

# TOC Blockfile

## A2 AFF

### A2 R2Ps

#### Uq- P-5 Support R2Ps

1. Burden. Even if the permanent members on the council rightnow support the responsibility to protect initiative, our opponents have to prove that a humanitarian crisis is going to manifest that one of the members will want to intervene in.
2. Uq-Overwhelms. If a permanent member really wants to intervene in a criss, then that country will probably intervene without UNSC proposal. In fact, [Deo '14 of The Diplomat](#) explains that the council has declined in relevance and is paralyzed, thus, permanent members don't seek approval from the UNSC anymore.
3. Nonunique. [Russo '17 of the City University of New York](#) writes that after the tragedy in Libya, Russia and China's views on R2Ps have prevented the UNSC from implementing any further R2P peacekeeping operations. For example, Russo continues that China has vetoed any resolution that mentions R2Ps.
4. Delink. [Ganguly '16 of Indiana University Bloomington](#) outlines that due to American pressure on India to conform to international norms and India's desire to establish itself in the international order, India has shifted to approval of R2Ps, approving R2P operations during the Libyan and Syrian crises.
5. Turn; India only rejects R2P operations because it doesn't have a permanent seat for two reasons:
  - a. [Pai '13 of the Takshahila Institute](#) argues that India doesn't want to concentrate power for the Permanent Members because India is not a permanent member. Giving India a permanent seat would incentivize India to support R2Ps because it has a say in its operations.
  - b. [Ganguly '16 of Indiana University](#) explains that India is afraid that approving R2P operations could have long-term repercussions on UN operations in Kashmir. However, the Khan evidence from our case indicates that India would be able to influence the UN over Kashmir, which removes the incentive for India to reject R2Ps.

## W- India Vetoes R2P

1. Defense. [Jaganathan of Nehru University](#) explains that India makes exceptions to their anti-intervention stance when it comes to genocide or mass killings, however, mass killings and genocide are exactly what the R2P is used for, so no veto.
2. Defense. [The Economist '11](#) explains that the only time the UNSC has collectively used the R2P is in Libya. This has three implications:
  - a. One. Their impact is heavily mitigated because the use of R2P in a scenario where India could veto it is incredibly rare.
  - b. Two. The data suggesting harms of R2P is heavily skewed because it comes from the one use of collective R2P in the world.
  - c. Three. The majority of R2P uses are done unilaterally, which don't go through UNSC approval, and states that do it unilaterally will do it anyways.
3. Defense. [Dabhade '17 of ORF](#) explains that India has agreed to forgo its veto power in order to get a seat on the UNSC, leaving them unable to veto R2P, and [Dabhade '15 of ORF](#) furthers that India has literally never even voted against a single UN resolution in the organization's history.
4. Defense. [Deo '14 of the Diplomat](#) explains that not only would India need to be included to make a UNSC change, it would also need to include Brazil, Africa, and West Asia to force a change in UNSC strategy.
5. Defense. The R2P intervention in Libya was undertaken by NATO, and thus the issues with its implementation fall onto them, not R2P itself.
6. Defense. [Homans '11 of Foreign Policy](#) explains that in the past, China and Russia both vetoed a humanitarian intervention in Serbia but NATO did it anyways, meaning there's no solvency even with a veto.
7. Defense. [Evans '08 of the LATimes](#) explains that R2P is used as a justification retroactively after intervention has already occurred, preventing India from solving.

## A2 Peacebuilding

1. Defense. Denskus of Oxfam GB explains that peacebuilding efforts are ineffective because they don't include the input of people who know the region, instead preferring to force Western views on nations and skewing solutions to the peacebuilding nations' benefit.
2. Defense. Karlsrud '18 explains that Western militaries, along with Africa and China, are moving away from peacebuilding and towards stabilization as it is much more effective in preserving world peace, and the pendulum has now swung away from peacebuilding efforts.
3. Defense. The Economic Times explains that peacebuilding operations are struggling right now because they lack adequate funding and the political will backing them is often disingenuous.

4. Defense. Mahmoud of the IPI Global Observatory explains that peacebuilding suffers from a highly deterministic view of what peace looks like based off of colonialist powers rather than what peace looks like in the individual region.
5. Defense. Mahmoud furthers that most of the peacebuilding is focused on helping local elites rather than creating sustainable peace, creating a legitimacy deficit.
6. Defense. Denskus of Oxfam GB furthers that peacebuilding interventions happen in places that aren't actually unstable, they just don't have neoliberal democracies, creating needless violence in peaceful areas.

## A2 Indian Politics

1. Defense. No Indian PM has ever been able to get India a permanent seat on the UNSC, and Modi's opposing party has no ability to gain it either, so it won't be the voting issue for the election.
2. Modi projected to win right now, they have to prove otherwise

## A2 Peacekeepers (Good) Withdrawal

### Uq.- India PKOs for Seat

1. Alt-cause. [Axe '10 of the Diplomat](#) gives two reasons that India contributes large amounts of peacekeepers.
  - a. India uses peacekeeping to maintain their large army cheaply because India no longer has to pay the soldiers they contribute to the UN because they are then on the UN payroll.
  - b. India uses peacekeeping to ensure investments and economic ties in other countries are kept safe, like the natural resources India gets from the Congo
2. Alt-Cause. [Faridi of the Indian Journal of Political Science](#) explains that India's real reason for peacekeeping involvement is to boost their international image, which they want to do with or without the UNSC seat.
3. Alt-Cause. [The Stanley Foundation](#) explains that India wants to counterbalance the rise of peacekeeper contributions from China.
4. Defense. [Mukherjee of the Brookings Institute](#) explains that currently more than 80% of India's peacekeepers are operating in Africa, but recent failures by the UN have led the African Union to step up its own peacekeeping operations, deploying 64,000 peacekeepers since 2004. Crucially, he continues that it is beneficial for the UN to hand off peacekeeping operations to the AU to promote an "African owned African-led" solution rather than one invented by actors uninvolved in the conflict continents away.

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5. Defense. [The Stanley Foundation](#) explains that since India contributes so many peacekeepers to the UN, they cannot pull out of operations as they know it would cause the collapse of the operations which would draw political backlash.
6. Defense. [Autesserre of Foreign Affairs](#) explains that UN peacekeepers are incapable of resolving conflict effectively because they ignore the will of the populace in how peace should be pursued, instead preferring deals with elites and fixating on elections.

## A2 Peacekeepers Bad

1. Defense. [Hegre '18 of the Washington Post](#) explains that studies that find peacekeepers are ineffective use data including years from 1990s and before, which does not accurately represent peacekeepers now because in 2000 the UN overhauled peacekeeping operations giving them more ability to address the root cause of conflicts. In fact, the study conducted by Hegre finds that during 2001-2013, 150,000 lives would have been lost without peacekeepers.

### I-Peacekeepers Bad

1. Defense. [Gilligan and Sergenti](#), have calculated that 85 percent of UN operations have resulted in prolonged periods of peace or shortened periods of war.
2. Defense. [Fortna](#) has determined that the presence of peacekeepers decreases the risk of another war breaking out by 55–62 percent.
3. Defense. [Shannon](#) have shown that the deployment of UN troops reduces both battlefield deaths and civilian killings.

## A2 Indian Economy

### W-More Aid/IMF

1. De-link. [Sharma '18 of Outlook India](#) writes that India now rejects funding from countries and multilateral organizations because the Indian government wants to be seen as a self-sufficient international power. Thus, India wouldn't accept any financial benefits offered to them.
2. Defense. [Kuziemko '06 of the Journal of Political Economy](#) explains that even non-permanent members of the council see a 67% increase in aid, meaning India will see the benefits of more aid regardless because [India is running again in 2020](#).
3. Turn. [The IMF '18](#) explains that India's rapid domestic economic growth has lifted millions out of poverty, and things are only getting better. This means that if India were to start getting more aid, it would inherently divert aid from countries that actually need

it towards a country that doesn't need it and doesn't want it, only worsening global poverty.

4. Defense. [Business insider](#) tells us that with India emerging as one of the fastest growing economies in the world, it has transformed into a 'donor' status of foreign aid. The issue isn't whether India needs aid, the issue is that because they're trending towards becoming a donor nation- Nations have begun to debate whether or not they should receive aid in the first place.
5. Defense. India won't accept the aid for two key reasons:
  - a. Pride. Bidwai of the Guardian, their own link evidence, explains that the reason aid flow has stopped to india is because India is refusing aid from actors such as the UK and the US for years now. Chaudhury of the economic times explains that this policy is entrenched in India's increasing attempts to showcase its economic power to the world.
  - b. Lack of trust. Jacob of the Hindu explains that india doesn't trust aid from western nations or institutions such as the world bank, specifically because they find each donor comes with strings attached. If India is opposed to receiving aid that would leave them in any form of debt to another nation, be it political or monetary, it doesn't make any sense that they would accept aid as a bribe.
6. Defense. Desai of brookings tells us that india actually doesn't need aid. He explains that when India's largest donor stopped giving aid, the absence of aid barely had an impact on the poverty crisis in india. This is because india began to shift to a policy of self sufficiency, implementing new social programs and governmental reform for the poor.
7. Link d. This argument makes no logical sense, india has rarely ever voted against anyone on the council- why would the members suddenly feel a need to bribe them
8. Turn. [The World Economic Review](#) explains that Aid from the UN security council reduces economic growth because the recipient government spends the money on geopolitical issues
9. Defense. Jacob furthers that india opposes any form of indirect aid because they view it as an anchor to their geopolitical and economic power- the scenario they give you would never materialize in the first place

Weigh:

Even if they win a marginal increase in aid- realize that preventing india's increased power over pakistan is more important

- a) Borgen project The main cause of Pakistan's poverty rate is the fact that many Pakistanis lack basic human rights. Because the pakistani people are in more prevalent need of aid so india being able to cripple them through economic strangulation and water starvation would present a more dire circumstance

## W- Trade/FDI

### I-General Econ Growth/Poverty

1. Impact Turn. Studying 54 countries over 35 years, [Dreher '16 of Oxford University](#) finds that aid given to countries when they are a member on the council has reduced effectiveness because these countries divert the aid to fund geostrategic objectives to expand their diplomatic influence within the UNSC, rather than using the aid for development. In fact, this reduced effectiveness offsets any increases in aid because Dreher finds that aid contributed during UNSC membership reduces half of the potential economic growth a country would attain with their aid before UNSC membership.

## A2 Israel Lash Out

1. Defense. [Carroll of the JTA](#) explains that Israel and the United States are still incredibly close, and recently, relations between Trump and Netanyahu have increased as the leadership of the two countries become more supportive of each other.
2. Defense. India would not be an ally to Israel on the council. In fact, [Malhotra of the Diplomat](#) explains that India is very pro-Palestine in the conflict, and recently voted against Israel and the United States in recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.
3. Turn. [The Wire](#) explains that India has continually affirmed its support for the Palestinian cause in the Israel-Palestine conflict. If anything, this means that if India were to gain permanent membership, Israel would be more likely to lash out as they now have even less power on the UNSC.

## A2 UNSC Collapse

### Uq- Losing Legitimacy

1. [McDonald '10 of the Council on Foreign Relations](#) writes that the UNSC is not losing legitimacy in the status quo, with every nation still turning towards Security Council decisions and members prioritizing using the Council for decision-making.

## W- India increases Representation

1. [Malhotra '15 of the Fair Observer](#) writes that though India believes in representation and reform now, it will diverge from these interests once it attains a permanent seat in favor of protecting its own national interests. For example, prior to acquiring nuclear weapons, India was strongly opposed to nuclear proliferation, but after acquiring nuclear weapons, India changed its views on nuclear policy.
2. [McDonald '10 of the Council on Foreign Relations](#) continues that adding India to the Security Council wouldn't address issues with regional diversity because it would upset other regional rivals, who would continue to seek regional representation.

## W-India is US Ally on Council

1. Defense. [Das '17 of ORF](#) explains that India doesn't vote with the United States very often. In fact, he furthers that today, India continues to vote more similarly to Russia and the other USSR successor states than to pro-US Western nations.

## W- India Reforms

1. Defense. [Malhotra '15 of the Fair Observer](#) writes that though India believes in representation and reform now, it will diverge from these interests once it attains a permanent seat in favor of protecting its own national interests. For example, prior to acquiring nuclear weapons, India was strongly opposed to nuclear proliferation, but after acquiring nuclear weapons, India changed its views on nuclear policy.

## A2 China Equalizer

1. Defense. [Dutt '18 of Forbes](#) explains that China is India's largest trade partner; thus, India cannot afford to start conflict with China. Moreover, India is China's largest project-contracting market, so China won't initiate either.
2. De-link. [Barkha '19 of the Washington Post](#) explains that the Indian government will never attempt to counterbalance China because the government knows the economy can't take on the economic consequences from Chinese backlash, such as a trade war or sanctions.
3. Delink. [Kim '12 of Hankuk University](#) writes that after 2013, India could not afford to continue its quiet diplomacy with China, and sought to find ways to counterbalance China. Unfortunately, this attempt was a failure, which is why [Dutt '19 of the Washington Post](#) writes that aside from the catastrophic Doklam incident, Modi has consistently chosen to appease China rather than confront China.
4. Turn. [Mastro '18 of the Lawfare Magazine](#) writes that the CCP believes that reacting to the Indian military with signs of caution would undermine the government's legitimacy because it

would be tacitly conceding that developing nations can rise under Western ideals. Thus, he continues that if India tries to counterbalance China, the CCP would be forced to dramatically escalate the crisis to convey its superior military might, making conflict much more likely.

## W- India-US Alliance

1. De-link. [The Center for American Progress '18](#) writes that India does not like overly aggressive U.S. policies towards China and does not want to be pushed by the United States to side with the United States against China because India doesn't think aggressing against China is in its interest and doesn't trust the US government. Thus, [Paul '18 of War on the Rocks](#) writes that India will take a middle ground option of soft-balancing against China rather than allying with the U.S.
2. De-link. [Sharma '18 of Bloomberg](#) writes that due to China being vastly more powerful and influential than India, India is seeking a "reset" with China and has effectively chosen to ally with China over the US. In fact, India is helping China endure their trade war with the US by offering to keep up China's supply of exports while China raises tariffs on the US.

## W- India forms Multilateral Coalition

1. De-link. [Paul '18 of War on the Rocks](#) explains that India isn't able to form a multilateral coalition in the Indian Ocean because the nations in the region obtain higher levels of economic and military assistance than India can provide from China, which is why they have switched their allegiance to China.

## W- Veto/Proceedings in UNSC

1. Defense. [Steunkel of Harvard University](#) explains that India has agreed to forgo veto powers if made a permanent member, meaning they could not meaningfully oppose China on the council as they would have no real way to counteract them.
2. Defense. [Heydarian of the National Interest](#) explains that China completely disregards international law and rulings they find unfavorable, so even if India were to act against Chinese aggression, China would not back down.

## A2 NEG

### A2 Human Rights

1. Non-UQ. [Human Rights Watch](#) explains that currently, India is taking literally no steps to reduce their human rights abuses in the status quo.
2. Non-UQ. [Gettleman of the NYT](#) explains that Modi is a Hindu nationalist who riles up tensions and nationalism to further his political agenda, and is on track to win the 2019 election, meaning the human rights abuses have no end in sight.
3. Non-UQ. India is currently a member of the UN Human Rights Council. If that is not sufficient to enforce human rights, nothing will be.
4. Turn. Joining the UNSC thrusts India into the international spotlight, meaning that their long-standing human rights abuses will be questioned by the international community. If anything, joining the UNSC holds them more accountable.
5. Turn. [The Hindu '17](#) explains that India will seek reform for the UNSC once on the council. This means they require international support to accomplish their geopolitical aims, so they will have to scale down human rights abuses once on the council.
6. Turn. [Ratna of South China Voices](#) explains that currently, India practices non-alignment, however, once they acquire the seat and veto power, they will either have to align themselves with either the NATO bloc or the Russia/China bloc, and will face international backlash from the bloc they side against. Crucially, this will increase international pressure and attention on their rampant human rights abuses.

## A2 China

### W- China Causes Pakistan Attack

1. Defense. [Carafano '19 of the Heritage Foundation](#) writes that the Indian-US relationship is growing and China isn't a reliable ally for Pakistan in the region, which is why Pakistan has been anxious to de-escalate tensions with India such in the most recent incident.
2. Defense. [Tay '19 of CNBC](#) explains that China is currently already facing intense international pressure to apply sanctions to JEM in the status quo.
3. Turn. [Sareen '19 of the ORF](#) writes that India can force the China-Pakistan axis apart by raising the stakes for China through hard power methods like counterbalancing with the Quad. Critically, [Bana '19 of the Independent](#) writes that Pakistan can only go to conflict if China has its back militarily.

## A2 Gridlock

1. Defense. [Deo '14 of the Diplomat](#) explains that currently the UNSC is paralyzed and no resolutions are passing.
2. Defense. [Dabhade '15 of ORF](#) explains that India has literally never voted against a single bill in their entire history in the UN, so they won't be a roadblock to UN resolution passage.
3. Defense. [Dabhade '17 of ORF](#) explains that India has shown willingness to forgo their veto power if elected to the council. Crucially, this means that India won't obstruct new resolutions because they don't have the ability to.

### W- India Anti-Muslim

1. Non-UQ. [Ramzy '19 of the NYT](#) explains that China is literally detaining the Muslim Uighurs in their country for the purpose of ethnic cleansing, the UNSC already has that anti-Muslim influence.

### Weighing- India PK over PKO Gridlock

1. Comparatively, the aff world is better for peacekeeping. Even if gridlock means that fewer interventions get approved, there are still interventions that will be carried out. However, in their world, India pulls their peacekeepers, which Vira '12 of CSIS explains will devastate the entire UN's ability to carry out operations for the world, so we still have more offense on peacekeepers as some is greater than none.

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## A2 Kashmir

### UQ- Kashmir Insurgency Decreasing Now

1. Defense. [Slater '19 of the Washington Post](#) explains that Kashmir has not been de-escalating. In fact, from 2016 to 2017, the amount of Kashmiri youths joining the insurgency has increased more than 52%.
2. Defense. [Naseem '18 of the Washington Post](#) explains that military casualties in Kashmir reached their highest in a decade at 324.

### W- Veto Power w/ Seat Removes Solvency

1. Defense. [Dabhade '17 of ORF](#) explains that India has offered to forgo the veto as they see it as an oppressive power for the council.
2. Defense. The UN has been mediating Kashmir since 1948 and no solution has ever come through, they have no uniqueness.

## W- India Oppresses Kashmir

1. Alt-cause. [Ayyub of the Washington Post](#) explains that Prime Minister Modi and his BJP party has led a persecution of Muslims throughout India, though they are especially concentrated in Kashmir, and he will always continue to rile up tensions and oppression as it gives him political clout.
2. Defense. They're doing it a lot right now, they've killed thousands of people, so they obviously are not holding back to get the UNSC seat, so nothing will change because they're already oppressing to their fullest extent.
3. Defense. [The Hindu '17](#) explains that India wants to push for reform once they get on the council, which will require widespread international support. As a result, by acquiring the seat, India will have to reduce their human rights abuses to ensure international support for their policies.

## A2 Pakistan

1. Defense. [Raje '19 of Strife](#) gives three reasons India and Pakistan will never rapidly raise tensions.
  - a. Both countries do not want to face the economic consequences.
  - b. The international community always intervenes when tensions rise. Thus, [Ashraf '19 of Gulf News](#) explains that diplomatic pressure stops the countries from fully attacking each other.
  - c. Nuclear weapons have increases the overall stability in the region because they will never aggress to the point where nuclear miscalculation becomes a possibility.
2. Defense. [The Hindu '17](#) explains that India wants to reform the UNSC, which they will seek to do once on the council. This means that India cannot risk losing international image even with the UNSC seat because they need the support to pass their reforms.

### UQ- Tensions High w/ Recent Attacks

1. Alt-Cause. Aamir continues that the reason for aggression right now is because India's president Modi is up for reelection, and he's just posturing for popularity and isn't a threat to attack Pakistan. That's why the [South China](#) morning post writes that the attack would not have happened if elections weren't around the corner.

### UQ- Negotiations

1. Defense. [Paliwal '19 of the World Politics Review](#) gives two reasons negotiations will never happen.
  - a. There is no political incentive for any party in India to do negotiations because it is politically unpopular to act benevolent towards Pakistan.

- b. Pakistan's use of militants has made Indian policymakers think Pakistan is an untrustworthy negotiator. In fact, every single time negotiations have happened a Pakistani militant groups have attacked and ended the negotiations

## W- Political Will

1. De-link. [Najam '19 of The Hill](#) explains that the political sentiment for war in Pakistan and India is gone because both governments claimed victory over the recent military attacks and their domestic constituencies believe it.

## I- Indian Attack

1. Defense. [Marlow '18 of the Washington Post](#) explains that India is constrained from fully attacking Pakistan because they have nuclear weapons, which is why Modi in the past has made sure tensions don't escalate to a dangerous point.
2. Defense. [Aamir of the South China Morning Post](#) explains that Indian aggression towards Pakistan threatens other nations interests. China needs Pakistan for the Belt and Road Initiative and the US needs them for Afghan deescalation. Because of this, Aamir finds that India will never attack Pakistan because the US and China will backlash hard on them.

## I- Pakistan Attack

1. Defense. [Leghari of Gulf News](#) explains that the Pakistan PM just asked the Indian government to give peace a chance, as the Pakistani people support peace.
2. Delink. [Aamir '19 of the South China Morning Post](#) writes that Pakistan cannot afford an intense confrontation with India because of its intense economic crisis, and thus does not have the ability to fund any war.
3. Defense. [Carafano '19 of the Heritage Foundation](#) writes that the Indian-US relationship is growing and China isn't a reliable ally for Pakistan in the region, which is why Pakistan has been anxious to de-escalate tensions with India such in the most recent incident.
4. Turn. [Krauthammer '10 of National Review](#) writes that elevating India to a permanent member would anchor India as an ally to counterbalance China in the South China Sea. Indeed, [Dabhade '17 of the Observer Research Foundation](#) writes that providing India a permanent seat would serve as an equalizer to China in the region. That's critical, because [Sareen '19 of the ORF](#) writes that India can force the China-Pakistan axis apart by raising the stakes for China through hard power methods like counterbalancing with the Quad. Critically, [Bana '19 of the Independent](#) writes that Pakistan can only go to conflict if China has its back militarily.

## I- Water

1. [Kuegalman of Foreign Policy](#) explains that if India decided to maximize pressure on Pakistan by cutting off or reducing river flows, this would bottle up large volumes of water in northern India, which would cause significant flooding in major cities in Kashmir and in Punjab state

## I- IMF Loans

1. [Stratfor '18](#) explains that China has agreed to give Pakistan loans so it doesn't need them from the IMF.

## A2 Africa

### I- General

1. Alt-Cause. [Mullen '12 of Foreign Policy](#) explains that India is using developmental assistance in Africa like lines of credit and infrastructure to open up new markets for Indian goods.
2. Alt-Cause. [Pant '17 of the Diplomat](#) explains that the reason India is expanding in Africa is to counter China's growing influence in the region, so as long as China remains invested in Africa, India will as well.
3. Alt-Cause. [BBC '15](#) explains that India is interested in harvesting the natural resources from Africa, so with or without the seat they will remain in the region.
4. Alt-Cause. [Shahi '14 of the University of Delhi](#) explains that India is collaborating with Africa so much because India has a geostrategic incentive in establishing influence in the continent because it surrounds the Indian Ocean, what India considers its maritime neighborhood and seeks to control.

## A2 China FDI Increase

1. Non-UQ. [Dunseith '18 of India Briefing](#) explains that China has already increased FDI 600% to India because Chinese firms see profit in Indian tech startups.
2. Non-UQ. [Dutt '18 of Forbes](#) explains that China sees lots of potential for economic cooperation with India in the status quo, as India is the largest project-market in the world for Chinese firms. This means no matter what, China has a vested incentive in making India as economically successful as possible because it benefits their own economy.
3. Defense. Dunseith furthers that when China invests in India specifically, it does not take the form of energy infrastructure, but rather digital ecosystems and hyperlocal startups in tech.
4. Defense. [The Economic Times '18](#) explains that India has already supplied electricity to every village in India, meaning any FDI won't come in the form of energy infrastructure.

## A2 Indian Politics

### W- Seat gets Modi re-elected


1. Non-UQ. [Times Now News](#) explains that current polling data already suggests Modi will win the election, they have to prove that he will lose 100% without the seat.
2. Defense. Even if Modi were not to win, the UNSC seat will not solve 5 issues that would lose Modi the election.
  - a. [Patwa '18 of Entrepreneur](#) explains that the reason the BJP party has lost support is because of his tax reform, which the new seat doesn't solve.
  - b. [Samanta '19 of Economic Times](#) explains that Modi's oratorical skills, one of his greatest political strengths, doesn't translate to non-Hindi regions, leading to a loss of support in those regions.
  - c. [Wu '19 of the NYT](#) explains that more than 60% of Modi's voters are from rural areas, and intense economic stress caused by draughts and low farm incomes have made them begin to turn away from the party.
  - d. Wu continues that Modi can't win urban voters because their voting issue is the rapid decline in employment availability and increase in inflation in the last five years, they don't care about a UNSC seat.
  - e. Wu concludes that Indians also heavily vote along caste or religious lines no matter what, rather than based on actual issues.

## A2 Self Determination Kashmir Terrorists

1. Kashmir self determination insurgents don't kill that many people, state sponsored Pakistani groups in Kashmir do.
2. Kashmir knows that India will literally crush their tiny group, so they won't escalate and ramp up attacks.
- 3.

## Cards

Times Now



Times Now and VMR survey is back with yet another batch of poll-related data and analysis. In the current survey, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) is predicted to grab 283 out of 543 Lok Sabha seats, UPA - 135 and Others - 125.

In the last survey, the Times Now-VMR poll had shown that the NDA would have been 21 seats short of the half-way mark had 2019 Lok Sabha Elections been held in January.

#### [Mullen '12 Foreign Policy](#)

**Larger mercantilist goals also underpin Indian development assistance today.** The far-flung diaspora of Indian traders from Fiji to Kenya facilitated early trade relationships between India and some of the subsequent recipients of foreign assistance. **The global economic downturn has increased the necessity of finding new markets for India's rapidly growing industrial and service sectors. India's \$1 billion line of credit to Bangladesh in 2010 was extended to assist with infrastructure projects, such as highways and communications networks. But by tying the line of credit to 85 percent usage of Indian contractors, the aid also helps create new markets for India's goods and workers.** Similarly, \$125 million in Indian assistance to nearly 50 countries in the form of the [Pan-African e-Network](#) — which ties educational centers and hospitals in Africa with universities and specialty hospitals in India — may not be large in monetary terms, but it's also creating a demand for Indian tertiary health and education services at a fraction of their cost in upper-income countries. **India has learned from developed countries, particularly the United States, that foreign assistance can create benefits for both donor and recipient.** It has also learned from its nemesis China that development assistance can provide seed money to [enable the entry of private commercial interests](#).

**India's larger strategic ambitions have also influenced its development assistance.** It has bolstered its aid programs in Nepal and Bangladesh in an attempt to curb Chinese influence; it has emerged as the fifth-largest donor to Afghanistan as it works determinedly to keep its long-standing adversary, Pakistan, at bay; and it has also extended its reach into Myanmar to ensure that Beijing does not rule the roost. **Beyond its own neighborhood, India has sought to make inroads into Africa — not only to obtain access to critical raw materials and energy resources, but also to keep a check on Chinese interests** and win support in the United Nations for its ambitions to become a permanent member of the Security Council. Crucially to the recipient countries in Africa, neither India nor China usually imposes conditionalities on aid, in contrast to multilateral and bilateral OECD countries, which makes Indian aid, as well as Chinese aid, more attractive to recipient countries.

#### [Axe '11 The Diplomat](#)

'The financial benefits to individuals who proceed on such missions are undeniable,' retired Indian general Dhruv Katoch, now an analyst with the Center for Land Warfare Studies in New Delhi, says. 'Very rarely will an individual turn down an offer for a UN assignment.'

**What's more, while a soldier is deployed with the United Nations his respective defense ministry can remove him from the government payroll. In that sense, UN peacekeeping offers South Asian armies the opportunity to keep 10,000 troops apiece in their force structure at no cost to themselves. It's a tremendous bargain, provided the military can spare the troops. 'At some point it could become a burden on an over-stretched army,' Schaffer says.**

But Pakistan, with its ongoing military operations in the tribal regions bordering Afghanistan, 'is the only country that would have to worry about that; so far it hasn't restricted Pakistan's contributions,' Schaffer adds.

Of course, the pay differential only really benefits armies from developing nations. There's no financial incentive for, say, an American soldier to spend a year serving with a UN force, as his pay rate at home is higher than what the United Nations can offer. The Pentagon might save money by offloading a few thousand troops to some UN missions every year, but for the troops themselves, it would mean a morale-hurting pay cut. As long as South Asian economies remain relatively impoverished compared to developing nations, peacekeeping will retain its financial allure. The United Nations, then, is a meal ticket, helping pay for bigger and better-trained forces than developing countries could afford on their own.

**South Asian countries benefit in other ways from their major peacekeeping roles. For example, peace missions have enabled South Asia to build economic and diplomatic ties with a large number of poorer developing countries. In this way, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh gain 'influence and credibility,' Katoch says. This seems particularly important to India, at least as far as Congo is concerned. With a billion people and nearly ten percent annual GDP growth, India is most in need of something Congo has in abundance: resources.**

## Dreher '16 - UNSC aid results in lower economic growth

<http://twin.sci-hub.tw/6081/20c8bf6c5c3501b8b05963e9496a6aee/dreher2016.pdf#page=25>

**Based on a sample of 54 countries over the 1974–2009 period, we find that the effect of aid on growth is reduced by UNSC membership (see section 4). This result holds when we restrict the sample to Africa, which follows the strictest norm of rotation on the UNSC and thus where UNSC membership can most reliably be regarded as exogenous (Vreeland and Dreher 2014) and is robust to a battery of other tests.** Our results have at least two important implications. **First, to the extent that aid is given for geostrategic reasons, it should not be considered "development" aid. It might be effective in achieving the donors' geostrategic objectives, but it is less effective than other aid in promoting developmental outcomes such as growth.** Including such political aid in the category of development aid is likely to blur the potentially measurable effects of "true" development aid and is likely to add to frustration in the populations of donor countries granting the aid, ultimately reducing even those parts of aid that could be effective in raising growth. The second implication of our results concerns the instrumental variables scholars use to identify the effect of aid on growth. A large number of studies base their analysis on

instruments that proxy the geopolitical importance of a recipient country to the donor, implicitly or explicitly generalizing the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) to be representative of all aid, rather than political aid exclusively.<sup>5</sup> If geopolitical aid or aid given to recipients with political leverage more generally is less effective than other aid, the literature using political connections as instruments would not provide evidence of the ineffectiveness of overall aid, but rather of aid given to politically important countries. Their estimates would represent a lower bound for the effects of overall aid, which could explain the lack of a positive effect of aid on growth in a large number of studies (e.g., Rajan and Subramanian 2008).

Figure 4 shows mean yearly growth rates of per capita GDP for different lags of UNSC membership. The first bar displays the growth rates for countries that are not members of the UNSC. The other bars show the growth rates for different lags of UNSC membership: Growth during UNSC membership, one period before, one period later, two periods later, and three periods later. **The figure shows that compared to countries not on the UNSC, temporary members subsequently experience lower growth rates.<sup>13</sup> As expected, growth is lowest two periods after UNSC membership. Also note that growth rates are substantially higher one further period later (t + 1). This pattern is in line with our hypothesis that the increased aid committed in period (t2) during temporary UNSC membership (figure 2), which is disbursed in large parts in period (t1) (figure 3), has an adverse effect on how aid affects growth in period (t)** (figure 4). While these descriptive statistics imply no causality, their pattern lends support to our story.

Table 1 shows the main results, covering the 1974–2009 period. All data are averaged over four years. The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita; aid is measured as net Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a percentage of GDP.<sup>22</sup> When we do not account for diminishing returns to aid by including aid squared, the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant at the five-percent level (column 1). When we include aid squared, the interaction becomes significant at the one-percent level (column 2).<sup>23</sup> According to column 2, for any increase in DAid, the effectiveness of this change in aid disbursements decreases with the share of the period the recipient country has spent on the UNSC two periods before (i.e., when the aid has been committed). **The causal effect of a one percentage point increase in aid as a percentage of GDP on yearly economic growth is 0.64 percentage points higher if the recipient has not served on the UNSC compared to if it has served two years (i.e., 1/2 of the four-year period). Compared to the average growth rate of about 1.34 percentage points in our sample, this is a substantial reduction of almost half the average growth rate. The results thus support our hypothesis that aid committed during times of short-term political importance is indeed less effective.**

Figure 5 shows the marginal effects for the model of column 2 and the corresponding 90%-confidence intervals. The marginal effect of changes in aid on changes in growth depends on the magnitude of the change in aid and on membership on the UNSC. As the marginal effects depend on DAid and D(Aid2), any quantitative interpretation obviously depends on whether the coefficients of these variables are estimated consistently, and thus on the identifying assumptions in Clemens et al. (2012). As can be seen, the effect declines for higher values of DAid, reflecting diminishing returns to aid.<sup>24</sup> The aid-growth relationship is positive for countries that have not served on the UNSC when aid has been committed,<sup>25</sup> while being largely

insignificant for countries that have served one year, and significantly negative for those who served two years. **For a country receiving the median amount of aid (1.59 percent of GDP) the estimated effect of this aid on growth is 0.72 when the country has not served on the UNSC, but - 0.21 when the country has served one year on the UNSC, and - 0.30 when it has served two years. The negative consequences of the donors' political motivations are thus not only statistically but also economically significant.**

We further test the robustness of our results in a number of ways. First, we replace the share of years a country has served on the UNSC with a binary indicator variable for a country's presence on the UNSC. Second, we first-difference the UNSC variable rather than including it in levels. Third, we lag all control variables by one period rather than including them contemporaneously. Fourth, we employ early-impact aid as defined in Clemens et al. (2012) instead of all aid. Fifth, in light of the identifying assumptions discussed above, we include a number of additional variables (as changes between (t2) and (t1)) which could potentially induce omitted variables bias. **Most importantly, we control for changes in the institutional environment by including the International Country Risk Guide's (ICRG) variables measuring Bureaucracy Quality, Corruption, Democratic Accountability, Ethnic Tensions, External Conflict, Government Stability, Internal Conflict, Investment Profile, Law & Order, Military in Politics, Political Risk Rating, and Religious Tensions. One at the time, we also include imports of goods and services (as a share of GDP), trade (as a share of GDP), Foreign Direct Investment inflows (as a share of GDP), the recipient country's voting alignment with the United States in the UN General Assembly, and debt service (as share of GNI). Controlling for these additional influences considerably reduces any remaining risk of omitted variable bias.** As our final test for robustness, we employ Clemens et al.'s (2012) permutations of Rajan and Subramanian (2008) instead of those of Burnside and Dollar (2000).<sup>27</sup>

The results are shown in table 3. They show that our main result is unaffected by all of these additions. The robustness of our results to the inclusion of a large number of variables increases our confidence that the main specification above does not violate the identifying assumptions, so that the estimates above are consistent.

Finally, we turn to explanations for our results. As we have discussed in Section 2, the previous literature identified a number of transmission channels for individual donors. **Dreher et al. (2013) show that political motives reduce the quality of World Bank projects. Also for the World Bank, Kilby (2015) reports that political allies are allowed to start projects with inferior preparation. Stone (2008) finds that political favoritism undermines the credibility of IMF conditionality.** In order to test these transmission channels in our broad sample of donors, we would require data on aid conditionality and compliance with these conditions, project success, and time and resources invested in project preparation. These data do not exist for a broad sample of donors. Data exist, however, on different aid modalities and the sectoral composition of aid across recipient countries that are on the UNSC and those that are not. Previous research argues that the effectiveness of aid depends on the sector the aid is given to and the modalities through which it is delivered (Bjørnskov 2013). To the extent that UNSC membership affects composition and modalities,<sup>28</sup> the effectiveness of aid would change.

Table S6.1 in appendix S6 reports the amount of aid committed to individual sectors while countries have been temporary members of the UNSC compared to other times (in

constant million 2011 US\$), for the 1973–2011 period. There are substantial differences between those countries on the UNSC and the rest. When we perform a simple t-test for equality of a certain category's share in total aid committed to UNSC members and nonmembers we find that the share increases significantly in 7 of the 26 sectors, and decreases in one sector. **For example, UNSC members receive larger general budget support (b46%), more aid for other social infrastructure (b105%), more food aid (b59%), but less emergency aid (39%). According to Nunn and Qian (2013), US food aid increases the risk of civil conflict. Bjørnskov (2013) shows that a category of aid that includes emergency aid increases growth. Both increases in food aid and reductions in emergency aid are thus likely to reduce the effectiveness of aid.**

## Sharma '18 - India rejects aid because it wants to be viewed as a self-sufficient power

<https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/analysis-why-modi-govts-decision-to-refuse-foreign-donations-for-kerala-floods-i/315418>

**The decision to refuse financial aid from outside evolved at a time when India was offering itself as an attractive market and investment destination to foreign investors. In addition, it was also keenly campaigning among member countries for reforms in the United Nations and enlisting support for its place as a permanent member in the UN Security Council.** Moreover, much of the world was also looking at India as an emerging global player and were also preparing for the historic nuclear deal for the Indo-United States nuclear deal to accept it as a de facto nuclear weapons power.

**“India’s emerging status at the international stage certainly played an important role in the change in the government’s policy on seeking foreign financial and other assistance to deal with natural disasters in the country,” admits Kanwal Sibal, who had succeeded Mansingh as foreign secretary.** Much of this also has with the perception that countries have about India. “Earlier foreign agencies coming in with their sniffer dogs would get a lot of publicity every time they rescued 10 people. But at the same time when our workers and agencies rescued 10,000 people they would often go unnoticed,” he adds.

**That image and perception about India both within the country and to the outside world has undergone a significant change over the past decade or so. Today, not only is India regarded as one of the fastest emerging economies, its capabilities in other areas are also taken note of, especially when it sends team to help other countries during disasters.**

Paul, T.V. “HOW INDIA WILL REACT TO THE RISE OF CHINA: THE SOFT-BALANCING STRATEGY RECONSIDERED.” War on the Rocks. Sept. 2018.

<https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/india-and-the-rise-of-china-soft-balancing-strategy-reconsidered/>

**Meanwhile, the smaller states of South Asia are increasingly playing [smart games](#) to hedge between China and India: They obtain high levels of economic and military assistance from China, forcing India to offer them increased aid as well. But the amount of Indian economic and infrastructure aid is nowhere near China offers.** The Indian Ocean littoral is fast emerging as [China's ocean](#) too, with a military base operational in Djibouti and one planned in Pakistan, and commercial ports under construction or planned in Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. **Small dependent states such as [the Maldives](#) are breaking away from India in a rare display of independence. China's Belt and Road Initiative, although largely built around economic and infrastructure development, has immense geopolitical significance. India is one of the most affected countries, especially given its unwillingness to join as a junior partner.**

Sharma '18 , Bloomberg, [www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-04-26/power-imbalance-between-india-and-china-has-grown-lopsided](http://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-04-26/power-imbalance-between-india-and-china-has-grown-lopsided).

**The tough words that accompanied last year's [standoff](#) are no longer heard in the halls of power in New Delhi. Indian officials have muted criticism of China's Belt and Road Initiative, although they still refuse to sign onto the plan. They've essentially [entered](#) the shadow trade war between the U.S. and China on China's side,** offering to export more soybeans to keep up supply if the Chinese government does impose tariffs on U.S. agricultural products. China's shown few signs of reciprocating these concessions.

Most embarrassingly for those of us who like to trumpet democratic India's commitment to liberal values, the government's top bureaucrat [wrote](#) to his peers in February warning them it was a "sensitive time" for bilateral relations and "advising" them to stay away from any function commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Dalai Lama's arrival in India as a refugee from Chinese persecution. The decision was made just as India's foreign secretary travelled to Beijing to lay the groundwork for this week's summit.

**Some might welcome India's new posture as plain realism. The asymmetry of power and influence between the two Asian giants has rarely been so stark, especially in India's backyard.** Earlier this year, the Maldives -- once closely tied to India -- theatrically [shifted allegiance](#) to China and to an authoritarian political model that isolated the country's India-friendly democrats. India found it had few political levers in Male and even fewer economic incentives to offer. Most mortifyingly for a country accustomed to thinking of the Indian Ocean as its private lake, at the height of the crisis China [sent a naval group](#) into the region for the first time in four years.

Indian policymakers are now faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, they have few resources with which to challenge China. But, if they step back, they are surrendering to a familiar Chinese strategy: a multi-layered effort to force other regional powers to abandon their spheres of influence. India's neighbors have long been targets for China's affections. As Aparna Pande of the Hudson Institute [points](#) out, for decades 60 percent of China's arms exports have gone to Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. **For India's partners across the world, the Modi government's pursuit of a "reset" with China should be a warning that the South Asian giant isn't anywhere near ready to counter China's rise.** Indian

policymakers meanwhile must pragmatically evaluate the benefits and costs of placating China. Have similar efforts in the past by Japan or the U.S. paid off? If not, is there another option?

## The Center for American Progress '18 - India does not want to side against China with the US

<https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2018/01/14/444786/united-states-india-forging-indispensable-democratic-partnership/>

However, India is highly skeptical of U.S. policy toward Pakistan, which does not treat Pakistan as the threat that India believes it is. **At the same time, India does not like overly aggressive U.S. policies towards China and does not want to be pushed by the United States to side with the United States against China.**

While India may want a closer security partnership with the United States, **doubts remain as to whether the United States will be a reliable partner for India when the chips are down.**

The United States often thinks that India is a free rider in the international system, but American officials fail to take into account how much India is doing to maintain peace and security in the Indo-Pacific, independent of any joint activities with the United States. This comprehensive set of Indian economic, diplomatic, and military actions is often undervalued.

The United States could do more to advocate for Indian membership in key multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations Security Council or the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and for updating international institutions to reflect the growing size of Indian influence.

**The United States too often expects India to take positions that are not in India's interests or that it does not have the capacity to take, such as more vocally supporting human rights abroad.**

While U.S. officials often complain about the Indian bureaucracy, they too often fail to account for the difficulty in moving the American bureaucracy closer to India.

The United States often extols the values of diversity, inclusivity, and human rights, but often fails to look at its own house and the strains of intolerance taking hold in America.

Prime Minister Modi and the Indian government are looking to work with President Trump, primarily on economic and security cooperation. **But some in India believe that the current U.S. administration's policies are unpredictable and that "America-first" policies could potentially shut out Indian workers and harm Indian efforts to increase domestic manufacturing.**

Mastro, Oriana. "Can India Help the United States Against China?" Lawfare Magazine. Aug. 2018.

[//RJ](https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-india-help-united-states-against-china)

I argue that **concerns about regime legitimacy are the primary reason for China's lack of balancing: The Chinese Communist Party needs to interpret China's external environment in a way that supports its right to power at home.** As economic growth slows down, **the CCP is pushing the narrative that only with the Party in charge can China achieve its "national rejuvenation."** In the words of current leader Xi Jinping, This narrative of return to a rightful place of regional preeminence contributes to Party legitimacy by appealing to the public's sense of Chinese exceptionalism and civilizational pride. **If the Indian military can**

**present a challenge to the Chinese military, then the Chinese government must tacitly acknowledge the possibility that another country, and a democratic one at that, can rise successfully without the CCP at the helm. The Party fears that such an admission, even if not explicit, would undermine the government's legitimacy in the eyes of the people.** In short, internal stability depends on the Chinese people's continued belief in the often-heard argument that "there is no developing country in the world that achieves prosperity and stability under Western-style democracy."

Mastro, Oriana. "Can India Help the United States Against China?" Lawfare Magazine. Aug. 2018. <https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-india-help-united-states-against-china> //RJ

But there is also bad news. First, **China's need to downplay India's military modernization also suggests that a competitive U.S. strategy of building Indian partner capacity is unlikely to have the desired effects.** A strategy that relies on increased Indian military presence along the Sino-Indian border to goad China to invest more in ground capabilities at the expense of maritime ones is unlikely to succeed because **China will not respond in a traditional balancing fashion to progress in Indian ground capabilities.** This is a critical point given the new U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and its emphasis on encouraging a greater Indian role in countering Chinese assertiveness in East Asia. Second, **the need to show military superiority to domestic audiences likely extends to any encounters with Indian forces. This could create some dangerous incentives for China to escalate in a crisis in an attempt to convey its superior military might instead of attempting to defuse the issue and offer off ramps. These escalation pressures create a unique degree of crisis instability in which China may be tempted to resort to force instead of relying on diplomatic means to resolve the issue.** Even if China does not want to fight a war with India, displays and maneuvering of military forces to convey a strong message to India to back down could have the opposite effect. The two-month military standoff at Doklam, sparked by the Chinese military's attempts to extend a road through territory disputed by China and Bhutan, demonstrate some of these problematic escalatory dynamics.

Paul, T.V. "HOW INDIA WILL REACT TO THE RISE OF CHINA: THE SOFT-BALANCING STRATEGY RECONSIDERED." War on the Rocks. Sept. 2018. <https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/india-and-the-rise-of-china-soft-balancing-strategy-reconsidered/> //RJ

China's provocative behavior in the South China Sea and increasing economic and naval presence in the Indo-Pacific are among the reasons the United States has recently characterized China as a "strategic competitor." Some **analysts seem to assume New Delhi is a natural partner and will join the United States in this struggle as China becomes more powerful and threatening.** However, while **these analysts** do acknowledge the constraints, they nonetheless **tend to overestimate India's willingness to serve as a counterweight to China,** while underestimating internal and external constraints on such explicit balancing behavior. My contention is that India is likely to form both a soft-balancing coalition, relying on diplomacy and institutional cooperation, and a limited hard-balancing coalition, that is, strategic partnerships short of formal alliances. But **an outright alliance with the United States is very improbable.** The recently concluded U.S.-India "two-plus-two" meeting of foreign and defense ministers and secretaries suggests that the path toward a limited hard-balancing coalition may be opening despite many remaining hurdles. Whether a limited U.S.-India hard-balancing coalition progresses toward an outright hard-balancing alliance will depend heavily on China's behavior, especially the threat level it poses to India in the years to come.

Dutt, Barkha. "Modi Likes to Project Muscular Nationalism - except When It Comes to China." *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 22 Mar. 2019, [www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/22/modi-](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/22/modi-)

likes-project-muscular-nationalism-except-when-it-comes-china/?noredirect=on&utm\_term=.ca16a4b74f4a. Accessed 26 Apr. 2019.

**India, a thriving democracy however flawed, already has the moral advantage over China. So why should historically cherished moral principles, such as India's support for the Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of the Tibetan people, be diminished to ease tensions with a nation that has never stood with India's national interest?** Yet, in 2018, a government circular asked officials to [skip public events attended by Tibetan leaders in exile](#).

**At the end of its first term, the outgoing Modi government's China policy has hit a bit of a dead end. India's economy can't afford to take on the Chinese behemoth. And, notwithstanding one military standoff between the armies of both countries in Bhutan, the government's instinct was still to seek conciliation with China, instead of confrontation or even competition. Modi's China policy has militated against his own self-declared muscular nationalism.**

Hegre, Håvard, et al. "U.N. Peacekeeping Really Can Be Effective. Here's How We Tabulated This." *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 28 June 2018, [www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/06/28/u-n-peacekeeping-really-can-be-effective-heres-how-we-tabulated-this/?noredirect=on&utm\\_term=.1b5f053c98cd](http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/06/28/u-n-peacekeeping-really-can-be-effective-heres-how-we-tabulated-this/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1b5f053c98cd). Accessed 26 Apr. 2019.

**Here are four ways PKOs contribute to peace. This intervention reduces the amount of violence during conflict, reduces the duration of conflict, increases the duration of peace following conflict — and limits the risk that conflict in one country spreads to neighboring countries.**

In a new [article in the Journal of Politics](#), we conducted the first comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping along all these proposed pathways. We found that **past studies have significantly underestimated the positive impact of U.N. peacekeeping.**

**Traditionally, U.N. PKOs took on limited tasks, often constrained to monitoring ceasefires and peace agreements. An important shift occurred in the late 1990s when the U.N. started issuing increasingly more extensive PKO mandates. These include "Multidimensional missions," such as the UNMIT in Timor-Leste, with activities intended to address the roots of the conflict, such as economic reconstruction and institutional transformation of police, army, and judicial systems, as well as holding elections.**

**In the early 2000s, the U.N. also scaled up the deployment of "Enforcement missions," exemplified by UNMIS in Sudan and the earlier UNPROFOR in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Our study shows that it is mainly these more ambitious PKOs with a mandate to change the situation that are "winning the war on war" — not the missions that aim merely to maintain the status quo.**

**Existing studies tend to evaluate PKO effectiveness by looking at individual pathways separately. This approach is likely to severely underestimate the overall effectiveness of PKOs, we found. Instead, we developed a methodology that allows us to rigorously evaluate the effectiveness of PKOs along all of these pathways simultaneously. Based on a model trained on the period**

**1960-2013, we run a set of simulations to assess the impact of alternative U.N. peacekeeping policies for the period 2001-2013. We believe this approach allows our study to be one of the first to offer a comprehensive assessment of PKO effectiveness.**

**We find that peacekeeping is even more effective than previous studies suggest. In the short run, peacekeeping missions limit the amount of violence.** But we also find clear evidence that the de-escalated conflicts are easier to end conclusively a few years down the road. Sierra Leone fits these patterns. The country experienced prolonged conflict until the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers, [UNAMSIL](#), in 1999. The level of violence dropped precipitously after the deployment of the PKO and three years after the PKOs deployed the conflict ended.

[https://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/653/c\\_653796-l\\_1-k\\_pko\\_prediction\\_preprint\\_main.pdf](https://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/653/c_653796-l_1-k_pko_prediction_preprint_main.pdf)

Several studies show a beneficial effect of PKOs. However, by looking at individual effect pathways (intensity, duration, recurrence, diffusion) in isolation they underestimate the peacekeeping impact of PKOs. We propose a novel method to evaluate the combined impact across all pathways based on a statistical model of the efficacy of UN PKOs in preventing the onset, escalation, continuation, and recurrence of internal armed conflict. We run a set of simulations based on the statistical estimates to assess the impact of alternative UN policies for the 2001–13 period. If the UN had invested US 200 billion in PKOs with strong mandates, **major armed conflict would have been reduced by up to two thirds relative to a scenario without PKOs and 150,000 lives would have been saved over the 13- year period compared to a no-PKO scenario.** UN peacekeeping is clearly a cost-effective way of increasing global security.

Malhotra, Shairee. "India's Potential at the UN Security Council." Fair Observer. Sept. 2015.  
[https://www.fairobserver.com/region/central\\_south\\_asia/indias-potential-at-the-un-security-council-12050/](https://www.fairobserver.com/region/central_south_asia/indias-potential-at-the-un-security-council-12050/)

Should it attain a permanent seat on the UNSC, the question is whether India would positively influence the ethos of the council, or if it would simply behave like the permanent members have historically done. The presence of more states, while rendering the Security Council more internationally representative, would not alter the fundamental structure and dysfunctional mechanism of the UNSC. The veto power thwarts the UN from tackling major international issues, while granting the permanent members disproportionate sway over its workings. Examining India's two-year presidency at the UNSC, which culminated at the end of 2012, reveals that Delhi has confidently amplified some pressing issues. On reforms, India's cooperation and outreach with African states reeks of pragmatic considerations to gain traction at the UN General Assembly for its permanent seat bid. A major victim of international terrorism itself, India persuaded the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee to adopt a document that emphasizes "zero tolerance" to terrorism. Furthermore, India has also pushed for efforts toward peacekeeping and anti-piracy, all of which augment the country's interests. Yet **through its unassertive stance** in 2011-12 over the Syrian crisis, **India lost an opportunity to underscore its democratic credentials and use its two-year term at the UNSC positively, preferring to first**

**and foremost maintain its autonomous decision-making.** India's abstentions on the issue of Gaza—which the country has historically been supportive of—took place during a real peaking of Indo-Israeli ties, especially in the defense and military sectors. India's abstentions on human rights violations in several countries, including Sri Lanka, Ukraine and North Korea, are indicative of a selective approach to peace. **Let us also consider India's behavior in the global nuclear regime. Historically, India has been vociferously critical of the international nuclear order,** even famously coining the term “nuclear apartheid,” and it has ardently proposed for global disarmament. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has encountered the most persistent resistance from India. The country refuses to sign on the grounds that it is an inherently “discriminatory” treaty, perpetuating the nuclear status of old powers while serving to inhibit new ones from emerging and preventing them from enhancing their security. However, since India conducted its nuclear tests in 1998—and the 2005 Indo-US nuclear deal, through which America bypassed the NPT to accommodate India in nuclear commerce—a major transformation has occurred in Delhi's attitude. As C. Raja Mohan states, **India's traditional and powerful stance on nuclear disarmament has moved to the less ambitious goal of nuclear restraint and arms control measures preventing the spread of nuclear technology. India's normative opposition to the international nuclear order and the “discriminatory” regime argument were suggestive of its relative power position in the international system and only lasted till Delhi developed nuclear weapons itself. Once this was achieved, India's attitude altered from its traditional defiance of nuclear order to supporting it in countering states like Iran, which Delhi voted against in 2005, 2006, 2009 and 2011 vis-à-vis its nuclear program. India, in consistency with the behavior of other powers on being part of the nuclear system, is now inhibiting other states from becoming a part of it.** NOT MUCH TO CHANGE The nature of international relations, or IR, determines that **India's behavior will be consistent with the traditional behavior of the Security Council's permanent members, with strategic interests trumping institutional imperatives.** While during the Cold War era, India attempted to make its presence relevant in the international realm by pragmatically resorting to normative vocabulary, these were typical of the instruments employed by a weak state to secure its interests in the global hierarchy. **India is no longer attempting to set fresh criteria and establish alternative universalities in reshaping the world. Instead, in tandem with altering global realities and its emergence as a major player, it is focusing on playing the game of realpolitik.** Institutions are not a mitigating factor where the interests of great powers are threatened, and they are only pertinent when there is no conflict between these. **Like the permanent members, India is satisfying its political interests first,** while refusing to act in the face of massive brutality. As Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul assert, there is a “behavioral requirement of great power status: a great power is and becomes what a great power does.” In the words of former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh: “We are living in a world of unequal power, and we have to use the available international system to promote our interests.” While Singh stated this in the context of widening India's development options, there is no reason why the country would not do exactly that if it gains a permanent seat on the UNSC. This would allow India to more substantially articulate and pursue its foreign policy choices and interests. In accordance with its rise in the international community, India is increasingly being expected to take a stance on

global issues. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi's enthusiastic and innovative emphasis on foreign policy, the likelihood is that India will do so—but only to secure and preserve its national interests, rather than any noble cause of maintaining world peace. **India, or any other UNSC contender, cannot alter the fundamental interest and power that is based IR. It is unlikely that India will add some great "value" to the effectiveness of the Security Council. Ultimately, IR is dominated by securing a country's self-interest, and India being a rational actor in the international system will predictably behave and operate no differently than other great powers.**

McDonald, Kara. "UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S. Interests." Council on Foreign Relations. 2010.

[https://books.google.com/books?id=G5X4DaVZXdC&pg=PA7&pg=PA7&dq=%22Second,+designating+new+permanent+members+will+not+likely+sate+demands+for+greater+regional+representation.+Indeed,+opposition+to+the+main+aspirants+\(Brazil,+Germany,+India,+and+Japan\)+is+strongest+from+their+regional+rivals+\(Argentina,+Mexico,+Italy,+Pakistan,+and+South+Korea\).+Some+propose+that+each+regional+bloc+should+determine+its+own+permanent+representative,+but+such+decisions+are+more+properly+left+to+the+entire+world+body.+Regional+selection+could+result+in+the+seating+of+unexpected,+possibly+compromising+candidates.+Should+the+United+States+accept+Cuba+or+Venezuela+as+a+permanent+UNSC+member+if,+by+some+bizarre+twist+in+backroom+negotiations,+Brazil+or+Mexico+cannot+secure+Latin+American+support?+%22&source=bl&ots=4PAAodKR9n&sig=ACFU3U3YqV\\_roVTPbv2PT78YKHfzvsYpg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKewi4c-wwezAhXkjIQKHYLTAeYQ6AEwAhoECAAQAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=G5X4DaVZXdC&pg=PA7&pg=PA7&dq=%22Second,+designating+new+permanent+members+will+not+likely+sate+demands+for+greater+regional+representation.+Indeed,+opposition+to+the+main+aspirants+(Brazil,+Germany,+India,+and+Japan)+is+strongest+from+their+regional+rivals+(Argentina,+Mexico,+Italy,+Pakistan,+and+South+Korea).+Some+propose+that+each+regional+bloc+should+determine+its+own+permanent+representative,+but+such+decisions+are+more+properly+left+to+the+entire+world+body.+Regional+selection+could+result+in+the+seating+of+unexpected,+possibly+compromising+candidates.+Should+the+United+States+accept+Cuba+or+Venezuela+as+a+permanent+UNSC+member+if,+by+some+bizarre+twist+in+backroom+negotiations,+Brazil+or+Mexico+cannot+secure+Latin+American+support?+%22&source=bl&ots=4PAAodKR9n&sig=ACFU3U3YqV_roVTPbv2PT78YKHfzvsYpg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKewi4c-wwezAhXkjIQKHYLTAeYQ6AEwAhoECAAQAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false)  
//R/

Such talking points pack a political punch in the developing world. But these arguments confront two inconvenient truths. First, regional representation and parity were never the basis for designating the UNSC's permanent members, which were chosen primarily as guarantors of world peace. The same should be true, presumably, of any additional permanent seats. The charter suggests that the candidacies of emerging powers such as Brazil or India (as well as established ones like Germany and Japan) should be weighed not on their role as regional leaders, but on their ability to help safeguard international peace. The place to address regional balance is clearly in the UNSC's elected seats, since Article 23 of the UN Charter explicitly mentions "equitable geo- graphic distribution" as a secondary consideration. **Second, designating new permanent members will not likely sate demands for greater regional representation. Indeed, opposition to the main aspirants (Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan) is strongest from their regional rivals (Argentina, Mexico, Italy, Pakistan, and South Korea).** Some propose that each regional bloc should determine its own permanent representative, but such decisions are more properly left to the entire world body. Regional selection could result in the seating of unexpected, possibly compromising candidates. Should the United States accept Cuba or Venezuela as a permanent UNSC member if, by some bizarre twist in backroom negotiations, Brazil or Mexico cannot secure Latin American support.

McDonald, Kara. "UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S. Interests." Council on Foreign Relations. 2010.

[https://books.google.com/books?id=G5X4DaVZXdC&pg=PA7&pg=PA7&dq=%22Second,+designating+new+permanent+members+will+not+likely+sate+demands+for+greater+regional+representation.+Indeed,+opposition+to+the+main+aspirants+\(Brazil,+Germany,+India,+and+Japan\)+is+strongest+from+their+regional+rivals+\(Argentina,+Mexico,+Italy,+Pakistan,+and+South+Korea\).+Some+propose+that+each+regional+bloc+should+determine+its+own+permanent+representative,+but+such+decisions+are+more+properly+left+to+the+entire+world+body.+Regional+selection+could+result+in+the+seating+of+unexpected,+possibly+compromising+candidates.+Should+the+United+States+accept+Cuba+or+Venezuela+as+a+permanent+UNSC+member+if,+by+some+bizarre+twist+in+backroom+negotiations,+Brazil+or+Mexico+cannot+secure+Latin+American+support?+%22&source=bl&ots=4PAAodKR9n&sig=ACFU3U3YqV\\_roVTPbv2PT78YKHfzvsYpg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKewi4c-wwezAhXkjIQKHYLTAeYQ6AEwAhoECAAQAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=G5X4DaVZXdC&pg=PA7&pg=PA7&dq=%22Second,+designating+new+permanent+members+will+not+likely+sate+demands+for+greater+regional+representation.+Indeed,+opposition+to+the+main+aspirants+(Brazil,+Germany,+India,+and+Japan)+is+strongest+from+their+regional+rivals+(Argentina,+Mexico,+Italy,+Pakistan,+and+South+Korea).+Some+propose+that+each+regional+bloc+should+determine+its+own+permanent+representative,+but+such+decisions+are+more+properly+left+to+the+entire+world+body.+Regional+selection+could+result+in+the+seating+of+unexpected,+possibly+compromising+candidates.+Should+the+United+States+accept+Cuba+or+Venezuela+as+a+permanent+UNSC+member+if,+by+some+bizarre+twist+in+backroom+negotiations,+Brazil+or+Mexico+cannot+secure+Latin+American+support?+%22&source=bl&ots=4PAAodKR9n&sig=ACFU3U3YqV_roVTPbv2PT78YKHfzvsYpg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKewi4c-wwezAhXkjIQKHYLTAeYQ6AEwAhoECAAQAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false)  
//R/

**The UNSC's relevance is not declining; it remains the premier multilateral institution for matters of international security.** To be sure, UN member states exploit a range of frameworks—including regional organizations, ad hoc coalitions, and interest-based partnerships—to advance their national and collective security. Examples range from the African Union to the Six Party Talks on North Korea. But **in the last five years, the UNSC has spent comparatively less time rubber-stamping diplomatic agreements made outside its chambers and more time forging agreements within its own ranks.** UNSC Resolution 1701 to end the Lebanon war, the P5+ Germany negotiations on Iran, and the UNSC's sanctions against North Korea are all examples. **The UNSC's continued relevance is also illustrated by states' desire to serve on it.** Every October, the UNGA is filled to capacity when delegations elect the new rotating UNSC members amid an orgy of vote-buying. **Even countries that make a profession of attacking the UNSC's credibility nonetheless spend millions trying to gain a seat—suggesting that, at a minimum, it retains prestige.**

Mastro, Oriana. "Can India Help the United States Against China?" Lawfare Magazine. Aug. 2018. <https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-india-help-united-states-against-china> //RJ

I argue that **concerns about regime legitimacy are the primary reason for China's lack of balancing: The Chinese Communist Party needs to interpret China's external environment in a way that supports its right to power at home.** As economic growth slows down, **the CCP is pushing the narrative that only with the Party in charge can China achieve its "national rejuvenation,"** in the words of current leader Xi Jinping. This narrative of return to a rightful place of regional preeminence contributes to Party legitimacy by appealing to the public's sense of Chinese exceptionalism and civilizational pride. **If the Indian military can present a challenge to the Chinese military, then the Chinese government must tacitly acknowledge the possibility that another country, and a democratic one at that, can rise successfully without the CCP at the helm. The Party fears that such an admission, even if not explicit, would undermine the government's legitimacy in the eyes of the people.** In short, internal stability depends on the Chinese people's continued belief in the often-heard argument that "there is no developing country in the world that achieves prosperity and stability under Western-style democracy."

Mastro, Oriana. "Can India Help the United States Against China?" Lawfare Magazine. Aug. 2018. <https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-india-help-united-states-against-china> //RJ

But there is also bad news. First, **China's need to downplay India's military modernization also suggests that a competitive U.S. strategy of building Indian partner capacity is unlikely to have the desired effects.** A strategy that relies on increased Indian military presence along the Sino-Indian border to goad China to invest more in ground capabilities at the expense of maritime ones is unlikely to succeed because **China will not respond in a traditional balancing fashion to progress in Indian ground capabilities.** This is a critical point given the new U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and its emphasis on encouraging a greater Indian role in countering Chinese assertiveness in East Asia. Second, **the need to show military superiority to domestic audiences likely extends to any encounters with Indian forces. This could create some dangerous incentives for China to escalate in a crisis in an attempt to convey its superior military might instead of attempting to defuse the issue and offer off ramps. These escalation pressures create a unique degree of crisis instability in which China may be tempted to resort to force instead of relying on diplomatic means to resolve the issue.** Even if China does not want to fight a war with India, displays and maneuvering of military forces to convey a strong message to India to back down could have the opposite effect. The two-month military standoff at Doklam, sparked by the Chinese military's attempts to extend a road through territory disputed by China and Bhutan, demonstrate some of these problematic escalatory dynamics.

Dutt, Barkha. "Modi Likes to Project Muscular Nationalism -- Except When It Comes to China." Washington Post. Mar. 2019. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/22/modi-likes-project-muscular-nationalism-except-when-it-comes-china/?noredirect=on&utm\\_term=.71f6b4bfeeb](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/22/modi-likes-project-muscular-nationalism-except-when-it-comes-china/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.71f6b4bfeeb) //RJ

At the end of its first term, **the outgoing Modi government's China policy has hit a bit of a dead end. India's economy can't afford to take on the Chinese behemoth. And, notwithstanding one military standoff between the armies of both countries in Bhutan, the government's instinct was still to seek conciliation with China, instead of confrontation or even competition.** Modi's China policy has militated against his own self-declared muscular nationalism.

Shahi '14 University of Delhi

[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301769811\\_India\\_in\\_the\\_Emerging\\_World\\_Order\\_A\\_status\\_quo\\_power\\_or\\_a\\_revisionist\\_force](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301769811_India_in_the_Emerging_World_Order_A_status_quo_power_or_a_revisionist_force)

Another priority area for India in the twenty-first century is Africa. During the Second India-Africa Forum Summit held at Addis Ababa in 2011, the then Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, called Africa the "new growth pole" in the world.<sup>85</sup> According to Niranjan Desai, the former High Commissioner to Uganda, Africa is strategically and geopolitically significant for India.<sup>86</sup> The East African seaboard, from the Horn of Africa to South Africa, falls within India's strategic maritime "neighbourhood". Therefore, there is a geostrategic incentive for collaboration between India and Africa to maintain the Indian Ocean as a peaceful zone to encourage trade and enhance mutual security concerns. Besides, Africa is becoming an increasingly important source of oil, minerals and other raw materials for the growing needs of the quickly expanding Indian economy.

Najam '19 The Hill

<https://thehill.com/opinion/international/432679-be-worried-very-worried-about-what-just-happened-in-india-and-pakistan>

For those who insist on seeing a silver lining, there is one. Both Pakistan and India can, and have, claimed victory: military, diplomatic, moral. Domestic constituencies in both countries fiercely believe it is so. In India, Modi may just have won himself an election. In Pakistan, Khan's beleaguered government suddenly looks statesmanlike. Neither would like to risk losing this sweet spot with further adventures. Hence, a key condition for de-escalation is fulfilled.

Stratfor '18

<https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/pakistan-what-does-loan-china-mean-already-indebted-country>

China has reportedly agreed to give Islamabad a loan to shore up Pakistan's plummeting foreign exchange reserves as its import bill grows. Although the two countries have yet to sign a deal, the prospective loan — reportedly on the order of at least \$10 billion — would enable Pakistani Prime Minister-elect Imran Khan's incoming administration to avoid turning to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for help, as Pakistan has done 12 times in its history. The IMF attaches conditions to its loans, and austerity measures such as spending cuts, tax hikes and structural reforms would undermine Khan's ability to fund his populist vision for Pakistan: to turn the country into a social welfare state aimed at improving the lives of the poor.

Deo '14 The Diplomat

<https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/should-india-give-up-on-the-un-security-council/>

**It is worth noting that although matters of war and peace are the core function of the UNSC, it has not been consulted on any of these issues.** The most blatant instance was Obama's address to the UN General Assembly on September 24, where he defended airstrikes on Syria and Iraq. **The U.S did not deem it necessary, once again, to seek the approval of the UNSC. Sadly, UN secretary general Ban Ki Moon was pressured to support the U.S.'s unilateral actions, though he expressed the vain hope that the UNSC will lead the effort against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.**

In the east, China has completely rejected international arbitration on territorial disputes with its maritime neighbours, despite the Philippines taking the issue to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea.

And amid steadily deteriorating Russia-West ties, **U.S.-led NATO has not taken the issue to the UNSC**, though it has accused Moscow of breaching international law and compromising Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity by annexing Crimea. With these disagreements—as well as the opposing perspectives on Syria—the equation between the West and Russia has deteriorated to a point reminiscent of the hostilities between the two during the Cold War.

**The new standoff over Ukraine has completely paralysed the UNSC. However, such disregard was already evident when the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003 without the Security Council's authorisation, distorted the sense of UNSC Resolution 1973 on Libya in 2011 by justifying the invasion of that country, and recently ordered airstrikes on Syria.**

These repeated unilateral actions raise questions about the UNSC's relevance. It then becomes necessary to ask if India should persist in its efforts to be part of an organisation that lacks weight and sway.

Marlow

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/where-the-latest-india-pakistan-conflict-may-lead-quicktake/2019/02/15/d6e48c80-3107-11e9-8781-763619f12cb4\\_story.html?noredirect=on&utm\\_term=.4aca951aff78](https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/where-the-latest-india-pakistan-conflict-may-lead-quicktake/2019/02/15/d6e48c80-3107-11e9-8781-763619f12cb4_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4aca951aff78)

**Does India risk starting another full-scale war? Not really. Although there is enormous domestic pressure to respond militarily, India has long been constrained by the fact both countries have nuclear weapons. After the 2016 attack on Uri, Modi's government authorized limited strikes and made sure the situation didn't escalate --** a predicament helped by Pakistan's denials that any cross-border attacks even took place. However, this latest attack comes as Modi's party slumps in the polls ahead of the elections, possibly heaping greater pressure on the prime minister to retaliate.

Raje '19 Strife

<http://www.strifeblog.org/2019/02/28/will-india-and-pakistan-go-to-war/>

**Firstly, both India and Pakistan have made it clear that they do not want war.** When addressing the Pakistani retaliatory strikes on 27 February, Pakistani Major General Asif Ghafoor emphasised that no Indian military targets had been hit because Pakistan does not 'want to go on the path of war.' The Indian Minister for External Affairs, Sushma Swaraj echoed this sentiment when she said, 'India doesn't wish to see further escalation.' Escalation to war is a risk neither side is willing to take. **The existence of nuclear weapons and the economic costs of war are two factors that greatly influence this reluctance. Secondly, it is in the interests of the international community to step in with increased concern about the stability of the region in an attempt to stop escalation, as has been seen before.**

The question then is, despite the increased instability, why does the conflict between the two states not lead to war? **The answer lies in the examination of past wars between India and Pakistan and the role of the international community in bringing them to a close.** India-Pakistan crises in 1965, 1999 and the 2001-02 standoff all saw the international community scramble to bring about de-escalation.<sup>[7]</sup> **In all the crises, India adopted a strong coercive posture, possibly with the knowledge that in event of increased escalation, the international community will step in to cease hostilities as it did in each of those conflicts.**

**In sum, nuclear weapons increase stability in the region in general. They do increase the likelihood of low-level conflict, but they decrease the likelihood of all-out war between the two states. Secondly, escalation of conflict between India and Pakistan has always been looked at with growing concern by the international community, which has more often than not played a pivotal role in the cessation of hostilities, as the cases of 1948, 1965 and Kargil show. These factors decrease the likelihood of India and Pakistan going to war with each other despite the possibility that they will engage in an escalation of rhetoric or even low-level hostilities.** While the rhetoric in India today is inherently advocating strong retributive action against Pakistan, the above factors show that despite an escalation of rhetoric, diplomatic efforts or even limited military action, India and Pakistan will not actually end up in an all-out war with each other. The social media #saynotowar hashtag that is currently seen across a lot of Indian and Pakistani social media might be more on point than ever.

Russo, Jenna. "The Politics of R2P and Inaction in Syria: U.S., Russian, and Chinese Responses." CUNY. 2017. <https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/ru/conf/2018/23012018/Russo.pdf> //RJ

Indeed, many have attributed the Security Council's stalemate over Syria as a reaction to the 2011 NATO operation in Libya, which marked the first time the Security Council authorized military intervention in the name of R2P without the consent of the host government. 9 The way in which NATO toppled the Qaddafi regime was viewed by many as a gross mishandling of the mission's mandate, which was to be focused solely on the protection of civilians. Only three days after airstrikes began, China, Russia, and India began calling for an immediate ceasefire, claiming that NATO had abused the terms of its mandate and was instead pushing for regime change.<sup>10</sup> The perceived overstepping by NATO was confirmation to many, including Russia and China, that the West would use intervention in the name of R2P to achieve its own political agenda. As described by Le Yuchang, the Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister, "Libya...has gone too far from the original intention of R2P...We should not forget the lessons we learned from Libya...It has been vividly described as 'a successful surgery with a dead patient' and it is patent that this kind of 'protection' is a failed and irresponsible one applying 'protect' as the cover of the brutal 'intervention.'"<sup>11</sup>

Russo, Jenna. "The Politics of R2P and Inaction in Syria: U.S., Russian, and Chinese Responses." CUNY. 2017. <https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/ru/conf/2018/23012018/Russo.pdf> //RJ

Nevertheless, China has vetoed all Security Council resolutions invoking the third pillar of R2P, even non-military coercive measures, such as sanctions. This voting pattern can largely be attributed to China's relationship with Russia in the Security Council. Though short of a formal alliance, Russia and China have found mutual benefit from supporting one another, as they often have the most in common politically and ideologically. This includes their mutual interest to shift away from the U.S.-led unipolar system, in which they view their partnership with one another as an important balance to U.S. hegemony. In addition, China has historically tended to take more of a low-profile approach to international affairs, preferring to let Russia take the lead and instead focus on matters related to its economic objectives.<sup>21</sup> In this way, China has benefitted from Russia's vocal opposition to the West, which has spared it from being seen as a lone dissenter and has allowed China to maintain a delicate balance in its foreign affairs approach. While China is generally opposed to the notion of foreign interference in domestic issues, it is nevertheless concerned with cultivating a reputation as a responsible power. In addition, China's growing involvement in the global economy has led to a recognition that increased involvement in foreign affairs may be necessary to protect its own economic interests.<sup>22</sup>

Ganguly, Sumit. "India and the Responsibility to Protect." Indiana University Bloomington. 2016. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0047117816659593?journalCode=ireb> //RJ

A congeries of factors led to the shift in the Indian position. Globally, India came under increased pressure from the United States to adopt a firm stance against the Assad regime. At a regional level, the levels of violence in Syria had increased and also India was loath to alienate the Gulf states. The consideration of the views of the Gulf states was far from trivial. Close to 6 million Indians are employed there and it is believed that Saudi Arabia had offered to make up India's lost energy imports from Iran as a consequence of US pressures.<sup>43</sup> Nevertheless, India worked diligently to try and weaken some of the more intrusive features of

the resolution regarding possible sanctions, military intervention, and regime change.<sup>44</sup> It is also worth noting that India chose to vote in favor of the resolution although some influential members of India's attentive public had expressed their opposition to a favorable vote. Those opposed had highlighted the standard concern about the violation of national sovereignty (and its potential long-term repercussions for India in Kashmir), the danger of dragging the region into a wider sectarian conflict, and the possibility of finding some modus vivendi between the regime and the opposition forces.<sup>45</sup> India's position on R2P during the two crises and especially its third pillar is ably summed up in the following: The Indian maneuvering during the Libyan and Syrian crises highlights a common dilemma it faces as an emerging power in the multipolar international system. From abstaining in the case of Libya to adopting a more accommodating approach on Syria, India's shift indicates that it is gradually adapting its traditional foreign policy stances to reflect the responsibilities and ambitions of a country intent on establishing itself in the contemporary international order, although it retains serious concerns about RtoP's third pillar.<sup>46</sup>

Pai, Nitin. "India and International Norms: R2P, Genocide Prevention, Human Rights, and Democracy." Takshahila Institution. Aug. 2013. <http://takshashila.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Nitin-Pai-R2P-Chapter-Preview.pdf> //RJ

The not-unfounded suspicion that freedom and democracy were and remain guises under which Western powers promote their interests is another major reason for India's reservations. To the extent that there is a divergence in interests between India and the West, these reservations become more acute. Furthermore, given the handicap of not being a permanent member of the UNSC, India is prudent not to empower further a body of which it is not a member. New Delhi's reservations also arise from the risk that promoting international norms can backfire on India's own interests, especially if India needs the political support of other UN member-states or veto-wielding members of the UNSC. The experience of referring to the UN Pakistani aggression in J&K in 1947 and of pursuing nonproliferation negotiations in good faith, only to have lasting counterproductive outcomes, has made the Indian establishment suspicious of the motives of the great powers and generally defensive in its policy outlook.

[Simon Chesterman, 8-1-2018, "R2P and Humanitarian Intervention: From Apology to Utopia and Back Again by Simon Chesterman :: SSRN," No Publication, [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=3224116](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3224116)]//Rank

Despite clearly satisfying any notional threshold for action, the failure to respond meaningfully to the unfolding Syrian crisis can only partly be explained by Russian ties to Assad's regime. China joined with Russia in vetoing several resolutions, with Libya casting a shadow over these debates insofar as resolutions explicitly renouncing regime change as a goal had been used to achieve exactly that.<sup>48</sup> Perhaps of more interest for present purposes is that the states agitating for action tended not to use the language of R2P — either wary of raising the spectre of Libya or, perhaps, because that language tends to be used in support of foreign policy objectives rather than to create those objectives. If the latter is true, this would be consistent with the more cynical accounts of humanitarian intervention, which posit that the volume of a state's outrage at a

humanitarian crisis varies directly with its willingness to act in response to that crisis. Much as triumphalism at R2P's influence in Libya tended to overstate the case, reports of the death of R2P after Syria were greatly exaggerated.<sup>49</sup> Subsequent years saw continued mixed blessings for R2P. Russia and China vetoed at least four resolutions with R2P language over Syria,<sup>50</sup> while the Council as a whole was manifestly unable to deal with the crises in Central African Republic, Yemen, and elsewhere. There were also some indications of a more principled opposition to R2P. Although China's former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Qian Qichen, was a commissioner on the body that came up with the concept of R2P, there are signs that it is rethinking its support. In a 2014 speech on the international rule of law, the current Foreign Minister Wang Yi highlighted some of the ongoing difficulties: 'Hegemonism, power politics and all forms of "new interventionism" pose a direct challenge to basic principles of international law including respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in other countries' internal affairs.'<sup>51</sup> Though China's rise sometimes inspires fears that it will seek to establish an alternative model of international order — an 'Eastphalian' system,<sup>52</sup> for example, opposed to the 'Westphalian' one that now dominates — such statements actually appear more consistent with a traditionally conservative approach to sovereignty that dominated for most of the twentieth century.<sup>53</sup> The preceding account is consistent with analysis of the foreign policy of China, Japan, and other states that continue to engage with the debates on R2P — with an eye, however, not to expanding its scope but containing its effects. Bae, Infanzon, and Abbe have termed this partial engagement 'active in not being active'.<sup>54</sup>

**Carafano, James. "Problem-Plagued Pakistan Faces Incredible Challenges Beyond Its Rivalry With India." Heritage Foundation. Mar. 2019. <https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/problem-plagued-pakistan-faces-incredible-challenges-beyond-its-rivalry//RJ>**

Pakistan fears two things more than war with India: pressure from Washington and indifference from Beijing. ***In the latest round of tit-for-tat fighting with India, Pakistan saw a bit of both – more evidence that the country may be heading for the strategic dead-end of South Asia geo-politics.*** That's not the best outcome for ***Pakistan or the United States.*** Islamabad and New Delhi have been rivals since the partition of India created Pakistan in 1947. Their enmity wasn't dampened when both sides got nuclear weapons in the 1980s. But some things have changed. ***Today India sees Pakistan in its rearview mirror.*** India is focused on its role as an Indo-Pacific power and a rising global economic player. ***Pakistan has long tried to prop up its regional relevance and influence, in part, by supporting insurgencies and tolerating terrorist groups that undermine stability in India, as well as neighboring Afghanistan. These tactics*** have taken a terrible human toll – even in Pakistan, which has seen more than its share of extremist violence. Yet they ***are no longer enough to turn India's trajectory. Pakistan's*** other recourse for relevance has been to play "great power" politics. It ***has looked to both the U.S. and China to balance Islamabad's relationship with Delhi. And now that's a problem. The India-U.S. strategic relationship is quickly outpacing relations between America and Pakistan.*** This latest incident was a case in point. When terrorists struck in Kashmir, the message from the U.S. administration was pretty clear: India, we have your back. That's not to say U.S.-India ties are frictionless. Washington just dropped India from its Generalized System of Preferences program. That will slap about \$5 billion in new tariffs on Indian goods heading to the U.S. But President Trump has a penchant for running economic, security and diplomatic policies on separate tracks. While Delhi and Washington may continue to spar over how to build better economic ties, the Trump team will continue to press forward to strengthen the strategic partnership with India. ***Pakistan clearly laags India in importance as an American strategic ally in the region. But turning to Beijing doesn't seem to offer Islamabad much of value. So far, what Pakistan has gotten from economic engagement with Beijing is mostly debt. Pakistan's economy is so lackluster that Islamabad is seeking a \$12 billion bailout from the International Monetary Fund. If granted, it would be the 13th bailout the country has received since the 1980s. Nor does China appear to be delivering the diplomatic clout that Pakistan needs.*** For example, Beijing couldn't prevent the international Financial Action Task Force from "grey listing" Pakistan for its weakness in combating money laundering and terrorist financing. In fact, ***under pressure from the U.S. and***

**others, Pakistan may soon find itself “blacklisted” as a non-cooperative state. In the Pakistan-China relationship, Beijing seems primarily interested in helping itself. Over the long term, the strategic relationship could have little value beyond making Islamabad a tool of Chinese policy and perhaps, someday, a suburb of Beijing.** There is no easy exit for Pakistan. India won't be cowed by terrorism. Further, as the latest incident on the frontier demonstrated, there are limits to intensifying conflict between the two nuclear-armed countries. It was not surprising that **Pakistan quickly returned a downed-Indian fighter pilot to deescalate the confrontation.** Further, it doesn't look like Pakistan can leverage either the U.S. or China to pressure India. Yet dismantling the terrorist infrastructure and accompanying web of corruption that riddle Pakistan presents tremendous challenges as well. On the other hand, a Pakistan that muddles through in South Asia just risks being left further behind.

Sareen, Sushant. “For Pakistan, China is the New America.” Observer Research Foundation. Feb. 2019. <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/pakistan-china-new-america-48305//RJ>

Even more importantly, **China is still not in a position to bail out its ‘iron brother’ Pakistan out of trouble frequently,** especially if the US is the source of trouble. Nor is China likely to go out on a limb for Pakistan every time it gets into crisis. **Pakistan is an important client state, but not a state critical for China’s survival.** And **despite the fact that China has been doubling down in its support for Pakistan, there are some straws in the wind that suggest the beginning of a rethink in China on how much it should invest itself in Pakistan,** which could turn out to be a poor investment ultimately. Consequently, **India can use to force China to be more even-handed in its policy in South Asia,** especially on issues like designating and sanctioning terrorists like the Jaish-e-Mohammed chief, Masood Azhar, who China has been protecting for years. Until the Pulwama suicide attack on the CRPF bus, this was an irritant in Sino-Indian relations. It is going to become a core issue from now onwards for New Delhi. What **China will need to decide is whether the benefit it derives from its economic and strategic relationship with Pakistan is worth the economic and strategic cost of antagonising India and pushing it to a point where India reconsiders and reevaluates its policy of strategic caution in pushing ahead with the Quad and other initiatives aimed at containing China.** The fact that China makes more money out of India every year than it will out of its trade and investments in Pakistan is the economic side of things. **India, instead of assuming that the depth of Sino-Pak ties is immutable, needs to leverage its economic relationship with China and force China to understand the economic and political consequences of its support for a notorious Pakistani terrorist state. India has cards to play that can pry open the Sino-Pak nexus, provided it is willing to stare down the Chinese while playing these cards which include an active and intensive involvement in strengthening the Quad and more specifically in strategically engaging the US.**

Bana, Sarosh, Independent UK, 27 February 2019.

<https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/pakistan-india-tension-war-planes-china-a8799111.html//EK>  
**To go to war against India, Islamabad will have to look to China. China’s entry into the affray would raise major questions for India,** which lacks the military power to wage a war on two fronts for any length of time. There are those in India who are interpreting the government’s “non-military” pre-emptive action as a political move. The prime minister urged the public at a rally to vote for him to ensure the “safety and security” of their homeland. His ministers, too, upheld the aerial offensive as indicative of a strong and decisive leadership that provided security to all Indians. With Modi increasingly unsure of re-election, declaring a national emergency could potentially allow a delay to elections, extending the term of the incumbent regime for as long as the emergency continues. **The altercation between India and Pakistan is fraught with grave consequences.** An event of war will physically endanger civilians living along the borders and jeopardise the lives of all Indians and Pakistanis by devastating both country’s economies. Scaling down the rhetoric to come to an understanding is the only way forward.