# Sjostrom/Verska – NDCA Negative v1

## Contention 1 is the Immobility of the UN

#### Justin Gruenberg indicated that:

Justin S. Gruenberg, An Analysis of United Nations Security Council Resolutions: Are All Countries Treated Equally?, 41 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 513 (2009) Available at: <https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol41/iss2/12>, Date Accessed 4-6-2019 // JM

Since the Security Council began considering threats to international peace and security in 1946, the Council has not consistently performed its task, nor has it used wording in resolutions evenly. The history of the Security Council can easily be split into two distinct periods: Cold War and post Cold War.163 During the Cold War period, due to the veto possessed by both the United States and the Soviet Union, many “challenges to international peace and security” were not addressed by the Security Council, including the Berlin Blockade, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Prague Spring, and the Vietnam War.164 Each of these Subjects involved either the United States or the Soviet Union. Since neither country would allow itself to be criticized by the Security Council, each one vetoed resolutions regarding any of these Subjects, despite the threat to international peace and security each presented.165 Since each Permanent Member had veto power, the Security Council was usually confined to “operating on the margins of the major conflicts of its time, often intervening to encourage negotiation, to strengthen cease-fires and to deploy monitors and impartial peacekeeping forces.”166 From 1946 to 1989, only 646 Security Council resolutions were issued.167 The Security Council never issued more than thirty resolutions in a single year before 1990.168 Following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the Security Council was freed from its shackles and able to consider more issues while using different word choices.169 Since 1990, the Security Council has issued more than 1,100 resolutions.170 The vocabulary of the Security Council has changed in the post-Cold War period. Some words have not been used by the Security Council in resolutions in the post-Cold War period, such as “grieved” or “censure,” which have not been used since 1986. Other words, such as “alarmed” or “concerned,” are used more frequently in the current time period. Additionally, the breakup of the Soviet Union had a ripple effect on many other countries in Eastern Europe.171 For example, the fragmentation of Yugoslavia led to conflicts between warring factions that has killed hundreds of thousands and displaced millions from their homes.172 The Security Council, free from the constant threat or use of a veto by a Permanent Member, “displayed an unprecedented activism” in trying to facilitate peace and security.173 Table C shows the dramatically different usage of the Permanent Member veto in the two distinct eras.17

#### However, this activism would change in a world of enlargement. James Vreeland indicates in 2014 that:

James Raymond Vreeland & Axel Dreher, The political Economy of the United Nations Security Council, 2014, Cambridge University, p. 232-233, Date Accessed 4-8-2019 // JM

If there is insufficient political will to introduce permanent members without veto power, it is surely lacking to bring them in with veto power. New permanent members with veto power would directly diminish the power of the P5. Still, it is worth considering the effects that such changes would bring. Following the work of Tsebelis (1995, 2012), it is straightforward to see that more members with veto power cannot increase the likelihood of resolutions passing – it can only diminish such chances. Resolutions that might pass through the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China might not pass through Japan, Germany, Brazil and India. On many recent issues where Russia and China have abstained, they might have actually exercised their veto if they knew they would be joined by other veto powers. If it is more difficult to pass resolutions through the UNSC, higher levels of unilateral action might result. In these extreme cases, a country may be willing to take action with or without UNSC authorization – the 2003 invasion of Iraq comes to mind. There may be some policies, however, that a government will pursue only if it has UNSC authorization because such authorization lowers the political and material costs. Chapman and Wolford (2010: 228) contend, “The promise of lowered foreign policy costs … may not only facilitate coercion but also encourage aggressive behavior.” They suggest that “if the goal is to reduce the aggregate likelihood of war we should consider crafting institutions that are conservative with their authorization” (2010: 237).

#### The result of this is a sense of immobility. Princeton Lyman explains that:

Princeton Lyman, 2000, “Saving the UN Security Council - A Challenge for the United States”, p 127-146, <http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf2/mpunyb_lyman_4.pdf>, Date Accessed 4-6-2019 // JM

Reform is difficult because each proposal so far runs up against one or another fundamental interest of some key party or parties. The United States is prepared to support an expansion of the Council, to en- able Germany and Japan to become permanent members. The United States recognizes that realistically this would have to be accompanied by adding members from the Third World as well, to avoid the Council becoming in Secretary Albright's words "too industrio-centric." But the United States fears [of] expanding the Council by more than five or six, lest it become a debating society unable to take firm decisions in a timely manner.34 The concern is understandable. Coming to closure on critical resolutions — those dealing with serious crises and moving toward either sanctions or the use of force — is already an agonizingly slow and often tendentious process. Negotiations over resolutions dealing with the Iraq crises of 1997-98 involved in almost every case weeks of negotiations including wordsmithing back and forth among foreign ministers themselves as well as their representatives in New York. The stakes are high. The United States has had another concern. At present, the United States can count on eight votes in any significant situation (assuming P- 5 unity, and thus no veto, plus the votes of the two non-permanent members from the Western Europe and Other Group, and one vote from the non-permanent Eastern Europe group). It thus needs but one vote from Third World countries to secure a majority of nine. Expanding the Council to 21, with the addition of Germany, Japan and presumably a Central European country on one side, and a permanent representative each from Africa, Asia and Latin America, on the other, would preserve the same balance. But moving beyond that, to numbers strongly advocated by Third World members, up to 24 (two each from Asia, Africa and Latin America) or even 26, would result in needing more Third World votes. The U.S. fears being put in a position of defending its interests in the Security Council more by vetoing unfriendly resolutions than by being able to mobilize majority support. The Council would in such a situation become immobilized as in the Cold War period. However sound the logic behind it, the United States position has come to be seen as the principal obstacle to reform. That is because other regions cannot accommodate their claims within the numbers upon which the United States insists.

#### This is why the clear alternative becomes unilateral action. Vreeland concludes:

James Raymond Vreeland & Axel Dreher, The political Economy of the United Nations Security Council, 2014, Cambridge University, p. 232-233, Date Accessed 4-8-2019 // JM

If there is insufficient political will to introduce permanent members without veto power, it is surely lacking to bring them in with veto power. New permanent members with veto power would directly diminish the power of the P5. Still, it is worth considering the effects that such changes would bring. Following the work of Tsebelis (1995, 2012), it is straightforward to see that more members with veto power cannot increase the likelihood of resolutions passing – it can only diminish such chances. Resolutions that might pass through the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China might not pass through Japan, Germany, Brazil and India. On many recent issues where Russia and China have abstained, they might have actually exercised their veto if they knew they would be joined by other veto powers. If it is more difficult to pass resolutions through the UNSC, higher levels of unilateral action might result. In these extreme cases, a country may be willing to take action with or without UNSC authorization – the 2003 invasion of Iraq comes to mind. There may be some policies, however, that a government will pursue only if it has UNSC authorization because such authorization lowers the political and material costs. Chapman and Wolford (2010: 228) contend, “The promise of lowered foreign policy costs … may not only facilitate coercion but also encourage aggressive behavior.” They suggest that “if the goal is to reduce the aggregate likelihood of war we should consider crafting institutions that are conservative with their authorization” (2010: 237).

#### James Fearon explains that these:

James Fearon, 1-6-2005, “Reforming International Institutions to Promote International Peace and Security”, Stanford University, <https://web.stanford.edu/group/fearon-research/cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Reforming-Internationa-Institutions-to-Promote-International-Peace-and-Security.pdf>, Date Accessed 4-8-2019 // JM

Unilateral military interventions. Without some form of collective international authorization, unilateral military interventions against neighbors or states thought to be threatening can create an international public bad, even when the action is plausibly justifiable, for example, for humanitarian reasons. The problem is that unilateral interventions create general incentives for states to acquire more weapons (particularly nuclear weapons), and to see the unilateral use of force in their own cases as more justified and permissible. States may be able to reduce the international public bads of arms racing, regional wars, and nuclear proliferation if they can coordinate on mechanisms of global governance that will work to authorize the use of force when it favors international peace and security on average, but not otherwise.

#### Michael Horowitz concludes that:

Michael Horowitz, “Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, <http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/53/2/234>, Date Accessed 4-11-2019 // JM

Sagan and others focus on inexperience on the part of new nuclear states as a key  behavioral driver. Inexperienced operators and the bureaucratic desire to “justify”  the costs spent developing nuclear weapons, combined with organizational biases  that may favor escalation to avoid decapitation—the “use it or lose it” mind-set—  may cause new nuclear states to adopt riskier launch postures, such as launch on  warning, or at least be perceived that way by other states (Blair 1993; Feaver 1992;  Sagan 1995).3  Acquiring nuclear weapons could alter state preferences and make states more  likely to escalate disputes once they start, given their new capabilities.4 But their  general lack of experience at leveraging their nuclear arsenal and effectively communicating nuclear threats could mean new nuclear states will be more likely to  select adversaries poorly and to find themselves in disputes with resolved adversaries that will reciprocate militarized challenges.

## Contention 2 is Preventing Conflict

#### India and Pakistan are on the brink of war over the disputed Kashmir region. Arshad Zargar who explains on April 2nd that

Arshad R. Zargar, 4-2-2019, "India-Pakistan clashes on Kashmir border leave civilians dead," No Publication, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/india-kashmir-pakistan-clashes-civilians-killed-nuclear-armed-neighbors-tension/, Date Accessed 4-3-2019 // WS

Seven people have been killed and 28 injured in two days of small arms fire and shelling between Indian and Pakistani forces. The renewed clashes have taken place along the de-facto border that divides the Kashmir region in half. Both of the nations claim rightful ownership of the entire area, and they've fought three wars over it already. This week has seen the deadliest border escalation between the nuclear armed neighbors since they carried out [airstrikes on each other's territory](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/india-pakistan-conflict-imran-khan-indian-pilot-narendra-modi-nuclear-weapons/) near the end of February. An [intervention by the United States](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/pakistani-ambassador-calls-on-u-s-to-help-defuse-india-standoff/) and other nations brought the two countries back from the brink of a possible full-scale war. Four Pakistanis and three Indians have been killed in the cross-border clashes since Monday morning. On Tuesday, three Pakistani soldiers were killed by gunfire from Indian forces. A statement by the Pakistan military said they were killed in the Rawalakot area of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. A Pakistani civilian was also killed in shooting on Monday, and five civilians were injured.

#### Unfortunately India’s Permanent membership on the UNSC would push the two countries past the brink into all-out war for 3 reasons

#### First is India will use membership in their favor with regards to Kashmir. Aamir Khan explains in 2015 that

Aamir Khan 2015 “UNSC’S EXPANSION: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGIONS AND THE WORLD”, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632266.pdf>, date accessed 4-2-19 //WS

Kashmir is the major dispute between Pakistan and India. Pakistan wants a just resolution of the Kashmir dispute in accordance with the spirit of UNSC resolutions—the UNSC resolution maintained the issue of Jammu and Kashmir be determined through plebiscite as per the wishes of the people of Kashmir. The U.N. HLP report also refers to the Kashmir dispute as one of the “oldest and unresolved disputes on the UNSC agenda.”216 To silence the popular demand of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, India has deployed a huge military contingent, which is involved in the worst kind of human right violations. According to Noorani, “Indian Security Forces have systematically, and with impunity, perpetrated outrageous violations of human rights in the [Kashmir] valley.”217 Today, Pakistan and India are nuclear power; even small conflict may conflagrate to nuclear exchange which will devastate the entire South Asian region. Without settlement of the Kashmir dispute, use of force cannot be ruled out. Noorani contends that, “It is reasonable to conclude that relations between India and Pakistan will never be normal until the Kashmir dispute is settled.”218 Without resolution of the Kashmir dispute, India does not qualify to be a member of the UNSC. India has refused to implement the resolutions of the UNSC over settlement of the Kashmir dispute. It would be unjust to award membership of the council to a country that has violated its resolution. As a permanent member of the UNSC, India can influence favorable decisions at the UNSC over Kashmir. Furthermore, India, due to its strong conventional military, can resort to the use of force on the pretext of pre-emption or hot pursuit to coerce Pakistan to change its stance on Kashmir in favor of India

#### This specifically materializes in blocking UN intervention in the conflict. Oliver Stuenkel writes in 2010 that

Oliver Stuenkel, 2010, “Leading the disenfranchised or joining the establishment? India, Brazil, and the UN Security Council,” https://ri.fgv.br/sites/default/files/publicacoes/10d7bc9faa.pdf, Date Accessed 3-28-2019 // WS

But permanent membership would also help India defend its ever more global interests. According to Kulwant Rai Gupta, there is a sense in India that with regards to security matters, the role of the UNSC is increasing while that of the UN General Assembly is diminishing. Development issues are more and more handled by the IMF and the World Bank, while the UN turns into an institution dealing mostly with security issues. \* is interpretation is thus yet another reason why India should seek to gain admission as a permanent member to an ever more important organ.84 Finally, India is said to eye[s] a permanent seat to assure that the United Nations does not get involved in the conflict in Kashmir, which would, Indians fear, lead to a partition or independence of Kashmir.

#### That’s problematic as Reuters reports in February

Reuters, 2-19-2019, "Pakistan urges U.N. to intervene over Kashmir tension with India," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-pakistan/pakistan-urges-un-to-intervene-over-kashmir-tension-with-india-idUSKCN1Q80EM, Date Accessed 4-13-2019 // WS

“It is imperative to take steps for de-escalation. The United Nations must step in to defuse tensions,” he wrote, blaming India for deliberately ratcheting up its hostile rhetoric for domestic political reasons. The Pakistani appeal follows days of rising tension between the old rivals after a suicide bomber blew himself up near an Indian police convoy in Indian-controlled Kashmir on Thursday, killing at least 40 paramilitary police. Jaish-e Mohammad, a militant group said to be based in Pakistan which wants the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir to be part of Pakistan, claimed responsibility but the Pakistani government has denied any involvement. “Attributing it to Pakistan even before investigations is absurd,” Qureshi said. “India must be asked to conduct an open and credible investigation on Pulwama incident,” he said. Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir, a former princely state on the border between India and Pakistan, has been in dispute since the partition of India in 1947.

#### Second is shifting the balance of power as Shamsa Nawaz writes in 2017 that a

Shamsa Nawaz, 2017, "Violation of the UN Resolutions on Kashmir: India’s Quest for UNSC Permanent Membership," No Publication, <http://issi.org.pk/violation-of-the-un-resolutions-on-kashmir-indias-quest-for-unsc-permanent-membership/>, Date Accessed 4-1-19 // MN

The permanent seat in the UNSC will also give India a formal status as a nuclear power with the greater legitimacy of initiatives, whether wrong or right. This would certainly have a potential to destabilize the region by fueling regional confrontation and conflicts. Even the very existence of Pakistan would be endangered since the division of the Subcontinent remains a sore point in the Indian politics. The UNSC still upholds legitimacy for a worldwide action. It is crucial in maintaining the international order while looking after the super powers interests. However, it is difficult to see the role of the UN in such a world order more than a rubber-stamp. For example, the UN was emasculated when Iraq was invaded and Afghanistan was attacked.

#### Third is economic destruction. Khan continues that

Aamir Khan 2015, “UNSC’S EXPANSION: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGIONS AND THE WORLD”, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632266.pdf>, date accessed 4-2-19 //WS

The economic power of India backed by strong diplomatic weight could be devastating for Pakistan’s economy. India could destroy Pakistan’s economy by making Pakistan run dry by stopping the flow of western rivers, guaranteed to Pakistan under bilateral treaty between India and Pakistan—the Indus Water treaty (IWT). By disregarding the international binding of the World Bank as Guarantor in the IWT, India could obliterate the agro-based economy of Pakistan, which is a mainstay of Pakistan’s economy. The permanent membership would afford India an enormous advantage to block resolutions brought before the UNSC by Pakistan. Furthermore, as a permanent member of the UNSC, India could use its influence over international financial institutions, such as the International Monitory Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to prevent Pakistan’s access to these institutions; this would greatly damage Pakistan’s already weak economy.220 Likewise, all permanent members are represented on various committees.

#### That’s problematic as David Barno indicates in 2015:

David Barno, 11-5-2015, "A nuclear war between India and Pakistan is a very real possibility," Quartz India, <https://qz.com/india/541502/a-nuclear-war-between-india-and-pakistan-is-a-very-real-possibility/>, Date Accessed 4-3-19 // MN

These stakes are even higher, and more dangerous, today. Since 2004, India has been developing a new military doctrine called [Cold Start](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf), a limited war option designed largely to deter Islamabad from sponsoring irregular attacks against New Delhi. It involves rapid conventional retaliation after any such attack, launching a number of quick armoured assaults into Pakistan and [rapidly securing limited objectives](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19889/pakistans_nuclear_posture.html) that hypothetically remain below Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. In accordance with this doctrine, the Indian military is meant to [mobilise half a million troops in less than 72 hours](http://archive.defencenews.in/defence-news-internal.aspx?get=&id=H3gVhgw0WhI=). The problem is, unlike its neighbours India and China, Pakistan has not renounced the first use of nuclear weapons. Instead, Pakistani leaders have [stated](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/watch-out-india-pakistan-ready-use-nuclear-weapons-13284) that they [may have to use nuclear weapons](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/pakistan-tests-missile-that-could-carry-nuclear-warhead-to-every-part-of-india/2015/03/09/920f4f42-c65c-11e4-bea5-b893e7ac3fb3_story.html) first in order to defend against a conventional attack from India. Therefore, both to [counter Cold Start](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/pakistan-wants-battlefield-nukes-use-against-indian-troops-12200) and help to [offset](http://tribune.com.pk/story/858106/pakistan-needs-short-range-tactical-nuclear-weapons-to-deter-india/) India’s growing conventional superiority, Pakistan has accelerated its nuclear weapons programme—and begun to field short-range, low yield tactical nuclear weapons. Some observers now judge this nuclear programme to be the [fastest growing](http://defence.pk/threads/pak-nuclear-program-is-worlds-fastest-growing.170204/) in the world. Pakistan will reportedly have enough fissile material by 2020 to build [more than 200 nuclear warheads](http://www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-and-disarmament/strategic-stability-second-nuclear-age/p33809)—more than the UK plans to have by that time. It is not simply the pace of the build-up that should cause concern. Pakistan’s arsenal of short-range [tactical nuclear weapons](http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/McCausland.pdf) is a game changer in other ways. Pakistan clearly intends to use these weapons—on its own soil if necessary—[to counter Cold Start’s plan](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/pakistan-wants-battlefield-nukes-use-against-indian-troops-12200) for sudden Indian armoured thrusts into Pakistan. The introduction of these weapons has altered the long-standing geometry between the two nuclear powers and increases the risk of escalation to a nuclear exchange in a crisis. Beyond the risks of runaway nuclear escalation, Pakistan’s growing tactical nuclear weapons programme also brings a wide array of other [destabilising characteristics](http://fpif.org/threshold-nuclear-war-pakistan-india-keeps-dropping/) to this already unstable mix: the necessity to position these short-range weapons close to the border with India, making them more vulnerable to interdiction; the need to move and disperse these weapons during a crisis, thereby signalling a nuclear threat; and the prospects of local commanders being given decentralised control of the weapons—a “use it or lose it” danger if facing an Indian armoured offensive. Furthermore, large numbers of small nuclear weapons scattered at different locations increase the risk that some will fall into the hands of violent extremists. A terrorist group gaining control of a nuclear weapon remains one of the most frightening potential spin-offs of the current arms race. Perhaps the most dangerous scenario that could lead to catastrophe is a replay of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. In November 2008, 10 terrorists launched attacks that left 166 people dead before the last of attackers were finally killed by Indian security forces almost 60 hours after the attacks began. By that time, there was strong evidence that the attackers were Pakistani and belonged to a Pakistan-supported militant group. Indian public outrage and humiliation were overwhelming. Only through the combination of diplomatic pressure from the US and immense restraint exerted by then-Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh was an Indian retaliatory strike averted. The chances of such Indian government restraint in a similarly deadly future scenario are unlikely. Experts such as Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution and former US ambassador to India Robert Blackwill [agree](http://tribune.com.pk/story/834475/modi-likely-to-use-military-force-if-terror-attack-traced-to-pakistan-former-us-diplomat/) that if there were another Mumbai, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi would not step back from using military force in response, unlike his predecessors. Indian public opinion would demand retaliation, especially after the unpopular degree of restraint exercised by the Singh government after the Mumbai attacks. But there remains no meaningful senior-level dialogue between the two states—last August’s planned meeting between the two national security advisers was [cancelled](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/23/world/asia/pakistan-cancels-talks-with-india-citing-restrictions.html) after disagreements about Kashmiri separatists.

#### This strike would kill millions as Roblin quantifies in 2019 that:

Sebastien Roblin, 3-9-2019, "Why a So-Called "Limited" Nuclear War Between India and Pakistan Would Devastate the Planet," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-so-called-limited-nuclear-war-between-india-and-pakistan-would-devastate-planet-46532>, Date Accessed 4-2-2019 // WS

A 2014 study estimates that the immediate effects of the bombs—the fireball, over-pressure wave, radiation burns etc.—would kill twenty million people. An earlier study estimated a hundred 15-kiloton nuclear detonations could kill twenty-six million in India and eighteen million in Pakistan—and concluded that escalating to using 100-kiloton warheads, which have greater blast radius and overpressure waves that can shatter hardened structures, would multiply death tolls four-fold. Moreover, these projected body counts omit the secondary effects of nuclear blasts. Many survivors of the initial explosion would suffer slow, lingering deaths due to radiation exposure. The collapse of healthcare, transport, sanitation, water and economic infrastructure would also claim many more lives. A nuclear blast could also trigger a deadly firestorm. For instance, a firestorm caused by the U.S. napalm bombing of Tokyo in March 1945 killed more people than the Fat Man bomb killed in Nagasaki.

# Frontlines

#### Joseph Trevithick writes on February 27th that

Joseph Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway, 2-27-19 "Yes, India And Pakistan Could End The World As We Know It Through A Nuclear Exchange," Drive, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26674/yes-india-and-pakistan-could-end-the-world-as-we-know-it-through-a-nuclear-exchange, Date Accessed 4-2-2019 // WS

A series of events starting with a major terrorist attack in the disputed Jammu and Kashmir region has pushed India and Pakistan, and their nuclear arsenals, closer [to all-out war](http://thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26665/indian-pakistan-air-war-erupts-ending-in-captured-pilot-and-growing-fears-of-all-out-war) with each other than they have been in decades. Though the two countries have significantly smaller nuclear stockpiles compared to the United States or Russia, even a limited nuclear exchange between them could lead to health and climatic issues on a global scale, a scenario known as Nuclear Winter, which would end life on the planet as we know it. We at [The War Zone](http://thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26640/pakistan-says-it-scrambled-fighters-to-intercept-indian-jets-violating-its-airspace) have been following the developments in South Asia closely and you can read our wrap-ups of the past two days of fighting [here](http://thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26665/indian-pakistan-air-war-erupts-ending-in-captured-pilot-and-growing-fears-of-all-out-war) and [here](http://thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26642/pakistan-promises-retaliation-makes-nuclear-threats-after-indian-jets-bomb-its-territory). The precipitating event was an attack by the terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed that involved a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device ramming into a bus carrying Indian soldiers in Jammu and Kashmir, killing 40 and wounding many more.

### This is corroborated by

### AT: India Will De-escalate

#### Not true 🡪 National support against Pak means politicians wont de-escalate

Dan de Luce and Robert Windrem, 2-27-2019, “Can nuclear-armed India and Pakistan step back from the brink?” NBC News, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asia/can-nuclear-armed-pakistan-india-step-back-brink-n976831>, Date Accessed 4-3-2019, // SDV

Nuclear-armed rivals Pakistan and India are locked in the worst crisis in years over the disputed region of Kashmir, and the [capture of an Indian fighter pilot](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/indian-jets-downed-over-kashmir-pakistan-airstrikes-n976561) could mean the confrontation will only get worse, former diplomats and regional analysts say. The pilot, wing commander Abhinandan Varthaman, was in Pakistani military custody after his MiG 21 was shot down on Wednesday along the disputed border between the two countries. India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi now faces a crucial crossroads, experts said, faced with either holding back and seeking to settle the dispute, or taking further military action. With elections in less than three months in India, hitting back at Pakistan could play well to nationalist sentiment — but it could also risk a full-blown war. "New Delhi is in a really tough spot now," said Michael Kugelman, deputy director of the Asia Program at the Wilson Center, a Washington think tank. "Domestic political considerations make it very unlikely that India would want to de-escalate right now."

### AT: War Inevitable Now

#### No our ev indicates that they are on the brink of war but every time the situation is about to go too far, the UN steps in and cools it down. Our ev says India would veto this intervention meaning that in the AFF world there is no check on conflict.

### AT: China will just veto

#### This does not answer either of our links. Our ev indicates that India can will block resolutions that wouldn’t be in their favor, not them try and pass new ones. This means they can veto UN interventions that are designed to stop escalation.

### AT: Links Wont Cause Escalation

#### First, Our Khan evidence is excellent on this question. It explicitly indicates that India’s new influence over Pakistan will tip them over the edge. If India blokcs bills that crush Pakistan’s economy this will certainly cause retaliation

### AT: MAD – Pakistan Won’t Stike

#### MAD is the reason our ev says Pakistan will strike first. Since India has a far larger and superior conventional force, Pakistan will strike first with nukes to get an upper hand and avoid a certain loss

### AT: MAD – India Wont Srike with Nukes

#### We agree, India will invade with conventional forces first, but since India has a far larger and superior conventional force, Pakistan will strike first with nukes to get an upper hand and avoid a certain loss