# Laird Lewis Prelims AC—Lay Lewis Special

## Part 1: Substance

### Collapse Cards

#### North Korea is showing signs of imminent collapse – weakening economy and unwillingness to cooperate over nuclear weapons

Hill 15 [Christopher R. Hill, former US assistant secretary of state for East Asia, dean of the Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, and the author of “Outpost”; “North Korea’s Endgame”; Inquirer World Opinion; 08/20/2015; accessed 06/30/2016; <http://opinion.inquirer.net/88049/north-koreas-endgame>.]

By all accounts, **Kim enjoys little personal legitimacy in North Korea**. In Korean tradition, entrusting the family fortune to the youngest of a third generation is sometimes a dicey proposition. His father, Kim Jong-il, struggled mightily to fill Kim Il-sung’s shoes. Kim **Jong-un**, it seems, **is having even greater difficulty managing the family business**. Indeed, **he has launched what many are calling a** reign of terror: Scores of **senior officials have been summarily and brutally executed, while others cower in fear**. Despite the occasional construction project—usually a new amusement park—**North Korea under Kim Jong-un continues on its path toward oblivion.** The country’s economy is a shambles, **with its agricultural base, in the absence of any modern engineering and technology, increasingly susceptible to the vicissitudes of the weather. The authorities’ decision to allow markets to operate reflects** the need to make a virtue of **necessity: As** has been **true of decaying communist regimes elsewhere**, the government cannot afford to pay the collective farms **for their output**. China has essentially washed its hands of its small neighbor. Russia, challenged to court new friends, but also struggling to manage its own weakening economy, is not interested in reviving a friendship with a country that seems to have made it a point of principle never to pay anyone for anything. **One hallmark of Kim Jong-un’s leadership has been his** disinterest in negotiations to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Indeed, **while the Chinese** in recent years **struggled to restart the** so-called **six-party talks, the North Koreans quietly informed them, “No, thanks.” North Korea under Kim Jong-un has** invested heavily and **worked hard to develop ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons**. Its erstwhile partners—indeed **the whole world—have been given no other choice but to tighten sanctions**, increase vigilance **and**, in the case of the United States and its allies, **develop high-tech defenses that could render North Korean offensive systems obsolete before they are even unveiled. During the six-party process**, over the course of four years, North Korea’s interlocutors (**the United States, South Korea, China, Russia and Japan) offered the regime what amounted to a grand bargain: Shut down the nuclear program in exchange for a broad range of assistance and assurances. Kim Jong-un has walked away from the benefits that would come from recognition as a member of the international community in good standing**, apparently **intent on** leading his country farther into the wilderness. Given this, it is easy to understand why many analysts have begun to focus on what North Korea’s demise might mean for political arrangements on the Korean Peninsula. **At some point,** and in some as-yet-undefined way, **North Korea will be unable to function**, and South Korea will become the successor state.

#### North Korean collapse inevitable – their evidence won’t take into account Kim’s alienation, weakening allyship from nuclear tests, and the population’s desire to defect

Ryall 16 [Julian Ryall, Foreign Correspondent’s Club of Japan; “Is North Korea finally close to collapse?”; DW; 04/13/2016; accessed 07/03/2016; <http://www.dw.com/en/is-north-korea-finally-close-to-collapse/a-19183141>.]

**For decades**, politicians, policy **experts** and analysts **have been predicting the imminent implosion of the North Korean regime,** either as a result of economic collapse, external pressures, or a military coup to replace the Kim family as hereditary heads of state. Some have even gone so far to suggest that internal pressures were close to the point at which a popular uprising might occur, similar to the one that deposed Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaucescu in 1989. **Yet, successive members of the Kim clan have defied the crises** and predictions **to cling on to power. Today, however, North Korea faces arguably the toughest test of** "juche," **its official political ideology of self-reliance** that was dreamed up by Kim Il-sung, the first head of the nation and grandfather of present leader Kim Jong-un. Young and inexperienced There are some who believe that **Kim Jong-un - young and inexperienced in his role - has made too many mistakes since he inherited the nation** in December 2011, **and alienated too many of the people close to the regime that he should have looked to for support and advice.** North Korean news agency KCNA shows the test-firing of new-type large-caliber multiple launch rocket system by the North Korean military If international sanctions are to work, much will depend on China Equally, **his people are growing increasingly aware of life beyond North Korea's borders,** thanks to mobile communications and movies from South Korea and the West that are smuggled into the country. And **in trying to be the "strong man" of northeast Asia, and demanding respect through tests of nuclear weapons** and ballistic missiles, **Kim has even forced former allies to reassess their relationships with Pyongyang.** On April 9, the South Korean government announced that 13 employees of a North Korean restaurant in China had defected to Seoul. Rah Jong-yil, a former head of South Korean intelligence, said 13 defectors might not appear significant, but he believes it is an indicator of things to come. "This is a very revealing development and, I believe, shows us the state of the morale of people in Pyongyang," he told DW. Trusted citizens The North Korean state only permits its most trusted citizens to go abroad, where they are expected to earn hard currency, Rah said. If these people - the elite - are defecting, then the situation in Pyongyang is dire, he believes. "**In the past, North Korea has managed to keep everything from the outside world at arms' length, but because of** the international **sanctions, it has to send more workers abroad to earn money**," he said. "So now **they are seeing how other people live**, they are watching television dramas about life in South Korea, **and they are realizing that their government has lied to them**. "I believe we will see more defections of these elite members of North Korean society," he added. Yet with sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council in March apparently biting, the communist country is running out of ways to make the money it needs to continue to develop weapons of mass destruction and to keep its leaders living in the luxury they have come to expect. And there have been hints that **Pyongyang is already feeling the pinch**. Earlier this month, state media called on the international community to do away with the sanctions and return to discussions about security concerns in northeast Asia. More ominously, it has also called on the citizens to prepare for a new "arduous march." Four-year famine The term was first coined by the North Korean leadership in 1993 as a metaphor for the four-year famine that decimated the nation from 1994. The famine - in which as many as 3.5 million of the nation's 22 million people died - was brought on by economic mismanagement, natural disasters, the collapse of the Soviet bloc, and the consequent loss of aid, combined with the regime's insistence on putting the military first. If international sanctions are to work, much will depend on China, which has traditionally been North Korea's closest ally and has in the past been less-than-rigorous in ensuring that its borders are closed to items that have been banned by previous UN sanctions resolutions. The signs this time, however, are encouraging. Earlier this month, **Beijing indicated its own growing displeasure with Kim Jong-un's continued defiance of international efforts to convince him to halt nuclear and missile tests** by **announcing** that **it would ban all imports of coal, iron, iron ore, gold,** **titanium and rare earth minerals**. Those lucrative exports account for the bulk of North Korea's overseas earnings, and **losing them will put a sizeable dent in Pyongyang's income**. At the same time, **China announced that it would halt exports of oil into the North, which will quickly limit the military's ability to operate**. "Everything depends on China and, to a certain extent Russia, but I do believe **we are seeing the start of a crisis for the North Korean state**," said Ken Kato, director of Human Rights in Asia, and a member of the International Coalition to Stop Crimes Against Humanity in North Korea. "The defections tell me that **there is a deep malaise in North Korean society that is** only going to get worse as sanctions bite harder," he said. "That, in turn, will encourage more to defect and, thanks to technology, stay in touch with their friends and relatives they left behind." The sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council in March are apparently working Ultimately, **a vicious cycle of less money for the state, less money and food for the public and a consequent rise in defections will be** impossible to sustain, Kato believes. Chinese reaction The biggest concern will inevitably be the reaction of China, analysts agree. Beijing has no desire to deal with the cross-border humanitarian crisis that would result from a revolution or civil war breaking out in North Korea as a consequence of the regime collapsing. Equally, it would be unwilling to countenance a unified Korea led by South Korea and under the influence of the United States. The security ramifications for Beijing would be too serious. "The decision on whether North Korea collapses or if there is some other form of regime change will depend on China," Toshimitsu Shigemura, a professor at Tokyo's Waseda University, told DW. "Beijing does not want a sudden collapse, but it is not opposed to a change in the leadership in North Korea," he suggested.

#### Collapse will cause Diversionary War Against South Korea. Bennett 13:

**As the conditions for** a **collapse mature, the North Korean regime could try to invade the ROK** as a diversionary war **to prevent a North Korean collapse**. While the invasion would not be a consequence of collapse, per se, it could cause serious conditions in the ROK that would impede a ROK response to an eventual North Korean government collapse. Given the conditions in North Korea, the ROK should consider any invasion to be diversionary and should seek to precipitate a collapse of the North Korean government as part of its defense. Indeed, the most effective means for the ROK to limit damage may be to cause the attack to fail because of government failure rather than military failure. That said, a North Korean invasion of the ROK could cause considerable damage to the ROK, especially the area from Seoul northward. For example, North Korean artillery could cause substantial devastation in Seoul and elsewhere along the DMZ. North Korean forces advancing into the ROK could also cause many casualties to ROK military personnel and significant damage to the ROK land over which the conflict is fought, and ROK industry and other parts of its economy in the area of the conflict. Political, human rights, and other damage would almost certainly occur in areas the North occupies for any length of time. An eventual ROK counterattack to drive North Korean forces out of ROK territory and reestablish the ROK border would cause further damage. To provide a rough estimate of the damage from such a conflict, GEN Gary Luck, the U.S. commander in Korea at the time, said in his 1994 testimony to Congress that casualties in a future Korean war could equal the casualties of the first Korean War; just the military casualties were 36,000 U.S. dead and 400,000 ROK dead.26 General Luck’s accounting apparently assumed that only conventional weapons would be used. Economic losses could amount to 10 to 20 percent of ROK GDP over the first year of conflict simply due to military mobilization of civilian personnel and resources; the physical damage of an invasion could raise the economic losses much higher—perhaps as much as a 50 percent loss of ROK GDP the first year. All this damage would be far worse if North Korea used WMD as part of an attack, which it could decide to do. In particular, once a North Korean offensive were stopped and ROK and U.S. forces began a counteroffensive, **the North Korean leaders would** know that, unless the ROK and U.S. forces were stopped, the North Korean regime would probably be destroyed over time. Thus, the leaders could **decide to use WMD to stop the ROK and U.S. advance as an act of desperation, using** artillery to fire chemical weapons, **ballistic missiles to deliver** all forms of WMD, and improvised explosive **devices** with any form of WMD on North Korean territory and captured ROK territory. Depending on the scope and magnitude of WMD used, ROK personnel losses in the Seoul area alone could easily double the historical losses from conventional conflict and leave the ROK economy in shambles for years. Just a single North Korean nuclear weapon detonated in Seoul with a 10 kiloton yield could cause 200,000 or so fatalities, a similar number of serious injuries, and a financial cost of some $1.5 trillion

### US Preemptive Strike Cards

#### Trump Warns of Strike. Sanger 17:

[**North Korea**](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/northkorea/index.html?inline=nyt-geo)**’s detonation** of a sixth nuclear bomb on Sunday **prompted the Trump administration to warn that even the threat to use such a weapon against the United States and its allies “will be met with a massive military response.’’**

#### Preemptive Strike from the United States. Fox News 8/7/17:

**National security adviser** H.R. McMaster **said** Saturday **the threat of North Korea launching a nuclear weapon** at the U.S. or another rival nation **is “impossible to overstate” and repeated that a preemptive military strike remains an option**.

#### Only Option is Preemptive Strike. Lockie 17:

President Donald Trump's first choice for secretary of defense says the US may only have one option for dealing with North Korea — a large-scale military strike. “**A pre-emptive strike against launch facilities, underground nuclear sites, artillery and rocket response forces and regime leadership targets may be the only option left on the table," Keane told** [**The Times of London**](http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/military-solution-to-kim-is-getting-closer-says-general-j67f9cm96)**. "We are rapidly and dangerously moving towards a military option**.” Keane, who is said to be close to Trump, declined the role of secretary of defense offered to him by the president, [citing the recent death of his wife](http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/11/20/502769948/ret-army-gen-jack-keane-says-he-declined-offer-to-be-defense-secretary). Keane's statement, that a military strike, which several experts have told Business Insider would involve an [unthinkable number of civilian casualties](http://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-icbm-what-happens-if-us-intervention-2017-3), echoes sentiments from Trump in a recent interview with the [Financial Times](https://www.ft.com/content/9ae777ea-17ac-11e7-a53d-df09f373be87).

#### Trump paints critics as unpatriotic. Menon 17:

**Trump wouldn’t be the first leader, confronted with trouble at home, to trigger a crisis** abroad and **then appeal for unity and paint critics as unpatriotic**. Keep in mind, after all, that **this is the man who has already warned of “a major, major war” with North Korea.**

#### Historical Precedents Prove. Tierney 17:

In the summer of 1998, **at the height of the Monica Lewinsky scandal**, Bill Clinton confessed on television that his romantic relationship with a White House intern amounted to “a critical lapse in judgment ... a personal failure.” Three days later, **with his presidency hanging in the balance, the administration announced airstrikes** against suspected terrorist sites in Sudan and Afghanistan, following the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Many observers claimed that **Clinton had launched a classic diversionary war, or a use of force to sidetrack the media**, whip up patriotic sentiment, **and boost approval ratings**. One journalist asked Secretary of Defense William Cohen if he had seen the 1997 movie Wag the Dog, in which the White House fabricates a war to distract attention from the president’s dalliance with a young girl. Cohen said the only goal of the strikes, “was our absolute obligation to protect the American people from terrorist activities.” Today, **some critics claim that Donald Trump will** adopt a version of the Wag the Dog strategy, and **launch an actual major conflict to deflect attention** from the growing Russia scandal. In the Daily Beast, Michael Tomasky outlined a number of dangerous scenarios for a “caged and cornered animal” like Trump, the first being **that he “tries to start a war,” perhaps against North Korea**. Distraction is indeed at the core of Trump’s foreign policy—but its role is far more subtle and broadly applied.

#### Also, strikes boost approval ratings. Tierney 17 [2]:

The most tempting use of force may be a seemingly manageable, but still dazzling, kinetic operation, like a missile strike or a raid to kill terrorist leaders. Another option would be to escalate a crisis where an easy win seems available: The key is to find the right enemy, one that’s both widely hated and too weak to fight back. After all, there’s a well-established “rally ‘round the flag” effect, where **almost any military crisis temporarily juices the president’s approval ratings. In the wake of Clinton’s airstrikes** in 1998, one poll found that **68 percent of Americans approved of his foreign policy**. Republican House Speaker Newt Gingrich said, “it was the right thing to do at the right time.

#### Preemptive Strike Causes Massive Retaliation. Rich 17:

**The North has warned that it would immediately retaliate by launching nuclear missiles.** But predicting how Mr. Kim would actually respond to a limited attack is an exercise in strategic game theory, with many analysts arguing that he would refrain from immediately going nuclear or using his stockpile of chemical and biological weapons to avoid provoking a nuclear response from the United States.

### Military Coup Cards

#### Elites will rise up and kill Kim. Bennett 15:

Mariella - citing Bruce Bennett, senior defense analyst @ Rand in NEA military issues Mariella, "What will happen in North Korea Collapses," www.smmirror.com/articles/News/What-Will-Happen-If-North-Korea-Collapses/44454

**North Korea is a time bomb**. That was the thesis behind Dr. Bruce Bennett’s talk at the weekly Rotary of Santa Monica meeting Friday, Oct. 23. Bennett, a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation and an expert in Northeast Asian military issues, offered an introduction to Rotarians about preparing for the possibility of a North Korean collapse. He painted a surreal portrait of a post-Kim Jong-Un world – one with famine, infighting, and nuclear and biological warfare. “The collapse of North Korea has been rumored for decades,” Bennett said. “**But you never had a leader like you have** in North Korea **now**. This is a person who has done his best to offend his elites.” To put the current North Korean dictator in context, Bennett said that his predecessor and father, Kim Jong-Il, had changed his defense minister three times in 17 years, two of which died of old age. **Kim Jon-Un has changed his defense minister five times in less than four years. This, coupled with sociopathic brutality of well-known** purges **and gentle executions**, typifies a paranoid despot. “And as a result, I believe that sometime in the not-too-distant future, a number of years probably, we will see a change in the government in North Korea. You can’t project because sooner or later – I think – **some member of his elite is going to kill him**. And then we are going to have a change,” he said. The country runs on a hierarchy with Kim Jong-Un, the current leader, at the very top, Bennett explained. “A 32-year-old – roughly speaking, we don’t know for sure – he has then a variety of people below him. His security has gone up considerably after his father. **He’s feeling the threats**,” Bennett said. He said the real game changer came when Kim Jong-Un pulled his uncle out of the number two spot within the pecking order, making that role a veritable death sentence. “It wasn’t immediate; it would be in a matter of three of five years. But you and your family and your extended family were likely going to be exterminated,” he said. **With a race to the top after Kim Jong-Un, the political and military elite will likely suffer dissension**. “So, we anticipate that some combination of factions develop. This is just one guess. But if it does, **you’re going to expect civil** **war**. If that happens, **the all-ready terrible food situation in North Korea will get worse**. And as a result, sooner or later South Korea is going to decide if they’ve got to intervene. There is just no choice. They can’t let their ethnic brothers suffer,” he said. Once this happens, though, the Chinese will also intervene. “The Bank of Korea has projected that in a collapse of North Korea, roughly three million North Koreans out of a total 24 million population would make their way into South Korea over time,” Bennett explained. “Given where the population lives, that means about five million head towards China. And they want something less of zero of those people living in China because they worry about the disruptive affect they would have. And so China will intervene to deal with that and other issues.” **For a country with a disastrous economy, dilapidated industry, and antiquated infrastructure**, Bennett predicted that **once infighting happens, the North Koreans would starve as a result.**

### Solvency Cards

### Interoperability Cards

## Part 2: Paraphrased Version

### Lay Lewis Special

Because we believe in protecting innocent civilians, we affirm the resolution Resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea’s best interest.

We observe that this resolution asks if deployment of all anti-missile systems, both current and future are in South Korea’s best interest as the United States has already deployed THAAD.

Our sole contention is Winter is Coming.

There are 4 reasons for why South Korea would be the victim of a North Korean attack.

First is North Korean collapse.

Christopher Hill, former Secretary of State, writes that North Korea’s collapse is inevitable. Kim has killed dozens of top officials in order to maintain power. The economy is in shambles and Kim’s refusal to give up its nuclear weapons has made it lose allies. Foreign Correspondent, Julian Ryall continues that North Korean citizens are growing aware of life outside and see that North Korea has lied to them. Consequently, defectors and dissent have increased. In fact, North Korea’s ambassador who defected this year said that North Korea is on a downward spiral and on the verge of collapse.

Bruce Bennett of RAND writes in 13 that when Kim senses that North Korea is about to collapse, he may attack South Korea in an attempt to divert attention away.

The second is South Korea.

[Bruce Klinger of the Heritage Foundation](http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense) writes that if missile defense is not deployed, South Korea will be entirely reliant on preemptive strikes.

[Choe Sang-Hun of the New York Times](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/04/world/asia/north-korea-missile-test-icbm.html?mcubz=0) corroborates that North Korean missile tests significantly increase tensions on the peninsula, and combined with the fact that South Korea has [massive intelligence vulnerabilities](https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/korean-peninsula/risks-intelligence-pathologies-south-korea), the chance of a miscalculation is enormous.

In addition, Washington Post writes last month that in response to North Korean aggression, South Korea has been modernizing its decapitation squad and would use it if feeling extremely threatened. However, it concludes that this might lead to strikes against South Korea.

Bernie Berkowitz of the Washington Post writes in 2017 in a renewed conflict, North Korea would attack US military bases in South Korea.

Third is a North Korean military coup. Bruce Bennett of RAND writes in 15 that Kim Jong Un has had to kill dozens of senior officials. He finds that sooner or later, elites will rise up and kill him. However, he concludes that the result would be a civil war. Harry Kazianis of the National Interest writes in 2017 that a civil war would result in missile and nuclear launches against South Korea.

Fourth is a North Korea strike. NATO Commander Stavridis writes 2 days ago that the chances of a conflict were up to 30%. In addition, North Korea has threatened to shoot down US bombers flying close to its border, meaning that even an accident would likely start a war.

However, 4 anti-missile systems would protect South Korea.

First is Patriot. South Korea has deployed PAC-3s or Patriot. According to Alex Hempel in 2016, PAC-3 has been extensively combat tested and has had a 100% success rate recently. Furthermore, Sydney Freedberg writes this year that PAC-3 MSE is being deployed which can take down, ballistic missiles and artillery. MSE has double the range and a more powerful motor.

Second is Aegis. Brad Lendon writes in 2017 that Aegis ships protecting South Korea that can track and take down 100 missiles at the same time.

Third is THAAD. Bruce Klinger of the Heritage Foundation writes in 2015 that THAAD is the most advanced missile defense system as shown by its 100% success rate in tests by the US military. It intercepts at high altitudes in order to prevent harm. Chris Buckley furthers in 2017 that THAAD can distinguish between real missiles and decoys. Steve Mollman writes last week that South Korea has agreed to allow the US to deploy 6 THAAD batteries, the most of any nation on earth.

Fourth is Iron Dome. Azriel Bermant writes this month that South Korea has expressed interest to acquire Iron Dome from Israel. Melman 13 continues that Iron dome experienced 85% success in over 4000 attacks and can shoot down **artillery and rockets**.

Michael Elleman finds that a North Korea attack would only consist of only 50 missiles due to a lack of equipment and men, meaning that these systems would be able to stop an attack.

Even if these systems are not perfect, they can be combined. Lendon continues that THAAD’s radar would send data to Aegis and Patriot, allowing them to make the intercept in case THAAD fails and gives them early warning. Kazianis of the National Interest furthers in 2017 that this connection closes all gaps in South Korea’s defense.

This is critical as Professor Hayes of Victor University finds that even a limited war in the region would kill hundreds of millions of people.

Because we believe in protecting South Korea, we urge you to vote pro.

## Part 3: Weighing

### Contention Level Weighing

**Deterrence outweighs and turns case:**

**Magnitude---Korean nuclear exchange or missile attack causes mass casualties and brings the potential for an all-out war killing hundreds of millions. That’s Hayes.**

**Timeframe---preemptive North Korean or US strike is fast and happens almost immediately—could happen tomorrow, while denuclearization and diplomacy takes years to work without guarantee of success**

**Probability---Conflict escalation isn’t possible in a world where we can shoot down every missile---if we win this, war will only happen when you vote con.**

**Timeframe first---you can only die once---there’s only a chance we can solve their impacts AFTER we’ve defended ourselves from Korean nukes---other arguments don’t matter if we die.**

## Part 4: Preempts/Frontlines

## Preempts

### AT: Tests Flawed

#### They’re going to come up here and say tests are flawed

### AT: Mass Raids

#### They’re going to say that missile defense will be overwhelmed. However, remember Elleman which states how a potential attack will only include 50 missiles meaning that a single missile defense like Aegis could stop it, but we give you 3 other defenses that also can assist.

## Generic ATs

### AT: Negotiations with NK Solves

#### Negotiations with the North are impossible, containment is the only way to prevent war on the peninsula.

Mazza 16 - research fellow in foreign and defense policy studies @ AEI, specializes in East Asian Affairs  
Michael, "What to do about Kim Jong-Un," www.aei.org/publication/what-to-do-about-kim-jong-un/

To be clear, **Kim** Jong-un **will never commit to denuclearization nor** to peace and **stability** on the peninsula. To do so would be antithetical to the regime’s very nature. Writing recently for National Review, my colleague Nicholas Eberstadt described the North’s “essentially messianic—and unapologetically racialist—vision of history.” In that vision, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) will unite the Korean people, throw out foreign invaders, and establish DPRK rule over the peninsula. **Nuclear weapons**, then, **are not simply a deterrent but a tool by which to achieve unification**. And **for Pyongyang to genuinely commit to peace and stability on the peninsula would be to abandon the regime’s animating vision. Kim can sacrifice neither and expect to maintain the support of elites or the legitimacy of his rule. The North Koreans have enshrined their status as a nuclear power** in the constitution **and have repeatedly said they will never bargain away their nuclear weapons. There is little reason to believe that is simply a negotiating ploy.** Recognizing that the regime is the problem leads to what may be an uncomfortable conclusion: **the U**nited **S**tates and its partners must contain North Korea in the near-term while pursuing a longer term policy of regime change. Since the latest nuclear and missile tests, the United States, South Korea, and Japan have all imposed strong, unilateral sanctions on North Korea. The United Nations Security Council has also weighed in with its strongest resolution yet; these international sanctions, if enforced—and that’s a big if—will have real bite. The United States must now move to completely cut the DPRK off from the international financial system as it did in 2005. Altogether, this tightening web of financial and trade sanctions will make it increasingly difficult for Pyongyang to access hard cash, which is necessary both to support nuclear and missile programs and to ensure elite cohesion in the North. The idea is not to bring North Korea to the bargaining table—though the allies should consider any offers from the North to negotiate over its nuclear program—but rather to starve its weapons programs of resources and to sow internal dissension within the regime. In addition to stronger sanctions, the United States and its partners should step up pressure on North Korea on the human rights front. The allies should pursue two simultaneous lines of effort. Internationally, they should apply unrelenting pressure on China to encourage it to live up to is international obligations: Beijing must treat North Koreans that flee across its border as political refugees and speed their way to South Korea rather than send them back to the North. The United States should, in addition, repeatedly call a UN Security Council vote on referring Kim Jong-un and his top lieutenants to The Hague for prosecution for crimes against humanity. Beijing will use its veto, but it may grow tired of repeatedly, publicly allying itself with the world’s most odious regime. At the same time, the allies should enhance their efforts to provide the North Korean people with access to reporting on the world at large, on life in South Korea, and on Kim Jong-un himself. Citizens and soldiers alike should know that while they tighten their belts, the Pyongyang elite feast on Russian caviar and French cheeses. It’s far past time for the Kim regime’s domestic legitimacy to be seriously challenged. Finally, **the U**nited **S**tates and South Korea **should invest more deeply in their own self-defense capabilities.** Talks over the deployment to the Republic of Korea of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (**THAAD**) system, which **would enhance the South’s defense against ballistic missile threats**, are a good start. At home, the United States should expand the number of ground-based interceptors while also investing in a next-generation GBI. North Korea is unlikely to ever host large numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles—against a limited threat, continental missile defense can and should be made nearly airtight. **American and South Korean investments in defenses can turn North Korean missiles into wasting assets. The U.S.-ROK alliance should also take steps to further mitigate the Northern artillery threat, especially to the Seoul metropolitan area.** The first order of business is to identify and keep tabs on the thousands of artillery pieces beyond the Demilitarized Zone. The Korean People’s Army should have little doubt of the alliance’s ability to identify, track, and target the field guns that effectively allow North Korea to hold millions of South Koreans hostage. **Washington and Seoul should also make defense against incoming rounds a priority;** in this regard, the U.S. Army’s High Energy Laser Mobile Demonstrator is a promising technology. The steps described above may not bring stability to the Korean Peninsula in the near term. Indeed, the first two lines of effort are designed to sow instability in the North. But **the quest for stability is a mirage, and one that cedes the initiative to Pyongyang, which has opted to destabilize the peninsula at times of its choosing while putting the onus for escalation control on the allies.** Going forward, **the allies must be far more proactive in shaping the peninsula’s security environment. Just how the Kim regime will fall remains difficult to discern, but there is a clear moral and strategic imperative to hasten its collapse.** Unification under the Republic of Korea is the only way to ensure a nuclear-free, democratic, and flourishing Korean peninsula.

#### Negotiations with North Korea will Never Work—Containment is the only option. Vox Yesterday:

**There’s “no way to stop” Kim Jong Un’s regime and its missile and nuclear program**, a North Korea expert told Fox News on Thursday, the warning coming amid Pyongyang's continued threats to sink Japan and blast the U.S. “into ashes and darkness.” Leading Seoul-based North Korea expert Andrei Lankov told Fox News that **Kim** Jong Un **is accelerating his missile and nuclear program “much faster than anybody expected**.” “They want to get the point of having a sufficient number of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of destroying a sufficient number of American cities,” Lankov said. The expert expressed doubt about reining in North Korea’s trajectory in achieving its military goal, adding the use of any “military force” would send the peninsula into war. He said **sanctions and regional diplomacy wouldn’t work**, either. “I don’t think, **unfortunately, there is no way to stop them**,” Lankov said. “No way…A use of military force, but that would result in a second Korean war. That would be an absolute disaster.”

#### Only Containment works. Deptris 9/8/17:

**The only option the U.S. should pursue is deterrence and containment: keep the Jong-un regime inside of a box, leverage America's allies in Asia** in that effort, and make it crystal clear that pre-emption is official U.S. policy to deter the North Koreans from using nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles against American interests or our allies.

#### AFF is just True. Stewart 9/7/17:

President Donald Trump, like his predecessors, may find that **neither negotiations nor economic and military pressure can force North Korea to abandon its nuclear program**, and that **the United States has no choice but to try to contain it and deter North Korean leader Kim Jong Un** from ever using a nuclear weapon. North Korea conducted its sixth and most powerful nuclear test on Sept. 2, describing it as an advanced hydrogen bomb for a long-range missile, a dramatic escalation of its stand-off with the United States and its allies.

#### Diplomacy Will not Work—Evidence from 2 days ago. Costlow 9/28:

**Failure is an option**, especially when it comes to U.S. policy towards North Korea. **Decades of diplomatic efforts have failed** to de-nuclearize and pacify Kim Jong Un’s regime while parallel efforts to deter small-scale conventional and large-scale cyber-attacks have also failed.

## Framing Defense

### AT: Deployment Means Future

#### The United States has already deployed THAAD since when this topic was written and where we are now. Instead, we should be evaluating the situation and talking about whether or not the deployment of anti-missile systems are good or not. Otherwise, there is no point in debating this topic.

#### This is extremely unfair to the affirmative as the US has already deployed THAAD. This means that the negative would win every round since South Korea doesn’t have any plans to deploy a anti-missile system other than KAMD which is a small one.

### AT: Only THAAD

#### Resolution never states which anti-missile system. Also, THAAD directly connects all anti-missile systems, so we should be allowed to talk about them all.

## Frontlines

### AT: No NK First Strike

#### “Use it or lose it” mentality and weak command and control structures make North Korean first strike uniquely likely

O’neil 14

O'neil, Andrew. Andrew is Dean (Research) and Professor of Political Science in the Griffith Business School. Prior to being appointed Dean in April 2016, he was Head of the School of Government and International Relations (2014-2016) and Director of the Griffith Asia Institute (2010-2014). "Command Without Control? Nuclear Crisis Instability on the Korean Peninsula." Proquest. N.p., Spring 2014. Web. 9 July 2016. <http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1681110917/DF9944397C34E2BPQ/1?accountid=14667>.

Against this background, **there is a significant risk that North Korea will emulate the behavior of new nuclear weapons states. "Hard pressed by regional enemies who pose a credible threat of decapitation,"** Peter Feaver notes that new nuclear powers "**are likely to adopt a cheaper command and control solution: dispersal and delegation of the authority and ability to use nuclear weapons**."46 Historically, all nuclear powers have devoted comparatively modest resources to improving their command and control systems. Resources have typically been diverted to building up the "hardware" of weapons systems at the expense of command and control "software." Even the United States, at the height of the Cold War, chose to invest relatively little in making its command and control systems more robust in comparison to the massive scale of resources poured into developing warheads and ambitious nuclear delivery platforms.47 Ideas about "prevailing" against the Soviet Union in a "limited" nuclear war were questionable even if one assumed the seamlessness of command and control systems. The fact that U.S. systems were acutely vulnerable to collapse in the first hours of a nuclear exchange rendered fanciful any notion that nuclear war could somehow be controlled. In his pioneering work, Desmond Ball documented in detail the fragmented and poorly developed nature of NATO's nuclear command and control systems in the closing years of the Cold War.48 Given North Korea's severely strained economic circumstances and its stated commitment to building up the number of nuclear warheads and missile delivery systems in its arsenal, it will have limited resources to invest seriously in systems that reliably coordinate and manage nuclear forces. This focus on hardware at the expense of software will incur few costs in peacetime, when concerns about the potential for preventive attacks on the part of the U.S. and its allies are low. However, in a context where the perceived prospect of a first strike is increasing as tensions escalate, **Pyongyang may be tempted to configure nuclear forces according to a "use it or lose it" logic. This could promote an irresistible incentive for North Korea to strike first in a deepening crisis based on "a fear that if it does not strike first, it will not be able to strike at all, that its forces may be so vulnerable that they could be destroyed or immobilized by the other's attack."49 Any attempt by the regime to disperse its nuclear forces during a crisis may be read by Washington as a deployment in readiness for a first strike which could, in turn, promote an incentive for the U.S. to strike first. The overall point to emphasise is that North Korea's underdeveloped command and control capabilities will serve to accentuate crisis instability by encouraging first strike options.** Recognizing its vulnerability to a disarming first strike, if the regime in Pyongyang assesses war as inevitable, it may rationally calculate that it makes little sense holding back from using its most

#### Korean conflict is coming now – nuclear deterrence fails

**Chung 10** – Visiting Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Relations (RSIS), Nanayang Technological University (Chong Wook, 2010, “The Korean Crisis: Going Beyond the Cheonan Incident,” http://www.cfr.org/publication/22205/us\_policy\_toward\_the\_korean\_peninsula.html)

After a month-long investigation, **the Seoul government announced that the ship was hit by a torpedo launched from a North Korean submarine**. The evidence it produced included the tail part of the torpedo recovered from the bottom of the sea where the ship sank. **President Lee** Myung-bak, demanding the North's apology, **announced a series of measures suspending all inter-Korea cooperation** except in the humanitarian area. **North Korea**, which earlier denied its involvement, **immediately cut off almost all land, air and sea lines of communications with the South. It warned that any violation was to be dealt with by the wartime laws. It also placed its armed forces on special alert.** **The two Koreas appear to be heading for a serious military confrontation. Another factor that adds to the severity of the current crisis is the nuclear capability of the North.** Pyongyan is believed to have fissionable materials enough for up to ten plutonium bombs. **Its** two **nuclear tests** **so far reinforced the possibility of all-out military flare-up involving nuclear weapons. The nuclear logic could certainly apply for deterring a war, but North Korea has proven that the rational logic of deterrence may not necessarily hold**. Such is the risk of dealing with a desperate country whose brinkmanship tactics often defy the strategic calculus of its neighbors. The drastic decline in the South Korean stock market is indicative of how the situation is perceived. Despite all these ominous developments, however, premature pessimism is not advisable.

### AT: No Regime Collapse

#### North Korea collapse inevitable

**Gobry 15**(Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry-fellow Ethics and Public Policy Center, “Why North Korea's collapse is inevitable”, <http://theweek.com/articles/572913/why-north-koreas-collapse-inevitable> , August 21, 2015, N.G.)

**The world is rightly abuzz with the news that South Korea and North Korea exchanged artillery fire this week.** The decades-old conflict in the Korean Peninsula remains one of the world's major flashpoints, and North Korea is easily the world's most demonic regime (unless you count ISIS as a regime). **The conflict** is largely seen in terms of geopolitics, but it **would really make more sense to look at it from the** **perspective of North Korea's domestic politics**. **Totalitarian regimes are mostly driven either by ideology or internal politics**, not realpolitik as much. Nazi ideology was a better predictor of Germany's actions under the Third Reich than realpolitik considerations (which was the great mistake that both Neville Chamberlain and Joseph Stalin made in their dealings with Hitler). In this case, **North Korea's reigning ideology** — Juche, **a combination of communism, mercantilism, and racism** — doesn't tell us much. What we do know is that **Kim Jong Un is probably a weak leader, and is acting to shore up his support.** **Even on its best days, the regime teeters on the brink of collapse,** simply because **most of its people are starving and unhappy. It would take only a tiny push for the straightjacket of terror that keeps the regime together to fall apart**, for enough people to become more hungry than scared, and for enough regime thugs and mid-level officers to say, "No, not this time, we won't pull the trigger." **The regime's attempt to black out all outside information has been showing cracks**. Cell phones and DVDs (and probably Bibles) are streaming in from the Chinese border, where guards are easily bribed. This contraband is showing an increasing number of North Koreans that another way of life is possible. **Various market-driven "reforms,"** while improving the lot of a few ordinary North Koreans, also **highlight the regime's dons for what they are: corrupt kleptocrats, businessmen with guns. It's against this backdrop that we need to look at the regime's recent actions. Everything suggests that Kim Jong Un feels himself to be in a position of weakness**. He was allowed to succeed his father basically because the alternative was civil war and regime collapse. He needs a power base, and that means the military, and especially the more hardcore elements in the military. Hence the purging of Hyon Yong Chol, the grown-up in charge who probably thought the young Kim would be his puppet. Hyon was a military man's military man — formerly in charge of the regime's all-important nuclear program — but he was also close to the Chinese and (as far as we can tell given the murkiness of the regime) an advocate of mostly letting sleeping dogs lie. **Stirring up trouble abroad to shore up the base at home is the oldest trick in the tyrant's book**, and there seems to be little alternative explanation to the artillery strikes. North Korea feeds itself two ways: Chinese aid, and nuclear blackmail against the West and South Korea. Purging Hyon alienated the Chinese, so now it's back to Plan B, a replay of Kim Jong Il's breakneck nuclear program in the 1990s that irked the Chinese. He played the Clinton administration for suckers, extorting food aid in exchange for nuclear promises never kept. (You would think a Democratic administration would learn the lesson of listening to a tyrannical regime's nuclear promises — but that's a subject for another day.) So as we look at what is happening in the Korean Peninsula, **the main question shouldn't be about balance of power, but about what we do** when **the North Korean regime collapses. Because** **it's certainly not a matter of if, but when.**

### AT: No US Preemptive Strike

#### Trump paints critics as unpatriotic. Menon 17:

**Trump wouldn’t be the first leader, confronted with trouble at home, to trigger a crisis** abroad and **then appeal for unity and paint critics as unpatriotic**. Keep in mind, after all, that **this is the man who has already warned of “a major, major war” with North Korea.**

#### Historical Precedents Prove. Tierney 17:

In the summer of 1998, **at the height of the Monica Lewinsky scandal**, Bill Clinton confessed on television that his romantic relationship with a White House intern amounted to “a critical lapse in judgment ... a personal failure.” Three days later, **with his presidency hanging in the balance, the administration announced airstrikes** against suspected terrorist sites in Sudan and Afghanistan, following the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Many observers claimed that **Clinton had launched a classic diversionary war, or a use of force to sidetrack the media**, whip up patriotic sentiment, **and boost approval ratings**. One journalist asked Secretary of Defense William Cohen if he had seen the 1997 movie Wag the Dog, in which the White House fabricates a war to distract attention from the president’s dalliance with a young girl. Cohen said the only goal of the strikes, “was our absolute obligation to protect the American people from terrorist activities.” Today, **some critics claim that Donald Trump will** adopt a version of the Wag the Dog strategy, and **launch an actual major conflict to deflect attention** from the growing Russia scandal. In the Daily Beast, Michael Tomasky outlined a number of dangerous scenarios for a “caged and cornered animal” like Trump, the first being **that he “tries to start a war,” perhaps against North Korea**. Distraction is indeed at the core of Trump’s foreign policy—but its role is far more subtle and broadly applied.

#### Also, strikes boost approval ratings. Tierney 17 [2]:

The most tempting use of force may be a seemingly manageable, but still dazzling, kinetic operation, like a missile strike or a raid to kill terrorist leaders. Another option would be to escalate a crisis where an easy win seems available: The key is to find the right enemy, one that’s both widely hated and too weak to fight back. After all, there’s a well-established “rally ‘round the flag” effect, where **almost any military crisis temporarily juices the president’s approval ratings. In the wake of Clinton’s airstrikes** in 1998, one poll found that **68 percent of Americans approved of his foreign policy**. Republican House Speaker Newt Gingrich said, “it was the right thing to do at the right time.

### AT: No Military Coup

### AT: THAAD Sucks—Generic Solvency Dump

**Only THAAD solves North Korean missile threats---**

**1) Mass and mix---effective missile defense needs a combination of assets---squo defenses result in coverage gaps and small protected zones which make North attacks simple and guarantee failure**

**2) Low altitude interceptors---squo defenses, even if they work, result in mass casualties because they intercept missiles too close to targets to solve**

**3) Empirics---it’s got 100% success rate in tests---outewighs any imagined, theoretical issues---that’s the Klinger evidence**

**That’s Klingner---prefer it because it cites consensus of top US and Korean military leaders who are most informed on Korean military policy**

**Only THAAD contains the advanced sensor system necessary to shut down North Korean threats---solves North Korean countermeasures**

**Weitz 15** – Richard Weitz, Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute, 1-5-2015, “Avoiding Ballistic Blindness”, Hudson Institute, http://www.hudson.org/research/10917-avoiding-ballistic-blindness

Although these are important issues, an emergent requirement will be to field sufficient numbers of radars and other sensors to support these ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems. Indeed, **without adequate sensor coverage to detect and track missile threats, interceptors will be** flying **blind and** rendered **useless. The U**nited **S**tates **relies on sensors for** such essential roles as **searching, acquiring, detecting and tracking ballistic missiles, as well as discriminating between warheads and decoys**. In effect, radars play **a critical role in** warning that a missile has been launched, **tracking** and establishing the missile’s path, guiding the interceptor to the warhead and verifying its destruction. To achieve comprehensive and flexible missile defense coverage, **the U**nited **S**tates **needs** several **layers of sensors**. Whether deployed in the United States, **on foreign soil**, at sea or in space, **sensors** can **share tracking** and fire-control **data** with each other as well as missile shooters. **Having several types** of sensors is important. They **increase** the defender’s **confidence** in being able to detect **and** intercept incoming missiles, **reduce the risk** that one type **of** sensor will experience a major **technical flaw and decrease the effectiveness of** an adversary’s **countermeasures**. In particular, a dense network of interlocking sensors could help the ‘kill vehicles’ discriminate between incoming warheads and other nearby objects, such as missile debris and decoys. In this regard, the Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control (AN/TPY-2) plays a critical role. The AN/TPY-2 is an **X-band**, phased array, high-resolution radar that is capable of detecting small objects such as ballistic missiles at a range of more than 4,000 kilometers. The radar can be used in either the forward-based mode or the terminal mode. In the first case, the forward-deployed AN/TPY-2 cues various U.S. BMD systems by detecting, discriminating and tracking enemy ballistic missiles as early as their ascent phase of flight. For example, the radar can supply fire-control data to ship-based Aegis missile defense systems found in the U.S. and other navies. Moreover, the radar coverage provided by forward-based AN/TPY-2s **is more powerful than** that on **Aegis**-equipped ships. Thus, the radar can enhance the performance of those vessels. In terminal mode, the AN/TPY-2 **provides the fire-control** radar **for** the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (**THAAD**) system, a globally transportable weapon that intercepts short, medium and intermediate ballistic missiles inside or outside the atmosphere during their final phase of flight. The THAAD combines the AN/TPY-2 radar with interceptor missiles, a truck-mounted launcher and an integrated fire control system. THAAD is one of the most reliable systems in the U.S. inventory. Since 2005, the THAAD program has successfully completed 12 flight tests with 11-for-11 intercepts. The United States presently has four THAAD batteries. The AN/TPY-2 radars and THAAD batteries provide the Army with flexible missile defense capabilities that can be deployed to land sites in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Other U.S. AN/TPY-2s operate in the independent, forward-based mode in support of U.S. allies, including two in Japan. On Oct. 13, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) received its tenth AN/TPY-2. This radar will be integrated into the U.S. Army’s fifth THAAD defense battery, which will be delivered in 2015. Separately, a sixth battery is scheduled to be delivered in 2016. Despite these upcoming acquisitions, the number of AN/TPY-2 radars available to the United States is inadequate. The MDA originally intended to buy 18 AN/TPY-2 systems, but the number of planned purchases has since fallen to 12. Those six **[THAAD] systems are crucial for the protection of** both U.S. forces deployed abroad and friendly countries such as Israel and South **Korea**. The Congress and the executive branch also need to expand efforts to sell more BMD radars to U.S. foreign friends and allies in order to keep production running after the U.S. orders are complete. If the production facilities are shut down, it could take months and billions of dollars to restart them—and we know from recent experience that missile threats can emerge with little warning. On Oct. 27, U.S. Army General Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, warned that North Korea is in the process of mastering the miniaturization technology required to place a nuclear warhead on a mobile ballistic missile. Effectively, this means that North Korea could soon have the ability to launch a nuclear strike, without visible preparations, against U.S. forces in South Korea, Japan, Guam, Hawaii and eventually the continental United States. The only sensor system now available that can counter the immediate regional threat is the AN/TPY-2. The new Congress must keep in mind the imperative of funding BMD sensors as well as shooters. At a time of persistent budget challenges, better sensors substantially improve the effectiveness of existing interceptors at a much lower cost than buying more or developing newer interceptors.

**Enables allied interoperability---key to accuracy, response time, and expertise**

**Klingner 15** – Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center, 6-12-2015, “South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense”, Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/06/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense

Need for Allied BMD Interoperability **Missile defense is most effective when** systems are **incorporated into a seamless and cohesive network. Linking** South **Korean, U.S., and Japanese sensors would enable** more **accurate interceptions** by tracking attacking missiles **from multiple angles and multiple points** throughout the flight trajectory, similar to three outfielders communicating with each other to coordinate catching a fly ball. In the instance of multiple inbound targets, **interoperability would allow directing an** individual outfielder (or **BMD** system) **to specific targets** to enhance success. South Korea, Japan, and U.S. forces in both countries face a common threat from North Korean missiles. Map 1 shows how military bases of all three countries are aligned along a common azimuth and can be threatened by a single North Korean missile. A common threat should be addressed with an interoperable, multilateral defense. As General B. B. Bell (ret.) explained at a 2014 Heritage Foundation event: **If each allied country is making its own assessments and** developing its own **attack response decisions**—decisions which are required in seconds and even milleseconds—effective theater missile **defense will have large gaps, decision inadequacies, training shortfalls, and** stunningly **dangerous procurement shortfalls**.[22] Bell therefore advocates an integrated **joint** and **combined missile defense control capability to detect, track, sort, prioritize and allocate** tactical, regional, and medium range missile defense systems **against multiple simultaneous** atmospheric supersonic North Korean inbound **missiles. Allied** land and sea-based **radars must be fully interoperable and provide a single headquarters with a clear picture, tracking data, and likely** terminal **targets** for enemy airborne missiles, then the headquarters must allocate appropriate land and sea-based interceptor capability to defeat the attacks. Much of this must be done **so quickly that only a unified response center can make the appropriate decisions**.[23]

**THAAD makes North Korean threats a non-factor---military consensus**

**Baroudos 16** – Constance Baroudos, Vice President of the Lexington Institute, M.A. in political science, 2-16-2016, “U.S. Needs To Protect Itself From North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions”, Lexington Institute, http://lexingtoninstitute.org/u-s-needs-to-protect-itself-from-north-koreas-nuclear-ambitions/

Recently, North Korea claimed to have tested a fusion weapon – very unlikely due to the low recorded seismic activity – and launched its sixth long-range rocket that placed a satellite into orbit. Congressman Mac Thornberry, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, is correct that South **Korea needs** the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (**THAAD**) and America must boost homeland missile defense and modernize its nuclear deterrent for protection. Policy leaders should take the chairman’s recommendations seriously to ensure U.S. allies and citizens are safe from potential harm. THAAD uses a radar to detect and target incoming missile threats. **The system** then fires an interceptor from a truck-mounted launcher and kinetic energy **destroys short- and medium-range missiles in** the **terminal** stage of **flight. THAAD is considered one of the most advanced missile-defense** systems – **it** has **successfully completed 100 percent of tests since 2005**. This is why America deployed a THAAD unit to Guam to deter aggression from Pyongyang and defend the Pacific region. General Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, has specifically recommended the system to protect Seoul from Chinese and North Korean threats – **the system can counter** some threats from Beijing and just about **all threats from Pyongyang. Right now, the U.S. has limited protection** from intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) carrying nuclear, chemical, biological or conventional warheads with the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System. The GMD launches ground-based interceptors (GBIs) to destroy incoming missiles in space from sites located in Alaska and California. Vice Admiral James D. Syring, Director, U.S. Missile Defense Agency, stated at a recent event in Washington that GBIs will increase to 37 interceptors in 2016 and 44 interceptors in 2017. While GMD has received criticism due to high costs and uneven success of flight tests, the system needs upgrades and more testing to increase reliability and effectiveness.

**AT: THAAD Can’t Target Short-Range Missiles**

**THAAD’s most effective against short range missiles---extensive testing proves**

**Lyon, 16** – Rod Lyon, 2-23-2016, “The Hard Truth about THAAD, South Korea and China”, National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-hard-truth-about-thaad-south-korea-china-15295

Two **misperceptions** seem to **have crept into the media debate on this topic**, however. **Some argue**, for example, that **THAAD is optimized for interception of medium- and intermediate-range missiles and is “of little or no use” against short-range missiles**. They use that argument to support a second: that deployment of a THAAD battery and its associated radar in South Korea is actually a move that advantages the United States against China, rather than South Korea against North Korea. Let’s start with **THAAD’s abilities**. Its manufacturer describes it as a “capability to **defend against short and medium ranged ballistic missiles**.” And **a quick look at** **the THAAD flight test results shows that** **the bulk of its testing has been against short-range targets**. Here’s a video of the November **2015 test** in which **THAAD intercepts both a short-range missile and a medium-range one.** By contrast, it’s largely unproven against longer-range threats such as intermediate-range ballistic missiles. In essence, then, **THAAD is** **quite capable of intercepting short-range missiles**: **indeed, its mobile radar, the AN/TPY-2, can provide end-to-end coverage of short-range missile flights**, **enhancing** **the** **prospects for successful interception**.

### AT: Tests Rigged

#### THAAD successfully completed two tests from the United States government. These were not rigged and THAAD operators did not know the details of the launch and were operating under war-time conditions.

#### Tests are pretty accurate of actual percentage—past examples like Patriot and Iron Dome prove.

### AT: Decoys

#### Can distinguish between decoys. Buckley 17:

Deploying **Thaad’s current radar system** “would undermine China’s nuclear deterrence by collecting important data on Chinese nuclear warheads,” Li Bin, a nuclear weapons expert at Tsinghua University in Beijing, [wrote last week](http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/2017/0306/14759.html). He and other Chinese experts say the radar **could identify which** Chinese **missiles are carrying decoy warheads** intended to outfox foes. That would be like being able to see what cards China holds in a nuclear poker game, and that could weaken China’s deterrent, they say.

### AT: Overwhelm THAAD

#### THAAD is just one aspect of anti-missile defense—Aegis can take down 100. Lendon 17:

The guided missile destroyers, USS Stethem and USS McCampbell, are equipped with the **Aegis ballistic missile defense system**, which **is able to track 100 missiles simultaneously and fire interceptors to take out an enemy's ballistic projectiles**.

#### Protects Against All Threats and Mass Raids. Kazianis 17:

THAAD is a key element of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) and is designed to defend U.S. troops, allied forces, population centers and critical infrastructure against short-thru-medium-range ballistic missiles. THAAD has a unique capability to destroy threats in both the endo- and exo-atmosphere using proven hit-to-kill (kinetic energy) lethality. **THAAD is effective against all types of ballistic-missile warheads**, especially including Weapons of Mass Destruction (**chemical, nuclear or biological**) payloads. **THAAD was specifically designed to counter mass raids with its high firepower** (up to **72 Interceptors per battery**), capable yorganic radar and powerful battle manager/fire control capability. **THAAD is interoperable with other BMDS elements, working in concert with Patriot/PAC-3, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, forward based sensors**, and C2BMC (Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications System) to maximize integrated air and missile defense capabilities. THAAD is mobile and rapidly deployable, which provides warfighters with greater flexibility to adapt to changing threat situations around the globe.

#### Since the US is going to deploy 6 batteries in South Korea, this means that THAAD can destroy over 400 missiles without having to rearm. North Korea can only launch up to 50 at a time. That’s the Elleman 17 evidence.

### AT: Artillery

#### Iron Dome solves artillery—high success rate. Opall-Rome 16:

The Rafael executive also noted that in tests, **Iron Dome destroyed salvos of artillery shells** and "multiple" PGMs similar to those of the US Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). "If someone tries to launch a JDAM at you and you have **Iron Dome** protecting a forward operating base, you can take out that JDAM," he said. "What we've done in tests, which most people don't know, is we've **destroyed salvos of artillery shells. These are really difficult to destroy because they are so thick and you have to penetrate the metal casings** before you get to the warhead. But we did it. **We whacked artillery shells with Iron Dome**."

#### North Korea can’t reach THAAD---artillery range is too limited

Korea Times, 7-14 – The Korea Times, 7-14-2016, “Experts divided over THAAD's effectiveness in countering N.K. missiles”, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/07/205\_209398.html

**Experts said that the selection of the southern county would** also **make it [would be] difficult for North Korea to target** the **THAAD** battery **with** its new high-caliber multiple **rocket launchers. With a range of 200 km**, the 300-mm-caliber multiple rocket **launchers** have large areas of South Korea within their range, but **cannot reach Seongju**. (Yonhap)

#### Can’t launch all at once—multiple barriers and low effectiveness. Rei 17:

The above map shows the range of various types of North Korean artillery fired from the closest point on the DMZ. It quickly becomes clear that the vast majority of them aren’t actually in range of Seoul itself. **Only the M-1978** (since modified to the M-1989) actually **is [in range of Seoul]. This is a large**, rather unwieldy **system with a low rate of fire,** [**one to two rounds per five minutes**](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/seoul-imagery-artillery.htm)**. North Korea** [**only has around 400-500 of these systems**](http://militaryedge.org/armaments/170mm-m1989-koksan/). Various smaller cities are in range of some of the lesser systems but not densely-packed Seoul itself. How well can these situations actually hit? We can look at the best case for North Korean artillery: [the attack on Yeonpyeong island](https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/satellite-imagery-tactical-details-korean-artillery-exchange). This attack was planned out long in advance, by North Korea’s best troops, and was a preemptive strike on their part. The **North Koreans fired 170 rounds. Only 80 even hit** the island. **Of those, a whole quarter** (20) **failed to detonate,** suggesting quality control or storage problems. **The timing of the attacks suggest a well trained artillery corps involved,** but with poor equipment. Of the 60 that detonated, the locations hit suggest outdated maps on North Korea’s part. Four were killed and 19 wounded, primarily due to a lucky hit on a barracks. Only two South Korean guns (of six) were hit. Next up comes positioning: **not all North Korean artillery is positioned at the closest possible point** to Seoul. This salient is rather narrow, flat, and an easy target to quickly overrun In the event of a preemptive strike, air power — and ground power — would focus heavily on the immediate neutralization of this location. **North Korea** is well aware of this and **has not focused all of their equipment on this location**. Additionally, they have a whole border to defend, and other South Korean targets scattered along the border that are more important or easier to hit than random inaccurate hits on Seoul. **The US and South Korea have additionally spent decades working on how to deal with the North Korean artillery** threat, whether as a preemptive or responsive strike. Known as [OPLAN 5015](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5015.htm), **all known targets** (which extensive effort has been focused on identifying and monitoring) **are immediately shelled, while counter-battery radar is used to quickly locate and neutralize undetected targets**. While “digging in”, which North Korea has used extensively, offers protection to artillery pieces, modern precision shelling and penetrating munitions have significantly reduced its effectiveness.

#### This means that at best if North Korea has all artillery shells lined up and fire at once, only 400 shots are fired in the first 5 minutes and only 200 will hit and out of those 50 will not explode, leaving 150 shells left.

#### North Korea will not take this strategy since they will immediately be counter-attacked and all North Korean artillery pieces will be destroyed.

#### More Problems with NK artillery. Cavazos 12:

Numbers – Even though KPA has a tremendous number of artillery pieces, only a certain number are emplaced to range Seoul. KPA can’t emplace every weapon near Seoul or the rest of North Korea’s expansive border would be unguarded and even more vulnerable. Moreover, **an artillery tube immediately reveals its location as soon as it fires**. Therefore **only** about **two-thirds of artillery will open fire at a time**. The rest are trying to remain hidden; Protection – **Artillery shelters for twenty million people exist** in the greater Seoul metropolitan area. After the initial surprise has worn off, **there simply won’t be large numbers of exposed people**. Even **during the initial attack the vast majority of people will either be at work, at home, or in transit. Few people will be** standing in the middle of an open field **with no protection** whatsoever available anywhere nearby. Logistics – **in order to move south from the DMZ** trace **and place** the rest of **Seoul at risk, KPA must expose approximately 2,500** thin-skinned **vehicles each day along** three **well-defined transportation corridors. Otherwise, KPA grinds to an almost immediate halt** **without a way to transport fuel, ammunition and spare parts needed** to continue moving south. Alternatively, KPA can scavenge from ROK fuel stores and depots if they have not been previously destroyed.

#### In addition to above implications, this means AT MAX only around 250 artillery shells (NOT EVEN THAT SINCE THEY ARE NOT ALL AT THE BORDER) will actually fire before getting counter-attacked. This means that around 100 shells will land and 25 won’t explode. Last time, North Korea hit 80 shells at a target, 4 people died. And they are gonna get wrecked by US and South Korean artillery. Kim played himself.

### AT: THAAD Breaks SK-US Alliance

#### South Korea wants THAAD in squo—not deploying breaks the alliance. Yonhap 8/3/17:

**South Korea plans to deploy additional units of** the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (**THAAD**) system **regardless of an on-going environmental impact test** on its deployment site, the defense ministry said Thursday. "The conclusion of the small-scale environmental effect assessment and the initiation of temporary deployment are not in a cause-and-effect relationship," Moon Sang-gyun, spokesman at the Ministry of National Defense said in a press briefing. "They will go separately." **Moon's remarks suggest the deployment could begin before the environment** ministry's **review is finished**. "The **deployment of four additional THAAD launchers will be pursued** after consultations are done between South Korea and the U.S.," he added. Since the first two of the total six interceptor missile launchers of a THAAD battery earlier in the year, President Moon Jae-in ordered another, larger-scale environmental effect assessment on the deployment site in Seongju, some 300 kilometers southeast of Seoul, putting the deployment of the remaining launchers on hold.

### AT: THAAD Breaks Sino-SK Relations

#### Turn: THAAD Cements Alliance.

Kim 16 – Kim Sang Soon, President of the East Asia Peace Research Association, 7-12-2016, “Can THAAD unite China and South Korea on peninsula strategy?”, The Daily NK, http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk03600&amp;num=13984

The South Korea-China relationship has been fantastically successful in terms of social exchanges and economic activity over the past 20 years. With regards to political diplomacy, the personal trust built up between South Korean President Park Geun Hye and Chinese President Xi Jinping has raised the trust level between the two countries in general. Therefore, **the installation of THAAD will inflict a short term bruise on the relationship, but** in the medium to long term, the possibility that this will evolve into a larger conflict is remote. This author sees the South Korea-China relationship as one on the brink of an era of mature strategic cooperation. It is true that the THAAD decision has caused deep doubts on the Chinese side. Rather than worrying about how the THAAD installation will sever or terminate relations, **we need to be more concerned about how the strategic relationship between the two countries will** evolve **as a result of** the THAAD development. China’s ambiguous approach to the peninsula is being put to the test by the THAAD emplacement. **Compared to South Korea, China has been relatively loose on the matter of denuclearizing the peninsula. The question is: will their increased seriousness on the matter actually bring them closer to the South Korean position.** The ferocity of China’s opposition to THAAD reveals to us that peninsula issues such as denuclearization have become a hot issue of elevated importance to China. It is up to South Korea to devise and propose cooperative measures to China on these matters. To put it another way, China has been intensely focused on issues such as Taiwan Strait affairs and competing claims with Japan on the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, but now that Beijing’s attention has shifted over to the peninsula, there is a chance that the path to solving to the North Korean nuclear problem might be hastened. The most important element for all sides to focus on is denuclearization. THAAD will not usher in the termination of friendly South Korea-Sino relations. It actually **represents a** new beginning. In terms of accomplishing the shared goal of denuclearization, THAAD represents a purely defensive measure. But **THAAD might** also kick start a process in which China changes its strategy on the peninsula. Dialogue **between South Korea and China can help both countries to** deviseandact on **a more** future oriented and **cooperative security policy**. It is best for South Korea to avoid involving itself in diplomatic confrontations between America and China. Instead, it should devote its political energy towards two outcomes on the peninsula: denuclearization and peaceful reunification. At long last, the time is right for South Korea and China to have a security dialogue about denuclearizing the peninsula. South Korea should actively try to fulfill this goal. It’s time for China to change from its ambiguous peninsula strategy to a more forward-oriented approach.

## Part 5: Extensions

### Overview

#### Negotiations with North Korea will Never Work—Containment is the only option. Lam 9/15/17:

**There’s “no way to stop” Kim Jong Un’s regime and its missile and nuclear program**, a North Korea expert told Fox News on Thursday, the warning coming amid Pyongyang's continued threats to sink Japan and blast the U.S. “into ashes and darkness.” Leading Seoul-based North Korea expert Andrei Lankov told Fox News that **Kim** Jong Un **is accelerating his missile and nuclear program “much faster than anybody expected**.” “They want to get the point of having a sufficient number of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of destroying a sufficient number of American cities,” Lankov said. The expert expressed doubt about reining in North Korea’s trajectory in achieving its military goal, adding the use of any “military force” would send the peninsula into war. He said **sanctions and regional diplomacy wouldn’t work**, either. “I don’t think, **unfortunately, there is no way to stop them**,” Lankov said. “No way…A use of military force, but that would result in a second Korean war. That would be an absolute disaster.”

#### Diplomacy fails—containment and deterrence is the only possible way to stop North Korea. That’s the Lam evidence from yesterday. 60 years of history prove that negotiations will never work. Kim already has more than enough nukes. Only implementing strong defensive measures to protect innocent lives will work.

### 1AR Underview

#### Here’s how the round breaks down. War is coming with North Korea [in this specific method]. There is a chance of war in either world. I would rather have a 100% chance of solving a North Korea missile launch with a 30% chance of war than a 0% chance of solving missiles with a 30% chance of war. Vote AFF.

Here’s how the round breaks down. War is coming with North Korea [in this specific method]. They conceded all of our warrants which means that war will occur in either world. I would rather have a 100% chance of shooting down every missile when war happens than a world in which war happens with a 0% chance of shooting down missiles, destroying a country with 50 million people.

### Interoperability