

soft Copy paste every card in the con blocks in this doc, ideally in order. New thing Chris thinks we should try so people have less trouble finding EV when asked.

BCA means normal mil spending is capped

Belasco 2015 [Amy Belasco at the Congressional Research Service, "Defense Spending and the Budget Control Act Limits", *Congressional Research Service*, <<https://fas.org/sqp/crs/natsec/R44039.pdf>>] //CJC Enacted on August 1, 2011, **the Budget Control Act (BCA)** as amended (P.L. 112-75, P.L. 112- 240, P.L. 113-67) **sets limits on defense spending between FY2012 and FY2021** that are playing a significant role in the debate about the appropriate level of defense spending. Each year, if **Congress enacts a spending level that exceeds BCA caps for the defense base budget, the President is required to sequester or levy across-the-board cuts to each type of defense spending to meet the BCA caps.** These spending levels are sometimes referred to as revised or "sequester" caps. **War-designated funding (for "Overseas Contingency Operations") is not subject to BCA caps.**

PMC Impact D part 1

Stanley, Bruce E. *Outsourcing Security : Private Military Contractors And U.S. Foreign Policy*. Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2015. eBook Collection (EBSCOhost). Web. 15 Dec. 2016.
https://books.google.com/books?id=mFjxCQAAQBAJ&pg=PT162&lpg=PT162&dq=as+the+intensity+of+a+conflict+increases+by+1,000+military+casualties+there+is+an+increase+of+approximately+550+private+contractors&source=bl&ots=luCFB6fAs&sig=VQ02v0OfahGkNQ_jSSI7kX5y-M8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKewjcgueT3vvQAhVi1oMKHZSDQ8Q6AEIGzAA#v=onepage&q=as%20the%20intensity%20of%20a%20conflict%20increases%20by%201%20000%20military%20casualties%20there%20is%20an%20increase%20of%20approximately%20550%20private%20contractors&f=false

The coefficient of 71 executive decision trend is .344, which suggests that the rate of change after the decision increased by .34 percent every year, holding other variables constant (see figure 3). DoD kia is statistically significant at the $p < .01$ level. The coefficient for this intensity variable is .551, which suggests that **as the intensity of a conflict increases by 1,000 military casualties there is an increase of approximately 550 private contractors, holding other variables constant.** The variable representing intensity Mass Unrest is also statistically significant at the $p < .01$ level. The coefficient for the intensity variable is 1.75, which suggests that as the intensity of the conflict increases for every 1,000 civilian casualties there is an increase of approximately 1,750 private contractors, holding other variables constant. The second model represents the second test of the hypotheses under investigation. Model 2 includes the dependent variable, contractors; the independent variables DoD Budget, DoD Personnel, DoD Overseas, the duration of the conflict using four independent variables covering four geographic regions Middle East, East Europe, Asia, and Africa; an interrupted time-series test of the independent variable 92 executive decision; and a test of the intensity of the conflict using two independent variables, DoD kia and Mass Unrest.

Pmc Impact D part 2

Loven, Seth H., "Private Soldiers in Africa: A Look at the Effects of Private Military Contractors and Mercenaries on the Duration of Civil Wars in Africa from 1960 to 2003." (2013). Political Science Department -- Theses, Dissertations, and Student Scholarship. Paper 22. <http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscitheses/22>

This paper examines the effect of private soldiers, both Mercenaries and Private Military Contractors (PMC), on the duration of civil wars in Africa from 1960 to 2003. **Linear regression is used to determine if private soldiers increase or decrease the duration of civil wars. Ultimately it is found they have little to no statistical impact. This is**

contrary to the expectations of the theoretical literature on private military contractors, some of which expects private soldiers to profit from war and seek to lengthen duration, and some of which expects the use of additional private soldiers to shorten the duration of wars. Some discussion is given to examining why no strong statistical results were found, and some directions for future research are proposed.

Trump opposes PMCS

Gault, Matthew. "Donald Trump is Right About Defense Spending." Reuters. March 2 2016.

<http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2016/03/02/trump-is-right-about-defense-spending-and-that-should-scare-you/>

Sanders has a history of protecting military contractors — if they bring jobs to his state. When he was mayor of Burlington in the 1980s, he pushed its police force to arrest nonviolent protesters at a local General Electric plant. The factory produced Gatling guns and also was one of the largest employers in the area.

Yet, Sanders ideological beliefs can sometimes color his views. He was chairman of the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee in 2014 as scandal swept the Department of Veterans Affairs. Even as many VA supporters called for reforms, Sanders defended the hospital system because he felt conservatives were attacking a major government social-welfare agency. He still defends his stewardship of the committee. "When I was chairman, what we did is pass a \$15-billion piece of legislation," Sanders said during a recent debate with Clinton. "We went further than any time in recent history in improving the healthcare of the men and women in this country who put their lives on the line to defend us." In the age of terrorism and Islamic State bombers, the prevailing political wisdom holds that appearing soft on defense can lose a candidate the general election. For many of the 2016 presidential candidates, looking strong means spending a ton of cash. Even if you're from the party that holds fiscal responsibility as its cornerstone. **But Trump doesn't care about any of that. In speech**

after speech, he has called out politicians and defense contractors, or Private Military Contractors, for colluding to build costly weapons systems at the price of national security.

Obama passing reforms reducing PMCs

Lendman, 1/19/10, Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization, RENSE, "Outsourcing War - Rise Of Private Military Contractors (PMCs)", <http://www.rense.com/general89/outs.htm>, 7/2/10

In February 2007, Senator Obama introduced the Transparency and Accountability in Military Security Contracting Act as an amendment to the 2008 Defense Authorization Act, requiring federal agencies to report to Congress on the numbers of security contractors employed, killed, wounded, and disciplinary actions taken against them. Referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee, it never passed. Then in February 2009 **as president, Obama introduced reforms to reduce PMC spending and shift outsourced work back to government.** of dollars He also promised to improve the quality of acquisition workers - government employees involved in supervising and auditing billions spent monthly on contracts. Even so, PMCs are fully integrated into national security and other government functions, as evidenced by the massive numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan alone.

FY 2017 Defense budge = \$619b; 16k more Army, 3k more Marines, 4k more Air Force

Leo Shane Iii, 16, (), "Obama signs defense bill including pay raise, more troops," Military Times, 12-23-2016, <http://www.militarytimes.com/articles/ndaa-17-obama-signs>, 1-26-2017 (DNM)

President **Obama signed the annual defense authorization act into law** on Friday, finalizing a 2.1 percent pay raise for troops **next year** and a overhaul of military medical care in years to come. The annual budget legislation includes defense spending priorities and guidelines for fiscal 2017, but does not allot money for those items. That

comes with the annual appropriations bill, which Congress does not expect to finalize until this spring, nearly halfway through the fiscal year. But short-term budget extensions passed by Congress in early December will cover most of the gaps in military spending until then. Lawmakers approved the 2.1 percent pay raise as part of that deal, giving troops their largest pay raise since 2010. The pay boost, which goes into effect Jan. 1, will mean about \$550 more a year for most junior enlisted troops and around \$1,800 annually for mid-career officers. Congress also included plans to significantly boost the number of service members in the military.

Under the authorization bill, Army end strength is set at 476,000 *soldiers*, about *16,000 more* than the White House had requested for fiscal 2017. The *Marine Corps* will rise to 185,000 troops, an *increase of about 3,000* over requested levels. The *Air Force* will go to 321,000 airmen, *around 4,000 more* than Obama wanted. The Navy would remain at 324,000 sailors.

The **\$619 billion** bill is about \$3.2 billion more than Obama's request, a complaint that prompted veto threats from the White House in recent months. But the measure passed both the House and Senate with veto-proof margins and significant Democratic support. Obama threatened to veto all eight of the defense authorization bills sent to him during his two terms, but followed through only one time.

OCO fund is 59B

NPP 2016 [National Priorities Project, "Overseas Contingency Operations: The Pentagon Slush Fund", *NPP*, <<https://www.nationalpriorities.org/campaigns/overseas-contingency-operations/>>] //CJC

The Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) fund - sometimes referred to as war funds - is a separate pot of funding operated by the Department of Defense and the State Department, in addition to their "base" budgets (i.e., their regular peacetime budgets). Originally used to finance the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the OCO continues to be a source of funding for the Pentagon, with a fraction of the funds going to the State Department. Since the OCO fund has very little oversight and is not subject to the sequestration cuts that slashed every other part of the budget in 2013, many experts consider it a "slush fund" for the Pentagon. For example, Todd Harrison, senior fellow for defense studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, found that the Pentagon was stashing an estimated extra \$20 billion worth of non-war funding in the "operation and maintenance" accounts of its proposed 2014 war budget. Even Secretary of Defense Ash Carter has recently called the OCO "a road to nowhere." Current OCO levels: In FY2015, **the U.S. will spend \$64 billion through the OCO**, in addition to its \$496 billion Department of Defense base budget.

Space debris is past the tipping point and we have no tech to solve — takes decades for feedback loop to impact anything though

Kessler 2012 [Donald Kessler, who is now retired, served as the chief scientist for NASA's orbital debris program for 17 years. "We've Already Passed the Tipping Point for Orbital Debris", *IEEE*, <<http://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/satellites/weve-already-passed-the-tipping-point-for-orbital-debris>>] //CJC

Since the dawn of the space age, more than 20 000 objects larger than a softball have accumulated in Earth's orbit. About 1000 of those objects are spacecraft that carry active payloads, serving many valuable missions for mankind. But the rest could best be called junk, the by-product of thousands of launches and routine spacecraft deployments, nearly 200 explosions, and several collisions. And this junk poses a serious problem. **Many years ago, early orbital debris researchers predicted that parts of Earth's orbit could eventually**

become so crowded that accidental collisions would fuel a self-reinforcing boom in the hazardous debris population—even if we put a stop to future launches. That runaway debris generation scenario, often called the Kessler syndrome, may seem far off. But in fact, the sheer density of derelict objects in orbit has already exceeded what many consider to be the mathematical point of no return. In some of the most congested regions of low earth orbit, this point was actually passed more than 10 years ago, although the onslaught of chain-reaction collisions will likely take decades to pick up steam. As a result, **the threat of this potentially catastrophic domino effect has remained largely invisible.**

We've seen only one bellwether: the violent collision in 2009 of an active Iridium communications satellite with a derelict Russian payload called Cosmos 2251. That one accident created thousands of fragments big enough to be seen by ground-based radar antennas, as well as tens of thousands other pieces of debris that could damage satellites but are too small to detect and avoid. You might think such an unexpected and dramatic event would have spurred the aerospace community into action. But while the event did create some temporary interest and a slew of conferences and policy discussions, it didn't result in meaningful change to the way orbital debris is handled. How do we change our ways? A year ago, at NASA's request, we, along with 11 other experts in space operation, policy, law, and risk management finished an assessment of the agency's orbital debris and micrometeoroids programs for the National Research Council. NASA has led the way in many of the measurement, testing, analysis, and operations activities needed to address the problem. But we found the program is struggling to keep up with the expanding threat. And in the year since our report

was published, little seems to have changed. NASA continues to fight a growing hazard with what has been, at best, a level budget. **But long-term models tell us there are really only two ways to reduce the threat of collisions in orbit. One is to actively remove debris from densely populated regions of space, drawing the large object population back down below the tipping point. The other is to perfect just-in-time collision avoidance for objects that can't change direction under their own power, executing maneuvers (for example, by puffing gas into the path of a piece of debris) that could prevent collisions between two derelict objects. At the moment, we don't have the technology needed to pursue either of these options, and it's still unclear what national or international agencies should be responsible for pursuing them. Alarming, it may take hundreds of billions of dollars or more to clean up the debris environment over the next century in order to ensure reliable space operations.** There isn't even a clear legal statute that precisely defines ownership and liability issues for derelict object removal operations, and any international effort will likely struggle against trade and export restrictions that can limit technology development and sharing.

Antisat weapons are too expensive and all our satellites are defenseless against normal missiles

Macdonald 2016 [Cheyenne Macdonald at Daily mail, "Expert says Russian and Chinese anti-satellite weapons are the 'new reality' and warns ALL US satellites are at risk", *Daily Mail*, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3875832/Expert-says-Russian-Chinese-anti-satellite-weapons-new-reality-warns-satellites-risk.html>] //CJC

In an interview with Sputnik China, military expert Vasily Kashin says future satellites should be built with 'advanced electronic warfare systems,' as **current craft are essentially defenseless against interceptor missiles.** Kashin builds off recent claims by US Air Force Maj. Gen. Nina Armagno, who said Russia and China could soon be a risk to all US satellites in orbit by 2025. Systems like the US's Space Surveillance Telescope or the Russian space surveillance station Okno, which can detect satellite-fighters, 'won't resolve the problem,' he says.

'Such a system is capable of proving the fact that a satellite can be attacked by an enemy space vehicle, but the problem is that this system cannot protect the satellites,' Kashin told Sputnik China. The expert points to China's development of a 'simple and cheap' launch vehicle which uses ballistic missiles in plans to replace satellites destroyed during possible conflicts with new ones. Along with this, Russia is working to use ballistic missiles launched

from submarines to put satellites into orbit, he says. **'So far, anti-satellite weapon has remained fabulously expensive, and the number of relevant launch vehicles is limited,'** Kashin told Sputnik China.

Retrenchment solves LITERALLY EVERYTHING THIS CARD IS FIRE AF YO--Chris "FLAMES!"--Will

MacDonald 2011 [Paul MacDonald, professor of political science at Williams College, "Graceful Decline?", *International Security*, <http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00034>] //CJC

Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. **Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades.** In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. **Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility.** Yet **our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one's reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers.** Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. **Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations.** We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, **periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline.** The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition.⁹³ China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism.⁹⁴ Most important, **the United States is not in free fall.** Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate **the United States will experience a "moderate" decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China** sometime in the next decade or two.⁹⁵ Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, **the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal.** The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. **Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness.**⁹⁶ **Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy,** in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. **In short, the United States should be**

able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul.⁹⁷ U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict.⁹⁸ Moreover, Washington's support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order.⁹⁹ A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas. Indeed, **even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory.¹⁰⁰ By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China.** Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. **Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes.¹⁰¹** Conclusion This article has advanced three main arguments. First, **retrenchment pessimists are incorrect when they suggest that retrenchment is an uncommon policy response to great power decline. States often curtail their commitments and mellow their ambitions as they fall in the ranks of great powers.** Second and related, declining great powers react in a prompt and proportionate manner to their dwindling fortunes. They do this for the same reason that they tend to seize opportunities to expand: international incentives are strong inducements. In the high-stakes world of great power politics, states can seldom afford to fool themselves or pamper parochial interests when relative power is perilously slipping away. Third, the rate of relative decline explains not only the extent of retrenchment but also the form. The faster the rate of decline, the more likely states are to reform their militaries, increase reliance on allies, and refrain from using force in international disputes. Taken together, **these findings suggest that retrenchment is an attractive strategy for dealing with great power decline.** Although we make no claim that the rate of relative decline explains everything, we suggest that our study represents a solid first cut and that domestic political factors loom too large in discussions of power transitions and hegemonic change. **Retrenchment has a bad reputation, but our findings suggest its benefits are overlooked. Competition spurs states to improve themselves, and if done intelligently this makes states better.** The historical record gives little cause for despair; **spending can be curbed,** interest groups controlled, and innovation fostered. And there is a fair chance of rebound; **declining powers rise to the challenge of decline so well that they recapture their former glory with some regularity.**

500B spent on readiness now

Amadeo 2016 [Kimberly Amadeo received an M.S. in Management from the Sloan School of Business at M.I.T. in 1987, an M.S. in Social Planning from Boston College in 1978. "U.S. Military Budget: Components, Challenges, Growth", *The Balance*, <<https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-military-budget-components-challenges-growth-3306320>>] //CJC

Myth #2: Defense spending should be increased, even if other programs must be cut.

Fact: **The Department of Defense budget of \$523.9 billion is** more than the \$441 billion deficit. That's **just to keep the military in readiness.** It doesn't include the cost of wars. Emergency funding adds \$58.8 billion to DoD's cost. Five other agencies support Defense: FBI

and Cybersecurity (in the Justice Department budget), the National Nuclear Security Administration (in the Energy Department's budget), Homeland Security, the Veterans Administration, and the State Department. They add \$175.9 billion in defense costs. These departments add \$14.9 billion to the OCO. The real cost of U.S. defense is \$773.5 billion. For more, see U.S. Military Budget: Components, Challenges and Growth, Cost of Iraq War, and War on Terror Facts.

Gregg Easterbrook, NYTimes, 2015 March 09, Accessed Online: 29 December 2016, "Our Navy is Big Enough" URL: <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/09/opinion/our-navy-is-big-enough.html>

Yet **no naval expansion is needed. The Navy has 10 nuclear-powered supercarriers — 10 more than the rest of the world.** No other nation is even contemplating anything like the advanced nuclear supercarriers that the United States has under construction. **China possesses one outdated**, conventionally powered carrier, and is believed to be building two other carriers, neither of which is a nuclear supercarrier capable of contesting the "blue water," or deep open oceans, where the United States Navy dominates. In aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, naval aviation, surface firepower, assault ships, missiles and logistics, the United States Navy is more powerful than all other navies of the world combined.

Some commentators engage in fearmongering regarding China's carriers, new submarines and its anti-ship ballistic missile. But the carriers are modest compared with America's, the submarines far less capable than ours. And there's no evidence that its anti-ship missile has had a realistic test. China's neighbors are unhappy that the growing Chinese Navy may back Beijing's claims regarding the South China Sea. But Chinese naval expansion does not pose any direct threat to the national security of the United States, or to its dominance of the oceans. For the United States to think there is something sinister in China's projecting power in its own nearby waters would be like China's asserting there were something sinister in the fact that the United States Fourth Fleet operates in the Caribbean. South China Sea jurisdictional disputes are an issue to be resolved by negotiation. Making the United States Navy even more powerful won't matter to such clashes.

For many centuries, naval rivalry was a central aspect of great-power relations. **Yet for more than half a century there has been no great-power naval rivalry** — because the United States Navy rules. The last major sea battle was at Okinawa, in 1945. Piracy still occurs, but in the main, global trade has flourished because sea lanes are open and commercial vessels ply the oceans unthreatened by warships. Free commerce upon the oceans brings nearly all nations, including developing nations, higher living standards and less poverty.

Since Navy operations take place far from home, Americans may be unaware of their country's nautical strength and of the progressive role the Navy plays in world affairs. Many Americans have never seen an active-duty United States warship; ships can't march in Fourth of July parades or fly over football games. **But arguably, naval hegemony is among the greatest American achievements, and one that makes all nations better off. That hegemony is secured by such a dramatic margin that no naval buildup is needed.**

A few years ago, I gave a lecture at the United States Naval War College, in Newport, R.I. Officers from 129 nations have graduated from the Naval War College; flags of their countries ring the grounds. I was reminded that one lesson that officers of other navies learn at the Naval War College is that there is zero chance they will ever defeat the United States in battle — so why even try? This situation is a tremendously positive development for the world, but it also means there is no reason to increase the Navy's budget, nor for Congress to fret about how many ships we have.

Beauchamp, Zack. "ISIS is Losing" *Vox Policy*, March. 2015. Web.

<http://www.vox.com/2015/2/23/8085197/isis-is-losing>.

But, after months of ISIS expansion and victories, **the group is now being beaten back. It is losing territory in the places that matter.** Coalition airstrikes have hamstrung its ability to wage offensive war, and it has no friends to turn to for help. Its governance model is unsustainable and risks collapse in the long run. In conventional terms, **ISIS is pretty badly outnumbered.** The CIA estimates that ISIS has between 20,000 and 31,500 fighters; some private sector sources suggest that figure may be closer to 100,000. There are about 48,000 official Iraqi government soldiers, but 100,000 to 120,000 Shia militiamen fighting on the government's side buttress them. The BBC reports that there are 190,000 Kurdish Peshmerga in Iraq's north. And that's to say nothing of ISIS's enemies in Syria. The group's ideology demands total and absolute adherence to its narrow and extremist interpretation of Islamic law. In their view, nobody — including alQaeda — is sufficiently pure. This causes ISIS fighters to lash out at people and groups who would otherwise be allies, making any alliances that ISIS forms temporary at best.

Fearon, James, and Gideon Rose. "The ISIS Crisis." Google Books. Stanford University, 01 Feb. 2015. Web. 20 Dec. 2016.

[https://books.google.com/books?id=r6CBwAAQBAlpg&pg=PT152&dq=more%2Bwe%2C%2Bthe%2Bless%2B%2Bthe%2Bmore%2Bwe%2Bhave%2Bmore%2Bat%2Bstake%2Bhand%2Bwho%2B%2B%2Bsome%2Bcases%29%2Bthe%2BUnited%2BStates%2Bwants%2Bto%2Bbuild%2Bup%2Btheir%2Bown%2Bcapabilities.%2BSecond%2C%2Balthough%2Bthe%2B%2Bsurely%2Ba%2Bhorrible%2Borganization%2C%2Bthe%2Bdoes%2Bnot%2Bpose%2Bsource%2Bbl&ots=caB1F1PBG&sig=PHZ_J0Kq_hvlyhXAR-cnQZRMp_A&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwIPn6e0gYTRAhVb-WMKHbc08J0QGAIEHDAARv=onepage&q=more%20we%20do%2C%20the%20less%20will%20be%20done%20by%20parties%20in%20the%20area%20who%20have%20more%20at%20stake%20and%20who%20\(in%20some%20cases\)%20united%20states%20wants%20to%20build%20up%20their%20own%20capabilities.%20Second%2C%20although%20it%20is%20surely%20a%20horrible%20organization%2C%20the%20does%20not%20pose%20a%20false%20threat%20to%20the%20United%20States%20and%20through%20corrupt%20local%20proxies%20ISIS%20bailed%20the%20United%20States%20to%20attack%20and%20the%20way%20it%20does%20the%20more%20it%20helps%20with](https://books.google.com/books?id=r6CBwAAQBAlpg&pg=PT152&dq=more%2Bwe%2C%2Bthe%2Bless%2B%2Bthe%2Bmore%2Bwe%2Bhave%2Bmore%2Bat%2Bstake%2Bhand%2Bwho%2B%2B%2Bsome%2Bcases%29%2Bthe%2BUnited%2BStates%2Bwants%2Bto%2Bbuild%2Bup%2Btheir%2Bown%2Bcapabilities.%2BSecond%2C%2Balthough%2Bthe%2B%2Bsurely%2Ba%2Bhorrible%2Borganization%2C%2Bthe%2Bdoes%2Bnot%2Bpose%2Bsource%2Bbl&ots=caB1F1PBG&sig=PHZ_J0Kq_hvlyhXAR-cnQZRMp_A&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwIPn6e0gYTRAhVb-WMKHbc08J0QGAIEHDAARv=onepage&q=more%20we%20do%2C%20the%20less%20will%20be%20done%20by%20parties%20in%20the%20area%20who%20have%20more%20at%20stake%20and%20who%20(in%20some%20cases)%20united%20states%20wants%20to%20build%20up%20their%20own%20capabilities.%20Second%2C%20although%20it%20is%20surely%20a%20horrible%20organization%2C%20the%20does%20not%20pose%20a%20false%20threat%20to%20the%20United%20States%20and%20through%20corrupt%20local%20proxies%20ISIS%20bailed%20the%20United%20States%20to%20attack%20and%20the%20way%20it%20does%20the%20more%20it%20helps%20with)

"First, **the more we do, the less will be done by parties in the area** who have more at stake and **who** (in some cases) **the United States wants to build up their own capabilities.** Second, although it is surely a horrible organization, ISIS does not pose that big a direct threat to the United States. Third, the more the United States does, the more it actually helps ISIS with the group's own storyline, which says that it is the most important and legitimate nationalist (in a way) opposition to foreign, infidel oppression exercised both directly and through corrupt local proxies. ISIS baited the United States to attack, and the United States took the bait. The more it does, the more it helps with

ISIS' recruitment drives. Fourth, **[yet] the only good way to get rid of ISIS in the long run is to let local actors deal with it** and/or let the

Civil war is 90% of deaths and most common

Lacina 2006 [Bethany Lacina at the Stanford Political Science Department, "Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, <http://www.bethanylacina.com/Lacina_civilwar_severity.pdf>] //CJC

Civil conflict is the most common form of warfare, accounting for all but three of the wars that broke out from 1990 to 20021 and 90 percent of civilian and combatant battle deaths during the same period.² As greater academic attention has been paid to internal warfare, scholars concentrating on large-n statistical work have begun to converge on a handful of factors that seem most important in explaining civil conflict onset and duration (for reviews of the quantitative literature, see Lacina 2004; Sambanis 2002, 2004).

Anup Shah, 13, World Military Spending — Printer friendly version — Global Issues, No Publication, <http://www.globalissues.org/print/article/75> // ZS

The lion's share of this money is not spent by the Pentagon on protecting American citizens. It goes to **supporting U.S. military activities, including interventions, throughout the world.** Were this budget and the organization it finances called the "Military Department," then attitudes might be quite different. Americans are willing to pay for defense, but they would probably be much less willing to spend billions of dollars if the money were labeled "Foreign Military Operations."

Drug Policy Alliance, nd. [Drug Policy Alliance, "Supply and Demand", *Drug Policy Alliance*, <http://www.drugpolicy.org/supply-and-demand>] //AKC

A prime example of the drug war's backward logic is its distortion of the basic economic principle of supply and demand. The federal government funnels vast resources into criminal justice and interdiction policies intended to reduce the supply of drugs, while neglecting treatment and education strategies that could help reduce drug demand.

This singular focus on supply reduction has failed to control organized crime syndicates and quell drug trade-related violence. The sky-high profits of the illegal drug trade ensure that each kingpin who falls will only be replaced with another, **making supply-side interdiction a ceaseless battle.** Education and treatment programs yield more permanent reductions in demand through prevention and healing.

MarEx, 2016 [MarEx, "Proposed 2017 Budget Includes Cuts for Ports, USCG and Navy", *The Maritime Executive*, <http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/proposed-2017-budget-includes-cuts-for-ports-uscg-and-navy>] //AKC

The president's proposed budget also included reductions for the maritime service branches of the armed forces.

The budget for the U.S. Coast Guard includes about 40 percent less for vessel acquisition, construction and improvements (AC&I) this year, and about 10 percent less than the 2016 budget overall. The AC&I budget includes \$150 million for design work on a new heavy icebreaker and \$100 million for design and analysis for the new Offshore Patrol Cutter, both major acquisition priorities for the USCG. At present the USCG has only one active heavy icebreaker.

No Arctic conflict – low military presence and MAD checks – the aff only makes escalation more likely

Bailes 13 – Visiting Professor at U. of Iceland (Alyson, "Arctic: new conflict theatre between Russia and the West, or model of peace?," European Leadership Network, 12/16/13, http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/arctic-new-conflict-theatre-between-russia-and-the-west-or-model-of-peace_1099.html)/JG

To be sure, some commentators on the Arctic have other worries than just a disorderly 'race for oil'. They note signs of increased military spending on assets designed for the polar seas, together with support facilities; and they warn that an 'incident' could escalate into an international clash. What of these complications? First, **all Arctic states except Russia are cutting military expenditure generally and their Arctic plans are modest**, involving mainly higher-tech replacements for old assets and a small growth in numbers. Russia's plans in the Arctic are not more grandiose than elsewhere and actual construction has made a slow start. New bases like Denmark's in East Greenland, and Russia's being built in the New Siberian Islands (far to the East), are designed mainly to get closer to the High Northern seas for purposes of patrolling and policing, climate monitoring, and response to accidents. A study in 2012 by the respected pro-peace institute SIPRI concluded: **"Conventional military forces specially adapted to the harsh Arctic environment are projected to remain small scale**, especially given the size of the Arctic region, and will remain in some cases considerably below cold war levels." [i] One must also remember that Russia and the West remain in a state of uneasy strategic balance overall, despite all the progress made since the Cold War. Russia's northern coast is now its only real major 'break-out' area, and its forces there are also supposed to offset US and Western power in general. But recalling this also highlights something many analysts miss. **The nuclear and naval stand-off between the USA and the Soviet Union or Russia has always taken place over the North Pole. Albeit by a deadly and costly logic, it has kept the peace since the 1950s. Why should either side think they could use military force against the other, in this very area, without the terrible dangers of escalation? Can one really imagine Russia fighting any of the other countries around the Arctic, all full NATO members, without fear of NATO retaliation? So long as Moscow's own Arctic assets are secure and the key sea route firmly under its grip, why would it take that risk here more than anywhere else?** Arguably, in fact, the Arctic interaction of Russia and the West is less tense, less subject to out-of-control incidents, than anywhere else

their strategic peripheries touch. **Since Cold-War times both sides have cooperated on Arctic exploration and environmental management.** Since 1996 the Arctic Council has formalized and extended this cooperation, inter alia reaching two legally binding agreements (among the five Nordics, Russia, USA and Canada) on cooperation in Search and Rescue, and major oil-spill response, respectively. Under these agreements all sides have pledged to use their naval and air assets and other security expertise to help each other when something goes wrong. Add the way that Russia has opened up for Western investment in its own Arctic resource exploitation, and there seems rather less to worry about here than in the Caucasus or even the Eastern Baltic. Of course, governments are not the only potential conflict players, as seen in the recent clash between the Russian authorities and Greenpeace. But that example also suggested how high the odds are against other states getting drawn in by a non-state incident in this region. The Arctic does not have 'weak states' or civil conflicts, and the most violent non-state actors likely to surface there - smugglers and opportunistic terrorists - would be the enemies of all. The real threats of a changing Arctic are the non-military ones of violent nature, accidents, infrastructure failure, pollution, business miscalculations, destabilizing migration, other social disruption and new disease - all things that states can profit most from tackling together. And if some commentators are still worried about a random military clash, why are they not deluging us with proposals for arms control and confidence-building measures to help avert it? Interestingly, the only considered and specific ideas of that kind so far have come from a Russian think-tank.

The plan will threaten China – sparks escalatory conflict

Rainwater 12 -Shiloh Rainwater is a senior honors student studying political science and international relations at Pepperdine University, where he expects to graduate in spring 2013. after graduating, he plans to pursue his interest in international trade issues by obtaining a law degree in international law as well as a master's degree in international relations. He has conducted extensive research projects for various organizations, including policy analysis of democratic movements in the Middle east for Pepperdine's communication Division and research into the geopolitical and logistical implications of operating nonprofits abroad, ('China's arctic Strategy and Its Implications", 2012, <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/31708e41-a53c-45d3-a5e4-ccb5ad550815/Race-to-the-North--China-s-Arctic-Strategy-and-Its.aspx//nemo>)

Nevertheless, the potential for conflict exists, and its likelihood will depend to a significant degree on how the circumpolar states react to China's arctic ambitions. China's strategy emphasizes the status quo only so long as that proves conducive to its "core interests"; Beijing could pursue more revisionist policies if it perceived these interests as severely threatened. If at some point the CCP were to determine that supply disruptions or a blockade of commercial vessels threatened its economic interests in the arctic to the point of impacting Chinese social, and subsequently regime, stability, it could respond with military force. to reduce the likelihood of such a conflict, the arctic eight should incorporate PrC interests into their arctic policy calculus, in two basic ways. first, the circumpolar states must be cautious not to overreact to a Chinese presence in the arctic. this is not to say that they should avoid precautionary measures; prudence dictates that the arctic eight prepare for military contingencies and protect their northern sovereignty should, for instance, the strategic value of the arctic region eventually attract Chinese warships for protecting trade or exerting pressure on the

United states. still, the logic of the security dilemma suggests that heavy arctic militarization or inflammatory rhetoric could provoke conflict if regional states, worried about China's growing influence, were to engage in excessive military posturing and thereby intensify China's concerns. second, the arctic eight should seek to include, rather than exclude, China in arctic institutions and agreements, which they can do without ceding their own rights. admission of the PrC as a permanent observer country to the arctic Council, for example, would go far toward meeting Chinese interests. a number of non-arctic countries (all of them european) already operate as permanent observers to the council, and the expansion of such a right to an east asian country would enhance the organization's soft power in that region. More importantly, admission of China to the arctic Council as a permanent observer would not significantly diminish the influence of the arctic eight, as, among other limitations, observers do not have voting privileges. given this point, along with the fact that Chinese and american interests are aligned on such issues as free navigation through the Northwest Passage, Washington would be well served to advocate China's accession to the council. China's arctic strategy remains in its formative stages. yet even if a Chinese threat to arctic security never materializes, the unfolding race to the north will tend to intensify sino-arctic strategic suspicion, as well as tension between China and other non-arctic states seeking a say in arctic affairs. to avoid a destabilizing escalation, it will be important not only for the littoral states to be inclusive of China but also for the PrC to improve the transparency of its arctic policy making by clarifying its intentions in the High North.

China fears being left out

Rainwater 12 -Shiloh Rainwater is a senior honors student studying political science and international relations at Pepperdine University, where he expects to graduate in spring 2013. after graduating, he plans to pursue his interest in international trade issues by obtaining a law degree in international law as well as a master's degree in international relations. He has conducted extensive research projects for various organizations, including policy analysis of democratic movements in the Middle east for Pepperdine's communication Division and research into the geopolitical and logistical implications of operating nonprofits abroad, ('China's arctic Strategy and Its Implications", 2012, <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/31708e41-a53c-45d3-a5e4-ccb5ad550815/Race-to-the-North--China-s-Arctic-Strategy-and-Its.aspx//nemo>)

Despite its many achievements in terms of investment and cooperation, *China fears it is being shut out of the arctic*. In 2008, for example, the "arctic five" (Canada, Russia, the United States, Denmark, and Norway)—signed the Ilulissat declaration, committing themselves to peaceful resolution of territorial sovereignty disputes in the arctic.⁸² However, with its narrow definition of arctic matters as regional ones, the declaration perceptually attempts to exclude non-arctic states from them.⁸³ *China fears that in this fashion the circumpolar states will "gang up and 'carve up the arctic melon' and its natural resources among themselves, to the exclusion of everyone else."*⁸⁴ to secure its position in arctic affairs, therefore, Beijing propagates the notion that it has rights in the arctic, engages in "lawfare" to obfuscate the legal framework, advocates institutional reform, and cultivates hard-power measures to secure its interests. first and foremost, *China harbors a deep sense of entitlement to arctic resources, sea-lanes, and governance. this entitlement relies on various justifications*. as a Northern Hemisphere country that is affected by arctic warming, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and the world's most populous state, China sees its role in arctic affairs as indispensable. Chinese Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo made this point in March 2010, proclaiming that "the arctic belongs to all the people around the world as no nation has sovereignty over it."⁸⁵ similarly, in 2009 Hu Zhengyue, China's assistant minister of foreign affairs, warned that arctic countries should "ensure a balance of coastal countries' interests and the common interests of the international community."⁸⁶ Hu, it seems, *was advising the circumpolar states not to lock up for themselves the resources and sea-lanes of the arctic*. China further asserts its rights by employing the language of UNCLOS to argue that the arctic and its resources are the "common heritage of all humankind" and do not belong exclusively to the arctic five.⁸⁷ In reality, "common heritage" in UNCLOS refers to the high seas, designated by UNCLOS as the area that lies beyond EEZ boundaries. If the current territorial and continental-shelf claims of the circumpolar states are ultimately accepted as presented, 88 percent of the arctic seabed would likely fall under their combined sovereign EEZ jurisdictions, with the small "doughnut hole" in the center qualifying as the common heritage.⁸⁸ since, however, most of the resource wealth in the arctic lies within these claims, China perpetuates the notion that the entire arctic ocean is the common heritage of humankind so as to expand its legal rights there.⁸⁹ this sort of "lawfare," or misuse of the "law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective," is an essential component of China's strategy, enabling the PrC to circumvent its weaker status as a non-arctic state through asymmetrical means.⁹⁰ China also appears bent on reforming the institutions governing the arctic so as to create for itself a more favorable legal environment. China's national news magazine Beijing Review has boldly asserted that every treaty and organization constituting the arctic legal regime—including UNCLOS, the International Maritime Organization, and the arctic Council—is riddled with flaws and must be reformed. for example, in China's view the laws enacted by the arctic Council are not legally binding and "a politically valid . . . arctic governance system has yet to be established." Moreover, China resents the fact that arctic affairs are dominated by the littoral states, claiming that "it is unimaginable that non-arctic states will remain users of arctic shipping routes and consumers of arctic energy

without playing a role in the decision-making process. . . . [a]n end to the arctic states' monopoly of arctic affairs is now imperative."⁹¹ one area that China wishes to reform is free navigation

through arctic sea lanes, according to UNCLOS, while foreign vessels are granted the right of "innocent passage" through territorial waters and free navigation through exclusive economic zones, states retain full sovereignty over internal waters—waters on the landward side of the baseline from which the territorial zone is demarcated and can restrict shipping therein. Under this provision, Russia has declared that currently accessible portions of the Northern sea route fall within its internal waters;⁹² for its part, Canada has asserted that the Northwest Passage constitutes "historic internal waters."⁹³ In response, some Chinese scholars and government officials have suggested that the Svalbard treaty—the instrument that governs the international use of Norway's Svalbard archipelago, where China maintains its sole arctic research station—could be used as a model for resolving Canada's claims of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage.⁹⁴ Under such an agreement, Canada would retain full sovereignty over the passage but with the provision that international shipping would be allowed free navigation rights. However, Canada, like Russia, places an extremely high premium on its arctic sovereignty and is unlikely to favor such a proposal.⁹⁵ In light of these disadvantages, some speculation has arisen as to whether China, which has an extensive history of advocating its own sovereignty rights while disregarding the claims of other states, will respect the sovereign claims of the circumpolar states or instead utilize military force to secure its interests. In fact, a Chinese military presence in the arctic is not beyond the realm of possibility, and the idea is entertained with some seriousness in the PRC.

For example, Li Zhenfu of Dalian Maritime University has written that the arctic "has significant military value, a fact recognized by other countries." Similarly, the PLA, which has apparently assumed the role of guardian of China's core national interests, has adopted a strident tone on arctic affairs. In 2008, for example, senior Colonel

Han Xudong warned that the "possibility of use of force cannot be ruled out in the arctic due to complex sovereignty disputes."⁹⁶ In contrast, Chinese political officials have expressed a preference for cooperative resolution of arctic disputes. this disjunction between Chinese military and political commentary hints at internal divisions over arctic strategy and raises questions whether the PLA is driving China's economic and strategic fixation with the arctic. to the extent that in fact it is, PLA posturing could translate into action. With its naval modernization program now aimed at "far-sea defense," a Chinese military presence in the arctic could materialize as Beijing becomes more reliant on arctic resources and sea-lanes to fuel its

economy. China could deploy submarines or surface warships into the arctic to conduct surveillance, defend economic interests, or accomplish strategic goals. In recent years the PLA has grown increasingly assertive, as in 2009, when five Chinese vessels stalked USNs impeccably, ostensibly defending China's territorial claims in the South China Sea.⁹⁷ David Curtis Wright has argued that given this trend, along with "the brazen nuclear-powered submarine violation of Japanese territorial waters on 10 November 2004, the lurking of one or more Chinese submarines in the arctic should not come as much of a surprise, if it has not happened already."⁹⁸ In fact, Xuelong's oceanographic studies and sea-bottom research during its 1999 expedition had "operational implications for the PLA's antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability," suggesting that China could already be making preparations for a military contingency in the High North.⁹⁹ *In addition to these considerations, China might also find an arctic naval presence attractive as it would constitute a strategic vantage point from which to exert pressure on the United States in the event of a confrontation over, for example, Taiwan.* at a minimum, when climate change makes the sea routes and resources of the arctic truly profitable, China may seek to establish a naval presence along the Bering Strait to provide trade security. No more than fifty-two nautical miles wide, the Bering Strait, which separates Alaska and Russia, was referred to as the "Ice Curtain" during the Cold War and is now sometimes called the "Bering Gate."¹⁰⁰ As China's only entry point into the arctic, the Bering Strait is a narrow choke point through which all of the nation's energy and trade transiting the arctic will have to pass. The PLA, therefore, will be deeply concerned with its safety.

Obama increasing budget by 5 billion a year

Reuters, 2016 [Reuters, "Obama Budget Proposal Includes \$19 Billion for Cybersecurity", *Fortune Tech*, <http://fortune.com/2016/02/09/obama-budget-cybersecurity/>] //AKC

President Barack Obama's budget proposal for the 2017 fiscal year seeks \$19 billion for cyber security across the U.S. government, a surge of \$5 billion over this year, according to senior administration officials.

The request comes as the Obama administration has struggled to address the growing risk posed by criminals and nation states in the digital world.

The initiative, to be released later on Tuesday, is more than a one-third increase from the \$14 billion sought last year and will include \$3.1 billion for technology modernization at various federal agencies.

Using the military kills readiness (interventions)

Spencer 2000 [Jack Spencer is Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, "The Facts about Military Readiness," *Heritage Foundation*, September 15, 2000.] <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2000/09/BG1394-The-Facts-About-Military-Readiness>) //WGC

Effect on Readiness. **This dramatic increase in the use of America's armed forces has had a detrimental effect on overall combat readiness.** According to General Shelton, "our experience in the Balkans underscores the reality that multiple, persistent commitments place a significant strain on our people and can erode warfighting readiness."²⁶ **Both people and equipment wear out faster under frequent use.** For example, **units deployed in Somalia took 10 months to restore their equipment to predeployment readiness levels.**²⁷ According to a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) survey of **Army leaders who participated in peace missions, almost two-thirds said that their units' training readiness had declined.**² Training is a key component of readiness, and **frequent missions cause the armed forces to reduce training schedules.** For example, Operation Allied Force caused 22 joint exercises to be cancelled in 1999. Joint training exercises were reduced from 277 in fiscal year (FY) 1996 to 189 in FY 2000.

Trump loves war — but only when we win

Carroll 2016 [Lauren Carroll at Politifact, "Super PAC ad says Trump likes war, even nuclear, but that needs context", *Politifact*, <<http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/jun/19/priorities-usa-action/super-pac-ad-says-trump-likes-war-even-nuclear-lac/>>] //CJC

We decided to check out the context of both of those comments and see if the ad is fairly representing Trump's position. We also looked at **Trump's overall views** on nuclear policy. **I love war** in a certain way.' This comment comes from a 90-minute speech in Iowa on Nov. 12, 2015. In the speech, Trump theorized that former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein feigned having weapons of mass destruction to scare neighboring Iran, before briefly sidetracking into his feelings on war generally. **"This is the Trump theory on war,"** he said. **"But I'm good at war.** I've had a lot of wars of my own. I'm really good at war. **I love war** in a certain way. **But only when we win."**

China Mil spending growth is decreasing cuz econ slowdown but still up

Global Security 2016 [Global Security, "China's Defense Budget", *Global Security*, <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/budget.htm>>] //CJC

China announced 05 February 2016 that it will raise its defense spending by 7.6% this year, its lowest increase in six years. Citing a budget report, China's state-run Xinhua news agency says a sizable amount of the 146.7 billion US dollar budget will be used to protect China's maritime rights in the South China Sea. **The defense budget hike was the first single-digit rise since 2010. It followed a nearly unbroken two-decade run of double-digit jumps, and came as the Chinese economy slows.** On March 4, 2015, China announced that it would raise its defense budget by approximately 10%. While down from the previous year's 12.2% increase, the announcement nonetheless marked the fifth consecutive year with a double digit increase in official military spending. This would roughly translate to 890 billion yuan , or about \$US145 billion.

Trump will continue Bush trend of frivolous wars; contributes to China's rise

David **Smith**, 4-1-2016 ["President Trump fills world leaders with fear: 'It's gone from funny to really scary'," Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/apr/28/donald-trump-president-world-leaders-foreign-relations>] MJS 1-5-2017

Shen Dingli, the deputy head of Fudan University's institute of international affairs, described Trump as a "foolish" man who was taking advantage of a "naive America". But he said he was a foolish man Beijing should welcome in the White House. **George W Bush had done huge damage to America's standing in the world by invading Iraq.** Shen argued. **A Trump administration would continue that trend.**

"Everybody knows that **American aggression has made China rise more rapidly. So if another American president would invade Panama, would invade North Korea, would invade Vietnam, that would give China superpower status because America would weaken itself,**" Shen predicted, adding: "So [we would be] happy to see it."

Government spending crowds out private sector

Furceri and Sousa, Feb **2009** [Davide Furceri (OECD and University of Palermo), Ricardo M. Sousa (University of Minho, NIPE, London School of Economics, and FMG), "The Impact of Government Spending on the Private Sector: Crowding-out versus Crowding-in Effects," http://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe/docs/2009/NIPE_WP_6_2009.pdf] MJS

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of government spending on the private sector, assessing the existence of crowding-out versus crowding-in effects. **Using a panel of 145 countries from 1960 to 2007, the results suggest that government spending produces important crowding-out effects, by negatively affecting both private consumption and investment.** Moreover, while the effects do not seem to depend on the different phases of

economic cycle, they vary considerably among regions. The results are economically and statistically significant, and robust to several econometric techniques.

Foreign Aid 6th Response

Sullivan, 2011. ["US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation." Patricia L. Sullivan, University of Georgia. Brock F. Tesson, University of Georgia. Xiaojun Li, Stanford University. Foreign Policy Analysis (2011) 7, 275–294.

http://aida.wss.yale.edu/~ng3/NANCYS_Yale_Website/resources/papers/Aid_20140816_FINAL.pdf GT]

What can states expect to receive in return for the military aid they provide to other states? Can military aid buy recipient state compliance with donor objectives? In this study, we systematically investigate the effects of US military assistance on recipient state behavior toward the United States. We build on existing literature by creating three explicit theoretical models, employing a new measure of cooperation generated from events data, and controlling for preference similarity, so that our results capture the influence military aid has on recipient state behavior independent of any dyadic predisposition toward cooperation or conflict. We test seven hypotheses using a combination of simultaneous equation, cross-sectional time series, and Heckman selection models. **We find that, with limited exceptions, increasing levels of US military aid significantly reduce cooperative foreign policy behavior with the United States.** US reaction to recipient state behavior is also counterintuitive; instead of using a carrot-and-stick approach to military aid allocations, our results show that recipient state cooperation is likely to lead to subsequent reductions in US military assistance.

Foreign Aid 5th Response

Dubey, 2009 ["Bases, Bullets and Ballots: the Effect of U.S. Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia." Oeindrila Dubey from NYU and Suresh Naidu from Harvard. July 15, 2009

http://www.cgdev.org/doc/events/07.29.09/Bases_Bullets_Ballots.pdf GT].

This paper examines the effect of U.S. military aid on political violence and democracy in Colombia. We take advantage of the fact that U.S. military aid is channeled to Colombian army brigades operating out of military bases, and compare how changes in aid affect outcomes in municipalities with and without bases. Using detailed data on violence perpetrated by illegal armed groups, we find that **U.S. military aid leads to differential increases in attacks** by paramilitaries (who are allied with the military), but has no significant effect on attacks by the guerrillas. We also find that the **aid shock results in more paramilitary political assassinations** during election years, but has no significant effect on guerrilla assassinations. Moreover, **when aid rises, voter turnout falls** more in base municipalities during regional elections and these effects are larger in politically contested municipalities. To address potential endogeneity in the timing of aid, we use an instrument based on U.S. military aid to the rest of the world (excluding Latin America). Our results are also robust across a wide variety of alternative control groups. **The findings suggest that foreign military aid may strengthen the capacity of armed non-state actors, undermining domestic political institutions.**

Foreign Aid 4th response

Strandow, 2014. ["Foreign Aid and the Intensity of Violent Armed Conflict." Daniel Strandow, Uppsala University, Michael G. Findley, University of Texas at Austin, Joseph K. Young, American University, 6 November 2014. http://www.michael-findley.com/uploads/2/0/4/5/20455799/foreign_aid_violent_conflict_strandow-findley-young.pdf GT]

We conclude that greater funding concentration increased military fatalities by 40% compared to if there were low or no funding concentration. We caution readers not to overemphasize this result for three reasons: (1) It is impossible to know what percentage of the total population of aid projects that we have been able to geocode. This problem is not unique for this study but is common for this type of data. (2) We rely on the assumption that aid commitments are correlated with warring parties expectations about future aid disbursements, something that is potentially contentious. (3) Our results should only be generalized to contested areas where there have been reports of at least one military casualty during a year.

Foreign Aid 3rd response

Nielsen, 2010. ["Foreign Aid Shocks as a Cause of Violent Armed Conflict" Richard A. Nielsen, Michael G. Findley, Zachary S. Davis, Tara Candland, Daniel L. Nielson. September 8, 2010. <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.173.3014&rep=rep1&type=pdf> GT] Richard Nielsen from the Department of Government, Harvard University

Alternative operationalizations of our primary independent variable Aid Shocks – the percentile cutoff to be considered an aid shock, **the number of aid shocks in any 5-year period**, and a continuous measure of aid change – **give further insights into the effects of aid changes on conflict.** We find that our results are similar with aid shocks defined as the lowest 25% of aid changes ($b=0.48$, $p = 0.051$), as the lowest 20% ($b = 0.79$, $p = 0.001$), and as the lowest 10% ($b = .78$, $p= 0.016$) compared to the 15% cutoff in the baseline analysis. Figure 3 shows the coefficients that result from varying the cutoff for aid shocks. The results hold for a variety of definitions of aid shocks – we could have defined aid shocks as narrowly as the most negative eight percent of aid changes or as broadly as the most negative twenty-five percent of aid changes. **Similar results also were produced when we used the average number of aid shocks in the previous five years to predict the onset of violent conflict ($b = 1.96$, $p = 0.013$).**

Pursuing unipolar heg directly trades off with cooperation and multilateralism

Adams 2015 - professor of international relations at American University's School of International Service

Gordon and Richard Sokolsky, "The GOP Plan to Bring Back a Unipolar World," Dec 30, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/30/rubio-bush-republican-presidential-politics/> //CJC

Preserving the unipolar moment Republican rhetoric is replete with calls to restore the leadership of the United States, as the most powerful, indispensable, and exceptional nation. Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) captures this view well, though he is not alone. For Rubio, the United States is the natural, inevitable, and indispensable leader. "America plays a part on the world stage for which there is no understudy. When we fail to lead with strength and principle, no other country, friend or foe, is willing or able to take our place. And the result is chaos," Rubio says on his campaign website. "While America did not intend to become the world's indispensable power, that is exactly what our economic and political freedoms have made us. The free nations of the world still look to America to champion our shared ideals," he adds. For Sen. Ted Cruz, this standing gives the United States a dominant position. "It is dangerous to dictators like [Vladimir] Putin when Americans remember their exceptionalism," Cruz wrote in an opinion piece for CNN. "The unique combination of power and principle that has made the United States the greatest force for good on the planet has historically posed a grave threat to repressive bullies." **The call to restore American leadership and its dominant international role is a consistent theme for Republican presidential candidates.** It is a dangerous one, because the world has changed in a fundamental way. **The United States is simply no longer a global goliath bestriding a unipolar world.** Turkey no longer jumps when America says frog. Putin is unmoved by U.S. demands. China is clearly expanding its own role, creating international economic organizations that include most of its closest allies but not the United States. **The raw measures of military and economic power that are typically invoked to rebut the relative change in global power are not easily converted into the currency of diplomatic leverage.** In contrast to the Republican message, in today's world, power is often "situational," assembled by coalitions of like-minded countries with the capacity, resolve, and resources, to take effective action to advance shared interests. **American leadership looks different in this world; it is most effective when the United States helps mobilizes these multilateral partnerships,** and allows others to take ownership of the solution. **Insisting that the United States take the lead in international events, crises, and conflicts, would be counter-productive. An elusive quest to restore a unipolar world order run from Washington leads to behavior at odds with the requirements of effective diplomacy in a rebalanced, multipolar world.** Moreover, asserting U.S. control, as **the GOP field suggests, vastly overstates the degree to which we are responsible for or could change global realities and problems.** To recognize this reality is not declinism or abandoning the field, as Rubio suggests — it is realism. His view, in addition, is inconsistent with popular opinion: while Americans support a strong military, they are reluctant to incur the risks and costs of being a global cop. Indeed, according to opinion surveys, the public prefers disengagement from or avoidance of arenas of military conflict. And **it overlooks the extent to which overreaction and hegemonic overreach over the past 15 years — the invasion of Iraq, CIA renditions to other countries for interrogation, expanded NSA global surveillance,** to name but a few — has undermined the willingness of other countries to welcome U.S. leadership. Military power is not the answer The key ingredient of Republican national security policy is the "restoration" of U.S. military power, and its more vigorous assertion abroad. In a March 2015 column he authored with Sen. Tom Cotton, Rubio linked force reductions directly to diminished U.S. leadership. "Our force reductions have been felt throughout the world — by our friends and our enemies. They have presented not just a crisis of readiness for America, but also a perilous strategic weakness. Our adversaries have been emboldened by what they perceive as our diminished military presence." Similarly, Jeb Bush has argued that any sound plan to defeat IS and other threats hinges on our military strength. "Let that slip away, and what would America be in world affairs, except one more well-intentioned voice at the United Nations? In any effort of ours to overcome violence and secure peace, a winning strategy depends on maintaining unequalled strength, and we can never take it for granted." Chris Christie offers an argument of pre-emption: "A strong military doesn't just help us to deal with the threats we face. It helps eliminate them before we even see them." The argument that U.S. military power has declined and that its revival is the key to restoring our global leadership is false. This is because this idea deliberately understates current U.S. military capabilities. The Republicans conveniently avoid the reality that U.S. defense spending is greater than the combined defense budgets of the next eight countries with the highest levels of defense spending. Today, U.S. defense budgets are \$150 billion higher than the Cold War average (in constant dollars). This spending buys an impressive, incomparable military. Unlike any other country, the United States maintains a network of globe-girdling alliances and more than 800 military facilities overseas. The United States is the only country in the world that can deploy troops, fly aircraft, and sail naval ships around the world, supported by a truly global network of communications, logistics, transportation, and intelligence agencies. No other country has such a capability. **The Republican argument is also misleading. It substitutes measures of military capability and the assertive use of military force for sound foreign policy judgment.** U.S. military power is useful and necessary for many good things: it can help

maintain a favorable balance of global power, support freedom of navigation, deter aggression against allies and friends, demonstrate the credibility of U.S. security commitments, respond to humanitarian disasters, provide critical support for American diplomacy, and, embedded in a broader policy context, contribute to the struggle with terrorist organizations.

Diplomacy reduces conflict length by 76%

Regan 2006 [Patrick Regan is professor of political science at Binghamton University, “Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil War”, *Journal of Peace Research*, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/255605960_Diplomacy_and_Other_Forms_of_Intervention_in_Civil_War>] //CJC

Much of the empirical literature suggests that outside interventions tend to lengthen the expected duration of civil wars; conversely, the policy community often acts as if they hold the opposite expectation for the outcome of intervention. We argue that the divergence can be found in how models of intervention are specified in the literature. We propose a model with two novel contributions. First, we incorporate mediations as the key to resolving the strategic problems that the civil war parties face. Second, we account for the decaying effect of interventions over time. Our results suggest that **diplomacy is critically important for understanding the duration of civil conflicts**. We find that mediation has a dramatic effect on the expected duration of a civil war, and that when controlling for diplomatic efforts, economic interventions can also reduce the expected duration.

[...]

In a second model, we have excluded structural interventions and included the effect of diplomacy and the timing of diplomacy on the length of the conflict. The results show that **diplomatic interventions dramatically reduce the expected duration of a conflict**. For example, **the expected duration for civil conflicts that have experienced diplomatic interventions is reduced by about 76% over conflicts without diplomatic interventions**. This interpretation is, however, made more complicated by the decay function we used to model the effects of interventions over time, though we will address this issue when we interpret the full results (see Model II).

America will remain the world’s superpower – strongest defense budget, forces, and alliances.

Donilon 14 (Tom Donilon, Lawyer with a J.D. from the University of Virginia, “We’re No. 1 (and We’re Going to Stay That Way),” *Foreign Policy*, 3 July 2014, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/03/were-no-1-and-were-going-to-stay-that-way/>,) //CJC

By any measure, our military power is unmatched, and that’s not likely to change anytime soon. In terms of sheer size, the United States spends more each year on defense than the next 10 nations put together. **Our defense budget is more than five times bigger than that of our nearest competitor, China — despite that country’s rapid military buildup**. **Even after 13 years of war — the longest period of continuous conflict our armed forces have ever seen — we remain capable of defeating any adversary**.

But even these measurements underestimate our military's true advantages. The U.S. Navy owns 11 of the world's 20 aircraft carriers, making America the only country on Earth with a truly global power projection. With more than a decade of experience fighting terrorism, our special operations forces have become a unique American asset. The May 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan — over 7,000 miles away from the United States — was only the most visible example of how our battle-tested special operators successfully execute complex missions in dangerous places across the globe.

And by historical measures, the current U.S. defense burden is not excessive as a share of GDP. As we wind down the war in Afghanistan, our military now stands on a more sustainable footing, without the kind of overstretch that some have worried about.

We also possess a network of formal alliances with over 50 nations — the largest in history. Centered on our treaty alliances in Asia and Europe, this network has been built for over half a century on a bipartisan basis. No other country can look to anything like it. These enduring partnerships are a unique American strength, and we continue to deepen them across the globe today.

American hard power high now – huge spending, advanced weapons, and large military.

Das 14 (Satyajit Das, Economic Consult with a B.A. in Commerce and Law from the University of New South Wales, "America's Hard & Soft Power," EconoMonitor, December 15 2014, <http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2014/12/americas-hard-soft-power/>,] //CJC

The US remains a formidable military power. America spends around 40% of the total amount spent globally on defence, around six times second placed China. The technical and economic capacity to maintain, integrate and operate up-to-date complex defence systems provides America with a significant advantage.

The strategic shift to stand-off and remote weapons systems, such as drones, as well more technologically sophisticated weapons systems enhance its capabilities to protect its interests. Whatever the moral and legal implications of drone strikes against its enemies, America's ability to project power in support its interests remain unsurpassed.

America's political and economic interests increasingly dictate withdrawal from military engagements such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Reduced reliance on foreign energy supplies may allow the US to reduce its commitment to guarding crucial sea lanes such as the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca Straits.

In the post-cold war era, America has served as the "indispensable nation" (a phrase suggested by former Secretary of State Madeline Albright) policing the world's conflicts. But America is increasingly wary of "entangling alliances" (Thomas Jefferson) and overseas adventures "in search of monsters to destroy" (John Quincy Adams).

Emerging technologies, tactical innovations, capability enhancements, joint warfare means we don't need a larger army.

Lawrence Kapp, Coordinator Specialist in Military Manpower Policy, et al, September 2, 2016, Congressional Research Services, How Big Should an Army Be? Considerations for Congress, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44612.pdf>

On the other hand, the above arguments notwithstanding, other observers maintain that most of the functions listed above can be adequately performed with lower troop levels due to emerging technologies,

tactical innovations, and military capability advancements.¹⁹ **Proponents of this concept, which is often referred to as “transformation,” or a “revolution in military affairs,” maintain that special operations forces, combined with precision guided munitions, can have the kinds of decisive effects on the battlefield that used to be achieved through massive ground troop formations.**²⁰ Others believe that the Army is “overreacting” in its arguments for increased troop strength to meet the emerging strategic environment. Contrary to arguments that the Army would be overmatched in a contest with Russian forces, some maintain that **“it is exceedingly unlikely the U.S. Army will ever be ‘outranged and outgunned’” due to advances in joint warfare, and in particular, Air Force and Naval Air support to ground operations.**²¹ **Finally, some question whether the United States has the political appetite to engage in these kinds of ground-force intensive contingencies in the future.** As evidence, they refer to the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance which states that, “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.”²² Indeed, as former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said, “in my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined,’ as General MacArthur so delicately put it.”²³ Still, he went on to note, ...when it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten it right, from the Mayaguez to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and more—we had no idea a year before any of these missions that we would be so engaged.²⁴

Squo solves readiness deficits - 2017 training exercises

Petraeus 2016 [Mr. Petraeus, a retired Army general, commanded coalition forces in Iraq (2007-08) and in Afghanistan (2010-11) and later served as director of the CIA (2011-12), “The Myth of a U.S. Military ‘Readiness Crisis’”, *The Wall Street Journal*, August 9, 2016.]
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-myth-of-a-u-s-military-readiness-crisis-1470783221> //WGC

“U.S. military readiness is again a hot issue in the presidential election, but unfortunately the current debate glosses over some of the most important facts. While Congress’s sequestration-mandated cuts to military spending have hurt preparedness, **America’s fighting forces remain ready for battle. They have extensive combat experience across multiple theaters since 9/11, a tremendous high-tech defense industry supplying advanced weaponry, and support from an extraordinary intelligence community.** For those concerned that America’s military is in decline or somehow not up to the next challenge, we offer a few reassuring facts:• **The current national defense budget of over \$600 billion a year far exceeds the Cold War average of about \$525 billion (in inflation-adjusted 2016 dollars)** and the \$400 billion spent in 2001, according to official Pentagon and Office of Management and Budget data. The national defense budget, which doesn’t include Veterans Affairs or the Department of Homeland Security, constitutes 35% of global military spending and is more than that of the next eight countries—including China and Russia—combined. **Spending has been reduced from the levels of the late Bush and early Obama years, but that isn’t unreasonable in light of scaled-down combat operations abroad** and fiscal pressures at home. • Assuming no return to sequestration, as occurred in 2013, **Pentagon budgets to buy equipment now exceed \$100 billion a year, a healthy and sustainable level. The so-called “procurement holiday” of the 1990s and early 2000s is over.** • While some categories of aircraft and other key weapons are aging and will need replacement or major refurbishment soon, **most equipment remains in fairly good shape. According to our sources in the military, Army equipment has, on average, mission-capable rates today exceeding 90%—a historically high level.**

Marine Corps aviation is an exception and urgently needs to be addressed. • Training for full-spectrum operations is resuming after over a decade of appropriate focus on counterinsurgency. **By 2017 the Army plans to rotate nearly 20 brigades—about a third of its force—through national training centers each year. The Marine Corps plans to put 12 infantry battalions—about half its force—through large training exercises. The Air Force is funding its training and readiness programs at 80%-98% of what it considers fully resourced levels.** This situation isn't perfect, but it has improved—and while the military is still engaged in combat operations across the world. The men and women of today's all-volunteer military continue to be outstanding and committed to protecting America. Typical scores of new recruits on the armed forces qualification test are now significantly better than in the Reagan years or the immediate pre-9/11 period, two useful benchmarks. **The average time in service, a reflection of the experience of the force, is now about 80 months in the enlisted ranks,** according to Defense Department data. That is not quite as good as in the 1990s, when the average was 85-90 months, but is better than the 75-month norm of the 1980s. While there are areas of concern, **there is no crisis in military readiness.** But that doesn't mean the U.S. is good enough—especially in a world of rapidly changing technology, new threats emerging across several regions, and a constantly evolving strategic landscape. Here are some of the most pressing issues:

Credibility doesn't deter, creates a misperception which sets up unneeded conflict

Chris **Fettweis 2010**, [Associate Professor, Tulane University, Department of Political Science, 2012-present, "Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy"p.61-62, <http://web.b.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=b3304f16-980f-4384-9ec6-c359f80193c0%40sessionmgr111&vid=1&hid=115>] MJS

For individuals as well as **states**, pathologies – **mistaken** or incorrect **beliefs that inspire irrational action – create their own reality and drive behaviour accordingly.** In individuals, pathologies reside in the mind, while **state-level pathologies exist as shared irrational beliefs among leaders and the public.** Strategic pathologies, then, are incorrect beliefs that drive destructive, or at least counterproductive, state behaviour. **The United States suffers from several. The credibility imperative is a clear** example, one that continues to have a particularly strong influence upon the United States.⁷ **Credibility, when used in policy debates, is a code word for the prestige and reputation** of a state; it is, in Henry Kissinger's words, 'the coin with which we conduct our foreign policy', an intangible asset that helps states influence the actions of others.⁸ **In periods of high credibility, policymakers believe, a state can deter and compel behaviour** and accomplish goals short of war. When credibility is low, skeptical adversaries and allies may be tempted to ignore threats and promises. national leaders, therefore, healthy credibility seems to be the equivalent of many armed divisions, and is worth protecting at almost any cost. **This belief rests on a shaky foundation,** to put it mildly. **Decades of scholarship have been unable to produce much evidence that high credibility helps a state achieve its goals,** or that low credibility makes rivals or allies act any differently.⁹ Although study after study has refuted the basic assumptions of the credibility imperative, the pathology continues to affect policymaking in the new century, inspiring new instances of irrational, unnecessary action. The imperative, like many foreign-policy pathologies, typically inspires belligerence in those under its spell.¹⁰ Credibility is always maintained through action, usually military action, no matter how small the issue or large the odds. Insecurity, likewise, whether real or imagined, leads to expansive, internationalist, interventionist grand strategies. **The more danger a state perceives, the greater its willingness to go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. The 'preventive' war in Iraq is the**

most obvious consequence of the inflated US perception of threat, but is hardly the only one. America's insecurity pathology is in need of diagnosis and cure, lest Iraq be not a singular debacle but a harbinger of other disasters to come. Strategic performance can be improved if pathologies are recognised and eliminated. Better policy would result from a dispassionate, rational analysis of material costs and benefits of proposed action. In other words, although states do not always act rationally, they would usually be better off if they did. Of course, this sometimes involves the oversimplification of reality, because such calculations are not normally possible in the real world where neither costs nor benefits are knowable a priori. If they were – if rationality were not bounded – foreign-policy decisions would be easy to make. And any discussion of rationality necessarily implies assumptions about values, since rarely are costs and benefits neatly comparable. No equation can tell a policymaker precisely how many lives are worth sacrificing in pursuit of a particular national interest. Nonetheless, states can take steps toward maximising the chance for rationality in their choices. One obvious way is to recognise the States do not always act rationally irrational motivators for behaviour, and work to eliminate those impulses that tend to have a high probability of producing low-quality results. Good foreign policy cannot be built upon an irrational foundation. Indeed, rationality in decision-making should be thought of as a minimum requirement for sagacious leaders, for their own good and for that of the international system as a whole.

THE US AND RUSSIA ARE GOING TO BE ALLIES SOON

NEIL MacFARQUHAR, (New York Times), "Putin and Trump Talk on Phone and Agree to Improve Ties, Kremlin Says," November 14, 2016
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/world/europe/putin-calls-trump.html>

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and President-elect Donald J. Trump spoke by telephone for the first time on Monday, agreeing to review what both consider the poor state of relations between the two countries, according to a statement from the Kremlin. The two agreed "on the absolutely unsatisfactory state of bilateral relations," said the statement, and they both endorsed the idea of undertaking joint efforts "to normalize relations and pursue constructive cooperation on the broadest possible range of issues." The issues discussed included trade and economic ties as well as combating terrorism. Mr. Putin was one of the first world leaders to congratulate Mr. Trump last Wednesday, sending him a telegram about an hour after he had emerged the victor, but the two men have not met nor had they spoken previously. **Mr. Putin repeated the congratulations over the phone. The Russian president said he hoped that Moscow could build a "collaborative dialogue" with Washington on the bases of "equality, mutual respect and noninterference in the other's internal affairs," the release said.**

Turn – military shows of force undermine cooperation needed to restore relations and establish crisis stability

Michael **Kofman** is a **Global Fellow at the Kennan Institute, Wilson Center, and an analyst at CNA Corporation, November 30, 2016, Donald Trump Must Offer an Olive Branch to Russia**, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/donald-trump-must-offer-olive-branch-russia-test-the-art-the-18553>

Current hostility and distrust in U.S.-Russia relations hardly make it an opportune time to re-examine the bilateral relationship, yet **this abhorrent state of affairs is precisely what necessitates a new strategy on the part of the next president. Strategic stability, long taken for granted, is disintegrating,**

while the net sum of military interactions with Russia is on a trajectory towards crisis. The next administration must understand that absent a course correction, the coming years in our relations will be driven by an entirely negative agenda, largely set by Moscow, to the detriment of U.S. interests and the security of our allies. **The first priority should be to arrest the deteriorating relationship,** reestablish military contacts with the aim of ceasing provocative behavior, **curbing tit-for-tat shows of force, crude messaging and unnecessary risk taking.** Early steps in good faith can be made through a modicum of cooperation in Syria, a conflict where Russia already holds most of the cards, and may ultimately contribute to the U.S. campaign against Islamic State. Russia can prove instrumental, or a spoiler, to U.S. interests on North Korea, Afghanistan, Iran and perhaps even China depending on the policies the next president chooses to pursue. However, we must accept that compartmentalization in our relationship with Russia is impossible without resolving the two destabilizing issues in the relationship: Ukraine and sanctions. The United States cannot expect to confront Russia on its core interests, while seeking cooperation elsewhere on its own.

Russia Not a Threat: Threat Created by MIC

Fang, 2016 [Lee Fang, "U.S. Defense Contractors Tell Investors Russian Threat Is Great for Business", *The Intercept*, <https://theintercept.com/2016/08/19/nato-weapons-industry/>] //AKC THE ESCALATING ANTI-RUSSIAN rhetoric in the U.S. presidential campaign comes in the midst of a major push by military contractors to position Moscow as a potent enemy that must be countered with a drastic increase in military spending by NATO countries.

Weapon makers have told investors that they are relying on tensions with Russia to fuel new business in the wake of Russian's annexation of Crimea and modest increases in its military budget.

In particular, the arms industry — both directly and through its arsenal of hired-gun, think-tank experts and lobbyists — is actively pressuring NATO member nations to hike defense spending in line with the NATO goal for member states to spend at least 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense.

Retired Army Gen. Richard Cody, a vice president at L-3 Communications, the seventh largest U.S. defense contractor, explained to shareholders in December that **the industry was faced with a historic opportunity. Following the end of the Cold War, Cody said, peace had "pretty much broken out all over the world," with Russia in decline and NATO nations celebrating. "The Wall came down," he said, and "all defense budgets went south."**

Now, Cody argued, Russia "is resurgent" around the world, putting pressure on U.S. allies. "Nations that belong to NATO are supposed to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense," he said, according to a transcript of his remarks. **"We know that uptick is coming and so we postured ourselves for it."**

...

Many **experts are unconvinced that Russia poses a direct military threat.** The Soviet Union's military once stood at over 4 million soldiers, but today Russia has less than 1 million. NATO's combined military budget vastly outranks Russia's — with the U.S. alone outspending Russia on its military by \$609 billion to less than \$85 billion.

And yet, the Aerospace Industries Association, a lobby group for Lockheed Martin, Textron, Raytheon, and other defense contractors, argued in February that the Pentagon is not spending enough to counter “Russian aggression on NATO’s doorstep.”

...

“Russian saber-rattling has additional benefits for weapons makers because it has become a standard part of the argument for higher Pentagon spending — even though the Pentagon already has more than enough money to address any actual threat to the United States,” he said.

Deterrence empirically fails

Fearon 2002 [James Fearon at Department of Political Science, Stanford, “SELECTION EFFECTS AND DETERRENCE”, *International Interactions Magazine*, <<https://web.stanford.edu/group/fearon-research/cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Selection-Effects-and-Deterrence.pdf>>] //CJC

How often and under what conditions do threats issued in the course of an international dispute successfully deter aggressive action by the state challenging the status quo? This important and apparently straightforward empirical question provoked a heated debate in the field of international relations in the late 80s and early 90s. On one side, Paul Huth and Bruce Russett argued that **deterrent threats succeeded in 34, or almost 60 percent, of the 58 “extended immediate deterrence” crises they identified.** On the other side, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein forcefully disputed this assessment. By their reading, **only 10 of Huth and Russett’s cases were properly regarded as “deterrence encounters” and at most two of these contained instances of successful deterrent threats.**

Hardline deterrence strategies will fail - We cannot assess or influence North Korea, Russia, and China’s decision calculus - History proves

Larkin 11 - USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT CRACKS IN THE NEW JAR: THE LIMITS OF TAILORED DETERRENCE by Lieutenant Colonel Sean P. Larkin United States Air Force Dr. R. Craig Nation Project Adviser (<http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a560099.pdf>) CM

Assessing Adversaries’ Decision Calculus **Tailored deterrence requires that the U.S. understand each adversary’s decision calculus with a high level of certainty and detail** in order to design deterrent actions that will achieve decisive influence over adversaries’ choices. However, **tailored deterrence’s assumptions oversimplify the basis on which people actually make decisions. People** make choices based in part on their perceptions of expected utility, but they **are also heavily influenced by other factors, including** their **personal perspectives and cognitive biases.** Many of these **factors are enigmatic even to the actors themselves, making decision calculus exceptionally difficult** to assess and leaving adversaries’ choices largely unpredictable. History provides many examples of deterrence failures in which the defender misunderstood the adversary’s decision calculus and was therefore surprised by an “irrational” action. Keith Payne cites the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, **China’s entry into the Korean War, and the Soviet deployment of nuclear missiles to Cuba as examples in which U.S. estimates of adversary decision calculus predicted the opposite outcome.** 59 Janet Gross Stein uses Egypt’s 1973 surprise attack against Israel and Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait as other case studies of intelligence and deterrence failures. 60 In all these examples, the defenders assessed that their presumably rational adversary would refrain from action because upsetting the status quo would result in a net loss. However, the deterrence failures listed above cannot be attributed to irrationality. As Keith Payne observed, there is an often-unappreciated difference between rational and reasonable decision-making. 61 If an actor is rational, then they make decisions that logically link to their objectives. However, whether or not an actor’s decisions are reasonable is a matter of perspective. If an outside observer does not share or understand the adversary’s goals and values, then the adversary’s decisions may appear unreasonable, and will therefore be unpredictable. 62 Second-wave theory and tailored deterrence both correctly assume that truly irrational actors are rare, but fail to appreciate how little this assumption matters when compared to the impact of the actors’ divergent perspectives on a deterrence relationship. The Adversary’s Perspective. **Opposing leaders frequently see the world**

much differently because of the large differences in the leaders' individual expectations and beliefs. Cognitive psychology shows that all people develop unique belief systems, or "schemata," based on their experiences to help organize and interpret information. These schemata are necessary to functioning in a complex world, but they also "constrain and condition how and what leaders perceive."⁶³ As a result of these differing contexts, leaders may interpret the same situation quite differently. For example, while **the U.S. confidently concluded that China would stay out of the Korean War, Mao Zedong attacked the U.S. Eighth Army in North Korea because he believed China was being encircled by America.**⁶⁴ Leaders' perceptions are also shaped by the mental shortcuts, or "heuristics," that all people use to selectively process and recall information. **One of the most powerful heuristics results in the availability bias—the tendency for people to interpret events in terms of other events they can easily remember.**⁶⁵ This results in leaders being disproportionately influenced by historical events that they or their country experienced directly.⁶⁶ Saddam Hussein's perspective on combat in the Iran-Iraq War led him to disregard U.S. airpower; he similarly concluded from the U.S. experience in Lebanon that America was casually averse and would not be able to remove him from Kuwait.⁶⁷ 16 Third-wave theory also maintains that **domestic political considerations are often a critical factor in adversaries' decisions.** This factor is consistent with Robert Jervis' observation that leaders often make a decision based on one value dimension (e.g. domestic politics) without fully considering its impact on other dimensions. ⁶⁸ Thus, Anwar Sadat's primary concerns in 1973 were domestic politics, regaining lost honor and the consequences of not attacking, rather than the probable military outcome of attacking Israel. ⁶⁹ The Deterrence's Perspective. In its estimation of adversary decision calculus, **the U.S. is constrained by the same cognitive barriers that influence an adversary's viewpoint, as well as other biases that commonly undermine intelligence analysis and policy making. Intelligence estimates of all kinds are prone to the bias of mirror-imaging, which is the assumption that the adversary thinks and operates like the analyst's country.**⁷⁰ Mirror-imaging is closely related to the availability heuristic, since when reliable intelligence is lacking, analysts and policymakers alike will tend to fill in the blanks with information that is readily recalled: their nation's capabilities, plans, and intentions. For example, Israel's emphasis on airpower drove it to judge Egypt's readiness in 1973 by an Israeli standard. Due to this mirror-imaging, Israel ignored compelling evidence of an imminent Egyptian attack, believing that Sadat would be deterred at least until Egypt reconstituted its air force. ⁷¹ Analysts also tend to be biased toward viewing the adversary's actions as the result of centralized direction and to underestimate other explanations, such as coincidences, accidents or mistakes. ⁷² The centralized direction bias is particularly troublesome for the analysis of adversary decision calculus since it causes analysts to "overestimate the extent to which other countries are pursuing coherent, rational, goalmaximizing policies" and to "overestimate the predictability of future events in other countries."⁷³ The power of this bias and the unpredictability of even a well-known adversary were highlighted in 1962, shortly before the U.S. discovered Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. The U.S. erroneously concluded in a Special National Intelligence Estimate that the Soviet Union would not put offensive weapons in Cuba because such a move would be inconsistent with the observed patterns of Soviet behavior and American estimates of Khrushchev's decision calculus. ⁷⁴ **Decision-makers may also be affected by motivated biases, which result from subconscious psychological pressure that distorts perception.** Motivated biases differ from cognitive biases because the source of the error is the person's fear and needs, rather than expectations or cognitive limits.⁷⁵ This tendency results in defensive avoidance techniques to selectively process information that supports their favored policy to reduce anxiety. In May 1967, pressure from domestic and Arab constituencies probably motivated Egypt's overestimation of its chances of winning a war with Israel. Egypt's leaders initially assessed that war would result in low benefits and high costs. However, contrary to rational deterrence theory's requirements, Egypt's leaders reversed their estimate a few weeks later and chose war. ⁷⁶ Motivated biases are more powerful when decision-makers are afraid or feel helpless. ⁷⁷ **Fear and anxiety can disrupt information processing, such as retention and memory, and can result in distorted processes of defensive avoidance and hypervigilance.**⁷⁸ These insights indicate that predicting or influencing adversary decision calculus is even more difficult in crisis situations. They also call into question deterrence's objective of compelling rational behavior by instilling fear. Third-wave theory and case studies demonstrate that assessing adversaries' decision calculus is extremely difficult and cannot be used as a reliable anchor for tailored deterrence strategies. One final example serves to demonstrate that **misperception and bias are the norm, not the exception in intelligence and international relations.** In 2003, coercive threats against Saddam Hussein failed to compel Iraq's compliance with U.S. demands because Saddam was much more concerned about preventing a coup and the threat from Iran than he was about U.S. threats to invade. The misunderstanding was mutual, as Saddam believed he understood enough about Washington's decision calculus to at least deter a U.S. march to Baghdad, if not an invasion of southern Iraq.⁷⁹ Given the pervasive nature of such misperceptions, the assumption that the U.S. can reliably assess adversaries' decision calculus is clearly in error and represents a significant flaw in tailored deterrence. **The U.S. assumption that it can decisively influence adversaries' choices is the second flaw** in tailored deterrence. This

assumption is erroneous for three reasons. First, misperceptions and biases limit an actor's ability to send effective deterrent messages. Second, adversaries are similarly constrained in their understanding of such signals. Third, tailored deterrence campaigns are limited by a lack of interagency unity of effort and inescapable friction in execution. These limitations suggest that only the most overt, overwhelming and credible deterrent threats have utility, while attempts to deter gradually via precise messages are often misguided. The Challenge of Sending Effective Deterrent Messages. In addition to the previously described difficulties in understanding adversaries' decision calculus, a deterring actor is constrained by biases that accompany attempts to influence others. The egocentric bias leads people to overestimate their influence over others and to see cause-and-effect linkages that do not exist. This tendency can cause policymakers to perceive an adversary's behavior as targeted toward them and that the adversary's behavior was caused by the policymaker's previous actions. ⁸⁰ This phenomenon is a double threat to deterrence strategies. First, the egocentric bias may inflate the policymaker's belief that an adversary can be deterred. Second, the bias can result in erroneous assessments that deterrence is working when, in fact, the adversary's restraint is explained by other factors. ⁸¹ Another common limitation on an actor's ability to send deterrent messages is a lack of empathy for how an adversary sees the world. ⁸² Policymakers have such powerful beliefs about their nations and they spend so much time immersed in their own plans that they have trouble imagining that an adversary may have different views. ⁸³ For example, the U.S. failed to understand Japan's perspective before Pearl Harbor. While Washington thought that Japan would view the prospect of war with the U.S. as disastrous, Japanese leaders concluded they had no other choice but to attack. ⁸⁴ A third bias, which is related to the egocentric bias and lack of empathy, is overconfidence: people tend to overestimate their capacity to make complex judgments. Overconfidence leads policymakers to overestimate their ability to influence an adversary via discrete messages. ⁸⁵ There is probably no better example of such hubris than U.S. attempts to decisively influence North Vietnamese behavior via incremental airstrikes and carefully calibrated force deployments. Although these messages were sent from the highest levels of government in Washington, Hanoi did not notice the subtleties, nor did it receive any messages compelling enough to modify its decision calculus. ⁸⁶ Adversary Perceptions of Deterrent Messages. Deterrent messages that are clear and credible to the sender and impartial parties may still be missed, misunderstood, or discarded by the receiver. ⁸⁷ Adversaries' may misperceive due to any number of factors described above, such as: the availability bias, differing schemata, mirror-imaging, motivated biases and the distorting effects of anxiety. Actors' perceptions are also heavily influenced by their most recent experiences and concerns. The "evoked set" of data that is active in a person's mind creates a context based on recent events for interpreting new information. If the receiver's context differs from the sender's, misperception is more likely. ⁸⁸ Deterrent messages may fail to persuade because an adversary's perception is skewed by other distractions. Achieving decisive influence over an adversary's choices requires that deterrent signals overcome cognitive biases and persuade the decision-maker to change core beliefs about the likely results of a contemplated course of action. However, strongly held beliefs, such as a leader's conviction that war is necessary, are the most resistant to change. ⁸⁹ In order to change a person's attitude, new information must overcome many layers of subconscious defenses. ⁹⁰ A person's first defense is failing to see that new information contradicts existing beliefs. The information can be evaded by ignoring it, or interpreting it to fit the person's views, particularly if the data is ambiguous. The second mechanism is to accept that the information is discrepant, but to reject its validity. A third and related defense is to reject the source of the information as unreliable. Subsequent defenses include acknowledging the contradiction but setting it aside and bolstering the belief by seeking a new justification for an old decision. ⁹¹ The subconscious lengths to which people will go to preserve their beliefs make it difficult to deter an adversary gradually with discrete messages. A sufficiently motivated or confused adversary can ignore deterrent signals such as diplomatic messages or the deployment of military forces, especially if such signals are sent incrementally. Adversaries can accommodate isolated messages without changing their beliefs, but are more likely to reevaluate their convictions if a large amount of contradictory information arrives all at once. ⁹² By this same logic, subtle signals should have more utility against an adversary who is already deterred, since such messages would seek only to reinforce an existing perception. Since adversaries' beliefs are resistant to change, it follows that

adversaries" perceptions of credibility and interests are dominant factors in deterrence outcomes. First, deterrence signals cannot create credibility that does not exist in the mind of the adversary. Unambiguous scenarios where survival interests are at stake, such as the superpowers' defense of their homelands during the Cold War, provide clarity that reduces the chance of misperception. 93 In contrast, America's ambiguous policy toward South Korea in 1950 and Kuwait in 1990 left much more room for adversary error. Second, carefully crafted deterrence messages cannot balance an inherent asymmetry of interests. The U.S. and South Korea have apparently deterred a second North Korean invasion since 1953, but have been unable to deter Pyongyang from building nuclear weapons or conducting deadly attacks on South Korean forces. **Despite the substantial U.S. commitment to preventing all three scenarios, North Korea clearly possessed a much greater interest in acquiring a nuclear deterrent** and in manufacturing crises.

Deterrence theory wrong - arms buildup makes miscalc inev

Boyd 16 (Dallas Boyd is a National security professional with expertise in nuclear weapons policy, nuclear counterterrorism policy, deterrence theory, and adversary decision-making. "Revealed Preference and the Minimum Requirements of Nuclear Deterrence," Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2016. www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/Spring16/Boyd.pdf) jsk

Ultimately, this analysis rests on inferences about the true risk tolerance of US leaders and the confidence of their adversaries in both resisting nuclear coercion and retaliating after a nuclear strike. Because neither of these variables can be established conclusively before a crisis occurs, there is room for disagreement about their potential implications. **What should be uncontroversial, however, is that widely divergent perceptions of capability and resolve in a crisis may lead to catastrophic misjudgments.**⁶¹ Additionally, there should be no doubt that such divergences exist. Consider the multiple levels of perception that would be operative if the United States attempted nuclear coercion—much less a first strike. First would be US leaders' confidence in their counterforce capabilities, followed by the enemy's estimation of them. Next would be the enemy's confidence in its ability to retaliate after absorbing a counterforce strike and the United States' assessment of this probability. Beneath these first-order judgments are even more subjective evaluations: American leaders' perception of the enemy's perception of US first-strike capabilities, the enemy's perception of US leaders' perception of its retaliatory capability, and so on. **Mistaken assumptions in any one of these dimensions could result in grave errors.** For example, if US leaders are so enamored of their first-strike capabilities that they perceive little risk of retaliation, the threshold for launching a preemptive attack—or merely engaging in nuclear coercion—might be dangerously low. Indeed, this prospect has not escaped foreign strategists. Chinese analysts Li Bin and Nie Hongyi have noted that the limitations of US offensive forces are "not clear enough" to American leaders, creating the possibility that they "may think they have" the capability to neutralize China's retaliatory forces. According to Li and Nie, the Americans' "blind confidence" might give rise to attempts at nuclear saber rattling or worse.⁶² Compounding this danger is the possibility that a state subjected to American coercion may believe just as strongly in its own capacity to retaliate. Moreover, if either side believes that the other privately shares its own assessment, they may fatally misjudge the robustness of deterrence. In particular, foreign leaders may take at face value US rhetoric on nuclear terrorism and conclude that the ability to deliver a single bomb is sufficient to deter the United States. In this circumstance, they may discount the gravity of American threats even if they are quite sincere. Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Spring 2016 Dallas Boyd [64] Because US offensive capabilities are the chief source of these potential risks, the responsibility arguably falls to the United States to minimize them. One doctrinal option is simply to limit offensive nuclear forces exclusively to damage-limitation roles, that is, reducing the brunt of an enemy attack when it is not merely likely but imminent or under way. Striking first in this scenario requires no great tolerance for risk, because some level of damage is inevitable, and preemption merely reduces that damage as much as possible. However, this option would leave counterforce capabilities intact, offering no assurance that American leaders would forswear preemptive attacks in less than dire circumstances. **The most effective means of preventing nuclear aggression—and the terrible risks entailed—is to dismantle counterforce capabilities altogether.**

Understanding global strategic cultures key to effective deterrence

Ruhle 16 (Michael Ruhle is Head of Energy Security Section at the NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division. "The Comeback of Nuclear Deterrence," Berlin Policy Journal, Jan 19 2016. berlinpolicyjournal.com/the-comeback-of-nuclear-deterrence/) jsk

We're Only Human A stable deterrence regime requires all actors to adhere to a "rational" cost-benefit calculus. Thus, nuclear deterrence cannot work against actors that are "irrational" to begin with, e.g. fanatical martyrs. Deterrence may also fail when rationality evaporates in a crisis: certain ideologies or strains of nationalism, for example, may produce the kind of myopia that make leaders adopt risky offensive strategies. But the more important scenario in which rationality could disappear is essentially defensive. Since humans will always give priority to avoiding losses rather than to acquiring gains, the fear of losing something valuable will make leaders take far greater risks than the opportunity to change the status quo in their favor. Hence, as much as one would want to have the upper hand in a crisis, one should still avoid pushing a nuclear adversary into a corner. Know Your Adversary's Culture Deterrence may be a universal concept, but its practical application may well be culture-specific. For example, a culture that attaches great value to sacrifice or even martyrdom will be much harder to deter with the specter of military punishment than a "post-heroic" society. This is not to say that certain states are "undeterrable", but their cost-benefit calculus might be so different as to render the defender's deterrence messages ineffective. Hence, if you want your adversary to understand your deterrence message correctly, you need to have a fairly good grasp of their "strategic culture": historical experiences, values, core beliefs, military traditions, and, last but not least, language. Despite your best efforts, you will never get it perfectly right – but you might not get it quite so wrong.

Even if they win deterrence is good in theory, they can't predict its effectiveness in policy

Payne 15 (Dr. Keith B. Payne is president of the National Institute for Public Policy, and professor and department head at the Graduate School of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (Washington campus). He is a former deputy assistant secretary of defense and served on the bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture Commission (Perry-Schlesinger Commission). *Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age*, 2015. Available on Muse, accessed via the Wake Forest library system.) jsk
Nevertheless, in the absence of "knowing the opponent" and tailoring deterrence policies to fit the specific case, regional deterrence in the second nuclear age will be too unpredictable for us to assume its effectiveness. Even when information about the challenger is available and efforts are made to tailor deterrence to the occasion, its effectiveness will not be "ensured" or "conclusive." U.S. leaders, in sharp contrast to past practice, will need to take seriously the potential for deterrence failure. This potential will likely be considerably more pronounced in U.S. relations with regional rogues, but it is an irreducible risk in any attempt to translate deterrence theory into deterrence policy. Repeated claims by senior officials and commentators to the contrary, in the absence of substantial intelligence and "tailoring," confident promises about deterrence working predictably should be recognized as hubris. Deterrence theory can explain how leaders should behave, assuming the challenger's rationality and a variety of additional contextual conditions. Deterrence policies, however, cannot provide the basis for confident prediction about how a particular challenger will behave because Of the stark gap separating deterrence theory assumptions concerning decision-making and the manner in which leaders sometimes actually make decisions. The now-traditional deterrence framework of the Cold War discounted the various factors that can degrade rational and well informed decision-making, including the potential for ignorance, miscalculation, misjudgment, and irrationality. Yet, historical case studies typically demonstrate that such factors can and in fact have affected decision-making, particularly under conditions of crisis and stress.

EMPIRIC / LINK: The world was more peaceful when US military spending was low

Chris **Fettweis 2010**, [Associate Professor, Tulane University, Department of Political Science, 2012-present, "Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy" p.61-62, <http://web.b.ebscohost.com/turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=b3304f16-980f-4384-9ec6-c359f80193c0%40sessionmgr111&vid=1&hid=115>] MJS

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that **there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon**, and that **there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability**. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending \$100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.²⁹ To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.³⁰ And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. **No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military**, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. **No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums**; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the US military was diminished. **The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities**. **Most of all, the United States was no less safe**. **The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending** under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. **Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.**

No threats to Heg in the squo

Salvatore **Babones**, June 11th, **2015**, [an associate professor of sociology and social policy at the University of Sydney. He is a comparative sociologist who writes on comparative international development and on quantitative methods for the social sciences, "American Hegemony Is Here to Stay", <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/american-hegemony-here-stay-13089>] MJS

Ultimately, **it is inevitable that in the long run American power will weaken and American hegemony over the rest of the world will fade**. **But how long is the long run?** There are few factual indications that **American decline has begun—or that it will begin anytime** soon. Short-term fluctuations should not be extrapolated into long-term trends. Without a doubt, 1991 was a moment of supreme U.S. superiority. But so was 1946, after which came the Soviet bomb, Korea and Vietnam. **American hegemony has waxed and waned** over the last seventy years, **but** it has **never** been **eclipsed**. **And it is unlikely that the eclipse is nigh.**

The rise of China does not lead to the decline of US hegemony

Michael **Beckley 12**, [research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2012, "China's Century?," *International Security*, Vol. 36, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Chinas_Century.pdf] MJS

According to the Global Language Monitor, which tracks the top 50,000 media sources throughout the world, the “rise of China” has been the most read-about news story of the twenty-first century, surpassing the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Iraq War, the election of Barack Obama, and the British royal wedding.¹ One reason for the story’s popularity, presumably, is that the rise of China entails the decline of the United States. While China’s economy grows at 9 percent annually, the United States reels from economic recession, costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and massive budget deficits. This divergence in fortunes has produced two pieces of conventional wisdom in U.S. and Chinese foreign policy debates.² First, the United States is in decline relative to China. Second, much of this decline is the result of globalization—the integration of national economies and resultant diffusion of technology from developed to developing countries—and the hegemonic burdens the United States bears to sustain globalization. *An alternative*, though less prevalent, *perspective rejects both of these assumptions.*³ In this view, U.S. power is durable, and globalization and America’s hegemonic role are the main reasons why. The United States derives competitive advantages from its preponderant position, and globalization allows it to exploit these advantages, attracting economic activity and manipulating the international system to its benefit. Resolving the debate between these two perspectives is imperative for prudent policymaking. If proponents of the dominant, or “declinist,” perspective are correct, then the United States should contain China’s growth by “[adopting] a neomercantilist international economic policy” and subdue China’s ambitions by “disengag[ing] from current alliance commitments in East Asia.”⁴ If, however, the United States is not in decline, and if globalization and hegemony are the main reasons why, then the United States should do the opposite: it should contain China’s growth by maintaining a liberal international economic policy, and it should subdue China’s ambitions by sustaining a robust political and military presence in Asia. With few exceptions, however, existing studies on the decline of the United States and the rise of China suffer from at least one of the following shortcomings.⁵ First, most studies do not look at a comprehensive set of indicators. Instead they paint impressionistic pictures of the balance of power, presenting tidbits of information on a handful of metrics. In general, this approach biases results in favor of the declinist perspective because most standard indicators of national power—for example, gross domestic product (GDP), population, and energy consumption—conflate size with power and thereby overstate the capabilities of large but underdeveloped countries. For example, in a recent study Arvind Subramanian contends that “China’s dominance is a sure thing” based on “an index of dominance combining just three factors: a country’s GDP, its trade (measured as the sum of its exports and imports of goods), and the extent to which it is a net creditor to the world.”⁶ The United States and China, however, are each declining by some measures while rising in terms of others. To distinguish between ascendance and decline writ large, therefore, requires analyzing many indicators and determining how much each one matters in relation to others. Second, many studies are static, presenting single-year snapshots of U.S. and Chinese power. This flaw tends to bias results in favor of the alternative perspective because the United States retains a significant lead in most categories. The key question, however, is not whether the United States is more powerful than China at present, but whether it will remain so in the future. Without a dynamic analysis, it is impossible to answer this question. This study addresses these shortcomings by comparing the United States and China across a large set of economic, technological, and military indicators over the past twenty years. The results are mixed, but the bulk of the evidence supports the alternative perspective. Over the last two decades, globalization and U.S. hegemonic burdens have expanded significantly, yet the United States has not declined; in fact it is now wealthier, more innovative, and more militarily powerful compared to China than it was in 1991.

China has narrowed the gap in terms of GDP and now exports a greater volume of high-technology products and employs more scientists than any country in the world. However, GDP correlates poorly with national power; more than 90 percent of China's high-tech exports are produced by foreign firms and consist of low-tech components; and China's quantitative advantage in scientists has not yet translated into qualitative advantages in innovation. The United States suffers from a huge debt problem that its political system appears ill-suited to solve. China, however, faces its own fiscal mess, which may be more intractable than America's. The widespread misperception that China is catching up to the United States stems from a number of analytical flaws, the most common of which is the tendency to draw conclusions about the U.S.-China power balance from data that compare China only to its former self. For example, many studies note that the growth rates of China's per capita income, value added in high-technology industries, and military spending exceed those of the United States and then conclude that China is catching up. This focus on growth rates, however, obscures China's decline relative to the United States in all of these categories. China's growth rates are high because its starting point was low. China is rising, but it is not catching up.⁷

China will never invade Taiwan, Korea, Senkakus, or laundry list of other places and their expansion isn't a threat to the US

Babones 2015 [Salvatore Babones, American comparative sociologist at the University of Sydney in Sydney, Australia, "Is China a Threat? The Devil's in the Details," *Foreign Policy In Focus*, <<http://fpif.org/is-china-a-threat-the-devils-in-the-details/>>] //CJC

For very different reasons, China poses little threat to South Korea. China increasingly views North Korea more as a burden than as an advance column for an attack on the South. **And China has recently been courting South Korean technology investment** in order to reduce its dependence on Japan. Political relations across the Taiwan Strait are inevitably dominated by questions over the status of Taiwan. Every election in Taiwan sparks talk about and fears of Chinese invasion. But no country in the world has staged a large-scale amphibious assault since the U.S. landings at Incheon, South Korea in 1950. For more than half a century, even American adventures abroad have been small-scale (Grenada) or launched from land bases (Iraq). **The Chinese military will never have the capacity to invade Taiwan against armed resistance — not now, not later, not ever. It just can't be done in the contemporary military context in which a single cruise missile can sink a transport ship carrying thousands of troops.** It makes no sense to worry about **something that is not technically possible. The Philippines? Why would China want to invade the Philippines? Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar? Ditto, ditto, ditto.** China is involved in a plethora of minor border disputes with its neighbors, but none of these involve core territorial interests or serious legal claims that China (or most of its neighbors, for that matter) have historically been interested in pushing. They're all frozen conflicts that are unlikely ever to thaw. Some pundits worry about the increasing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. India may not rival China as a great power, but even India should be able to contain China's ability to project power as far away as the Indian Ocean — and India has every reason to do so. In short, **it's difficult to imagine concrete scenarios for major regional conflict sparked by China.** It's true that there are many flashpoints for minor conflict: **the Senkaku Islands**, various shoals and reefs in the South China Sea, China's expanded air defence identification zone, and most notoriously China's building of a whole new island in the middle of the ocean, presumably intended to form the basis for reinforcing its maritime claims. The outcome of **these disputes** may determine who gets to drill for deep offshore oil decades in the future. But they **don't involve major national interests for any of the countries concerned,**

least of all the United States. So while it's possible that China will become involved in a minor air or sea incident with one or more of its maritime neighbors, it's entirely unlikely that China will become involved in a major regional conflict with any of them. No one is going to go to war because two warplanes collide in mid-air. Historically countries have not even gone to war over the intentional shooting down of civilian airliners, never mind military accidents.

[...]

There are as yet no signs that China's military expansion threatens the United States. Quite the contrary: It might support greater Chinese involvement in international peace-keeping, and it could spark more appropriate burden-sharing among America's Asian allies.

Pivot and Alliances will not deter – recent history proves.

Ross 2012 Robert S. **Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and an Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University**, "The Problem With the Pivot: Obama's New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive," China US Focus, **December, 2012**, <http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-problem-with-the-pivot-obamas-new-asia-policy-is-unnecessary-and-counterproductive/>

Even if the United States had limited its response to China's nationalist diplomacy to improving defense ties with its maritime allies in the region, China's leaders would not have been pleased. But, those steps were necessary for U.S. security, occurred far from China's borders, and built on the policies of previous administrations. When Washington got directly involved in China's sovereignty disputes and increased its presence on China's land borders, however, Beijing predictably saw this departure from past U.S. policy as gratuitous, expansionist, and threatening. As might be expected from a great power faced with a deteriorating strategic environment, China has pushed back against the pivot with concrete policies rather than the merely aggressive rhetoric it employed in the past. One result has been that China has all but given up its effort to use its leverage over North Korea to get it to abandon its nuclear program. Since 2011, Beijing has substantially increased its food aid to Pyongyang, imported more of North Korea's mineral resources, and made significant investments in North Korean mining, infrastructure, and manufacturing. China has also withdrawn its support for the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear program, forcing Washington to pursue bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang. Meanwhile, North Korea continues to develop its nuclear weapons capability. The pla has also put pressure on those of China's neighbors that have boosted their defense cooperation with the United States. In the spring of 2011, tensions between Beijing and Hanoi escalated as Chinese patrol ships harassed Vietnamese seismic survey boats in disputed waters, and several Chinese military officers advocated the use of force against the Vietnamese navy. Similarly, China's maritime confrontation earlier this year with the Philippines over the contested Scarborough Shoal suggests that Beijing will push back against countries that rely on the United States to support them in sovereignty disputes. China sent combat-ready patrols to defend its claim to the shoal and, after the Philippines withdrew its ships, established a permanent presence there. Also this year, Chinese national oil companies announced unprecedented plans to drill for oil in disputed waters—the other claimants have been active in these waters for years—and the pla formed a new military garrison charged with defending the country's territorial claims in the South China Sea. Since then, China has continued to actively strengthen its presence throughout the disputed waters and islands. As all these events suggest, the Obama administration's pivot has not contributed to stability in Asia. Quite the opposite: it has made the region more tense and conflict-prone. Military aircraft and naval ships now crowd the region's skies and waters. And the United States risks getting

involved in hostilities over strategically irrelevant and economically marginal islands. If the risk is greatest of an accidental conflict, then it seems counter intuitive to increase the risk of an accident

Maintaining hegemony causes transition conflicts in Asia – the US will attempt to hold on

Layne '08 - Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the [George Bush School of Government and Public Service](#) at [Texas A&M University](#), [international relations](#) theorist [Christopher Layne, "China's Challenge to U.S. Hegemony" *Current History*, January 2008, pages 14-18, <http://acme.highpoint.edu/~msetzler/IR/IRreadingsbank/chinauscontain.ch08.6.pdf> / Alisa Yang]

China's rise affects the United States because of what international relations scholars call the "power transition" effect: Throughout the history of the modern international state system, ascending powers have always challenged the position of the dominant (hegemonic) power in the international "peaceful rise," an ascending China inevitably will challenge the geopolitical equilibrium in East Asia. The doctrine of peaceful rise thus is a reassurance strategy employed by Beijing in an attempt to allay others' fears of growing Chinese power and to forestall the United States from acting preventively during the dangerous transition period when China is catching up to the United States. Does this mean that the United States and China are on a collision course that will lead to a war in the next decade or two? Not necessarily. What happens in Sino-American relations largely depends on what strategy Washington chooses to adopt toward China. If the United States tries to maintain its current dominance in East Asia, Sino-American conflict is virtually certain, because u s grand strategy has incorporated the logic of anticipatory violence as an instrument for maintaining American primacy. For a declining hegemon, "strangling the baby in the crib" by attacking a rising challenger preventively—that is, while the hegemon still holds the upper hand militarily—has always been a tempting strategic option.

US Hegemony is not needed in East Asia; China and Japan prove

Ted Carpenter April 2013, [a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor to *The National Interest*, is the author of nine books and more than 500 articles and policy studies, "Delusions of Indispensability" <http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/delusions-indispensability-8145>] MJS

Prospects **in other regions** are less definite, but **there are** still **opportunities for Washington to reduce its military exposure and risks**. The most important region to the United States, East Asia, presents a less encouraging picture than does Europe for off-loading security obligations, since there is no cohesive, multilateral organization comparable to the EU to undertake those responsibilities. Yet even **in East Asia there are alternatives to U.S. hegemony**, which has been in place since 1945. Washington's dominance was born in an era in which there were no credible challengers. Although the USSR had some ambitions in the western Pacific, its primary goals were elsewhere, largely in Eastern Europe and the emerging states of the Third World. China after the Chinese Revolution in 1949 was belligerent, but also weak and poor. Japan, utterly defeated in World War II and worried about Soviet and Chinese intentions, was content to maintain a pacifist image and rely heavily on the United States for defense. The rest of the region consisted of new, weak states arising out of rapidly decaying European colonial empires. As in Europe, the situation today is totally different. **Japan has the world's third-largest economy, China is an emerging great power, and East Asia has an assortment of other significant economic and political players. It will be increasingly difficult for the United States, a nation thousands of miles away, to dominate a region with an ever-expanding roster of major**

powers. Instead of frantically trying to prop up a slipping hegemony, U.S. policy makers must focus on helping to shape a new security environment. Among other steps, Washington should wean its principal allies in the region—especially Japan, South Korea and Australia—from their overreliance on U.S. defense guarantees. Not only should U.S. leaders make it clear that the United States intends to reduce its military presence, but they should emphasize that those allies now must take far greater responsibility for their own defense and the overall stability of the region. The most likely outcome of such a policy shift would be the emergence of an approximate balance of power in East Asia. China would be the single strongest country, but if Japan, South Korea, and other actors such as Vietnam and Indonesia take the actions necessary to protect their own interests, Beijing will fall far short of having enough power to become the new hegemon. A balance-of-power system would be somewhat less stable than the current arrangement, but it would likely be sufficient to protect crucial American interests. And it may be Washington's only realistic option over the medium and long term. Clinging to an increasingly unsustainable hegemony is not a realistic strategy.

Failure of US China relations results in intensifying international problems – multiple factors. Only a cooperative relationship between the US and China can avoid great power wars, resource scarcity, economic collapse, environmental degradation, and increased carbon emissions

Fingar and Garrett 13 (Thomas Fingar, Stanford University and Banning Garrett, Atlantic Council, September 2013, "China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future," Atlantic Council, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/China-US_Cooperation_Key_to_the_Global_Future_WEB.pdf) DDI – JT

As the megatrends and uncertainties evolve over the coming two decades and beyond, China and the United States, along with the rest of the world, will face unprecedented challenges and unpredictable, disruptive change. We offer three global scenarios to illustrate how the complex megatrends, key uncertainties, and disruptive changes could play out, depending in large part on whether the relationship between China and the United States is primarily cooperative or conflictual.

- Global Drift and Erosion: This scenario is characterized by the inability of China and the United States to work together effectively, if at all, to address key global challenges and to resolve regional conflicts. Problems created or exacerbated by the megatrends, key uncertainties, and their interactions worsen, creating a world that is less peaceful, less stable, and less prosperous. The debacle of the 2009 Copenhagen UN climate change conference demonstrated the global impact of the failure of the United States and China to agree on far-reaching steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In this future, the US and China again fail to respond adequately to continuing problems such as economic imbalances associated with the efforts of many countries to break into and then move from middle income status to that of high income. There is disruptive socio-political change related in part to both economic and demographic transitions, and environmental problems involving inadequate energy,

water, and food resources. Washington and Beijing could be too preoccupied with political and military competition and territorial disputes in the Western Pacific, as well as by bilateral differences over intellectual property and other trade issues, to tackle these pressing problems. Among possible developments, **US-China tensions could adversely affect global responses to energy challenges. These range from threats to security of supplies resulting from conflict in the Middle East and Persian Gulf to the need for a global energy transition away from fossil fuels to minimize carbon emissions and the impact of energy price volatility on global economic growth.** Further, **China and the United States also could fail to cooperate in efforts to mitigate the potentially disruptive impact of greatly increased demand for food, water, and other resources created by the addition of more than one billion people to the global population by 2030 as well as possibly two billion or more people to the developing world middle class. Without adequate international cooperation and global governmental mechanisms, this could lead to deeper economic crises, unresolved political conflicts, and worsening environmental conditions.**

- **Zero-Sum World:** A second possible trajectory could lead to the emergence of an even more competitive and dangerous zerosum world, in which nations pursue narrow national interests. For example, the world could experience intense monetary and trade protectionism, with countries seeking geopolitical advantage at the expense of international cooperation for the common good. **It could see intensifying rivalries, creating hostilities and rendering cooperation on global challenges nearly impossible as global governmental mechanisms break down or are marginalized.** In this scenario, the impact of megatrends and critical challenges on global developments is overwhelmingly negative. The world economy is in a tailspin, brought on, perhaps, by a deepening European recession followed by a new meltdown of the global financial system and then a worse recession than that sparked by the 2008 financial crisis. **Regional conflicts and disputes in East Asia intensify suspicions and threaten to ignite conflict among the major powers.** The United States and China not only fail to cooperate on longer-term global issues but also fail to work together to resolve immediate regional tensions which spin out of control, leading to military conflict that threatens to drag the US and China into direct confrontation.
- **Global Revitalization and Cooperation:** A third possible trajectory could lead to a world in which **sustained and effective cooperation builds/rebuilds key institutions to address old and emerging challenges as well as “black swans.”** Globalization and global integration continue apace with more successful efforts to mitigate or prepare for negative consequences. **This scenario is characterized by greater strategic stability among major powers and by sustained prosperity and economic growth in China, the United States, and most other countries.** Through cooperative development and deployment of new technologies countries implement **effective measures to manage energy, water, governance, and other challenges.** The result would be a wide range of win-win outcomes for all nations. **It is difficult to find any credible path to such “global revitalization and cooperation” that does not include a cooperative US-China relationship.** This makes efforts to achieve such an outcome imperative for the leaders of both countries, despite the differences and suspicions between them.

Sino-Japanese War Unlikely Because of Nukes

ThinkProgress, 2014 [ThinkProgress, “Why Everyone Needs To Stop Freaking Out About War With China”, *ThinkProgress*, <https://thinkprogress.org/why-everyone-needs-to-stop-freaking-out-about-war-with-china-29354eaa709d#.c93ucq1h9>] //AKC

War between China and Japan is more than unlikely: it would fly in the face of most of what we know about the two countries, and international relations more broadly. It’s not that a replay of 1914 is impossible. It’s just deeply, vanishingly unlikely.

...

But **there’s one big factor shaping the balance of power in East Asia that means the talk is likely to remain just that: nuclear weapons.** The tagline for World War I in 1914—“The War To End All Wars”—would have a decidedly different meaning in 2014, as war’s end would be accomplished by the world’s end. So whereas, in 1914, all of the European powers thought they could win the war decisively, **East Asia’s great powers recognize the risk of a nuclear exchange between the United States and China to be catastrophic. Carleton University’s Stephen Saideman calls this the end of the “preemption temptation;” nobody thinks they can win by striking first anymore. Indeed, despite the words of some of its military leaders, China (at least nominally) has a no-clash-with-Japan policy in place over the islands.**

Sino-Japanese War Unlikely Because of Money

ThinkProgress, 2014 [ThinkProgress, “Why Everyone Needs To Stop Freaking Out About War With China”, *ThinkProgress*, <https://thinkprogress.org/why-everyone-needs-to-stop-freaking-out-about-war-with-china-29354eaa709d#.c93ucq1h9>] //AKC

It’s wrong to talk about incentives to go war in purely military terms. A key component of the Senkaku/Diaoyu is economic: the islands contain a ton of natural resources, particularly oil and gas. **But far more valuable are the trade ties between the two countries. China is Japan’s largest export market, so war would hurt Japan more than China, but it’d be pretty painful for both.**

Angell may have been wrong about Europe, but he’s probably right about East Asia. M.G. Koo, a political scientist at Chung-Ang University, surveyed several Senkaku-Diaoyu flareups between 1969 and 2009. **He found that economic ties between the two countries played an increasingly large role in defusing tensions as the trade relationship between the two countries deepened.**

The 1978 crisis over the islands is a good example. Bilateral trade had grown substantially since the end of the last big dispute (1972), but they had entered into a new phase after Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms began in 1978. A key part of the early modernization plan was the Peace and Friendship Treaty (PFT) with Japan, **a diplomatic treaty** that (among other things) **“facilitated a rush of Japanese firms into the Chinese market.”** According to Koo, **“policy circles in China and Japan” had “increasingly recognized that the [Senkaku/Diaoyu] sovereignty issue could possibly jeopardize the PFT negotiations, thus undermining economic gains.”** The leadership tamped down

tensions and, afterwards, “shelving territorial claims for economic development seemingly became the two countries’ diplomatic leitmotif in the treatment of the island dispute.”

There’s reason to believe today’s China and Japan aren’t bucking the historical pattern. Despite a year of heated rhetoric and economic tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, bilateral trade has been recovering nicely of late. Quartz’s Matt Phillips, looking over the numbers, concluded that “the China-Japan trade war is pretty much over.” Sure, Chinese business leaders are making some nationalistic noises, but Phillips points out that the “lack of mass, nationalistic protests in China suggests the powers-that-be have decided there’s no need for that to hurt an important business relationship.” Trade really does appear to be calming the waves in the East China Sea.

No Taiwan war- China doesn’t want to invade, and deterrence checks escalation

Keck 13 (12/24, Zachary, formerly Managing Editor of The Diplomat where he authored The Pacific Realist blog, Previously, he worked as Deputy Editor of e-International Relations and has interned at the Center for a New American Security and in the U.S. Congress, where he worked on defense issues, Why China Won't Attack Taiwan, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/why-china-wont-attack-taiwan/>) //CJC

Even assuming China’s military capabilities are great enough to prevent the U.S. from intervening, there are two forces that would likely be sufficient to deter China from invading Taiwan. The first and least important is the dramatic impact this would have on how countries in the region and around the world would view such a move. Globally, China seizing Taiwan would result in it being permanently viewed as a malicious nation. Regionally, China’s invasion of Taiwan would diminish any lingering debate over how Beijing will use its growing power. Every regional power would see its own fate in Taiwan. Although Beijing would try to reassure countries by claiming that Taiwan was part of China already, and thus the operation was a domestic stability one, this narrative would be convincing to none of China’s neighbors. Consequently, Beijing would face an environment in which each state was dedicated to cooperating with others to balance against Chinese power. But the more important deterrent for China would be the uncertainty of success. To be sure, China’s military capabilities are growing to the point where it will soon be assured of its ability to quickly defeat Taiwan’s military forces. A little longer down the road it will also likely be confident that it can prevent the U.S. from intervening in the conflict. However, as recent U.S. military conflicts have adequately demonstrated, being able to defeat another nation’s armed forces and being able to pacify the country are two different things altogether. It is in this latter aim that China’s strategy is likely to falter. Taiwanese are adamantly opposed to being incorporated into a non-Democratic China. These feelings would only harden in the aftermath of the invasion. Thus, even if it quickly defeated Taiwan’s formal military forces, the PLA would continue to have to contend with the remnants of resistance for years to come. Such a scenario would be deeply unsettling for leaders in Beijing as this defiance would likely inspire similar resistance among various groups on the mainland, starting first and foremost with ethnic minorities in the western China. Should the PLA resort to harsh oppression to squash resistance in Taiwan, this would deeply unsettle even Han Chinese on the mainland. In fact, the clear parallels with how Imperial Japan sought to pacify Taiwan and China would be lost on no one in China and elsewhere. The entire situation would be *a nightmare for Chinese leaders*. Consequently, they are *nearly certain* to avoid provoking it by invading Taiwan. The only real scenario in which they would invade Taiwan is if the island nation formally declared independence. But if Taiwanese leaders have avoided doing so to date, they are unlikely to think the idea is very wise as China goes stronger. Thus, the status-quo in the Taiwanese strait is unlikely to be changed by military force. Instead, Beijing is likely to continue drawing Taiwan closer economically, and

seeking to disrupt the U.S.-Taiwanese bilateral relationship. The hope would be that leaders in Taipei will ultimately conclude that they cannot resist being absorbed into China, something China itself can facilitate this by offering favorable terms.

China and Taiwan are reaching consensus on key issues now with cooperation

Taipei Times 2014 [Staff writer "Taiwan, China reach consensus on nine deals," <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/02/23/2003584158>] //AGK

Taiwan and China on Friday reached a consensus on proposals to improve the implementation of nine of 19 agreements they have signed to date. The consensus came after a two-day meeting in China's Changsha between the intermediary bodies handling negotiations for the two countries in the absence of official ties — the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Beijing-based Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). The Changsha meeting was held to review the implementation and impact of the 19 cross-strait pacts signed since 2008 when President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) set in motion a more conciliatory approach toward China. During the review, **consensus was reached on improving the implementation of accords covering cooperation in the fields of finance, air transportation, sea transportation, healthcare, crime fighting, food safety, investment protection, fishing crews and agricultural quarantines.**

Doubling down on spending will create arms race, new cold war, kills coop

Michael Swaine, Joseph Prueher, J. Stapleton Roy, Paul Heer, David Lampton, Ezra Vogel, **December 12, 2016** [Swaine is a senior fellow, "How America Can Lead in Asia," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/12/12/how-america-can-lead-in-asia-pub-66428>] MJS 12-22-2016

The security imperatives of China and the United States are potentially, but not inherently, incompatible. They become incompatible only if neither side is willing to accommodate, in some fashion, to the other's fundamental interests.

The solution is not for the United States to double down militarily, spending vast amounts of money in a futile attempt to remain militarily predominant across all of maritime East Asia. Such an approach would be virtually certain to result in an intensifying arms race and political rivalry with Beijing that would undermine the basis for vital Sino-U.S. cooperation in other areas. At worst, **it could generate a new Cold War** that benefits no one.

Washington also needs to adapt its security posture in the region to one that the U.S. economy can sustain, and the U.S. polity can endorse, especially given America's myriad domestic priorities.

No risk of SCS conflicts – Globalization checks

Jenny, 15 – [Nicolas Jenny, Masters at Fudan University in Shanghai, 1-28-15, Trade Goes on as Usual in the South China Sea, www.realclearworld.com/articles/2015/01/28/trade_goes_on_as_usual_in_the_south_china_sea_110939.html] //CJC

International relations scholars and journalists have intensely debated the reasons behind China's increased assertiveness in the South China Sea. But Beijing's foreign policy actions in the region have made most countries suspicious if not completely resentful of China. ¶ This has led some to claim that, 'China today faces the worst regional environment since Tiananmen. Its relations with Japan are at a record low; China-ASEAN ties have similarly deteriorated due to the South China Sea disputes and China's heavy-handed use of its clout to divide ASEAN.' ¶ Despite this resentment, analysts have largely overlooked the trade dynamics between China and other claimants in the South China Sea dispute. One would naturally assume that deep suspicions or resentment of Beijing would translate into diminishing trade ties, yet the opposite has taken place. ¶ For example, Vietnam recorded an 18.9% increase in Chinese imports in 2014 despite Hanoi's attempts to broaden its import partners. The issue became particularly relevant following China's decision to place an oil rig in disputed waters earlier in 2014. ¶ The Philippines, no stranger to Chinese pressure in the South China Sea, also reported a 12.4% increase of exports to China during the first nine months of 2014. Coincidentally, China is also the Philippines' third largest, and Vietnam's largest trading partner. ¶ While smaller East Asian states continue to hedge their bets against China, there is a resounding pattern in their trade statistics - they all present a strong trade deficit in China's favour. Vietnam's trade deficit with China reached a record high in 2014 while the Philippines' highest trade deficit is with China, representing 16% of imports, a 35% increase from previous years. ¶ Herein lays the conundrum of the South China Sea dispute: while claimant states rally against Beijing's nine-dash line, economically, they need China more than China needs them. Access to China's market has forced foreign companies and their governments to compromise on politics. While European companies have compromised on issues such as internet censorship, Southeast Asia's governments have been forced to compromise on sovereignty in the South China Sea. ¶ This economic fact of life for Southeast Asian states has produced ripple effects across policy. For example, following the deadly anti-China riots in Vietnam, Hanoi promised to reimburse and rebuild China's factories damaged by the protests. Similarly, the Philippines' economy suffered tremendously in 2012 when China drastically cut banana imports. ¶ China will soon have successfully leveraged its economic power to reach political ends - the consolidation of the South China Sea as Beijing's core interest. It will not have primarily been through vast military expansion as many had predicted, but rather through its economic might. Trade has arguably been China's most widely used foreign policy tool and as China's wealth increases, this is only set to continue. ¶ As it should be remembered, the South China Sea dispute is not all about potential energy deposits in the region. It is a dispute over competing visions of the South China Sea and a weary China who sees itself surrounded. Heightened trade flows between China and the claimant states can assure a certain amount of stability in the region. ¶ And although many are quick to remind us that trade cannot serve as a deterrent to conflict, today's globalised world stands in stark contrast to the beginning of the 20th century. Even the Philippine president, Aquino, argued that territorial disputes in the South China Sea were unlikely to lead to conflict because no one was willing to sacrifice the huge trade flows in the region. ¶ Therefore, despite the issues over sovereignty and the occasional flare-ups between various claimants, peace, no matter how precarious, will prevail - no country is ready, particularly China, to sacrifice trade at the expense of stability.

No SCS miscalc - Empirics prove. Increased presence of CG ships actually results in less potential for conflict.

Stashwick, 15 [Steven, spent 10 years on active duty as a U.S. naval officer, made several deployments to the Western Pacific, and completed graduate studies in international relations at the University of Chicago. He is a Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve.2015 ("South China Sea: Conflict Escalation and 'Miscalculation' Myths," The Diplomat, September 25, 2015, Accessible Online at: <http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-china-sea-conflict-escalation-and-miscalculation-myths/>] //CJC

In Asia, there is recent and dramatic precedent for restraint, even after an unambiguously hostile local event, which belies theoretical arguments about the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation. When the South Korean warship Cheonan was sunk in 2010, South Korea determined that North Korea was responsible. Far from a mere 'incident' of the sort worried over in the South China Sea, this was a belligerent act against South Korea's armed forces. And yet, there was no miscalculation-fueled conflict spiral, and instead a strategically calibrated response.

It remains unknown whether the sinking of the Cheonan was ordered by the North Koreans (they continue to deny any responsibility), the act of a renegade, or, perhaps least plausibly, an accident. What is clear is that despite a sunken ship and 46 sailors killed, the incident did not spiral out of control. This suggests that South Korea's political calculus did not view militarily punishing North Korea worth the risk of a renewed – and potentially nuclear – war, which is to say that an extraordinary but tactical-level event did not trump strategic preferences. Even so, some take the miscalculation-escalation dynamic so far as to suggest that incidents between fishing vessels and coast guards in the South China Sea might lead to war. In view of the Cold War record and the recent Cheonan example, such propositions are drastically overstated. It is conceivable that a state already resolved to escalate a dispute militarily might view a local maritime incident as a convenient casus belli. But in that emphatically calculated case, no institutional impediments to such incidents would prevent the hostility.

On the contrary, the prevalence of coast guards and fishing vessels is actually a sign of restraint. For a front so often considered a "flashpoint," it is notable how few incidents in the South China Sea are between naval assets. This is not accident or luck, but instead suggests that regional players deliberately use lightly armed coast guard and other para-military "white hull" vessels to enforce their claims. Because these units do not have the ability to escalate force the way warships do, it in fact signals their desire to avoid escalation. And while "gray hull" naval vessels may be just over the horizon providing an implicit threat of force, they can also provide a further constraint on potential incidents; their very presence compels parties to consider how far to escalate without inviting more serious responses.

As in the Cold War, parties in the South China Sea have sought diplomatic mitigation of maritime incidents, principally through the perennially-stalled Code of Conduct, the year-old Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), and the bilateral Military Maritime Consultative Agreement between the U.S. and China. But underpinning concerns about miscalculation and escalation, and mitigation efforts like CUES, is the idea that by avoiding incidents the region will avoid war. This belief is dangerous insofar as it conflates the symptoms of the disputes (incidents at sea) with the terms of the dispute itself (maritime rights and sovereignty). Incidents and the activities that precipitate them help establish new and accepted regional norms and "facts on the ground" (bloodlessly, if inelegantly). In that sense, avoiding incidents sets back the de facto resolution of the disputes. Since the balance of these evolving norms and facts on the ground appears to favor China's efforts (e.g., using its coast guard to eject fishing vessels from disputed waters and island reclamation projects), it is neither surprising that China's regional rivals propose institutional remedies like CUES and the Code of Conduct, nor that China only agrees to them after negotiating away any legally binding provisions.

The record suggests that miscalculation concerns over incidents in the maritime realm are exaggerated and can artificially increase tensions, raise threat perceptions, and justify arms build-ups.

Whether an incident is deliberate, or a true organic accident, if it occurs within a dispute context where neither side desires armed conflict, it will not escalate at the strategic level. However, because of the very seriousness of that perceived escalation threat, the miscalculation narrative can also motivate positive diplomatic efforts like INCSEA, DMA, and now CUES (not to overstate their realistic contribution to resolving disputes).

Further, for all its conceptual and historical problems, and not least its potential to feed narratives of aggression, another possible advantage of focusing on "miscalculation" in the South China Sea is that it allows countries to maintain ambiguity about the real terms of dispute. Avoiding war is a distinct objective from "solving" disputes; war is a dispute resolution mechanism after all. But if peace is the priority, ambiguity may be preferable if all that clarity reveals is just how intractable those disputes may be. Clarity can rob governments of the flexibility to equivocate to their domestic audiences (and competitors) and force a choice between escalating a conflict and backing down from their claims. Then open conflict might become more realistic. Conversely, if all parties are more or less content to live with ambiguity in the region's maritime claims, then a somewhat mutually dissatisfying peace prevails, but peace nonetheless. Everyone wants to win, but as long

as everyone also wants to avoid losing even more, occasional incidents do not have to fuel strategic tension.

US-China war is impossible – deterrence checks even if they overtake

US

Glaser 11 - Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Director of the Elliott School's Institute for Security and Conflict Studies (Charles, "Will China's Rise Lead to War?" Foreign Affairs, April 2011) //CJC

What does all this imply about the rise of China? At the broadest level, the news is good. Current international conditions should enable both the United States and China to protect their vital interests without posing large threats to each other. Nuclear weapons make it relatively easy for major powers to maintain highly effective deterrent forces. Even if Chinese power were to greatly exceed U.S. power somewhere down the road, the United States would still be able to maintain nuclear forces that could survive any Chinese attack and threaten massive damage in retaliation. Large-scale conventional attacks by China against the U.S. homeland, meanwhile, are virtually impossible because the United States and China are separated by the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean, across which it would be difficult to attack. No foreseeable increase in China's power would be large enough to overcome these twin advantages of defense for the United States. The same defensive advantages, moreover, apply to China as well. Although China is currently much weaker than the United States militarily, it will soon be able to build a nuclear force that meets its requirements for deterrence. And China should not find the United States' massive conventional capabilities especially threatening, because the bulk of U.S. forces, logistics, and support lie across the Pacific. The overall effect of these conditions is to greatly moderate the security dilemma. Both the United States and China will be able to maintain high levels of security now and through any potential rise of China to superpower status. This should help Washington and Beijing avoid truly strained geopolitical relations, which should in turn help ensure that the security dilemma stays moderate, thereby facilitating cooperation. The United States, for example, will have the option to forego responding to China's modernization of its nuclear force. This restraint will help reassure China that the United States does not want to threaten its security--and thus help head off a downward political spiral fueled by nuclear competition.

Low-level conflicts won't escalate to accidental war –MAD and diplomacy still checks

Keck 13 - Former Deputy Editor of E-International Relations (Zachary, The Diplomat, "Why China and the U.S. (Probably) Won't Go to War," <http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/why-china-and-the-us-probably-wont-go-to-war/>)//CJC

These can and should be supplemented with clear and open communication channels, which can be especially useful when unexpected crises arise, like an exchange of fire between low-level naval officers in the increasingly crowded waters in the region. While this possibility is real and frightening, it's hard to imagine a plausible scenario where it leads to a nuclear exchange between China and the United States. After all, at each stage of the crisis leaders know that if it is not properly contained, a nuclear war could ensue, and the complete destruction of a leader's country is a more frightening possibility than losing credibility among hawkish elements of

society. In any case, measured means of retaliation would be available to the party wronged, and behind-the-scenes diplomacy could help facilitate the process of finding mutually acceptable retaliatory measures.

Drone Strikes increase vengeance terrorist attacks

Bergen 2011 [Peter, and Jennifer Rowland. "CIA Drone Strikes and the Taliban." Talibanistan (2011): 229-36. Web. <<http://ftp.iza.org/dp6262.pdf>>] //CJC

For the Taliban in Afghanistan the reaction functions we estimate are of the form, 11 where DS_t and DU_t represent **drone strikes which were successful** and which were not successful in killing a militant leader at time t , respectively. p is The estimation results are reported in table 10, with the second column giving the estimation results from the incidence specification and the fourth column giving the estimation results from the levels specification. We find that there is no large and significant impact of unsuccessful drone strikes on terrorist attacks by the Taliban in Afghanistan, but **a terrorist attack in Afghanistan is 8.8% more likely five days after a successful drone strike. This indicates that vengeance effects may be particularly strong when drone strikes are able to kill militant leaders for Taliban violence in Afghanistan.**

Drones kill 8-15 civilians for every one dead terrorist

Bashir 2014 [Hira Bashir leads data analytics at Pakistan Body Count. She has co-authored the book, Drones and Pakistan. "International Law and Drone Strikes in Pakistan." (2014). <<http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2015/The%20Impact%20of%20Drone%20Strikes%20in%20Pakistan.pdf>>] //CJC

If the intensity of **drone attacks** and suicide bombing is analyzed from year 2007 to year 2009, **94% of the time, 15 civilians died** (either by suicide bombing or a drone strike) **for every one terrorist killed by a drone strike.** From year 2010 to year 2012, **eight civilians were killed for every one terrorist.** President Obama has called the presence of Al-Qaeda in the border areas of Pakistan a cancer, at the same time urging Pakistan to fight the cancer of extremism. In light of the data presented in this paper, we should question the appropriateness of this metaphor: Do the ills that plague Pakistan not include drone warfare and its deadly effects on civilians, for whose deaths no one has been held accountable?

Drones cause widespread anti-American sentiment

McManus 2014 [Doyle McManus is a reporter for the LA Times. "The Drone Warfare Drawbacks." Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times, 5 July 2014. <<http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mcmanus-column-drones-20140706-column.html>>] //CJC

In an almost-invisible campaign that started modestly under Bush and expanded dramatically under Obama, **the U.S. has launched more than 1,600 drone strikes** in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya and even, in one case, in the Philippines, according to Micah Zenko of the Council on Foreign Relations. **Drone strikes may be an efficient way to kill terrorists, but they're no way to make friends.** That's one of the messages of a stinging new

report issued recently by a panel of experts convened by Washington's independent Stimson Center, a thoroughly establishment group of former officials from both Democratic and Republican administrations. Blue-ribbon commissions in Washington often pull their punches; this one, chaired by retired Army Gen. John P. Abizaid and former Pentagon official Rosa Brooks, didn't. Among its highlights: Just because drone wars have succeeded in killing terrorists doesn't mean they're working. "The Obama administration's heavy reliance on targeted killings as a pillar of U.S. counter-terrorism strategy rests on questionable assumptions and risks increasing instability," the report warns. **After a decade of drone strikes, it notes, we face more Islamic extremists, not fewer. The widespread use of drones has created a backlash around the world, and not only in remote villages in Pakistan or Yemen.** The report quotes retired Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the former U.S. commander in Afghanistan, warning that **the tactic creates resentment "much greater than the average American appreciates."** Reliance on drones for "targeted killing" has allowed the CIA and Pentagon to obscure exactly whom we are fighting.

Drones undermine the war on terror

Thomas Michael **McDonnell, Professor of Law, Pace University** School of Law, **2012**, George Washington International Law Review, v. 44, ARTICLE: SOW WHAT YOU REAP? USING PREDATOR AND REAPER DRONES TO CARRY OUT ASSASSINATIONS OR TARGETED KILLINGS OF SUSPECTED ISLAMIC TERRORISTS, p. 299-300

At the very least, **there is a reasonable doubt that using drones for targeted killing operations of suspected Islamic terrorists will**, in the long run, **seriously disable the terrorist organizations they lead.** Despite the decapitation of numerous Taliban and al Qaeda leaders and the Obama administration's belief that the strikes have effectively paralyzed al Qaeda in the Pakistan tribal areas, **there is some evidence to suggest that such operations might actually strengthen such organizations both internally and externally.** Employed against these targets, **the unchivalrous**, seemingly cowardly, **method of warfare might result in greater support for terrorists and more terrorist recruits in the Islamic world.** Perhaps even more important, compiling hit lists and then using a machine remotely operated from a distant land, to take the life of listed suspected terrorists appears much more like murder than honorable combat and, thereby, undermines world public order. Furthermore despite their precision, drone missile attacks often endanger non-combatants. The United States and its allies should restrict the targeted killing of suspected Islamic terrorists to the exceptional case where a militant poses an imminent threat to the United States, allied troops or civilians, and, as a matter of policy, if not crystallized, international law, ensure that innocent civilians be spared.

Civil wars are low now, less deadly than interstate wars, and don't kill that many people

HSRP 2014 [Human Security Report Project at Simon Fraser University, "The Decline in Global Violence Reality or Myth?", *HSRP*, http://www.hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/HSR2013/HSR_2013_Press_Release.pdf] //CJC

Today there is broad agreement within the research community that the number and deadliness of interstate wars has declined dramatically since the end of World War II, and **the incidence of civil wars has declined substantially since the end of the Cold War**. But given the fragmentary nature of much of the historical data on war and homicide rates, debate on the extent of violence in earlier periods of history remains deeply contested and unlikely to abate soon. Professor Pinker is well aware that his findings are sharply at odds with widely held popular beliefs: In a century that began with 9/11, Iraq, and Darfur, the claim that we are living in an unusually peaceful time may strike you as somewhere between hallucinatory and obscene. The post-World War II conflict data offer compelling evidence that both **the decline in the number and deadliness of wars are real**. The 2000s are indeed relatively peaceful compared with previous decades. The HSRP graphic below shows the rapid decline in international wars (anti-colonial wars are included in this category) over the past 60 odd years. The average number of international wars being fought every year per decade shrinks dramatically—from over six in the 1950s, to less than one in the 2000s. This matters says Human Security Report Project Director, Andrew Mack, because, **“international wars kill far more people on average than do the far more numerous civil wars.”** We should note however that **the total number of armed conflicts of all types**—i.e., not just international wars—**increased threefold** from the 1950s to the end of the Cold War. **But most of these conflicts were low-intensity civil wars with relatively modest fatality counts. From the early 1990s to the present day, overall conflict numbers have dropped by some 40 percent, while the deadliest conflicts, those that kill at least 1,000 people a year, have declined by more than half.**

US intervention empirically makes civil wars last longer

Sambanis 2000 [Nicholas Sambanis is a writer and researcher for the World Bank. "External Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars." World Bank, 2000. <<https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/373430892.pdf>>] //CJC

Out of 138 intra-state conflicts since 1944, 89 attracted external interventions by at least one external third party. Within the 89 cases, if repeated interventions were taken into account the total number of interventions amounts to 190, of which 76 were accounted for by major powers. **The countries with the dubious distinction of having the highest number of interventions are: USA (35)**, Former USSR/Russia (16), France (10), UK (9), China (6) and Cuba (5). Out of the 190 interventions, only 57 have led to an end in the fighting. External interventions are associated with longer-lasting wars. **A scatter diagram of war duration and external interventions during 1960-99 for all countries that have experienced civil wars reveals an upward-sloping relationship** (Figure 3.B). Moreover, **the mean duration of civil wars that were terminated and which had external interventions was nine years; while those wars that were terminated but did not have an intervention had a mean duration of only 1.5 years.**

Even if US intervention causes a peace deal it still increases the risk of future conflict by 94%

Kenwick 2014 [Michael Kenwick at Pennsylvania State University. "Military Intervention and Settlement Durability in Civil Conflicts." Pennsylvania State University, 2014. Web. 1 Dec. 2016 <http://sites.psu.edu/mikekenwick/wp-content/uploads/sites/19790/2014/10/kenwick_intervention_july141.pdf>] //CJC

Despite the importance of this issue, extant literature does not provide a direct/complete answer to the question at hand. **Existing research on military interventions has focused primarily on its short term effects on the duration and outcome of ongoing conflicts** (Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom 2004, **Regan 2002**, Lemke & **Regan 2008**, **Cunningham 2010**, Balch-Lindsay, Enterline & **Joyce 2008**, Gent 2008). **Work that has studied the impact of third**

parties on the peace process, on the other hand, generally focuses on the role of non-combatant forces, such as peacekeeping missions and the role of non-combatant guarantors that intervene after hostilities have ended (Walter 1997, Fortna 2004a, Doyle & Sambanis 2000, Diehl 1994, Diehl 2008). Comparatively little is known about how the presence of foreign troops in an ongoing conflict affects the peace that follows

[...]

Furthermore, **military interventions prior to peace agreements increase the hazard of conflict recurrence**. The Intervention coefficient summed with the interaction between the Intervention and Negotiated settlement ($\beta_{\text{Intervention}} + \beta_{\text{Intervention}} \times \text{Negotiated Settlement}$) is statistically significant with a value of 0.662, and a two-tailed, 95% confidence interval [0.007, 1.317]. Substantively, these results indicate that **civil conflicts that end in negotiated settlements with interveners present are 94% more likely to experience peace failure than conflicts ending in negotiated settlements that do not feature third party interveners**. The two-tailed 95% confidence interval around this effect is [0.7%, 273%]. As predicted by the Intervention Hypothesis, intervention decreases peace duration when civil conflicts end in a negotiated settlement.”

[...]

Civil War codes whether a conflict produced at least one thousand battle-related deaths in at least one year of its duration (Gleditsch et al. 2002). **Empirical evidence has shown that third party interventions may be less likely in conflicts that have produced a large number of fatalities** (Regan 1998). Increasing fatalities may also reduce both the likelihood that a civil conflict will end in a negotiated settlement (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline & Joyce 2008). Like conflict duration, fatalities may also function to disseminate information between combatants, which then reduces uncertainty and increases settlement durability. For these reasons, an indicator of whether a conflict episode resulted in a civil war is also included.

One-sided military interventions shift the balance of power and causes the threatened actor to kill 25-40% more civilians

Wood 2012 [Reed Wood, professor of politics and global studies, “Armed intervention and civilian victimization in intrastate conflicts”, *Journal of Peace Research*, <http://www.public.asu.edu/~rmwood4/woodkathgent_jpr.pdf>] //CJC

Research has begun to examine the relationship between changes in the conflict environment and levels of civilian victimization. We extend this work by examining the effect of external armed intervention on the decisions of governments and insurgent organizations to victimize civilians during civil wars. We theorize that changes in the balance of power in an intrastate conflict influence combatant strategies of violence. **As a conflict actor weakens relative to its adversary, it employs increasingly violent tactics toward the civilian population** as a means of reshaping the strategic landscape to its benefit. The reason for this is twofold. First, **declining capabilities increase resource needs at the moment that extractive capacity is in decline**. Second, **declining capabilities inhibit control and policing, making less violent means of defection deterrence more difficult**. **As both resource extraction difficulties and internal threats increase, actors' incentives for violence against the population increase**. To the extent that **biased military interventions shift the balance of power between conflict actors, we argue that they alter actor incentives to victimize civilians**. Specifically,

intervention should reduce the level of violence employed by the supported faction and increase the level employed by the opposed faction. We test these arguments using data on civilian casualties and armed intervention in intrastate conflicts from 1989 to 2004. Our results support our expectations, suggesting that interventions shift the power balance and affect the levels of violence employed by combatants.

[...]

To examine the substantive significance of this relationship we simulate the expected level of one-sided rebel violence for changes in the balance of intervention forces. 15 As Figure 1 demonstrates, **when the balance of intervention forces shifts to favor the rebels** (positive movements along the x-axis toward “0” or parity), **the group reduces its use of anti-civilian violence**. Conversely, **as the balance shifts against them, the rebels increase violence**.

Specifically, **a one standard deviation decrease in the intervention variable from parity (i.e., an intervention of 1,293 troops in favor of the government in a conflict with no previous intervention) raises the expected number of civilians killed by insurgents from 107 to 134—an increase of 25%**. Intervention clearly has a substantial effect on the scale of one-sided rebel violence. [FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Now consider the analysis of government violence presented in the third column of Table 1. The intervention ratio variable has a positive and statistically significant effect on the level of one-sided government violence. Thus, as the size of a rebel intervention increases relative to the size of a government intervention, governments target civilians in greater numbers. This result also indicates that interventions favoring the government over rebel forces decrease the regime’s use of anti-civilian violence, providing further

support for our hypothesis. Figure 2 reports simulation estimates to demonstrate the substantive effects of the relationship. **From parity, a one standard deviation increase in the intervention variable (i.e., a 1,398 troop intervention in favor of the rebels in a conflict with no previous intervention) increases the expected number of annual civilian killings by government forces from 73 to 102, nearly a 40% increase**. 15 All simulations were performed using Clarify in Stata 11 (King, Tomz & Wittenberg, 2000). Simulations were conducted with all continuous independent variables at their means and dichotomous variables at their modal values, assuming that actors perpetrated one-sided rebel violence in the previous year. 22 government violence. These results demonstrate that **shifts in the power balance by external military interveners contribute to changes in the use of violence**.

Intervention makes civil wars 2x more deadly

HSR 2012 [The Human Security Report, “State-Based Armed Conflict”, *HSR*, <http://hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/HSR2012/HSRP2012_Chapter%205.pdf>] //CJC

In 2009 the three deadliest conflicts in the world were all in Central and South Asia—in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. There were just three high-intensity conflicts outside of Central and South Asia in 2009: in Iraq, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where Rwandan and Congolese forces battled the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR).⁸ Of these six high-intensity conflicts, those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and the DRC are **internationalized intrastate conflicts. This type of conflict, as we explain later, tends to be considerably deadlier than civil wars in which there is no military intervention by external powers**. Four of 2009’s six most deadly conflicts, those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Somalia, are associated with international and local campaigns

against Islamist groups. The security implications of this association were discussed in the last Human Security Report. 9

[...]

Many of the deadliest conflicts of the past two decades have involved external military forces fighting in civil wars. **These internationalized intrastate conflicts are, on average, twice as deadly as intrastate conflicts where there is no military intervention.**¹³ Interstate wars tend to have far higher battle-death tolls than civil wars with or without external military support, but as shown in Figure 5.7, conflicts between states have become extraordinarily rare. Since the end of the Cold War there have been three times as many internationalized intrastate conflicts as interstate conflicts. **Internationalized intrastate conflicts are a type of civil conflict in which the military forces of one or more external governments fight in support of one of the warring parties.**¹⁴ This includes so-called humanitarian interventions if external military forces officially take sides and support ¹⁵a party to the conflict with troops. However, the definition does not include most peacekeeping missions, which are usually deployed to support negotiated settlements—and sometimes to help protect the peace against spoilers—but not to further the goals of a combatant.¹⁵ States intervene militarily in civil conflicts in other countries for a variety of reasons. They may send forces to protect political or ideological interests, as was the case in the so called proxy wars of the Cold War era, or in response to humanitarian crises. Intervening states often have a complex combination of motivating factors, many of which may remain unstated. Our data do not provide information on these motivations but rather enable us to focus on the common characteristic of these conflicts: the presence of external military forces supporting at least one of the warring side

Case Study: Kosovo; Military action tradeoff with humanitarian assistance, need more funds for efficient humanitarian aid

Morton, 2014. [Rebecca, at University of Bristol, "Humanitarian Intervention: Advantages and Disadvantages in East Timor and Kosovo." International Relations. E-ir, 29 Mar. 2014. Web. 26 Dec. 2014. Morton, Rebecca. <<http://www.e-ir.info/2014/03/29/humanitarian-intervention-advantages-and-disadvantages-in-east-timor-and-kosovo/>>. GST

“Often interveners are too focused on securing a short-term end to the conflict rather than providing long-term reconstruction to prevent future violence. **Belloni (2007: 467) argues that costly military interventions leave a smaller budget for long-term development aid.**”
“**This is supported by the fact that although Western governments spent \$4 billion on the bombing campaign in Kosovo, only \$1 billion was pledged for reconstruction whilst an estimated \$30 billion was required (Herring, 2001: 236).** Taking into account the negative effects of intervention in Kosovo and its lack of provision for long-term stability, the advantages of intervention are outweighed.”

US aid gets used to crackdown on HR—empirics

Shank 2013 [Michael Shank is a writer for US News. “Aid Gone Awry in Africa: America must be far more careful about who winds up on the receiving end of its military aid”. 18 June 2013. <<http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/06/19/how-american-military-assistance-goes-wrong-in-africa>>] //CJC

This "Western money" and "African boots" approach to security assistance programs is increasingly seen by Washington as an innovative alternative to large- scale wars – one that

allows for "sharing" the burden of security and empowering foreign forces to address their own problems. But without careful accountability and rigorous evaluation, its implementation looks a lot more like short-sighted Cold War policies in Latin America than local empowerment. Take a look at how bad it's gotten as part of the mission creep on the African continent's northern half. **Human Rights Watch released a report last month documenting the abuse, rape and torture of at least 1,000 Somali refugees by U.S.-backed Kenyan police forces as retaliation for supposed terrorist attacks.** This follows a report by the Open Society Justice Initiative released last November that connected U.S. counterterror assistance and influence to systemic human rights abuses in Kenya and Uganda, and another account of U.S.-backed torture in Mauritania. And then there's always **the Ethiopian government, another major recipient of U.S. assistance, which has used anti-terrorism laws to actively repress civil society, crack down on peaceful dissent and limit the civil rights of Muslims and others.**

Turn -- INTERNATIONAL AID FREES UP RESOURCES FOR LEADERS TO ENGAGE IN WARFARE

Mary **Anderson, President of the Collaborative for Development Action**, Inc, DO NO HARM: HOW AID CAN SUPPORT PEACE OR WAR, 1999, p. 49-50

In some circumstances external aid can fill so great **a proportion of civilian needs for food, shelter, safety, and health services that significant local resources are thereby freed up for the pursuit of war.** This economic substitution effect of aid has a further political impact. **When external aid agencies assume responsibility for civilian survival, warlords tend to define their responsibility and accountability only in terms of military control.** Even if they started with a commitment to peacetime political leadership, **as the international aid community takes over the tasks of feeding and providing health services** and shelter for civilians these **military-oriented leaders increasingly relinquish responsibility for civilian welfare.** They focus on military ends and, over time, define their roles solely in terms of physical control (and the violent attainment and maintenance of that control). As this occurs, warriors struggling for victory over space and people lose all interest and competence in civilian affairs and become increasingly ill prepared to assume broad, responsible leadership in a postwar period.

Turn -- AID BENEFITS SPECIFIC GROUPS, INCREASING ETHNIC CONFLICT & GENOCIDE

Daniel **Langenkamp, Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy**, THE AIMS AND IMPACTS OF AID IN AFGHANISTAN, May 2002, <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/humansecurity/pdf/Langenkamptotal.pdf>

It is important to note **that the criticisms leveled against humanitarian aid have also been aimed at development assistance.** As Steven Knack, of the World Bank, Peter Uvin, and Mark Duffield have noted, **development aid can also feed into the exploitative processes that end up assisting corrupt local elites and harming vulnerable populations.** As Uvin demonstrated in Rwanda, **development aid can exacerbate social tensions, encourage bad policy making, make governments less accountable to**

voters, intensify competition for resources, and **feed processes of structural violence in a country, ultimately empowering the very elites who benefit from exploiting marginalized segments of the country.** In Rwanda's case, Uvin notes, **the relationship between development aid and genocide were direct: development actors essentially colluded with a corrupt and genocidal regime by turning a blind eye to widespread human rights violations committed by the regime, ultimately refusing to acknowledge that their assistance was detrimental to the poor.**

Military aid increases terrorism

Eric Neumayer (London School of Economics) "Foreign terror on Americans" 2011

<http://www.grammatikhilfe.com/geographyAndEnvironment/whosWho/profiles/neumayer/pdf/Terror%20on%20Americans.pdf>

Turning to our variables of main interest, we find evidence in favour of our hypothesis. In particular, the three **'military support' variables exert a positive impact on the number of US victims.** All three show a significant and positive relation to the number of American terror victims, as our theory predicts. The three variables also exert a substantively important influence on the dependent variable. **A one standard deviation increase in the measure of military aid, arms exports and military personnel raises the expected count of anti-American terrorism by 135%, 109% and 24%,** respectively. Model 4 of Table II shows that the predictions of our theory still find support if we simultaneously include military support. An analysis of substantive effects based on Model 4 allows one to gauge the relative importance of the three measures of military support when entered together in the estimations. **A one standard deviation increase in US military aid raises the expected count of anti-American terrorism most by 114%, followed by arms exports and military personnel, in which a one standard deviation increase leads to an increase of 45% and 30%, respectively.** It would thus appear that US military aid matters most for **foreign terror on Americans.**

Military aid recipients may feel more emboldened to take action against the enemy because they have a powerful hegemon on their side.

Brock Tessman, (University of Georgia), "US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation," 2011

http://plsullivan.web.unc.edu/files/2011/09/Sullivan_FPA_Military-Aid-Cooperation.pdf

Table 3 presents results from using equation 1 to simulate the substantive impact of the statistically significant independent variables on recipient state cooperation. States that do not receive any US military aid display an average level of cooperation with the United States of +1.5 when all other variables are held constant at their means. The model predicts that states that obtain the average amount of US military aid (\$20 million) will be less cooperative—scoring an average of)11 on the cooperation-conflict scale. **An increase in US military aid to one standard deviation above the mean leads to an additional six-point reduction in the monthly cooperation score of the recipient state.** In contrast, an increase in the number of US troops from its mean to one standard deviation above the mean raises recipient state

cooperation almost one point. Democratic recipients are on average four points more cooperative than nondemocratic recipients.

Trump won't use increased military spending towards nation building

Vitali, Ali, 07 Sep 2016 ["Trump Calls for Increased Defense Spending, More Military Might." *NBCNews.com*. NBCUniversal News Group, <http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/trump-calls-increased-defense-spending-more-military-might-n644056>] 23 Dec 2016

MRS

In Drumpf's contrast, his policies would serve America's interests and refuse to employ strategies of regime change and nation building ."The current strategy of toppling regimes, with no plan for what to do the day after, only produces power vacuums that are filled by terrorists," Drumpf said. "Gradual reform, not sudden and radical change, should be our guiding objective in that region." The strong statements on this issue stand in contrast to Drumpf's non-answer on Tuesday regarding if he would support regime change in Syria.

Nation Building is ineffective at preventing terrorism

Benjamin H. Friedman and Justin Logan, 2012 ["Why the U.S. Military Budget is 'Foolish and Sustainable'," CATO Institute, <https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/articles/logan-friendman-obis-spring-2012.pdf>] **MRS**

The third strategic concept inflating U.S. defense spending is the presumed importance of trying to change the domestic politics of foreign states. These missions, whether called regime change, counterinsurgency or state-building, have been regular features of U.S. foreign policy for more than a century. They are always justified by some combination of liberal ideology and U.S. security arguments. Because our focus here is the **irrelevance of these missions to national security**, we address only the latter, which have lately justified these missions as a tool for counterterrorism and non-proliferation.

Effective counterterrorism does not require repairing the politics of states where terrorists dwell.

The U.S. occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan show that achieving stability—let alone liberal democracy—in such disordered states is substantially more costly, in every sense, than the trouble the project is meant to prevent. Less obviously, **the newly received wisdom that “failed states” cause terrorism is wrong.** A tiny minority of failed states has provided haven for terrorists that target Americans, meaning that the theory lacks correlation, let alone causation. The chief example of this supposed problem, Afghanistan in the late 1990s, was a threat not because the government failed but rather because its government allied itself with al Qaeda. Having made the Taliban government more effective in the 1990s would have done nothing to prevent the 9/11 attacks.¹⁷ Anarchy is the source of many woes, but they are mostly borne by the locals.

Hegemonic Nation building fails miserably

Chris **Fettweis 2011**, [Associate Professor, Tulane University, Department of Political Science, 2012-present, "The Superpower as Superhero: Hubris in U.S. Foreign Policy," https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1902154] MJS

Many times since the end of the World War II the United States has attempted to re-shape other countries to fit an image of its choosing. Washington made it a top Cold War priority to address the economic, political and even cultural strength of states that appeared vulnerable to communist infiltration. That impulse persists, providing the foundation for what has become known as "nation-building," which today has replaced the anti-communist element with a paternalistic concern for the development of political and legal institutions, as well as economic growth and even religious evolution, all for strategic purposes. A 2007 RAND study pointed out that since the end of the Cold War the United States has embarked on a nation-building exercise on average once every two years.⁴¹ Such interventions are invariably based on the belief that target states will prove willing and even eager to receive U.S. aid and advice, and will come to accept the notion that outsiders know better than they do about the functions of their societies. As it happens, however, many nations prove stubbornly resistant to building. The experiences in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere ought to suggest at the very least that nation building is a daunting and difficult task, one that takes years of effort and billions of dollars to be successful. While sometimes worthwhile, these tasks should not be entered into lightly. "What is remarkable about this entire experience," observed Francis Fukuyama, "is how little institutional learning there has been over time; the same lessons about the pitfalls and limitations of nation-building have to be relearned with each new involvement."⁴² One of those central lessons should be that other people, even from less developed societies, are not likely to be passive consumers of received wisdom from the United States. The experience in Somalia is instructive, if misunderstood. The United States led the efforts of the international community to relieve a manmade famine in late 1992, and saved somewhere between 100 and 250 thousand lives.⁴³ The mission was a resounding success, at least until the mission began to evolve beyond famine relief. "Combatants must be disarmed, retrained and re-employed," explained Madeleine Albright, who was then the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. "Development aid must be delivered and efficiently used. Democratic institutions must be established. Those who disrupt the peace must be stopped."⁴⁴ Once the United States accepted the idea that its forces had to stay until a stable Somali state emerged, it began to engage in a wholly different task. It was nation-building, not humanitarian intervention, that failed in Somalia. The latter does not necessitate the former; presumably the international community could have left Somalia with the promise to return if the warlords allowed famine to break out again. The Somalis need to work out their own governance for it to be successful (and still do). They can use outside ideas, training and funds, no doubt, but not direction and micromanagement from outsiders.

Risk of nuclear terror is exaggerated – no incentives due to long time frame, resource requirements, and it's contradictory to their cause.

Weiss 15 - Leonard Weiss, visiting scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). He is also a national advisory board member of the Center for Arms control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, 11/27/2015("On Fear and Nuclear Terrorism," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 71, Issue 2, 2015,] //CJC

While fear of nuclear weapons is rational, its extension to terrorism has been a vehicle for fear-mongering that is unjustified by available data. Some writers have recognized this lack of data on the subject,² and their works have started a lively debate, with pushback by proponents of the more conventional alarmist view (see Mowatt-Larssen, 2010). This debate on nuclear terrorism tends to distract from events that raise the risk of nuclear war, the consequences of which would far exceed the results of terrorist attacks. And the historical record shows that the war risk is real.

Despite the development and deployment of command-and-control systems in all nations with nuclear weapons (some more sophisticated than others), the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated that miscalculation, misinterpretation, and misinformation could lead to a "close call" regarding nuclear war, and that the possibility of a war being launched under conditions of confrontation cannot be dismissed. Accordingly, most analysts believe that reducing the motivation of non-weapon states to acquire nuclear weapons and increasing the motivation of weapon states to reduce and eliminate their nuclear arsenals is a worthwhile ongoing goal.

Achieving this goal has been helped by a number of cases in which countries have halted nuclear weapon programs or activities, or dismantled weapons in their possession.³ In these cases, the calculus dictated that security would be enhanced by giving up nuclear weapons, thus reducing the likelihood of becoming a target of another country's nukes or motivating a rival to acquire such weapons.

If the fear of nuclear war has thus had some positive effects, the fear of nuclear terrorism has had mainly negative effects on the lives of millions of people around the world, including in the United States, and even affects negatively the prospects for a more peaceful world. Although there has been much commentary on the interest that Osama bin Laden, when he was alive, reportedly expressed in obtaining nuclear weapons (see Mowatt-Larssen, 2010), and some terrorists no doubt desire to obtain such weapons, evidence of any terrorist group working seriously toward the theft of nuclear weapons or the acquisition of such weapons by other means is virtually nonexistent. This may be due to a combination of reasons. Terrorists understand that it is not hard to terrorize a population without committing mass murder: In 2002, a single sniper in the Washington, DC area, operating within his own automobile and with one accomplice, killed 10 people and changed the behavior of virtually the entire populace of the city over a period of three weeks by instilling fear of being a randomly chosen shooting victim when out shopping.

Terrorists who believe the commission of violence helps their cause have access to many explosive materials and conventional weapons to ply their "trade." If public sympathy is important to their cause, an apparent plan or commission of mass murder is not going to help them, and indeed will make their enemies even more implacable, reducing the prospects of achieving their goals. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists is not like the acquisition of conventional weapons; it requires significant time, planning, resources, and expertise, with no guarantees that an acquired device would work. It requires putting aside at least some aspects of a group's more immediate activities and goals for an attempted operation that no terrorist group has previously accomplished. While absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence (as then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld kept reminding us during the search for Saddam's nonexistent nuclear weapons), it is reasonable to conclude that the fear of nuclear terrorism has swamped realistic consideration of the threat. As Brian Jenkins, a longtime observer of terrorist groups, wrote in 2008:

They can't steal a weapon – dozens of safeguards and international collaboration account for loose nukes and irrational states

Weiss 15 - Leonard Weiss, visiting scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). He is also a national advisory board member of the Center for Arms control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, 11/27/2015("On Fear and Nuclear Terrorism," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 71, Issue 2, 2015] //CJC

Stealing nukes. Nothing is better protected in a **nuclear** weapon state than the **weapons** themselves, which **have multiple layers of safeguards that**, in the United States, **include intelligence** and surveillance, **electronic locks** (including so-called "permissive action links" that prevent detonation unless a code is entered into the lock), **gated** and locked **storage facilities, armed guards, and** teams of **elite responders** if an attempt at theft were to occur. We know that **most weapon states have such protections**, and there is no reason to believe that such protections are missing in the remaining states, since no weapon state would want to put itself at risk of an unintended nuclear detonation of its own weapons by a malevolent agent. Thus, **the likelihood of** an unauthorized agent secretly planning a **theft**, without being discovered, and getting access to weapons with the intent and physical ability to carry them off in the face of such layers of protection **is extremely low**—but it isn't impossible, especially in the case where the thief is an insider.

The insider threat helped give credibility to the stories, circulating about 20 years ago, that there were "loose nukes" in the USSR, based on some statements by a Soviet general who claimed the regime could not account for more than 40 "suitcase nukes" that had been built. The Russian government denied the claim, and at this point there is no evidence that any nukes were ever loose. Now, it is unclear if any such weapon would even work after 20 years of corrosion of both the nuclear and non-nuclear materials in the device and the radioactive decay of certain isotopes.

Because of the large number of terrorist groups operating in its geographic vicinity, **Pakistan is frequently suggested as a possible candidate for scenarios in which a terrorist group** either **seizes a weapon via collaboration with insiders** sympathetic to its cause, or in which terrorists "inherit" nuclear weapons by taking over the arsenal of a failed nuclear state that has devolved into chaos. Attacks by a terrorist group on a Pakistani military base, at Kamra, which is believed to house nuclear weapons in some form, have been referenced in connection with such security concerns (Nelson and Hussain, 2012). **However, the Kamra base** contained US fighter planes, including F-16s, used to bomb Taliban bases in tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, so the planes, not nuclear weapons, were the likely target of the terrorists, and in any case the **mission was a failure**. **Moreover, Pakistan is not about to collapse, and the Pakistanis are known to have received major international assistance in technologies for protecting their weapons** from unauthorized use, store them in somewhat disassembled fashion at multiple locations, **and have a sophisticated nuclear security structure in place** (see Gregory, 2013; Khan, 2012). However, the weapons are assembled at times of high tension in the region, and, to keep a degree of uncertainty in their location, they are moved from place to place, making them more vulnerable to seizure at such times (Goldberg and Ambinder, 2011). (It should be noted that US nuclear weapons were subject to such risks during various times when the weapons traveled US highways in disguised trucks and accompanying vehicles, but such travel and the possibility of terrorist seizure was never mentioned publicly.) Such **scenarios of seizure in Pakistan would require a major security breakdown within the army** leading to a takeover of weapons by a nihilistic terrorist group with little warning, **while army loyalists along with India** and other interested parties (like the United States) stand by and **do not intervene**. This is not a particularly realistic scenario, but it's also not a reason to conclude that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is of no concern. It is, not only because of an internal threat, but especially because it raises the possibility of nuclear war with India. For this and other reasons, **intelligence agencies in multiple countries spend considerable resources tracking the Pakistani nuclear situation to reduce the likelihood of surprises**. But any consideration of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal does bring home (once again) the folly of US policy in the 1980s, when stopping the Pakistani nuclear program was put on a back burner in order to prosecute the Cold War against the Soviets in

Afghanistan (which ultimately led to the establishment of Al Qaeda). Some of the loudest voices expressing concern about nuclear terrorism belong to former senior government officials who supported US assistance to the mujahideen and the accompanying diminution of US opposition to Pakistan's nuclear activities.

States won't give terrorists nukes – there are no guarantees terrorists will cooperate and only results in the state becoming a nuclear target.

Weiss 15 - Leonard Weiss, visiting scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). He is also a national advisory board member of the Center for Arms control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, 11/27/2015("On Fear and Nuclear Terrorism," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 71, Issue 2, 2015,]//CJC

Acquiring nukes as a gift. Following the shock of 9/11, government officials and the media imagined many scenarios in which terrorists obtain nuclear weapons; one of those scenarios involves a weapon state using a terrorist group for delivery of a nuclear weapon. There are at least two reasons why this scenario is unlikely: First, once a weapon state loses control of a weapon, it cannot be sure the weapon will be used by the terrorist group as intended. Second, the state cannot be sure that the transfer of the weapon has been undetected either before or after the fact of its detonation (see Lieber and Press, 2013). The use of the weapon by a terrorist group will ultimately result in the transferring nation becoming a nuclear target just as if it had itself detonated the device. This is a powerful deterrent to such a transfer, making the transfer a low-probability event.

It is impossible for terrorists to build a nuke – hundreds of challenges

Weiss 15 - Leonard Weiss, visiting scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). He is also a national advisory board member of the Center for Arms control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, 11/27/2015("On Fear and Nuclear Terrorism," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 71, Issue 2, 2015] //CJC

Manufacturing a nuclear weapon. To accomplish this, a terrorist group would have to obtain an appropriate amount of one of the two most popular materials for nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium separated from fuel used in a production reactor or a power reactor. Weapon-grade plutonium is found in weapon manufacturing facilities in nuclear weapon states and is very highly protected until it is inserted in a weapon. Reactor-grade plutonium, although still capable of being weaponized, is less protected, and in that sense is a more attractive target for a terrorist, especially since it has been produced and stored in prodigious quantities in a number of nuclear weapon states and non-weapon states, particularly Japan.

But terrorist use of plutonium for a nuclear explosive device would require the construction of an implosion weapon, requiring the fashioning of an appropriate explosive lens of TNT, a notoriously difficult technical problem. And if a high nuclear yield (much greater than 1 kiloton) is desired, the use of reactor-grade plutonium would require a still more sophisticated design. Moreover, if the plutonium is only available through chemical separation from some (presumably stolen) spent fuel rods, additional technical complications present themselves. There is at least one study showing that a small team of

people with the appropriate technical skills and equipment could, in principle, build a plutonium-based nuclear explosive device (Mark et al., 1986). But **even if one discounts the high probability that the plan would be discovered at some stage** (missing plutonium or spent fuel rods would put the authorities and intelligence operations under high alert), translating this into a real-world situation suggests an extremely low probability of technical success. **More likely**, according to one well-known weapon designer,⁴ **would be the death of the person or persons in the attempt to build the device.**

There is **the possibility of an insider threat**; in one example, a team of people working at a reactor or reprocessing site could conspire to steal some material and try to hide the diversion as MUF (materials unaccounted for) within the nuclear safeguards system. **But this scenario would require intimate knowledge of the materials accounting system on which safeguards in that state are based and adds another layer of complexity** to an operation with low probability of success.

The situation is different in the case of using highly enriched uranium, which presents fewer technical challenges. Here an implosion design is not necessary, and a “gun type” design is the more likely approach. Fear of this scenario has sometimes been promoted in the literature via the quotation of a famous statement by nuclear physicist Luis Alvarez that dropping a subcritical amount of HEU onto another subcritical amount from a distance of five feet could result in a nuclear yield. **The probability of such a yield (and its size) would depend on the geometry of the HEU components and the amount of material. More likely** than a substantial nuclear explosion from such a scenario **would be a criticality accident that would release an intense burst of radiation, killing persons in the immediate vicinity**, or (even less likely) a low-yield nuclear “fizzle” that could be quite damaging locally (like a large TNT explosion) but also carry a psychological effect because of its nuclear dimension.

In any case, since the critical mass of a bare metal perfect sphere of pure U-235 is approximately 56 kilograms, **stealing that much highly enriched material** (and getting away without detection, an armed fight, or a criticality accident) **is a major problem for any thief** and one significantly greater than the stealing of small amounts of HEU and lower-enriched material that has been reported from time to time over the past two decades, mostly from former Soviet sites that have since had their security greatly strengthened. Moreover, fashioning the material into a form more useful or convenient for explosive purposes could likely mean a need for still more material than suggested above, plus a means for machining it, as would be the case for HEU fuel assemblies from a research reactor. In a recent paper, physics professor B. C. Reed discusses the feasibility of terrorists building a low-yield, gun-type fission weapon, but admittedly avoids the issue of whether the terrorists would likely have the technical ability to carry feasibility to realization and whether the terrorists are likely to be successful in stealing the needed material and hiding their project as it proceeds (Reed, 2014). But this is the crux of the nuclear terrorism issue. There is no argument about feasibility, which has been accepted for decades, even for plutonium-based weapons, ever since Ted Taylor first raised it in the early 1970s⁵ and a Senate subcommittee held hearings in the late 1970s on a weapon design created by a Harvard dropout from information he obtained from the public section of the Los Alamos National Laboratory library (Fialka, 1978). Likewise, no one can deny the terrible consequences of a nuclear explosion. The question is the level of risk, and what steps are acceptable in a democracy for reducing it.

Although the attention in the literature given to nuclear terrorism scenarios involving HEU would suggest major attempts to obtain such material by terrorist groups, **there is only one known case of a major theft** of HEU. It involves a US government contractor processing HEU for the US Navy in Apollo, Pennsylvania in the 1970s **at a time when security and materials accounting were extremely lax. The theft was almost surely carried out by agents of the Israeli government** with the probable involvement of a person or persons working for the contractor, **not a sub-national terrorist group** intent on making its own weapons (Gilinsky and Mattson, 2010). The circumstances under which this theft occurred were unique, and there was significant information about the contractor’s relationship to Israel that should have rung alarm bells and would do so today. Although it involved a government and not a sub-national group, the theft underscores the importance of security and accounting of nuclear materials, especially because the technical requirements for making an HEU weapon are less daunting than for a plutonium weapon, and the probability of success by a terrorist group, though low, is certainly greater than zero. Over the past two decades, there has been a significant effort to increase protection of such materials, particularly in recent years through the efforts of nongovernmental organizations like

the International Panel on Fissile Materials⁶ and advocates like Matthew Bunn working within the Obama administration (Bunn and Newman, 2008), though the administration has apparently not seen the need to make the materials as secure as the weapons themselves.

ISIS and Al-Qaeda don't pose a threat – their tactics are not new and won't be catastrophic

Ward 15 - Alex Ward, Assistant Director of the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council where he works on U.S. defense policy, strategy and military affairs., 5/29/15("How Much Does ISIS Really Threaten America?," published by How Much does ISIS really Threaten America, Available online at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-much-does-isis-really-threaten-america-12993?page=2>] //CJC

While some concern is warranted, **there is no need for alarm** on the scale we are currently witnessing. The ISIS threat is overhyped, giving the group more power than it deserves while distracting from bigger threats. More to the point, **there is no new phase of terrorism, just the same phase**—but with a different ability to promote use of usual tactics.

Indeed, the threats facing the American homeland today, mostly of the “lone wolf” variety, are threats the United States has faced for years. What is needed now is a new way of dealing with an old problem.

In an era of increased connectivity, the ability of terrorists to contact lone-wolf candidates is greater than ever—and American leaders are worried. Terrorist organizations, like ISIS, have used the means of this hyper-connected era, especially social media, to great effect. A Brookings Institution study showed that ISIS has a “sophisticated and innovative methodology” that makes use of the “at least 46,000 ISIS-supporting Twitter accounts.” This social media strategy—and the appeal of ISIS’ cause—has attracted lone wolves to carry out strikes in the West, with the brutal attack in Paris so far being the most significant. The United States is worried sick about a potential terrorist-inspired lone wolf operation on its own soil and is scrambling to tighten security at military bases and malls alike.

In addition, ISIS’ mastery of social media and messaging inspired a cadre of foreign fighters and people sympathetic to its mission. Many fighters have gone to the battlefields in Iraq, Syria, and beyond in hopes of establishing an Islamic state. Nicholas Rasmussen, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, called the rate of foreign fighters traveling to the area “unprecedented.”

The worry for Western governments is that these fighters will obtain advanced asymmetric warfare training and use them to great effect back in their home states. The thirty to forty Americans who have traveled to the Middle East—a dozen or so who may have joined ISIS—worry U.S. law enforcement because, upon their return, they pose a threat to homeland security.

These trends are certainly concerning, but they do not equate to a “new phase” of terrorism for the U.S. homeland. The reasons why are straightforward.

For one, **ISIS’ main focus is** consolidating gains and **grabbing new territory** in Syria and Iraq.

What it has been able to do there certainly constitutes a new phase in the way terrorists operate, but **does not** radically **change the danger calculus** on American land. Indeed, **ISIS is not** yet fully **focused on bringing chaos to the West**. Yes, it wants to eventually destroy Western targets, but that is currently a lesser concern for ISIS. And, the **lone wolf attacks** the group does inspire will **continue to be smaller and less**

catastrophic than has been seen in America’ recent past. Further, **al-Qaeda**—the bigger threat to the United States—**is not at the capacity level at which it once** was due to the United States. **Its ability to pull off** a spectacular attack like 9/11 **is substantially reduced**, although not impossible. So while the United States should still be vigilant for a large-scale attack, the country can breathe a little easier.

It is also important to note that **what is happening now** with ISIS and many other anti-Western terrorist groups **is not** necessarily **a new phenomenon**. While ISIS certainly has an amazing ability to inspire action via social media, **the appeal of fighting for an ideological cause** **has been around since time**

immemorial. The Iraq and Afghanistan Wars in the 2000s, the Afghanistan War in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and even the Spanish Civil War of the 1930s are just some examples of when foreigners came running in order to help a cause for which they believed they should die. As for lone wolf or smaller-scale attacks in the United States, *the country has dealt with these kinds of issues for a long time*. Even today the United States experiences "one attack, on average, every thirty-four days." In essence, the fear from returning foreign fighters should not scare us any more than current domestic terrorists do because they are already here and acting. To claim that ISIS is currently more dangerous to American targets seems off, although a lack of a coherent policy to stem the group could change that calculus.

Al Qaeda does not pose a threat – lack of funds and leadership – drones have empirically been successful in reducing the number of attacks.

Lee 15 - Kangil Lee, research analyst at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, 2015("DOES AL QAEDA CENTRAL STILL MATTER?," published by Revista UNISCI, Available online at <https://www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-72478/UNISCIDP37-2LEE.pdf>] //CJC

However, scholars who argue the demise of Al Qaeda Central seem to prefer a much simpler approach that measures al Qaeda's operational capability by a couple of simple factors. There are two main pieces of evidence used to support the argument that Al Qaeda has been defeated. Firstly, the death of bin Laden and the demise of Al Qaeda's core group of members, especially members of the Shura council. Secondly, the absence of terrorism in the West that Al Qaeda Central is involved in. These are central pieces of evidence that points towards al Qaeda's demise, which suggest Al Qaeda Central is incapable of carrying out any attacks.

For example, in 2012, Peter Bergen argued *Al Qaeda is defeated because CIA drone policy in Afghanistan (Al Qaeda Central's stronghold for long time), successfully eliminated 28 Al Qaeda key members* especially those on the Shura council revealed by Jamal al fadhli, a former Al Qaeda member. Bergen said *as a result, Al Qaeda only has one senior leader left, al Zawahiri, who lacks charisma*, and who took over the group after the death of Osama bin Laden.³⁶ According to Bergen, *Al Qaeda Central has never launched a successful terrorist attack in the West since 9/11* except for the 7/7 London bombing that killed 52 commuters. Even so-called affiliates and lone wolves inspired by Al Qaeda have only killed 17 people in the United States since 9/11.

Sageman backs up this assertion, and in 2011 added to Bergen's claim, arguing *a comprehensive survey of global neo-jihadi terrorism in the West highlights that there were 60 plots over the past 20 years, perpetrated by 46 different networks. Of these only 14 successfully inflicted any casualties, and only two were perpetrated by al-Qaeda* proper in the past 20 years. Over the past five years, global neo-jihadi and al-Qaeda terrorism in the West has been in decline and the vast majority of the plots were perpetrated by independent home-grown groups, inspired by al-Qaeda but not linked to it or its allies.³⁷ Many terrorist attempts launched by like-minded terrorist groups or individuals have not been traced back to Afghanistan. Moreover, he says, there is no evidence Al Qaeda Central was involved in any terrorist plots since 9/11. *Al Qaeda Central currently does not run a training centre for terrorists, and the group is not capable of funding*

terrorist attacks anymore due to the loss of its financial resources. There has been no global neo-jihadi terrorist casualty in the West in the past four years and none in the U.S. in the past eight years.

According to Javier Jordán, terrorism expert and the author of *The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign against Al Qaeda Central: A Case Study*, US drone policy managed to oppress the group's operational capability. Jordán claims that there were 136 terrorist incidents from 2001 to 2012, and Al Qaeda Central was involved in only 33 cases out of 136, 5 in the United States and 28 in Europe. From 2001 to 2006, Al Qaeda Central was quite active in plotting terrorist attacks, as 20 incidents were conducted during the first half of that period. Whereas, Al Qaeda Central's activity came to a lull especially after 2007, the year US drone activity was stepped up in Afghanistan. Even 13 cases of attacks between 2007 and 2012, did not cause any casualty or damage to Western society. Jordán concludes the complexity and lethality of Al Qaeda Central's terrorist actions on American and European soil have fallen dramatically.³⁸ Jordán evaluates **Al Qaeda endured immense structural damage from the CIA** drone campaign. As a result, **Al Qaeda lost control over affiliates in strategic and operational positions**, and switched into a significantly decentralized organization **that has** tried to recover its influence to affiliates but due to **difficulties in communicating** with affiliates, their efforts have largely failed. Now Al Qaeda Central has no or very little capability to plot and launch terrorist attacks, probably none outside of Afghanistan and Pakistan.³⁹

After the US drone policy commenced, approximately 60 key members of Al Qaeda were killed by drones. It is unclear exactly how many Al Qaeda members died in this campaign, although Jordán and Sageman presumed around 60. As matter of fact, even bin Laden was concerned about the loss of experienced members and his anxiety is well expressed in one of his documents seized from the Abbottabad raid. It is important to have the leadership in a faraway location to gain expertise in all areas. **When this experienced leadership dies, this would lead to the rise of lower leaders who are not as experienced** as the former leaders **and** this would lead to the **repeat of mistakes**.⁴⁰

Although the effect of the targeted killing policy has never been proved, the killing of key members in the organization seems to have caused some level of disconnection between groups. As per bin Laden's recommendation to avoid wiretapping or signal intercepting by CIA, Al Qaeda members prefer hand-written letters to communicate with each other. This is safe but it takes time to communicate especially with affiliates outside of Afghanistan. Indeed, along with beginning of drone program, al Qaeda's terrorism operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan have significantly decreased since 2008. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) shows that only one terrorist attack occurred in Pakistan after 2008, conducted by Al Qaeda Central.⁴¹ Nevertheless, we have no idea what has brought on the decrease in the number of terrorism incidents.

Focus on crises and future wars kills efforts to combat everyday oppression by militaristic agents of the state (like the police)

Chris J. **Cuomo**, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cincinnati, 1996 ("War Is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence," *Hypatia*, Volume 11, Number 4, Fall, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Complete, p. 31-32)

Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, **crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as**

givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. **The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control.** Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. **Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism.** Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that **horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state.** **Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence** also enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore **can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance.**

For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. **It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war."** Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connections among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns.

Challenging racism is a prior ethical question that is a prerequisite for the formation of any moral agent—this is a pre-fiat voter

Albert Memmi 2k, Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ U of Paris, Naiteire, Racism, Translated by Steve Martinot, p. 163-165 *edited for gendered language

The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved. Yet, **for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions.** One cannot be indulgent toward racism; one must not even let the monster in the house, **especially not in a mask.** To give it merely a foothold means to **augment the bestial part in us** and in other people, **which is to diminish what is human.** **To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence.** It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. **it is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim** (and which [person] man is not [themselves] himself an outsider relative to someone else?). Racism illustrates, in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated that is, it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. **The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animosity to humanity.** In that sense, **we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge.** However, it remains true that **one's moral conduct only emerges from a choice:** one has to want it. It is **a choice among other choices, and always debatable** in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that **the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order, for which racism is the very negation.** This is almost a redundancy. **One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism,**

because racism signifies the exclusion of the other, and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is ‘the truly capital sin. It is not an accident that almost all of humanity’s spiritual traditions counsels respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because **injustice engenders violence and death.** Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. But no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains *within itself the seeds of its own death*. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. “Recall.” says the Bible, “that you were once a stranger in Egypt,” which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming one again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal—indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. **In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality** because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice, a just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.

In the long run, government investment increases wealth inequality

Turnovsky, June 2012 [Santanu Chatterjee, Stephen J. Turnovsky, economics professors “Infrastructure and Inequality,” European Economic Review, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228175493_Infrastructure_and_Inequality] MJS

We develop a model in which **public capital** is both an engine of growth and a determinant of the distributions of wealth, income, and welfare. **Government investment increases wealth inequality over time, regardless of its financing. The time path of income inequality is, however, highly sensitive to financing policies, and is often characterized by sharp intertemporal tradeoffs, with income inequality declining in the short run but increasing in the long run.** Public investment generates a positive correlation between growth and income inequality along the transition path, but their short-run and long-run relationship depends critically on (i) how externalities impinge on allocation decisions, (ii) financing policies, and (iii) the time period of consideration. Finally, these policies also generate sharp trade-offs between average welfare and its distribution, with government investment improving average welfare, but also increasing its dispersion. Our results are obtained numerically but extensive sensitivity analysis confirms their robustness across key parameter values.

Government provision of public goods such as infrastructure represents an important mechanism whereby wealth can be redistributed across society. Many emerging-market countries such as India, China, and Brazil have embarked on ambitious expansions of public investment in roads, ports, communication and transportation networks, power generation and water services, mainly as a means to sustain their high growth rates of the last two decades. **Among developed countries, a significant fraction of the increase in government stimulus spending in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis of 2007-08 was targeted towards infrastructure. At the same time, income inequality has also risen steadily**

across the world, both in emerging markets and most OECD countries. An important question that arises in this context is the effect of pro-growth infrastructure investment policies on the dynamics of inequality. Indeed, as Anand and Segal (2008) point out, reducing inequality may be an important social objective for a government. The issue then is whether investment in public infrastructure, with its accompanying growth and productivity benefits, can achieve this objective.

This paper, therefore, seeks to synthesize two extensive, but independent, strands of literature into a unified framework. On the one hand, **the theoretical literature on growth and inequality has not dealt with issues related to public investment and its financing.**³ On the other hand, **the extensive literature on public investment and growth (see footnote 1) has generally ignored distributional issues.** Studying the public investment-growth-inequality relationship in the context of a fully specified dynamic model therefore represents an important synthesis of previous work.

Government spending on public capital leads to a persistent increase in wealth inequality over time, regardless of how it is financed. In contrast, the time paths of both pre- and post-tax income inequality are highly sensitive to the financing policy adopted, and in many cases are characterized by sharp intertemporal tradeoffs. For example, **while government investment financed by a lump-sum or consumption tax leads to a short-run decline in income inequality, this is completely reversed over time, leading to an increase in the long-run dispersion of income.** This is somewhat surprising, since lump-sum taxes are a non-distortionary source of financing and government spending creates a larger stock of a non-excludable and non-rival public good. We also find that more than two-thirds of the long-run increase in income inequality can be attributed to an increase in labor income inequality, consistent with the recent empirical findings of Atkinson et al. (2011). Public expenditure financed by capital or labor income taxes yields sharp differences between pre-tax and post-tax income inequality, both in the short run and over time. Regardless of the financing, both measures of income inequality increase over time. This is consistent with trends in OECD countries, where both government spending and inequality have risen steadily over time.⁸

While the relationship between an economy's income growth and inequality are important, the relationship between average welfare and its dispersion (welfare inequality) is arguably of greater significance to policymakers. **We find that public investment generates sharp trade-offs between average welfare and its distribution, in the sense that while government expenditure on infrastructure improves average welfare, it also increases its inequality.** However, spending financed by taxing consumption or labor income is associated with less adverse tradeoffs.

Increase in Government Spending on Infrastructure

We consider the effect of an unanticipated and permanent increase in the rate of government investment from its benchmark rate of 5% to 8% of GDP. We compare the responses under the four financing schemes noted, namely (i) lump-sum tax, (ii) capital income tax, (iii) labor income tax, and (iv) consumption tax. In all cases we assume that the economy

starts from an initial benchmark equilibrium in which government expenditure is fully financed by lump-sum taxes, and all distortionary tax rates are zero, i.e. $\tau = 0$, so that $\tau = 0$ in equation (10'). For the distortionary taxes, we assume that the corresponding tax rate is set such that it fully finances the long-run change in government expenditure. Thus starting from $\tau = 0$, the corresponding required changes in the tax rates (given the underlying tax base) are respectively $\Delta \tau = 0.03$, $\Delta \tau = 0.075$, $\Delta \tau = 0.05$, $\Delta \tau = 0.096$ [see Table 1.B]. This means that during the transition as the tax base is changing, residual lump-sum tax financing must also be employed to ensure that the budget remains balanced at all times.

Figure 1A illustrates the dynamic responses of the distributions of wealth and income to this pure government spending shock. **During the transition, the increasing stock of public capital raises the marginal product of private capital and encourages private capital accumulation. Since private capital is unequally distributed in the economy, capital-rich agents experience a larger increase in their income from capital investment than do capital-poor agents. Wealth inequality therefore increases in transition to the long-run.** By raising the expected long-run return to capital and labor, the higher government spending has a productivity impact on labor supply, causing the real wage to rise and labor supply to increase (not shown). **In the short run, since capital-poor agents supply more labor relative to the capital-rich, their higher wage income compresses the dispersion of labor supply, thereby leading to an instantaneous decline in income inequality on impact of the shock. In transition, however, this trend is reversed due to two reinforcing effects. First, the increase in wealth inequality increases the dispersion of income. Second, as the productivity benefits of the gradually accumulating stock of infrastructure are realized along the transition path, average labor supply increases.** Since capital-poor agents work more than the capital-rich, their labor incomes increase at a slower rate than those of the capital-rich, due to diminishing returns. This tends to widen the dispersion of labor income over time, consequently increasing income inequality. In the long-run, this leads to an overall increase in income inequality relative to its initial benchmark.

Table 1B(ii) reports the short-run (instantaneous) and long-run effects on wealth, pre-tax, and post-tax income inequality. All these effects are calculated as percentage changes in the coefficient of variation relative to its pre-shock steady-state level. Row 1 reports the case where the increase in government spending is financed by a lumpsum tax. **Being non-distortionary, this policy isolates the pure effect of a government spending increase on the distributional measures.** Since the stock of private capital, its initial distribution, and the stock of public capital are initially given, **wealth inequality does not change on impact. It does so only gradually, increasing by about 2.7% in the long run.** Since the lump-sum tax is nondistortionary, the pre-tax and post-tax distributions of income are identical. **In the short run, income inequality declines by 2.6% relative to its pre-shock level. However, over time this decline is reversed, and in the long run income inequality increases by about 5%,** thus highlighting how government investment generates a sharp intertemporal trade-off for the distribution of income.

In general, **our results suggest that government spending on public capital will increase wealth inequality over time**, irrespective of how it is financed. The mechanism is straightforward. **Government investment tends to enhance the productivity of private capital, thereby stimulating its accumulation, and with private capital being more unequally distributed among agents than is labor, this tends to increase wealth inequality.**

Cause of Gentrification is Government Policies/Infrastructure Investment

Florida, 2015 [Richard Florida, urban studies professor, 09/02/15, CityLab, <http://www.citylab.com/housing/2015/09/the-role-of-public-investment-in-gentrification/403324/>]

But **a comprehensive review of gentrification research** by researchers **at** the University of California **Berkeley and UCLA**, published by the Federal Reserve of San Francisco, **helps us better understand the real underlying drivers of gentrification.** While the location choices of advantaged groups provide its immediate impetus, **gentrification—and the actions of these very groups—is also shaped by large-scale government policies and public investments.**

Homeownership Rates Among the Low Income

Stein, 2015 [Perry Stein, Washington Post, May 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2015/05/04/d-c-home-prices-have-tripled-in-15-years-heres-how-that-affects-low-income-residents/>]

In 2001, 31 percent of low-income households — households that earn less than \$26,807 and fall in the bottom 25 percent of District households' incomes — owned their homes. **In 2014, only 19 percent of low-income households owned their homes.** That a 40 percent decrease in the rate of homeownership among low-income residents.

Gentrification Leads to More Income Inequality

Muhammad, 2014 [Dedrick Muhammad, Director of the Racial Wealth Divide Initiative, Huffington Post, 01/29/14, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dedrick-muhammad/must-end-gentrification-t_b_4687167.html]

As President Obama noted in his State of the Union address, **economic inequality** has **reached an epic height** in our nation, shutting the doors of opportunity for millions of Americans. In urban centers **we see this growing inequality through gentrification.** Too often **the “development” of urban centers means the displacement of low and moderate-income long-time residents and new housing and amenities for the rich. A first step in ending the growing economic inequality, which is deeply tied to ongoing racial inequality, is to stop this displacement.**

The corrosive effect of gentrification can be found throughout the nation even in the “liberal” whitest city of America Portland, Oregon. Portland is known internationally as a leader

in urban design with many boasting of its bike-friendly streets, accessible 20-minute neighborhoods and quaint local business culture. In fact, this year, Portland was named the best U.S. city by the real estate company, Movato.

Unbeknownst to many, however, Portland is also a case study in gentrification, a glaring reminder that **urban economic disparities will persist as long as the structural inequalities of our economy remain.**

Increase in Military Spending does not mean Increase in Infrastructure, even in US

Brown, Sep 2016 [Brown University, "Economic Costs," <http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/economic>] MRS

Spending on the wars has involved **opportunity costs for the US economy.** Although military spending does produce jobs, spending in other areas such as health care could produce more jobs. **Additionally, while investment in military infrastructure grew, investment in other, nonmilitary, public infrastructure such as roads and schools did not grow at the same rate.**

Military spending increases long term terrorism

Nasir Muhammad, [Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, "War on Terror: Do Military Measures Matter? Empirical Analysis of Post 9/11 Period in Pakistan", COMSATS Institute of Information of Information Technology, December 2011 <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35635/1/DPE_MS21139.pdf>]

"It is interesting to see the terrorist attacks reduce initially in response to increase in military spending. However, the impact turns positive within a year. Terrorism intensity, on the other hand, responds positively to higher defense budget. The reason may be that the insurgents responds with more deadly attacks (such as suicide bombings) when there is military operations financed by increased budgetary allocations. Overall, results show that unidirectional causal relationship is found running from terrorism intensity and terrorist attacks to military spending. The feedback hypothesis exists between terrorism intensity and terrorism attacks".

High military spending alienates EU allies and fuels anti-American sentiment

Korb 2002 [Lawrence J. Korb is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress "Reshaping America's Military". Center for American Progress. 20 July 2002. <<https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2002/07/20/336/reshaping-americas-military/>>] //CJC

The war against terrorism clearly shows that the United States cannot and should not attempt to meet the array of existing threats by itself. Instead, we should cooperate with our allies and help build international institutions to share the necessary security responsibilities. If we do not work

with our allies on military matters, we cannot expect them to cooperate with us in other areas important to our security such as getting better intelligence about possible terrorist activities, drying up financial flows to terrorist groups, and bringing terrorists to justice. **By keeping military spending at or near Cold War levels and continuing to assume unilateral responsibility and leadership during most cases of international turmoil, we** are going to overload domestic circuits and, as you saw in your trips to the NATO summit in May 2001 and to Europe in May 2002, **may alienate European allies by widening the technology gap between our military and theirs. We may also aggravate the grievances that serve as rallying points for those who fan the flames of anti- Americanism and thus potentially worsen the terrorist problem.** Moreover, we will not be able to solve the gravest threats to our security — global problems such as terrorism, drugs, disease, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Drone Strikes increase vengeance terrorist attacks

Jaeger, 2011 [David A. Jaeger, Zahra Siddique. "CIA Drone Strikes and the Taliban," The Institute for the Study of Labor, Talibanistan (2011): 229-36. Web. <http://ftp.iza.org/dp6262.pdf>,] //CJC

For the Taliban in Afghanistan the reaction functions we estimate are of the form, 11 where DS_t and DU_t represent **drone strikes which were successful** and which were not successful in killing a militant leader at time t , respectively. p is The estimation results are reported in table 10, with the second column giving the estimation results from the incidence specification and the fourth column giving the estimation results from the levels specification. We find that there is no large and significant impact of unsuccessful drone strikes on terrorist attacks by the Taliban in Afghanistan, but **a terrorist attack in Afghanistan is 8.8% more likely five days after a successful drone strike. This indicates that vengeance effects may be particularly strong when drone strikes are able to kill militant leaders for Taliban violence in Afghanistan.**

More modernized nukes are vulnerable to hacking

Jason Fritz, (St Cloud University), "Hacking Nuclear Command and Control," http://icnnd.org/documents/jason_fritz_hacking_nc2.doc

All computers which are connected to the internet are susceptible to infiltration and remote control. Computers which operate on a closed network may also be compromised by various hacker methods, such as privilege escalation, roaming notebooks, wireless access points, embedded exploits in software and hardware, and maintenance entry points. For example, e-mail spoofing targeted at individuals who have access to a closed network, could lead to the installation of a virus on an open network. This virus could then be carelessly transported on removable data storage between the open and closed network. Information found on the internet may also reveal how to access these closed networks directly. **Efforts by militaries to place increasing reliance on computer networks, including experimental technology such as**

autonomous systems, and their desire to have multiple launch options, such as nuclear triad capability, enables multiple entry points for terrorists.

Money isn't the problem – the rebels suck

Jim Sciotto, (CNN), "Hitch in U.S. training program for Syrian rebels: Little interest in fighting ISIS," June 30, 2015

<http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/30/politics/syrian-rebels-pentagon-training-isis/>

The number of U.S.-trained Syrian rebels has dropped to less than 100, one year after the Pentagon announced a \$500 million program to bolster moderate fighters. After struggling to train and equip moderates, the Pentagon has had to remove even many existing recruits from the program, a senior U.S. military official told CNN. **Existing recruits have been removed for reasons ranging from being underage to physically unfit. Recently, a large group of recruits also quit en masse to return home to Syria after training for several weeks. And the vast majority of recruits have no interest in taking on ISIS but instead want to fight the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the official said.** Military officials said they are focused on "quality over quantity" in training rebels, but they acknowledged that the administration's goal of training 3,000 to 5,000 rebels per year for three years is not being met.

No solvency – the problems of the Middle East are internal. Outside intervention can't solve them

Marc Lynch is **professor of political science at The George Washington University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Winter 2017**, Washington Quarterly, Beilligerent Minimalism: The Trump Administration and the Middle East, https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Winter2017_Lynch.pdf

That does not, however, mean that the Middle East will not change. The internal contradictions of today's Middle East, including intense domestic instability in almost every Arab country and the destabilizing effects of multiple unresolved wars, may weaken those structural constraints on the new administration and open the possibility for more fundamental changes to regional order. But **it will not be because of Trump's policies—or any initiatives from outside the region—it will fundamentally be because of structure—or changes from within the region—as has been true for decades.** Trump is the third consecutive new president to come to office vowing fundamental change in America's Middle East

policy. Both George W. Bush and Barack Obama came to office determined to scale back U.S. presence in the Middle East. Each president ended up with much different results than anticipated. **Each left office with a region marked by destabilizing wars, failed democratic change, intense anti-Americanism, strained alliances, and dangerously evolving jihadist networks.** Each succeeded at their top objectives—Bush by overthrowing Saddam Hussein, Obama by signing the nuclear agreement with Iran—but neither immediately saw the expected benefits of these policies to materialize. The similarities in their otherwise divergent trajectories offer a critical case study in the limits of any president’s ability to change U.S. posture in the Middle East, and of the likely fate of Trump’s ambitions.

[...]

This pattern of failed transformation and unintended consequences has less to do with any specific decisions or policies than with the overarching stickiness of structure. Changing the Middle East from the outside in any direction is inherently difficult. Long-standing patterns of power, rivalry, and identity tend to reassert themselves even after major upheavals. The mechanism by which structure trumped agency in the Bush administration was the inexorable costs of the Iraqi quagmire, while for the Obama administration it was primarily the resistance by U.S. allies to his aspirations. Their resistance to change incorporated the full arsenal of alliance politics, from foot-dragging to leash-slipping to open opposition.

[...]

The United States is trapped in the Middle East by an unforgiving structure, one largely of its own making, from which it now cannot escape. **Trump will likely attempt to redirect Obama’s policies by focusing on combatting radical Islam and the containment of Iran, rebuilding relations with traditional U.S. allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, and dropping calls for democracy in favor of transactional relations with autocratic regimes.** This approach assumes the ability of friendly autocrats to enforce unpopular foreign policies and effectively control their own societies. And during the Clinton and Bush administrations, this required the forward deployment of U.S. military forces at levels unlikely to be sustainable today, especially since it would require a significant and politically contentious increase following Obama’s years of restraint and the American public’s domestic focus.

Increased intervention causes massive Anti-Americanism

Marc **Lynch** is **professor of political science at The George Washington University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Winter 2017**, Washington Quarterly, Beilligerent Minimalism: The Trump Administration and the Middle East, https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Winter2017_Lynch.pdf

Trump’s avowed reticence to intervene in the Middle East outside of counterterrorism may prove popular at home, but it’s unlikely to significantly change regional public opinion of the United States. Whatever the calculations of Arab leaders, an intense, persistent anti-Americanism has characterized Arab public opinion for decades, regardless of changing American policies or public diplomacy initiatives. The 2016 wave of the respected Arab Barometer survey asked respondents to name the most positive thing the United States could do for the region: 62 percent of Egyptians and 50 percent of Tunisians said

“the [United States] should not get involved.” 9 A more assertive America, whether in Syria or elsewhere, would likely produce yet another surge of anti-Americanism in response.

Congress not following Pentagon’s Requests

Isaacs 2016 [John, “Congress is Endangering Military Readiness,” *National Interest*. Accessed at:<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/congress-endangering-military-readiness-15904>.] //DNP

House Armed Services Committee chairman Mac Thornberry recently complained about readiness weaknesses across the U.S. military. But he and his colleagues can release additional defense funds to alleviate some of these shortcomings—if they look within. Rep. Thornberry’s litany of grumbles includes the **Marine Corps’ inability to meet training requirements, less than one-third of Army units at acceptable readiness levels, pilots flying well below the minimum number of hours required for minimal proficiency and the Marine Corps’ major accident rate almost doubling**—from an average of 2.15 per hundred thousand flying hours to 3.96. **The problem, says Thornberry, is lack of money for the military, especially for crucial operations and maintenance funding.** Gen. John Paxton, assistant commandant of the Marine Corps, has also spoken of readiness shortfalls: “We know historically that if you don’t have the money and you don’t have the parts and you don’t have the maintenance, then you fly less.” There’s one explanation that Thornberry neglects to mention, and that Paxton is too careful to suggest: Congress is more interested in protecting bases and weapons-program jobs in their districts than providing readiness funding. Case in point: Congress held up the nomination of a senior Pentagon nominee solely to block the Army’s plan to deactivate a combat unit in Alaska that was deemed less than essential—a move that could have saved tens of millions of dollars. It worked. This is a recurring problem. **The Pentagon proposes savings to fund higher-priority programs;** Congress, more interested in the military as a jobs program, says no. Calling the problem a shortage of funding **ignores Congress’s role in creating and exacerbating the problem.** For years, **Congress has denied Pentagon requests to launch a new round of base closures, which are designed for long-term savings,** and is certain to do so again this year. For example, the so-called ICBM caucus—**members of Congress** from states where intercontinental ballistic nuclear missiles are deployed—**has coerced the Air Force into keeping deactivated missile silos** in the more expensive “warm status” to protect jobs in their state. Last year, Congress barred reductions or preparation for reductions of any deployed or nondeployed nuclear strategic delivery systems or launchers below New START levels. This restriction prevented any related cost savings that could have been used for military readiness. And while the Pentagon requested fifty-seven F-35 airframes divided between the Air Force, Army and Marines, **Congress arbitrarily hiked that total to sixty-eight airframes,** at an added cost of over \$1.3 billion. Those extra dollars would have provided a substantial amount of ammunition for training exercises. According to Taxpayers for Common Sense, **Congress also pumped an additional \$1 billion for the DDG-51, Arleigh Burke class of destroyers, even though the Navy didn’t request it.** Overall, **members inserted more than \$4.5 billion in 2016 for programs the Pentagon never asked for.** That money could have funded a lot of flying hours. It’s unfortunate that readiness and training money don’t create jobs in districts like ships and airplanes do. If they did, Chairman Thornberry likely wouldn’t be able to complain about readiness. But back in reality, there’s one group to blame: His colleagues from both parties in the U.S. Congress.

Military spending bad, useless, unwarranted, unsustainable, causes war

Betts 2007 [Richard Betts, "A Disciplined Defense: How to Regain Strategic Solvency," *Foreign Affairs* (2007). Accessed at: <http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/BettsDisciplined.pdf>.] //DNP

In recent years, **U.S. national security policy has responded to a visceral sense of threat spawned by the frightening intentions of the country's enemies rather than to a sober estimate of those enemies' capabilities and what it would take to counter them effectively.** The **United States faces** very **real dangers** today and potentially bigger ones in the future, **but these are not threats that can be tamed by current spending** on the most expensive components of military power. U.S. political leaders, meanwhile, have forgotten the craft of balancing commitments and resources responsibly. Nobody younger than 80 can remember a peacetime United States without vast standing armed forces, even though that was the norm for the first 150 years of the republic. So the post-Cold War situation does not seem as odd as it should. **Contractors** who live off the defense budget **have** also **become more adept at engineering political support by spreading subcontracts around** the maximum number of congressional districts. And the traditional constituencies for restrained spending in both major political parties have evaporated, leaving the field free for advocates of excess.

[...]

Strategic solvency is an equation with several variables, and during the Cold War, U.S. presidents tilted in different directions to make the balance of commitments and resources come out right. President John F. Kennedy and President Reagan tried to close the gaps between ambitious objectives and limited resources by raising defense spending. President Richard Nixon closed a similar gap the opposite way, trimming military commitments through burden sharing and diplomatic realignments. President Dwight Eisenhower wanted to cut spending while maintaining the commitments he inherited, and he did so by adapting the strategy and accepting greater risk (opting to defend NATO through the doctrine of massive nuclear retaliation rather than with large conventional forces). Today's **supporters of increased military spending justify** their advocacy by pointing out **that current levels of spending**, measured by the share of GDP devoted to defense, **are well below those of the Cold War.** This is both true and irrelevant. The **argument focuses on only one component** of the equation -- **spending** -- and **conveniently ignores that the scope of commitments, the choice of strategy, and the degree of risk accepted can be adjusted** as well. And it draws the wrong lesson from history, which when properly interpreted suggests that today's lesser threats could be handled with greater aplomb.

[...]

The last time the United States faced a multipolar international system, in the decades prior to World War II, **its peacetime defense spending was usually no more than two percent of GDP.** In 1939, the last year before U.S. mobilization for World War II began in earnest, it was only 1.4 percent. Such a level was certainly too low, and the United States learned that lesson for good after Pearl Harbor. But on what grounds can one conclude that the **current level** should be three times as high? Certainly, it **cannot be justified based on any actual threats that the U.S. armed forces might plausibly be expected to encounter.** The military capabilities of the United States need to be kept comfortably superior to those of present and potential enemies. But they **should be measured relatively**, against those enemies'

capabilities, and not against the limits of what is technologically possible or based on some vague urge to have more.

[...]

Washington opened the sluice gates of military spending after the 9/11 attacks primarily not because it was the appropriate thing to do strategically but because it was something the country could do when something had to be done. With rare exceptions, **the war against terrorists cannot be fought with** army tank battalions, air force wings, or naval fleets -- the **large conventional forces that drive the defense budget**. The main challenge is not killing the terrorists but finding them, and **the capabilities most applicable** to this task **are intelligence and special operations forces**. Improving U.S. capacity in these areas is difficult. It requires recruiting, training, and effectively deploying a limited number of talented and bold people with the relevant skills. It **does not require half a trillion dollars' worth of conventional and nuclear forces**. In addition to terrorism, the other major security threat to the United States today is the **proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons of mass destruction** (WMD) -- another problem that **cannot be solved through the deployment of large and expensive conventional forces**. Air strikes alone are unreliable as a counterproliferation tool, especially when the target has been given ample warning to disperse and hide the infrastructure needed to produce such weapons. At best, bombing can set back a program temporarily; at worst, it can energize it. The only sure military way to eliminate another state's WMD programs in their early stages is to invade that state and occupy it -- a path that the debacle in Iraq makes highly unlikely to be followed anytime soon. In the end, the least unsatisfactory instruments to use are diplomatic and economic ones: rewards for cooperation and sanctions for noncompliance. Once a state crosses the nuclear threshold, preventive war against it becomes too dangerous to risk. It makes sense to handle the problem through containment and deterrence -- strategies that despite their flaws held the line against Moscow and Beijing for decades. The people who panic over Iran and North Korea today should bear in mind that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Kim Jong Il are pikers compared with Stalin and Mao. There is no sure thing in strategy, but given the alternatives it is reasonable to bet that what worked with the earlier despots will work with the later ones as well. As for possible future threats, China obviously looms large. If its economic growth continues and its internal politics remain stable, it is bound to act like other great powers in history, flexing its muscles for what it believes are its rights and contesting foreign domination of its neighborhood. Worse yet would be **an anti-American alliance between a rising China and a recovered, resentful Russia**. Even this prospect, nevertheless, **does not warrant Cold War levels of military spending** right now. Although military rivalry with China is more likely than not, it is not inevitable, and it is not in U.S. interests to make it a self-fulfilling prophecy -- something that premature or immoderate military initiatives targeted at China could achieve. There will be time to prepare before such conflict begins in earnest. The United States remains far ahead in airpower and sea power, the capabilities that a war in the Taiwan Strait would test. Fighting the large Chinese army on the Asian mainland would always be difficult, but the solution to that problem is not larger U.S. forces but a strategy that avoids such combat (except on the Korean Peninsula, where geography makes a defensible front feasible).

[...]

The **global-policing** mission aims to protect others, not Americans alone, from immediate threats. Some advocates, emphasizing a new domino theory, would claim that it involves enlightened self-interest, as the immediate threats to others can eventually become immediate threats to the United States if allowed to fester and metastasize. Contract out Middle Eastern stability to local tyrants, let Afghanistan become a safe haven for terrorists, the argument runs, and the result is 9/11. Such logic **makes preventive war a legitimate instrument of national security policy**. One major problem with this ambition is that attempts to run the world generate resistance. Local actors rarely see the dominant power's actions as benign or disinterested; **external interventions often provoke resentment and nationalist reactions**; praise for good

results is accorded stingily; and blame for problems, freely. As a result, **muscular military activism tends to multiply enemies**, whereas sound strategy should reduce and divide them. A second problem is that **domestic support for humanitarian intervention tends to depend on its being quick and cheap, while success on the ground depends on its being sustained and expensive**. Political leaders rarely suggest spending a great deal of national blood and treasure on remote problems. The experience in Iraq is likely to reinforce their skepticism about doing so. These two problems reinforce each other. **To have any chance at playing the role of benign hegemon successfully, the United States would need to be more consistent in enforcing international law, overthrowing murderous regimes, preventing governments from acquiring dangerous weapons**, and so forth. But the burden of doing so would be huge, requiring national mobilization and exertion far beyond what even the most ardent interventionists ask for today. But if Washington chooses to keep the costs low by backing up its universal rhetoric with limited actions in a few easy cases, its policies will inevitably be regarded as arbitrary, capricious, or driven largely by its own material interests. **An imperial role is, therefore, both unaffordable and unwise. The fact that Washington does not presently have the capabilities to sustain it should not be considered a problem.**

[...]

To ask whether the United States can afford higher levels of military spending is stupid. It can, and if necessary, it would. The problem is that there are other important things that the United States wants and can afford too, and a dollar spent on one thing cannot be spent on another. **Defense spending has to be balanced** not simply **against** presumed military needs but against other needs as well. Those needs include not just bedrock **domestic programs** such as Social Security and Medicare entitlements, which are imperiled by looming deficits, but also other programs affecting national security. **The State Department**, for example, is comparatively starved. It is **struggling to staff embassies and project the United States' message around the world** with a Foreign Service of a few thousand officers and a requested operating budget of just over \$7 billion. Its total budget request for 2008 -- including foreign aid, contributions to international organizations and peacekeeping missions, and supplementals for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan -- is just over \$42 billion, which is equal to 6.5 percent of the funding request for the Pentagon. **For dealing with a world in which many threats stem from political and economic instability and anti-American sentiment, and in which the U.S. government has great trouble communicating at the grass-roots level, these numbers appear badly unbalanced.**

Any form of US military support increases terrorism

Eric Neumayer (London School of Economics) "Foreign terror on Americans" 2011

<http://www.grammatikhilfe.com/geographyAndEnvironment/whosWho/profiles/neumayer/pdf/Terror%20on%20Americans.pdf>

Turning to our variables of main interest, we find evidence in favour of our hypothesis. In particular, the three **'military support' variables exert a positive impact on the number of US victims**. All three show a significant and positive relation to the number of American terror victims, as our theory predicts. The three variables also exert a substantively important

influence on the dependent variable. **A one standard deviation increase in the measure of military aid, arms exports and military personnel raises the expected count of anti-American terrorism by 135%, 109% and 24%**, respectively. Model 4 of Table II shows that the predictions of our theory still find support if we simultaneously include military support. An analysis of substantive effects based on Model 4 allows one to gauge the relative importance of the three measures of military support when entered together in the estimations. **A one standard deviation increase in US military aid raises the expected count of anti-American terrorism most by 114%, followed by arms exports and military personnel, in which a one standard deviation increase leads to an increase of 45% and 30%, respectively.** It would thus appear that US military aid matters most for **foreign terror on Americans.**

Modernization happens w/o spending on maintenance or support infrastructure

Majumdar 2016 [Dave, "The Pentagon's Readiness Crisis: Why the 2017 Defense Bill Will Make Things Worse," *National Interest*. Accessed at:<http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-pentagons-readiness-crisis-why-the-2017-defense-bill-16954>.] //DNP

"The House NDAA **cuts O&M by a net \$11.6 billion** to fund procurement and it **forces higher troop numbers without providing the necessary infrastructure to support them, creating a hollow force that is less ready,**" reads the HASC minority document. "It **focuses on** procuring **new weapons that in some cases will replace older systems** with newer ones that are not as fatigued. However, the **bulk of this effort goes toward procuring these systems without investing in the necessary O&M and support infrastructure to keep them well maintained and provide servicemembers with the training and supplies they need to be truly ready.**"

Nuclear Modernization causes escalation

Sam Worthington, September 7, 2016, The Ongoing "Modernization" of the United States Nuclear arsenal, <http://masspeaceaction.org/us-nuclear-modernization/>

Nuclear modernization offers no prospects for enhanced security, though it may raise the risk of inadvertent escalation during crisis instability. It is virtually guaranteed to prompt a renewed nuclear arms race, which constitutes a major a threat to strategic stability and encourages proliferation beyond the existing nuclear powers. If the program is not trimmed or killed in its infancy, it will be virtually impossible to stop.

Further modernization increases threats and risks nuclear escalation, it also crushes arms control

Sam Worthington, Tufts University, September 7, 2016, The Ongoing "Modernization" of the United States Nuclear arsenal, <http://masspeaceaction.org/us-nuclear-modernization/>

While proponents of modernization claim that it will enhance strategic stability, the supposed security benefits are highly contested, and a plethora of evidence suggests that many of the proposed weapons upgrades are counterproductive to US foreign policy goals. Contrary to the defenses raised by the Obama administration, **the development of the new Long Range Standoff Weapon, the F-35 nuclear mission, and the B61-12 warhead will make conflict more likely by signaling an aggressive nuclear posture and increasing the likelihood of inadvertent escalation.** Moreover, **the effort to upgrade various nuclear weapons systems will have disastrous implications for international arms control efforts. Modernization could undermine several existing arms control agreements, while further weakening the prospect of arms control in the future. In addition to being detrimental to U.S. security** and international credibility, nuclear modernization is simply unaffordable, with a price tag of approximately \$1 trillion over 30 years.

No significant cyber attacks – civilian harm, can only be used once, can be reversed to target the attacker, retribution, resource limits, need luck, lack of assets

Ryan C. Maness, 2015 Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, and Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasgow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, pp. 16-17

We find that the security dilemma has no place in these international interactions. The cyber world is nebulous; an infiltration against a military facility in this realm could bleed into the public sector. **Malicious cyber incidents on infrastructure have been and will continue to be rare to nonexistent because states are restrained due to the high probability of civilian harm, the nature of the weapons (single use), and the weak payoffs if utilized (Gartzke 2013). These types of offensive cyber actions are just as unlikely as interstate nuclear or chemical weapons attacks. There is a system of normative restraint in cyber operations based on the conditions of collateral damage, plus the factors of blowback and replication.** Foreign policy tactics in the cyber world can be replicated and reproduced. **Any cyber weapon used can be turned right back on its initiator. On top of this, it is likely that severe cyber operations will bring retribution and consequences that many states are not willing to accept. We have seen many interstate conflicts since the advent of the Internet age,** but the largest and only cyber operation thus far during a conventional military conflict, **the 2008 Russo-Georgian skirmish,** consisted of almost trivial DDoS and vandalism. **Since then, Russia has even avoided using cyber weapons during the Crimean and larger Ukrainian crises of 2014. Other operations are mainly propaganda operations or occur in the realm of espionage.** That the United States did not use cyber tactics against Iraq, Afghanistan, or Libya, at least as directed at the executive level, signifies that cyber tactics are typically restrained despite significant constituencies in the military that want to use the weapons. **Stuxnet is the outlier,** as our data demonstrate, not the norm or the harbinger of the future to come. **Cyber operations are limited in that their value is negligible, the consequences of a massive cyber incident are drastic, and the requirements to carry one out are vast. The idea of a lone cyber hacker being able to bring states to their knees is a fantastic one. Cyber operations like Stuxnet require an exceptional amount of funds, technical knowledge, luck, and on-the-ground assets for successful implementation.** Massive and truly dangerous cyber operations are beyond the means of most countries. **These statements are not opinions, but contentions made based on the facts at hand and the data we have collected.** We also see regionalism dominate in cyberspace. Despite the vastness and transboundary capacity of the Internet, most operations are limited to local targets connected to traditional causes of conflict, such as territorial disputes and leadership disagreements. Issues are important (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981) in world politics and in cyber politics. This is why international relations scholarship is so important in relation to the cyber question. Cyber operations are not taken devoid of their international and historical contexts. What has happened in the past will influence how future technologies are leveraged and where they are applied. The goal

of this book will be to use this theoretical frame to explain the cyber conflict dynamics of rival states, as well as non-state actors willing and able to launch cyber malice

() No impact to Cyber attacks

Ryan C. Maness, 2015 Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, and Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, p. 213

We developed our theory of cyber engagement fully in Chapter 3. The argument considers that cyber restraint is expected to dominate cyber interactions and should be predictive of future cyber operations. **States will restrain themselves from crossing the “red lines” of cyber conflict because of the high operational and normative cost associated with these operations. They will not shut down military networks, knock out power grids, or black out Wall Street; the fear of blowback and retaliation not only in cyberspace, but by conventional means as well, is too great. States will also avoid these actions because of fears of collateral damage and infecting the rest of the Internet. Actions taken in cyberspace tend to invade all aspects of cyberspace. Even when states take actions to keep operations in the realm of cyber, the operations tend to spread and proliferate in ways not predicted.** Escalated offensive capabilities will not be used because they could lead directly to war, civilian harm, and economic retaliation, which would then escalate conflict among states. These tactics would spread the conflict from the cyber realm to conventional conflict. **Therefore, restraint is what we expect to find when we examine cyber conflict among states. States will do what they believe they can get away with and then will go no further.** Restraint is the outcome we expect to see among states, while the process we expect to see at work is what we term cyber straitjacketing. **The low level and limited amount of cyber conflict we do observe will mostly be between regional rivals,** an unexpected result given the global reach of cyber technologies. Cyber regionalism is the assertion that most rival interactions in cyberspace will have a regional context, usually tied to territorial issues and other traditional issues between regional actors. However, **because cyber conflict is restrained, these cyber incidents and disputes will usually take the form of propaganda, vandalism, or inconvenient denial of service methods and will not escalate to militarized conflict solely because of cyber issues. Escalation,** especially among regional rivals, **has been prevented through restraint** thus far.

Countries only engage in cyber espionage, not war

Ryan C. Maness, 2015, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, and Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, pp. 49-50

Going further, we spell out a theory of cyber espionage and how cyber terrorism will be utilized by states. Here we define cyber espionage as the use of dangerous and offensive intelligence measures to steal, corrupt, or erase information in the cybersphere of interactions. What is unusual about cyber espionage is the paradox of the tactic being common, but also literally the least a state can do. When cyber actions are exhibited, they tend to be low-level espionage actions that do not rise to the level of conflict or warfare. **States seem to be very measured and concentrated in their cyber espionage activities.** They take action for specific reasons if there is a demonstrated weakness in a target. If a target seems to take few measures to protect the home base and its resources, the initiator will exploit the vulnerability. **In the espionage realm, states seem to be doing the least they can, given that their demonstrated capabilities often far outweigh their actual expressions of activity. States will restrain themselves from unleashing the full weight of their cyber capabilities, because the damage done is**

not worth the costs. Simple cost-benefit analysis would suggest that this will be the course of cyber operations in the future, yet the discourse takes on a troubling and inflammatory tone, in terms of what others predict. In short, some hype the collective fears in the system for their own ends. **What we end up seeing in this domain is spycraft, not warcraft. Operations are taken to exploit a weakness in security, rather than operations taken to exploit or crush a target.** Choices in the cyber realm are not made based on a need to infiltrate a target, but almost solely on the opportunity to hit a target based on its failures to secure basic protection. **When the walls are down, the state will do what it can to gather information. When the walls are up, the state will be restrained** and will not seek to use methods to break down the walls, because there will be consequences for these actions. **China has been notorious for finding and exploiting gaps in American cyberspace defenses, but it has also sought to limit its conflictual interactions with the United States in most other realms.** In this way, we see cyber espionage activities as a method to make known what can be done in relation to defense gaps, rather than a method to seek exploitation based on offensive capabilities.

No cyber terror threat

Ryan C. **Maness, 2015 Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, and Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, pp. 16-17**

Non-state cyber terrorism is relatively weak and benign. To reiterate, our focus here is on state-based actions, but we should make it clear that **non-state actor terrorist initiatives in cyberspace are limited because of the nature of the tactic**— therefore our selection of domains is warranted and critical. Instead of being an easily utilized method of hitting an enemy, as common myths indicate, **extreme cyber actions are generally only available to state-based actors because of the money, time, and skill involved to exploit cyber targets.** We will dive into the reasons for the weakness of non-state/ terrorist actors more fully in Chapter 7, when we examine the process of Cyber Gaza and other operations. Stuxnet is also indicative of this process, and we will explore it in more depth in Chapter 6. In the Stuxnet case, the state actors must have had massive amounts of money and technological knowledge to create, transport, and initiate the cyber weapon. They also must have had assets inside the target willing to help make the operation a success. On top of this, they had to be incredibly lucky (or unlucky, in terms of how Stuxnet was released into the wild). **Paradoxically, powerful states are the only ones who can really marshal offensive cyber capabilities to commit state-sponsored cyber terrorism, but they will not utilize this step, since the action would be so costly in terms of reputation.**

Cyber threats never go away with more money – that's b/c they aren't real

Evgeny Morozov, 2013 [staff writer, "Battling the Cyber Warmongers," WSJ, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704370704575228653351323986>] MJS 1-2-2017

Ironically, the more we spend on securing the Internet, the less secure we appear to feel. A 2009 report by Input, a marketing intelligence firm, projected that government spending on cybersecurity would grow at a compound rate of 8.1% in the next five years. A March report from consulting firm Market Research Media estimates that the government's total spending on cybersecurity between now

and 2015 is set to hit \$55 billion, with strong growth predicted in areas such as Internet-traffic surveillance and monitoring.

Given the previous history of excessively tight connections between our government and many of its contractors, it's quite possible that the over-dramatized rhetoric of those cheerleading the cyberwar has helped to add at least a few billion dollars to this price tag. Mr. McConnell's current employer, Booz Allen Hamilton, has just landed \$34 million in cyber security contracts with the Air Force. In addition to writing books on the subject, Richard Clarke is a partner in a security firm, Good Harbor Consulting.

Steven Walt, a professor of international politics at Harvard, believes that the nascent debate about **cyberwar presents "a classical opportunity for threat inflation."** Mr Walt points to the resemblance between our current deliberations about online security and the debate about nuclear arms during the Cold War. Back then, those working in weapons labs and the military tended to hold more alarmist views than many academic experts, arguably because the livelihoods of university professors did not depend on having to hype up the need for arms racing.

Markus Ranum, a veteran of the network security industry and a noted critic of the cyber war hype, points to another similarity with the Cold War. Today's hype, he says, leads us to believe that "we need to develop an offensive capability in order to defend against an attack that isn't coming—*it's the old 'bomber gap' all over again: a flimsy excuse to militarize.*"

Perfect security—in cyberspace or in the real world—has huge political and social costs, and most democratic societies would find it undesirable. **There may be no petty crime in North Korea, but achieving such "security" requires accepting all other demands of living in an Orwellian police state.** Just like we don't put up armed guards to protect every city wall from graffiti, we should not overreact in cyberspace.

For example, a **re-engineering of the Internet** to make it easier to trace the location of cyberattackers, as some have called for, **would surely be expensive, impractical and extremely harmful to privacy.** If today's attacks are mostly anonymous, tomorrow they would be performed using hijacked and fully authenticated computers of old ladies.

What is worse, any major re-engineering of the Internet could derail other ambitious initiatives of the U.S. government, especially its efforts to promote Internet freedom. Urging China and Iran to keep their hands off the Internet would work only if Washington sticks to its own advice; otherwise, we are trading in hype.

In reality, we don't need to develop a new set of fancy all-powerful weaponry to secure cyberspace. In most cases the threats are the same as they were 20 years ago; we still need to patch security flaws, update anti-virus databases and ban suspicious users from our sites. It's human nature, not the Internet, that we need to conquer and re-engineer to feel more secure. But it's through rational deliberation, not fear-mongering, that we can devise policies that will accomplish this.

Russia wants better US Russia relations

New York Post Nov 9 2016 [New York Post, "Putin wants to restore relations between Russia and US", *New York Post*, <<http://nypost.com/2016/11/09/putin-wants-to-restore-relations-between-russia-and-us/>>] //CJC

MOSCOW – **Russia is ready to do its part to fully restore ties with Washington** following the election of businessman Donald Trump as the next U.S. President, **Russian President Vladimir Putin said** on Wednesday. Trump stunned the world by defeating heavily favoured rival Hillary Clinton in Tuesday's presidential election, ending eight years of Democratic rule and sending the United States on a new, uncertain path. Among those uncertainties will be the Trump administration's future relations with Russia. Ties between Washington and Moscow have become increasingly strained over the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, and allegations of Russian cyber attacks featured in the U.S. election campaign. "**We heard the campaign statements of the future U.S. presidential candidate about the restoration of relations between Russia and the United States.**" **Putin said** on Wednesday at a ceremony to receive credentials from new foreign ambassadors. "**It is not an easy path, but we are ready to do our part and do everything to return Russian and American relations to a stable path of development,**" **he added.**

Trump hates the Syrian Rebels

Marc Lynch is professor of political science at The George Washington University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Winter 2017, *Washington Quarterly*, Beilligerent Minimalism: The Trump Administration and the Middle East, https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Winter2017_Lynch.pdf

Intervention in Syria was one of the only Middle East issues discussed during the presidential campaign, and one of the sharpest points of disagreement. The Clinton campaign was prepared to immediately ramp up military assistance to the Syrian rebels, and would likely have moved to the declaration of a no-fly zone. The expectation of this coming intervention had shaped at least the last half-year of the war's conduct, with rebels preparing for their new role, and Assad, backed by Russia, seeking to consolidate control in as many areas as possible.

Trump, however, **has dismissed Syria's rebels as dominated by jihadists and has vocally opposed military intervention on their behalf.**²⁰ He has at times made conflicting statements in support of safe areas defended and funded by Gulf states, but he has generally aligned himself with Russia's view of the conflict as one between Assad's secular state and a jihadist insurgency.

Trump will likely receive little intelligence to contradict his dim view of the current rebels or to

2017 Budget Increase R+D

Department of Defense, 2016 [Department of Defense, "Department of Defense (DoD) Releases Fiscal Year 2017 President's Budget Proposal", *DOD*, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/652687/department-of-defense-dod-releases-fiscal-year-2017-presidents-budget-proposal/>] //AKC

Technological Innovation. The DoD is pursuing new technology development, operational concepts, and organizational constructs to maintain our military's technological superiority.

- **For FY 2017, we invest science and technology funds that advance key technology areas such as hypersonics, large data analytics, advanced materials, and human-machine teaming.**
- The budget invests a total of \$112.1 billion in FY 2017 to develop and procure the equipment, technology and capabilities we need to deter and, if necessary, fight and win full-spectrum conflicts in the future.
- **The budget increases funding for our research and development accounts, which total \$71.8 billion in FY 2017.**
- The budget reflects our continuing efforts to connect with America's technology community. This includes \$45 million in FY 2017 for our Defense Innovation Unit-Experimental (DIUx).
- **The budget includes \$40 million in FY 2017 for our pilot program with In-Q-Tel, leveraging a venture capital model to help find innovative solutions for some of our most challenging problems.**
- The budget includes \$137 million in FY 2017 to support our manufacturing innovation institutes, including one focused on flexible hybrid electronics.

Gohoshroy, 2011 [Subrata, "Restructuring defense R&D", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, <http://thebulletin.org/restructuring-defense-rd>] //AKC

The military's R&D budget has escaped detailed scrutiny largely because it is politically safe for members of Congress to support research -- and politically dangerous not to. Any talk of cutting the R&D budget routinely results in push-back from the top universities and defense contractors, accompanied by a barrage of negative press coverage. **No one, it seems, wants to be seen as opposing scientific research to bolster the "technological edge" that gave America its military superiority over the Soviet Union and continues to provide enormous advantages.**

The business of R&D. Congressional military committees have for years grossly abused the Defense R&D budget, using it to channel money to contractors in their districts via the earmarking process. In 2009, the Defense Department paid nearly \$44 billion in R&D funds to its top 20 for-profit contractors, compared to \$3.6 billion that went to nonprofit federally funded research and development centers, including research universities and the national laboratories they administer.

Over the years, R&D has become big business by minimizing research and spending wildly on almost anything that can be classified as development. In current dollars, the total US defense research and development budget has grown exponentially, expanding especially fast under the Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush administrations. **The portion of the budget that is arguably for productive research has remained small.**

Our universities and professional organizations of scientists and engineers frequently lament the decline of funding for basic research and the gradual loss of US dominance in science. **In this budget environment, simply asking for more funds for science likely won't bring results. A realistic program of R&D reform that helped the United States reassert its global leadership in science and technology and reduced the defense budget very well might.**

Alterman, 2012 [Eric Alterman, "Is Defense R&D Spending Effective?", *Center for American Progress*, <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/general/news/2012/01/13/11001/think-again-is-defense-rd-spending-effective/>] //AKC

Second, **Ghoshroy argues that it's far from clear to what degree this spending goes to protecting American soldiers, much less the nation at large. "Most of the U.S. casualties in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been caused by improvised explosive devices, which require little in the way of technology beyond the mobile phones used to detonate them,"** he writes. "The United States' high-technology, high-price, and high-maintenance weaponry is of relatively little value in such conflicts." Whenever the issue comes up for debate—as when spending levels turn out to be unsustainable, as they are today, or when a number of weapons systems turn out to be total turkeys, as so many are today—the discussion of cuts, Ghoshroy notes, "routinely results in push-back from the top universities and defense contractors, accompanied by a barrage of negative press coverage. No one, it seems, wants to be seen as opposing scientific research to bolster the 'technological edge' that gave America its military superiority over the Soviet Union and continues to provide enormous advantages."

...

Of course, there is a great deal of flat-out failure to be expected in research and development, especially in basic research, but some of **these failures at the applied and development stages of R&D are protected by the Pentagon's remarkable ability to call it "success."** Ghoshroy notes the example of when, in 1997, the \$100 million test of a ground-based missile defense system failed, and its contractors termed it successful because no benchmarks had yet been established. Not much pushback ensued, Ghoshroy observed, because "congressional military committees have for years **grossly abused the Defense R&D budget**, using it to channel money to contractors in their districts via the earmarking process."

Military Spending Harms GDP

Pieroni 2011 [Luca, "KEYNESIAN AND NEW-KEYNESIAN MODELS: THE IMPACT OF MILITARY SPENDING ON THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY," *Department of Economics University of Verona*. Accessed at:http://www.univr.it/documenti/AllegatiOA/allegatooa_8236.pdf.] //DNP

This paper carried out **an analysis on US economy from 1960 to 2008** with the objective of verifying and quantifying the effects of different broad categories of government expenditure on private consumption,

so to contribute to the empirical literature which has reported mixed evidence so far. Our findings obtained using structural VAR method and reproduced by a DSGE model simulation can be summarized as follows. **GDP and private consumption** seems to **respond**: i) positively to total government purchases of goods and services; ii) positively to civilian spending; iii) **negatively to military expenditure**. While i) and ii) strengthens the new-Keynesian theoretical approach, known as the **credit-constrained agents**, iii) seems to confirm the standard neoclassical wealth effect. Moreover, the way of financing of different public spending components is extremely relevant. In particular, **military spending is financed by an increase in government budget deficit**, contrary to the civilian spending case. We also found a clear **substitution effect between the resources devolved for the defence and non-defence sectors**.

Russia's military budget is collapsing, no war risk

Harry J. Kazianis (@grecianformula) is **director of defense studies at the Center for the National Interest**, founded by former U.S. President Richard M. Nixon. Kazianis also presently serves as Executive Editor of the National Interest and fellow at both the Potomac Foundation and the Center for China Policy at the University of Nottingham (UK). He is the author of the book *The Tao of A2/AD: China's Rationale for the Creation of Anti-Access*. Kazianis in the past has led the foreign policy communication efforts of the Heritage Foundation, is the former editor-in-chief of *The Diplomat* and a fellow at CSIS:PACNET. **November, 14, 2016**
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2016/11/14/how_donald_trump_can_make_the_pivot_to_asia_a_great_again_112118.html

While Russia might be flexing its muscles in Ukraine and in Syria, **Moscow faces long-term and well documented demographic and economic challenges it will not easily overcome. And with big cuts coming to its military budget starting next year, we might be witnessing the peak of Russian military and diplomatic might.**

Hegemony isn't needed in Europe, EU actors fill the void

Ted Carpenter **April 2013**, [a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor to *The National Interest*, is the author of nine books and more than 500 articles and policy studies, "Delusions of Indispensability" <http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/delusions-indispensability-8145>] MJS

But even **during the final decades of the Cold War, the U.S. security blanket unfortunately caused an excessive and unhealthy dependence on the part of democratic Europe**. And with the demise of the Soviet Union, **a policy based on U.S. dominance now reeks of obsolescence**. Despite its recent financial struggles, **the European Union collectively has both a population and an economy larger than those of the United States**. And Russia, if it poses a threat at all, **is a far less serious menace than was the Soviet Union**. Yet **U.S. leaders act as though the EU nations are inherently incapable of managing Europe's security affairs**. And for their part, **the European allies are content to continue free riding on Washington's exertions, keeping their defense budgets at minimal levels and letting the United States take primary responsibility for security issues that affect Europe far more than America**. Even a modest increase in defense spending by the principal European powers would enable the EU to handle any security problems that are

likely to arise in the region. In that sense, Washington's dominant role in dealing with the Balkan conflicts in the 1990s was not evidence of the continuing need for U.S. leadership, but rather underscored the negative consequences of having encouraged Europe's security dependence on the United States for so many decades. The reality is that the threat environment in Europe is quite benign. There are few plausible security threats, and the ones that might arise are on the scale of the Balkan spats—problems that the European powers should be able to handle without undue exertion. Washington can safely off-load responsibility for European security and stability to the countries directly involved. The United States is most certainly not indispensable to the Continent's security any longer.

No Baltic invasion

Bandow 2016 [Doug Bandow is senior fellow at the Cato Institute, "Russia Won't Attack the Baltic States", *Cato Institute*, <<https://www.cato.org/blog/russia-wont-attack-baltic-states>>] //CJC

Equally striking is how NATO membership has discouraged the Baltic nations from doing much for their own defense. Last year Latvia and Lithuania devoted 1.06 percent and 1.14 percent, respectively, of GDP to the military. Estonia was 2.04 percent—the first time Tallinn met the official NATO standard. Yet **the surging fear over Russian adventurism is misplaced. Vladimir Putin's behavior is bad, but poses little threat to America, "old" Europe, or even most of Russia's neighbors.** He has taken Moscow back to the Russian Empire, not the Soviet Union. His government demands respect for its status, protection of Russia's borders, and consideration of its interests. Mikhail Saakashvili's Georgia was actively anti-Russian, pursued close ties with America, and sought membership in NATO—all certain to antagonize Moscow. Ukraine always mattered more to Moscow than Georgia or the Baltics for historical and cultural reasons, as well as the naval base of Sebastopol. Putin acted only after Europe pushed a trade agreement to reorient Ukraine away from Russia and both Brussels and Washington backed a street revolution against the elected president who leaned toward Russia. Even then, Putin sought to weaken, not conquer, Ukraine. His brutal response was murderous and unjustified, but militarily on par with U.S. interventions. **Putin continues to demonstrate no interest in ruling those likely to resist Russia's tender mercies. Seizing the Baltic states likely would generate substantial popular resistance.** Moreover, as weak nations currently containing no foreign troops, **the Baltics pose no potential threat to Russia.** Finally, **the Baltic ethnic Russian populations, though significant, demonstrate little sentiment for joining Mother Russia.** They prefer cultural connection to political affiliation, **creating a poor target for the sort of destabilizing tactics deployed against Ukraine.** So **what would Russia gain from attacking the Baltics? A recalcitrant, majority non-ethnic Russian population.** A possible temporary nationalist surge at home. A likely short-lived victory over the West. As I argue in *National Interest*: **"The costs would be far greater. Grabbing the Baltics likely would spur population exodus and trigger economic collapse. Launching a war without the convincing pretext present in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine might leave the Russian public angry over the retaliation certain to come."**

Putin doesn't want the Baltics

Pravda 2016 [Pravda.ru is a Russian Newspaper, "Those thinking Russia can attack Baltic States need their heads examined - Putin", *Pravda.ru*, <http://www.pravdareport.com/news/russia/kremlin/05-09-2016/135521-russia_baltic_states-0/>] //CJC

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that the concerns about Russia's possible attack on the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia) were nothing but "nonsense." "All sane people" realize that there is no such threat." Putin said in an interview with Bloomberg. During the interview, a journalist suggested that the West does not trust Russia because of the wish of the latter to expand its zone of influence and establish control over border areas. "I think that all sensible people, who are really involved in politics, understood that the reference to Russia's threat to, let's say, the Baltic countries is complete nonsense. Are we going to wage war against NATO or something?" Putin wondered. Putin reminded that NATO countries are home to approximately 600 million people, whereas Russia is home to 146 million. Putin mentioned that Russia was a nuclear power, but then added: "Are you really suggesting that we are going to conquer the Baltic States using nuclear weapons, or what? What kind of nonsense is that?" Putin said.

Economic interdependence prevents a US-Russia War.

Stewart 3/7/14, staff writer for the New York Times, cites a study by J.P. Morgan Securities, quotes a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, (James B., March 7, 2014, "Why Russia Can't Afford Another Cold War", New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/08/business/why-russia-cant-afford-another-cold-war.html?_r=0)/CJC

Russia is far more exposed to market fluctuations than many countries, since it owns a majority stake in a number of the country's largest companies. Gazprom, the energy concern that is Russia's largest company by market capitalization, is majority-owned by the Russian Federation. At the same time, Gazprom's shares are listed on the London stock exchange and are traded over the counter as American depositary receipts in the United States as well as on the Berlin and Paris exchanges. Over half of its shareholders are American, according to J. P. Morgan Securities. And the custodian bank for its depositary receipts is the Bank of New York Mellon. Many Russian companies and banks are fully integrated into the global financial system. This week, Glencore Xstrata, the mining giant based in Switzerland, was in the middle of a roughly \$1 billion debt-to-equity refinancing deal with the Russian oil company Russneft. Glencore said it expected to complete the deal despite the crisis. Glencore's revenue last year was substantially larger than the entire gross domestic product of Ukraine, which was \$176 billion, according to the World Bank. The old Soviet Union, in stark contrast, was all but impervious to foreign economic or business pressure, thanks in part to an ideological commitment to self-sufficiency. As recently as 1985, foreign trade amounted to just 4 percent of the country's gross domestic product, and nearly all that was with the communist satellite countries of Eastern Europe. But the Soviet Union's economic insularity and resulting economic stagnation was a major cause of the Soviet Union's collapse. According to Mr. Talbott, the Soviet Union's president at the time, Mikhail Gorbachev, was heavily influenced by Soviet economists and other academics who warned that by the turn of the century in 2000, the Soviet economy would be smaller than South Korea's if it did not introduce major economic reforms and participate in the global economy. To attract investment capital, Mr. Gorbachev created the Moscow stock exchange in 1990 and issued an order permitting Soviet citizens to own and trade stocks, bonds and other securities for the first time since the 1917 Bolshevik revolution. (Before then, Russia had a flourishing stock exchange in St. Petersburg, established by order of Peter the Great. It was housed in an elegant neoclassical building directly across the waterfront from the Winter Palace. As a symbol of wealth and capitalism, it was one of the earliest casualties of the revolution.) Even before this week's gyrations, the Russian stock market index

had dropped near 8 percent last year, and it and the Russian economy have been suffering from low commodity prices and investor concerns about the Federal Reserve's tapering of bond purchases — factors of little significance during the Cold War. **By contrast, today “Russia is too weak and vulnerable economically to go to war,”** Mr. Aslund said. **“The Kremlin’s fundamental mistake has been to ignore its economic weakness and dependence on Europe. Almost half of Russia’s exports go to Europe, and three-quarters of its total exports consist of oil and gas.”** The energy boom is over, and Europe can turn the tables on Russia after its prior gas supply cuts in 2006 and 2009. Europe can replace this gas with liquefied natural gas, gas from Norway and shale gas. If the European Union sanctioned Russia’s gas supply to Europe, Russia would lose \$100 billion or one-fifth of its export revenues, and the Russian economy would be in rampant crisis.”

North Korea views US military policy as an attempt at domination — kills nuclear talks and causes NoKo lashout and war — they view it as self defense from the US

Pyongyang Broadcasting Station 2003 (5/14/03, "North Korea says US wants to resolve nuclear issue through war", BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, lexis) //DNP

In a situation where DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea -US dialogue on the Korean Peninsula's nuclear issue has stalled, **US military moves are ill-bodingly escalating bit by bit.** According to reports, the United States is said to have decided to continue the deployment of the six F-117 Stealth fighter-bombers it had mobilized to the joint Foal Eagle military exercise in South Korea last March. Besides these fighter aircraft, the withdrawal of some 10 F-15E fighter-bombers and some mechanized units, which were also mobilized for the same military exercise, is not being confirmed. Meanwhile, one US daily reported that the US military base in Okinawa, Japan is becoming a US advance base vis-a-vis the North. The paper said **the United States is cautiously reinforcing forces in the area neighbouring the Korean Peninsula** and revealed that it is conducting a ground warfare exercise in the heart of Okinawa to prepare for an emergency. **This is material evidence that the United States is covertly stepping up preparations to crush our Republic by force** behind the curtain of DPRK-US dialogue for the resolution of the nuclear issue. As is clear to everybody, **the Korean Peninsula's nuclear issue is a product of the US dominationist strategy** vis-a-vis the DPRK. From the position of cherishing the Korean Peninsula's peace and the nation's security, **we are making sincere efforts towards a peaceful resolution to the nuclear issue**, which was generated by the United States. Notwithstanding this, the clue to resolving the nuclear issue is nowhere in sight. **Verbally, the United States is blabbering about a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear issue, but in fact, it is acting the opposite.** And why it is doing so is coming to light. **The US policy towards the DPRK is a policy of interference, aggression, and domination.** The United States started the nuclear commotion and it has not exerted any efforts to bring it under control. The objective of all this is to achieve their policy of aggression vis-a-vis the DPRK. The fact that the United States has turned its back on the issue of restoring the DPRK-US dialogue process while only paying attention to reinforcing forces and conducting war preparations in South Korea shows they are trying to resolve the nuclear issue through the means of war. It is no secret that the United States has already completed a military preemptive strike plan, including a strike against our nuclear facilities, on the pretext of the nuclear issue. **The US attempt at northward aggression is becoming more clear and is rapidly being translated into action.** It is by all means no coincidence that one South Korean broadcasting network said the United States' continued extension of the fighters' deployment is exceptional. There are reports that if a war were to break out in Korea, the US Air base on Okinawa - where the US 3d Marine Expeditionary Force, equipped with enough fighter power capable to swiftly respond to a Korean war, is stationed and where Kadena Air base, the biggest base in the Pacific region, is located - will assume the role of war command headquarters. **US forces' ground warfare exercises aimed at northward aggression are secretly being conducted. This is an event that cannot be overlooked. Prior to the start of the Iraqi war, the United States conducted ground warfare exercises by mobilizing massive armed**

forces of aggression, which were deployed outside the Iraqi boundaries. When we recall this, the US forces' secret ground warfare exercises, which are being conducted on Okinawa under conditions where war equipment is forward deployed in South Korea and its vicinity while finding fault with the nuclear issue, are suggestive of many things. We cannot but help regard all of these unusual events as a dangerous sign of a war of aggression against our Republic. **The outbreak of a second Korean war and a nuclear war of northward aggression at this time is becoming a reality and is a matter of time,** both of which cannot be refuted. These facts verify that **the United States** - like making a plausible lie outwardly and actually doing some other wicked thing - **is not interested in holding dialogue with us and resolving the nuclear issue** and that their advertisement is nothing but some specious thing to cover up their theory on northward aggression. The real US purpose is to crush us with strength both yesterday and today. **Now that the US provocation of a war of northward aggression has become an established fact, we cannot help but exercise our due self-defensive rights.** Deterrent is not a US monopoly. We also have the right to choose. We are not Iraq. The United States must not run amok, word indistinct with the result of the Iraqi war. **If the United States ignores our warning and sets out on the road of igniting a war of northward aggression to the end, we will mercilessly crush the aggressors with unpredictable and limitless annihilating strikes. We never make empty remarks.**

North Korea launched missiles because of South Korea-US military drills

McKirdy Mar 9 2016 [Euan McKirdy is a writer and reporter for CNN. "North Korea fires two short-range missiles", *CNN News*, <<http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/08/asia/north-korea-nuclear-warheads/>>] //CJC

North Korea fired two short-range ballistic missiles early Thursday from North Hwanghae province, south of Pyongyang, according to a South Korean military statement. The

missiles were fired toward the sea, east off the Korean peninsula, and the South closely tracked the projectiles and is monitoring the situation, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff said. The launch is the latest saber rattling on the peninsula that roils with tension. The show of force follows a **North Korean claim that it has miniaturized nuclear warheads to fit on ballistic missiles,** according to the state-run Korean Central News Agency. **Meanwhile, in the South, its military conducts the "largest ever" joint exercises with the United States.**

The muscle flexing between North and South occurs a week after the United Nations Security Council imposed broad sanctions against North Korea because of that nation's recent nuclear test and another missile launch, both of which defied current international sanctions. For now, the South maintains a readiness posture in case of a North provocation, the South military says. Nuclear warheads The report about miniaturized nuclear warheads comes after the North reported a successful test of what it said was a hydrogen bomb in February. State media reported Wednesday that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met with nuclear scientists and technicians, who briefed him on "research conducted to tip various type tactical and strategic ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads." The agency also published photographs that appeared to show Kim visiting a facility where the warheads have been made to fit on ballistic missiles -- the first time state media has released images showing its miniaturized weapons technology. CNN cannot independently confirm the photos' veracity or the claims of the KCNA.

David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security told CNN's Brian Todd on Monday that his group thinks the North Koreans had probably already miniaturized a warhead. A South Korean Defense White Paper from 2014 also noted that its neighbor's ability to miniaturize nuclear weapons seemed, at the time, "to have reached a considerable level."

[...]

The tensions heighten once again on the Korean Peninsula, with the United States and South Korea conducting what has been described by a South Korean Defense Ministry spokesman as the "largest ever" joint military exercises, in which around 17,000 U.S. military personnel are participating alongside some 300,000 South Korean troops, according to U.S. Forces Korea.

North Korea on Sunday warned it would make a "pre-emptive and offensive nuclear strike" in response to the joint exercises.

No NoKo collapse — economic reforms and shifts in power structure increase flexibility

Moon et. al. 15 — Chung-in Moon, a professor of political science at Yonsei University in Seoul, South Korea, and Ildo Hwang, a journalist with Donga Ilbo who specialises in North Korean affairs, 2015 ("North Korea still stable despite external vulnerabilities," *East Asia Forum*, December 28th, Available Online at <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/12/28/north-korea-still-stable-despite-external-vulnerabilities/>, Accessed 07-21-16)

North Korea seems to have had an *internally stable 2015*. Its economy is far from faltering and Kim Jong-un has firmly consolidated his power base. There were no explicit signs of internal challenge. Kim is both reigning and ruling. But Pyongyang's provocative behaviour in the international domain could produce severe consequences for North Korea. Uncertainty remains high.

In late October, Pyongyang announced that it will hold the Seventh Congress of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) in May 2016, 35 years after the Sixth Party Congress in 1980. At the first Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, the late North Korean chairman Kim Jong-il mentioned to then South Korean president Kim Dae-jung that he would convene a congress, but it was never realised. Kim Jong-un succeeded power without the congress ever being held. This announcement is therefore a significant move.

Kim Jong-un is likely to use the upcoming party congress as a platform to declare the beginning of a new era under his leadership. His 2015 New Year speech had already hinted the possibility of redirecting the governing ideology.

Kim Jong-un's previous New Year speeches made it clear that his rule is founded on two pillars: the ideological lines of his grandfather Kim Il-sung and father Kim Jong-il. But in 2015, such ideological edifices did not appear. Instead, Kim Jong-un routinely mentioned old rhetoric such as strengthening monolithic leadership, *juche* (self-reliance), as well as the importance of *songun* (military first) politics. The North Korean leader may well introduce his own brand of ruling ideology at the Seventh Party Congress in 2016.

The decision reveals Kim Jong-un's growing confidence in economic performance and power consolidation. North Korea underwent major economic difficulties in 2015 — partly because of international sanctions and poor harvests, and partly because of falling prices of coal and iron ore that accounted for almost half of its exports.

But Pyongyang's economic performance has remained rather robust, owing to the flourishing informal sector. Since 2009, more than 400 *jangmadang* (informal marketplaces) have been introduced. They have facilitated the distribution of necessary consumer goods through a quasi-market mechanism. Such informal markets critically mitigated the negative consequences of severe drought and poor harvest. This was a sharp contrast to the period of mass starvation of the 1990s, after which the public distribution system collapsed. Equally important is the advent

of donju (money holders) who are serving as new agents of capital accumulation as well as sources of valuable hard currency.

The size of the informal sector is now believed to be larger than that of the formal sector. Some experts even compare the current North Korean economy to the Chinese economy under Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening up initiative. As the logic behind a market economy becomes more widespread, the state economy is becoming increasingly flexible. The state no longer commands and dictates the economy. Citizens themselves have become increasingly adaptive and entrepreneurial, seeking their own survival through whatever means available.

Paradoxically, the adaptive behaviour of ordinary citizens has weakened the effectiveness of international sanctions.

The power structure has also been shifting from old, vested interests (such as the military) to the party and the cabinet. They now control overall economic activities, including foreign exchange earnings and foreign direct investment. Cadres from the Organisation and Guidance Department of the KWP — which played a pivotal role in Kim Jong-un's smooth succession to power — have emerged as the core power elite group.

The generational change of the power elite has been another defining characteristic of the Kim Jong-un leadership in 2015. Relatively young party members have been extensively recruited. Old guards, such as the second generation of revolutionary leaders and military personnel who were powerful during the Kim Jong-il era, have been either purged or discharged.

Your authors are just wrong — North Korea cares too much about regime survival to escalate

Jackson and Suh, 7-9-15 – [Van Jackson, Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, Hannah Suh, Asia-Pacific Security Program at Center for a New American Security, 7-9-2015, The Biggest Myth about North Korea, The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-biggest-myth-about-north-korea-13290>] //CJC

A million lives and a trillion dollars. Experts in the 1990s predicted that the costs of war with North Korea would reach at least this magnitude. While this is probably true of a worst-case scenario, and estimates would doubtless be even higher today, pundits and officials alike have allowed it to cloud reasoned judgment about North Korea. A strawman argument has taken hold that any actions against North Korea will lead to cataclysmic death and destruction. This is wrong. Alliance military actions against North Korea will not automatically trigger a nuclear holocaust or the annihilation of Seoul. Fear, risk aversion and a misunderstanding of North Korea have allowed the most dangerous scenario to be conflated with the most likely one. Rather than being paralyzed by the fact that anything is possible, alliance policy and military planning needs to recognize a simple reality: no matter what North Korea threatens, it will assiduously seek to avoid war-triggering actions. North Korea's own historical behavior and its widely presumed goal of regime survival confirms as much. It isn't hard to find pundits who would have us believe North Korea is prepared to immolate the Korean Peninsula in a blaze of glory at the first hint of conflict. One argument goes that offensive military action "likely would trigger a war which would devastate South Korea." Another offers that even an "extremely limited" preemptive strike "...risks sparking a major military conflict...that might have devastating consequences for the [United States], Korea, and beyond..." Still others argue that there's nothing the United States or South Korea can do because North Korean artillery aimed at Seoul prevents even minor military actions, implying that any attacks on North Korea will trigger the worst scenario

imaginable. One analyst even pointedly remarks that using force against North Korea would be worse than allowing its nuclear program to expand. Nor is this illogic limited to pundits; successive U.S. administrations have fallen prey to the same fear-based, rather than logic-based, thinking. During the George W. Bush administration, the prevailing view "...was that if any kind of military strike starts against North Korea, the North Koreans would invade...and they will cause enormous destruction of Seoul." And former secretary of defense Robert Gates wrote in his memoir of the Obama administration's hyperventilating pleas with the highest levels of the South Korean government not to retaliate against North Korea for its November 2010 artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island. Widespread fear of a North Korean total war is a pathology based on an imaginary North Korea. No matter one's political leanings, right and left alike agree that North Korea's primary goal is regime survival, meaning that North Korea will not only take actions to safeguard its regime, but also avoid taking actions that put its survival at risk. This bears out in sixty years of observing North Korean behavior—even during the so-called "second Korean war" of the late 1960s, North Korea never escalated beyond isolated military attacks. Today, North Korea threatens South Korean NGOs that send propaganda balloons into its territory, yet fires at the balloons and not the people launching them. In repeated naval clashes with South Korea in the Yellow Sea, North Korea strikes some blows and suffers others, but it never escalates beyond the local clash. North Korea has had countless opportunities to escalate or broaden conflicts in a crisis, yet has consistently chosen restraint. Whatever North Korea's rhetoric and motivations for violence, its track record shows a preference for not taking actions that would jeopardize the regime, and the North Korean escalation that everyone fears would do precisely that. Even if North Korea responded with violence when attacked or retaliated against, there is a massive difference between responding with limited or tit-for-tat violence (its historical modus operandi) and responding with the most devastatingly lethal response it can come up with, like a nuclear first-strike or artillery barrages against Seoul. The latter are regime-ending actions, while the former may demonstrate resolve against the alliance and allow both sides a chance to sue for peace.

North Korea wont lash out unless directly threatened

McKirdy and Kwon '16 Euan- Digital Producer based in Hong Kong for CNN, KJ- CNN producer based out of Seoul, 5-8-16, "Kim Jong Un: We'll only use nuclear weapons if sovereignty threatened," <http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/07/asia/north-korea-nuclear-use-sovereignty/>] //CJC

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said the country would not use a nuclear weapon unless its sovereignty is encroached by "invasive hostile forces with nuclear weapons," according to the country's state news agency KCNA. He made the remarks Saturday at the ruling Workers' Party of Korea's Seventh Congress in Pyongyang, which began the day before. Kim also reportedly said North Korea will faithfully fulfill its nuclear nonproliferation obligations and make an effort to realize global denuclearization. In his 15-minute opening speech Friday, Kim touted the country's weapons development, saying they had "elevated our respect to the world and enemies."

We are on the brink of an arms race in SCS

Gabriel Domínguez, Srinivas Mazumdaru, Dec 2015 [Deutsche Welle (DW) is Germany's international broadcaster, "Are South China Sea tensions triggering an arms race?," DW,

<http://www.dw.com/en/are-south-china-sea-tensions-triggering-an-arms-race/a-18927467>] MJS
12-22-2016

As tensions mount in the Asia Pacific, countries in the region are pouring more and more money into modernizing their militaries, concludes a new report by analytics firm IHS. The paper's authors estimate that the nations' collective defense spending will jump from \$435 billion in 2015 to around \$533 billion by 2020, meaning the region is set to account for a third of entire global military spending within the next five years.

The projection comes just days after the commander of the US Pacific Fleet, Scott Swift, warned of a possible arms race that could engulf the area. Asia Pacific countries are embroiled in a slew of territorial spats, particularly over the South China Sea (SCS), a key waterway through which over \$5 trillion of global maritime trade passes every year. China claims most of the SCS, arguing that it is asserting its so-called "historic rights" to maritime resources in the area. This has led to territorial feuds with neighboring nations such as Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia which lay competing claims. **There are, indeed, strong indications that tensions over the SCS are in danger of provoking a full-scale regional arms race.** This became evident in the latest defense spending statistics, which indicate that, of the ten countries globally whose defense budgets grew fastest in 2015, four are states bordering the SCS. These are the Philippines, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam **"The driver of this arms race is a classic security dilemma. That is, the attempt by one country to increase its own security by increasing its military strength** has the effect of creating insecurity in neighboring states," James D. J. Brown, an expert on international affairs at Temple University's campus in Tokyo, told DW. **These neighbors then respond by increasing their own military capabilities, thereby neutralizing any advantage initially gained by the first country. Further increases in military strength then follow, creating a spiral of insecurity and a dangerous arms race.** In the case of the SCS, experts such as Brown argue that **this security dilemma has been sparked by China's increased assertiveness in defending what it views as its vital national interests.** The biggest fear, Wezeman warns, is that with more and more arms in the area, the chance of opposing forces meeting each other under conditions of tension, pride and unclear rules of engagement becomes greater. Although **the US** has no direct territorial claims in the SCS, it **plays a key role in the dispute, given its political, commercial and defense interests in the area.** Washington, for instance, has vowed to continue sending military aircraft and ships near China's artificial islands in the SCS to assert navigation rights in this commercially important waterway.

Doubling down on spending will create arms race, new cold war, kills coop

Michael **Swaine**, Joseph Prueher, J. Stapleton Roy, Paul Heer, David Lampton, Ezra Vogel, **December 12, 2016** [Swaine is a senior fellow, "How America Can Lead in Asia," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/12/12/how-america-can-lead-in-asia-pub-66428>] MJS 12-22-2016

The security imperatives of China and the United States are potentially, but not inherently, incompatible. They become incompatible only if neither side is willing to accommodate, in some fashion, to the other's fundamental interests.

The solution is not for the **United States to double down militarily, spending vast amounts of money** in a futile attempt to remain militarily predominant across all of maritime East Asia. **Such an approach would be virtually certain to result in an intensifying arms race and political rivalry with Beijing that would undermine the basis for vital Sino-U.S. cooperation in other areas.** At worst, **it could generate a new Cold War** that benefits no one.

Washington also needs to adapt its security posture in the region to one that the U.S. economy can sustain, and the U.S. polity can endorse, especially given America's myriad domestic priorities.

Arms race causes 2x chance of militarized interstate dispute (MID), chance of war up 5x

Rider 2000 [Toby J. Rider at the Department of Political Science at Texas Tech University, "Taking Arms Against a Sea of Troubles: Conventional Arms Races During Periods of Rivalry." World Bank, 2000. Web. 1 Dec. 2016. <<http://saramitchell.org/Gibleretal.pdf>>] //CJC

In addition to escalation, **arms races seem to have an important substantive impact on the likelihood of conflict**, especially in comparison with the other variables in our models. For example, as Table II shows, **the chance of a MID for strategic rivals more than doubles, from 16% on average to 35% during an arms race year, and the chance of war changes from 1 in 100 to 1 in 20 during arms race years.** These results are especially dramatic in comparison with the two other variables that are statistically significant across both models – contiguity increases the probability of both types of conflict by just over 23%, and an alliance decreases these probabilities by more than half.

Security Umbrellas Are Bad

Ben Friedman, (Cato Institute), "Why the U.S. Military Budget is 'Foolish and Sustainable'", Spring 2012

<https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/articles/logan-friendman-obis-spring-2012.pdf>

The argument that U.S. alliances are necessary for stability and global commerce is only slightly more credible. **One problem with this claim is that U.S. security guarantees can create moral hazard—emboldening weak allies to take risks they would otherwise avoid in their dealings with neighbors. Alliances can then discourage accommodation among neighboring states, heightening instability and threatening to pull the United States into wars facilitated by its benevolence.** Another point against this argument is that even if

regional balancing did lead to war, it would not obviously be more costly to the U.S. economy than the cost of the alliance said to prevent it. **Neutrality historically pays.10 The larger problem with the idea that our alliances are justified by the balancing they prevent is that wars generally require more than the mutual fear that arms competition provokes.**

Namely, there is usually a territorial conflict or a state bent on conflict. Historical examples of arms races alone causing wars are few.¹¹ This confusion probably results from misconstruing the causes of World War I—seeing it as a consequence of mutual fear alone rather than fear produced by the proximity of territorially ambitious states.

Military Innovation Sucks

Andrews 2016 [Lena, “Five Costs of Military Innovation,” *War on The Rocks*. Accessed at: <https://warontherocks.com/2016/02/five-costs-of-military-innovation/>.] //DNP

Lena is a senior program specialist at the United States Institute for Peace

1. Effectiveness

Too often overlooked in conversations about innovation, both in the military and elsewhere, is the natural, predictable, and sometimes **crippling tradeoff between innovation and effectiveness.** In the business literature on innovation, this is often referred to as the explore-exploit dilemma. Put simply, organizations which are good at “exploring” (i.e. innovating), tend to make significant sacrifices in “exploitation” (i.e. everyday production and efficiency). In other words, **the very things that make an organization good at innovating — nonhierarchical structures, hands-off management techniques, nontraditional professional development and rewards, etc. — can be liabilities when it comes to consistent execution.** The holy grail is thus to balance exploration and exploitation, a feat which only a handful of businesses can claim to have achieved.

In the military, this challenge is **doubly problematic.** First, in a world of constrained resources, **innovation and change** in one area can often **undermine the military’s ability to deliver on other mission sets.** It should therefore come as little surprise that **investments in the third offset may weaken our ability to successfully carry out other missions,** and this trade-off should explicitly be part of the discussion. For example, after a decade of investing in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare capabilities, the third offset may very well mean that these new skills are left to atrophy as resources move elsewhere.

Second, the explore-exploit tradeoff has costs that are far more consequential in the military than in the private sector. For the private sector, the success and failure of innovation is measured in dollars. For the military, **success and failure is measured in battlefield effectiveness and, sometimes, lives.** Thus, while investing in new technologies may leave Google or Amazon strapped for cash, **the costs of shifting investment priorities in the defense community are on a different scale entirely.** We therefore need to acknowledge and understand where innovation will make us stronger and where it will make us weaker, so we can avoid sending our troops into situations where they are ill-equipped for the task at hand.

2. Vulnerability

Innovations are, by definition, new. This is precisely what makes them so exciting and effective — especially in the military context where surprise can lead to significant battlefield gains.

But for all of the new capabilities that come with innovative technologies and doctrines, we often forget the vulnerabilities that accompany new technologies. Take the Internet, for example. It enables us to undertake crippling cyberattacks against our adversaries, but it also exposes the United States to significant risk.

Similarly, while the push towards unmanned weaponry and greater automation in the defense sector provides the U.S. military with unparalleled intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and strike capabilities at low risk to U.S. lives, the increased reliance on satellites required by these platforms creates a new — and often underappreciated — set of challenges. As Jacquelyn Schneider notes, **the United States' increasing reliance on cyber capabilities creates a "capability-vulnerability paradox."** While U.S. investments in cyber-technologies might allow the military to conduct strikes further away from the battlefield and with greater effectiveness, **the increased dependence on satellite relay nodes, intelligence infrastructure, and GPS communication create new opportunities for attack.**

In short, **new capabilities create new vulnerabilities**, and we should not be too sanguine about the risks attached to the high-tech advances envisaged by the third offset. This is especially so in a world where interoperability challenges, jamming, cyberattacks, and counter-stealth technologies are a persistent and growing threat.

3. Financial

As a purely practical matter, the financial costs of innovation should not be lost on the architects of these reforms. After all, there is a reason why many start-ups fail — **innovation can be capital- and time-intensive, and there is no guarantee that the product will ultimately prove viable when it makes it to the market.** For every successful innovation there are many ideas, prototypes, and alternatives that never make it off of the cutting room floor. And even when they do, long time horizons means that costs can add up.

Those in the defense R&D and procurement communities know this fact all too well. Indeed, the **cost overruns associated with developing new military technologies** have become par for the course in most major U.S. military acquisitions of recent years, **as the lack of truly competitive bidding and tendency toward over-commitment have exploded acquisitions costs.** But in addition to the standard reasons for the overruns that often accompany defense acquisitions, the **technologies of the third offset will likely involve advanced, proprietary, and even covert technologies, all of which can result in a big price tag and offer little guarantee of long-term utility.**

As Stephen Rodriguez highlighted here at *War on the Rocks*, the last attempt at technological offset came with some incredibly expensive budgetary casualties, and there is no reason to think this time will be any different. To be fair, some leaders at DoD are well aware of the financial costs of the third offset, and many will be mitigated by savings accrued from other, more successful innovations. Nevertheless, we should not be naïve about the material costs that this initiative will require.

4. Culture of Hierarchy

There are many reasons we should expect the military to resist major innovation. As James Q. Wilson and Barry Posen have pointed out elsewhere: Organizations are created to minimize uncertainty, change inherently introduces uncertainty, and thus we should not be surprised when organizations resist change. Some of this resistance is unnecessary, and hampers the military when it attempts to introduce valuable new technologies. However, it is important to remember that, perhaps more than any other organization in the world, the military relies on a culture of order, discipline, and hierarchy — formalized in the military chain of command — in order to perform its duties well. And so while innovation may be critical in some areas of the military, the benefits of decentralized, independent thinking must always be weighed against the risks of degrading the military hierarchy — a difficult balance to strike for even the most modern militaries. Of course, challenging hierarchy is not always bad, and innovation on the battlefield can also save lives. Nevertheless, we should not overestimate the value of innovation at the expense of overlooking the critical importance of hierarchy and structure to U.S. military effectiveness.

5. Strategic-Tactical

Perhaps the most understood risk of the innovations that will come with the defense reforms of recent months is the risk of “putting the technology cart before the strategy horse,” as Jon Czarnekcki so pithily put it. Indeed, the contributors at [War on the Rocks](#) have led the way in assessing how **technological innovation absent complementary strategic, doctrinal, and organizational change is both useless and potentially counterproductive to political and national security ends.** Technology can enable significant war-fighting gains, but rarely does it induce revolutionary change alone. Military officials are well aware of this, but their civilian bosses often need reminding that investments in technology must accompany investments in training and exercises.

Trump Doesn't Want to Spend Money on Allies

Kottasova, 2016 [Ivana Kottasova, “Reality Check: Trump on NATO countries paying their fair share”, *CNN Politics*, <http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/27/politics/donald-trump-nato-allies/>] //AKC

Donald Trump continued his calls Wednesday for NATO countries to contribute more to the alliance, and CNN's Reality Check Team looked into his claim.

Speaking in Doral, Florida, Trump said, **"I think NATO's great. But it's got to be modernized. And countries that we're protecting have to pay what they're supposed to be paying."**

It's a position that Trump has stated several times before, saying **he believes that the US is getting "ripped off" and that some NATO members are getting an unfair "free ride."**

CNNMoney reported on NATO payments earlier this month, when the alliance's members met to discuss a number of issues, including money.

Trump crushes Asian stability — comparatively larger internal link.

Vu 16 — Khang Vu, Analyst from New London, New Hampshire who studies International Relations, China, and International Political Economy, 2016 (“Why A Trump Presidency Would Be Bad For Asia,” *The Diplomat*, April 7th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/why-a-trump-presidency-would-be-bad-for-asia/>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

As the race to the White House is heating up, Asian countries are paying close attention to the candidates' foreign policy platforms. For the last few weeks, international headlines have focused on Donald Trump's vision of a nuclearized Northeast Asia and his proposal to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea and Japan if the two countries do not contribute more to the alliance. For the most part, scholars and strategists have denounced Trump's plan. However, despite these negative remarks, primary results have shown that Trump is undoubtedly the Republican front-runner for the presidency. Even though the final result of the presidential campaign is not decided until November, Trump's negative impacts on Asia are too clear to be ignored.

Trump's foreign policy can be broken down into three main components. First, he **seeks to limit** the scope of U.S. **foreign policy**, from a major international player **to an isolationist**. Second,

Trump wants to withdraw U.S. commitment to America's East Asian allies, at the potential cost of Japan and South Korea acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And third, Trump wants to conduct foreign policy as a form of doing business, which means America must get benefits from any relationship with another country. A thorough examination at each of these components will provide a comprehensive look at potential consequences of Trump's policies towards Asia.

First, the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy since the end of World War II has always been the desire to construct and safeguard a liberal world order that every country is required to adhere to. Widespread U.S. interventions into global issues have strengthened the foundation for such a rule-based political order, and the presence of the United States has constrained the rise of new non-Western countries that seek to upset international standards and norms. Unfortunately, a Trump presidency is likely to pull America out of its role, giving rising powers like China greater leeway to impose its vision of order on neighboring countries. Moreover, such a decline in U.S. influence will send a dangerous signal to its East Asian allies that America is no longer willing to come to their defense, prompting them to resort to necessary security measures in order to make up for the loss of American commitment.

As a consequence of American isolationism, Trump has suggested withdrawing troops from South Korea and Japan and allowing the two countries to develop their own nuclear weapons. Trump's intention is based on two major assumptions. First, upgrading and maintaining a large, modern conventional force is not an effective deterrent compared to developing a nuclear capability. Second, allowing South Korea and Japan to have nukes will relieve America of its responsibility as a "nuclear umbrella," preventing the U.S. from engaging in a nuclear war with North Korea.

Carafano, 2010 [James Carafano, "Top 10 Reasons to NOT Put Defense Spending 'On the Table'", *The Daily Signal*,

<http://dailysignal.com/2010/12/01/top-10-reasons-to-not-put-defense-spending-on-the-table/>] //AKC

#6. Defense cuts would mean a whole lot less defense. **What primarily make defense spending inefficient are overly prescriptive laws, particular demands, and whipsaw policies established by Congress. When the budget is cut, the inefficiencies Congress created in the past don't automatically make go away.** In fact, since they are still there, trying to do more with less becomes even more difficult and far less efficient. The American taxpayers would be paying for all the inefficiencies without getting much capability in return.

Eaglen, 2011 [Mackenzie Eaglen, "How to Save Money, Reform Processes, and Increase Efficiency in the Defense Department", *The Heritage Foundation*, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/01/how-to->

[save-money-reform-processes-and-increase-efficiency-in-the-defense-department](#)] //AKC

The 112th Congress should use the best recommendations from various proposals and continue to pursue savings from within the defense budget in order to reinvest funds into modernizing all of the services. Five select packages of reforms promise to generate significant fiscal savings and government efficiencies while minimizing the increases in risk to national security:

1. Continuing and expanding select efficiencies initiatives undertaken by Secretary Gates,
2. Implementing and expanding select reforms recommended by the Fiscal Commission co-chairmen,
3. Expanding the use of public–private partnerships for performance-based logistics,
4. Modernizing base operations and the maintenance and supply systems, and
5. Reducing wear and tear on military equipment and increasing the use of multiyear contracts and block upgrades.

Making defense operations more efficient will not automatically produce savings, allowing further reductions in defense budgets. Whereas managers generally have incentives to improve efficiency in the private sector, there are typically fewer incentives for efficiency and good management in government.

For example, between FY 2002 and FY 2005, man-days of ship depot maintenance and days out of service per ship declined dramatically. The improvement in efficiency should have allowed the Navy to reduce maintenance manpower, save more than 12 percent of its maintenance budget, and redirect these savings toward procurement or some other urgent priority. However, analysts note that changes in efficiency norms do not appear to have entered the budgeting process. **Instead of decreasing to reflect greater efficiency, the maintenance budget increased each year during that period.**

Krugman, 2015 [Paul Krugman, “The case for cuts was a lie. Why does Britain still believe it? The austerity delusion”, *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/business/ng-interactive/2015/apr/29/the-austerity-delusion>] //AKC

In May 2010, as Britain headed into its last general election, elites all across the western world were gripped by austerity fever, a strange malady that combined extravagant fear with blithe

optimism. Every country running significant budget deficits – as nearly all were in the aftermath of the financial crisis – was deemed at imminent risk of becoming another Greece unless it immediately began cutting spending and raising taxes. Concerns that imposing such austerity in already depressed economies would deepen their depression and delay recovery were airily dismissed; fiscal probity, we were assured, would inspire business-boosting confidence, and all would be well.

People holding these beliefs came to be widely known in economic circles as “austerians” – a term coined by the economist Rob Parenteau – and for a while the austere ideology swept all before it.

But that was five years ago, and the fever has long since broken.

Greece is now seen as it should have been seen from the beginning – as a unique case, with few lessons for the rest of us.

It is impossible for countries such as the US and the UK, which borrow in their own currencies, to experience Greek-style crises, because they cannot run out of money – they can always print more. Even within the eurozone, borrowing costs plunged once the European Central Bank began to do its job and protect its clients against self-fulfilling panics by standing ready to buy government bonds if necessary. As I write this, Italy and Spain have no trouble raising cash – they can borrow at the lowest rates in their history, indeed considerably below those in Britain – and even Portugal’s interest rates are within a whisker of those paid by HM Treasury.

...

I don’t know how many Britons realise the extent to which their economic debate has diverged from the rest of the western world – **the extent to which the UK seems stuck on obsessions that have been mainly laughed out of the discourse elsewhere.** George Osborne and David Cameron boast that their policies saved Britain from a Greek-style crisis of soaring interest rates, apparently oblivious to the fact that interest rates are at historic lows all across the western world. The press seizes on Ed Miliband’s failure to mention the budget deficit in a speech as a huge gaffe, a supposed revelation of irresponsibility; meanwhile, Hillary Clinton is talking, seriously, not about budget deficits but about the “fun deficit” facing America’s children.

...

The doctrine of “expansionary austerity” is largely associated with work by Alberto Alesina, an economist at Harvard. Alesina used statistical techniques that supposedly identified all large fiscal policy changes in advanced countries between 1970 and 2007, and claimed to find evidence that spending cuts, in particular, were often “associated with economic expansions rather than recessions”. The reason, he and those who seized on his work suggested, was that spending cuts create confidence, and that the positive effects of this increase in confidence trump the direct negative effects of reduced spending.

This may sound too good to be true – and it was. But policymakers knew what they wanted to hear, so it was, as Business Week put it, “Alesina’s hour”. The doctrine of expansionary austerity quickly became orthodoxy in much of Europe. “The idea that austerity measures could trigger stagnation is incorrect,” declared Jean-Claude Trichet, then the president of the European Central Bank, because “confidence-inspiring policies will foster and not hamper economic recovery”.

Besides, everybody knew that terrible things would happen if debt went above 90% of GDP.

Growth in a Time of Debt, the now-infamous 2010 paper by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard University that claimed that 90% debt is a critical threshold, arguably played much less of a direct role in the turn to austerity than Alesina’s work. After all, austerians didn’t need Reinhart and Rogoff to provide dire scenarios about what could happen if deficits weren’t reined in – they had the Greek crisis for that. At most, the Reinhart and Rogoff paper provided a backup bogeyman, an answer to those who kept pointing out that nothing like the Greek story seemed to be happening to countries that borrowed in their own currencies: even if interest rates were low, austerians could point to Reinhart and Rogoff and declare that high debt is very, very bad.

What Reinhart and Rogoff did bring to the austerity camp was academic cachet. Their 2009 book *This Time is Different*, which brought a vast array of historical data to bear on the subject of economic crises, was widely celebrated by both policymakers and economists – myself included – for its prescient warnings that we were at risk of a major crisis and that recovery from that crisis was likely to be slow. So they brought a lot of prestige to the austerity push when they were perceived as weighing in on that side of the policy debate. (They now claim that they did no such thing, but they did nothing to correct that impression at the time.)

When the coalition government came to power, then, all the pieces were in place for policymakers who were already inclined to push for austerity. Fiscal retrenchment could be presented as urgently needed to avert a Greek-style strike by bond buyers. “Greece stands as a warning of what happens to countries that lose their credibility, or whose governments pretend that difficult decisions can somehow be avoided,” declared David Cameron soon after taking office. It could also be presented as urgently needed to stop debt, already almost 80% of GDP, from crossing the 90% red line. In a 2010 speech laying out his plan to eliminate the deficit, Osborne cited Reinhart and Rogoff by name, while declaring that “soaring government debt ... is very likely to trigger the next crisis.” Concerns about delaying recovery could be waved away with an appeal to positive effects on confidence. **Economists who objected to any or all of these lines of argument were simply ignored.**

But that was, as **I said, five years ago.**

Again, some economists argued from the beginning that all the talk of expansionary austerity was foolish – back in 2010 I dubbed it belief in the “confidence fairy”, a term that seems to have stuck. **But why did the alleged statistical evidence – from Alesina, among others – that spending cuts were often good for growth prove so misleading?**

The answer, it turned out, was that it wasn't very good statistical work. A review by the IMF found that the methods Alesina used in an attempt to identify examples of sharp austerity produced many misidentifications. For example, in 2000 Finland's budget deficit dropped sharply thanks to a stock market boom, which caused a surge in government revenue – but Alesina mistakenly identified this as a major austerity programme. **When the IMF laboriously put together a new database of austerity measures derived from actual changes in spending and tax rates, it found that austerity has a consistently negative effect on growth.**

Yet even the IMF's analysis fell short – as the institution itself eventually acknowledged. I've already explained why: most historical episodes of austerity took place under conditions very different from those confronting western economies in 2010. For example, when Canada began a major fiscal retrenchment in the mid-1990s, interest rates were high, so the Bank of Canada could offset fiscal austerity with sharp rate cuts – not a useful model of the likely results of austerity in economies where interest rates were already very low. In 2010 and 2011, IMF projections of the effects of austerity programmes assumed that those effects would be similar to the historical average. But a 2013 paper co-authored by the organisation's chief economist concluded that under post-crisis conditions the true effect had turned out to be nearly three times as large as expected.

So much, then, for invisible bond vigilantes and faith in the confidence fairy. What about the backup bogeyman, the Reinhart-Rogoff claim that there was a red line for debt at 90% of GDP? **Well, in early 2013 researchers at the University of Massachusetts examined the data behind the Reinhart-Rogoff work. They found that the results were partly driven by a spreadsheet error.** More important, the results weren't at all robust: using standard statistical procedures rather than the rather odd approach Reinhart and Rogoff used, or adding a few more years of data, caused the 90% cliff to vanish. What was left was a modest negative correlation between debt and growth, and there was good reason to believe that in general slow growth causes high debt, not the other way around.

By about two years ago, then, the entire edifice of austere economics had crumbled. Events had utterly failed to play out as the austere predicted, while the academic research that allegedly supported the doctrine had withered under scrutiny. Hardly anyone has admitted being wrong – hardly anyone ever does, on any subject – but quite a few prominent austere now deny having said what they did, in fact, say. The doctrine that ruled the world in 2010 has more or less vanished from the scene.

Amadeo, 2016 [Kimberly is President of WorldMoneyWatch.com. She has 20 years senior-level experience in economic analysis and business strategy working for major international , "U.S. Military Budget: Components, Challenges, Growth", October 26, 2016 <https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-military-budget-components-challenges-growth-3306320>] PP

DoD Tries to Save Money, But Congress Won't Let It

The **Defense Department knows it needs to become more efficient. It now spends a third of its budget on personnel and maintenance. That will rise to 100% by 2024, thanks to retirement and medical costs.** That leaves no funds for procurement, research and development, construction, or housing. These necessary support programs now take up more than a third of DoD's budget. (Source: "[Pay Will Swallow DoD Budget by 2024](#)," Center for Strategy and Budgetary Assessments, April 8, 2013.)

Congress is also reluctant to allow DoD to cut other costs, like military health benefits and the growth of military pay. It recently gave service-members a 1% pay increase, but cut the cost-of-living-adjustment by 1% for veterans who retire before age 62. However, disabled veterans and surviving families had the cut re-instated. (Source: "[House Quickly OKs Bipartisan Budget Deal](#)," Stars and Stripes, December 12, 2013. "[Disabled Veterans Get Back Pension Raises](#)," CNN, January 14, 2014.)

Sequestration would have cut defense spending by \$487 billion in ten years if it had continued. However, many Congressmen said the cuts would jeopardize national security. They were particularly concerned about a cutback of about 100,000 troops, closure of domestic military bases, and termination of some weapons systems -- all of which would have cost jobs and revenue in their districts. **That's why defense spending is the only budget area that rarely gets focused on as an area to cut.** (Source: "[Lawmakers Skeptical of Cuts in 2013 Defense Budget](#)," Reuters, February 15, 2012.)

Analysis: congress will never let the military remove inefficient spending because while it doesn't help the military it helps politicians to create jobs n such à either they'll never get efficient or if they do they'll only be able to justify maintaining current capabilities, not increasing them.

Thompson, 2011 [Loren Thompson, "Defense Cuts Could Destroy A Million Jobs", *Forbes*, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2011/09/19/defense-cuts-could-destroy-a-million-jobs/#5209f5f67164>] //AKC

What's wrong with the picture is that Washington is wasting a lot of time and energy trying to implement contradictory measures that will cancel each other out in terms of their impact on the economy. The Budget Control Act signed by

the president in August could result in cuts to defense totaling \$100 billion annually for nine straight years beginning in fiscal 2013, and similarly sizable cuts to domestic programs. In a moment, **I'll illustrate how the defense cuts by themselves could wipe out a million jobs, many of them high-paying tech positions in areas related to exports and innovation.**

An especially troubling aspect of the present situation is that the cuts mandated by the Budget Control Act to reduce deficits could grow bigger if the president's jobs bill passes, because the special committee would need to find additional savings to cover the price-tag for its package of tax changes and targeted spending. So in the current environment where legislators are trying to cut deficits and stimulate the economy at the same time, the government could end up destroying many thousands of good jobs to create lots of not-so-good jobs in areas like construction. What kind of a tradeoff is that?

So let's do the math. **The number of jobs created by defense spending varies depending on the nature of the activity and how much each job pays, but it's a safe bet that at least one direct job is created for every \$200,000 in spending. Thus, the \$100 billion in annual military spending cuts that might be spawned by deficit-control legislation potentially accounts for 500,000 direct jobs.** But that's just the beginning, because numerous additional jobs are created in retail, construction, education and other pursuits as defense workers spend their income. Analysts argue endlessly about what this economic multiplier effect might be, however a very conservative guess would be **that each direct job leads to the creation of at least one indirect job (the real number is probably over twice that).** So even a restrained analysis suggests that **\$100 billion in defense cuts will wipe out a million jobs.**

Forward presence is key to effective deterrence

Jonathan Solomon 14, a senior systems and technology analyst for Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc., a former US Navy surface warfare officer, holds an MA from the Georgetown University Security Studies Program and a BA in international relations from Boston University, "Conventional Deterrence Requires Forward Presence," 10-14-2014, <http://www.informationdissemination.net/2014/10/conventional-deterrence-requires.html>, DOA: 6-11-2015, y2k

Whereas punishment can be delivered credibly and efficiently from a distance, **conventional deterrent forces can only effectively impose denial—and** thereby **achieve credibility—when they are positioned forward**. This does not mean the bulk of the defender's forces must be positioned at the border with the opponent, let alone within a probable contested zone. Granted, the political objective of not ceding highly valued territories or waters to the opponent by default will generally require that some forces be positioned in these places. It is also worth noting there can be some advantages to selective 'frontline' positioning of defensive forces. Strategic advantages might include compelling an aggressor to incur the costs and risks of dislodging those forces; one particularly noteworthy example of this is Thomas Schelling's threat that leaves something (in this case, an ill-controllable escalation process) to chance. Operational-tactical advantages might include the likelihood that an aggressor's own forces would become exposed to interdiction or counterattack once they clashed with the frontline defense. By no means, however, does an entire defense have to be positioned that 'far' forward. Rather, **a credible forward defense is one in which the bulk of the conventional deterrent force is positioned close enough to a potential contested zone** such that they can arrest an aggressor's *operational tempo and progress* in time to prevent a *fait accompli*, if not parry the aggressor's offensive moves altogether. It follows that deterrence credibility weakens if the bulk of a conventional deterrent is positioned beyond a range from which it can fill the above role. As I noted in my SSQ article: **The defender's posture is predicated on** permanently **deploying** adequate **forces within the contested theater**, as the prospective *aggressor's calculus* takes into account the likelihood that reinforcements from outside the theater, not to mention the defender's overall national military-economic potential, cannot be sufficiently mobilized in mass and time—even if it recognized and rapidly acted upon strategic warning of War (a historical rarity)—to prevent *the aggressor's first moves* from securing either a formidable operational advantage or a *fait accompli* decision. **This does not mean transoceanic** airlift and **strike assets** cannot play important roles in buttressing the defender's in-theater deterrent, **but the tyrannies of distance, fuel, payload volume, and time grant** in-theater forces **far greater credibility for denying desired spoils**. Relatedly, **movements of token forces** toward the crisis zone **to signal resolve**, or the use of token "tripwire" forces in the crisis zone for the same purpose, **are unlikely to do much to enhance credibility** if the potential aggressor perceives at least one conventional option exists that the defender's overall in-theater forces do not appear capable of foreclosing. (Pg. 119)

Interventions against genocide never have the political support

Chaim Kaufmann, 2002 [Associate Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, "See No Evil: Why America Doesn't Stop Genocide," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2002-07-01/see-no-evil-why-america-doesnt-stop-genocide>] MJS 1-3-2017

Samantha Power's disturbing book suggests that the question is more complex. **Through a series of careful historical case studies, Power, a former Balkan war correspondent, traces the development of the concept of genocide from the Turkish campaign against the Armenians in 1915 to the present -- along with the repeated failure of the world, and**

particularly the United States, to prevent such horrors. She argues that **this pattern is due** not to public or elite indifference to the idea of moral responsibility, nor to a lack of timely warning or feasible intervention options, but rather **to structural features of the American political system. Under normal circumstances,** she shows, **American officials face stronger incentives to avoid action against genocide than to stop it.** Power's book will likely become the standard text on genocide prevention because it thoroughly debunks the usual excuses for past failures, while offering a persuasive framework that can help predict future outcomes and suggest policy responses. It is also engaging and well written; together with the awful fascination of the subject, this should be enough to guarantee that it will be widely read by both students and policymakers.

The crucial puzzle at the heart of Power's book is why **the Clinton administration,** which entered office more committed to humanitarian intervention and a moral foreign policy than any U.S. administration since World War II, **wound up standing by and watching two genocides.** Bill Clinton campaigned on the first Bush administration's failure to contain the genocide in Bosnia and staffed his foreign policy bureaucracies with long-standing advocates of "moralpolitik." Yet for more than two years his administration did little about Bosnia until it was embarrassed into stronger action after the Srebrenica massacre of Bosnian Muslims in 1995. And in opposing Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, U.S. action was fairly prompt but woefully inadequate until British Prime Minister Tony Blair dragged Clinton into committing to defeat the Serbian army on the ground.

The most egregious failure, however, was the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Of all genocides since World War II this would perhaps have been the easiest to stop, and yet the United States not only did not halt the killing but actively prevented other willing powers from taking effective action. After Hutu soldiers murdered ten Belgian peacekeepers on April 7, 1994, the Belgian government made it clear to the United States that it would pull its troops out unless the UN presence in Rwanda was reinforced. The United States advised pulling out and also played a decisive role in persuading the UN Security Council to cut the strength of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) from 2,500 to 500 just two weeks after the genocide began. As a result, more than 800,000 people died between April and July 1994. Continuing civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Rwanda, partly sparked by the Rwandan genocide, have led to at least another two million deaths.

The causal chain, though frustrating, is reasonably straightforward. **The rest of the world does not act because the United States does not. The United States does not act, in turn, because public support for humanitarian intervention is diffuse and rarely mobilized.** Absent clear demonstrations that the public supports intervention, the military is unwilling. Partly because of the military's position, the political right is opposed. Because the political right is opposed, presidents are cautious and believe that pushing for action cannot benefit them politically but can only cost them. Because presidents do not favor humanitarian action, finally, career foreign policy and national security officials learn that strong advocacy of it is both unlikely to succeed and bad for their job prospects. The result is that humanitarian disasters

have a hard time even getting on an administration's agenda, let alone generating momentum for action.

One-sided military interventions shift the balance of power and causes the threatened actor to kill 25-40% more civilians

Wood 2012 [Reed Wood, professor of politics and global studies, "Armed intervention and civilian victimization in intrastate conflicts", *Journal of Peace Research*, <http://www.public.asu.edu/~rmwood4/woodkathgent_jpr.pdf>] //CJC

Research has begun to examine the relationship between changes in the conflict environment and levels of civilian victimization. We extend this work by examining the effect of external armed intervention on the decisions of governments and insurgent organizations to victimize civilians during civil wars. We theorize that changes in the balance of power in an intrastate conflict influence combatant strategies of violence. **As a conflict actor weakens relative to its adversary, it employs increasingly violent tactics toward the civilian population** as a means of reshaping the strategic landscape to its benefit. The reason for this is twofold. First, **declining capabilities increase resource needs at the moment that extractive capacity is in decline.** Second, **declining capabilities inhibit control and policing, making less violent means of defection deterrence more difficult.** **As both resource extraction difficulties and internal threats increase, actors' incentives for violence against the population increase.** To the extent that **biased military interventions shift the balance of power between conflict actors, we argue that they alter actor incentives to victimize civilians.** Specifically, intervention should reduce the level of violence employed by the supported faction and increase the level employed by the opposed faction. We test these arguments using data on civilian casualties and armed intervention in intrastate conflicts from 1989 to 2004. Our results support our expectations, suggesting that interventions shift the power balance and affect the levels of violence employed by combatants.

[...]

To examine the substantive significance of this relationship we simulate the expected level of one-sided rebel violence for changes in the balance of intervention forces. 15 As Figure 1 demonstrates, **when the balance of intervention forces shifts to favor the rebels** (positive movements along the x-axis toward "0" or parity), **the group reduces its use of anti-civilian violence.** Conversely, **as the balance shifts against them, the rebels increase violence.** Specifically, **a one standard deviation decrease in the intervention variable from parity (i.e., an intervention of 1,293 troops in favor of the government in a conflict with no previous intervention) raises the expected number of civilians killed by insurgents from 107 to 134—an increase of 25%.** Intervention clearly has a substantial effect on the scale of one-sided rebel violence. [FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Now consider the analysis of government violence presented in the third column of Table 1. The intervention ratio variable has a positive and statistically significant effect on the level of one-sided government violence. Thus, as the size of a rebel intervention increases relative to the size of a government intervention, governments target civilians in greater numbers. This result also indicates that interventions favoring the government over rebel forces decrease the regime's use of anti-civilian violence, providing further support for our hypothesis. Figure 2 reports simulation estimates to demonstrate the substantive effects of the relationship. **From parity, a one standard deviation increase in the intervention variable (i.e., a 1,398 troop intervention in favor of the rebels in a conflict with no previous intervention) increases the expected**

number of annual civilian killings by government forces from 73 to 102, nearly a 40% increase. 15 All simulations were performed using Clarify in Stata 11 (King, Tomz & Wittenberg, 2000). Simulations were conducted with all continuous independent variables at their means and dichotomous variables at their modal values, assuming that actors perpetrated one-sided rebel violence in the previous year. 22 government violence. These results demonstrate that **shifts in the power balance by external military interveners contribute to changes in the use of violence.**

US intervention empirically makes civil wars last longer

Sambanis 2000 [Nicholas Sambanis is a writer and researcher for the World Bank. "External Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars." World Bank, 2000.

<<https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/373430892.pdf>>] //CJC

Out of 138 intra-state conflicts since 1944, 89 attracted external interventions by at least one external third party. Within the 89 cases, if repeated interventions were taken into account the total number of interventions amounts to 190, of which 76 were accounted for by major powers. **The countries with the dubious distinction of having the highest number of interventions are: USA (35), Former USSR/Russia (16), France (10), UK (9), China (6) and Cuba (5).** Out of the 190 interventions, only 57 have led to an end in the fighting. External interventions are associated with longer-lasting wars. A scatter diagram of war duration and external interventions during 1960-99 for all countries that have experienced civil wars reveals an upward-sloping relationship (Figure 3.B). Moreover, **the mean duration of civil wars that were terminated and which had external interventions was nine years; while those wars that were terminated but did not have an intervention had a mean duration of only 1.5 years.**"

Our defense trumps their means and motives warrants—all ev goes neg

Fitzpatrick, 16—Executive Director, IISS-Americas (Mark, *Asia's Latent Nuclear Powers* pg 109, dml)

That Japan has remained a non-nuclear-weapons state throughout the post-war period, despite having both the *capabilities* and the *presumptive motivations*, points to the *strength of the enduring constraints*. The reasons Japan did not seek nuclear weapons *at any time over the past 50 years* remain dispositive today. As *every internal study* over the years has found, the *social, political, economic and strategic factors* all continue to *weigh heavily against nuclearisation*. Citing these reasons, former US State Department Japan expert Kevin Maher said in 2011: "We've *never had any concern* about the Japanese government building a nuclear weapon."¹⁶²

Even if they win the link, internal whistleblowers will put a brake on the nuclear program

Fitzpatrick, 16—Executive Director, IISS-Americas (Mark, *Asia's Latent Nuclear Powers* pg 110-111, dml)

Societal opposition to nuclear weapons is *particularly strong* in the academic and scientific communities, including in the nuclear technology field, which is both *pacifist* and *leak-prone*. If a hawkish prime

minister were to decide nuclear weapons must be built, former Foreign Ministry official Kaneko believes that scientists and engineers would *refuse to go along* and that some would become *whistleblowers*. The openness of Japanese society is the *most effective brake* on a nuclear-weapons programme, he contends.¹⁶⁸ Hymans calls such pacifist scientists and other opponents of nuclearisation “*veto players*”, and notes that Japan has them in *even greater numbers* after Fukushima.¹⁶⁹ This societal transparency, combined with the *highly intrusive IAEA monitoring presence* in Japan, would make it *nigh on impossible* for Japan to pursue a clandestine path to nuclear weapons.

Sure we do!

Fitzpatrick, 16—Executive Director, IISS-Americas (Mark, *Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers* pg 99-100, dml)

If Japan were to go nuclear, it would be the result of a *severe deterioration in its security situation* in the face of a strong threat and a perception that Japan could *no longer count on America’s extended deterrence*. A *breakdown in the global nuclear non-proliferation regime* might add to the motivation. Such a nightmare combination is unlikely in the foreseeable future. And even if one or more of the factors did materialise, nuclearisation is *far from inevitable*. In fact, each of these situations *has arisen to a certain extent* over the past two and a half decades. When the *Soviet threat* disappeared with the end of the Cold War, many Japanese worried that the US would have less reason to extend a defence commitment. *China’s nuclear modernisation* and growing conventional capabilities threaten Japanese security, as does *North Korea’s nuclear posture*. The emergence in Asia of *three new declared nuclear states* since 1998 showed an *unravelling of the non-proliferation order*. And yet Japan has *steadfastly remained non-nuclear*. It looks *set to remain so*.

America’s Asian allies won’t go nuclear

Jang 5/4/16 (Se Young Jang is currently completing her Ph.D. dissertation on U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy towards South Korea from 1953 to 1981, and her research is based on extensive multi-archival research in the United States, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, and South Korea. “Will America’s Asian Allies Go Nuclear?” <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-americas-asian-allies-go-nuclear-16055?page=show/>, AB)

Some policy experts argue that South Korea and Japan would not attempt to join the nuclear club regardless of their level of nuclear capability. The decision to go nuclear would certainly bring a major risk of political and economic isolation. Moreover, as previous U.S. administrations have done, Washington would not simply let them develop their own nuclear weapons. Currently, there is no reason to believe that the United States would risk losing its influence in the region and stand by growing military tension and domino effects caused by nuclear newcomers. *Needless to say, South Korea and Japan, both state parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), would not want to join North Korea as the only country having ever withdrawn from the treaty which they have been upholding for almost half a century. Finally, Japan’s own experience with atomic bombs in the Second World War is another aspect*

to be considered; antinuclear sentiments are deeply rooted in the identity of many Japanese, and the Japanese government might not willingly abandon its position as the only “victim” of a nuclear attack by pursuing nuclear armament.

When it comes to South Korea, it is interesting to note that public opinion about nuclear weapons is clearly divided and sometimes tilts in favor of acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent. According to several polls taken after North Korea's fourth nuclear test, between 52 and 68 percent of respondents were in favor of developing nuclear armament in the South, notwithstanding a decline in public support from 2013. Furthermore, some politicians from conservative circles do not hide their wish to have those weapons in spite of the South Korean government's official support for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. For instance, Chung Mong-joon, a seventh-term lawmaker of the ruling Saenuri Party as well as a son of the founder of the Hyundai Group, is one of the prominent political figures who have continuously opined that South Korea should have its own deterrent. Lately, this pronuclear argument has been reinforced by new supporters, including lawmaker Won Yoo-chul, parliamentary floor leader of the Saenuri Party. At the National Assembly in February, Won stated that “[t]he time has come for us to seriously consider effective and substantial measures of self-defense and deterrence again <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-americas-asian-allies-go-nuclear-16055?page=showst> North Korea,” proposing that South Korea develop its own nuclear arsenal, or that U.S. tactical nuclear weapons be brought back to the South.

In reality, however, the arguments of these politicians would not be implementable even if they gained more traction, because of the legal and technological restrictions imposed on South Korea. One of these restrictions is the U.S.-ROK Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, which prohibits South Korea from reprocessing spent nuclear fuel, while

the South's long lasting efforts to acquire a right to pyroprocess the fuel have a still long way to go. As far as Japan is concerned, its nuclear intentions have not been stated clearly, but its capability to reprocess spent nuclear fuel increasingly concerns the international community. Unlike South Korea, Japan has been allowed to enrich uranium and to reprocess spent fuel under the the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, and has been building the Rokkasho reprocessing plant with the support of French state-owned company Areva since the early 1990s. Even though the plant's opening has been postponed again until 2018 after a series of delays, Japan has accumulated a huge surplus of plutonium stocks. Currently, Japan stockpiles eleven metric tons of plutonium in domestic sites, while another thirty-six metric tons are waiting to be returned to Japan from Britain and France where they have been reprocessed. This is a sufficient amount of plutonium to produce nearly six thousand atomic bombs. On that account, Japan is often regarded as a “latent” nuclear-weapon state. Although 730 pounds of weapons-grade plutonium were transported to the United States in March, this is a tiny portion of Japan's plutonium stocks, and it will not ease international security concerns. The fact that the Japanese cabinet approved a bill to guarantee funding for the reprocessing plant also shows that Tokyo does not intend to reconsider its current policy on the reprocessing of nuclear fuel. As long as Japan continues to pursue reprocessing while maintaining or not significantly reducing its plutonium stockpiles, the United States and Japan will have a hard time justifying their anxieties about China's plans to develop a reprocessing capability. Nuclear weapons programs are generally clandestine by nature. However, the global nonproliferation regime put in place by the NPT is now well established, and significantly affects its member states' decisions.

If any “democratic” state party to the NPT wanted to develop nuclear weapons, that country would be subjected to the double pressure: from the international community, and from domestic opinion. In the cases of South Korea and Japan, it would be a triple pressure, including the U.S. government, their closest ally.

Thus, if the international community intends to prevent further nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia, close consideration should be given to how these three pressures against potential proliferators can be used and coordinated. With the already existing international and bilateral pressure, another key driver discouraging the ROK and Japanese governments from going nuclear will be domestic pressure in the form of either elections or organized public movements.

Korea's recent legislative elections have interesting implications in this regard. One of the reasons that had led some lawmakers from the ruling conservative party to express their pro-nuclear opinion in public early this year was their confidence in victory in the April 2016 election. As President Park Geun-hye and her ruling party had high approval ratings and were expected to overwhelmingly win the legislative election, they were less prudent than usual on such a controversial issue as nuclear armament. The election, however, turned out to be a humiliating defeat for the ruling Saenuri Party; not only did the party lose the parliamentary majority that they had held for sixteen years, but they secured even fewer seats than the main opposition Minjoo Party. This poor result is likely to restrain the attempts of some right-wing politicians to use the North Korean threat for their pronuclear arguments. Furthermore, opposition parties supportive of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula are expected to have a stronger voice in security issues when a new parliamentary term starts at the end of May.

In Japan, the likelihood of opposition parties being able to pressure Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's administration on nuclear policy is more limited because the dominance of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the Diet is not expected to change in the near future. Yet Japanese civil society has nurtured a solid antinuclear culture through its own experiences: the U.S. atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, and the Fukushima disaster in 2011. The antinuclear movements in Japan started in the 1950s, and since then have mostly focused on opposing nuclear arms.

For instance, Hidankyo (the Japan Confederation of A- and H- Bomb Sufferers Organizations) was nominated three times for the Nobel Peace Prize for its invaluable work to prevent a nuclear war and to eliminate nuclear weapons, and Mayors for Peace, initiated by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1982, has also been actively working to raise international awareness about the necessity for the total abolition of nuclear weapons. However, it was not until when the Fukushima disaster happened that antinuclear sentiments, particularly against nuclear power, became popular among ordinary Japanese citizens. In June 2012, Japan witnessed the largest turnout of demonstrators in Tokyo since the 1960s—two hundred thousand people, according to the maximum estimates—in

response to the government's decision to restart Units 3 and 4 at the Oi nuclear power plant.

Even though anti-nuclear power protests seem to have lost their momentum after the pronuclear LDP returned to power at the end of 2012, Japan's once highly motivated anti-nuclear power movements have the potential to grow into a civil movement against Japan's development of nuclear weapons, should the time come. South Korea and Japan would not easily abandon their nuclear ambitions if China and North Korea held their current speed in nuclear proliferation. Demanding that only South Korea and Japan comply with their nonproliferation obligations in Northeast Asia will be increasingly difficult to justify. However, a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia is ultimately in nobody's interest. Together with a variety of international and bilateral efforts to curb the proliferation trend in the region, it is also important to strengthen domestic antinuclear voices that can check and control these governments' decisions on nuclear weapons. As long as South Korea and Japan remain democratic, going nuclear will be a complicated task.

No arms race—tipping point theory is empirically denied

Kang, 15—Professor, International Relations and Business and Director, USC Korean Studies Institute, University of Southern California (David, "IS THERE AN ARMS RACE IN EAST ASIA?", http://www.brookings.edu/~media/events/2015/11/17-east-asia/20151117_asia_arms_race_transcript.pdf, dml)

If it is true, we really need to think about what we are doing. I'm not so sure it is as true as we think it is, and my point there is, what I'm calling a *tipping point*, meaning the idea is that at some point if the U.S. *pulls back*, or if the U.S. is not as involved, there will be a tipping point, and they will step up and do it themselves. We are the cork in the bottle, whatever, so that if we pull out, eventually there will be enough fear, and they will all start arming and fighting with each other. I'm not so convinced there's a tipping point, if there is, it's a much lower tipping point than we think, or higher, or whatever it is. Let me show you what I mean. You guys get the argument, you've heard this argument all the time, right, it's the U.S. defense umbrella, et cetera, et cetera. The question is, if the U.S. weren't there would the region be more unstable? Well, what we know is, that the U.S. pivot started out five years ago, aimed at prioritizing economics -- diplomacy first, economics second, and the military third.

I actually think Obama got it right. I think the region wants a lot of U.S. stuff from the U.S., military being one of the weakest, or the *lowest priority*. After five years we are down to the rebalance essentially being some troops in Darwin, and a couple of ships to the Philippines. And this other stuff is really de-prioritized. But we did that in part because of our military was overstretched and tired from other places. We did it in part because even in East Asia the U.S. presence has decreased dramatically over a generation, which we tend to forget, which is why I talk about the tipping point. So, we had a-half-million troops in 1970, obviously, the height of the Vietnam War. By 1990, 100,000 troops, now we are down to 67,000 troops, so we are at 90 percent reduction in boots on the ground in East Asia, that's a -- you know, you have to go pretty far, if there is no tipping point that -- Well, maybe it's not troops on the ground, boots on the ground. Here is our naval deployment over a generation; 101 service combatants, again, height of the Cold War; 8 carriers. So we are at whatever, 3, roughly a third reduction in aircraft carriers, 60 percent reduction in principal service combatants, et cetera, submarines are still the same.

There is still no question, the United States Military is the most powerful in the world, there is no question, but it does lead to what I think is the real interesting question, is how low would those numbers have to go, if 50 percent doesn't. If 90 percent of troops and 50 percent of service combatants, doesn't prompt any response in East Asia, it's a pretty low tipping point.

Their disad doesn't come close to the threshold required for treaty breakdown

Horowitz, 15—Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich (Liviu, “Beyond Pessimism: Why the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Will Not Collapse,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* Volume 38, Issue 1-2, 2015, pages 126-158, dml)

Finally, even assuming that the rate of proliferation will increase, the question remains: **how many withdrawals are actually necessary to generate a mass exodus, thus terminating the treaty.** Research shows that for every participant in an arrangement, the perceived necessary critical mass of partakers will be different, contingent on a number of specific impetuses. With the departure of some participants, the mass might diminish and reach the threshold for some others. Their departure will cause yet more to abandon the agreement. Ultimately, this process could reach a threshold, beyond which nobody will continue to engage within the **NPT**. While who withdraws would surely play a key role, **there is little reason to believe that a ‘point of no return’ can be reached with less than one-third of the participants abandoning the treaty.**⁷¹ While the withdrawal of a major power would surely hurt the NPT’s attractiveness, it *remains unclear* how, on its own, such a step could *destroy the treaty*. Similarly, multiple withdrawals will surely be damaging to the NPT’s many attributes, but appear *unlikely to be lethal*. **Even NPT analyses that suggest a grim outlook conclude that the critical mass necessary for the non-proliferation norm to decay would most probably be over 20 states.** Given the barriers and limits to reactive proliferation considerations outlined above, the NPT’s demise as a result of proliferation begetting more proliferation seems to be anything but imminent.

Innovation causes technological distortion

United Nations University, n.d. [“The effects of military technology”, *United Nations University*, <http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu38ne/uu38ne0a.htm>] //BS

The development of military technologies has an effect on the direction of technological change that goes beyond the simple diversion of resources from civilian innovation. **A set of factors - basic principles, technological preferences, performance requirements, nature of the demand - have a strong effect on the kind of technologies developed by the military, in ways that have reduced efficiency, slowed down civilian applications and distorted the overall direction of technical change.**

How is it possible to document these effects? **The inefficiency of technological systems developed on the basis of military requirements, in the case of numerically controlled machine tools and nuclear reactors, has been shown by detailed reconstructions of their development and by international comparisons with the same technologies developed on other countries in a civilian environment.**

David Noble has documented how the development in the 1950s of numerically-controlled machine tools at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology with the funds of the US Air Force has led to machinery that offered a strong centralization of control and wide versatility, while ignoring cost constraints: ‘in an effort to meet Air Force specifications therefore, the industry ended up with perhaps the more complex and expensive approach to N/C (numerical control) then available’ (Noble 1984: 203).

Cost constraints have made the application of these machines extremely limited in civilian sectors. In 1978, twenty years after their introduction in 1958, only 2 per cent of metal-working machinery in US manufacturing industry was numerically controlled. Only in the aerospace industry, largely financed by the Defense Department, the ratio was 6 per cent. According to Melman, the military nature of their development ‘probably had the long-term effect of severely retarding the adoption of advanced technology in the

metalworking industry' (Melman 1983: 107). This delay in the diffusion of numerical-control systems allowed Europe and Japan to reduce the advantage of the US in this field, and made easier their successful effort to export their machine tools in the US market.

A second example is that of nuclear power. US nuclear reactors were developed after a strong R&D effort by the US Navy, without exploring alternative designs and without competitive mechanisms, that have led, according to various studies in this field (G. Thompson 1984) to the failure of the industry. In the US, 'the design fostered by the US Navy was heavily promoted by the Atomic Energy Commission, a design flawed in many respects. The consequence, as we have seen in the 1980s, is a wholesale economic disaster compared with the widely held expectations for the technology' (Tirman 1984: 217).

The main current example of the distorting effects of military technology is provided by manufacturing automation. The same tendency towards eliminating the control and presence of production workers that had so deeply marked the development of numerically controlled machine tools has led to a major involvement of the US military in a variety of industrial automation programmes, from the Air Force Integrated Computer-Assisted Manufacturing (ICAM) aiming at a 'workerless factory' (Melman 1983: 236), to the Navy's Rapid Acquisition of Manufactured Parts (RAMP) (Business Week, 20 April 1987, p.60; see section 3.2 above).

The effects of such a form of industrial automation can be seen in the project sponsored by the US Air Force for producing the B1-B bomber in a 'factory without workers.' Vought Aero Products, a division of LTV Aerospace & Defense Co. has built a \$10.1-million factory with eight Flexible Manufacturing Systems that can build 564 parts of the bomber. The system has been in operation since July 1984 and it has been considered 'an absolute success' (Business Week, 3 March 1986). **But the bombers so far completed have shown major defects in the electronic systems, fuel leaks and an early need of parts replacement; repairing them is expected to take two years and \$7 billion, on top of the \$27 billion already spent for the first 100 aircrafts** (Business Week, 24 November 1986, p.47). **From being the gem of US military technology, the B1-B bomber has become another major scandal of US military procurement.**

Military R&D is worse than the private sector

Eric Alterman, 1-13-2012 [Eric Alterman is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and a Distinguished Professor of English at Brooklyn College and the CUNY Graduate School of Journalism. He is also a columnist for The Nation, The Forward, and The Daily Beast, "Is Defense R&D Spending Effective?" Center for American Progress, <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/general/news/2012/01/13/11001/think-again-is-defense-rd-spending-effective/>] MJS 1-4-2017

These kinds of shenanigans are obviously not the responsibility of those engaged in Pentagon-funded basic research, but it's exactly this kind of fiddling with the test results that corrupts the process of what gets funded and for how much. In fact, as lead op-ed in The Economist recently argued, while much of the technology that citizens and corporations today rely on was originally created for military use, **civilian technological R&D in recent years has more often benefited the Pentagon rather than the other way around.** Today, for instance, The Economist reports, the U.S. Air Force is using Sony PlayStation 3 video game consoles for

its newest supercomputer project. U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan take advantage of their “iPods and iPhones to run translation software and calculate bullet trajectories. Xbox video-game controllers have been modified to control reconnaissance robots and drone aircraft. Graphics chips that power PC video-cards are being used by defence firms to run simulations.” **The reason for this is the strength of capitalism. Electronics firms have to move faster than the Pentagon to meet consumer demand and to keep up with their competitors.** With more than 1 billion mobile phones sold each year, these firms can afford the kind of targeted research that makes Pentagon R&D irrelevant to their need. What’s more, as The Economist also points out, “the emergence of open standards and open-source software makes it easier to repurpose off-the-shelf technologies or combine them in novel ways.” **In many respects, the relationship between military-funded R&D mirrors the relationship between defense spending and non-defense spending in the overall economy.** As Applebaum’s report notes (because he believes defense R&D to be the exception to this rule), defense spending is deeply inefficient as an economic stimulus. **He quotes the economist Robert “Pollin, who calculates that “\$1 billion in spending on health care produced an economic benefit about 14 percent larger than spending on defense. The impact of spending on transportation, education and energy were even larger.”**

Trump’s increase in military spending will be offset by less welfare

David Morris, 10-21-2016 [, "The wasteful truth about military spending if Trump were to become president," Salon, <http://www.salon.com/2016/10/21/the-wasteful-truth-about-military-spending-if-trump-were-to-become-president/>] MJS 1-4-2017

In September 2016, as the Republican nominee, **Donald Trump** the politician dramatically reversed his position. **He now proposes a massive increase in military spending.** And instead of making the military more efficient by cutting Pentagon waste, **Trump will “fully offset” the increase in military spending by reducing spending on non-defense programs through reducing their “government waste and budget gimmicks.”**

For an idea of what that might entail for non-defense spending, consider the Republican budget blueprint passed by the House in early 2015 (no Democrat voted in favor). **To offset a significant increase in military spending, the New York Times reports, Medicaid would be cut by \$900 billion. Spending on the food stamp program would be shrunk by hundreds of billions of dollars. Spending for Pell Grants for college, job training and housing assistance would be slashed.**

Means-testing has lifted millions out of poverty

Sharman, 2013 [July 2013, Arloc Sharman, Danilo Trisi, Sharon Parrott , “Various Supports for Low-Income Families Reduce Poverty and Have Long-Term Positive Effects On Families and Children,” *Center for Budget and Policy Priorities*, <http://www.cbpp.org/research/various-supports-for-low-income-families-reduce-poverty-and-have-long-term-positive-effects>] JSM
Arloc Rharman is a Senior Fellow at the CBPP, Danilo Trisi is a Senior Research Analyst at the CBPP and Sharon Parrot is the Vice President for Budget Policy and Economic Opportunity at the CBPP

“The EITC and SNAP are examples of “means-tested” programs, that is, programs that limit assistance to people with low or modest incomes. Other means-tested programs include Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for low-income seniors and people with disabilities; cash assistance programs funded by the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, and programs that provide non-cash benefits like housing assistance. **In 2011, means-tested benefits lifted 19.7 million people above the poverty line, including 8.5 million children.**[5] (See Appendix Table 2 for state-by-state figures.) **Medicaid and CHIP provided health insurance to 66 million Americans during 2010** — roughly 32 million children, 18 million parents, 10 million people with disabilities, and 6 million seniors. Medicaid and CHIP have greatly reduced the numbers of uninsured children and now provide coverage to most low-income children. Due to Medicaid and CHIP, children are much less likely than non-elderly adults to be uninsured. Some 9.4 percent of children were uninsured in 2011, compared to 21.2 percent of non-elderly adults.[6] To be sure, some critics question the effects of safety net programs on individual behavior, such as work effort, and how that affects poverty. **Several of the leading researchers in the field have conducted a comprehensive review of the available research and data on how safety net programs affect poverty, and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) has published their results. They found that, after accounting for what the research finds to be modest overall behavioral effects, the safety net lowers the poverty rate by about 14 percentage points.** In other words, one of every seven Americans would be poor without the safety net but is above the poverty line because of it. That translates into more than 40 million people.[7]”

Multitude of reasons why ROK won't proliferate despite assurance being low now

Stangrone 2/29/16—Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade at the Korea Economic Institute of America (Troy, "Going Nuclear Wouldn't Be Easy for South Korea." National Interest. nationalinterest.org/feature/going-nuclear-wouldnt-be-easy-south-korea-15345?page=2)

North Korea has conducted four nuclear tests, pushed boundaries with its missile tests, is pursuing second strike capabilities, and shows no indication of slowing down. South Korea in response has made a strategic bet that closing the Kaesong Industrial Complex can help to create leverage internationally to convince Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear ambitions, but **some in Seoul and Washington are suggesting that South Korea should consider developing its own nuclear umbrella** as leverage in talks with North Korea. However, *this would be much more difficult than proponents generally acknowledge.*¶ Since abandoning its own pursuit of nuclear weapons in the 1970s, South Korea has relied on United States *nuclear umbrella* for extended deterrence to prevent either a large scale invasion by the North or a nuclear attack. However, as North Korea continues to advance its nuclear and missile programs in spite of the international sanctions, it is understandable that experts and policy makers would look for new ways of deterring North Korea and incentivizing it to roll back its nuclear weapons and missile programs. ¶ Arguments in favor of South Korea developing an independent nuclear deterrent tend to center around four arguments. First, that once North Korea has a range of deployable nuclear weapons with a second strike capability the military balance on the peninsula will have changed in a dangerous way. Second, that the international community has been ineffective in convincing North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program, jeopardizing South Korea's national security. As a result South Korea needs to take responsibility for its own defense. Only with its own nuclear deterrent would Seoul have the ability to negotiate the elimination or reduction of Pyongyang's program. Third, that whether now or in the future the protection of the United States might become untenable. This is often expressed in the question of whether the United States would risk Los Angeles to save Seoul or concerns over future U.S. defense cuts. And lastly, that the prospect of a nuclear armed South Korea, and potentially Japan, might focus minds in Beijing on resolving the problem of North Korea.¶ Ads by Adblade¶ Trending Offers and Articles¶ You Won't Believe Your Eyes with These Perfectly Timed Pictures!¶ ¶ 13 Child Stars Who Have Changed Over The Years¶ 22 Dog Breeds Most Likely to Turn on Their Owners! #8 Will surprise you!¶ The South Korean public has also shown support for domestic nuclear weapon. Polls taken shortly after the closing of the Kaesong Industrial Complex show domestic support ranging from 52.2 percent to 67.7 percent and *polling done by the Asan Institute for Public Policy after North*

Korea's third nuclear test indicated that South Korean faith in U.S. extended deterrence was waning.¶ However, South Koreans are rarely asked if they would be willing to bear the costs of a domestic nuclear weapon. Those cost would likely come in the form of diminished international standing, economic hardship, and uncertain strategic benefits.¶ For South Korea to develop its own nuclear weapons program it would have to join North Korea as the only country to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), an ignominious club for sure. Withdrawal would dent Seoul's growing international standing and make it the only member of MIKTA, an emerging club of middle powers, to have a nuclear weapon, something which would not enhance South Korea's middle power prestige.¶ While a loss of international stature to ensure domestic security might be an acceptable trade off, *there would likely be economic costs as well.* **Developing a nuclear weapon would have consequences for South Korea's own nuclear industry. Nuclear power provides a third of South Korea's electricity and represents 13 percent of its primary energy consumption.** Lacking adequate domestic reserves of nuclear fuel, **South Korea is dependent upon members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group which conditions supply on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Pursuing a nuclear option would put the fuel supply for South Korea's domestic reactors at risk.**¶ **South Korea also has designs on becoming a major exporter of nuclear power plants.** In 2009, it won a \$40 billion contract to construct and manage four nuclear power plants in the UAE and in 2013 a bid for a research reactor in Jordan. Those deals and **any future potential exports would be put risk.**¶ **South Korea would also potential face economic sanctions.** Iran and North Korea have both faced significant financial and economic sanctions for their pursuit of nuclear weapons, while India and Pakistan faced sanctions as well. *Because South Korea is perhaps one of the world's most trade dependent nations it would be especially vulnerable to external economic pressure.*

Military Innovation Kills Current Military Programs - Undermines readiness

Goure 2016 [Dan, "The Pentagon's Third Offset: Just a Smoke Screen for a Shrinking US Military?," *National Interest*. Accessed at: <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-pentagons-third-offset-just-smoke-screen-shrinking-us-16583?page=2>] //DNP

The bigger danger is that DoD will become enamored of its new offset strategy and cut current programs and forces in anticipation of great results emerging from its investments in automation, big data and robots. There is a **long history of the Pentagon and the White House promising huge leaps forward in military capabilities for future systems that are just PowerPoint slides, but cutting real capabilities now.**

Decline in US hegemony inevitable – US should look towards post-unipolar world

Richard **Maher 10**, [Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science department at Brown University, 12/10/10, "The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World," *Orbis*, Volume 55, Issue 1, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438710000633>] MJS

The **decline in the United States' relative position is in part a consequence of the burdens and susceptibilities produced by unipolarity.** Contrary to the conventional wisdom, **the U.S. position** both internationally and domestically **may actually be strengthened once this period of unipolarity has passed.** **Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, world politics has been unipolar,** defined by American preponderance in each of the core components of state power—military, economic, and technological. **Such an imbalanced distribution of power in favor of a single country is unprecedented in the modern state system. This material advantage does not automatically translate into America's preferred political and diplomatic outcomes, however. Other states,** if now only at the margins, **are challenging U.S. power and authority.** Additionally, on a range of issues, **the United States is finding it increasingly difficult to realize its goals and ambitions.** The even bigger challenge for policymakers in Washington is how to respond to signs that **America's unquestioned preeminence in international politics is waning.** This decline in the United States' relative position is in part a consequence of the burdens and susceptibilities produced by unipolarity. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the U.S. position both internationally and domestically may actually be strengthened once this period of unipolarity has passed. On pure material terms, the gap between the United States and the rest of the world is indeed vast. The U.S. economy, with a GDP of over \$14 trillion, is nearly three times the size of China's, now the world's second-largest national economy. The United States today accounts for approximately 25 percent of global economic output, a figure that has held relatively stable despite steadily increasing economic growth in China, India, Brazil, and other countries. Among the group of six or seven great powers, this figure approaches 50 percent. When one takes discretionary spending into account, the United States today spends more on its military than the rest of the world combined. This imbalance is even further magnified by the fact that five of the next seven biggest spenders are close U.S. allies. China, the country often seen as America's next great geopolitical rival, has a defense budget that is one-seventh of what the United States spends on its military. There is also a vast gap in terms of the reach and sophistication of advanced weapons systems. By some measures, the United States spends more on research and development for its military than the rest of the world combined. What is remarkable is that the United States can do all of this without completely breaking the bank. The United States today devotes approximately 4 percent of GDP to defense. As a percentage of GDP, the United States today spends far less on its military than it did during the Cold War, when defense spending hovered around 10 percent of gross economic output. As one would expect, the United States today enjoys unquestioned preeminence in the military realm. No other state comes close to having the capability to project military power like the United States.¹ And yet, despite this material preeminence, **the United States sees its political and strategic influence diminishing around the world.** It is involved in two costly and destructive wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, where success has been elusive and the end remains out of sight. **China has adopted a new assertiveness** recently, on everything from U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, currency convertibility, and America's growing debt (which China largely finances). **Pakistan,** one of America's closest strategic allies, **is facing the threat of social and political collapse.** **Russia is using its vast energy resources to reassert its dominance** in what it views as its historical sphere of influence. **Negotiations with North Korea and Iran have gone nowhere** in dismantling their nuclear programs. Brazil's growing economic and political influence offer another option for partnership and investment for countries in the Western Hemisphere. And **relations with Japan,** following the election that brought the opposition Democratic Party into power, **are at their frostiest in decades.** To many observers, **it seems that America's vast power is not translating into America's preferred outcomes.** As the United States has come to learn, raw power does not automatically translate into the realization of one's preferences, nor is it necessarily easy to maintain one's predominant position in world politics. **There are many costs that come with predominance** – material, political, and reputational. **Vast imbalances of power create apprehension and anxiety in others,** in one's friends just as much as in one's rivals. In this view, it is not necessarily *American* predominance that produces unease but rather *American predominance.* **Predominance also makes one** a tempting target, and **a scapegoat for other countries' own problems and unrealized ambitions.** Many a Third World autocrat has blamed his country's economic and social woes on an ostensible U.S. conspiracy to keep the country fractured, underdeveloped, and subservient to America's own interests. **Predominant power likewise breeds envy, resentment, and alienation.** How is it possible for one country to be so rich and powerful when so many others are weak, divided, and poor? **Legitimacy**—the perception that one's role and purpose is acceptable and one's power is used justly—**is**

indispensable for maintaining power and influence in world politics. As we witness the emergence (or re-emergence) of great powers in other parts of the world, we realize that **American predominance cannot last forever. It is inevitable that the distribution of power and influence will become more balanced in the future, and that the United States will necessarily see its relative power decline.** While **the United States** naturally should avoid hastening the end of this current period of American predominance, it **should not look upon the next period of global politics and international history with dread or foreboding.** It certainly should not seek to maintain its predominance at any cost, devoting unlimited ambition, resources, and prestige to the cause. In fact, contrary to what many have argued about the importance of maintaining its predominance, America's position in the world—both at home and internationally—could very well be strengthened once its era of preeminence is over. **It is, therefore, necessary for the United States to start thinking about how best to position itself in the “post-unipolar” world.**

Trump collapses US hegemony—irreversible

Wright 16 Thomas, fellow and director of the Project on International Order and Strategy @ the Brookings Institute, *Politico*, January 16, “Trump’s 19th-century foreign policy,” <http://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-19th-century-foreign-policy-presidential-campaign/> //CJC

Thus, beneath the bluster, the ego and the showmanship is the long-considered worldview of a man who has had problems with U.S. foreign policy for decades. **Trump has thought long and hard about America’s global role and he knows what he wants to do. There is virtually no chance that he would “tack back to the center” and embrace a conservative internationalist foreign policy.** If he did get elected president, **he would do his utmost to liquidate the U.S.-led liberal order by ending America’s alliances, closing the open global economy, and cutting deals with Russia and China.** He would find this hard to do, not least because the entire U.S. foreign policy establishment would be opposed to him and he needs people to staff his National Security Council, State Department and Defense Department. But there is real power in the presidency, especially if there is clear guidance about the chief executive’s wishes. In any event, **the mere fact that the American people would have elected somebody with a mandate to destroy the U.S.-led order might be sufficient to damage it beyond repair.** After his election, **other countries will immediately hedge against the risk of abandonment. There will be massive uncertainty around America’s commitments.** Would Trump defend the Baltics? Would he defend the Senkaku Islands? Or Saudi Arabia? Some nations will give in to China, Russia and Iran. **Others, like Japan, will push back, perhaps by acquiring nuclear weapons. Trump may well see such uncertainty as a positive. Putting everything in play would give him great leverage.** But by undoing the work of Truman and his secretary of state, Dean Acheson, **it would be the end of the American era.**

No impact to heg – data

Fettweis, 11 Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is *no evidence* to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have *suggest the opposite may be true*. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending \$100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.⁵¹ To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”⁵² On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew *more peaceful* while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. *No militaries* were enhanced to address power vacuums, *no security dilemmas* drove insecurity or *arms races*, and *no regional balancing* occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, **the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending.** Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view *on faith alone*.

Hegemony doesn’t produce peace, peace is a product of modern technology

Benjamin H. **Friedman 2014**, [research fellow in defense and homeland security studies. He writes about U.S. defense politics, focusing on strategy, budgeting, and wars, graduate of Dartmouth College, a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and an Adjunct Lecturer at George Washington’s Elliot School of International Affairs, “Debating American Engagement: The Future of U.S. Grand Strategy”, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_c_00140] MJS

An increasingly peaceful world. An array of research, some of which Brooks et al. cite, indicates that **factors other than U.S. power are diminishing interstate war and security competition.** **These factors combine to make the costs of military aggression very high, and its benefits low.**³ **A major reason for peace is that conquest has grown more costly. Nuclear weapons make it nearly suicidal in some cases.**⁴ **Asia, the region where future great power competition is most likely, has a “geography of peace”:** its maritime and mountainous regions are formidable barriers

to conflict. **Conquest also yields lower economic returns than in the past.** Post-industrial economies that rely heavily on human capital and information are more difficult to exploit.⁶ Communications and transport technologies aid nationalism and other identity politics that make foreigners harder to manage. **The lowering of trade barriers limits the returns from their forcible opening.**⁷ Although states are slow learners, they increasingly appreciate these trends. That should not surprise structural realists. Through two world wars, the international system “selected against” hyper aggressive states and demonstrated even to victors the costs of major war. Others adapt to the changed calculus of military aggression through socialization.⁸

When rising power challenges Heg it ends in war w/o concessions

Allison 2015 [Graham Allison, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?”, *The Atlantic*, <<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756>>] //CJC

The defining question about global order for this generation is whether China and the United States can escape Thucydides’s Trap. The Greek historian’s metaphor reminds us of the attendant dangers when a rising power rivals a ruling power—as Athens challenged Sparta in ancient Greece, or as Germany did Britain a century ago. **Most such contests have ended badly, often for both nations,** a team of mine at the Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs has concluded after analyzing the historical record. **In 12 of 16 cases over the past 500 years, the result was war. When the parties avoided war, it required huge, painful adjustments in attitudes and actions on the part not just of the challenger but also the challenged.**

Based on the current trajectory, war between the United States and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than recognized at the moment. Indeed, judging by the historical record, war is more likely than not. Moreover, current underestimations and misapprehensions of the hazards inherent in the U.S.-China relationship contribute greatly to those hazards. A risk associated with Thucydides’s Trap is that **business as usual**—not just an unexpected, extraordinary event—**can trigger large-scale conflict.** **When a rising power is threatening to displace a ruling power, standard crises that would otherwise be contained,** like the assassination of an archduke in 1914, **can initiate a cascade of reactions that, in turn, produce outcomes none of the parties would otherwise have chosen.**

War, however, is not inevitable. Four of the 16 cases in our review did not end in bloodshed. Those successes, as well as the failures, offer pertinent lessons for today’s world leaders. Escaping the Trap requires tremendous effort. As Xi Jinping himself said during a visit to Seattle on Tuesday, “There is no such thing as the so-called Thucydides Trap in the world. But should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves.”

Unilateralism and the focus on military power causes American arrogance and trades of with cooperation on terrorism, climate change, disease

H.D.S. Greenway, Columnist at the Boston Globe, Boston Globe, January 25, 2002, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/FS/jnye/reviews/greenway_globe.pdf //CJC

Nye articulated the concept of "soft power," arguing that America's real strength lay not only in military prowess but in the attractions of its open society, its universities, its popular culture, and economic opportunities that had become a world magnet. Then, at century's end, when the United States had reached a zenith of power and authority, Nye started a new book to warn against hubris and unilateralism - the soon-to-be-published "The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone." Before the book was finished the events of Sept. 11 came along and underscored his thesis. As the 21st century dawned, Americans had forgotten their fears of being overtaken by the Far East and instead had become "arrogant about our power, arguing that we did not need to heed other nations," according to Nye. "We seemed both invincible and invulnerable." Then came September to put paid to all that. To some, the very freedoms that make up our soft power are "repulsive," particularly to fundamentalists. But "hard nuggets of hate are unlikely to catalyze broader hatred unless we abandon our values and pursue arrogant and overbearing policies that let the extremists appeal to the majority in the middle," Nye argues. There are world problems that simply cannot be tackled by one country alone, no matter how powerful: financial instability, climate change, drugs, infectious diseases, and terrorism. If the United States is bound to lead, it is also bound to cooperate, Nye writes. With the end of the Cold War America went too quickly from declinism to triumphalism. All the trends of globalization and the information age favor the growing soft power of the United States, "but only if we avoid stepping on our own message." Nye writes that "isolationists who think we can avoid vulnerability to terrorism by drawing inward fail to understand the realities of a global information age." As for going it alone, unilateralism is not a viable option; it risks undermining our soft power and invites coalitions to form against us, which would eventually limit our hard power.

Weaponization bad --- causes planet-ending conflict that outweighs nuclear war

Mitchell et al., Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh, Ayotte and Helwich, Teaching Fellows in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, 2001 (Dr. Gordon R., Kevin J., David Cram, ISIS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defence, "Missile Defence: Trans-Atlantic Diplomacy at a Crossroads", No. 6 July, <http://www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no6.html>)

A buildup of space weapons might begin with noble intentions of 'peace through strength' deterrence, but this rationale glosses over the tendency that '... the presence of space weapons...will result in the increased likelihood of their use'.³³ This drift toward usage is strengthened by a strategic fact elucidated by Frank Barnaby: when it comes to arming the heavens, 'anti-ballistic missiles and anti-satellite warfare technologies go hand-in-hand'.³⁴ The interlocking nature of offense and defense in military space technology stems from the inherent 'dual capability' of spaceborne weapon components. As Marc Vidricaire, Delegation of Canada to the UN Conference on Disarmament, explains: 'If you want to intercept something in space, you could use the same capability to target something on land'.³⁵ To the extent that ballistic missile interceptors based in space can knock out enemy missiles in mid-flight, such interceptors can also be used as orbiting 'Death Stars', capable of sending munitions hurtling through the Earth's atmosphere. The dizzying speed of space warfare would

introduce intense 'use or lose' pressure into strategic calculations, with the spectre of split-second attacks creating incentives to rig orbiting Death Stars with automated 'hair trigger' devices. In theory, this automation would enhance survivability of vulnerable space weapon platforms. However, **by taking the decision to commit violence out of human hands and endowing computers with authority to make war, military planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict.** Yale sociologist Charles Perrow has analyzed 'complexly interactive, tightly coupled' industrial systems such as space weapons, which have many sophisticated components that all depend on each other's flawless performance. According to Perrow, this interlocking complexity makes it impossible to foresee all the different ways such systems could fail. As Perrow explains, '[t]he odd term "normal accident" is meant to signal that, given the system characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable'.³⁶

Deployment of space weapons with pre-delegated authority to fire death rays or unleash killer projectiles would likely make war itself inevitable, given the susceptibility of such systems to 'normal accidents'. It is chilling to contemplate the possible effects of a space war. According to retired Lt. Col. Robert M. Bowman, 'even a tiny projectile reentering from space strikes the earth with such high velocity that it can do enormous damage — even more than would be done by a nuclear weapon of the same size!'.³⁷ In the same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of peace, defence analyst David Langford sees one of the most destabilizing offensive weapons ever conceived: 'One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people!'³⁸ Given this unique potential for destruction, it is not hard to imagine that **any nation subjected to space weapon attack would retaliate with maximum force, including use of nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons. An accidental war sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunge the world into the most destructive military conflict ever seen.**

US MILITARIZATION OF SPACE CAUSES GLOBAL PROLIFERATION AND WORLD WAR THREE

Noam Chomsky, Institute Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, International Socialist Review, Issue 19, July-August 2001, <http://www.isreview.org/issues/19/NoamChomsky.shtml>, ACC: 8.20.05, p. online

The answer is, as I said, full-spectrum dominance, such total dominance of space that no adversary will even come close. Nobody really seriously thinks they can achieve that. But it doesn't matter. It sets in motion a new age of warfare in which the U.S. happens to be technologically so far in the lead that no potential adversary is going to say, Fine, have a nuclear first strike if you like. They're going to proceed, and they will proceed in predictable ways, namely by developing anti-satellite weapons, to which the U.S. will have to respond with even more massive militarization. Furthermore, it is pretty well understood that it's going to lead to proliferation. China is going to respond. Russia is going to respond. If China develops its at the moment very minimal deterrent into one that's capable of responding to this extended system, India is going to respond out of concern over

China. Pakistan will react to India developments. Israel will react to Pakistan developments. Other countries will get into the game. It will pretty clearly have the effect of proliferating weapons of mass destruction. Nobody seriously believes that any potential adversary of the U.S. is going to be nutty enough to try to send a missile. So the missile defense system isn't intended to do anything defensive. What it's intended to be is a protection for U.S. forces on the ground or in the air. It's supposed to give room for a first strike with relative confidence that there can't be a reaction. This is known. The Canadian military advised the government of Canada in papers that were leaked that the purpose of the missile defense is not any kind of defense. It's to create a cover for offensive military actions, including possibly a first strike. The Star Wars program, SDI, was understood in the same way. So it's basically an offensive weapon. A lot of debate now is whether national missile defense is technically possible. Is it going to work? That's kind of missing the point. If it looks like it's not going to work, then it's not a big problem. If there's any hint that it might work, potential adversaries have to take that seriously. **When you're talking about weapons of total destruction—the likelihood and confidence of total destruction—minimal probability has to be assumed to be reality.** You can't take chances. The Space Command isn't really concerned about the danger that we might blow up the world. That's a small problem. What they're interested in is something different. **They're interested in providing a basis for U.S. military action, including first strike if needed.** But more important, they're protecting U.S.-based investments and commercial interests. And they give an analogy. They say that the militarization of space is very much like the development of navies. The British navy ruled the seas in order to protect British investments and commercial interests. And then, of course, other navies responded, like the German navy. **You go on and get into** the First **World War.**

The debris generated from even one very small war in space cascades --- causes the entombment of the planet and cripples the environment --- destroys the use of space and guarantees extinction through blocking out the sun

Rebecca **Johnson**, Director of the Disarmament and Arms Control Programme at the Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, **2003**, ("Missile defense and the weaponisation of space," ISIS Policy paper on missile defense, January, <http://www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no11.html>)

Space in low earth orbit is teeming with human generated debris, defined by NASA as "any man-made object in orbit about the Earth which no longer serves a useful purpose". There are some 9,000 objects larger than 10 cm and over 100,000 smaller objects. **As orbiting debris may be travelling at very high velocities, even tiny fragments can pose a significant risk to satellites or spacecraft,** as experienced by US astronaut Sally Ride, when a tiny, orbiting fleck of paint gouged the window of the space shuttle during her first flight.²⁵ If the fleck of paint had been metal, its impact might have had lethal consequences. As noted by Joel Primack, a physics professor at the University of California and expert on the problems of space debris, **"the weaponisation of space would make the debris problem much worse, and even one war in space could encase the entire planet in a shell of whizzing debris that would** thereafter **make space near**

the Earth highly hazardous for peaceful as well as military purposes”.²⁶ This would entomb the earth and jeopardise the possibility of further space exploration. In addition, **Primack speculates that even a small number of “hits” in space could create sufficient debris to cause a cascade of further fragmentation** (a kind of chain reaction). This, in turn, could potentially **damage the Earth’s environment and, as the Sun’s rays reflect off the dust, cause permanent light pollution, condemning us to a “lingering twilight”.**²⁷

Trump will not be in support of environmental or climate change

Davenport 2016. [Coral Davenport is a climate and energy reporter for the New York Times. “Donald Trump Could Put Climate Change on Course for ‘Danger Zone’ ” New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/11/us/politics/donald-trump-climate-change.html?_r=0 // ARS

Mr. Trump has called human-caused [climate change](#) a “hoax.” He has vowed to dismantle the [Environmental Protection Agency](#) “in almost every form.”

And in an early salvo against one of President Obama’s signature issues, Mr. Trump has named Myron Ebell of the business-backed Competitive Enterprise Institute to head his E.P.A. transition team. Mr. Ebell has asserted that whatever warming caused by greenhouse gas pollution is modest and could be beneficial. A 2007 Vanity Fair profile of Mr. Ebell called him an “[oil industry](#) mouthpiece.”

Global warming may indeed be the sharpest example of how policy in Washington will change under a Trump administration. President Obama has said his efforts to establish the United States as the global leader in climate policy are his proudest legacy.

But if Mr. Trump makes good on his campaign promises, experts in climate change policy warn, that legacy would unravel quickly. The world, then, may have no way to avoid the most devastating consequences of global warming, including rising sea levels, extreme droughts and food shortages, and more powerful floods and storms.

Mr. Trump has already vowed to “cancel” last year’s Paris climate agreement, which commits more than 190 countries to reduce their emissions of planet-warming carbon dioxide pollution, and to dismantle the Clean Power Plan, Mr. Obama’s [domestic climate change regulations](#).

“If Trump steps back from that, it makes it much less likely that the world will ever meet that target, and essentially ensures we will head into the danger zone,” said Michael Oppenheimer, a professor of geosciences and international affairs at Princeton University and a member of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which produces global reports on the state of climate science.

Mr. Trump cannot legally block other countries from fulfilling their Paris agreement commitments, nor can he quickly or unilaterally erase Mr. Obama’s climate rules.

McMaken 2015 [Ryan, "US Soldiers are Paid Significantly More than Civilians with Similar Skills and Education," *Mises Institute*. Accessed at: <https://mises.org/blog/us-soldiers-are-paid-significantly-more-civilians-similar-skills-and-education>.]

In this report on military compensation, the Congressional Budget Office concluded: With cash allowances and federal tax advantages included, regular military **compensation for the average enlisted member exceeded the 75th percentile of civilian earnings**. For several years, DoD has stated that its aim is to make RMC [Regular Military Compensation] comparable with the 70th percentile of civilian earnings. CBO's analysis suggests that the goal has been achieved. Americans have a tendency of thinking of their incomes solely in terms of the number on their paychecks, but when all compensation and benefits are considered, the CBO reminds us, the picture is rather different. After all, military personnel have access to a variety of non-cash benefits. The DoD concludes: **Benefits provided to service members are substantially more valuable than those provided to civilians with comparable education and experience**, meaning that total compensation for service members is more generous relative to civilian compensation than the traditional comparison of cash pays would suggest. In fact, the DoD reports military compensation is even more generous than thought when we look beyond Regular Military Compensation (RMC): **Military Annual Compensation package for both enlisted personnel and officers compares to approximately the 80th percentile of compensation for civilians**, as compared to the 70th percentile when using only RMC as the point of comparison...

The US will always intervene in intrastate conflicts to pursue its interests—and it's more likely to intervene when the power differential is greater

Bennett 2015 [Hailey Bennett is a BA in political science from James Madison University, "Causes of Third Party Military Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts", *James Madison University*, <<http://commons.lib.jmu.edu/honors201019/7/>>] //CJC

Since the conclusion of World War II, **the number of expansive interstate wars has decreased while devastating intrastate wars and conflicts have increased exponentially**.

The Cold War ushered in an era of international stability in the bipolar balance of power, but proxy wars, wars of succession and independence, genocide and civil war made the era anything but peaceful. **These conflicts proved to be breeding grounds for third party military interventions, which increased simultaneously**. In this thesis, I attempted to determine what factors encouraged third party states to intervene militarily in the affairs of other

states in the post-World War II era. I conducted a mixed methods approach, incorporating statistical analyses and case studies to identify global and specific trends in intervention. The cross-national statistical analyses include logit and ordered probit analyses and support the role of threat to influence in the international system, power discrepancy, alliance capability and economic conditions of the crisis actor as significant factors to decision-making. On the other hand, the case studies focus on three cases of U.S. intervention (or lack of) across time. They are Lebanon from 1982-1984, Algeria in 1992 and Libya in 2011. The results of the case studies support

factors such as threat to influence, media attention and previous successful interventions in the crisis state as causes of U.S. military intervention. Ultimately, I establish that the United States will pursue interventions for the sake of its national interests abroad. The two statistical analyses depict that three of the seven tested independent variables were significant indicators of violence/intervention for both the four-point and binary

dependent variables—power discrepancy, alliance capability and economic conditions. In the logit analysis **power discrepancy suggests that as its value increases, the chances of intervention increase; alliance capability suggests that as it is greater, intervention increases; economic conditions suggests that improving domestic economies increase**

chances of intervention. Gravity was not significant in the ordered probit analysis, but in the logistic regression analysis, it was significant and indicates that a threat to influence encourages intervention. Since the logistic regression analysis is the true measure of my research question of whether or not intervention occurs, as opposed to the level at which it occurs, it is fair to say that four of my variables were significant in explaining intervention; however two of the four results rejected my established hypotheses. 123 These results poorly align with the results of the case studies examined. In those cases, only gravity or threat to the balance of power/influence appeared as important to the U.S. decision-making process at the international level of analysis. Alliance capability and power discrepancy were not overly significant factors for the United States. Rather, several of the variables that were not tested statistically were of importance and significance for the United States in addition to gravity: humanitarian crisis as illustrated in the mass media and history of previous successful intervention in the conflict state. For the significant statistical results, gravity and power discrepancy supported my hypotheses, whereas my hypotheses for alliance capability and economic conditions were 125 rejected. I predicted a positive relationship for all four variables (because economic conditions is coded differently, I anticipated a negative relationship). My hypothesis for gravity suggested that if there were an increasing threat to a state's influence or balance of power, then there would be an increased likelihood of military intervention on behalf of the potential third party (Waltz 1967; Finnemore 2003; Shirkey 2012;

Werner 2000; Saunders 2009). The positive direction of the coefficient for the logistic regression analysis suggests that an increase from there not being a threat to influence to there being a threat to influence in the international system indicates there is a shift from no violence/minor clashes to major clashes/full-scale war. This result is in support of my hypothesis since I consider the use of violence on the dichotomous scale to be synonymous with intervention. However, this variable was not significant in the ordered probit analysis accounting for the four-point dependent variable. The same relationship is true for power discrepancy. I predicted that as the difference in power between a potential third party and a state in conflict increases, then so too do the chances of military intervention (Shirkey 2012; Parenti 2002). Again, a positive coefficient for power discrepancy indicates a positive relationship, supporting my established hypothesis.

[...]

Table 9: Power Discrepancy Predicted Probabilities—Logit Results

	Power Discrepancy- 10 th Percentile	Power Discrepancy- 90 th Percentile	Change
No Violence/Minor Clashes	0.598	0.207	-0.391
Serious Clashes/Full-scale War	0.402	0.793	0.391

**Math: $.391/.402 = .972$ or 97.2% increase

Trump isn't non-interventionist

Greenberg, Jon. "Clinton Says Trump Supported Intervention in Libya." @politifact. Politifact, 7 Sept. 2016. Web. 13 Jan. 2017.

“But in a [NBC News forum](#) focused on the role of the commander-in-chief, Clinton deflected that criticism. She said there was no difference between herself and Trump on the Libyan action.

"He's on record extensively supporting intervention in Libya, when Gadhafi was threatening to massacre his population," Clinton said Sept. 7, 2016.”

<http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/03/why-pentagons-cybersecurity-dollars-dont-add/108895/> Senior Correspondent Aliya Sternstein, March 31, 2015

“This is **not the first time the Pentagon has had difficulty labeling its cyber investments....Cyber budget numbers are squishy, partly, because authority over the cyber mission is fragmented** — split among Cyber Command, the Defense Information Systems Agency and the various military services.

Cyber Security Failing for Administrative Reasons

<http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Can-cybersecurity-spending-protect-the-US-government> Adam Rice, Computer Weekly “Can cybersecurity spending protect the US government?”

When it comes to cybersecurity, the government is big on rules, rules and more rules. It has spent millions on writing down, in painful details, exactly what needs to be done -- and what cannot be done. The Federal Information Security Management Act ([FISMA](#)) has created an environment that's all about compliance with the administration of systems, not securing them. It is true that you can be [FISMA compliant](#) and still have a network that the bad guys can infiltrate. **To develop a cybersecurity plan by computer and manage the administrative burden does almost nothing to prevent an advanced persistent threat actor from running roughshod over a network** but that approach does create lots of work and budget for busy government contractors and employees.

US Naval Institute 2015 [US Naval Institute staff, "China's Military Built with Cloned Weapons," *USNI News*, October 27, 2015, <https://news.usni.org/2015/10/27/chinas-military-built-with-cloned-weapons>] //WGC

"Russia continued to use Chinese money from arms sales to develop new technology, which China then stole. After several deals in which the Chinese quickly reversed engineered Russian weapons to produce their own versions, Russia finally wised up and began to reject Chinese requests to purchase single examples of their most advanced systems on a "trial" basis. To add salt to Russia's wounds, China is now exporting knockoff weapons to the international market and undercutting Russia's own arms trade in the process. But like a counterfeit Louis Vuitton handbag with a faulty zipper, Chinese clone weapons may be more style over performance. "I think the big issue with all Chinese weapons – including copies of Western equipment – is that they remain untested in combat," Eric Wertheim author of U.S. Naval Institute's *Combat Fleets of the World* and a naval analyst said. "We just don't know how they will perform, so while they may be far less expensive than their western counterparts, many countries are understandably reluctant to take the risk of acquiring products that haven't passed the ultimate test of combat. I expect that some of these systems are likely to perform as advertised while others may significantly underperform compared to their western counterparts." Although Chinese clone weapons may not yet possess the quality and capabilities of the originals, **several U.S. military and industry officials have expressed concern that the ongoing sophisticated cyber espionage campaign will allow China to rapidly improve their arsenal and even soon produce aircraft that will match all aspects of US fifth generation fighters** like the F-22 and F-35."

Clarke 16 [Joe Clarke of the Guardian in April 6, 2016, "Where does the \$8bn UN peacekeeping budget go?, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2016/apr/06/where-does-8bn-un-peacekeeping-budget-go>] //wgc

"The overall budget is equivalent to 1% of US defence spending. The first thing to note about the peacekeeping budget is how small it is, at least when compared with the defence budgets of national governments. At \$8bn, the entire peacekeeping budget is equivalent to one month of US military spending in Afghanistan at the height of the conflict in 2010, or just 1.4% of the current US defence budget, which stands at \$573bn. So what are the reasons for this disparity? For a start, the UN has far less manpower than the US. The US has 1.3 million military personnel worldwide and, in 2014, despite significant cuts, it had 450,000 troops on active duty. Today, the UN peacekeeping force stands at a little over 100,000. That might sound like a lot, but the US currently has 40,000 troops in Germany, almost double the size of the UN peacekeeping force in Congo – a country that has seen decades of continuous fighting. **The UN peacekeeping budget is equivalent to just 1.4% of the current US defence budget"**

UN 2014 [United Nations General Assembly, "Evaluation of the implementation and results of protection of civilians mandates in United Nations peacekeeping operations," March 7, 2014, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/68/787] //WGC

“Immediate response was considered to include intervention, whether political or military, during the attack itself. **Of the 507 incidents involving civilians** reported in Secretary-General’s reports from 2010 to 2013, **only** 101, or **20 per cent, were reported to have attracted an immediate mission response.** Conversely, missions did not report responding to 406 (80 per cent) of incidents where civilians were attacked. The rate of reported response varied across missions, reflecting the seriousness of incidents and the availability of early warning, the accessibility of incident sites and other factors. It was highest in UNISFA (68 per cent) and MONUSCO (26 per cent) and lowest in MINUSTAH and UNMISS (less than 10 per cent).

20. In most cases, mission personnel were not on site at the time of the attack and did not reach the site during the attack. While many peacekeepers have died in the course of their duty, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations data suggest that no casualties have resulted from interposition between a vulnerable population and hostile elements attacking civilians, although an interposition is an option indicated in the Operational Concept.

21. The impact of these incidents on civilians, as reported by the Secretary-General, was vast. It included civilian deaths, injuries, sexual violence, abductions, displacements, property loss affecting livelihoods and other human rights violations.”