

R2R

We negate resolved: The deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea's best interest.

Our Sole Contention is De-Escalation

Mansourov at the Nautalis Institute in 2014 writes:

The principal purpose of the DPRK's nuclear weapons program is to ensure the favorable environment for regime survival and national development by deterring external threats against the country's sovereignty and by freeing internal resources for economic growth. The North Korean government emphasizes the critical role of nuclear weapons in national security by putting them in the center of its campaign to prevent war.

Thus, North Korea's nuclear development is limited to national defense, not aggression.

Outmatched by the US military's vast conventional superiority, the North Korean regime sees nuclear weapons as the only way to balance the scales. According to Fifield at the Washington Post in 2017:

North Korea has used its emerging weapons capability as a deterrent, betting that if it can threaten nuclear retaliation on South Korea, the United States will not take the risk of striking.

In Kim Jong-Un's mind, deterrence is the only way to keep his country safe. Missile defense, however, undermines his sense of security. Etzioni at George Washington University in 2017 explains:

The logic of nuclear deterrence presumes that making any major strike is virtually suicidal. However, if one nuclear power can prevent a retaliatory strike by an anti-missile defense system, mutual destruction is no longer assured, and the deterrence effect breaks down.

In response to the destabilizing effects of missile defense, North Korea is taking two steps.

First, they are acting out.

Without a credible nuclear deterrent, North Korea becomes forced to act out more aggressively to demonstrate that it is still a threat.

McKeown at the American Security Project in 2017 notes that:

North Korea, in reaction to the deployment of missile defenses has continued to escalate its missile testing as self-defense against the United States' provocative actions. While this behavior is characteristic, the frequency of testing is unprecedented.

Second, they are again trying to level the playing field.

In order to restore the balance, the North has tried to develop missiles that can get around missile defense. According to the ISDP in 2016:

North Korea has viewed the decision to deploy missile defense as both a provocation and an act of aggression. Their response has been to continue missile development and invest in technologies that could bypass missile defense systems.

These new missiles nullify missile defense. Minjeong at the Asan Forum in 2017 writes:

new technological advances meant that Pyongyang is now able to fire missiles without being detected. This makes South Korea's missile defense defense effectively useless.

North Korea's escalation in reaction to missile defense has pushed South Korea to militarize, too. Reuters in 2017 reports:

The escalating threat arising from nuclear-armed North Korea's recent series of missile tests is prompting South Korea to beef up its military muscle by allowing Seoul to build more powerful missiles and to build a nuclear-powered submarine.

Such a state of heightened tensions, where all parties feel threatened and are rapidly militarizing, creates a hair trigger scenario where the outbreak of war is more likely.

Gollman at CBC in 2017 explains:

there remains the threat of a miscalculation — that amplified rhetoric, a military mistake, or the misinterpretation of an action could snowball into something much larger. it's going to happen, chances are it's going to happen in this heightened state

BMDs increase the chance of war. Lee at Bond University in 2016 explains:

Missile defense systems increases the risk of inter-Korean war once again

More specifically to South Korea, Osnos at the New Yorker writes last week:

The past six months the enmity has reached a level rarely seen since the end of the Korean War

The only way out of the current crisis is de-escalation. Benjamin concludes:

the question is how best to de-escalate the conflict so it doesn't explode into war.

Adding another weapon system into the mix is not the answer.

Thus, we negate.

Cut Cards

Escalation

Mansourov 14 [Alexandre Y. Mansourov, Ph.D., Senior Associate of Nautilus Institute], 12-16-2014, "Kim Jong Un's Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know," Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability,

<https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/> //DF

The principal purpose of the DPRK's nuclear weapons program is to ensure the favorable environment for regime survival and national development by deterring external threats against the country's sovereignty and leadership and by freeing internal resources for economic growth and individual consumption. The survival of the ruling Kim family is intimately linked to the nuclear weapons development program because nuclear arms help legitimize Kim Jong Un's hereditary rule, keep his foreign foes at bay, and allow the DPRK government to prop up the civilian economy with the additional resources previously spent on conventional military arms. On March 31, 2013, Kim Jong Un said, "Nuclear weapons guarantee peace, economic prosperity, and people's happy life." [4] According to the MOFA spokesman statement on 4 October 2014, "The DPRK's nuclear force serves a powerful treasured sword to protect the sovereignty of the country and the dignity of the nation and provides a sure guarantee for focusing efforts on preserving peace and security, building economy and improving the standard of the people's living." [5] Despite what many Western analysts believe, development of nuclear weapons does not take precedence over economic development in Kim Jong Un's North Korea. In a visible departure from the military-first policy, as envisioned and practiced by his father Kim Jong Il, the Workers' Party of Korea under Kim Jong Un's leadership adopted at the March 2013 Plenum of its Central Committee the so-called Pyongjin Line, i.e. the strategic course on parallel construction of economy and nuclear weapons (경제건설과 핵무력건설을 병진시킴에 대한 전략적로선). [6] Notwithstanding the Songun imperatives, both are regarded as parallel tracks of the overall national development strategy designed to fulfil the supreme interests of the Korean people and Juch'e revolution. According to the DPRK foreign ministry spokesman's statement on 4 October 2014, "The DPRK's line of simultaneously developing the two fronts serves as a banner for bolstering nuclear deterrence for self-defence to cope with the reckless nuclear threat and aggression by the U.S. and its followers and, on its

basis, winning a decisive victory in building a thriving nation... The DPRK's line of simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and the building of nuclear force is the strategic line which should be permanently maintained to meet the supreme interests of the Korean revolution." [7] **The North Korean government emphasizes the critical role of nuclear weapons in national security and defense strategies by putting them in the center of its campaign to prevent war** and shape peace suitable to Pyongyang and in the foundation of its plans to wage war under the conditions favoring the North. In his speech on 31 March 2013, Kim Jong Un called for increasing the "pivotal role of nuclear weapons in war deterrent strategy and war-waging strategy." [8] According to the DPRK national security doctrine, as part of the overall war deterrent strategy (전쟁억제전략), "the nuclear deterrent enables peaceful development at home and allows North Korea to dictate international trends on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia."

Fear of the United States is the root cause of North Korea's militarism. Benjamin at the Korea Policy Institute in 2017 explains: Benjamin 17 Medea Benjamin, 8-2-2017, "Urgent Warning: Time to Hit the Reset Button on U.S.-Korean Policy," Korea Policy Institute,

<http://kpolicy.org/urgent-warning-time-to-hit-the-reset-button-on-u-s-korean-policy/> //DF It was the resilience of Seongju and neighboring Gimcheon residents that pushed the Moon administration to pause the deployment process until a thorough environmental impact assessment had been completed, which would have taken about a year. This gave the villagers hope that they would have time to convince President Moon to rethink and reverse the THAAD agreement altogether. The president's recent decision will only spark more local outrage. The North Korean nuclear program is certainly alarming, as are the myriad human rights violations of that repressive regime. But **the question is how best to de-escalate the conflict so it doesn't explode** into all-out nuclear war.

Adding another weapon system into the mix is not the answer. The North Korean regime feels encircled. It knows that the most powerful nation in the world, the United States, wants to overthrow it. There's Trump's belligerent rhetoric: "If China is not going to solve North Korea, we will." There's the ever-tightening screws of sanctions.

Just a few hours before the latest North Korean missile test, Congress approved yet another round of sanctions to squeeze the North. **There are 83 U.S. military bases on South Korean soil and U.S. warships often patrol the coast.** U.S.-South Korean military exercises have been getting larger and more provocative, including dropping mock nuclear bombs on North Korea. The US military also announced that it would permanently station an armed drone called Gray Eagle on the Korean Peninsula and it has been practicing long-range strikes with strategic bombers, sending them to the region for exercises and deploying them in Guam and on the peninsula. **The United States has also long held a "pre-emptive first strike" policy toward North Korea. This frightening threat of an unprovoked U.S. nuclear attack gives North Korea good reason to want its own nuclear arsenal.** North Korea's leadership also looks at the fate of Iraq's Saddam Hussein and Libya's Muammar Gaddafi, leaders who gave up their nuclear programs, and concludes that nuclear weapons are their key to survival. So **the North Korean leadership is not acting irrationally;** on the contrary. On July 29, the day after the test, North Korean President **Kim Jong-un asserted that the threat of sanctions or military action "only strengthens our resolve and further justifies our possession of nuclear weapons."**

Outmatched of the US military's vast conventional superiority, the North Korean regime sees nuclear weapons as the only way to balance the scales. According to Fifield at the Washington Post in 2017:

Fifield 17 Anna Fifield, 9-5-2017, "For Kim Jong Un, nuclear weapons are a security blanket. And he wants to keep it.," Washington Post,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/for-kim-jong-un-nuclear-weapons-are-a-security-blanket-and-he-wants-to-keep-it/2017/09/05/d7b7ecb8-9236-11e7-b9bc-b2f7903bab0d_story.html?utm_term=.dde3d3d231ba //DF

North Korea as a state was formed at the end of World War II, when the Soviet Union and the United States drew a line across the peninsula as a "temporary measure." But it was solidified during the Korean War, a brutal conflict in which the U.S. Air Force leveled the North, to the extent that American generals complained there was nothing left to bomb. Ever since, North Korea has existed in a state of insecurity, with the

totalitarian regime telling the population that the United States is out to destroy them — again. It is in this context that, following the collapse of its nuclear-armed benefactor, the Soviet Union, the Kim regime has sought weapons of its own. “If you were the head of a small, isolated, poor country surrounded by potentially hostile military powers, you’d be looking for some way to ensure your own destiny, too,” said Jon Wolfsthal, a nuclear nonproliferation expert who served on President Barack Obama’s National Security Council. **North Korea has used its emerging weapons capability as a deterrent, betting that if it can threaten nuclear retaliation** or even a conventional attack **on South Korea, the United States will not take the risk of striking.** Contrary to an assertion by the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, that North Korea is “begging for war,” **all of the regime’s recent belligerence about destroying the United States has been couched as retaliation for an American preemptive strike**, not as North Korea making the first move. That, Kim knows, would be suicidal. But he looks at what happened to Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi leader who didn’t manage to develop nuclear weapons, and Moammar Gaddafi, the Libyan who gave up his nuclear program, and sees that he needs them to keep the United States at bay, analysts say. **“North Korea sees that in the 70 years that nuclear weapons have been in existence, no nuclear state has ever been invaded,”** said Koh Yu-hwan, a professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University in the South. **Now having the ability, or almost having the ability, to send a nuclear weapon to the United States makes those hyperbolic threats of devastating retaliation all the more credible.** “They know that they don’t have to destroy every American city to deter us,” Wolfsthal said. “They just have to make us think three times before attacking them.”

In Kim Jong-Un’s mind, deterrence is the only way to keep his country safe. Missile defense, however, undermines his sense of security. Etzioni at George Washington University in 2017 explains:

Etzioni 17 Amitai Etzioni [University Professor and professor of international relations at The George Washington University], 8-10-2017 “THAAD: Best a Bargaining Chip,” The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/thaad-best-a-bargaining-chip/> //DF

Those quick to exclaim “Great, two for the price of one” should recall that nuclear powers hold each other at bay; that mutually assured destruction seems to be a major reason why the big powers have avoided war since 1945. To remind: **The logic of nuclear deterrence presumes that if [a country] either China or the U.S. launches a nuclear attack, they must expect to be paid back in kind, to be devastated, making any major strike virtually suicidal. However, if one nuclear power can prevent a retaliatory strike (by an anti-missile defense system, for instance), the other nation must fear the possibility of a devastating attack without the ability to respond. As a result, mutual destruction is no longer assured, and the deterrence effect breaks down.** Further, such concerns may well lead the newly vulnerable nation to put its nuclear forces on a hair trigger alert, ready to strike preemptively at any sign of preparation of an attack by the other. In short, if THAAD batteries are effective, they are highly destabilizing.

In response to the destabilizing effects of missile defense, North Korea is taking two steps.

First, they are acting out.

Without a credible nuclear deterrent, North Korea becomes forced to act out more aggressively to demonstrate that it is still a threat.

McKeown at the American Security Project in 2017 notes that:

American Security Project. "THAAD-A Necessary Measure? | ASP." American Security Project. 5 Jun. 2017. Web. 19 Aug. 2017.

<https://www.americansecurityproject.org/thaad-a-necessary-measure/> //NS

The negative effects of the implementation of the THAAD system have been notable. North Korea, in reaction to the deployment of the system, has continued to escalate its missile testing. While this behavior is characteristic of their aggressive rhetoric since 2008-2009, the frequency of testing is unprecedented. A North Korean foreign ministry spokesman threatened that the country would increase the pace of its nuclear weapons program as self-defense against the United States' provocative actions. This year alone, North Korea has conducted nine missile tests. Furthermore, the last missile tested by North Korea on May 28th landed within Japan's exclusive economic zone, which shows its increasing disregard for international norms.

Second, they are again trying to level the playing field.

In order to restore the balance, the North has tried to develop missiles that can get around missile defense. According to the ISDP in 2016:

ISDP 16 11-2016, "THAAD in the Korean Peninsula," Institute for Security and Development Policy,

<http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2016/11/THAAD-Backgrounder-ISDP-2.pdf> //DF

North Korea has viewed the decision to deploy [missile defense] THAAD as both a provocation and an act of aggression. Their response has been to continue missile development and invest in technologies that could bypass [missile defense] systems like THAAD. Correspondingly, one day after the announcement of THAAD deployment, North Korea tested a Pukkuksong-1 (KN-11) SLBM.⁴¹ This was followed by three short range missiles that were fired six days after the announcement and another two intermediate-range missiles in early August 2016.⁴² North Korea has also stated that they will retaliate with a "physical response."

⁴³ The continuous missile development by North Korea could be seen as tests for bypassing THAAD's abilities, as it is possible to launch more missiles than a missile defense can intercept.⁴⁴ So far, only one THAAD battery is planned to be deployed which could be a critical weakness. THAAD's difficulty in intercepting missiles with irregular trajectories could also be used; in theory, North Korea's medium-range Rodong missiles would be able to bypass THAAD as they have an irregular trajectory.⁴⁵ Recent analysis suggests that North Korea is developing a new submarine that would be larger than the previous GORAE-class experimental ballistic missile submarine.⁴⁶ The improvement of SLBMs, could be considered another weakness of THAAD and would give a critical advantage to North Korea. In any case, North Korea have continued their nuclear development, conducting a fifth nuclear test in September 2016.⁴⁷

This nullifies missile defense's effectiveness

Han Minjeong (The Asan Forum). "Country Report: South Korea (March 2017)." March 23, 2017.

<http://www.theasanforum.org/country-report-south-korea-march-2017/>

Choi Yeong-mi and Kwak Tae-hwan looked into why the issue had become so controversial and what to do to resolve internal conflicts in Hankuk kwa kukje jeongchi 32, no. 3. They found four areas where ideological division was stark—perceptions of the North Korean nuclear threat, the efficacy of THAAD, its impact on international relations, and its impact on inter-Korean relations and reunification. Based on an opinion poll of 150 North Korea and Northeast Asia security experts, they determined that the efficacy issue recorded the most significant conflicts—reflected in four detailed concerns—defense capability, deterrence, complementarity, and cost. Among the four, cost was found to be the most controversial concern among the experts. Proponents argued it is successfully complementing KAMD, and the cost is not huge as it is mainly covered by the US forces based in Korea. Even if the cost is high, it is worthwhile for guaranteeing national security, they said. However, opponents argued that there would be huge derivative expenses, and they would be a waste given that the efficacy of the defense system has not been proved yet. They also disagreed that it is complimentary with KAMD. Kim and Kwak also found it interesting that the experts were starkly divided on its impact on the relationship with China. Proponents argued that the deployment did not necessarily hurt the relationship as it is not targeting Beijing, but China was using it to split the South Korea-US relationship. However, opponents argued that intentions did not matter, as it meant being part of the regional US missile defense system, which was denied by the proponents. It was suggested that the South Korean government clearly explain what the costs are and how they are going to be covered. As for its connection to China, the government was urged to make sure to get rid of any possible misunderstanding from China, proactively explaining its defensive nature. The authors reiterated that whatever the government decides, if the controversial issues remain unexplained to the public, the THAAD issue will be a burden for future administrations. The ideological divides were found in media outlets after the North Korean missile tests in February and the advanced deployment of THAAD. A February 20 Hangyoreh article argued that the **new technological advances meant that Pyongyang is now able to fire missiles without being detected. This makes South Korea's defense efforts—the Kill chain, KAMD, and THAAD—effectively useless.** Criticizing that the current government and conservatives are irrelevantly linking Kim Jong-nam's assassination and the recent missile test with THAAD deployment, the author urged the government to acknowledge the harsh reality before moving further. The author argued that THAAD is more about protecting the ally, the US military bases located in Okinawa and Guam, than about protecting the South Korean people. Protecting an ally can certainly be one ground for security policies. However, as long as the government denies the actual reason for the deployment, internal conflicts will never stop, and there will be no reasonable public discussion.

North Korea's escalation in reaction to missile defense have pushed South Korea to militarize, too. Reuters in 2017 reports:

Reuters 17 Reuters, 8-11-2017 "North Korea Missile Crisis Seen Pushing South Korea to Gun Up," New York Times,

[//DF](https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2017/08/11/world/asia/11reuters-northkorea-missiles-militarisation.html?partner=IFTTT)

The escalating threat arising from nuclear-armed North Korea's recent series of missile tests is prompting South Korea to beef up its military muscle [by]

and experts warn it could spur an arms buildup elsewhere in Northeast Asia. South Korea and Japan are accustomed to the North's frequent threats to attack. But the war of words between Washington and Pyongyang has raised fears of a sudden clash along the world's most militarised border dividing the two Koreas, which might quickly escalate to all-out war. After North Korea's second test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on July 28, South Korean President Moon Jae-in ordered a speedy deployment of the controversial U.S. THAAD anti-missile defense system, reversing his earlier decision to postpone it pending an environmental review. This week, the U.S. Defence Department said it was "actively" considering **revising bilateral ballistic missile guidelines** with South Korea **to allow Seoul to build more powerful missiles** -- at the South's request. Moon told U.S. President Donald Trump in a telephone conversation on Monday South Korea also wants **[and] to build a nuclear-powered submarine**, presidential officials said. **"All of this could lead to further militarization of South Korea,"** said Yang Uk, a senior research fellow at the Korea Defence and Security Forum.

Such a state of heightened tensions, where all parties feel threatened and are rapidly militarizing, creates a hair trigger scenario where the outbreak of war is more likely.

Gollman at CBC in 2017 explains:

Gollman 17 Mark Gollman, 4-26-2017, "Why 'miscalculation is the enemy' that could spark a U.S.-North Korea conflict," CBC News,

<http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/north-korea-threat-missile-donald-trump-1.4085375> //DF

Despite heightened tensions, many experts say it's unlikely the U.S. and North Korea are headed toward imminent military conflict. While the leaders of both countries are impulsive and unpredictable, they are also desperate to avoid pre-emptive strikes. However, there remains the threat, albeit small, of a miscalculation – that amplified rhetoric, a military mistake, or the misinterpretation of an action by any of the main actors in the region could snowball into something much larger. "We're talking about a highly unlikely chain of events happening all at once aligning to create that sort of circumstance," said Philip Yun, a former member of a government working group that managed U.S. policy and negotiations with North Korea under Bill Clinton. "But that is a possibility and if it's going to happen, chances are it's going to happen in this heightened state. "Mistakes happen, so when mistakes happen, miscalculation is the enemy here."

Gibler in 2005 confirms this empirically, finding that:

Gibler 05 Douglas M. Gibler [Department of Political Science, University of Kentucky], 2005, "Taking Arms Against a Sea of Troubles: Conventional Arms Races During Periods of Rivalry," Journal of Peace Research, <http://saramitchell.org/Gibleretal.pdf> //DF

In addition to escalation, arms races seem to have an important substantive impact on the likelihood of conflict, especially in comparison with the other variables in our models. For example, as Table II shows, the chance of a MID [militarized interstate dispute] for strategic rivals more than doubles, from 16% on average to 35% during an arms race year, and the chance of war changes from 1 in 100 to 1 in 20 during arms race years. These results are especially dramatic in comparison with the two other variables that are statistically significant across both models – contiguity increases the probability of both types of conflict by just over 23%, and an alliance decreases these probabilities by more than half.

BMDs increase the chance of war

Lee 16 Kun Min Tayler' Lee [Bond University], 12-2016, "THAAD: Missile Defense or Diplomatic Challenge?," Culture Mandala: Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies,, <http://www.international-relations.com/CM2016/5-THAAD-Missile-Defense.pdf> //DF

As noted above, in February 2016, South Korea suspended operations at the jointly run Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), following the North's fourth nuclear test. This was a significant incident for the two Koreas, because it was the last remaining point of peaceful engagement between them. Analysts contend that the deployment of THAAD on top of this incident increases the risk of inter-Korean war once again, and they even go on to say the Korean peninsula can become the 'actual battlefield' in a conflict between the United States and China, with South Korea being on U.S. side, and the North supporting China (Kwon, 2016). In another analysis, forwarded by Hyeon-Jun Jeon from the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI), the deployment of THAAD is viewed as having a negative impact on China's military power, upon which North Korea depends for its protection. (DailyNK, 2015) This can be very dangerous, as the North would lose the relationship with China, becoming completely isolated and alienated from the global society. This would increase the chance of an invasion of the South, and the war could even include use of nuclear weapons. Irrespective of whether a war would occur, the heightened expectation of an invasion would impact on South Korea's political and economic stability with foreign investors reluctant to commit to a country in such peril.

More specifically to South Korea, Osnos at the New Yorker writes yesterday:

Osnos 17 Evan Osnos, 9-18-2017, "The Risk of Nuclear War with North Korea," New Yorker, <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/09/18/the-risk-of-nuclear-war-with-north-korea> //DF
Americans are accustomed to eruptions of hostility with North Korea, but in the past six months the enmity has reached a level rarely seen since the end of the Korean War, in 1953. The crisis has been hastened by fundamental changes in the leadership on both sides. In the six years since Kim Jong Un assumed power, at the age of twenty-seven, he has tested eighty-four missiles—more than double the number that his father and grandfather tested. Just before Donald Trump took office, in January, he expressed a willingness to wage a “preventive” war in North Korea, a prospect that previous Presidents dismissed because it would risk an enormous loss of life. Trump has said that in his one meeting with Barack Obama, during the transition, Obama predicted that North Korea, more than any other foreign-policy challenge, would test Trump. In private, Trump has told aides, “I will be judged by how I handle this.” On the Fourth of July, North Korea passed a major threshold: it launched its first intercontinental ballistic missile powerful enough to reach the mainland United States. In response, on July 21st, authorities in Hawaii announced that they would revive a network of Cold War-era sirens, to alert the public in the event of a nuclear strike. Trump said that he hopes to boost spending on missile defense by “many billions of dollars.” On September 3rd, after North Korea tested a nuclear weapon far larger than any it had revealed before—seven times the size of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki—the U.S. Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, warned that a threat to America or its allies would trigger a “massive military response.”

The only way out of the current crisis is de-escalation. Benjamin concludes:

Benjamin 17 Medea Benjamin, 8-2-2017, "Urgent Warning: Time to Hit the Reset Button on U.S.-Korean Policy," Korea Policy Institute,

<http://kpolicy.org/urgent-warning-time-to-hit-the-reset-button-on-u-s-korean-policy/> //DF

It was the resilience of Seongju and neighboring Gimcheon residents that pushed the Moon administration to pause the deployment process until a thorough environmental impact assessment had been completed, which would have taken about a year. This gave the villagers hope that they would have time to convince President Moon to rethink and reverse the THAAD agreement altogether. The president’s recent decision will only spark more local outrage. The North Korean nuclear program is certainly alarming, as are the myriad human rights violations of that repressive regime. But **the question is how best to de-escalate the conflict so it doesn’t explode into all-out nuclear war. Adding another weapon system into the mix is not the answer.** The North Korean regime feels encircled. It knows that the most powerful nation in the world, the United States, wants to **overthrow it**. There’s Trump’s belligerent rhetoric: “If China is not going to solve North Korea, we will.” There’s the ever-tightening screws of sanctions. Just a few hours before the latest North Korean missile test, Congress approved yet another round of sanctions to squeeze the North. **There are 83 U.S. military bases on South Korean soil and U.S. warships often patrol the coast.** U.S.-South Korean military exercises have been getting larger and more provocative, including dropping mock nuclear bombs on North Korea. The US military also announced that it would permanently station an armed drone called Gray Eagle on the Korean Peninsula and it has been practicing long-range strikes with strategic bombers, sending them to the region for exercises and deploying them in Guam and on the peninsula. **The United States has also long held a “pre-emptive first strike” policy toward North Korea. This frightening threat of an unprovoked U.S. nuclear attack gives North Korea good reason to want its own nuclear arsenal.** North Korea’s leadership also looks at the fate of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, leaders who gave up their nuclear programs, and concludes that nuclear weapons are their key to survival. So **the North Korean leadership is not acting irrationally**; on the contrary. On July 29, the day after the test, North Korean President Kim Jong-un asserted that the threat of sanctions or military action “only strengthens our resolve and further justifies our possession of nuclear weapons.”

Missile defense systems, despite their name, are inherently offensive. Strojnik at the American Security Project in 2016 explains:

Strojnik 16 Tomaz Strojnik, 7-18-2016, "THAAD and Aegis: Creators of Peace or Instability?," American Security Project,

<https://www.americansecurityproject.org/thaad-and-aegis-solutions-to-defense-or-creators-of-instability/> //DF

Unlike the missile defense concepts of the past which were geared towards defeating a large-scale nuclear attack, today's systems are designed to counter nations with relatively few ballistic missiles and short range missiles. With at least thirty-one countries possessing ballistic missiles, states are naturally inclined to obtain a defensive system that can counter the offensive capabilities of others. **When states acquire a BMD system, they do so only to protect themselves against threats. Unfortunately, surrounding states may perceive this as an escalatory move since they will undermine their weapons systems. States like China and Russia, who view such deployments in their regions as directed towards them, oppose their presence because it prevents them from threatening damage to cities and military bases. The problem with increasing one's own security, is that it can create feelings of insecurity and force the insecure state to increase its own security.** This security dilemma exists because there is a lack of communication between the parties involved and a lack of identification of what has caused the insecurity in the first place. Even though Poland and South Korea's BMD systems are directed towards rogue states like Iran and North Korea respectively, these systems could easily be redirected towards other states. Weapons are inherently ambiguous. They cannot always be easily identified as offensive or defensive, and they cannot delineate the targeting of one foe over another. To avoid this conflict spiral, nations should make conciliatory efforts to show the other side that the purpose of the weapons system is not aimed? towards them but another. Both NATO and South Korea have made it clear to Russia and China that their BMD systems are directed towards other states, but this has failed to satisfy concerns.

1. Aggravating North Korea

North Korea's nuclear weapons can now reach the US. This empowers the North to act more aggressively against the South. Bush at the Brookings Institute in 2017 writes:

Bush 17 Richard C. Bush, 8-9-2017, "The real reason a North Korean nuclear weapon is so terrifying—and it's not what you think," Brookings,

<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/08/09/the-real-reason-a-north-korean-nuclear-weapon-is-so-terrifying-and-its-not-what-you-think/> //DF

North Korea's nuclear program poses another danger, perhaps the greatest one. Pyongyang may soon assume that it can now act more recklessly vis-à-vis South Korea at the conventional level and well short of a major attack because it can hypothetically counter the United States at the nuclear level. The scenario I have in mind is one in which North Korea starts at a relatively low rung of the escalation ladder: sinking a South Korean naval vessel, bombarding South Korean- controlled islands in the West Sea, or creating trouble in the demilitarized zone. It has done all of these things in the last seven years but then backed off from further conflict. Once Pyongyang can target the continental United States, it will likely take bigger risks

than it has to date. It would undertake such limited-war actions as much to achieve political gains as military ones. It would hope to test South Korean intentions and try to drive wedges within South Korean society: between t

2. China

China's missile modernization will be sped up by BMDs. Mullany at the Times in 2017 explains:

Mullany 17 Gerry Mullany and Chris Buckley, 3-7-2017, "China Warns of Arms Race After U.S. Deploys Missile Defense in South Korea," New York Times,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/world/asia/thaad-missile-defense-us-south-korea-china.html?mcubz=3&_r=0 //DF

China has long opposed American missile defenses, in part because of fears that they might embolden American decision-makers to consider a first strike to destroy China's relatively small nuclear arsenal. Chinese strategists warn that the United States might consider such an attack if it was confident a defense system could intercept Chinese weapons that escaped destruction. **China is believed to have already embarked on a program to modernize its arsenal and develop new weapons designed to avoid missile defenses, and analysts said the deployment of Thaad could prompt it to accelerate those efforts.**

Takashi Kawakami, a professor of international politics and security at Takushoku University in Tokyo, said the deployment of Thaad could put the United States in a stronger position to consider a pre-emptive strike on North Korea. If the United States took such action, he said, "North Korea is going to make a counterattack on the U.S. or Japan or another place, so in this case they will use Thaad" to defend against the North's missiles.

China is supplying weapons material to North Korea. Corr at Forbes in 2017:

Corr 17 Anders Corr, 7-5-2017, "Chinese Involvement In North Korea's Nuclear Missile Program: From Trucks To Warheads," Forbes,
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2017/07/05/chinese-involvement-in-north-koreas-nuclear-missile-program-from-warheads-to-trucks/#5931ad086f2f> //DF

North Korea's launch of a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile on July 4, U.S. Independence Day, is a direct affront to the U.S. that **was likely supported by Chinese technology and expertise.** Indications of Chinese involvement include Chinese transport trucks used for multiple North Korean missiles, the biconic warhead design of the Hwasong-14, and other Chinese missile components. U.S. President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson are now publicly pointing the finger at China, and it's about time. **The distinctive biconic warhead design appears similar to a Pakistani design associated with China. China or its ally Pakistan likely provided the warhead design, or the warhead itself, to North Korea.** Rick Fisher, a Senior Fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center said, "Indian sources credit China as the source of the new [Pakistani] ABABEEL warhead multiple reentry vehicle technology and it is indeed plausible Pakistan passed such Chinese-origin technology to North Korea." According to Fisher, **China may also have provided the warhead technology directly to North Korea.** He said, "as the Hwasong program started during the rule of Kim Jong Il, it is also possible that Chinese technology was originally given to North Korea which fashioned the new warhead that was tested by Pakistan on ABABEEL."

China thinks BMDs are destabilizing

Pickrell 17 Ryan Pickrell, 6-1-2017, "China and Russia Hate America's Missile Defense Systems for a Very Simple Reason," National Interest,

<http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-russia-hate-americas-missile-defense-systems-very-20949> //DF

In addition to the commentary in the state-run People's Daily, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs again complained about the deployment of a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea. "The US global missile defense system is ultimately targeted at the nuclear deterrent capability of China and Russia," the Global Times, a nationalist outlet affiliated with the state-run People's Daily, argued in February. Russian President Vladimir Putin took a personal swing at the U.S. missile defense system Thursday, claiming Russia has no choice but to build up its defenses. "This destroys the strategic balance in the world," Putin told reporters at an economic forum. "What is happening is a very serious and alarming process. In Alaska, and now in South Korea, elements of the anti-missile defense system are emerging. Should we just stand idly by and watch this? Of course not. We are thinking about how to respond to these challenges." Putin declared that the U.S. is using North Korea as an excuse to develop its anti-missile capabilities. Russia, like China, has also been developing its offensive weaponry, exploring hypersonic missile delivery systems and other improvements.

They are developing missiles

Panyue 17 Huang Panyue, 3-1-2017, "Foreign Media: China Develops Hypersonic Missiles Against THAAD," Chinese Military, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-03/01/content_7508672.htm //DF

Foreign media reported that China is developing hypersonic weapons with an eye to piercing the missile defense shields of Japan and its East Asian neighbors. Japan's Kyodo News February 26 quoted Canada's Kanwa Defense Review that the Rocket Force of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has recently decided on a hypersonic weapon developing program targeting the missile defense system in Japan and China's Taiwan, as well as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to be deployed in the Republic of Korea (ROK) soon. It is reported that hypersonic weapons are next-generation maneuvering strike weapons to be installed atop the ballistic missiles that travel at speeds of up to Mach 10, or 10 times the speed of sound. They can maneuver and glide along the atmospheric edge, making them very difficult to be shot down by anti-missile weapons. It is thought that if China's hypersonic weapons advances, Japan's anti-missile system could be made impotent. Japan's Air Self-Defense Force has already deployed the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile defense system along with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force's Aegis destroyers equipped Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors. China's Taiwan has also deployed Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), while ROK decided to deploy the advanced Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system on its soil to better cope with the missile threats from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Reports said that in addition to the hypersonic weapon project of the PLA Rocket Force, China has been developing such hypersonic weapons through another channel. A state-owned enterprise is engaged in developing hypersonic weapons that can be launched atop long-range ballistic missiles to penetrate the missile defense system on the U.S. mainland. American media reported that China has carried out seven hypersonic sliding vehicle tests in recent years, six of which succeeded. While China has acknowledged to such testing, but it was previously unknown that it was also working on short-range hypersonic weapons development program for East Asian targets.

Hypersonic missiles basically nullify BMDs' effectiveness

Mcintyre 17 Jamie McIntyre, 6-5-2017, "The hypersonic threat that keeps US commanders up at night," Washington Examiner,

<http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/the-hypersonic-threat-that-keeps-us-commanders-up-at-night/article/2624599> //DF

The U.S. is in fact developing not just hypersonic weapons but also systems to counter them. The Trump administration, in its fiscal 2018 budget submission to Congress last month, requested \$75 million for "hypersonic defense" as part of \$7.9 billion overall funding plan for missile defenses. But critics in Congress complain that's a mere \$379 million over last year's request from former President Barack Obama and well below the annual \$9 billion funding level planned by the Bush administration. "These weapons present an entirely new capability we must counter as they are specifically designed to exploit the gaps and the seams in our existing missile defense architecture, thus defeating the systems we currently have in place," said Rep. Trent Franks, R-Ariz, on the floor of the House in March. Franks, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, is concerned the threat from high-speed maneuvering weapons is figuratively flying below the radar. "The threat has outpaced us," Franks said. "These new weapons are capable of traveling more than a mile per second and fly at flat or nonballistic trajectories to prevent our missile defense systems from tracking them."

BMDs are militarization

Lee 17 Brianni Lee, 2-17-2017, "THAAD Deployment in South Korea: Militarism Leading To Political Regression," Harvard International Review, <http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=14503> //DF

The militarization of South Korea is not a new phenomenon; after the Korean War, South Korea inevitably became one of the most militarized nations in the world, especially given that it is one of few countries in the middle of an extended ceasefire and one of the only divided nations in the world. While the South Korean government had shown reservations about deploying US weapons and further militarizing the peninsula, mainly because of its concerns about spoiling Sino-Korean relations, North Korea's ever-increasing military aggression caused South Korean President Park Geun-hye to announce the deployment of THAAD. The decision sparked a new controversy between South Korean liberals, who are against any further militarization of the peninsula, and conservatives, who see THAAD as a first step towards further militarization.

THAAD deployment may be the beginning of further militarization of the Korean peninsula, and could lead to broader instability in East Asia and a renewed confrontation between a US-South Korea alignment and a China-Russia-North Korea alignment, reminiscent of Cold War-era factions. China's strong reaction against THAAD deployment sparked stronger nationalistic demands for nuclear armament within the Saenuri Party, South Korea's conservative ruling party, highlighting THAAD's risk of regional tension and greater militarization. The Saenuri Party argues that in order for South Korea to be independent of foreign powers for its protection, it has to establish a well-organized nationwide missile defense (MD) system. However, it is impossible for South Korea to immediately deploy an extensive MD system throughout its territory because of a lack of technology and available weapons. South Korea would have to buy more weapons from the United States, resulting in increased dependence on the United States for national defense. For China and Russia, which have openly expressed discomfort with the presence of the US military in nearby countries, an increased US military presence in South Korea could be the perfect reason to unite against the United States and South Korea. This not only would create acute tension between two separate alignments, but would also prevent South Korea from achieving peaceful reunification of the two Koreas under democratic rule. China's fierce condemnation of THAAD deployment is the expression of its discomfort with the nearby presence of the US military. While the United States argues that the deployment of THAAD has a purely defensive purpose, China assumes that THAAD deployment creates a potential threat of US intervention against Chinese military action. China also accuses the South Korean government of supporting US military interests and willingly taking the role of the United States' "puppet state." China has two main arguments against THAAD deployment. First, China argues that THAAD is unnecessary for protecting South Korea. THAAD is designed to detect and shoot down ballistic missiles in their reentry phase, thereby preventing longer-distance missiles from exploding on land. Because the distance between Pyongyang and Seoul is merely 194 kilometers, China has claimed that THAAD is not suited for protecting South Korea. Second, THAAD's radar can detect China's military actions and interfere with Chinese interests. Because THAAD has to detect missile action as soon as possible, it must constantly collect data from areas within a 1,000 kilometer range, which includes Chinese and Russian territory. THAAD deployment in South Korea seems unlikely to improve relations with North Korea since compromised relations with China, one of few countries with significant influence over North Korea, will likely further damage relations on the peninsula.

