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Venezuela's economy has a history of failure.

Harvard economist Javier Corrales writes that Venezuela is one of the few Latin American countries to have had, not one, but two lost decades. In 8 years out of a 12-year period, Venezuela suffered some sort of economic emergency like a banking crisis, a currency crisis, or an economic recession.

More recently, Venezuela has been embroiled in an economic crisis since 2014.

The Venezuelan government's strict socialist policies are the root cause of this turbulence. Starting in 2003, dictator Hugo Chavez began implementing price controls and limitations on how much profits companies could make. Chavez also implemented a backward currency control scheme that created a black market for foreign currency and increased inflation in the economy.

The Foundation for Economic Education explains that the government's socialist policies created shortages of goods and decimated any private sector activity.

Until recently, dictator Nicolas Maduro followed the socialist economic model of Chavez, his predecessor.

The Foreign Policy Institute explains that the Venezuelan government uses socialist policies to shrink the private sector and consolidate power. The Wall Street Journal confirms that easing price controls is a risky move for a government that has championed its socialist policies as the country's only salvation.

*Fortunately, US economic sanctions pressure Nicolas Maduro to **roll back the key socialist policies of his predecessor.***

The Irish Times '19 explains that Maduro has historically insulated his regime from the failing economy by snuffing all of his democratic opposition. Shepp '19 of New York Magazine explains that the main reason why Maduro is still in power is the military.

Thankfully, targeted economic sanctions prevented Maduro from insulating himself from the crisis this time around.

Stratfor '19 writes that Maduro cannot shield the military from the blow of sanctions. Soldiers will go unpaid, and military families will suffer from food shortages. Furthermore, the Latin American Risk Review '19 explains that Maduro is running out of his gold reserves faster than he can replace them, which puts his rule in a precarious situation.

The pressure against Maduro reached a critical mass in 2019, where there were multiple attempted coups and many key military leaders fled.

With his rule threatened, Maduro is forced to reform. O'Grady '19 of the Wall Street Journal writes that economic sanctions have forced Maduro to implement market reforms so that the regime has enough dollars to maintain support among the military.

The Economist '19 writes that sanctions forced the government to retreat from socialism.

Maduro has lifted nearly all of the economic controls imposed by Hugo Chavéz. The government has stopped dictating the exchange rate and controlling prices. Private firms can now import whatever they choose and set their own prices.

These reforms have been immensely successful.

Indeed, Lopez '19 of Venezuela Analysis explains that Maduro's reforms, such as the elimination of price controls and the free circulation of dollars, have opened up new economic scenarios in 2020, including the **"end of shortages of essential goods and the creation of new business opportunities."**

Furthermore, The Economist writes that "It is not just the rich who can afford [these goods]." Millions of "Venezuelans have direct access to cash transfers from relatives living abroad."

For the first time in years, supermarkets are stocked with food, and Venezuela's economy could grow by 4 percent, according to leading Venezuelan economist Francisco Rodriguez. Argus Media furthers that the private sector will account for more than 25 percent of GDP for the first time in decades.

Byas '19 of the New American confirms that before Venezuela was socialist, it was a prosperous country that grew at a rapid pace.

Conversely, lifting sanctions would prevent these reforms. CSIS '19 finds that lifting sanctions would let Maduro pay off the military without resolving the humanitarian crisis.

Prevent the next socialist disaster. Vote con.

Durham Neg

The current crisis in Venezuela is nothing new.

Harvard economist Javier Corrales writes that in 8 years out of a 12-year period, Venezuela suffered some sort of economic emergency.

More recently, Venezuela has been embroiled in an economic crisis since 2014.

This crisis is no accident. Specifically, the Venezuelan government's strict socialist policies caused this turbulence. The government has enforced aggressive price controls and limitations on how much profits private firms could make.

Niemietz '18 of the Foundation for Economic Education explains that the government's socialist policies created shortages of goods and services and created a chilling effect on any private sector activity.

Fortunately, US economic sanctions have targeted Maduro's inner circle, reversing these policies. Tian '19 of SIPRI explains that the military, Maduro's main source of power, has historically been shielded from the harms of economic crisis.

Thankfully, targeted economic sanctions prevented Maduro from insulating his regime from the crisis.

The Latin American Risk Review explains in 2020 that Maduro's regime is facing serious resource constraints due to sanctions. Thus, Stratfor '19 writes that Maduro will not be able to shield the military from the blow of sanctions this time. Soldiers' wages cannot keep up with inflation, and military families will face food shortages.

With his rule threatened, Maduro is forced to reform. O'Grady '19 of the Wall Street Journal writes that, with the sanctions biting, "Maduro's big challenge is to scrape up enough dollars to maintain support among the military," forcing him to implement market reforms to stabilize the economy.

Sanctions have forced the government to implement two beneficial reforms.

First, lifting socialist controls.

The Economist '19 confirms that sanctions forced the government to lift nearly all of its socialist economic controls. The government has stopped trying to dictate the exchange rate and control prices, and private firms can now import whatever they choose. Dollars now flow freely through the economy.

Furthermore, Al Jazeera finds that It is not just the rich who can afford it. Even lower class Venezuelans have direct access to cash transfers from relatives living abroad.

The second reform Maduro has implemented is privatizing the oil industry.

In the past, Venezuela had a law requiring the government to be involved in any oil project.

Bellorin '16 of Caracas Chronicle explains that this policy has harmed oil production, as the government is extremely ineffective at producing oil. Hausmann '19 of Americas Quarterly confirms that the majority of the collapse in Venezuela's oil sector was caused extreme mismanagement and corruption.

Thankfully, sanctions have forced the government to allow private companies to participate in oil production.

Venezuela Analysis '20 explains that since the sanctions target the Venezuelan government, it has handed off its operations to private companies to avoid sanctions and recover production. The New York Times '20 finds that Maduro is letting foreign companies take over the day-to-day operations of oil fields, essentially privatizing the oil industry.

These policies are successful. Katona '19 explains that Venezuelan oil exports are booming, allowing their main oil company to pay all of its debts. Historically, Caracas Chronicle '16 writes that when Brazil opened up its oil industry to private sector investment, oil production boomed.

The overall impact is revitalizing Venezuela.

Venezuela Analysis '19 explains that Maduro's reforms, such as the elimination of price controls and the free circulation of dollars, have opened up new economic scenarios in 2020, including the "end of shortages of essential goods."

For the first time in years, Venezuela's economy could grow by 4 percent, according to leading Venezuelan economist Francisco Rodriguez. Hyperinflation has recovered, and the private sector will account for more than 25 percent of GDP for the first time in decades.

Without the pressure of sanctions, the government will not maintain these reforms. Mora '18 of Foreign Policy explains that Maduro views the private sector as a threat to his power, which is why previous socialist policies were aimed at crippling the sector and forcing them to rely on state-owned currency.

Oil Advantage

[Find mismanagement root cause]

Extend Stratfor and O'Grady from case who explain that sanctions have completely strained Maduro's finances, forcing him to reform.

Venezuela Analysis January 7 2020

due to US sanctions, these purchasing and contracting operations become even more complicated. One way to manoeuvre around such obstacles would be to transfer the handling of these operations to private partners, but this would have to be done through granting them majority shareholder status. In a context where PDVSA's accounts are heavily constrained by sanctions, reducing state participation would result in private partners having greater flexibility to mobilise resources in the international banking system

New York Times January 4 2020

(Reuters) - Venezuelan state company PDVSA is letting some joint venture partners take over the day-to-day operation of oilfields as its own capacity dwindles due to sanctions Maduro's government and the opposition last year discussed allowing partners in PDVSA-led joint ventures to operate the oilfields, which would reverse a legal requirement that PDVSA control the operations. That could give Maduro more breathing room by encouraging fresh investment in PDVSA's operations, potentially boosting oil revenues. PDVSA is no longer producing. It's signing contracts for others to produce in a de facto privatization

Caracas Chronicles 2016

Fire precedent for privatizing oil

Article 22 of Venezuela's hydrocarbon law (a.k.a., the oil law) requires that the State keep a majority stake in any "empresa mixta" in the industry. This nationalistic approach has become a bottleneck now that both the State and PDVSA are virtually broke. When the time to invest comes, PDVSA simply does not have the financial resources to pay its share. As a consequence, projects get put on hold and production eventually declines. Does it work? Well, let's look south. Brazil is almost a clinical case study of how liberalization boosts production, while state control hampers it. The country opened its upstream sector in 1998. Since then participation by private oil companies has increased hand-in-hand with production. Production increased on the back of the 1998 apertura until Petrobras' finances became strangled by corruption and low oil prices, slowing down development and production in the pre-salt. Since the enactment of the pre-salt law, only one bidding round for one area (Libra) has been called: all the way back in 2013. In response to this slowdown, the pendulum has swung the other way. The law that forces Petrobras to be the sole operator of the pre-salt is about to be removed in hopes of boosting investment and production. The trend is pretty clear: when it comes to implementation of the petroleum activities, let the private sector do the heavy lifting and have the option, rather than the obligation, of State participation.

IPI '19 confirms that after Venezuelan oil production fell from 3 million barrels to 2.5 million.

Sanctions have forced Venezuela to privatize its biggest oil company.

To avoid sanctions, Venezuela Analysis '20 writes that PDVSA has handed off its operations to private companies to recover production.

The New York Times '20 finds that PDVSA is letting companies take over the day-to-day operations of oil fields, essentially privatizing the oil industry.

Indeed, Caracas Chronicle '16 writes that when Brazil opened up its oil industry to private sector investment, Brazil's oil production increased.

Frontlines

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F2 Only helps rich

1. Sukhm's card

F2 Sanctions prevent private sector from getting capital

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F2 Price controls good

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F2 Laws haven't been passed

F2 Banking crisis

F2 Doing for the election

Durham Neg

We negate.

Dictator Nicolás Maduro is leading Venezuela on a path of ruin.

Thankfully, U.S. sanctions have destroyed the regime's finances. CSIS '19 explains that sanctions have decreased the revenue of the Maduro regime by freezing its assets and cutting off illegal mining revenue.

Vyas of the Wall Street Journal last week explains that "although a military-led gold-mining initiative has helped Mr. Maduro mitigate the financial blow" of sanctions, a lack of revenue is the ultimate threat to his survival. Latin America Risk Report confirms that "The regime is running out of gold and cannot mine more fast enough." Maduro's support from abroad is also drying up. Gaden '18 writes that "China and Russia have grudgingly offered minor economic support but repeatedly shunned the bailout Maduro needs."

Sanctions target the military, a key source of Maduro's power. Stratfor confirms that "Maduro will not be able to shield the military from U.S. sanctions this time. Soldiers will go unpaid, and military families will suffer from food shortages." Thus it's unlikely that the military will follow Maduro's orders to repress the population. Indeed, Arreaza '19 of Americas Quarterly confirms that Maduro's delayed response to recent protests shows internal divisions in the regime.

Overall, CSIS '19 writes that targeted sanctions have also strained Maduro's inner circle.

Even though current protests are failing, future ones will work. The Latin American Risk Report '19 confirms that high levels of inequality are creating the conditions for a strong resurgence of protests in 2020. These protests will likely occur outside of the traditional opposition, making them harder to repress because they won't have clear leadership.

A new wave of protests could end the regime. The Wall Street Journal finds that Maduro has lost all support among the poor, leaving the military as his only source of support. Arreaza furthers that Maduro's National Guard and intelligence services have risen against him, forcing him to rely on the inexperienced military, which is not comfortable with cracking down on protesters. Gamboa '19 of Foreign Affairs explains that Maduro's strategy of killing protesters can easily fail since officers are reluctant about using violence against fellow citizens and fear facing human rights trials in the future.

Thus, Forbes '17 explains that if Maduro deploys the military to suppress a large amount of protesters, soldiers would refuse his orders and the regime would fall. Bloomberg '19 confirms that this strategy has worked in Serbia and Egypt, where the military stood down in the face of popular defiance.

Conversely, lifting sanctions would remove this pressure, giving Maduro a breath of fresh air. CSIS '19 finds that lifting sanctions would give the regime access to money to buy the loyalty of military officials and would weaken democratic forces in Venezuela.

The impact of removing Maduro is an economic transition.

Maduro is responsible for Venezuela's crisis.

Moises '16 of the Atlantic finds that the culprits of Venezuela's economic implosion has been Maduro's economic mismanagement, policies like price controls, and corruption.

Rapoza '19 of Forbes writes that Maduro's Socialist regime is, point blank, "the only reason why Venezuela is a mess." He finds that the economy was declining years before American sanctions.

Thus, CNBC '19 concludes that "a sudden Maduro departure and transition to a...reformist government would provide 'the best hope for kick-starting...the Venezeulan economy.'" Padden '19 explains that "because the Venezeulan people have suffered so much [under socialism], they would be willing to give a lot of political capital to the new leadership" to implement market-based reforms.

Moody's Analytics predicts that, in a scenario where Maduro is removed, sanctions would be lifted and Venezuela would be re-integrated into global financial markets, facilitating a speedy economic recovery and a return to *double-digit economic growth* rates that spills over to the entire region, lifting millions out of poverty.

Link-ins

Water

Two reasons why we solve water better:

1. Brain drain. Rendon '19 explains that water infrastructure is failing because the trained professionals who run the infrastructure have fled the country. Fortunately, War on the Rocks explains that if Maduro is ousted, many Venezuelans will return to Venezuela and help with the recovery.
2. Mismanagement. Hernandez '19 explains that fears of a water crisis started since 2013 due to the government's mismanagement and underinvestment in water infrastructure. Only a reformist government solves by investment and maintaining infrastructure.

Brain drain pre-req to water crisis

Rendon, Moises. "Unraveling the Water Crisis in Venezuela." CSIS. December 10 2019//SK

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/unraveling-water-crisis-venezuela>

Challenges of the Water Crisis in Venezuela **The following are key challenges to mitigating the damage of the water crisis in Venezuela and to planning a coordinated response to rebuild the country's water management system**

1. Absence of Water and the Impact on the Country's Health System
2 There is a direct link between the absence of clean water and diarrheal diseases, which are the causes of infant and child mortality. Insufficient potable water and poor sanitation within Venezuela have also contributed to a rise in cases of Hepatitis A, malaria, and dengue, among other vector-borne diseases. Preventable childhood diseases, such as diphtheria, have returned. Between 2016 and 2018, about 1,249 cases of transmission diseases have been confirmed—after 24 years of full eradication. Between 2017-2018, there were about 6,400 confirmed cases of Measles, according to the [Pan American Health Organization \(PAHO\)](#). Infant, child, and maternal mortality have all reached levels not seen in Venezuela in decades.

3. Lack of Institutional Capacity
Corruption, lack of maintenance, and **departure of trained professionals have left the water infrastructure in Venezuela in a deplorable state. Without institutional capacity, monitoring infrastructure and management system conditions have been a taxing task for all stakeholders. As a result, water systems are operating at half their capacity and are unable to regularly provide safely treated water to nearly 90 percent of the population**

4. Access to Humanitarian Aid
The Maduro regime continues to reject most humanitarian aid to Venezuela. This year, for the first time, although publicly non-committal, the Maduro regime allowed the [UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(UNOCHA\)](#) to begin to assess needs and allowed some humanitarian aid deliveries. However, the international community needs to continue to increase pressure on the Maduro regime to allow access for all urgent and badly-needed aid. Perhaps more importantly, the international response must ensure that any humanitarian aid in Venezuela follows international standards, which includes the de-politicization of food and social benefits, unlike what has characterized the Maduro regime. Challenges to distribution, logistics, infrastructure, and supply chains need to be addressed, including securing the distribution of emergency food supplies from both corruption and looting. Similarly, developing an emergency plan to restore public services, such as access to water and sanitization, would be key to alleviating the suffering of the Venezuelan people. Venezuela currently lacks social infrastructure and has demonstrated an inability to meet basic humanitarian needs, particularly with respect to access to clean water. Not only is the massive restoration of the infrastructure a multi-year and multi-billion-dollar challenge, but in parallel fashion, the new government will need to build strong institutions and partnerships at every level to be able to maintain and manage the renewed water and humanitarian response system.

4. Brain Drain A significant barrier in constructing a strategic plan is the significant brain drain that has occurred in Venezuela. About 15 percent (4.5 million) of Venezuelans have fled the country since 2015, including many of the engineers, scientists, medical professionals, and business leaders who are needed to rebuild the country

It is also imperative to retain talent and expertise, as it will be difficult to close the talent gap once the reconstruction period begins. For perspective, [in Chile](#) 64 percent of the approximately 85,000 Venezuelan residents registered in 2017 had an undergraduate or graduate degree. **The electricity sector in Venezuela has suffered from the brain drain, as more than 20,000 employees working for Corpoelec, the Venezuelan electrical sector, have fled**

5. Lack of Data
There is an absence of data and analysis on the challenges and needs of the water distribution network. It is vital to conduct thorough

fact-finding missions to be able to assess the crisis and understand how to respond. Gathering such data requires engagement with local communities via monitoring and evaluation instruments and conducting field research in conjunction with funding from international financial institutions, including the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the [World Bank](#). In addition, local communities would benefit from best practices in water usage, integration, and operation.

People would return under a new regime

Perera, Fabiana. "THE MORNING AFTER MADURO IN VENEZUELA." War on the Rocks. May 2019//SK
<https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/the-morning-after-maduro-in-venezuela/>

To be successful, a new regime will need extensive support early on from international financial institutions and the United States. [Christine Lagarde, head of the International Monetary Fund](#), and [President Donald Trump](#) have said they are working on an aid package for Venezuela to be delivered as soon as democracy is restored in the country. A new regime faces the task of gaining the trust of its citizens and of potential investors. To achieve the first, a new regime will need an immediate influx of capital directed toward delivering basic services. But the relationship with international investors works the other way around: A new regime will have to inspire trust in order for much-needed capital to flow into the oil sector. In both cases, Venezuela faces one additional challenge: its isolation. Most foreign airlines have [stopped flying to the country](#), some in response to [unpaid debts](#) from the Venezuelan government, others citing the [safety of their crewmembers](#). To achieve the necessary influx of assistance, it will be important to connect the country to potential partners through commercial air travel. **A new regime should be able to count on the Venezuelan diaspora to help with some of this. An estimated four million Venezuelans have left the country since the regime came to power. While the latest waves of migrants have been driven out by the humanitarian emergency, earlier waves have settled abroad and prospered. Many of these people remain interested in the situation in Venezuela. A new regime could count on the return of some of the human capital that left with them.** Venezuela veered into authoritarianism during a period in which the United States was practicing benign neglect of the region. Chávez and Maduro capitalized on this inattention to grow their authoritarian projects and build support for them throughout Latin America. A successful transition back to democracy will require benign engagement from private corporations, multilateral institutions, the U.S. government, and Venezuelans themselves. Private corporations will have a role to play in reviving the Venezuelan oil sector, as well as in reestablishing commercial air traffic and the availability of basic food and medicine. [Clorox, General Mills, and Pepsi](#), to name a few, once had operations in the country. In the future, Venezuela will need these firms' investment again. Multilateral institutions will be needed to help finance repairs to the country's [crumbling infrastructure](#), much of which was built over half a century ago.

Oil

1.

Guaido will diversify (not produce more oil)

Cannon, Barry. "Juan Guaidó's Policy Proposals: 'The Venezuela to Come' or the Venezuela That Has Already Been?" Venezuela Analysis. March 15, 2019//AP
<https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/14386>

The state (or as the authors repeatedly insist, "the government") will be financed by a 50% tax on each citizen's fund, thus, ensuring it's "accountability to citizens." It is not clear if this will be in addition to existing taxes on income and wealth or replace them.

Through this fund, the Venezuela Energética document makes clear how the other two objectives of **Guaidó's plan will be achieved: the diversification of the economy and the transition to renewable energy. The FPV will finance the development of new industries and a "robust service sector" including "hundreds of small businesses"**, again citing Norway as an example—despite the fact that Norway rarely uses its oil fund for these purposes. Similarly, **while most of the oil would be exported, these sales would finance the development of Venezuela's hydroelectric, solar, and wind energy sources**. The document, however, is not clear what mechanisms it will use to achieve these goals. The plan closes with two other key promises.

Socialism root cause of food shortages

<https://economics21.org/how-socialism-destroyed-venezuela>

There are three main policies implemented by Chavez since 1999 that produced the current crisis: Widespread nationalization of private industry, currency and price controls, and the fiscally irresponsible expansion of welfare programs. **One of Chavez's first actions was to start nationalizing the agriculture sector, supposedly reducing poverty and inequality by taking from rich landowners to give to poor workers. From 1999 to 2016, his regime robbed more than 6 million hectares of land from its rightful owners. Nationalization destroyed production in affected industries because no government has the capacity to run thousands of businesses or the profit motive to run them efficiently. Instead, government officials face incentives to please voters by selling products at low prices and hiring more employees than necessary, even when that's the wrong industry decision.** Socialism run rampant—not cronyism, corruption, falling oil prices, or U.S. sanctions—caused the crisis in Venezuela.

As economic theory predicted, **as state control of the agricultural industry increased, Venezuela's food production fell 75% in two decades while the country's population increased by 33%.** This was a recipe for shortages and economic disaster. After agriculture, the regime nationalized electricity, water, oil, banks, supermarkets, construction, and other crucial sectors. And in all these sectors, the government increased payrolls and gave away products at low cost, resulting in days-long countrywide [blackouts](#), frequent [water service interruptions](#), [falling oil production](#), and [bankrupt government enterprises](#). Yet taking over the most important sectors of the economy was not enough for the socialist regime. In 2003, Chavez implemented a [foreign currency control scheme](#) where the government set an overvalued exchange rate between the Venezuelan currency and the U.S. dollar.

General

We Outweigh for 3 reasons:

1. **Their case is short-term.** [Moody's Analytics '18](#) finds that, if Maduro is out of power, the US will lift sanctions on Venezuela, meaning if we win our case, sanctions will be lifted in the next year anyway. My opponents need to prove why the harms of ONE MORE YEAR of sanctions outweigh all of the benefits of a political transition.
2. **We solve the root cause.** [Martino '18](#) explains that socialist policies like price controls and taking over the agriculture sector have decreased food production in Venezuela by 75 percent. [Nitzberg '18](#) explains that without diversifying its economy away from oil, Venezuela will just see similar oil crises in the future. Only by getting rid of Maduro and implementing market reforms can we allow the economy to become more diversified by boosting the agriculture sector. [Nitzberg](#) finds that investing in agriculture will make every future oil crash less severe, and [Moody's](#) finds that removing Maduro will bring Venezuela back to 10+ percent growth.
3. **We solve their argument.**

Venezuela will fall back into another crisis

Nitzberg, Harry. "Cauterization and Infection: Trying to Fix the Venezuelan Economy." Towson University. Spring 2018//SK

<https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/wp.towson.edu/dist/b/55/files/2018/05/SPRING-2018-NITZBERG-ARTICLE-1t195ce.pdf>

Once inflation has been decreased and government revenues have been refilled by reinvigorated oil production, the Venezuelan government will not have much time to celebrate their short-term victory, they must focus on sustainability. Under the umbrella of sustainable economic growth is one necessity, economic diversification. In the case of Venezuela, economic diversification would entail a decrease in the percentage of GDP that can be tied back to the oil sector. **To put the dependence of the Venezuelan oil exports in perspective,**

95 percent of Venezuela's export earnings and 25 percent of Venezuela's GDP are from oil and gas exports.⁷⁰ With Venezuela's large amount of oil reserves, **should oil prices continue to steadily rise, Maduro's government may be tempted to just ride the wave of growth that would surely follow— directly into an economic trough when prices fall again. This is what economists call a "resource curse" or stagnation in economic development that accompanies booms and busts in the price of the product that an economy overly depends on.**⁷¹ When the price of the main export is high, the value of the country's currency rises.

When a country's currency becomes stronger, that country's exports become more expensive. As the other industries' prices rise, their ability to compete in international markets is decreased.⁷² Without the ability to compete, these firms die off.⁷³ When the domestic firms that are

needed for technological development die off, economic development is hindered.⁷⁴ Rather than wholeheartedly throwing the percentage of oil revenue that the government would receive on social programs and in oil production investment (extraction related machines/labor or land surveying), the Venezuelan government can attempt to counteract the “resource curse” by reinvesting a portion of the revenue in what economists call “infant industries.”

Diversification makes future crises less severe

Nitzberg, Harry. “Cauterization and Infection: Trying to Fix the Venezuelan Economy.” Towson University. Spring 2018//SK

<https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/wp.towson.edu/dist/b/55/files/2018/05/SPRING-2018-NITZBERG-ARTICLE-1t195ce.pdf>

In the case of Venezuela, the temptation to rely on oil is so great that government protectionism is necessary to develop infant industries.

Without the aforementioned protectionist measures, Venezuelans will continue to rely on the import of basic necessities, which become scarce in times of crisis. **The main industry to be developed in the meanwhile is agriculture**, an industry that former

president Hugo Chavez passively attempted to grow during his presidency.⁷⁵ As the current crisis in Venezuela is showing, **food production infrastructure is vital to sustain the Venezuelan population during sustained periods of low oil prices**. With protectionist policies to protect the infant agricultural industry and removal of price controls on food, **Venezuela may be able to better sustain downturns in oil prices in the future and become less reliant on oil revenue at the same time**.

Tech Add-On: Colombia DA

The second impact is a Colombian invasion.

Wyss '19 of the Miami Herald writes that Colombia sees Venezuela as an existential threat. Cobb '19 of Reuters warrants that Maduro supports rebel organizations that destabilize Colombia, such as the FARC guerilla group and ELN rebels.

To counteract Venezuela, Colombia has relied on sanctions.

Colombian Ambassador Francisco Santos explains that Colombia's current strategy involves waiting for sanctions to oust Maduro. But if America lifts its sanctions, conflict will ensue. Santos furthers that, if sanctions fail to oust Maduro, Colombia's Plan B will certainly call for violence.

Any conflict between Colombia and Venezuela would involve the United States

Santander '18 of The Conversation finds that the current administration has offered Colombia support in the event of a military clash with Venezuela. Unfortunately, Mora '19 of Foreign Affairs writes that an American precision strike campaign would kill thousands of civilians and displace 8 million Venezuelans.

Thus, we negate.

Political Transition Frontlines

F2 Defections low

1. Argument isn't about defections -- it's about the military backing down in the face of protests.
2. Washington Post: 90% of the special forces are in favor of the tyranny falling
3. Maduro is using the last traces of his gold reserves. Once they run out, military discontent will spike even more.

90% hate Maduro

“They are authorized to shoot us’: Stories from 5 soldiers who broke from Maduro and Venezuela’s armed forces.” Washington Post. 2019//SK

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/they-are-authorized-to-shoot-us-stories-from-5-soldiers-who-broke-from-maduro-and-venezuelas-armed-forces/2019/02/24/16f6cce2-3884-11e9-b10b-f05a22e75865_story.html

Defectors didn't come only from nearby bases. William Cancina, a member of the Venezuelan special forces, traveled from Caracas on the pretext of an intelligence mission, he said. But he had made arrangements with contacts in the Colombian police who were waiting for him in the crowd at the Simón Bolívar Bridge on Sunday. He said he walked calmly past his fellow national police, then through the tear gas to the other side, when Colombian police grabbed him. “I think **90 percent of the special forces are in favor of this tyranny falling**,” he said. “But for fear, terror, doubts, they don't stop supporting it.” Sgt. Maj. Mario Velasquez Reyes, 28, said he asked for permission to leave his Caracas base to visit a hospitalized brother. Instead, he headed to the border. “We aren't in agreement with this government, which brings hunger, misery, poverty,” he said. “The government has ruined all of Venezuela.”

F2 Protests going down

1. LARR in 2020: Bigger protests are likely to happen in 2020 because of Maduro's recent actions in the National Assembly, when he tried to halt the opposition.
2. LARR in 2020: Protests will also increase because of the economic divide that dollarization has caused.
3. All their evidence is about organized protests. Faiola '19 of the Washington Post: Even though large scale protests began to recede, Venezuelans have not stopped protesting as there have been 14,330 protests this year compared to 12,715 protests in 2018.

Protests reached 14K

Faiola, Anthony. “Venezuela’s struggling opposition seeks to tap into uprising wave across South America” The Washington Post, November 2019//AM

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/venezuelas-struggling-opposition-seeks-to-tap-into-uprising-wave-across-south-america/2019/11/16/435ce4da-071c-11ea-9118-25d6bd37dfb1_story.html

In January, after the opposition-controlled National Assembly named Guaidó as interim leader, the 36-year-old industrial engineer united the opposition, stirring hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans to take to the streets. But those **large-scale protests began to recede after an opposition conspiracy with Maduro allies failed to oust him on April 30**, and polls show support for Guaidó has ebbed in recent months. “We have committed errors, and I ask the Venezuelan people for forgiveness,” Guaidó told supporters. **Yet Venezuelans have never really stopped protesting, turning out for multiple smaller demonstrations, including many railing against the government over the broken power and water grids.** According to the Venezuelan Observatory of Social Conflict, **there have been 14,330 protests this year, mostly to**

demand economic improvements and better services such as water and electricity. At the same time, hopes for a negotiated solution have dimmed as talks between the opposition and Maduro's government, brokered by Norway, have broken down. After three rounds of talks, Maduro's negotiators withdrew in August in response to another round of U.S. sanctions. In a letter requesting a tougher line on Maduro from European leaders this month, Guaidó outlined the gist of the opposition's position.

Protests less in 2018

New Statesman America. "What the West gets wrong about Venezuela: it doesn't need ideology, it needs urgent care" February 2019//AM

<https://www.newstatesman.com/world/2019/02/what-west-gets-wrong-about-venezuela-it-doesn-t-need-ideology-it-needs-urgent-care>

Bodas's words underpinned a crucial political debate in Venezuela: is the fight to remove President Nicolas Maduro a struggle between left and right? Are liberals outside of Venezuela justified in supporting regime change? And is the international left right to defend a leader who calls himself a socialist and proletarian? To answer these questions, we must look at the reasons people are protesting. **According to the Observatorio Venezolano de Conflictividad Social**, an NGO and Human Rights group that monitors protests across the country, **Venezuelans took to the street a record 12,715 times in 2018, averaging 35 protests per day.** Of these protests, which took place across each of Venezuela's 23 states, 89 per cent (11,319) were to demand economic, social, cultural and environmental rights. The primary cause for such protests was to demand workers' rights and better salaries (5,535), followed by access to basic services such as gas, water and electricity (3,953), and access to food (1,257).

F2 Economy recovering

1. Miami Herald: Going to fall by 10% by TOP ECONOMISTS

F2 Military won't leave (international court, jail time, fearing for their lives)

1. Gamboa '19 of Foreign Affairs explains that Maduro's strategy of killing protesters can easily fail since officers are reluctant about using violence against fellow citizens and fear facing human rights trials in the future.
2. CNBC: Guaido granting amnesty
3. Not our argument -- not about defections
4. If they form a cohesive front, they don't fear this

F2 Military just kills protesters

1. Gamboa '19 of Foreign Affairs explains that Maduro's strategy of killing protesters can easily fail since officers are reluctant about using violence against fellow citizens and fear facing human rights trials in the future.
2. **Guaido's method of appealing to the conscience of the military and organizing the population has worked before — in Serbia in 2000 and in Egypt in 2010. In both countries, the military stood down in the face of popular defiance**

F2 Allocates all money to Caracas

1. NYT: \$13 pay
2. Increased inequality is what causes the new wave of protests

F2 Civil War

1. Scenario is that protesters protest and the military backs down -- soldiers are outnumbered + underpaid, don't want to risk a US intervention, and don't want to rack up more war crimes
2. 2002 Venezuelan coup attempt only led to 19 deaths

3. In Serbia, the coup only led to 2 deaths

F2 Military dictatorship

1. Arreaza: Less radical, still negotiate
2. Guaido has international funding and support
3. Military officials want sanctions to be lifted off, so they'll put a legitimate leader in place so the US lifts sanctions

F2 Guaido bad

1. VOA News: Popular support, democratic

F2 Surveillance

1. **The leading role in the uprising taken by members of the National Guard and the national intelligence services (SEBIN), which are supposed to be the most loyal to Maduro, reveals the fragility of his position**
2. Brookings: No real evidence of Cuban role; mostly just US assertions

F2 Alternate sources of funding

1. **The regime is running out of gold and cannot mine more fast enough out of the Orinoco belt to replace what is being strip mined out of the Central Bank**
2. **The official salary of Venezuela's top military general is \$13 a month**

F2 Past protests failed

Future protests will work for 3 reasons

1. Running out of gold now
2. Protests motivated by dollarization and inequality are occurring without the help of the opposition; they don't have clear leadership so they can't be repressed as easily (organized at the grassroots level by like public workers, teachers, etc.)
3. National Guard and intelligence service rose up against Maduro, so now he has to rely on the military which is less experienced/willing to kill protesters

The best piece of neg evidence on the topic -- GAME OVER

"Venezuela Stability Update - November 2019." Latin America Risk Report. November 2019//SK

<https://boz.substack.com/p/venezuela-stability-update-november>

In recent weeks, there have been a lot of disruptive protests in the region (and really, the world). [As Francisco Toro and I write in the Washington Post](#), there isn't a single ideological thread that pulls them all together. The region is now facing upheavals that resist easy categorization. The regional pendulum that used to swing back and forth between left and right has been chopped down and tossed into the fire. October 2019 may be remembered as the moment when Latin America outran its heuristics. To that, I'll add a few additional conclusions that I will expand on in the coming weeks: The protests across the region are likely to increase in 2020. While all countries are potentially impacted, the governments most vulnerable to destabilizing protests are those with the weakest claims to democratic legitimacy.

Unfortunately, the governments with the weakest democratic legitimacy are also those that are likely to use violent repression in the highest levels. While repression tends to inflame protests in democracies, it is often the key to survival in autocracies. With that in mind, today's

newsletter looks at Venezuela. Venezuela's protests are ongoing but not well organized **Venezuela had a large number of protests during October, many by health workers, teachers and citizens of poor barrios angry at the repression by FAES.** However, Venezuela's protests were among the least surprising in the region given the fact that protests have occurred all year. While local protests have been ongoing, protests were more destabilizing at the national level from January to April when Guaido made his big push that culminated in the 30 April uprising. **The continued organization of protests, particularly by public workers, echoes the anger and economic frustrations of protesters in less authoritarian**

countries. At the same time, the lack of a nationally organized and coordinated movement in recent months demonstrates a mixture of protest fatigue (especially in an economic scenario in which people are attempting to simply survive and feed their fa

F2 Protest fatigue

1. Arreaza

F2 Cuban Intelligence

1. Our argument doesn't rely on defections.

F2 Reforms already solve

1. Faiola '19 of the Washington Post: The current reforms don't amount to a larger shift--policies like RANDOMLY TAKING OVER PRIVATE COMPANIES and TAKING OVER THE ENTIRE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR that caused the crisis are still in place.
2. [warrant] Foreign Policy: Maduro will never embrace the private sector fully because the private sector as a threat to his power.

Reforms are temporary

Faiola, Anthony. "A fake Walmart, cases of Dom Pérignon and the almighty dollar: Inside socialist Venezuela's chaotic embrace of the free market." Washington Post. December 25 2019//SK

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/a-fake-walmart-cases-of-dom-perignon-and-the-almighty-dollar-inside-socialist-venezuela-chaotic-embrace-of-the-free-market/2019/12/23/ca4f2072-21c3-11ea-b034-de7dc2b5199b_story.html?arc404=true

President Nicolás Maduro is making tentative moves away from the socialist policies that once regulated the prices of basic goods, heavily taxed imports and restricted the use of the U.S. dollar. As a result, the South American nation's economic free fall is beginning to decelerate. The national inflation rate — still the world's highest — has slowed from a blistering 1.5 million last year to a relatively breezy annualized rate of 15,000 percent. **The changes might be temporary, and amount largely to an economic Band-Aid. There are no signs, for instance, of a larger strategy to reverse the agricultural land grabs and company seizures that helped lay the groundwork for one of the worst economic implosions of modern times.**