenwood in 2019** writes that IMF loans in the past to Pakistan have hurt Pakistan's economy because of stringent conditions, with unemployment rates rising, income inequality rising, and poverty getting worse. Pref on history.
3. Logically India wouldn't block loans that they say serve as a lifeline to Pakistan, because if Pakistan collapses India would have to deal with a refugee crisis and other problems.
4. India has a ton of geopolitical clout to block loans in the status quo, their ev doesn't describe what new powers India gets by joining UNSC. if they really care they can block rn

https://leitner.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/resources/docs/unsc_imf.pdf

Clearly, the top five IMF shareholders – the US, Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom – control the Fund. These members alone control nearly 40 percent of the vote share and are the only countries that automatically have seats on the IMF 24 member Executive Board. The rest of the world vies for representation through elections and shared seats. **With about 17 percent of the total votes, the US by itself has veto power over major decisions at the IMF, including the appointment of the IMF Managing Director.**

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-usa/pompeo-said-u-s-would-not-block-pakistan-if-it-seeks-imf-bailout-pakistani-minister-idUSKCN1LR13C>

The remarks, which Chaudhry said Pompeo made during his visit to Pakistan on Wednesday, come in stark contrast to Pompeo's warnings in July that the United States had serious reservations about the IMF giving money to Pakistan due to concerns Islamabad would use the cash to pay off Chinese loans.

Those comments rattled Islamabad, which is facing a currency crisis and may have no option but to turn again to the IMF for a rescue if staunch allies China and Saudi Arabia do not offer more loans to prop up its foreign currency reserves. Chaudhry told Reuters that relations between the United States and Pakistan were "broken" before Pompeo's trip to Islamabad but the visit had "set many things straight" and reinvigorated ties. **"He assured Pakistan that ... if Pakistan opted to go to IMF for any financial help, the USA will not oppose it,"** Chaudhry said in the capital, Islamabad. Responding to request for comment on Chaudhry's remarks, a spokesman for the U.S. State Department said **Washington wanted to see "a prosperous Pakistan that contributes positively toward regional stability and security."**

<https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2019/04/pakistan-requests-13th-imf-loan-amid-us-china-p-roxy-battle/>

Under some of the previous IMF structural adjustment programmes over the last four decades, debt-justice network CADTM Pakistan revealed that the unemployment rates increased, as did levels of inequality and poverty. As reported in Pakistan-based The News International last August, a [large rally](#) was held opposing further **IMF loans** and condemning what they expected would be further privatisation, which participants noted **would be to "the detriment of the working classes" and result in "costlier education, healthcare, electricity, gas, food and other items of daily living."**

According to [Pakistan Today](#), the speculated forthcoming **loan conditions include a general sales tax hike, currency devaluation, and the privatisation of state enterprises** — demonstrating a lack of deviation from programmes gone by (see Updates [83](#), [72](#), [64](#)).