

Because you can't make war and peace with the same people on the same territory at the same time, we negate; resolved: United Nations peacekeepers should have the power to engage in offensive operations.

**Contention One:** The loss of impartiality undermines conflict resolution.

While peacekeeping operations, or PKOs, have remained neutral in the past, granting them an offensive capacity necessarily entails a loss of that objectivity because a party is labeled the enemy.

This undermines UN authority and its capacity to resolve conflict for three reasons.

First, based on the UN's actions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Security Council Report explains

Aware of the wider implications these developments had for peacekeeping, Council members inserted caveats in both resolutions. Resolution 2098 underscored that the [Force Intervention Brigade] brigade was established "on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping". Resolution 2100 reaffirmed these principles, "including consent of the parties, [and] impartiality and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate" and recognised the specific mandate of each peacekeeping mission.

As it has claimed that its actions do not establish a precedent, affirming the resolution inherently backtracks on the UN's word.

Second, partial interventions embolden those they back. The American Journal of Political Science details

This article began with a simple question—do alliances lead to peace or to war? The answer is not quite as simple. Because alliances affect the decisions of both adversaries and allies, and because alliances may contain a variety of commitments, different agreements can have different effects. Defensive alliances to potential targets have a deterrent effect, but offensive alliances and promises of nonintervention to potential challengers have an incendiary impact, serving to increase the confidence of a challenger in his ability to succeed through aggression. Aggregating these effects can mask any relationship in large empirical studies.

Third, the perceived insecurity of parties in the conflict deters long-term peace. The Annual Review of Political Science shows

By focusing on bargaining problems, this article reveals why more negotiated settlements are not reached and implemented in conflicts that occur within states. Disputants who wish to end their conflict in a negotiated settlement need to reach mutually acceptable settlements in environments that are often information poor. They then need to [and] design enforceable contracts in situations where few mechanisms exist to check behavior, especially the behavior of the central government. The result is a strategic situation that often encourages violence at the expense of peaceful cooperation.

This has negative implications not only for the target conflict but also for two other reasons.

First, it undermines future UN actions. Unless offensive operations are applied as a universal policy, the UN becomes more unclear with how PKOs are used. The Center for International Cooperation from New York University writes

Forging a common understanding of robust peacekeeping and doctrine of the use of force is increasingly urgent as missions employ ad hoc approaches to the new challenges in the field. This increasingly presents negative consequences. Elsewhere, Gowan has noted how inconsistency can both impede streamlining command and control and also increasingly complicate efforts to form unified doctrine. Johnstone also suggests a further concern of how this leads to "uncertain expectations among the parties to a conflict, local populations, and the multiple participants in complex operations" that the traditional principles of peacekeeping "were developed in part to manage."<sup>1</sup> (Johnstone, 66).

Host countries must consent for PKOs to operate. If PKOs demonstrate inconsistency, it becomes less likely leaders give that consent, especially because offense may threaten their power.

Second, it jeopardizes humanitarian aid. The Stimson Center elucidates

Humanitarian actors depend on being perceived as impartial neutral and independent in order to have access to and acceptance by communities. This enables the delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians in need across conflict lines. The nature of the intervention brigade's mandate may mean that any humanitarian organization perceived to be part of or affiliated with the mission is at greater risk of being targeted or having its access blocked by armed groups. In this context, humanitarian groups may also

be particularly reluctant to cooperate or share information with the mission, fearing that the brigade's offensive operations could lead to civilian casualties or have a direct negative impact on local perceptions.

## **Contention Two: UN peacekeepers lack adequate resources.**

This is for a two reasons.

### **First, the UN is massively undersupplied compared to current demand. The Center for International Cooperation again states**

Despite these drawbacks, **robust actions are increasingly demanded and mandated.** Durch and England note that by mid-2008, mandates for over 80% of both troops and police in UN operations were Chapter VII (the chapter mandating peace enforcement) (42). Johnstone's "Dilemma's in Robust Peacekeeping" begins with the understanding that **robust peacekeeping is already a given in today's post-conflict toolbox.** Member states and others demand it, and DPKO has responded with more robust peacekeeping. It explores four peacekeeping operations between 2000 and 2005 – Sierra Leone, East Timor, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Haiti – that illustrate this trend. In each, Johnstone highlights how the Security Council provided a Chapter VII mandate, but that missions each began with a less forceful response and grew to use a more forceful one as the crisis escalated. As this trend is likely to continue into the future, the challenge is to acknowledge the demand for robust peacekeeping more cohesively and strategically. CIC has argued, however, that demand is but one part of the equation, and that critical to answering questions of what robust peacekeeping should look like in the future, one must focus on the supply of resources for robust peacekeeping. All of CIC's writing on robust peacekeeping recognizes the serious constraints the UN faces in composing peacekeeping. Gowan and Tortolani note, **[However,] "In the short to medium-term, the UN will of necessity have to work with military resources broadly comparable to those it has at present – and in some cases, even less."** (50) As neither the demand nor the supply of robust peacekeeping is binary, however, finding equilibrium between the two requires a closer look at the measurement of degrees of robustness.

### **Second, peacekeepers should be working in tandem with other missions, not alone. The International Journal of Peace Studies underscores**

In his study of military involvement in peacekeeping, James Arbuckle (2006: 157) observes: "It seems that **the surest way to create divisions among the international agencies who are supposed to be cooperating, and who must cooperate, is to have similar organizations pursuing similar goals** – we lose no time in running Occam's Razor down nearly invisible lines, separating from each other elements more alike than different. Is the similarity of roles itself a threat, making competition a perceived imperative, like the territorial behavior of human (as well as other animals)? Is it, on the other hand, a basic dissimilarity in goals, which, despite the similarity in means, is the fundamental conflict? Do we need conflict with other agencies to maintain the cohesion of our group? Perhaps our most serious differences will indeed arise when we do the same or nearly the same things for different reasons" (Arbuckle, 2006: 157). Rubinstein describes peacekeeping as an act of intervention that involves "claims about legitimacy, standing and authority" with legitimacy defined as appropriate actions, standing as appropriate status to carry them out, and authority as the power to intervene (Rubinstein, 2008: 19). Perhaps in part because of the syndrome Arbuckle identifies, the unfortunate truth is that **when UN peacemaking and peacekeeping tracks proceed independently, the different entities tend to crash into one another on all of these fronts.** This has demonstrated to me one source of the failure of UN efforts to bring to a conclusion the problem of Cyprus and the quagmire of Lebanon. Experience led DPKO in 2007 to conclude that "conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement ... should be seen as mutually reinforcing. **Used piecemeal or in isolation, they fail to provide the comprehensive approach required to address the root causes of the conflict** that, thereby reduces the risk of conflict recurring" (UN/DPKO "Capstone Doctrine," 2007: 20). Inescapably, the bottom line in these conflicts is the political will of the parties and the predisposition(s) or national interests of the major powers. It is from these elements that the Security Council arrives at proposed remedies putting the UN in whatever position it must assume. The Security Council has traveled a long way, accepting the integration of peacemaking and peacekeeping and even adding peace building to the formula. But in Cyprus and Lebanon, as well as other arenas where the missions mandated were not established as integrated initiatives, the duty of the key international actors after these many years is to commit to a cohesive UN political strategy, and the responsibility of the Secretariat and its officials is to act seamlessly for the desired outcome.

### **When an understaffed force is tasked to stabilize an area, a security vacuum can arise. Based on the UN's actions in the DRC, the Stimson Center warrants**

The intervention brigade's mandate to neutralize armed groups also creates particular risks to civilians given the conflict dynamics in eastern DRC. Although recent media attention has been focused on M23, a multitude of armed groups compete for power in the region. **A force of 3,000 may be able to dislodge an armed group from one area, but is too small to hold the ground. This can create a power vacuum that others fill,** including other armed groups and Congolese armed forces known to abuse civilians. **New groups that take over control of territory may exact reprisals against communities for their perceived support of the former occupying force.**

Ultimately, throwing an unprepared force into a conflict zone further undermines the UN's credibility as well as the mission's viability. **James Sloan from the University of Glasgow School of Law highlights**

The third element of the argument that emerged from the Brahimi Report, i.e., that the Security Council should wait until peacekeeping forces are sufficiently well-configured to be successful before establishing them or placing them in situ, is also problematic. It presumes a Security Council that is sufficiently circumspect to put political considerations to one side, as well as UN member states that are willing to contribute sufficient financial resources and personnel to the endeavor—despite the risk of the loss of life. It ignores the reality that many states may consider the contribution of personnel to operations where the forces will be in harm's way to be politically damaging (the US contributes no personnel to UNAMID) and may even be begrudging when it comes to donating equipment. Moreover, it ignores the possibility that **some members of the Security Council might consider it to be preferable to put in place an operation that is ill-suited to the task, rather than risk waiting until the time is right, lest they be seen to be doing nothing** in the face of mass atrocity. Former Secretary-General Kofi Anan described the establishment of a militarized peacekeeping operation with a robust mandate, but little chance of fulfilling it, as creating an 'alibi' for the Security Council. Presumably, the idea is that **if the UN is criticized for allowing another mass atrocity to occur, the Security Council can point to the fact that it did act: it established a militarized peacekeeping operation to prevent such an atrocity.** In this regard, the title of the third article in the Foreign Policy investigation may be recalled: 'A Mission That Was Set Up to Fail'.

The Pro world is one that advocates giving the UN more tools at its disposal. This only opens up the probability that the UN hastily sets up an offensive operation, even if it isn't right for the conflict, for the sake of saving face.