We affirm resolved: to better respond to international conflicts, the US should significantly increase its military spending.

Our sole contention is bolstering responses to intrastate wars.

In an era of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence, conventional war between states is mostly a relic. Intrastate, or civil wars have become the primary mode of conflict.

Hensel 2001 of Florida State University observes out of the

They identify **108 armed conflicts**, each of which resulted in at least 25 battle deaths during at least one calendar year **between** **1989-1998**. Of these armed conflicts, **only seven** -- two of which were active in 1998 -- **were** primarily **interstate** in nature. Nine others were intrastate conflicts with foreign intervention, and the remaining 92 were intrastate in nature.

Response to intrastate war has been affected by spending trends.

Kheel 2016 of The Hill reports that this past year

“World military spending increased last year for the first time since 2011, though U.S. **[military] spending dropped by 2.4 percent**, according to a report released Tuesday by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The United States, though, still remains the top military spender in the world, the report says, with spending totaling $596 billion in 2015. The 2.4 percent dip in U.S. spending was the smallest annual drop since 2011, according to the report. Other years saw more significant declines, for example **in 2014 spending fell 6.5 percent, and in 2013 it dropped 7.8 percent**.”

Cuts like this damage our ability to respond to conflicts.

Hoffman 2016 of the Foreign Policy Research Institute writes

“No doubt, future U.S. decisions about its place and role in the world will influence the stability of global order. Will that international engagement continue, or will the United States retrench and start focusing on nation building at home?61 The 2016 electoral debates suggest that a robust international role may not be politically sustainable. Poll findings depict an American populace weary and wary of foreign entanglements. One poll shows 53 percent of respondents saying that the U.S. “should mind its own business internationally” compared to 41 percent who said so in 1995.62 The costs for U.S. leadership and engagement compete for constrained resources for domestic priorities, and a period of retrenchment is possible. Some argue that it is strategically necessary or useful.63 Yet,American **retrenchment,** complete with caps **in defense** and foreign aid **spending, undercuts the capacity of the United States** to maintain order. **The** overall **size of the U.S. military has been declining along with its qualitative edge.** Explicit in the call for defense strategies built around technological breakthroughs, the so-called Offset Strategy is a concern about declining military superiority.64 Even the perception of reduced security capacity, much less an actual reduction, reduces deterrence and produces instability in regions where existing unresolved political or territorial disputes remain unresolved.”

And,

“While the United States will retain enormous strategic advantages and sizable military forces, its relative military superiority is declining, and the political will to deploy its advantages constructively could diminish. Disruptive forces are on the increase and have not yet been matched by adaptations in U.S. defense requirements. As noted in a recent report by CSIS, “The result is much more stress than had been expected on a shrinking force.”71 This forecast judges that an increased degree of uncertainty and the perception of **declining** relative **military superiority will generate a corresponding increase in** the probability of interstate conflict.72 A reduced interest in global order is additionally forecasted to increase the likelihood of intrastate **conflict**.”

Increased spending would address these problems. The 2017 Department of Defense budget request calls for increased spending with the objective to

“The defense strategy, as outlined in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, explains that the nation demands that the Joint Force have the ability to simultaneously protect the homeland; provide a global presence in support of U.S. interests, particularly to assure allies and deter aggression in the Asia-Pacific, European, and Middle East regions; and **project power** against a range of adversaries and challenges **across the spectrum of conflict.** The Department’s force planning and programming must address both the near-term and long-term priorities derived from these Departmental objectives. To underwrite this ability in the Joint Force, the Department’s budget must prioritize **[with] capability investments and recovery of the force’s readiness** while controlling internal cost growth that threatens to erode combat power. It must also develop and maintain a posture of CONUS-based and forward forces that prioritizes deterrence, surge for responsiveness to crises, and the ability to prevail in conflict. Finally, the Department must prioritize investments in and preparation for emerging 21st century threats, including those related to the space and cyberspace, the nuclear enterprise, and power projection in highly contested environments. This focus means sustaining robust investments in science, technology, research, and development in areas most critical to future conflict, including where there is the greatest potential for game-changing advances. It also requires reforms to headquarters, for structure, health care, and infrastructure so that the needed investment in priorities is possible.

Zenko 2004 of Brandeis explains that this type of spending would enable better response, finding

“Despite its collective condemnation and revulsion of the Holocaust, the international community has shown a disturbingly high tolerance for genocide in the last halfcentury. For many of these countries – now developing their own RDFs – quick **interventions** to halt genocide **are [often] impossible because of a lack of capabilities. What is** now most **needed** from them **is** a hurried expansion of the global capabilities necessary to conduct rapid and decisive operations.71 This expansion requires **additional defense spending** **to** procure the strategic transport and aerial refueling tankers that **increase the deployability** **of** standing **forces**. Ultimately, for all Genocide Convention signatories, past indifference is no excuse for future inaction. What is evident from recent humanitarian interventions is that **the efficacy of such missions in saving lives is** largely **dependent on** factors under **the interveners’** control: motivation, **capabilities** and response time.72 Preventing mass civilian attacks and genocide is no different, and as this paper has shown, RDFs are the best option for such interventions. Although long-term solutions are necessary to stabilize post-conflict countries, without an initial strong show of force to shape the situation on the ground, follow-on phases may never occur, or they may be irrelevant in terms of saving lives. Therefore, based on knowledge derived from recent events, the hypothetical intervention described above is the most likely future scenario to occur.

Thus, Salam 2015 of Slate writes

“Part of the reason **the U.S. needs to spend more on its military** is that the U.S.needs well-trained women and men with the skills and the talent **to handle chaotic situations**, and they need the best tools money can buy**.** The world is a dangerous place, but it is far less dangerous than it would be in the absence of a uniquely powerful United States”

Improved military capacity would not go unused.

Choksy 2011 of Indiana University explains that military intervention is our response to civil conflicts, writing

“**The parameters of U.S. policy toward international engagements** to stabilize and reconstruct failed, failing, and fragile countries **were laid out** in National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44 **as**: “The United States has a significant stake in enhancing the capacity to assist in **stabilizing** and reconstructing **countries or regions**, especially those **at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict** or calamity, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market economies. The United States should work with other countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law. Such work should aim to enable governments abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests.”[10] **This policy sets the parameters for intervention**, including that the U.S. should not feel constrained to wait until problems have reached crisis conditions or have globalized. Yet it also makes clear that intervention should occur in accordance with particular ideals, within specific parameters, and for the purposes of accomplishing very precise goals.

These interventions tend to focus on protecting innocents from atrocities.

According to Tardelli 2013 of the London School of Economics,

“However, as Western policymakers lost the framing provided by the notion of the ‘free world’ against the Soviet challenge and humanitarism continued to filter into Western political formulas, Western elites’leadership was increasingly called into question when failing to prevent mass atrocities. Similarly to the Cuban case, genuine humanitarian concerns coupled with deep-rooted ideas of US exceptionalism and of its guidance role vis-à-vis the target communities. As such, they served both altruistic and imperial objectives.32 In particular, the **Liberal tenets of the US political formula** continued to inform US policymakers’ views of foreign non-democratic elites. Similarly to the Russian case examined in Chapter 5, the discourse underpinning US intervention continued to **target** local dictators and autocratic elites, held responsible for **humanitarian disasters** andinstability. As Western notes, requests for US intervention in Somalia became gradually informed by a description of the conflict **as the result of violent campaigns** orchestrated by ruthless elites to advance their narrow political ambitions. Based on this portrayal, [liberals] argued that U.S.- led intervention targeted against these political elites would quickly mitigate the humanitarian catastrophe.33 In an increasingly homogenous system centred on Liberal values, such a discourse became predominant, reducing the space for cooperation with local leaders who were rejecting both US hegemony and its ideological tenets. In addition, the specific political platforms of the incumbent elites both in the US and Europe at the time reinforced these dynamics. As Brian Rathbun argues, the specific political platforms of the incumbent coalitions shaped European leaders’ acceptance of humanitarian norms and of the utility of force in this regard, which in turn affected their decisions to intervene.34 Similarly, the neoWilsonian platform with which Bill Clinton was elected in 1992 led to a public commitment for the enlargement of the perimeter of democracies, linking US security to the nature of foreign regimes.35 Interventions were driven also by elite’s calculations of power. In this regard, focusing exclusively on the humanitarian motivations of these operation risks overlooking the power dynamics underlying US and Western interventions during the 1990s. **Although the US elite** for the first time in its history **face**d **no direct threat to either its international or domestic power, US policymakers still** had to **confront** a twofold challenge: the consequences of the Soviet collapse and of the Cold War system on former clients and Third World states; and, **the** domestic **consequences of** US action and **inaction** in regard to the resulting conflicts**.**

There are two reasons why these interventions are crucial for responding to conflict.

First, they discourage antagonism by putting a cost on violence.

Intervening to inflict damage against aggressive actors would signal to those actors that their destruction comes at a cost.

Cambanis 2016 of the Century Foundation explains that intervention in conflicts like the ongoing Syrian Civil War would

.”A sharper and less episodic U.S.-led intervention could **raise the military cost for the Syrian government and its foreign sponsors**, while protecting civilians who die by the hundreds every week under shells, barrel bombs, and other indiscriminate fire” actors who commit atrocities against civilians.

He furthers that intervention could

“The U.S. intervention would have two aims, neither of them new: to reduce civilian death and displacement, and to **increase the faint chances of a diplomatic solution by raising the cost of continuing war** for the Damascus government and its sponsors.”

Secondly, intervention forces violent actors to divert attention away from committing atrocities

Western 2011 of Mount Holyoke College explains

“Even when civil wars do not stop right away, **external interventions** often **mitigate violence against civilians**. This is **because**, as the political scientist Matthew Krain and others have found, **interventions** aimed at preventing mass atrocities often **force would-be killers to divert resources away from slaughtering civilians and toward defending themselves**. This phenomenon, witnessed in the recent Libya campaign, means that even when interventions fail to end civil wars or resolve factional differences immediately, they can still protect civilians**.”**

Thus, Kraine 2005 of Wooster College finds that after military interventions that directly challenge the perpetrators of atrocities, the probability that killings will decrease jumps by 12 percentage points.

Mitigating civilian casualties is crucial because this violence induces migration away conflict zones. Wood 2016 of Arizona State University writes

“The principal purpose of this article is to review contributions to the emerging literature on civilian victimization. It therefore addresses three relevant questions related to this important topic. (1) While civil conflicts—including insurgencies, civil wars, rebellions, asymmetrical conflicts, etc.—typically impose substantial costs on the civilian population, the extent of those costs varies significantly across the sample of cases. What explains the variation in civilian costs across conflicts? (2) **Targeting civilians** potentially imposes costs on opponents (as well as civilian targets) and **reshapes the conflict landscape by displacing civilians and sowing instability.** What impact does civilian victimization have on the trajectory of the conflict and its outcome? (3) Foreign states and institutions often intervene in domestic conflicts, sometimes in direct response to mounting civilian causalities. How do these external parties influence the severity of civilian victimization?

This instability causes wars to spill over across borders. Salehyan 2006 of UC San Diego finds that a flow of 100,000 refugees increases the odds of civil war by 57-114%, and that a refugee flow of only 20,000 increased the chance of war between 2 countries by 85%.