Drew Thorburn AC

We affirm.

Because the resolution never states where the anti-missile systems need to be located, the aff can garner offense from any anti-missile system.

Use reasonability for T with a brightline of turn ground and talking about the region because there are multiple legitimate interpretations of the topic.

Also, aff flex is good. (Extemp)

Contention 1: Deterrence

Klinger 15 writes that Pyongyang can attack South Korea and Japan with nuclear or biological weapons with a preemptive strike and has threatened to do so. However, South Korea has no adequate missile defense. With current missile defense, the interception of a missile at a low altitude still causes harm. However, THAAD would create an essential multilayered defensive shield for South Korea. PAC would only have 1 second to intercept a missile while THAAD has 45 with a 100% success rate.

Contention 2: Trilateralism

Naidu 07 writes that BMDs provide the opportunity to strengthen cooperation between India and Japan as they would both have to work closely together to deter other countries as well as work with the US for deployment. Whether or not they cooperate impacts the larger security environment as Nagao 15 writes that China has become extremely aggressive in the region especially in regards to India. Japan-India cooperation deters China. In addition, cooperation also allows them to support other countries in the region to protect against Chinese aggression.

Contention 3: US-Japan Alliance

Weitz 13 writes that missile defense is an important aspect of the Japan-US alliance. BMD has strengthened cooperation. McCain 8 furthers that the US-Japan alliance has been a vital anchor of peace in Asia and the importance will only grow. Also, Herman 16 writes that this alliance prevents Japan getting nukes since they look to the US for assurance of their defense. If Japan were to get nuclear weapons the NPT would collapse because it has been the posterchild of the treaty because they have nuclear capabilities, but still refuse to develop nukes.

Contention 4: Alliance Cohesion

Manning 16 writes that currently our allies in Asia’s faith in the US is on the brink as well as their faith in the nuclear umbrella. BMDs are key to their assurance. This is because those countries have no incentive to proliferate with BMDs. Currently, South Korea is in an overheated debate whether or not they need nuclear weapons. Due to the growing North Korean threat, many allies have doubts about US deterrence.

Two warrants:

First, Missile defense prevents a perception of US disengagement from Japan and South Korea which reassures them. Santoro 15 writes that Japan and South Korea currently perceive a security gap. In order to continue assuring our allies, the US needs to continue investing in missile defense.

If perception fails, nuclear proliferation will occur as Ferguson 15 writes that if our allies perceive the US as not being able to counter threats and protect them.

Campbell 04 writes that it is the perception of US commitment that matters. A decline in presence undermines US credibility and gives them a perception that the US is becoming weak.

History proves as Campbell furthers that during the late 1900s when the US became disengaged from Southeast Asia, countries such as Taiwan and South Korea became interested in getting nuclear weapons and adopting nuclear weapon programs.

Second, just having BMDs in the region is independently key. WSJ 16 finds that without adequate missile defense, the South Korean consensus against going nuclear will not last because of a lack of deterrent.

A spillover effect also happens. Avery 09 writes that Japan going nuclear sets off an arms race with other countries like India, Pakistan, Taiwan, and South Korea.

There are 5 impacts.

First, Ahn 14 writes that nuclear arming of South Korea triggers North Korea as it would cause Pyongyang to reinforce its own nuclear arsenal. Consequently, it would undermine stability and increase chances of escalation.

Second, this increases the chances of miscalc as Friedberg 15 writes that when allies acquire nuclear weapons, there will be a possibility of a preemptive attack as there is an incentive to destroy another country’s nuclear stockpile.

Third is accidents. Jayes 15 writes that misperception already exists and there would probably be inadvertent escalation to nuclear war. This is increased by the risks of technical malfunctions, problems in fail-safe and control systems especially during testing.

Fourth is avoiding nuclear terrorism.

Scott Sagan of Stanford University writes that nuclear proliferation increases the likelihood of nuclear terrorism in which terrorists obtain nuclear material. James Doyle writes that several states have limited resources to defend facilities and have nuclear facilities in conflict-prone areas.

Fifth is the spread to Europe.

Van Ham 16 writes that a perception of American disengagement from East Asia causes EU countries to consider going nuclear as the NPT would be wrecked by Japan specifically.

Robert Mozley of Stanford University writes that if nuclear proliferation were to happen in Europe, the EU would eventually collapse as there would be a lot of internal disputes.

This is extremely problematic as John Bruton writes that the EU is necessary to deal with many issues such as AIDS and international security threats. Without the EU, there would be disastrous consequences.