

Atharva and I negate;

Our sole contention is emboldening enemies.

[Dewan '18](#) of **CNN** writes that "over the past five years... the US accounted for 61% of major arms sales to the Saudis." [Seligman '18](#) of **Foreign Policy** furthers that "the United States has provided the Arab coalition with logistical support, ... refueling,... targeting assistance, and intelligence." Moreover, [Riedel '18](#) of **Brookings** finds that "if [the] flow of [American] spare parts came to a close tonight, the Royal Saudi Air Force would be grounded tomorrow morning." Therefore, cutting arms sales would weaken Saudi Arabia in the short term.

However, this also means that doing so emboldens the Saudis chief rival, Iran. [Brands '18](#) of **Bloomberg** writes that "as aggressive as Iran... has been in recent years, its rulers still... had to operate in the shadow of American power... [and taking] away that restraining influence... [would result in] behavior that is [even] more provocative."

This would manifest in two ways.

Subpoint A is Yemen.

The [Council on Foreign Relations](#) explains that "Yemen's civil war began in 2014 when Houthi insurgents... took control of Yemen's capital... [driving] a coalition of Gulf states led by Saudi Arabia... [to launch] a campaign of economic isolation and air strikes... with U.S. support."

Fortunately, peace is imminent. [Xinhua](#) finds yesterday that "Yemen's Houthi rebels said that they are ready to withdraw... from the ports of... Hodeidah if requested by the United Nations," which [Mahmood](#) of **The National** writes last week is a "vital step towards ending the nearly-four year war." This is because [Hafezi '18](#) of **Reuters** writes that "The Iranians have given indications that they are now willing to... [push] the Houthis to move forward [and negotiate]."

Unfortunately, [Carafano '18](#) of **the Heritage Foundation** explains that "if America walks away, Tehran... would feel emboldened and likely double-down on expanding the war." The [ICG '18](#) concludes that "cutting off military assistance would... embolden the Houthis and Iran [to resume fighting]... hoping that... the Saudi-led coalition will... end its military activities."

The impact is disrupting aid flows.

Peace in Hodeidah is vital, as [Ghobari '18](#) of **Reuters** reports that "Hodeidah... handles 80 percent of the country's food imports and aid supplies." Luckily, **the BBC** reports this week that

the ceasefire has let "UN aid officials ... [reach] a vast store of desperately-needed food... in Yemen's Hudaydah port... [with] enough grain to feed 3.7 million people. Therefore, [Barrington '19 of Reuters](#) finds that "if fighting restarts... around the port of Hodeidah, [it would sever] the main supply route into the country... leaving no way to feed millions... [close to] starvation."

Subpoint B is regional destabilization.

Currently, Iran is restricted by US weapons. [Jerome '10 of the CFR](#) explains that "for Iran... [arms sales] present a powerful deterrent since there is nothing in Tehran's current arsenal that can cope with the latest versions [of American weapons]." [Ostovar '18 of Foreign Policy](#) corroborates, "even if... [Iran and Saudi Arabia] are quite evenly matched, the military power that the United States could bring to bear would heavily tilt a conflict in Saudi Arabia's favor."

Overall, [Terrill '11 of the Army War College](#) concludes that "Saudi Arabia and the United States often work well together in... [containing] Iranian influence." Without pressure, Iran seeks expansion. For example, [Sly '18 of the Washington Post](#) writes that "the withdrawal of [US] troops [from Syria opened]... the door to further Iranian expansion."

The impact is twofold.

First, an arms race.

Lacking US support and facing an aggressive Iran, the Middle East would enter a deadly arms race. [Roubini '17 of the Guardian](#) finds that "if the US no longer... [guaranteed] its Sunni allies' security, all regional powers – including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt – might decide that they can defend themselves only by acquiring nuclear weapons." Problematically, [Rider '11 of Texas Tech](#) finds that "an arms race increases the probability of war by 331%."

Second, an irate Iran.

[Posey '17 of the Heritage Foundation](#) explains that "Iran is increasingly destabilizing the Middle East [through proxy wars and terrorism]." She furthers that "[failure to contain Iran allows it] to [further] negatively influence and destabilize the Middle East." This would likely trigger conflict, as [O'Connor '18 of Newsweek](#) finds that "[there are] nine flashpoints... across the Middle East [where war could break out]." Already, [Taddonio '18 of PBS](#) quantifies that "there [have] been over a million casualties in the Middle East over the last decade [from proxy conflicts]."

Thus, we negate.

Subpoint A: Yemen

F2: Ceasefire violations

1. Even if there are some violations in the status quo, the overall ceasefire is holding strong and the leaders are making agreements. That's why **Doucet** from case explains that aid is flowing and **Mahmood** finds a week ago that troop withdrawals are starting to happen.
2. The majority of the violations are from the Houthis, which links into **Carafano** from case: if we weaken Yemen, we lose any shot at peace because the Houthis are more likely to fight back.

F2: Iran and Saudi underlying rivalry

1. Even if there is a rivalry, both actors are pursuing peace in Yemen. **Hafezi** explains that Iran is pushing the Houthis to the negotiating table and Saudi Arabia is already there, as per our case.

F2: War lasts forever

1. Peace talks wouldn't happen currently if the war lasted forever.
2. The reason why the war won't last forever is because [Nissenbaum '18](#) of the Wall Street Journal explains that the U.S is pushing Saudi Arabia to the table and **Hafezi** from case reports that Iran is pushing the Houthis.

Subpoint B: Iran

BIG POINT: Even if Iran itself doesn't attack, the proxy wars it starts in order to facilitate it's expansionism is enough to completely destabilize the Middle East. **O'Connor** says that there are nine places where Iran can start Yemen-scale wars, so beware even if it doesn't physically invade.

F2: Iran won't/can't nuclearize

1. [Haltiwanger '18](#) of the Business Insider explains that before the nuclear deal, Iran was only three to four months from getting a nuclear bomb. They still have that capability, as he continues that Iran could get its currently disabled centrifuges up and running very quickly.

F2: Iran is provoked by arms sales

1. That's not true at all. **Jerome** from case explains that nothing in Iran's arsenal can contest U.S weaponry. You're preferring our evidence because in the status quo, Iran

hasn't even tried to attack. If what they were saying was true, we'd be fighting in a Saudi-Iranian war already.

F2: Iran will never attack Saudi Arabia

1. (If they try reading provocation) BIG CONTRADICT BOIS
2. Even if Iran doesn't attack Saudi Arabia, **O'Connor** explains that there are nine flashpoints in the middle east where Iran could start devastating proxy conflicts which would still destabilize the region.
3. The **ICG** evidence pretty explicitly states that Iran would be emboldened to strike at Saudi Arabia if U.S arms sales were gone, as **Jerome** explains that U.S weapons are the deterrent to Iranian aggression.

F2: Iran is not a threat

1. Even if Iran doesn't attack Saudi Arabia, **O'Connor** explains that there are nine flashpoints in the middle east where Iran could start devastating proxy conflicts which would still destabilize the region. That's the real threat of an expansionist Iran.
2. Even if Iranian military spending is low, **Thrall '18** of GMU explains that Saudi Arabia doesn't have its own domestic defense industry, meaning they can't really defend themselves. That's why **Ostovar** from case explains that Iran and Saudi Arabia are very evenly matched until the U.S comes into the equation.

A2: Yemen

We concede that in the short term, Saudi Arabia won't be able to fight in Yemen. However, in the long term, they will be forced to resume the conflict because they are forced to combat their arch-rival Iran's expansion in Yemen. There are three reasons why they can.

1. **Carey '18 of Bloomberg** finds that "Saudi Arabia aims to build a defense industry at breakneck speed, and half of Saudi... [arms are] supposed to be done locally by 2030."
2. **Shesgreen '18 of USA Today** finds that is we cut sales, "the Saudis could turn to another country as... money is not a real obstacle to the oil-rich country." It's already happened, as **Carroll '17 of the Independent** writes that "agreement has already been reached on a \$3bn... deal to supply the Saudis with Russia's... advanced air defense missile system." Problematically, **Chollet '18 of Foreign Policy** finds that "the Russians... [would] supply them with less accurate weapons that will likely just kill more in Yemen." Indeed, **McKernan '18 of the Independent** finds that there was "a 34 percent increase in incidents of civilian harm [in Syria] caused by Russia [supplying airstrike technology]."
3. **Sanchez '19 of the Telegraph** finds that "any... change [in] the basis of... [the Saudi-US] relationship would reduce our influence and make peace less likely."

A2: Yemen famine

1. A Houthi takeover would worsen this. [Alasrar '18 of the National Interest](#) finds that “the Houthi government’s total neglect of sanitation services, and its failure to maintain... infrastructure has contributed to the deepening of the cholera epidemic.”