

R2R

We negate resolved: The deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea's best interest.

Contention One: Militarism

For Kim Jong-Un, nuclear weapons are essential to his country's survival. According to Fifield at the Washington Post in 2017:

North Korea has used its emerging weapons capability as a deterrent, betting that if it can threaten nuclear retaliation on South Korea, the United States will not take the risk of striking.

However, missile defense undermines these deterrents. Etzioni at George Washington University in 2017 explains:

The logic of nuclear deterrence presumes that making any major strike virtually suicidal. However, if one nuclear power can prevent a retaliatory strike by an anti-missile defense system, mutual destruction is no longer assured, and the deterrence effect breaks down

In order to restore the balance, the North has tried to develop missiles that can get around missile defense. According to the ISDP in 2016:

North Korea has viewed the decision to deploy missile defense as both a provocation and an act of aggression. Their response has been to continue missile development and invest in technologies that could bypass missile defense systems

South Korea's corresponding fears of North Korea have pushed it to militarize. Reuters in 2017 reports:

The escalating threat arising from nuclear-armed North Korea's recent series of missile tests is prompting South Korea to beef up its military muscle by allowing Seoul to build more powerful missiles and to build a nuclear-powered submarine.

North Korea's nuclear weapons have now advanced far enough to reach the US. Their fear of missile defense and new capabilities may make them to act more aggressively against the South. Bush at the Brookings Institute in 2017 writes:

Pyongyang may soon assume that it can now act more recklessly against South Korea at the conventional level and short of a major attack because it can counter the United States at the nuclear level. It would undertake such limited-war actions as much to achieve political gains that are deeply damaging to South Korean interests

Contention Two: Sanctions

Feng at Foreign Affairs magazine in 2017 writes:

China-North Korean relations have turned into a heavy burden for China, holding Beijing back from playing a greater role in the global and regional order. Beijing is highly aware of the costs if it continues to keep Pyongyang within its fold. North Korea's increasingly belligerent behavior has irritated China to an ever greater extent.

As a result, there has been more pressure to severely sanction the North. According to VOA News in 2016:

experts say "China has been intensively discussing how to internally block oil and cash from flowing into North Korea which fund their nuclear program

However, the deployment of missile defense has infuriated China and undermined all potential progress. Xiao, a professor at Fudan University in 2017 writes:

Beijing believes that missile defense would undermine China's security by offsetting its nuclear deterrence capability. With Beijing already engaged in a delicate balancing act to pressure Pyongyang to change its behavior while ensuring regime stability, the decision to deploy missile defense inevitably weakened China's determination to strictly sanction North Korea

Without China, sanctions are absolutely ineffective. Demick of the LA Times reports that the sanctions imposed this August:

were the eighth time that the U.N. Security Council has adopted a resolution in response to North Korea's missile tests However. Objections by China led the resolution drafters to remove a clause that would have barred imports of fuel oil to North Korea

If China took a real step in sanctioning North Korea by blocking oil imports, it would force Kim's hand. According to Lockie at Business Insider in 2017:

China accounts for 90% of its oil and 100% of its aviation fuel. That's why he finds that "China can disarm North Korea in the blink of an eye,"

Without oil, North Korea's military cannot get its gas guzzling missiles off the ground. At that point, even if it wanted to go to war, it would be forced to back down.

Preventing a war on the Korean Peninsula is of the utmost importance. Wright at the New Yorker Magazine in 2017 finds:

The Second Korean War could be deadly—producing tens of thousands of deaths just in Seoul, and a million casualties in the South alone. A war would not end quickly after the defeat of North Korean forces. Loyalists to the Kim regime might fight on in covert cells and costly guerrilla attacks

Thus, we negate

Cut Cards

We negate resolved: The deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea's best interest.

Contention One: Militarism

For Kim Jong-Un, nuclear weapons are essential to North Korea's survival. According to Fifield at the Washington Post in 2017:

Fifield 17 Anna Fifield, 9-5-2017, "For Kim Jong Un, nuclear weapons are a security blanket. And he wants to keep it," Washington Post,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/for-kim-jong-un-nuclear-weapons-are-a-security-blanket-and-he-wants-to-keep-it/2017/09/05/d7b7ecb8-9236-11e7-b9bc-b2f7903bab0d_story.html?utm_term=.dde3d3d231ba //DF

North Korea as a state was formed at the end of World War II, when the Soviet Union and the United States drew a line across the peninsula as a "temporary measure." But it was solidified during the Korean War, a brutal conflict in which the U.S. Air Force leveled the North, to the extent that American generals complained there was nothing left to bomb. Ever since, North Korea has existed in a state of insecurity, with the totalitarian regime telling the population that the United States is out to destroy them — again. It is in this context that, following the collapse of its nuclear-armed benefactor, the Soviet Union, the Kim regime has sought weapons of its own. "If you were the head of a small, isolated, poor country surrounded by potentially hostile military powers, you'd be looking for some way to ensure your own destiny, too," said Jon

Wolfsthal, a nuclear nonproliferation expert who served on President Barack Obama's National Security Council. **North Korea has used its emerging weapons capability as a deterrent, betting that if it can threaten nuclear retaliation** or even a conventional attack **on South Korea, the United States will not take the risk of striking.** Contrary to an assertion

by the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, that North Korea is "begging for war," **all of the regime's recent belligerence about destroying the United States has been couched as retaliation for an American**

preemptive strike, not as North Korea making the first move. That, Kim knows, would be suicidal. But he looks at what happened to Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi leader who didn't manage to develop nuclear weapons, and Moammar Gaddafi, the Libyan who gave up his nuclear program, and sees that he needs them to keep the United States at bay, analysts say. "North Korea sees that in the 70 years that nuclear weapons have been in existence, no nuclear state has ever been invaded," said Koh Yu-hwan, a professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University in the South. Now having the ability, or almost having the ability, to send a nuclear weapon to the United States makes those hyperbolic threats of devastating retaliation all the more credible. "They know that they don't have to destroy every American city to deter us," Wolfsthal said. "They just have to make us think three times before attacking them."

However, missile defense undermines these deterrents. Etzioni at George Washington University in 2017 explains:

Etzioni 17 Amitai Etzioni [University Professor and professor of international relations at The George Washington University], 8-10-2017 "THAAD: Best a Bargaining Chip," The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/thaad-best-a-bargaining-chip/> //DF

Those quick to exclaim "Great, two for the price of one" should recall that nuclear powers hold each other at bay; that mutually assured destruction seems to be a major reason why the big powers have avoided war since 1945. To remind: The logic of nuclear deterrence presumes that if [a country] either China or the U.S. launches a nuclear attack, they must expect to be paid back in kind, to be devastated, making any major strike virtually suicidal. However, if one nuclear power can prevent a retaliatory strike (by an anti-missile defense system, for instance), the other nation must fear the possibility of a devastating attack without the ability to respond. As a result, mutual destruction is no longer assured, and the deterrence effect breaks down. Further, such concerns may well lead the newly vulnerable nation to put its nuclear forces on a hair trigger alert, ready to strike preemptively at any sign of preparation of an attack by the other. In short, if THAAD batteries are effective, they are highly destabilizing.

In order to restore the balance, the North has tried to develop missiles that can get around missile defense. According to the ISDP in 2016:

ISDP 16 11-2016, "THAAD in the Korean Peninsula," Institute for Security and Development Policy, <http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2016/11/THAAD-Backgrounder-ISDP-2.pdf> //DF

North Korea has viewed the decision to deploy [missile defense] THAAD as both a provocation and an act of aggression. Their response has been to continue missile development and invest in technologies that could bypass [missile defense] systems like THAAD. Correspondingly, one day after the announcement of THAAD deployment, North Korea tested a Pukkuksong-1 (KN-11) SLBM.⁴¹ This was followed by three short range missiles that were fired six days after the announcement and another two intermediate-range missiles in early August 2016.⁴² North Korea has also stated that they will retaliate with a "physical response."

⁴³ The continuous missile development by North Korea could be seen as tests for bypassing THAAD's abilities, as it is possible to launch more missiles than a missile defense can intercept.⁴⁴ So far, only one THAAD battery is planned to be deployed which could be a critical weakness. THAAD's difficulty in intercepting missiles with irregular trajectories could also be used; in theory, North Korea's medium-range Rodong missiles would be able to bypass THAAD as they have an irregular trajectory.⁴⁵ Recent analysis suggests that North Korea is developing a new submarine that would be larger than the previous GORAE-class experimental ballistic missile submarine.⁴⁶ The improvement of SLBMs, could be considered another weakness of THAAD and would give a critical advantage to North Korea. In any case, North Korea have continued their nuclear development, conducting a fifth nuclear test in September 2016.⁴⁷

South Korea's corresponding fears of escalation have pushed it to militarize. Reuters in 2017 reports:

Reuters 17 Reuters, 8-11-2017 "North Korea Missile Crisis Seen Pushing South Korea to Gun Up," New York Times,

<https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2017/08/11/world/asia/11reuters-northkorea-missiles-militarisation.html?partner=IFTTT> //DF

The escalating threat arising from nuclear-armed North Korea's recent series of missile tests is

prompting South Korea to beef up its military muscle [by] and experts warn it could spur an arms buildup elsewhere in Northeast Asia. South Korea and Japan are accustomed to the North's frequent threats to attack. But the war of words between Washington and Pyongyang has raised fears of a sudden clash along the world's most militarised border dividing the two Koreas, which might quickly escalate to all-out war. After North Korea's second test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on July 28, South Korean President Moon Jae-in ordered a speedy deployment of the controversial U.S. THAAD anti-missile defense system, reversing his earlier decision to postpone it pending an environmental review. This week, the U.S. Defence Department said it was "actively" considering **revising bilateral**

ballistic missile guidelines with South Korea **to allow Seoul to build more powerful missiles** -- at the South's request. Moon told U.S. President Donald Trump in a telephone conversation on Monday South Korea also wants **[and] to build a nuclear-powered submarine**, presidential officials said. **"All of this could lead to further militarization of South Korea,"** said Yang Uk, a senior research fellow at the Korea Defence and Security Forum.

North Korea's nuclear weapons can now reach the US. This empowers the North to act more aggressively against the South. Bush at the Brookings Institute in 2017 writes:

Bush 17 Richard C. Bush, 8-9-2017, "The real reason a North Korean nuclear weapon is so terrifying—and it's not what you think," Brookings,

<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/08/09/the-real-reason-a-north-korean-nuclear-weapon-is-so-terrifying-and-its-not-what-you-think/> //DF

North Korea's nuclear program poses another danger, perhaps the greatest one. **Pyongyang may soon assume that it can now act more recklessly vis-à-vis South Korea at the conventional level and well short of a major attack because it can hypothetically counter the United States at the nuclear level.** The scenario I have in mind is one in which North Korea starts at a relatively low rung of the escalation ladder: sinking a South Korean naval vessel, bombarding South Korean-controlled islands in the West Sea, or creating trouble in the demilitarized zone. It has done all of these things in the last seven years but then backed off from further conflict. **Once Pyongyang can target the continental United States, it will likely take bigger risks than it has to date. It would undertake such limited-war actions as much to achieve political gains as military ones. It would hope to test South Korean intentions and try to drive wedges within South Korean society:** between t

Gollman in 2017 explains:

Gollman 17 Mark Gollman, 4-26-2017, "Why 'miscalculation is the enemy' that could spark a U.S.-North Korea conflict," CBC News,

<http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/north-korea-threat-missile-donald-trump-1.4085375> //DF

Despite heightened tensions, many experts say it's unlikely the U.S. and North Korea are headed toward imminent military conflict. **While the leaders of [North Korea and the US]** both countries are impulsive and unpredictable, they **are** also **desperate to**

avoid pre-emptive strikes. However, **there remains the threat**, albeit small, **of a miscalculation – that amplified rhetoric, a military mistake, or the misinterpretation of an action** by any of the main actors in the region **could snowball into something much larger.** "We're talking about a highly unlikely chain of events happening all at once aligning to create that sort of circumstance," said Philip Yun, a former member of a government working group that managed U.S. policy and negotiations with North Korea under Bill Clinton. "But that is a possibility and if it's going to happen, chances are it's going to happen in this heightened state. "Mistakes happen, so when mistakes happen, miscalculation is the enemy here."

Gibler in 2005 confirms this empirically, finding that:

Gibler 05 Douglas M. Gibler [Department of Political Science, University of Kentucky], 2005, "Taking Arms Against a Sea of Troubles: Conventional Arms Races During Periods of Rivalry," Journal of Peace Research, <http://saramitchell.org/Gibleretal.pdf> //DF

In addition to escalation, arms races seem to have an important substantive impact on the likelihood of conflict, especially in comparison with the other variables in our models. For example, as Table II shows, the chance of a MID [militarized interstate dispute] for strategic rivals more than doubles, from 16% on average to 35% during an arms race year, and **the chance of war changes from 1 in 100 to 1 in 20 during arms race years.** These results are especially dramatic in comparison with the two other variables that are statistically significant across both models – contiguity increases the probability of both types of conflict by just over 23%, and an alliance decreases these probabilities by more than half.

Contention Two: Sanctions

Feng at Foreign Affairs magazine in 2017 writes:

Feng 17 Zhu Feng, 7-11-2017, "China's North Korean Liability: How Washington Can Get Beijing to Rein In Pyongyang," Foreign Affairs,

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-07-11/chinas-north-korean-liability> //DF

China-North Korean relations have been slowly **souring since the end of the Cold War.** North Korea **ceased being China's ally long ago when Beijing decided,** against Pyongyang's objections, **to normalize its ties with Seoul in 1992.** A recent example of their dysfunctional relationship is the killing of Kim Jong-nam, former leader Kim Jong-il's eldest son, by North Korean agents in Malaysia. Its heavily publicized nature signaled Pyongyang's utter disrespect for Beijing, under whose protection the elder Kim had lived in Macau. China has long offered various forms of support to the North based on their shared history, but **the relationship has turned into a heavy burden for China, holding Beijing back from playing a greater role in the global and regional order. Beijing is,** of course, **highly aware of the costs if it continues to keep Pyongyang within its fold.** The completely divergent paths they have taken to fulfil their basic goals of peace and development since early the 1990s have kept the two countries apart. **For today's Chinese, North Korea today is reminiscent of the deplorable era under Chairman Mao Zedong.** But **for North Koreans, China is an "accomplice" to American imperialism.** Despite this, Beijing has not been ready yet to "give up" North Korea, since doing so would require an explicit policy decision, such as pulling its lifeline to North Korea or literally deeming it a "public threat." Trump once complained of China's failure to put enough pressure on Pyongyang. Although his warm meeting in April with Xi at Mar-a-Lago gave the impression that the two leaders were inclined to work together in "harnessing" North Korea, China's lack of determination in fully abandoning North Korea may disappoint the Trump administration. **North Korea's increasingly belligerent behavior has irritated China to an ever- greater extent.** Pyongyang conducted 15 missile tests in 2015 and 33 in 2016, and so far in 2017, it has tested ten. In 2016, Pyongyang conducted two nuclear tests despite ever-increasing international pressure. **Although North Korea's aim is to destroy the United**

States, China's capital is also well within range of some of Pyongyang's Scud missiles. It would only take one unpredictable official in the military chain or some such for North Korea to turn on a nominal ideological ally in the most drastic way. The threat of a nuclear attack is not the only thing China must worry about; the risk of a North Korean nuclear accident spewing radiation across the Chinese border could spell catastrophe in megacities such as Shenyang in the Liaoning province, which has over eight million people and is located just 124 miles from the North Korean border. Chinese public opinion toward North Korea is also worsening, with many Chinese now critical of Beijing's long-standing indecision to deal adequately with Pyongyang. A growing number of Chinese citizens believe that the North is a bad actor that poses a severe threat to China's security interests, according to polls conducted by the Global Times. Another portion of the Chinese populace believes that Beijing should not assume the responsibility for denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula—Washington should. China's only role, they believe, is to support reconciliation while bolstering negotiations, even if many Chinese are aware that such a limited role for China is remarkably inconsistent with the real threat posed by the North. Concern over North Korea has also been on the rise in South Korea, leading Seoul to allow the U.S. deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense ballistic missile defense system, against China's strong protestations. This is because THAAD interceptors are capable not only of shooting down North Korean missiles but also of obstructing missiles launched from China. This growing geostrategic complexity triggered by Pyongyang requires that Washington and Beijing not distract themselves with this negative spillover and focus on finding a workable solution. This is what a great many Chinese citizens want. When Beijing recently shuttered the Chinese branches of the South Korean-owned Lotte supermarket chain, providing land for the THAAD deployment, the move was viewed domestically as unconstructive. Although Beijing also managed to stir up Chinese nationalistic fervor by insisting that THAAD is a threat to China's national security, it was arguably little more than a cleverly engineered political ruse. Actual popular resentment toward North Korea is surging, and Beijing's passive North Korea policy is increasingly under fire domestically. For example, the Chinese academia and media are largely and distinctively divided over how Beijing should approach Pyongyang, and considering that many Chinese media outlets are wholly state owned, this signals that the likelihood of a reassessment of China's commitment to North Korea is slowly but firmly gaining favor in Beijing.

As a result, there has been more pressure to severely sanction the North. According to VOA News in 2016:

Brian Padden (VOICE OF AMERICA). Feb. 25, 2016, U.S. China Agree on Proposed Sanction Against North Korea, Retrieved Apr. 23, 2016 from

<http://learningenglish.voanews.com/content/us-china-agree-on-proposed-sanction-against-north-korea/3208250.html>

The U.S. also wanted to increase restrictions on North Korean banks' access to the international financial system. Chinese and South Korean media reported this week that China has ordered a halt to its coal trade with North Korea. They say some Chinese banks have frozen accounts belonging to North Koreans. China's Foreign Ministry said it does not know of these developments. However, experts say there is [was] increased popular support in China to cut off possible funding for North Korea's nuclear program. "China has been intensively discussing how to internally block oil and cash from flowing into North Korea," said Woo Su-keun, a professor of international relations at Donghua University in Shanghai. China, Russia oppose THAAD missiles There have been questions that China would be slow to reach agreement on U.N. sanctions. The U.S. and South Korea are considering the possible deployment of the controversial Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, missile defense system. China and Russia oppose THAAD deployment in Korea. They are concerned that it can possibly be used against their military forces in the area. This week, the Chinese Ambassador to South Korea, Qiu Guohong, suggested China would cut ties with South Korea over THAAD deployment. South Korea's Deputy Foreign Minister, Kim Hong-kyun, criticized the Chinese ambassador for attempting to exert influence over a South Korean national security issue.

However, the deployment of missile defense has infuriated China and undermined all potential progress. Xiao, a professor at Fudan University in 2017 writes:

Xiao 17 Ren Xiao [Professor and Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy at Fudan University in Shanghai], 1-2017, "Old Wine in a New Bottle? China's Korea Problem," Asia Policy //DF

Beijing believes that [missile defense] THAAD exceeds the ROK's defense needs and that the X-band radar system likely to accompany its deployment **would undermine China's security by offsetting its nuclear deterrence capability.** However, South Korea had its own logic, convinced that this decision was necessitated by the DPRK's moves. After the fourth nuclear test and the long-range rocket test that soon followed, the Park administration agreed to initiate consultations with the United States on the earliest possible deployment of a THAAD system. North Korea's accelerated missile testing program, evident since April 2006, reinforced the urgency and need for a meaningful response from Seoul. According to the official announcement, operational deployment of THAAD will occur by the end of 2017 and is intended to defend the infrastructure and citizens of South Korea and to protect core military capabilities underpinning the U.S.-ROK alliance. It was an obvious setback for Chinese diplomacy. During the Xi-Park meeting on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Hangzhou in September 2016, the THAAD issue was once again raised. According to what Xi said to Park, failing to resolve the issue would be unfavorable to strategic stability in the region and would exacerbate China's existing suspicions.² China, South Korea, and the United States must reach an understanding on the technical aspects of the system and identify ways to reassure China that THAAD will not undermine its national security. Amid heightened tension in the South China Sea, the THAAD decision suggested to North Korea that the Sino-U.S. rivalry was worsening. Pyongyang probably believed that it could take advantage of this situation. This assumption was not totally wrong. U.S. naval operations, especially sending warships into the South China Sea, highlighted the friction between the United States and China and were inevitably seen as challenging China. **With Beijing already engaged in a delicate balancing act to pressure Pyongyang to change its behavior while ensuring regime stability, the decision [to deploy missile defense] on THAAD inevitably weakened China's determination to strictly sanction North Korea.** In this sense, South Korea took this step at the expense of the ROK-China relationship and of Beijing's close cooperation on sanctioning Pyongyang. According to a study carried out by the Sejong Institute, a South Korean think tank, the volume of trade between China and the DPRK has been rising since the United States and South Korea announced their plans to deploy THAAD.³

Now, Chinese sanctions are absolutely ineffective. Demick of the LA Times reports that the sanctions imposed this August:

Barbara Demick (LA Times). "Tough new sanctions approved by U.N. could cost North Korea \$1 billion in exports annually." August 5, 2017.

<http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-north-korea-sanctions-20170805-story.html>

This is **[were] the eighth time** since 2006 **that the U.N. Security Council has adopted a resolution in response to North Korea's nuclear and missile tests [However].** Frustrated North Korea analysts were dubious that this latest measure would halt Pyongyang's juggernaut toward the development of a workable nuclear warhead. **Objections by China and Russia led the resolution drafters to remove a clause that would have barred imports of fuel oil to North Korea.** And more important, the resolution didn't impose sanctions on the Chinese companies and individuals who have helped North Korea evade sanctions. **"Objections by China and Russia led the resolution drafters to remove a clause that would have barred imports of fuel oil to North Korea"** said Anthony Ruggiero, an analyst for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He said the resolution might actually be counterproductive in that it will allow China and Russia to claim they are cooperating in efforts to rein in North Korea. "The U.S. government had been moving towards sanctioning Chinese companies and individuals, but they have

backed away from that," said Ruggiero. "I fear people in the Trump administration will now say, 'Well, we can't do anything more because we have to give the Chinese the chance to implement the new resolution.'"

If China took a real step in sanctioning North Korea by blocking oil imports, it would force Kim's hand. According to Lockie at Business Insider in 2017:

Alex Lockie. "China could stop North Korea's nuclear threat in a heartbeat without firing a shot."

Business Insider. 9 Jun. 2017. Web. 14 Jul. 2017.

<http://www.businessinsider.com/china-disarm-north-korea-trump-2017-6> > //NS

But Gordon Chang, the author of "The Coming Collapse of China," writes in The Cipher Brief that **90% of North Korea's trade is done with China, accounting for 90% of its oil and, in some years, 100% of its aviation fuel.** After a provocative North Korean missile launch in 2003, China cut off its supply of oil to North Korea for three days. In no time, the Kim regime caved to international demands and sat down for the six-party talks on nuclear disarmament. **[That's why he finds that] "China can disarm North Korea in the blink of an eye,"** Chang wrote. And it could do so by crippling North Korea's economy — but at a huge cost to North Koreans. Sanctions on North Korea do not affect regular trade. Although the UN takes very seriously the prospect of an aggressive, nuclear-armed North Korea, economic warfare in the form of too-harsh sanctions would harm or kill civilians — China also supplies at least a third of North Korea's food, according to Chang.

Without oil, North Korea's military cannot launch an effective attack, nor can it get its gas guzzling missiles off the ground. At that point, even if it wanted to go to war, it simply couldn't and would be forced to back down.

Preventing a war on the Korean Peninsula is of the utmost importance. Regardless of the effectiveness of missile defenses, any conflict would be devastating. Wright at the New Yorker Magazine in 2017 finds:

Wright 17 Robin Wright, 9-6-2017, "What Would War with North Korea Look Like?," New Yorker, <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-would-war-with-north-korea-look-like> //DF

If war erupted, the first phase would likely play out for at least a month, and possibly many weeks more. "North Korea is in a position now where its conventional warfare has atrophied over the years and not been modernized much," the retired General Gary E. Luck, the former commander of both U.S. and U.N. forces in Korea, told me. "But it still has the numbers in its military—because of the type of regime it is—that it could execute a conventional war not far afield from the last time around." It also now has a nuclear bomb. **North Korea has almost 1.2 million troops** in its various military branches, **plus another six hundred thousand in its reserves and almost six million in its paramilitary reserves,** according to "Military Balance 2017," published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a global think tank. South Korea's armed forces are about half the size of the North's, but it has 4.5 million troops in its reserves and another three million in its paramilitary reserves. Partly because there is still no formal end to the last Korean War, only an armistice, the United States has about twenty-eight thousand troops deployed in South Korea, with tens of thousands more in the U.S. Pacific Command. **In the end, North Korea would lose a war,** the generals and military analysts say. The regime of Kim Jong Un would probably collapse. **But the Second Korean War could be deadly—producing tens of thousands of deaths just in Seoul, and possibly a million casualties in the South alone.** It would almost certainly be devastating physically in both the North and South, military experts say. **"The devastation to the peninsula would be disastrous, just disastrous,"** the retired Major General James (Spider) Marks, who served in both Korea and Iraq, told me. (During the first Korean War, between 1950 and 1953, the United States lost more than thirty thousand troops in battle. South Korea lost almost a quarter million troops and a million civilians. In North Korea, just over a million troops and civilians are estimated to have died.) Luck, a Purple Heart recipient who served in Vietnam and the first war against Iraq, told me "it would be a very tough fight." He said, "in the end, we would win, but the price we'd pay to get there would be pretty dadgum high. There would be horrendous loss of life. There are twenty-five million people in South Korea within

artillery range of North Korea." North Korea has thousands of artillery pieces embedded deep in the northern slopes above the Demilitarized Zone that divides the Korean Peninsula. Lost in tensions over North Korea's nuclear programs are its chemical and biological weapons, Luck added. "They are something to be worried about." As bad as the scenario for the first phase seems, **the second phase could then get worse. "A war would not end quickly after the defeat of North Korean forces,"** Mark Fitzpatrick, the executive director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies office in Washington, told me. "North Korea would not be immediately pacified." **A conventional conflict could then devolve into the now familiar kind of insurgency that U.S. forces face in the Middle East and South Asia. Loyalists to the Kim regime might fight on in covert cells and costly guerrilla attacks.** "North Korea would not go down as fast as Saddam's regime (in less than a month of the U.S. invasion) or the Taliban (in two months), but the aftermath would be similar and probably of greater intensity," Fitzpatrick said. **"North Koreans are brainwashed into believing that the Kim dynasty is deity-like and Americans are the source of all evil."** Numerous war games have analyzed what it would take to eliminate the regime and its weaponry, he noted, but little has been done to study what might happen afterward. **The same problem plagued military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan: they achieved their initial goals, only to get sucked into open-ended quagmire.**

Chong, a professor at SUNY, in 2016 writes:

Chong 16 Chong Jin Oh [Professor Dr., Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Fulbright Visiting Professor State University of New York], 2016, "NEO-COLD WAR IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA: RISING TENSION BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA," Review of International Law and Politics //DF

North Korea's recent provocation and South Korea's tough reaction are escalating the tension in the region to Cold War levels. North Korea's twin provocations of a fourth nuclear test on January 6 and a long-range rocket launch on February 7 both dramatically escalated tensions on the divided peninsula while simultaneously adding fuel to the already crackling fire of U.S.-China rivalry in East Asia. These two events have brought conspicuous change - and an uncertain future - to the Korean Peninsula. The current South Korean government reaction's has broken from precedent and now tension in the Korean Peninsula is like a runaway train. In the past, South Korea has taken a defensive realist policy not unlike that of neighboring China. This is mostly because **South Korea has no interest in any type of military confrontation with the North. A conventional military conflict would certainly result in a victory for South Korea**, especially with almost assured U.S. aid, **but would devastate the capital Seoul, which sits only 40 km from the demarcation line.** Accordingly, China and **South Korea had a shared security interest in preventing war in the Korean Peninsula.** However, continuous aggressive military gestures on the part of North Korea are shifting the region's security paradigm. China seems to be continuing its traditional protective policy towards North Korea, a stance which has disappointed the South Korean government. Many South Korean commentators are arguing that, in refusing to join in international efforts to punish Pyongyang, China has shown itself not interested in preventing the rise of nuclear-armed North Korea, but rather interested in preserving North Korea's role as a strategic regional asset for Chinese interests. It is obvious that China has an interest in maintaining the status quo in the Korean peninsula, as North Korea acts as a physical buffer for China. North Korea could possibly be forced to abandon its nuclear aspirations if China were to impose harsh economic sanctions but China fears that this would result in internal collapse of the North Korea regime which would eventually lead to loss of their buffer zone.

Because war is good for absolutely nothing, we negate.

Frontlines

C1: Chinese Retaliation

A2: Pivot to US – Impact Defense

US-SK trade relations are in shambles; Trump might even pull out of the trade deal.

This is not a partner they can turn to

Thrush 17 Glenn Thrush and Gardiner Harris, 9-2-2017, "Amid Nuclear Tensions, Trump Mulls Exit From South Korea Trade Deal," New York Times,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/02/world/asia/us-south-korea-trade.html?mcubz=3&r=0>

//DF

President Trump is considering pulling out of a major trade agreement with South Korea as he tries to fulfill get-tough campaign pledges on international trade. But he has not yet made a final decision, two senior administration officials said Saturday.

The president's top economic advisers remain deeply divided over a possible withdrawal from the

United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, as negotiators from both countries struggle to rewrite the five-year-old deal. The debate comes as the United States and South Korea are working together to try to combat a growing nuclear threat from North Korea, which said on Sunday that it had tested a hydrogen bomb that could be mounted on an intercontinental ballistic missile. It is a more powerful weapon than the atomic bomb it had tested in the past. In recent days, a frustrated Mr. Trump has pushed his staff to take bold

action against a host of governments, including the one in Seoul, that he has accused of unfair trade practices. But many of his more moderate advisers, including the chairman of the National Economic Council, Gary D. Cohn, believe that such a move could prompt a trade war that could hurt the United States economy. An industry publication, Inside U.S. Trade, first reported late Friday that the administration was considering withdrawing from the treaty as early as next week. "Discussions are ongoing, but we have no announcements at this time," a White House spokeswoman said in an email. But Mr. Trump, asked during a trip to the Gulf Coast on Saturday whether he was talking with his advisers about the trade deal, said: "I am. It's very much on my mind."

The idea of potentially withdrawing seems to have been prompted by the breakdown in negotiations between

South Korean officials and the United States trade representative, Robert Lighthizer, an American official with knowledge of the situation said. An initial meeting generated little consensus, with South Korean officials offering to consider minor adjustments to the agreement but rejecting a wholesale renegotiation, angering hard-liners in the White House who have targeted countries like China, Japan, Mexico and South Korea that have large trade surpluses with the United States. But it remains unclear whether the administration would actually withdraw from the deal, and industry representatives who have lobbied the White House say the president's team has done little of the work — like a wide consultation with affected industries — needed before taking such a step. The possibility of abandoning the agreement has alarmed economists and some members of the president's own party

who fear that such a move would force South Korea to block American manufacturers and farmers from a lucrative market.

C2: Militarism

A2: Other Forms of Militarism – Uniqueness Defense

A2: Stop Military Exercises – Freeze Link Defense

A2: Blackmail/Stealing Money – Impact Defense

NK's aim isn't to get money, it's to normalize relations with the US

Sigal 17 Leon V. Sigal, 8-22-2017, "Bad History," 38 North,
<http://www.38north.org/2017/08/lsigal082217/> //DF

At the root of that bad history is a misreading of Pyongyang's purpose, which has never been about blackmail or money. During the Cold War, Kim Il Sung played China off against the Soviet Union to maintain his freedom of maneuver. In 1988, anticipating the collapse of the Soviet Union, he reached out to improve relations with the United States, South Korea and Japan in order to avoid becoming overly dependent on China. That has been the Kims' main aim ever since. From Pyongyang's vantage point, that aim was the basis of the 1994 Agreed Framework, which committed Washington to "move toward full normalization of political and economic relations," or, in plain English, end enmity. That was also the essence of the September 2005 Six Party Joint Statement in which Washington and Pyongyang pledged to "respect each other's sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies" as well as to "negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula." For Washington, suspension of Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs was the point of these agreements, which succeeded for a time in shuttering the North's production of fissile material and stopping the test-launches of medium and longer-range missiles. Would North Korea have kept its word? No one will ever know because both agreements collapsed when Washington did little to implement its commitment to improve relations and Pyongyang reneged on denuclearization.

A2: Freeze Reduces Deterrence – Impact Defense

1. NK would still never be able to attack

Fatton 17 Lionel Fatton, 4-15-2017, "Could China's Diplomatic Proposal Break the North Korean Deadlock?," IPI Global Observatory,
<https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/06/china-north-korea-nuclear-missiles/> //DF

In line with Wang's two-way suspension proposal, the US could slow down the deployment and rotation of military assets and personnel in South Korea, and accelerate that country's control of armed forces in wartime. More importantly, annual joint military exercises could be scaled back and conducted farther away from North Korea's territory. Scenarios could be revised to appear less threatening from Pyongyang's perspective. This would radically reduce tensions and have a real impact on the North's

perception of its international environment. These activities would not radically affect the deterrent power of the US-South Korea alliance. The degree of interoperability between the armed forces might somehow decrease, but not extensively as long as exercises are not completely canceled. **Even with the scaling down, it would still be suicidal for Pyongyang to trigger war on the Korean peninsula. South Korean armed forces are qualitatively superior and much better prepared for modern warfare than their northern counterparts. The US also maintains an overwhelming military presence** in the region. Finally, Japan's government recently reclaimed the legislative right to collective self-defense and can be expected to back, and possibly participate with US forces in, any war that occurs.

2. NK aggression is rooted in US aggression. There is a long history of NK responding well to peaceful overtures, and responding aggressively to military provocations – THAAD is a continuation of broken practices

Lee 17 Brianni Lee, 2-17-2017, "THAAD Deployment in South Korea: Militarism Leading To Political Regression," No Publication, <http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=14503> //DF

Following the international current of détente, Kim Dae-jung, the third president of the sixth republic of South Korea, formulated and implemented the Sunshine Policy. The Sunshine Policy promoted conversations with the North Korean government with the least degree of military, economic, and diplomatic pressure. With his efforts to improve the relations between the two Koreas and achieve peaceful reunification, President Kim was able to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang in 2000 after 55 years of disconnection. The Sunshine Policy resulted in successful meetings of separated families in North and South Korea, and discussions on economic cooperation and the process of autonomous reunification. At the same time, the Clinton administration in the United States sought to check further development of North Korea's nascent nuclear program via the Agreed Framework, by providing two light-water reactors (LWRs), which are difficult to use for producing nuclear weapons, and putting North Korea under the close watch of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). President Kim's successor Roh Moo-hyun continued the Sunshine Policy, expanding economic and humanitarian aid to North Korea. However, President Roh was harshly criticized by conservatives who claimed that his aid, rather than helping North Korean civilians, actually helped North Korea solidify its dictatorial government and develop nuclear weapons. Additionally, US President George W. Bush, who was highly skeptical of Clinton's policy towards North Korea, terminated the Agreed Framework and discontinued the ties Clinton had fostered, without working to create a new policy. This left North Korea under no supervision. US intelligence agencies later found out that North Korea was trying to develop nuclear weapons using a different method, and the Bush administration immediately withdrew the supply of oil to North Korea, which was critical to the maintenance of the earlier agreement. Such abrupt, hardline action by the Bush administration disrupted South Korean attempts to cautiously and gradually build trust with North Korea. Unlike Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, their successor, conservative President Lee Myung-bak, took a hardline approach toward North Korea. President Lee declared that South Korea would economically support North Korea to the point where North Korean per capita income reached US\$3,000 on the condition that North Korea completely gave up its nuclear weapons and opened its border. This upset the North Korean government, and a series of conflicts followed, including the shooting of a South Korean tourist in North Korea, North Korea's second nuclear test, North Korea's alleged sinking of the South Korean warship ROKS Cheonan, and the bombardment of Yeonpyeong. Relations between North and South Korea sharply deteriorated. Experiencing the failures of hardline policies during Lee's presidency, South Korea's liberal parties have argued for the revival of the Sunshine Policy. However, President Park continues uncompromising, strict policies toward North Korea. Last February, Park decided to completely shut down a joint North-South Korean industrial complex, known as the Kaesong industrial complex. Kaesong was seen as the last hope of improving relations between South and North Korea because it proved that cooperation, however feeble, could exist between the two Koreas. Park argued that shutting down the Kaesong industrial complex was a strategic act to economically pressure North Korea in response to its belligerent satellite launch. However, liberals and even some hardliners question the effectiveness of this policy, as

Kaesong is not a main source of North Korean revenue. Park's decision to deploy THAAD in South Korea shows her determination to approach North and South Korean relations militarily, which will only lead to a destructive arms race.

Extras

Chinese Retaliation

China is strongly opposed to anti-missile systems in South Korea. According to Buckley at the New York Times in 2017, this is because China worries that they

Buckley 17 Chris Buckley, 3-11-2017, "Why U.S. Antimissile System in South Korea Worries China," New York Times,

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/11/world/asia/us-south-korea-thaad-antimissile-system-china.html?_r=0 //DF

Chinese experts are nearly unanimous in supporting Beijing's criticisms. But quite a few foreign experts say those fears are overstated or unfounded. The United States already has access to radar systems in Qatar and Taiwan able to peer at China's missile tests, and Japan has two radar systems just like the one used for Thaad, Mr. Lewis said. "I don't see the deployment of Thaad in South Korea as a significant improvement in the ability of the U.S. to monitor Chinese missile tests," he said. The Chinese government appears to have an exaggerated view of the Thaad radar's abilities, two experts, Jaganath Sankaran and Bryan L. Fearey, wrote in a recent paper. That radar is often said to have a range of about 620 miles. Some Chinese experts say its reach could be much farther. But in practice the range could be much lower and "not possess the ability to track Chinese strategic missile warheads/decoys," Mr. Sankaran and Mr. Fearey wrote. "The Thaad radar simply cannot cover the entire or even a substantial part of the Chinese mainland." Even so, China's real, underlying worry appears to be that Thaad could open the door to a much wider, more advanced fence of antimissile systems arrayed around it by America's allies, several experts said. That would magnify Chinese worries about the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent, and entrench Chinese fears of encirclement by a coalition knit together by a shared antimissile system. "I think this is what really worries them, because then what you have is the basis for a common interoperable system," said Michael J. Green, the former senior director for Asia in the National Security Council under President George W. Bush. "I think it's more about the creation of a virtual collective security system," he said of China's worries about Thaad.

In response, China is lashing out at South Korea. Mody at CNBC in 2017 reports:

Seema Mody. "China Lashes out as South Korea Puts an American Anti-missile System in Place." CNBC. CNBC, 28 Apr. 2017. Web. 26 June 2017.

<http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/17/thaad-anti-missile-system-makes-china-lash-out-at-south-korea.html>.

Think tank Eurasia Group told CNBC that China's retaliation against the anti-missile system[s] is becoming a threat to South Korea's economy. China has in recent weeks begun alleging code violations against South Korean firms as an excuse to shut down some of South Korean company Lotte's retail facilities in China, and it has blocked online trade in South Korean goods. China has lashed out at high-profile Korean firms in entertainment, consumer goods, travel and the like. Lotte did not immediately return a CNBC request for comment. Also this month, Beijing began impeding tourist travel from China to South Korea, a popular destination for Chinese citizens. "Some estimates suggest that Beijing's travel ban could reduce the number of Chinese visitors to South Korea by up to 70 percent, resulting in billions of dollars in lost tourism-related revenue," Scott Seaman, director of Asia at the Eurasia Group, wrote in a note to clients.

Making an enemy out of China is detrimental to the South's strategic interests. Meick, a policy analyst in 2017 explains:

Meick 17 Ethan Meick [Policy Analyst, Security and Foreign Affairs], 7-26-2017, "China's Response to U.S.-South Korean Missile Defense System Deployment and its Implications," U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,

https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Report_China%27s%20Response%20to%20THAAD%20Deployment%20and%20its%20Implications.pdf //DF

China's economic retaliation against South Korea follows a pattern of Chinese actions toward countries with which it finds itself in a diplomatic or security dispute. Other countries that experienced China's wrath include Japan (China temporarily suspended exports of rare earth minerals amidst heightened tensions in the East China Sea in 2010⁸⁴), Norway (China boycotted Norway's salmon exports after Liu Xiaobo, a Chinese dissident, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010⁸⁵), the Philippines (China subjected exports of Philippine tropical fruit to a quarantine following a standoff over disputed territory in the South China Sea in 2012⁸⁶), and Mongolia (China called off senior-level talks and imposed additional fees on imports following the visit by the Dalai Lama, Tibet's exiled spiritual leader, in 2016⁸⁷). Taiwan is a frequent target of Chinese retaliation. Following the inauguration of President Tsai Ing-wen in May 2016, the Chinese government has been reducing the number of Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan as part of a pressure campaign on President Tsai.⁸⁸ What distinguishes the retaliation against South Korea is the breadth of China's actions, and the public nature of the row. That the tensions are centered on a weapons system provided to South Korea by the United States complicates the geopolitical calculus for the parties involved. **South Korea's economic dependence on China makes it particularly vulnerable to retaliation. China is South Korea's largest export market:** China has, on average, accounted for about 25 percent of South Korea's annual exports over the past decade (see Appendix Table 1). ⁸⁹ In 2016, South Korean exports to China reached \$124 billion, nearly twice as much as exports to the United States, South Korea's second-biggest export market.⁹⁰ **Such economic leverage means a prolonged clash would be very problematic for South Korea. At the same time, China's reliance on exports from South Korea has been declining** since 2014.⁹¹ Part of the reason for this decline—independent of any political motivations—is the changing nature of China's domestic manufacturers, which are increasingly competitive with South Korean producers, reducing China's need to import South Korean parts and components (mostly electronics). ⁹² During the Commission's May 2017 trip to South Korea, representatives of South Korean government and business noted South Korea is pursuing trade partner diversification, particularly in Southeast Asia, though expectations are moderate.⁹³ Interlocutors at South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed to the high spending power of Chinese tourists compared to their counterparts in Southeast Asia, calling Chinese tourists "irreplaceable."⁹⁴

In reaction, China is strongly lashing out at South Korea. Moody in 2017 writes:

Seema Mody. "China Lashes out as South Korea Puts an American Anti-missile System in Place." CNBC. CNBC, 28 Apr. 2017. Web. 26 June 2017.

<<http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/17/thaad-anti-missile-system-makes-china-lash-out-at-south-korea.html>>.

U.S. officials insist the system has nothing to do with China and point out that it is not an offensive weapon. "THAAD is a purely defensive system designed to counter short- and medium-range regional ballistic missiles. It will not undermine China's or Russia's strategic deterrent," said U.S. Navy Commander Gary Ross. Experts on the region, including former U.S. Ambassador Thomas Hubbard, and Richard Weitz, director of the Hudson Institute's Center for Political-Military Analysis, told CNBC that a warming trend between South Korea and China was put to an end

by the THAAD issue. China is South Korea's largest trading partner. **"China has already engaged in one of its most assertive influence campaigns in recent history to prevent the THAAD deployment, encompassing threatening leadership speeches, alarming media commentary, and most recently coercive economic pressure"** that has included government-sanctioned trade boycotts," Weitz said.

Any small shift in Chinese-South Korean trade would decimate the South Korean economy because as Key Business Issue points out:

Key Business Issue. "Protracted slump of South Korea's export sector." World.kbs.co.kr. n.d. Web. 12 Jul. 2017. <http://world.kbs.co.kr/english/program/program_economyplus_detail.htm?No=5806> // NS
If US President-elect Donald Trump pushes ahead with his pledge to declare China a currency manipulator and fights against the country in a "trade war", not only China, but other Asian nations around China are bound to suffer economic damages as well. If the Chinese economy shrinks due to stiff American tariffs, the neighboring nations trading with China will shrink in tandem. Among such neighboring nations, **South Korea's dependence on exports to China amounts to 26% [of its entire trade volume]**. According to the International Monetary Fund, when China's GDP growth rate drops by 1 percentage point, Korea's GDP growth rate will drop 0.5 percentage points. **Twenty-six percent of Korea's entire trade volume goes to China. Korean exports are highly dependent on the neighboring country.** Its dependence on the US accounts for about 14% as well. That means nearly half of Korea's trades are with either China or the US. If there is a trade war between Washington and Beijing, it will be extremely important to choose a side carefully. Also, the US now plans to strengthen protectionist policies and abolish or renegotiate free trade deals, including the Korea-US FTA. Amidst such developments, Korea must decide whether to strengthen its economic ties with China, or to boost its cooperation with the US. Korea needs to come up with ways to prepare for an emergency situation.

Ren at Barrons Magazine in 2017 furthers:

Ren 17 Shuli Ren, 3-5-2017, "China's Sanctions Over THAAD Can Sink Korea's Economy," No Publication,

<http://www.barrons.com/articles/chinas-sanctions-over-thaad-can-sink-koreas-economy-1488773168>
//DF

China has expressed its displeasure at South Korea over its intent to install a U.S.-backed missile defense system by telling Chinese travel agencies not to organize group tours to Korea and suspending conglomerate Lotte Group's supermarket operations in China. **China's travel ban can shave at least 20% off Korea's GDP growth this year**, says Credit Suisse. The bank currently forecasts Korea to grow at 2.5%. The reasoning is very simple. **Chinese tourists**, who come as part of tour groups, **contribute \$7.3 billion in tourism revenue to Korea's economy**, or 0.5% of its total GDP. **Individual tourists** from China, **contribute another \$11.3 billion**, or 0.8% of its total GDP. So if China just cancels travel groups alone this year, 0.5% of Korea's GDP is gone, or 20% of overall GDP growth estimated by Credit Suisse. And things could get worse. China has asked for a boycott of Lotte Group's products, but China's displeasure has so far only been directed at cosmetics, duty-free shops and Korean casinos. Will China launch sanctions against Korean smartphones and car makers too?

China's retaliation has also affected other sectors. South Korean newspaper The Hankyoreh reports just two days ago that China has begun targeting automakers:

Hankyoreh 17 8-31-2017, "[Editorial] Dialogue with Beijing needed to resolve THAAD dispute," The Hankyoreh, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/809116.html //DF

Four of the Hyundai Motor Company's factories in China were temporarily shut down before resuming operations on Aug. 30. The shutdown occurred when a Chinese parts manufacturer discontinued its supplies to Hyundai, which had failed to make payments on time because of its sagging sales in the Chinese market. For now, the Chinese company has resumed its supply of parts, allowing the factories to reopen, but the future doesn't look bright. If sales in the Chinese market remain as stagnant as they are today, the company may face an even worse crisis down the road. The difficulties that Hyundai and Kia are facing in the Chinese market would be unimaginable if not for the THAAD deployment. **A boycott on South Korean products has caused automobile sales to plummet this year.** As of July, Beijing Hyundai (Hyundai's branch in China) had sold 415,000 units this year, down almost 30% from the same period last year. The reason the company has been unable to pay its parts suppliers on time is because of this cash crunch. Automakers are not the only companies that are in trouble. The Lotte Group, which provided Seoul with the THAAD site in a land swap, is suffering tremendous losses, with around 90 of its more than 100 retailers in China closed for business. It's regrettable that China is using the THAAD deployment as a pretext for meting out this kind of economic retribution to companies in the South Korean private sector. In particular, Beijing Hyundai and Dongfeng Yueda Kia (Hyundai and Kia's Chinese offices) are joint ventures that are split fifty-fifty with Chinese companies. **Such incidents are likely to create serious difficulties for economic cooperation between South Korea and China in the future.**

China is planning to develop advanced missiles to counter THAAD. Armstrong at the Huffington Post in 2016 writes:

Armstrong 16 Ian Armstrong, 2016, "Why the U.S.-South Korea Missile Shield Could Provoke China to Develop Advanced Weaponry," HuffPost, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-armstrong/us-korea-missile_b_11532232.html //DF

How, then, will China respond? As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently stated, THAAD is "not a simple technical issue, but an out-and-out strategic one" — and a strategic military problem will evoke a strategic military response. **Countering a powerful missile defense system means more advanced Chinese missiles, with more aggressive deployment.** Little analysis has considered how the THAAD deployment will shape the Chinese military, and media outlets have mischaracterized the impact of the deployment from the Chinese perspective by focusing on the missile-intercepting aspects of the system. This assumption does not account for another major THAAD component — the AN/TPY-2 radar, which identifies and communicates the location of missile targets to the interceptor. In reality, China's largest concerns come not from the interception component of THAAD, but rather the detection capability provided by the AN/TPY-2. The United States and South Korea have repeatedly asserted that the deployment will be "focused solely on North Korean nuclear and ballistic threats" — not Chinese missiles. The possibility remains, however, for THAAD's radar to be covertly switched into a longer range mode that feeds into the broader U.S. missile defense — giving Washington earlier notice of Chinese launches. Regardless of the Pentagon's intentions, the Chinese perceive the agreement on THAAD as a demonstration that the United States does not value strategic stability with China. Beijing will be motivated to restore its nuclear and ballistic credibility by developing missile technologies that make the AN/TPY-2's early warning potential irrelevant. **In countering the THAAD deployment to South Korea, two existing Chinese missile programs are likely contenders for accelerated development — hypersonic glide vehicles and multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles** known as MIRVs. **China has already tested and reportedly begun deploying small numbers of MIRV-equipped missiles. MIRVs provide China with the ability to inundate late-phase missile interceptors like THAAD,** as multiple guided warheads will disperse from a single MIRV missile in the final minutes of its descent. Consequently, **the potential strategic imbalances created by bringing THAAD to South Korea are offset, as MIRVs are significantly more difficult to intercept, regardless of how early they are detected.** While MIRVs overwhelm THAAD's interception capabilities, hypersonic gliders empower **China to bypass them altogether.** HGVs are an emerging breed of ultra-fast weaponry, and China has apparently successfully tested its secret developmental glider, the DF-ZF, seven times. Capable of traveling in unconventional up and down trajectories at speeds far greater than traditional ballistic missiles, HGVs like the DF-ZF will be extraordinarily difficult to detect and intercept with existing U.S. missile defense.

Thus far, China's HGV testing has consisted of medium and intermediate-range demonstrations, perhaps indicating that the DF-ZF is being developed with regional missile defense systems in mind. With the South Korean THAAD deployment potentially informing the broader U.S. architecture, China is incentivized not only to accelerate its development of HGVs, but to expand the program to cover longer range missiles capable of hitting the United States. Once operational, the unprecedented speed of the DF-ZF would effectively neutralize the early warning potential of THAAD radars on the Korean peninsula.

Militarism

Strojnink of the American Security Project BMDs spur security dilemmas because other states inevitably perceive them as weapons geared towards them.

Strojnink 16 Tomaz Strojnink, 7-18-2016, "THAAD and Aegis: Creators of Peace or Instability?," American Security Project,

<https://www.americansecurityproject.org/thaad-and-aegis-solutions-to-defense-or-creators-of-instability/> //DF

Unlike the missile defense concepts of the past which were geared towards defeating a large-scale nuclear attack, today's systems are designed to counter nations with relatively few ballistic missiles and short range missiles. With at least thirty-one countries possessing ballistic missiles, states are naturally inclined to obtain a defensive system that can counter the offensive capabilities of others. When states acquire a BMD system, they do so only to protect themselves against threats. Unfortunately, surrounding states may perceive this as an escalatory move since they will undermine their weapons systems. States like China and Russia, who view such deployments in their regions as directed towards them, oppose their presence because it prevents them from threatening damage to cities and military bases. The problem with increasing one's own security, is that it can create feelings of insecurity and force the insecure state to increase its own security. This security dilemma exists because there is a lack of communication between the parties involved and a lack of identification of what has caused the insecurity in the first place. Even though Poland and South Korea's BMD systems are directed towards rogue states like Iran and North Korea respectively, these systems could easily be redirected towards other states. Weapons are inherently ambiguous. They cannot always be easily identified as offensive or defensive, and they cannot delineate the targeting of one foe over another. To avoid this conflict spiral, nations should make conciliatory efforts to show the other side that the purpose of the weapons system is not aimed? towards them but another. Both NATO and South Korea have made it clear to Russia and China that their BMD systems are directed towards other states, but this has failed to satisfy concerns.

US militarism has demonstrable effects on North Korean aggression. Beauchamp at Vox News in 2017 explains that in July and August, Kim Jong-Un was caught in a vicious cycle of threats with Trump; each time one made an aggressive statement, the other was forced to respond. However, when Trump was distracted by the events in Charlottesville, it gave Kim some breathing room

Beauchamp 17 Zack Beauchamp, 8-15-2017, "While Trump was distracted, North Korea calmed down. That's not a coincidence.," Vox,

<https://www.vox.com/world/2017/8/15/16150412/trump-north-korea-charlottesville> //DF

The US-North Korea tensions were driven by a vicious cycle — with North Korea, Trump, and the media each playing key roles in sustaining it. The crisis began with a North Korean missile test at the end of July. For the first time, Pyongyang managed to successfully test an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with enough range to theoretically hit New York or Washington with a nuclear bomb. The US responded, as it often does, with a show of strength — flying B-1B bombers over South Korea to signal its commitment to defending the South. About a week later, on August 7, the North issued its response: a threat to nuke the United States if American forces struck North Korea. “Should the US pounce upon the DPRK with military force at last, the DPRK is ready to teach the US a severe lesson with its strategic nuclear force,” North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho said, using an acronym for North Korea’s full formal name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. This kind of aggressive rhetoric is pretty standard for North Korea. Issuing threats to get the West’s attention and signal strength has been Pyongyang’s approach for years; it did not indicate any major change in North Korea’s policy toward the United States.

When things really got scary, though, is when President Trump responded. During a public appearance on August 8, he warned that “North Korea had best not make any threats against the United States” or “they will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.” While threats like this are normal coming from Pyongyang, they are not how the United States usually talks to North Korea. Trump’s belligerent statement raised the risk of the conflict by sending a signal to the North that its fairly normal behavior could be met with an abnormal American response — potentially including military force. “His words could ... lead Pyongyang to miscalculate or believe it needs to act preemptively if it believes a US attack is imminent,” Rosenberger told me at the time. “Those consequences could be catastrophic.” The North, ever afraid of looking vulnerable to American intimidation, responded immediately with a threat to fire missiles near Guam. The hostility had reached a point where both sides were openly threatening military conflict. Here’s where the media comes in. In a situation like this, reporters understandably ask the president how he’s thinking about the crisis. With a normal president, you’d get a normal response. But Trump is so instinctively blustery that he won’t back down from even his most irresponsible rhetoric. When asked whether his “fire and fury” statement was too tough, on August 10, he responded by amping up the heat. “Maybe it wasn’t tough enough,” he said. “[North Korea] should be nervous. Things will happen to them like they never thought possible.” This sent an even more belligerent signal to the North and set off even more media frenzy. As rising North Korea tensions dominated the news, the president — an avid cable news consumer — continued to weigh in, sending off threatening (and false) tweets. It was a dangerous cycle: North Korea, Trump, and breathless media coverage all egged each other on, creating a situation where each side believed the risk of war — though still low — was growing. “I said several times [last week] the risk of war had been minute; now it was small. But we don’t expect the US president to be the one raising it,” explains Mira Rapp-Hooper, a Senior Fellow at Yale Law School’s China Center. With the US media understandably refocusing on a shockingly large white supremacist rally on Friday, and then a neo-Nazi terrorist attack that killed one counterprotester on Saturday, North Korea was suddenly out of the headlines. The president’s attention refocused on responding to the crisis, including damage control from his Saturday statement in which he chose not to condemn white supremacists by name. Since the Charlottesville crisis began on Friday, Trump hasn’t made any new statements on North Korea. Nor did he tweet anything new; the only presidential tweets on the subject were retweets of positive press coverage about his administration’s policy — nothing that would indicate a new threat to North Korea. This gave more sober voices on all sides a chance to take over the issue. Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson wrote a joint op-ed, published in the Wall Street Journal on Monday, in which they announced that the US has “no interest in regime change or accelerated reunification of Korea,” emphasized the “peaceful” and “defensive” aims of US policy, and said the US “is willing to negotiate with Pyongyang.” It was an overt attempt to undermine their boss’s bluster and walk America away from the brink. The op-ed was “clearly an attempt by the adults to create a recognizable declaratory policy before [Trump] effs it up again,” Rapp-Hooper says. In this climate, it became easier to for the North to back down from its threat to test missiles near Guam. It’s likely the North wanted to do that anyway — that it never wanted war and that its threat toward Guam was meant as a bargaining chip in a bid for negotiations with the US. It has used threats for that purpose before, and will likely use them like this again. “This is no mixed message. It is exactly how the North moves back from the edge of the cliff,” Carlin writes. “Put that together with the fact that the regime hadn’t been mobilizing the population for imminent crisis over the preceding four or five days, and you get a familiar North Korean dance move.” But in a climate where the president was constantly making threats, it was harder for the North to step back from the brink without looking like Trump badgered them into submission.

Lee at the Harvard International Review in 2017 writes:

Lee 17 Brianni Lee, 2-17-2017, "THAAD Deployment in South Korea: Militarism Leading To Political Regression," Harvard International Review, <http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=14503> //DF

North Korea spends about US\$4 billion a year on its missile and nuclear programs, which accounts for approximately 24 percent of the country's GDP. North Korea's relatively large spending on ICBM technology and nuclear development could be attributed to its desire to show the United States that it has the power to shoot a nuclear missile to Washington. An ICBM would be a significant improvement from the Taepodong-2, a ballistic missile with a maximum range of 4,500 kilometers that North Korea currently possesses. As it is clear that North Korea is in the process of developing an ICBM with a minimum range of 5,500 kilometers, the US government urged the installment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korea, and the South Korean government approved the deployment of THAAD in the country's south. The international community must acknowledge that military pressure, containment, and simply waiting for the regime in Pyongyang to collapse have [has] failed to stop North Korea's military aggression. [missile defense] THAAD deployment in South Korea is not only a potential obstacle for achieving the denuclearization of North Korea, but is also a repetition of past mistakes, encouraging further isolation of North Korea, an arms race in East Asia, and a revival of Cold War tensions.

Second, China.

China's missile modernization will be sped up by BMDs. Mullany at the Times in 2017 explains:

Mullany 17 Gerry Mullany and Chris Buckley, 3-7-2017, "China Warns of Arms Race After U.S. Deploys Missile Defense in South Korea," New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/world/asia/thaad-missile-defense-us-south-korea-china.html?mcubz=3&_r=0 //DF

China has long opposed American missile defenses, in part because of fears that they might embolden American decision-makers to consider a first strike to destroy China's relatively small nuclear arsenal. Chinese strategists warn that the United States might consider such an attack if it was confident a defense system could intercept Chinese weapons that escaped destruction. China is believed to have already embarked on a program to modernize its arsenal and develop new weapons designed to avoid missile defenses, and analysts said the deployment of Thaad could prompt it to accelerate those efforts.

Takashi Kawakami, a professor of international politics and security at Takushoku University in Tokyo, said the deployment of Thaad could put the United States in a stronger position to consider a pre-emptive strike on North Korea. If the United States took such action, he said, "North Korea is going to make a counterattack on the U.S. or Japan or another place, so in this case they will use Thaad" to defend against the North's missiles.

China is supplying weapons material to North Korea. Corr at Forbes in 2017:

Corr 17 Anders Corr, 7-5-2017, "Chinese Involvement In North Korea's Nuclear Missile Program: From Trucks To Warheads," Forbes, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2017/07/05/chinese-involvement-in-north-koreas-nuclear-missile-program-from-warheads-to-trucks/#5931ad086f2f> //DF

North Korea's launch of a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile on July 4, U.S. Independence Day, is a direct affront to the U.S. that was likely supported by Chinese technology and expertise. Indications of Chinese involvement include Chinese transport trucks used for multiple North Korean missiles, the biconic warhead design of the Hwasong-14, and other Chinese missile components. U.S. President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson are now publicly pointing the finger at China, and it's about time. The distinctive biconic warhead design appears

similar to a Pakistani design associated with China. China or its ally Pakistan likely provided the warhead design, or the warhead itself, to North Korea. Rick Fisher, a Senior Fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center said, "Indian sources credit China as the source of the new [Pakistani] ABABEEL warhead multiple reentry vehicle technology and it is indeed plausible Pakistan passed such Chinese-origin technology to North Korea." According to Fisher, China may also have provided the warhead technology directly to North Korea. He said, "as the Hwasong program started during the rule of Kim Jong Il, it is also possible that Chinese technology was originally given to North Korea which fashioned the new warhead that was tested by Pakistan on ABABEEL."

North Korea's fear of US militarism is at the root of their aggression. Benjamin at the Korea Policy Institute in 2017 explains:

Benjamin 17 Medea Benjamin, 8-2-2017, "Urgent Warning: Time to Hit the Reset Button on U.S.-Korean Policy," Korea Policy Institute,

<http://kpolicy.org/urgent-warning-time-to-hit-the-reset-button-on-u-s-korean-policy/> //DF

It was the resilience of Seongju and neighboring Gimcheon residents that pushed the Moon administration to pause the deployment process until a thorough environmental impact assessment had been completed, which would have taken about a year. This gave the villagers hope that they would have time to convince President Moon to rethink and reverse the THAAD agreement altogether. The president's recent decision will only spark more local outrage. The North Korean nuclear program is certainly alarming, as are the myriad human rights violations of that repressive regime. But the question is how best to de-escalate the conflict so it doesn't explode into all-out nuclear war. Adding another weapon system into the mix is not the answer. The North Korean regime feels encircled. It knows that the most powerful nation in the world, the United States, wants to overthrow it. There's Trump's belligerent rhetoric: "If China is not going to solve North Korea, we will." There's the ever-tightening screws of sanctions. Just a few hours before the latest North Korean missile test, Congress approved yet another round of sanctions to squeeze the North. There are 83 U.S. military bases on South Korean soil and U.S. warships often patrol the coast. U.S.-South Korean military exercises have been getting larger and more provocative, including dropping mock nuclear bombs on North Korea. The US military also announced that it would permanently station an armed drone called Gray Eagle on the Korean Peninsula and it has been practicing long-range strikes with strategic bombers, sending them to the region for exercises and deploying them in Guam and on the peninsula. The United States has also long held a "pre-emptive first strike" policy toward North Korea. This frightening threat of an unprovoked U.S. nuclear attack gives North Korea good reason to want its own nuclear arsenal. North Korea's leadership also looks at the fate of Iraq's Saddam Hussein and Libya's Muammar Gaddafi, leaders who gave up their nuclear programs, and concludes that nuclear weapons are their key to survival. So the North Korean leadership is not acting irrationally; on the contrary. On July 29, the day after the test, North Korean President Kim Jong-un asserted that the threat of sanctions or military action "only strengthens our resolve and further justifies our possession of nuclear weapons."

Missile defense is at the heart of North Korea's fears. McKeown at the American Security Project in 2017 notes that:

American Security Project. "THAAD-A Necessary Measure? | ASP." American Security Project. 5 Jun. 2017. Web. 19 Aug. 2017. <<https://www.americansecurityproject.org/thaad-a-necessary-measure/>> //NS

The negative effects of the implementation of the THAAD system have been notable. North Korea, in reaction to the deployment of [US anti-missile systems]the system, has continued to escalate its missile testing. While this behavior is characteristic of their aggressive rhetoric since 2008-2009, the frequency of testing is unprecedented. A North Korean foreign ministry spokesman threatened that the country would increase the pace of its nuclear weapons program as self-defense against the United States' provocative actions. This year alone, North Korea has

conducted nine missile tests. Furthermore, the last missile tested by North Korea on May 28th landed within Japan's exclusive economic zone, which shows its increasing disregard for international norms.

NK launched missiles in response to THAAD deployment

Mody 17 Seema Mody, 3-17-2017, "China lashes out as South Korea puts an American anti-missile system in place," CNBC,

<https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/17/thaad-anti-missile-system-makes-china-lash-out-at-south-korea.html> //DF

A powerful U.S. anti-missile system designed to protect South Korea is sparking regional anxiety that's begun hitting one of Asia's most important economies. The system, known as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, is designed to defend South Korea and Japan from missile attack. North Korea and its unpredictable leader Kim Jong Un possess nuclear weapons and make a habit of regularly threatening neighbors. THAAD, which could be operational as soon as summer 2017, uses radar to track when a ballistic missile is launched and then intercepts and destroys the missile before it descends onto its target. This month, in the most recent show of force, North Korea launched four ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan. The United States has taken a more aggressive tone with North Korea, with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson saying on Friday that military action against the country is "on the table."

China thinks BMDs are destabilizing

Pickrell 17 Ryan Pickrell, 6-1-2017, "China and Russia Hate America's Missile Defense Systems for a Very Simple Reason," National Interest,

<http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-russia-hate-americas-missile-defense-systems-very-20949> //DF

In addition to the commentary in the state-run People's Daily, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs again complained about the deployment of a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea. "The US global missile defense system is ultimately targeted at the nuclear deterrent capability of China and Russia," the Global Times, a nationalist outlet affiliated with the state-run People's Daily, argued in February. Russian President Vladimir Putin took a personal swing at the U.S. missile defense system Thursday, claiming Russia has no choice but to build up its defenses. "This destroys the strategic balance in the world," Putin told reporters at an economic forum. "What is happening is a very serious and alarming process. In Alaska, and now in South Korea, elements of the anti-missile defense system are emerging. Should we just stand idly by and watch this? Of course not. We are thinking about how to respond to these challenges." Putin declared that the U.S. is using North Korea as an excuse to develop its anti-missile capabilities. Russia, like China, has also been developing its offensive weaponry, exploring hypersonic missile delivery systems and other improvements.

They are developing missiles

Panyue 17 Huang Panyue, 3-1-2017, "Foreign Media: China Develops Hypersonic Missiles Against THAAD," Chinese Military, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-03/01/content_7508672.htm //DF

Foreign media reported that China is developing hypersonic weapons with an eye to piercing the missile defense shields of Japan and its East Asian neighbors. Japan's Kyodo News February 26 quoted Canada's Kanwa Defense Review that the Rocket Force of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has recently decided on a hypersonic weapon developing program targeting the missile defense system in Japan and China's Taiwan, as well as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to be deployed in the Republic of Korea (ROK) soon. It is reported that hypersonic weapons are

next-generation maneuvering strike weapons to be installed atop the ballistic missiles that travel at speeds of up to Mach 10, or 10 times the speed of sound. They can maneuver and glide along the atmospheric edge, making them very difficult to be shot down by anti-missile weapons. It is thought that if China's hypersonic weapons advances, Japan's anti-missile system could be made impotent. Japan's Air Self-Defense Force has already deployed the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile defense system along with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force's Aegis destroyers equipped Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors. China's Taiwan has also deployed Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), while ROK decided to deploy the advanced Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system on its soil to better cope with the missile threats from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Reports said that in addition to the hypersonic weapon project of the PLA Rocket Force, China has been developing such hypersonic weapons through another channel. A state-owned enterprise is engaged in developing hypersonic weapons that can be launched atop long-range ballistic missiles to penetrate the missile defense system on the U.S. mainland. American media reported that China has carried out seven hypersonic sliding vehicle tests in recent years, six of which succeeded. While China has acknowledged to such testing, but it was previously unknown that it was also working on short-range hypersonic weapons development program for East Asian targets.

Hypersonic missiles basically nullify BMDs' effectiveness

Mcintyre 17 Jamie McIntyre, 6-5-2017, "The hypersonic threat that keeps US commanders up at night," Washington Examiner,

<http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/the-hypersonic-threat-that-keeps-us-commanders-up-at-night/article/2624599> //DF

The U.S. is in fact developing not just hypersonic weapons but also systems to counter them. The Trump administration, in its fiscal 2018 budget submission to Congress last month, requested \$75 million for "hypersonic defense" as part of \$7.9 billion overall funding plan for missile defenses. But critics in Congress complain that's a mere \$379 million over last year's request from former President Barack Obama and well below the annual \$9 billion funding level planned by the Bush administration. "These weapons present an entirely new capability we must counter as they are specifically designed to exploit the gaps and the seams in our existing missile defense architecture, thus defeating the systems we currently have in place," said Rep. Trent Franks, R-Ariz, on the floor of the House in March. Franks, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, is concerned the threat from high-speed maneuvering weapons is figuratively flying below the radar. "The threat has outpaced us," Franks said. "These new weapons are capable of traveling more than a mile per second and fly at flat or nonballistic trajectories to prevent our missile defense systems from tracking them."

NK will use missile testing to incrementally push South Korea. Bush at the Brookings Institute in 2017 writes that North Korea is incrementally escalating the conflict, seeing how hard they can push South Korea. Every time they make a provocative action and get away with it, it's a win for them and a loss for the South.

Bush 17 Richard C. Bush, 8-9-2017, "The real reason a North Korean nuclear weapon is so terrifying—and it's not what you think," Brookings,

<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/08/09/the-real-reason-a-north-korean-nuclear-weapon-is-so-terrifying-and-its-not-what-you-think/> //DF

The scenario I have in mind is one in which North Korea starts at a relatively low rung of the escalation ladder; sinking a South Korean naval vessel, bombarding South Korean-controlled islands in the West Sea, or creating trouble in the demilitarized zone. It has done all of these things in the last seven years but then backed off from further conflict. Once Pyongyang can target the continental United States, it will likely take

bigger risks than it has to date. It would undertake such limited-war actions as much to achieve political gains as military ones. It would hope to test South Korean intentions and try to drive wedges within South Korean society: between the military on the one hand and President Moon's dovish advisers on the other; between conservative parties and progressive ones; between segments of the public that don't want to see their country pushed around and those who worry about Seoul's vulnerability. Where President Moon would come out is anybody's guess.

Negotiations

The deployment of anti-missile systems complicates efforts to bring the two most important parties to the table.

First, China.

China is displeased with North Korea's actions. Diamond in 2017 writes:

Diamond 17 Larry Diamond, 4-15-2017, "There Is a Peaceful Way Out of the North Korea Crisis," Atlantic,

<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/north-korea-trump-china/524349/> //DF

As the old saying goes, however, in crisis there is both danger and opportunity. In his summit with the Chinese leader, President Trump clearly became aware of the complexity of the situation as seen by the Chinese regime: North Korea is not a mere client state of China, and a Chinese attempt to use its economic leverage (such as cutting off essential food and oil supplies) to pressure the Kim dictatorship could bring unpredictable consequences, including, the Chinese fear, a collapse of the North Korean regime that would send millions of North Korean refugees streaming across the border into China. Yet **the Chinese leadership is clearly deeply frustrated with North Korea's erratic and menacing behavior, which increasingly endangers China's vital interests in regional peace and stability.** It is **This** incipient **shift in China's thinking** that **presents the most promising opportunity for a breakthrough on the** long-stalled **diplomatic front.** Whether through a resumption of the six-party talks or initiation of direct three-party negotiations involving China, the U.S., and North Korea (with the U.S. closely coordinating with Japan and South Korea), a diplomatic breakthrough must be pursued.

In fact, Griffiths at CNN in 2017 reports that:

Griffiths 17 James Griffiths and Serenitie Wang, Cnn, 8-8-2017, "China willing to 'pay a price' for stronger North Korea sanctions," CNN,

<http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/08/asia/china-north-korea-sanctions/index.html> //DF

A Chinese government official said last month that China-North Korea trade was worth \$2.6 billion in the first half of 2017, up about 10% over the same period last year. But **coal imports [from North Korea] slumped by 75%, suggesting Beijing is gradually choking off North Korea's biggest source of foreign currency. China's willingness to support the new sanctions sends a strong message to North Korea,** said Patrick Cronin, an Asia specialist at the Washington-based think tank Center for a New American Society. "North Korea's economy is not so large that it can afford to forgo stiff economic sanctions on exports like coal, one of the mainstays of (the country's) economy," he said. "So **for China to join,** on top of the international community, **sends a**

signal to North Korea that this is serious economic damage if they don't find a way to reduce those sanctions and the pressure from that."

However, missile defense has undermined all potential progress. Xiao, a professor at Fudan University in 2017 writes:

Xiao 17 Ren Xiao [Professor and Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy at Fudan University in Shanghai], 1-2017, "Old Wine in a New Bottle? China's Korea Problem," Asia Policy //DF
Amid heightened tension in the South China Sea, the THAAD decision suggested to North Korea that the Sino-U.S. rivalry was worsening. Pyongyang probably believed that it could take advantage of this situation. This assumption was not totally wrong. U.S. naval operations, especially sending warships into the South China Sea, highlighted the friction between the United States and China and were inevitably seen as challenging China. With Beijing already engaged in a delicate balancing act to pressure Pyongyang to change its behavior while ensuring regime stability, the decision [to deploy missile defense] on THAAD inevitably weakened China's determination to strictly sanction North Korea. In this sense, South Korea took this step at the expense of the ROK-China relationship and of Beijing's close cooperation on sanctioning Pyongyang. According to a study carried out by the Sejong Institute, a South Korean think tank, the volume of trade between China and the DPRK has been rising since the United States and South Korea announced their plans to deploy THAAD.³

And Reals at CBS in 2017 explains:

Reals 17 Tucker Reals, 5-2-2017, "Why THAAD is controversial in South Korea, China and Russia," CBS News, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-thaad-is-controversial-in-south-korea-china-and-russia/> //DF

It is not the prospect of the U.S. shooting down a North Korean missile irking Beijing, but rather the ability. THAAD's advanced radar system gives the U.S. military the ability to peer across the Yellow Sea into China's own airspace and potentially to track the movement of Chinese military hardware on the ground. Beijing has voiced its strong disapproval since the THAAD deployment in South Korea was first announced. That annoyance was reiterated Tuesday by Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang, who urged "relevant sides to immediately stop the deployment." He added, without any clarification, that China would "firmly take necessary measures to uphold our interests." China's disapproval is perhaps the most problematic, given the Asian behemoth's unique role as longtime benefactor of the North Korean Kim dynasty. Beijing remains far and away the most valuable trading partner -- virtually an economic lifeline -- for North Korea. President Trump and his top aides have made it clear that they want China to try to force Kim back to the negotiating table by curtailing that trade. China doesn't want a war on its border for a number of reasons, and there have been real signs that it's tightening the financial screws on its old ally, North Korea. But [missile defense] THAAD remains a massive hurdle in the dialogue between Beijing and Washington.

China is key to decreasing tensions because of how much influence it holds over North Korea. According to Lockie in 2017:

Alex Lockie. "China could stop North Korea's nuclear threat in a heartbeat without firing a shot." Business Insider. 9 Jun. 2017. Web. 14 Jul. 2017.

<http://www.businessinsider.com/china-disarm-north-korea-trump-2017-6> //NS

But Gordon Chang, the author of "The Coming Collapse of China," writes in The Cipher Brief that 90% of North Korea's trade is done with China, accounting for 90% of its oil and, in some years, 100% of its aviation fuel. After a provocative North Korean missile launch in 2003, China cut off its supply of oil to North Korea for three days. In no time, the Kim regime caved to international demands and sat down for the six-party talks on nuclear disarmament. [That's why he finds that] "China can disarm North Korea in the blink of an

eye," Chang wrote. And it could do so by crippling North Korea's economy — but at a huge cost to North Koreans. Sanctions on North Korea do not affect regular trade. Although the UN takes very seriously the prospect of an aggressive, nuclear-armed North Korea, economic warfare in the form of too-harsh sanctions would harm or kill civilians — China also supplies at least a third of North Korea's food, according to Chang.

Second, North Korea.

According to Bandow:

Doug Bandow, 12-2015, "North Korea Wants to Negotiate a Peace: U.S. Should Sit Down and Talk," HuffPost, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/north-korea-wants-to-nego_b_8769306.html

Of course, **no one wants to start fighting again. Not even [North Korea]** the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which would lose badly since its erstwhile ally China wouldn't again intervene to save the North. **Indeed, North Korea has proposed negotiations over a formal peace treaty.** In October Foreign Minister Ri Su-yong used the UN as a platform to urge the U.S. and DPRK to agree to a treaty **ending the conflict.** North Korean television reiterated the call a few days later. In the past Pyongyang's proposals appeared pro forma. But now might be different. Cha Du-hyeon, national security adviser to the previous South Korean president, suggested that the repetition was **"a possible sign that North Korea is serious about holding a conversation with U.S."**

However, the deployment of anti-missile systems decreases the chance of diplomacy.

McKeown at the American Security Project in 2017 notes that:

American Security Project. "THAAD-A Necessary Measure? | ASP." American Security Project. 5 Jun. 2017. Web. 19 Aug. 2017. <https://www.americansecurityproject.org/thaad-a-necessary-measure/>

The negative effects of the implementation of the THAAD system have been notable. North Korea, in reaction to the deployment of the system, has continued to escalate its missile

testing. While this behavior is characteristic of their aggressive rhetoric since 2008-2009, the frequency of testing is unprecedented. A

North Korean foreign ministry spokesman threatened that the country would increase the pace of its nuclear weapons program **as self-defense against the United States' provocative actions.** This year alone, North Korea has conducted nine missile tests. Furthermore, the last missile tested by North Korea on May 28th landed within Japan's exclusive economic zone, which shows its increasing disregard for international norms.

US provocations undermine the trust needed for successful diplomacy. Pritchard in 2007 explains:

Pritchard 07 Charles L. Pritchard, 2007, "Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb," Brookings Institute, http://intelros.ru/pdf/jfq_53/27.pdf

Charles L. Pritchard offers this statement by a North Korean official as evidence of flawed American policy in Failed Diplomacy: **"If [North Korea] the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] feels that it could trust the United States, then there is no need for a single nuclear weapon and we will dismantle them."** This book is Pritchard's insider's account of the U.S. inability to halt the Korean Peninsula's nuclearization through the Six-Party Talks. Though Failed Diplomacy is primarily aimed at North Korea watchers, it is also useful for those concerned with counterproliferation in places where multilateral methods have been similarly unsuccessful.

Just bringing parties to the table reduces the chance of war. The Japan Times in 2017 explains:

Japan Times, 7-18-2017, "Why is South Korea pushing for talks with North Korea?,"

<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/07/18/asia-pacific/south-korea-pushing-talks-north-korea/#.WXDj9NPYuAw> //DF

In August 2015, North Korea's No. 2 leader, Hwang Pyong So, and South Korea's national security director, Kim Kwan-jin, met at Panmunjom and reached a deal on averting possible bloodshed over a land-mine blast that maimed two South Korean soldiers. The December 2015 talks at a now-stalled joint factory park in North Korea ended with no breakthroughs. **While the two Koreas have a history of failing to follow through** on some rapprochement agreements struck during their rare talks, **any dialogue between the rivals is considered a positive step toward easing tensions.**

Negotiations are the only way out

Moon 17 Chung-in Moon [Distinguished Professor Emeritus at Yonsei University. He is also a Co-convenor of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament], 1-2017, "Managing North Korean Nuclear Threats: In Defense of Dialogue and Negotiations" Asia Policy Institute //DF

Sanctions, deterrence, preemptive attacks, and defense, including **THAAD, might not be ideal solutions to the North Korean threat. No matter how devilish the North is, dialogue and negotiation seem to be the only viable alternative. The fact that these options did not work in the past should not be a reason to dismiss them.** The United States and regional states should find common ground against North Korea's nuclear development. **Sanctions and other pressure should be utilized not as leverage to bring about the collapse of the North Korean regime but as inducements for North Korea to return to dialogue and negotiation.** By way of conclusion, I would like to suggest the following ideas.¹⁶

Thus, we negate

Link – Freeze

Second, it would allow a for a freeze.

Choong at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in 2017 writes:

Choong 17 William Choong [Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies], 8-30-2017, "North Korea: Why It's Time to Double Down on the Double Freeze," The Diplomat,

<http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/north-korea-why-its-time-to-double-down-on-the-double-freeze/> //DF

A potential solution to the North Korea impasse would be a re-examination of China's suspension-for-suspension, or freeze-for-freeze proposal, whereby North Korea would suspend its nuclear and missile testing in exchange for a suspension in military exercises by American and South Korean forces. Such a solution would

have to be cognizant of two current realities. First, short of an explicit American security guarantee, North Korea has deemed nuclear weapons to be strategic insurance for the survival of the regime and the country. Second, any workable solution would have to be less ambitious, yet plausible enough, as to put all concerned parties on the road to achieving the long-term goal of denuclearisation. The first phase of a double-freeze could incorporate another element — a ban on nuclear technology exports by North Korea, as well as a freeze on long-range missiles short of an ICBM and nuclear activities at Yongbyon, in addition to the return of nuclear inspectors. Another proposal would be for the U.S. and South Korea to continue smaller, unit-by-unit training without scaling back their frequency or intensity. If the freeze-for-freeze holds for say, 12 months, more extensive talks for Phase Two could begin. This would cover talks on economic development, trade development and financial integration. The U.S. could propose four-power talks between China, North Korea, South Korea; Washington could also propose the beginning of talks to negotiate a peace treaty, and move towards the normalization of U.S.-North Korean relations. The third and last phase would address denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. While the possibility appears to be remote for now, it is worth noting that the goal of abandoning nuclear weapons was in the 2005 Joint Statement. Quoted by the North Korean media in the wake of Pyongyang's 4 July 2017 ICBM test, Kim Jong-un did not negate the possibility of putting his country's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles on the negotiating table; rather, he offered the possibility that this could be done if the U.S. terminated its "hostile and nuclear threat to the DPRK." A freeze-for-freeze model would be fraught with difficulties, given the history of North Korean intransigence on previous agreements. As Robert Gates, the former U.S. secretary of defense, said in 2009, Americans are "tired of buying the same horse twice" vis-a-vis North Korea. Trump, for all his mercurial and unorthodox approaches to policy, might be convinced of a freeze-on-freeze as a possible — albeit longer — route to denuclearization. Trump has indicated that he would be willing to initiate talks with Kim Jong-un. He is learning that the Chinese, for all their connections to the North Korean regime, cannot be pushed to effect additional sanctions on Pyongyang. In May 2017, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson indicated that Washington harbored no "hostile intention" towards Pyongyang and was not considering regime change or an invasion. The building blocks are in place — a viable model for freeze-on-freeze, support from China and South Korea and a U.S. president who is not dogmatically opposed to new thinking on old problems. North Korea is said to be the "land of bad options." In the current circumstances, however, a dialogue about a freeze-for-freeze could present an entry into long-term talks about disarmament — the least bad option in putting North Korea back on the road to denuclearization. Think of the latest missile launch over Japan as much as an act of aggression as a cry for dialogue.

Removing missile defense could present just this opportunity. Benjamin at the Korea Policy Institute in 2017 explains that halting missile defense deployment would alleviate tensions and pave the way for negotiations.

Benjamin 17 Medea Benjamin, 8-2-2017, "Urgent Warning: Time to Hit the Reset Button on U.S.-Korean Policy," Korea Policy Institute,

<http://kpolicy.org/urgent-warning-time-to-hit-the-reset-button-on-u-s-korean-policy/> //DF

Trump has few options. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis has warned that a pre-emptive strike on the North's nuclear and missile capabilities could reignite the Korean War. Trump had hoped that Chinese President Xi Jinping could successfully rein in Kim Jong-un, but the Chinese are more concerned about the collapse of North Korea's government and the chaos that would ensue. They are also furious about the deployment of THAAD in South Korea, convinced that its radar can penetrate deep into Chinese territory. But the Chinese do have another proposal: a freeze for a freeze. This means a freeze on North Korean missile and nuclear tests in exchange for a halt on U.S.-South Korean war games. The massive war games have been taking place every year in March, with smaller ones scheduled for August. A halt would alleviate tensions and pave the way for negotiations. So would halting the deployment of the destabilizing THAAD system so disliked by South Korean villagers, North Koreans and the Chinese. Given the specter of nuclear war, the rational alternative policy is one of de-escalation and engagement. President Moon has called for dialogue with the North and a peace treaty to permanently end the Korean War. North Korean

diplomats have raised the possibility of a “freeze for a freeze.” Time has proven that coercion doesn’t work. There’s an urgent need to hit the reset button on U.S.-Korean policy, before one of the players hits a much more catastrophic button that could lead us into a nuclear nightmare.

A freeze is the best approach to North Korea. In an interview of experts on the Korean Peninsula, Haldevang in 2017 reports:

Haldevang 17 Max De Haldevang, 8-11-2017, "This is the diplomatic way out of the North Korea crisis," Quartz,

<https://qz.com/1051864/the-us-north-korean-nuclear-crisis-can-be-averted-with-this-diplomatic-strategy/> //DF

US president Donald Trump’s war of words with Kim Jong-un’s North Korean regime shows no sign of abating. The Western world is feverish with speculation on whether Trump is employing the Richard Nixon “madman theory,” where to buy a house outside a nuclear blast zone, and how the hell to survive if an attack does come. What’s certain, though, **is that old-fashioned diplomacy can shepherd the world out of this flare-up.** We spoke to three experts who laid out how to do it. Step One: Make contact. The two sides may not have official diplomatic relations, but there are at least two channels of communication open the US could use, says Joel S. Wit, who had senior roles in North Korea nuclear negotiations under president Bill Clinton. The first is the quiet dialogue they’ve been holding to secure things like the release of student Otto Warmbier: “It’s been sporadic, they’ve been trying to keep it extra low-key, and doing it in third countries where no reporters can find them—that’s the way they should do it,” says Wit, a senior fellow at Johns Hopkins and Columbia University. If that fails, another channel is the North Korean mission to the UN in New York, but it’s not ideal, Wit says. “It’s a useful way of relaying messages but you’re not really going to accomplish a lot more than that.” US secretary of State Rex Tillerson has openly offered talks to the North Koreans—but with the proviso that they freeze their missile launches before they even get to the table. That, however, “is not going to happen,” Wit says. To make that kind of concession Pyongyang will want something much larger than just a sit-down with the US. Instead, he argues, Washington should offer a preliminary meeting with no preconditions, something it’s so far refused to do. Step Two: Lay out the demands. All the experts said the immediate deal will have to be some variation of **a “freeze for freeze.”** Tom Collina, policy director at anti-nuclear foundation the Ploughshares Fund, explains what this might look like. “The United States and South Korea somehow reduce the military threat to the North,” for example, by modifying the military exercises that are supposed to be starting later this month. In exchange for that, the North would agree to freeze its missile and nuclear program,” he says. Beyond that, each side will lay out what it wants as the ideal endpoint of prolonged negotiations. The US will almost certainly say it wants a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. The North might push for a peace treaty with the US, the restoration of diplomatic relations, a permanent end to any US-South Korea military exercises, or some combination of the three. **If the North stops testing, that buys the rest of the world time to put pressure on the regime. For Pyongyang, meanwhile, reduced joint military activity between the South and the US would ease its sense of existential threat. Once that’s been agreed on, and everyone has calmed down a bit, formal negotiations can commence—**with the aim being that the freezes kick in as official talks start. **Talks are slow and painful, moving closer together small offer by small offer, but they can work,** says Wit, pointing to the (often derided) 1994 agreement he worked on as an example. At the time of the agreement, he says, the sense was that North Korea would have enough material to make 75 bombs within 10 years. The agreement fell apart in 2002 because the Koreans were discovered to have been cheating, but Wit says at that point they only had five bombs. The agreement had successfully stalled nuclear development by years, he argues.

O’Hanlon 17 Michael E. O’Hanlon, 6-22-2017, "A way forward on North Korea?," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/06/22/a-way-forward-on-north-korea/> //DF

So China’s strategy has been to buy time — and preserve the status quo — with talks that may be linked to some kind of testing freeze. They may now have a new advocate of that approach, President Moon Jae-in of South Korea, who was elected on a platform pledging resumed engagement with the North. On Tuesday, he embraced a similar idea, telling Norah O’Donnell of CBS News in an interview that a freeze could be a way station to a second phase of talks that would “achieve the complete dismantling of North

Korea's nuclear program." In an interview broadcast on Wednesday, the North Korean ambassador to India, Kye Chun-yong, said his country was willing to consider a moratorium on nuclear and ballistic missile tests if the United States and South Korea stopped their annual joint military exercises. "Under certain circumstances, we are willing to talk in terms of freezing nuclear testing or missile testing," Mr. Kye said, speaking in English. "For instance, if the American side completely stops big, large-scale military exercises temporarily or permanently, then we will also temporarily stop. Let's talk about how to solve the Korean issue peacefully." It has been reported that at least one North Korean ambassador is suggesting openness to a freeze, temporary or permanent, on their production and testing of nuclear and long-range missile forces. This would be in exchange for a parallel freeze on large-scale, annual U.S. and South Korean military exercises on the peninsula—in particular, the large exercises that may involve 20,000 or more troops, known as Foal Eagle and Ulchi Focus. Moreover, going beyond what North Korea's ambassador suggested, the freeze would have to extend to the production of nuclear capabilities as well—not simply to the testing of devices. My initial instincts are that, if the freeze can be made reasonably verifiable (perhaps with China and Russia providing inspectors, along with Swiss or other neutral parties), this trade is well worth considering. It would have to extend to not just North Korea's known plutonium production facilities but to uranium enrichment capabilities as well. We would have to have some basis for believing that any previously unknown and undeclared sites were being accessed by inspectors. To be sure, the United States and South Korea should not weaken their military preparations for the defense of the Republic of Korea (ROK) under any foreseeable circumstances. Nor should they loosen most sanctions on North Korea appreciably in return for a freeze; any such true detente requires actual North Korean denuclearization, and some internal reforms as well. Nor should they simply trust Pyongyang to comply with any deal we might strike; verification is crucial. But the military consequences of an end, temporary or even permanent, to the annual large-scale exercises that Combined Forces now conduct on the peninsula can probably be addressed and considerably mitigated. Even without large-scale exercises, we can and should of course continue smaller unit-by-unit training without any scaling back of their frequency or intensity. We can and must continue to improve plans with Seoul for defense of South Korea at the level of headquarters and planning. We should continue to practice using command and control systems to simulate response to a North Korean attack, and thus to be ready for any large-scale effort that may someday be needed. We should rehearse the initial stages of deploying reinforcements from the United States and other locations to Korea. We could also bring some South Korean forces to the United States at times for larger-scale integrated exercises here. Engineers and logisticians can continue to practice, on a small scale, their various preparations for receiving reinforcements from the United States and weaving those into an ongoing military campaign. Further simulations and wargaming can be done, again with only modest actual movements of forces, to anticipate the effects of various kinds of North Korean attacks or sabotage on allied infrastructure and on cities like Seoul and Incheon.

Link – China Sanctions

However, the deployment of THAAD has upset China and reduced the chance that they will negotiate. Mcleary of Foreign Policy notes in March that:

Paul Mcleary. "China's Fear of U.S. Missile Defense Is Disingenuous." Foreign Policy. 20 Mar. 2017. Web. 12 Jul. 2017.

<<https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/20/chinas-fear-of-u-s-missile-defense-is-disingenuous-north-korea-trump-united-states-tillerson-thaad/>> //NS

This dynamic does not bode well for the ability of China and the United States to work together on North Korea. If China's leaders continue to view this dynamic in starkly zero-sum terms, and believe that any enhancement to U.S. military posture in the region is necessarily to China's disadvantage, Washington's ability to cooperate with Beijing will be severely limited. Moreover, China's ability to convince South Korea to align itself with China's interests will have to take South Korea's own interests into account, which will immediately run counter to China's long-standing (if grudging) support for North Korea. Of course, cooperating to diminish the threat posed by North Korea is the best and perhaps only way to defuse this crisis. The basis for that cooperation should be obvious — neither side wants to see North Korea develop a credible nuclear capability, nor do they want to see war on the Korean Peninsula. Nonetheless, China's insistence on seeing the United States as fundamentally hostile to China's interests will likely prevent either side from cooperating in any meaningful way. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson addressed THAAD during a joint press conference with South Korean Foreign Minister Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se during his recent visit to the region. Tillerson expressed the continued commitment of the United States to deploy THAAD, even in light of the ongoing president election in South Korea. "It's my expectation that the new government in South Korea will continue to be supportive of the THAAD system," said Tillerson, "because it is directed solely at the defense of [South Korea]." Tillerson also criticized China for its economic retaliation against South Korea as "inappropriate and troubling."

China won't work with the US on NK if missile defense is deployed

Lee 17 Hyun Lee, 4-11-2017, "Dialogue with North Korea is The Only Sensible Path," Korean Policy Institute, <http://kpolicy.org/the-only-sensible-path-at-this-point-is-dialogue/> //DF

China has made very clear to the United States that if it wants cooperation in North Korea, it should first reverse its very controversial decision on the deployment of the THAAD anti-missile system in South Korea, that is right now in the process of being deployed, and it is a very controversial issue. It probably will be on the agenda of the summit this weekend.

China considers the THAAD system, if it's based in South Korea, a threat to its security, because the radar that comes with the system can be used for surveillance activity on Chinese missiles. And so far, the Trump administration has been very aggressive in pushing THAAD deployment forward. Meanwhile, people in South Korea have been opposed to it, and are protesting every day outside the deployment site. If the US continues to push that forward it may make it very difficult to get Chinese cooperation on North Korea.

In fact, Daniels in 2017 explains that China called off talks with South Korea and Japan specifically because of THAAD.

Daniels 17 Jeff Daniels, 6-29-2017, "China talks with South Korea, Japan a no-go due to THAAD controversy," CNBC,

<http://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/29/china-talks-with-south-korea-japan-a-no-go-due-to-thaad.html> //DF

China has called off plans for top-level talks with South Korea and Japan, according to reports. The trilateral summit was expected to take place in late July. Beijing notified Tokyo that that time won't work, although the controversy over the U.S.-supplied THAAD missile shield system appears to be the main reason, according to Japan's Asahi Shimbun. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had been expected to host the summit. China has put economic pressure on Seoul to abandon the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, designed to defeat nuclear-armed North Korean missiles. The Chinese are concerned THAAD's powerful radar gives the U.S. and South Korea the ability to peer deep inside China to monitor military activities.

Link – North Korea

Khrustalev in 2017 explains:

Vladimir Khrustalev, Special To Rbth. "How North Korea may respond to the deployment of THAAD in South Korea." Russia Beyond The Headlines. 17 Apr. 2017. Web. 14 Jul. 2017.

<https://www.rbth.com/opinion/2017/04/17/how-north-korea-may-respond-to-the-deployment-of-thaad-in-south-korea_744041> // NS

One such missile carries about 30 potential targets. A volley of 16 Polaris missiles launched from one submarine can carry more than 500 targets, including 32 real warheads, which almost guarantee overcoming the missile defense system. North Korea, which has already been launching satellites on space rockets, will require five to seven years of work to develop such a missile. On top of that, along with the deployment of THAAD in Korea and potentially in Japan, the deployment of other missile defense systems at sea and on land will probably push North Korea towards more advanced measures such as the development of solid propellant missiles.

Impact

This is why Mcleary of Foreign Policy concludes in August that,

Paul Mcleary. "Which Works Best: Force or Diplomacy?." Foreign Policy. 21 Aug. 2013. Web. 1 Sept. 2017. <<https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/21/which-works-best-force-or-diplomacy/>> //NS

To be sure, military power can be a key to diplomatic success. As George Kennan once remarked, "you have no idea how much it contributes to the general politeness and pleasantness of diplomacy when you have a little quiet force in the background." But the key word there is "quiet," and the focus is still on diplomacy, not simply on blowing things up. Bottom line: it is worth remembering that America's greatest foreign policy successes were mostly the result of skillful diplomacy, not military prowess. Having a big stick is nice, but speaking softly is usually more effective. And if a country finds itself using that stick over and over and over, that's a very good sign that its foreign policy has lost its way.

They point the agreed framework negotiated by President Clinton in 1994.

Corroborating this, Cumings, a professor at the University of Chicago writes in 2017:

Cumings 17 Bruce Cumings [professor, the University of Chicago], 3-23-2017, "This Is What's Really Behind North Korea's Nuclear Provocations," Nation,

<https://www.thenation.com/article/this-is-whats-really-behind-north-koreas-nuclear-provocations/>

//DF

As I wrote for this magazine in January 2016, the North Koreans must be astonished to discover that US leaders never seem to grasp the import of their history-related provocations. Even more infuriating is Washington's implacable refusal ever to investigate our 72-year history of conflict

with the North; all of our media appear to live in an eternal present, with each new crisis treated as sui generis. Visiting Seoul in March, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson asserted that North Korea has a history of violating one agreement after another; in fact, President Bill Clinton got it to freeze its plutonium production for eight years (1994–2002) and, in October 2000, had indirectly worked out a deal to buy all of its medium- and long-range missiles. Clinton also signed an agreement with Gen. Jo Myong-rok stating that henceforth, neither country would bear “hostile intent” toward the other. The Bush administration promptly ignored both agreements and set out to destroy the 1994 freeze. Bush’s invasion of Iraq is rightly seen as a world-historical catastrophe, but next in line would be placing North Korea in his “axis of evil” and, in September 2002, announcing his “preemptive” doctrine directed at Iraq and North Korea, among others. The simple fact is that Pyongyang would have no nuclear weapons if Clinton’s agreements had been sustained. Now comes Donald Trump, blasting into a Beltway milieu where, in recent months, a bipartisan consensus has emerged based on the false assumption that all previous attempts to rein in the North’s nuclear program have failed, so it may be time to use force—to destroy its missiles or topple the regime. Last September, the centrist Council on Foreign Relations issued a report stating that “more assertive military and political actions” should be considered, “including those that directly threaten the existence of the [North Korean] regime.” Tillerson warned of preemptive action on his recent East Asia trip, and a former Obama-administration official, Antony Blinken, wrote in The New York Times that a “priority” for the Trump administration should be working with China and South Korea to “secure the North’s nuclear arsenal” in the event of “regime change.” But North Korea reportedly has some 15,000 underground facilities of a national-security nature. It is insane to imagine the Marines traipsing around the country in such a “search and secure” operation, and yet the Bush and Obama administrations had plans to do just that. Obama also ran a highly secret cyber-war against the North for years, seeking to infect and disrupt its missile program. If North Korea did that to us, it might well be considered an act of war. On November 8, 2016, nearly 66 million voters for Hillary Clinton received a lesson in Hegel’s “cunning of history.” A bigger lesson awaits Donald Trump, should he attack North Korea. It has the fourth-largest army in the world, as many as 200,000 highly trained special forces, 10,000 artillery pieces in the mountains north of Seoul, mobile missiles that can hit all American military bases in the region (there are hundreds), and nuclear weapons more than twice as powerful as the Hiroshima bomb (according to a new estimate in a highly detailed Times study by David Sanger and William Broad). Last October, I was at a forum in Seoul with Strobe Talbott, a former deputy secretary of state for Bill Clinton. Like everyone else, Talbott averred that North Korea might well be the top security problem for the next president. In my remarks, I mentioned Robert McNamara’s explanation, in Errol Morris’s excellent documentary The Fog of War, for our defeat in Vietnam: We never put ourselves in the shoes of the enemy and attempted to see the world as they did. Talbott then blurted, “It’s a grotesque regime!” There you have it: It’s our number-one problem, but so grotesque that there’s no point trying to understand Pyongyang’s point of view (or even that it might have some valid concerns). North Korea is the only country in the world to have been systematically blackmailed by US nuclear weapons going back to the 1950s, when hundreds of nukes were installed in South Korea. I have written much about this in these pages and in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Why on earth would Pyongyang not seek a nuclear deterrent? But this crucial background doesn’t enter mainstream American discourse. History doesn’t matter, until it does—when it rears up and smacks you in the face.

Pre-Emptive Strike

First, it enables the US to launch a preemptive strike.

Michaels at USA Today this week reports:

Michaels 17 Jim Michaels,, 9-5-2017, "Can North Korea target a U.S. city? Experts say not yet," USA TODAY,

<https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/09/05/experts-skeptical-north-korea-can-reach-us-cities/634706001/> //DF

North Korea has made speedy advances in its nuclear weapons program, but the rogue nation probably can't yet reach U.S. cities with nuclear-tipped missiles, analysts say. North Korea conducted a test

Sunday of its most powerful nuclear bomb to date, triggering a fresh wave of concern about the country and its unstable leader Kim Jong Un. It was North Korea’s sixth nuclear test, and Pyongyang claimed it detonated a hydrogen bomb, although that has not been confirmed by other

nations. **Targeting a U.S. city requires a long-range missile that can carry a hefty nuclear payload and then survive re-entry into Earth's atmosphere. "It's too early to conclude" that North Korea can effectively target mainland U.S. cities** with significant nuclear weapons, said David Albright, an analyst at the Institute for Science and International Security. "There's a lot of uncertainty." There's little debate, **however**, that **North Korea has made rapid headway in recent years in both missile technology and weapons development and is on a path to being able to reach U.S. targets.** Kim has already threatened Guam, a U.S. territory in the Pacific, and remains an immediate threat to South Korea and other U.S. allies in the region, which North Korea could reach with conventional weapons and shorter-range missiles. **"I don't think time is on our side here at all,"** said Philip Coyle, an analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation, who remains skeptical that North Korea can currently target U.S. cities with large payloads. **"Are they there now? I don't think so, but if we keep fooling around they are going to get there."** North Korean officials are master **propagandists who want to convince the world they have an effective threat so they will be treated as a nuclear power.** **"The North deliberately exaggerates their capabilities,"** Albright said. For its part, Washington doesn't want to underestimate the threat from North Korea, highlighting the danger it poses to the United States and its allies. The heated rhetoric on both sides sometimes masks the North's current capabilities. The recent spate of missile tests has generated alarm about North Korea's ability to reach the mainland United States. David Wright, an analyst at the Union of Concerned Scientists, said in a recent blog that a July test by North Korea of an intercontinental ballistic missile indicated its missiles could reach Los Angeles, Denver or Chicago. But **the bulk of the North's missile launches have been high-trajectory tests to determine missile range. An actual missile attack would be launched on a flatter trajectory with a heavy warhead attached.** In its most recent missile test, North Korea sent a missile flying over Japan on Aug. 29. South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff said the missile traveled about 1,700 miles and reached a maximum height of 341 miles as it flew over the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido. "They could carry a hand grenade, but whether they could carry something bigger is unclear," Coyle said. **Another technical challenge for an intercontinental ballistic missile is re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere.** The process generates heat that can burn up a warhead if the missile and warhead are not designed properly. Television imagery from **the missile test over Japan seemed to show the missile breaking up as it re-entered the atmosphere.** "It's one thing to build a missile and a bomb that can be carried on it, but then you have to survive the environment in space and re-entry," Coyle said.

The real threat posed by this is not the missiles themselves, but President Trump's reaction to them. According to Vox News in 2017:

Beauchamp 17 Zach Beauchamp, 8-1-2017, "Lindsey Graham: Trump 'told me' he will bomb North Korea if it keeps testing missiles," Vox,

<https://www.vox.com/world/2017/8/1/16075198/trump-lindsey-graham-north-korea-war> //DF

On Tuesday morning, **Sen. Lindsey Graham said that President Trump is willing to go to war with North**

Korea to stop it from being able to hit the American mainland with a nuclear weapon. "There is a military option: to destroy North Korea's nuclear program and North Korea itself," Graham told the Today show's Matt Lauer. "He's not going to allow — President Trump — the ability of this madman [Kim Jong Un] to have a missile that could hit America. "If there's going to be a war to stop him, it will be over there," Graham continued. "If thousands die, they're going to die over there. They're not going to die over here — and he's told me that to my face." Graham's press office confirmed that the senator was, in fact, reciting the details of a conversation he had with the president. According to Graham, the president "doesn't want a war" — but would be willing to start one that would kill millions of people in the region if it came down to it.

Once North Korea gains complete ability to hit the US, this option will no longer be possible, so Trump is pressed to act now. What is stopping Trump from pressing the button are US troops stationed in South Korea. However, missile defense changes the game.

Gomez at the Cato Institute in 2017 writes:

Eric Gomez, 5-15-2017, "THAAD Won't Save Asia (or America) from North Korea," National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/thaad-wont-save-asia-or-america-north-korea-20665>
With these technical limitations in mind, THAAD's main purpose is to provide a protective umbrella for U.S. air force bases in South Korea, and the port of Busan, the primary port of entry for follow-on U.S. ground forces in the event of a long-term fight with North Korea. But although missile defense systems are usually viewed as solely defensive, the protection they provide also creates a perverse incentive for U.S. military planners to use force offensively. If U.S. planners believe essential military facilities are relatively safe from missile attack, they could be emboldened to launch first strikes against North Korea's nuclear forces. Currently, the United States, South Korea, and North Korea all face strong incentives to go first in a conflict. The best way for the United States and South Korea to limit the damage of a North Korean attack is to destroy the North's nuclear weapons on the ground or kill Kim Jong Un before he can give the order. Unfortunately, **Before [missile defense] THAAD, a disarming blow was incredibly risky because of the damage that just a few surviving nuclear-armed missiles could do to U.S. forces in South Korea.** The risk and danger of a disarming strike are both still high, but **THAAD [missile defense] does reduce[s] them by providing a better shield against any weapons that may survive the first strike.** Ultimately, THAAD will do little to defuse the current tensions on the Korean peninsula. **The greater protection it provides to U.S. troops could make U.S. escalation less costly and therefore more attractive.** The Trump administration will have to find another way out of this crisis.

He furthers that:

Eric Gomez, 5-15-2017, "THAAD Won't Save Asia (or America) from North Korea," National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/thaad-wont-save-asia-or-america-north-korea-20665>
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What makes this worse is that Trump has unrestricted power to launch nukes.

Wellerstein at the Washington Post in 2016 explains:

Alex Wellerstein, 12-1-2016, "No one can stop President Trump from using nuclear weapons. That's by design.," Washington Post
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/12/01/no-one-can-stop-president-trump-fr-om-using-nuclear-weapons-thats-by-design/?utm_term=.ab34cd976f54 //DF

All year, the prospect of giving the real estate and reality TV mogul the power to launch attacks that would kill millions of people was one of the main reasons his opponents argued against electing him. "A man you can bait with a tweet is not a man we can trust with nuclear weapons," Hillary Clinton said in her speech accepting the Democratic presidential nomination. She cut an ad along the same lines. Republicans who didn't support Trump — and even some who did, such as Sen. Marco Rubio (Fla.) — also said they didn't think he could be trusted with the launch codes. Now they're his. When **Trump [has]** takes office in January, he will have **sole authority over more than 7,000 warheads. There is no failsafe. The whole point of U.S. nuclear weapons control is to make sure that the president — and only the president — can use them** if and **whenever he decides to do so**. The one sure way to keep President Trump from launching a nuclear attack, under the system we've had in place since the early Cold War, would have been to elect someone else.

Any pre-emptive strike on North Korea would cause a war. The Economist in 2017 reports:

Economist 17 8-5-2017, "How to avoid nuclear war with North Korea," Economist, <https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21725768-there-are-no-good-options-curb-kim-jong-un-blundering-war-would-be-worst-how> //DF

President Donald Trump has vowed to stop North Korea from perfecting a nuclear warhead that could threaten the American mainland, tweeting that "it won't happen!" Some pundits suggest shooting down future test missiles on the launchpad or, improbably, in the air. Others suggest using force to overthrow the regime or pre-emptive strikes to destroy Mr Kim's nuclear arsenal before he has a chance to use it. Yet it is just this sort of military action that risks a ruinous escalation. Mr **Kim [Jong Un]'s bombs and missile-launchers are scattered and well hidden. America's armed forces**, for all their might, **cannot reliably neutralise the North Korean nuclear threat before Mr Kim has a chance to retaliate. The task would be difficult even if the Pentagon had good intelligence about North Korea; it does not**. The only justification for a pre-emptive strike would be to prevent an imminent nuclear attack on America or one of its allies.