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# A2 Aff

## A2 Legitimizing UNSC

1. **Delink: Adding India would not legitimize the UNSC**

[Hurd 2008](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/27800702.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A901eb0a4106e368ee789088504857e27)

 Second, each hypothesis can be undermined by the possibility of "informal membership" in the Council. **As the Council increases the opportunities for participation available to nonmembers, it steals the foundation from many of the reform arguments.** The deliberative hypotheses, in particular, are weakened to the extent that Council rules of procedure, and Charter requirements, allow nonmembers of the Council to contribute to deliberation. **The justification for adding new formal members is defeated if states' presence and participation can be solicited on a case-by-case basis**. What remains is the potential legitimating power of the pure membership argument, where formal presence is thought by itself to have a legitimating effect (as in Hl, H2, and H3). In the end, it is not clear that the formal structure of Council membership is the most important constraint on deliberation, or that adding new members would necessarily add to its deliberative quality. Finally, the weakness of many of these arguments relative to empirical evidence makes it plausible to conclude that **much of** the **"legitimacy talk"** This content downloaded from 12.50.8.10 on Fri, 29 Mar 2019 18:02:06 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Ian Hurd 213 around which reform arguments are constructed **is a false front, covering up the political interests of states. What aspirants to Council membership seem to be really seeking are the status and prestige that they believe go along with a seat**.56 These real motives behind the rhetoric are not affected by the lack of evidence for the rhetorical claims. They are not without effect, however, given the nature of rhetorical power. Two new issues then come to the fore, each worthy of further research. First, the ubiquity with which reform arguments are defended by reference to the alleged "legitimacy deficit" of the Council suggests that the international community expects that proposals be couched in universal rather than particularistic values. Second, these generalizable claims may subject their speakers to the possibility of rhetorical entrapment, so that public statements about a principle of legitimation might be turned around by others in ways the speaker never intended but from which they can't escape.57 International talk may be cheap, but it is never free.

1. **TURN: Giving India a seat would greenlight humans rights violations internationally.**

[Nawaz 17](https://www.academia.edu/37138288/Violation_of_the_UN_Resolutions_on_Kashmir_Indias_Quest_for_UNSC_Permanent_Membership)

Kashmiris want an honourable space for themselves according to the UN Charter. In 1990, when a popular uprising broke out, the most shouted slogan was, ‘until a plebiscite is held, our struggle will continue.’37 The history has seen large processions heading towards the UNMOGIP headquarters demanding for their independence. The protests were relodged on August 18, 2008, and called for the implementation of the UN resolutions. On March 1, 1990, more than one million Kashmiris marched towards the UNMOGIP headquarters and called for the UN-supervised plebiscite. More than 600 memoranda were submitted for the UN Secretary General to urge India to grant Kashmiris their right of self-determination.38 The disputed status of Kashmir and the continuous denial of India to their right of self-determination have further strengthened their national identity. The Plebiscite Movement, originated by the Plebiscite Front in 1955, has greatly contributed to keeping the demand alive along with the presence of the UN resolutions. It represents the popular demand. On the other hand, the role of the UN has been invalidated with the passage of time. The most recent UN attempt was made in 2002, when Indo-Pak forces confronted each other at the borders. India mobilised half a million troops to pressurise Pakistan, not to side with the Kashmiri freedom fighters on their principle demand. **However, the current wave of atrocities by India to suppress the movement after the extrajudicial killing of the freedom fighter, Burhan Wani, in July 2016, and the use of pellet guns to blind several have not been able to stir the world’s conscience. . The use of the brutal force by India [in kashmir against protestors] is impertinence to an international organisation. It compounds vulnerability for peaceful world governance**. The functions and the powers of the UNSC under the UN Charter are to maintain international peace and security and investigate the disputes, which eventually might lead to any international friction. The threats, which might violate peace, are also determined and terms of settlement are recommended. The UN needs to assume its role more assertively. **Furthermore, the US support to India’s bid for a permanent seat in the UNSC would give a free rein to India to continue with the violation of international norms and further lead to the failure of yet another crisis management body.**

1. **Turn: India would collapse UNSC legitimacy in the middle east**

[Jabeen 10](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320700560_Indian_Aspirations_for_Permanent_Membership_in_UN_Security_Council_and_American_Stance) (YZ)

 Pakistan prefers to deal with Kashmir issue first, while India wants to give priority on less sensitive issues and is skeptical of the third party involvement. **Conferring this status in UNSC, India would be in a position to block any undesired policy on Kashmir. The UN resolution of 1948 on Kashmir still stands**, although India argued that the events of Simla Agreement have over taken this. **Veto power is a question in such situation**. If India is to take a role beyond South Asia, however, it has to enjoy peaceful relations with its neighbors. Peace process has been started to improve the relations since 2003 but uncertainty of the peace process and insurgency in Kashmir have the potential to keep India in tension. **Pakistan opposed the expansion of the UNSC with veto power to counter India** (News Time, 2010, January 12). **Pakistan might also be able to rally other Muslim states to block India in General Assembly.**

India commits large scale human right abuses on muslims and supports Israel

[Gautam Dec. 17](https://www.newsclick.in/why-india-so-keen-support-israel) (YZ)

Then why is **India [is]** so **keen to support Israel** when, at this point, it means **standing in opposition to the rest of the world**. Not standing with Palestine is to stand with all of these crimes and human rights violations. **This decision would also pave way for more illegal Israeli settlements, more destruction, dispossession and ethnic cleansing of Palestinians.** And it is not pragmatic to have such proximity with Israel: India’s proximity with Israel isolates it from most of its neighbours and geopolitical hinterland and may even affect its trade and investment possibilities with its main economic partners. **India’s growing support for Israel is symptomatic of its own right-ward shift. Under the new [Modi BJP] regime in India, freedom and dissent have taken a serious toll. Anti-minority hate crimes have increased significantly with mob** [**lynchings**](https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/india-modi-beef-lynching-muslim-partition/533739/) **going unpunished. Recently in December, a Muslim family was** [**driven out**](https://thewire.in/207009/meerut-hindu-muslim/) **of their home**s in Meerut, Uttar Pradesh as Hindutva groups, including BJP’s youth wing, were advocating against living next to them. In Satna, Madhya Pradesh, Christmas carol singers were [attacked](http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/right-wing-hindu-group-attack-christian-carol-singers-in-mp-s-satna-117121500437_1.html) by Hindutva mobs, a priest’s car burnt and the singers were taken into custody by the police. **In active and tacit ways, the Indian establishment is allowing an atmosphere of fear and hatred to prevail.**

## A2 Encouraging Broader UNSC reform

1. **Turn: More non permanent members worsens great power conflict**

[Bosco 2014](https://acuns.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/05-GG204-Bosco.pdf)

Finally, a concert approach offers a different perspective on the perennial question of Security Council reform and enlargement. Those who argue for significant Council expansion often cast these arguments in terms of legitimacy and respect for the Council’s decisions.A more representative Council, it is asserted, will command greater respect and ultimately be more effective. Arguments in favor of Council reform therefore lean heavily on a governance conception of the Council’s role and usually pay little heed to its concert utility. From a concert perspective, Council reform might be quite beneficial if it extends the benefits outlined above to other major powers. Yet membership reform might also pose a danger to the concert dynamic. Some proposals would significantly **expand[ing] the number of nonpermanent seats** and produce a total membership of up to thirty members. Reform of this type **might alter the diplomatic balance considerably and discourage major powers from using the Council as often as they do now.** If so, **the push for a more representative** and effective **Council could inadvertently undermine** one of **the institution**’s hidden values.

It is essential that powerful states remain invested in the UNSC, as Bosco states,

This article distinguishes between the UN Security Council’s “governance” and “concert” functions and argues that the latter is important in assessing the body’s diplomatic value. It presents data suggesting that serving together on the Council deepens diplomatic linkages between permanent members. It also argues that Council membership may offer several benefits for managing relations between the permanent members. Specifically, **the Council provides a mechanism through which permanent members have slowed the pace of crises that might threaten their relations**, used ambiguity to **produce[d] exits from potentially dangerous situations, and mitigated diplomatic humiliation.** The article contends that many proposals for Council reform pay little attention to this concert function and, if adopted, may unwittingly diminish a key benefit of the institution. KEYWORDS: United Nations, diplomacy, Security Council

1. **Turn: Transparency reform worsens great power conflict**

[Bosco 2014](https://acuns.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/05-GG204-Bosco.pdf)

The Council’s working methods have come under intense scrutiny during the past several decades. A number of voices have argued that the Council needs to increase its transparency. 41 The body’s informal consultations— where most major decisions are made—have been a particular focus of criticism. These meetings, which became standard practice in the late 1970s, occur without any record of discussion and often without a formal agenda. In response to persistent criticism, the Council has agreed to provide regular updates on its informal meetings and to create certain avenues for civil society input. From a governance perspective, this emphasis on transparency is understandable. A legitimate governing body’s methods and procedures must be clear to the public. Whether transparency is unambiguously beneficial from a concert perspective is less clear. **Some of the Council’s most effective moments have resulted from off-the-record** informal **consultations, particularly between permanent members. A relentless transparency drive** that discourages, for example, regular consultations among the permanent members **might sacrifice important Council benefits on the altar of good governance**. As Voeten argues, “**Successful reforms to make the Security Council more transparent may [make]** actually have adverse effects in that **powerful states** may **flee the forum**

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**4. TURN: India stops caring about reforms that benefit others once it gets on the council - India wants to get reelected to the SC now so they behave.**

[Khan 15](https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632266.pdf)

**The reform proposals of the U.N. HLP and aspirants’ countries will benefit only those countries that succeed in getting permanent seats at the UNSC and not the regions that the permanent members are selected from.** The selection of a specific country from a particular geographic region does not mean that that country would be representative of that region. **Furthermore, countries selected as permanent members have no obligation to look after the interests of their respective regions.** After being selected as permanent members, member states are not accountable to the region—**only nonpermanent members remain accountable to the regions for their reelection. Furthermore, most of the states are involved in various conflicts with the regional countries, and are therefore likely to use the permanent membership to influence the outcome of any dispute in their favor. Careful analysis reveals that P5 countries have cast vetoes against countries of their own, respective regions.** Recently, Russia has vetoed a resolution on Ukraine in order to block discussion on the annexation of Crimea.201

## A2 Countering China

1. **Delink: India and China often align on the UNSC**

[Pillalamarri 2015](https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-should-back-india-for-a-permanent-un-security-council-seat/)

Despite the lack of explicit Chinese support for an Indian bid to join the UNSC as a permanent member, India should make the most of China’s favorable position to press China to support its bid.**India and China often vote together at international forums despite their bilateral differences and border disputes. Moreover, an India on the UNSC** would provide a neutral and independent counterweight to other powers, an**d would help usher in a more multipolar world, as many Chinese analysts wish for.** Despite being a liberal democracy, **India has supported** Russia and **China on issues of non-interference in the affairs of other states and would help balance the UNSC away from the Western bloc.**

1. **Delink: U.S., India, and the EU already defeated OBOR in the UN**

[**Sirohi 2018**](https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-china-belt-and-road-united-nations)

The spread of “Xi Jinping thought” via subterfuge came to a complete halt, at least at the UN, thanks to some diplomatic due diligence by India, the US and the EU. China’s little helper Pakistan could do nothing but watch. The last vestige of BRI propaganda was deleted from a resolution on Afghanistan on December 6 in a final act of cleansing that started last year when India took a strong stand against BRI and rained on Xi’s parade by raising questions about transparency, environmental standards, predatory economics and violations of sovereignty. Just as last year, **when the coalition of India, US and EU worked to remove references to BRI from two other resolutions**, the three-pillar resistance was led by the young Indian diplomats at India’s permanent mission who negotiated with other delegations and gathered widespread support. **The latest victory was achieved when references to BRI contained in the 2017 and 2016 resolutions on Afghanistan**, which had the UN General Assembly welcoming “regional economic cooperation through regional initiatives, such as the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road (the Belt and Road) Initiative and other regional projects,” were deleted. The 2018 resolution on Afghanistan was rid of BRI baggage.

**3. India never really contains China anyways**

[Chen 15 the Diplomat](https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/why-china-doesnt-see-india-as-a-threat/)

The second reason is quite straightforward. Very simply speaking, **India needs Chinese investment to develop its economy in the long run**. Sure, India does not want to be dominated by China economically, but **in the long run there is no better alternative than China to help India’s huge appetite for investment in infrastructure**. For example, Obama announced that the U.S. would invest $4 billion in India over the coming years, a number that pales in comparison to China’s pledge of $20 billion for India, announced during President Xi Jinping’s visit to India in 2014. Of course, there is no reason for India to reject investment from other powers as long as India resists economic colonization. Moreover, although India has some advantages with its democratic system, there is a lot to learn from China with regard to China’s unique model of economic development. If India can learn the right lessons from China and avoid China’s mistakes, then indeed the 21st century might be a century for Asians**. Lastly, policymakers in India fully understand that it is pointless and even counterproductive to contain a rising** China. The truth is that China has already risen and any plan to contain China would be a huge mistake. This is not to say that a containment strategy would not cause damage to China’s national interests (it would). But the point is rather that **any power who initiates this containment strategy would suffer vastly itself. Thus, no rational state would choose such a suicidal strategy.** Despite the fact that there is some kind of security and economic cooperation between India and Vietnam, no evidence suggests that India truly wants to intervene in the South China Sea dispute. India’s strategy in the South China Sea is more likely a response to China’s increasing inroads into the Indian Ocean and continued support for Pakistan. If China is willing to make some concessions in those areas, India will also likely make some concessions in the South China Sea.

## A2 SCS

1. China would never give up the South China Sea

[**BBC 18**](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-44638817) (YZ)

**[President Xi Jinping has said] (that) China** is committed to peace but **will not give up "even one inch" of territory,**President Xi Jinping has said, after talks with visiting US Defence Secretary James Mattis.

China would never give up SCS for x reasons:

a.) It would literally be political suicide for the communist party and cause population outcries if they give up the South China Sea

[Dixon 14](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00905992.2014.969693?src=recsys) (YZ)

Much has been made **over**the past few years of **China's ambitions of regaining control of its irredentist claims in the East and South China Seas**. While some of this speculation focuses on the massive amounts of money the People's Republic of China (PRC) has funneled into its naval modernization program, other analysts are more interested in the drivers behind the increasingly popular sentiment that the country must “reclaim” its lost territories. **The Chinese Communist Party can ill afford to ignore the voice of an already disenchanted population if it hopes to stay in power, particularly in regard to matters of national pride**. As a result, in dealing **[especially] with China's irredentist claims, nationalism in particular can be a powerful ideological facto**r in shaping the nation's foreign policies. This is especially apparent in the case of irredentism, where nationalism can often override diplomatic and strategic imperatives.

[RAND](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1170/MR1170.ch3.pdf) (YZ)

Chinese scholars and academics with close ties to the Chinese government echo this view. As one said: “Regional countries have occupied China’s islands and reefs, carved up its sea areas, and looted its marine resources,” adding that China’s moves in recent years are a “long-overdue and legitimate action to protect its territorial integrity.” **If China lost such territory, “the legitimacy of the communist regime would be questioned.”**12 Echoing this sentiment, another Chinese academic said: “The Spratly issue is about what is China, and what is China’s space.”13 **Simply put, any Chinese leader considering compromise on the issue would have to take account of the likely adverse reaction of key domestic audiences.**1

b.) The South China Sea is the future of China’s economy and energy independence

[RAND](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1170/MR1170.ch3.pdf) (YZ)

Another factor animating **China’s desire to establish control over the Spratlys is its growing appetite for oil and the inability of domestic oil production to meet this demand.** According to the most recent projections of the United States Energy Information Administration, **by the year 2020 China is projected to import 70 percent of its oil and 50 percent of its gas.** Virtually all this oil will transit the South China Sea, and thus any disruption of the flow of oil to China could have a crippling effect on the Chinese economy. Historically, the Chinese have sought to minimize their strategic dependence on other countries, and this ideology of self-reliance is still very much alive. It is likely, therefore, that **Chinese leaders are uncomfortable over the prospect of increasing dependence on foreign oil**and will look for ways to lessen China’s vulnerability to any disruption. **Physical control over the Spratlys would** achieve this objective in two ways: first, it would **prevent** other countries from using the Spratlys to mount**an [foreign] oil interdiction effort**. Second, **[and] the Chinese claim that there are large oil and gas deposits in the waters surrounding the Spratlys** and that exploitation of these deposits would help to redress the projected shortfall between oil production and consumption.

[Vidas 17](https://www.fni.no/news/fish-not-oil-at-the-heart-of-the-south-china-sea-conflict-article1556-330.html) (YZ)

The question is who should benefit from these resources. **According to Beijing, China is entitled to the lion’s share [of South China Sea’s resources].** Based on historic rights, the country’s so-called [Nine-Dash Line](https://web.archive.org/web/20090529204756/http%3A/www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf) covers close to 80 percent of the South China Sea. However, that claim is contrary to the framework of maritime zones under the [UN Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)](http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf) and, of course, rejected by the other South China Sea states.

After all,**the South China Sea fisheries are** [**vital**](http://www.oceanrecov.org/news/ocean-recovery-alliance-news/boom-or-bust-the-future-of-fish-in-the-south-china-sea.html) **to the economies of the claimant states**. The area holds at least 3,365 species of marine fish, 55 percent of global marine fishing vessels operate in the South China Sea, and some **12 percent of global fishing catches take place here. Moreover, for fringe states, fish is an extremely important source of nutrition, and fisheries employ at least 3.7 million people**

c.) China does not want a repeat of the Century of Humiliation, the government fears losing anything. Concessions would imply the government is weak like the Qing.

[Heller 19 of RealClearDefense](https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/02/04/south_china_sea_china_breaks_from_a_century_of_humiliation_114158.html) (YZ)

**Each humiliation China suffered – its loss of territory, ports, trade, and sovereignty – only occurred due to the ability of foreign militaries to control Chinese territory. The fear of these events repeating themselves**, no matter how unlikely, **motivates China’s drive for regional power and maritime expansion.**Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream is fueled by trade and commerce, which in turn requires both mercantile and naval power to command the sea.

Two additional themes emerge from this history which shapes China’s maritime policy. First,**the CCP does not trust western states and institutions. China remembers its past experiences with international law and treaty agreements as tools for European, American, and Japanese domination**. The faction of Chinese leaders who most favor competition with the United States, who Michael Pillsbury refers to as the **Chinese hawks, frequently invokes events from the Century of Humiliation to remind China why Washington cannot be trusted.** As modern Chinese thinkers wrestled with big questions about why their country was weak, debates eventually merged into a widespread belief that, “the problem [was] not with China but with the West.”Foremost in this belief is the hypocrisy Nanjing saw in the European-created international system. **Since colonial Europe justified its actions through the use of international law while simultaneously promising China it would gain acceptance into a new, fair international system**—acceptance which never came—**Chinese leaders resolved themselves to believe any Western system** would never accept their state.**Such distrust undoubtedly plays a factor in China’s reluctance to cooperate, negotiate, or accept international arbitration** on a myriad of issues today such as the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.

1. South China Sea is at peace right now xd

[Liu of Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/27/china-not-tolerate-trump-military-muscle-south-china-sea) (YZ)

**China and** the Association of Southeast Asian Nations **(Asean) countries agreed on the framework of a code of conduct. The parties have agreed to hold at least three more rounds of consultations before the end of this year**. The South China Sea is calm and the region is in harmony.

1. NU: India already is conducting FONOPS

[Economic Times 2018](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-reneging-on-promise-by-conducting-naval-drills-in-south-china-sea-china/articleshow/58786836.cms?from=mdr) (DS)

BEIJING: **India which is conducting major naval drills with Singapore in the disputed South China Sea has "reneged" on its promise not to provoke China on the sensitive issue, a Chinese military expert said today.** Judging from the deployment of anti-submarine weapons, **the purpose of the drills is clearly aimed at impacting China's submarines in the Indian Ocean, which India regards as a "threat" to its influence in the area**, Song Zhongping, a military expert who used to serve in the People

1. India wouldn’t want to piss off China even if they get the seat

[Chen 15 the Diplomat](https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/why-china-doesnt-see-india-as-a-threat/)

The second reason is quite straightforward. Very simply speaking, **India needs Chinese investment to develop its economy in the long run**. Sure, India does not want to be dominated by China economically, but **in the long run there is no better alternative than China to help India’s huge appetite for investment in infrastructure**. For example, Obama announced that the U.S. would invest $4 billion in India over the coming years, a number that pales in comparison to China’s pledge of $20 billion for India, announced during President Xi Jinping’s visit to India in 2014. Of course, there is no reason for India to reject investment from other powers as long as India resists economic colonization. Moreover, although India has some advantages with its democratic system, there is a lot to learn from China with regard to China’s unique model of economic development. If India can learn the right lessons from China and avoid China’s mistakes, then indeed the 21st century might be a century for Asians**. Lastly, policymakers in India fully understand that it is pointless and even counterproductive to contain a rising China.** The truth is that China has already risen and any plan to contain China would be a huge mistake. This is not to say that a containment strategy would not cause damage to China’s national interests (it would). But the point is rather that **any power who initiates this containment strategy would suffer vastly itself. Thus, no rational state would choose such a suicidal strategy.** Despite the fact that there is some kind of security and economic cooperation between India and Vietnam, no evidence suggests that India truly wants to intervene in the South China Sea dispute. India’s strategy in the South China Sea is more likely a response to China’s increasing inroads into the Indian Ocean and continued support for Pakistan. If China is willing to make some concessions in those areas, India will also likely make some concessions in the South China Sea.

## A2 Counter China in Africa

1. **NU/Doesn't have the money and neglected for too long - china already controls africa**

[**Rajagopalan**](https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/indias-china-challenge-in-africa/) **2018**

For New Delhi, Africa has become a lot more significant because of China’s proactive engagement in the region**. But at the same time, India’s long neglect and the inadequate economic capacity are serious disadvantages in the face of China’s strategic push and the economic muscle.** Nonetheless, India’s promises and commitments will be judged against China’s projects in the region. New Delhi’s biggest challenge has been its inability to deliver on the promises that it makes. There is little sign that India has done much about this, adding to the doubts about India’s capacity to compete with China.

Unlikely they can even try to compete with China because they’re so far behind

[Patey 18](https://africanarguments.org/2018/08/31/can-india-keep-pace-with-china-in-africa/) (YZ)

**India’s broader economic relations with Africa are less impressive** than many of its leaders care to admit. India’s investment in Africa amounted to only $14 billion by 2016, [ranking between Singapore and Switzerland](http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=2130), and **well behind its top investors of** the US, UK, France, and **China**. As Malancha Chakrabarty at the Observer Research Foundation [has pointed out](http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-india-s-feeble-stakes-in-africa-2586516), investment levels to Africa are often misstated as over $47 billion has round-tripped through the tax haven of Mauritius since 2008. **India’s loans to Africa, which received a $10 billion boost** from Prime Minister Modi at the 2015 India Africa Summit Forum, are similarly modest in context. **From 2000 to 2016, China provided** [**$124 billion in loans**](https://www.axios.com/xis-africa-tour-an-opportunity-to-fortify-chinese-economic-ties-e5f24704-1325-4c86-af12-9df0fb3ce3a1.html)**. And like China, India also places** [**stringent economic conditions**](https://www.csmonitor.com/World/2017/0828/As-China-ups-game-in-East-Africa-India-tries-to-guard-home-advantage) **on its African partners** to contract mainly Indian companies and supplies for projects covered by Indian finance. **Beating China at its own game seems neither achievable for India nor advisable.** But New Delhi could reinvigorate the “Asia-Africa Growth Corridor”, an economic cooperation agreement between India and Japan. It could ensure there is genuine momentum and developmental spin-offs from the project rather than just token awards for Indian and Japanese corporations.

1. **T: China is the only one that has the will and capacity to invest in Africa and has a strategic interest in doing so**

The United States and its partners should not be naive about China’s advance across the continent, but they should not view its rival’s involvement as a zero-sum game, either—not least because Africans would not welcome such an approach. The world stands to gain from China’s engagement in Africa. **China is the only global actor that is realistically capable of relieving (or, at least to date, has even shown interest in) tackling Africa’s enormous infrastructure deficit, especially in power and transport, which will cost a staggering** [**$90 billion every year for the next decade**](https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_-_Planning_to_deliver/%24FILE/EY-Dynamics-Issue8-v8-Planning.pdf) **to address. And China needs Africa’s natural resources and export markets to fuel its own growth.**

1. **T: Chinese loans and aid is actually really good, especially compared to other loans that African nations would get**

[Brautigam 2018 Washington Post](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/04/12/china-africa/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.77b1106efa05) (YZ)

**In Africa, we found that China had lent at least $95.5 billion between 2000 and 2015.** That’s a lot of debt. **Yet by and large, the Chinese loans in our database were performing a useful service: financing Africa’s serious infrastructure gap. On a continent where over 600 million Africans have no access to electricity, 40 percent of the Chinese loans paid for power generation and transmission. Another 30 percent went to modernizing Africa’s crumbling transport infrastructure. [While some corruption happens, its minimal]**Some of these were no doubt pork barrel projects and white elephants: [airports](http://www.thesierraleonetelegraph.com/siera-leone-mamamah-airport-president-koromas-secret-talks-with-his-chinese-counterparts/) with few passengers, or [bridges to nowhere](https://www.heritage.org/budget-and-spending/report/the-bridge-nowhere-national-embarrassment). African presidents, like others, love to cut ribbons and leave legacies of big buildings. Chinese companies will receive nearly all of the contracts to build this Chinese-financed infrastructure. Questions have been [raised](http://www.sais-cari.org/s/working-paper_jamie-farrell.pdf) about its quality. Yet **on the whole, power and transport are investments that boost economic growth. And we found that Chinese loans generally have comparatively low interest rates and long repayment periods.**

[Kuo 18](https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2018-12-19-china-is-investing-in-africa-and-thats-a-good-thing/) (YZ)

A 2016 report by US management consultancy McKinsey on Chinese activities in Africa paints a different picture. The most extensive to date and based on interviews with **more than 1,000 Chinese firms across eight African countries, the report finds that: 89% of their employees are African, 64% provide training** and 44% of managers are African. Instead of development assistance, **Chinese firms have brought employment, training, new technology and financing. China is Africa’s number one trade partner, number one infrastructure financier and fastest-growing source of foreign direct investment.** If this is China’s “rogue” development policy, I think we need more of it. **In contrast,** economists William Eastly, in his *The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good,* and Zambian-born Dambisa Moyo’s *Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa***, have put forward compelling evidence that the more than $1-trillion in [Western] aid to Africa over the past 50 years, including the so-called good governance conditionalities, has in fact left Africans much worse off.**

4. India has no interest in countering the OBOR

[Bruno 2019 from Quartz](https://qz.com/india/1547154/what-are-indias-stakes-in-chinas-belt-and-road-plan/) (JW)

It is not surprising, then, that **many in Delhi regard the Belt and Road more as an opportunity than a threat.** Here is how the argument goes: While in a Western-led order India cannot expect to enjoy more than a secondary role, **China’s rise offers the exciting possibility of a genuinely multipolar—rather than merely multilateral—world where India can legitimately expect to become an autonomous centre of geopolitical power.** In this scenario, global power would be shared between four or five major powers: America, Europe, Russia, China and, presumably, India. Starting from behind, India would have to play its cards well, but nothing in the nature of things would prevent it from becoming a power at least equal to a declining Russia.

To be sure, Chinese foreign policy has been particularly disastrous in the way it has addressed the India question. At the very beginning, the Belt and Road was supposed to include Kolkata as one of its main nodes. The city and port play that role in the famous Xinhua map of the initiative. But China must have thought that India would be happy with any kind of role in the Belt and Road and neglected the vital task of cajoling and flattering its neighbour. The result has been very much the opposite—India became the core critic of Chinese geopolitical plans—**but many in Delhi think that because the root of the problem is China’s misperception of the issue, it can be corrected and an aggressive policy towards Beijing should be tempered by the recognition that India and China ultimately belong together.**

5. India doesn’t have the financial capability to counter the OBOR

[Bruno 2019 from Quartz](https://qz.com/india/1547154/what-are-indias-stakes-in-chinas-belt-and-road-plan/) (JW)

By investing in the Iranian port of Chabahar, India may hope to prevent an outcome where it finds itself isolated from the growing economies on its doorstep, but **the limited scale of the project offers a vivid contrast to the mammoth scale of the Belt and Road.** As opposed to Chabahar, the Chinese-led initiative is designed to fundamentally change global networks and move China to the centre of a new political and economic order. **It seems unlikely that two or three infrastructure projects can offer an adequate response on India’s side**. Nor is the issue strictly confined to economic power and rivalry. For many commentators in South and Southeast Asia, the Belt and Road is an opportunity for China to entrench its naval presence in the Indian Ocean, as its state-owned companies build dual-use ports that berth its cargo ships and military vessels, and open its first overseas bases in places such as Djibouti, and perhaps Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

## A2 Foreign Aid

1. **Delink: India has literally refused foreign aid in the past even when faced with devastating natural disasters, this policy is popular and likely to stay**

[Sharma 18](https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/analysis-why-modi-govts-decision-to-refuse-foreign-donations-for-kerala-floods-i/315418) (YZ)

**India’s decision to refuse financial aid from other countries** for the devastating floods in Kerala **is a conscious, well-thought out policy that had been put in place for nearly 15 years. Much of this had evolved from its self image, growing confidence over its own capacity as well as its rising clout at the international stage** as an emerging global power. **Interestingly, this is one area where there is also a broad political consensus among the country’s major political parties.**

1. **F2: Aid has worked in India in the past - No it hasn’t correlation no causation**

[Dichter 17 of Quartz](https://qz.com/959416/time-to-end-foreign-aid-but-for-the-right-reasons/) (YZ)

**India began to move ahead rapidly after 1991. Why?** The answer is complex—**a mix of culture, changes in government policy, and changes in arrangements in the political economy. But what most of these dramatic changes don’t correlate with is foreign aid. Aid has resulted in remarkably few significant shifts in economic growth and poverty reduction**. The truth is much of aid’s promise has come up empty.

1. **Delink: Foreign aid isn’t used to bribe UNSC members**

[Costa and Baccarini 2014](http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292014000200029)

The evidence suggests this in two ways: (i) the fact that, **even during the Cold War,** the evidence only supports the support-for-aid hypotheses when related to UNSC membership in Very Important Years and the fact that, otherwise, **aid is strongly related to poverty and not to political affinity** shows that, most of the time, aid was not granted according to political interest; (ii) the fact that, **after 1992, aid continues to be granted without major concern for the relative importance of** the year of **UNSC membership and**, particularly, **without any concern with political affinity** (actually *negatively correlated to it*) is also a strong indication that other UN objectives (like *development*, for instance), at least not immediately related to furthering US power, might be at stake.

1. **TURN: During membership on the UNSC, the effectiveness of aid decreases**

[Dreher 2016](https://academic.oup.com/wber/article-abstract/32/2/268/2669743?redirectedFrom=fulltext) Oxford

We investigate the effects of short-term political motivations on the effectiveness of foreign aid. Specifically, **we test whether the effect of aid on economic growth is reduced by the share of years a country served on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the period the aid is committed**, which provides quasi-random variation in aid. Our results show that**the effect of aid on growth is significantly lower when aid was committed during a country’s tenure on the UNSC.** This holds when we restrict the sample to Africa, which follows the strictest norm of rotation on the UNSC and thus where UNSC membership can most reliably be regarded as exogenous. We derive two conclusions from this. First, **short-term political favoritism reduces the effectiveness of aid. Second, results of studies using political interest variables as instruments for overall aid arguably estimate the effect of politically motivated aid and thus a lower bound for the effect of all aid.**

1. **TURN:Nations elected to the UNSC experience less growth and become less democratic**

[**Mesquita 2010**](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20773715?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)

**Nations elected to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as temporary members have lower levels of economic growth, become less democratic, and experience more restrictions on press freedoms than comparable nations not elected to the UNSC.** Using regression and matching techniques the authors show, for instance, that over the two-year period of UNSC membership and the following two years during which a nation is ineligible for reelection, **UNSC nations experience a 3.5 percent contraction in their economy relative to nations not elected to the UNSC.** The detrimental effects of UNSC membership are strongest in nondemocratic nations. **The authors contrast these results with the growing evidence that nations elected to the UNSC receive greater development assistance.**

## A2 Keeping India working in the UN

1. India negotiating with UN in order to get permanent seat

[Dormandy 2007](https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/indias-foreign-policy)

India also thinks globally, whether through UN peacekeeping or in its bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. While thus far the goal of a permanent seat has been unsuccessful, it has resulted in a number of indirect benefits both in terms of building a much closer bilateral relationship with Japan, and in raising its profile as a serious contender following UN reform. Meanwhile, **India continues to lead the G77 and the Non-Aligned Movement and in this capacity negotiates on behalf of the developing nations in the UN General Assembly and WTO Doha talks**.

## A2 General Indian multilat

1. Turn: India is committed to multilateral reform to try to get into the permanent security council

[Thakker 2018](https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-at-the-united-nations-an-analysis-of-indian-multilateral-strategies-on-international-security-and-development/)

Beyond this commitment to the multilateral reform process, India was successfully able to achieve Level Two multilateral engagement. Unlike in its advocacy on counterterrorism, **India successfully organised two coalitions with a united position, and even adopt the role as a coalition leader within the two blocs**: the G4 and the L.69. The L.69 holds monthly meetings at the Permanent Mission of India to discuss strategies and the group’s position.[85] **The group has also expanded from its initial membership of 25 to currently 42 members.**[86] A clear signal of India’s Level Two engagement here was that the L.69 also submitted a united policy position to the Intergovernmental Negotiation’s Framework Document, calling for an expanded Security Council with 27 members, with 11 permanent seats and 16 non-permanent seats.[87] Similarly, the G4, too, has scheduled meetings, albeit less regularly than the L.69. The most high-profile meeting took place in 2015 during the opening of the General Debate of the 70th Session of the General Assembly when Prime Minister Narendra Modi hosted the leaders of Brazil, Germany, and Japan at the G4 Summit.[88] The G4 also submitted a united policy position to the IGN’s Framework document calling for an expanded Security Council with 25-26 members, with 11 permanent seats and 14 or 15 non-permanent seats, reinforcing a united coalition with an agreed-upon position.[89] **Therefore, India has continued its multilateral engagement in its strategic approach to Security Council reform.**

## A2 Representation

1. **Delink: Adding India does not make the UNSC more representative**

[Nadin 1](https://ourworld.unu.edu/en/united-nations-security-council-reform)4

It is clear that aspirant countries understand the value of permanent membership, each has an interest in their own election and each uses the rhetoric of representativeness in support of their claims. **Adding India**, Brazil, Germany, Japan, South Africa and Nigeria (see table 2) **is not an exercise in representativeness**, nor is it an act of dispersing power. **Permanency concentrates power in the hands of five or** five + **six,** in the case of a reformed Council. **Including the powerful on the Council is** representativeness, insofar as it is **[only] representative of the distribution of power in the world, as decided at that particular moment in history.**

1. Delink: India will only look out for its own interests (BW)

[Khan 15](https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632266.pdf)

**The reform proposals of the U.N. HLP and aspirants’ countries will benefit only those countries that succeed in getting permanent seats at the UNSC and not the regions that the permanent members are selected from.** The selection of a specific country from a particular geographic region does not mean that that country would be representative of that region. Furthermore, **countries selected as permanent members have no obligation to look after the interests of their respective regions. After being selected as permanent members, member states are not accountable to the region—only nonpermanent members remain accountable to the regions for their reelection.**

1. Turn: India can use its influence against neighboring states (BW)

[Khan 15](https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632266.pdf)

Furthermore, **most of the states are involved in various conflicts with the regional countries, and are therefore likely to use the permanent membership to influence the outcome of any dispute in their favor. Careful analysis reveals that P5 countries have cast vetoes against countries of their own, respective regions**. Recently, Russia has vetoed a resolution on Ukraine in order to block discussion on the annexation of Crimea.201

## A2 Encouraging PKO reform

## A2 R2P Doctrine

1. T: If R2P doesn’t happen, then worse forms of unilateral actions would occur. In both worlds some type of intervention happens, comparatively, R2P is better.

[Bass 15 of Princeton](http://wws.princeton.edu/system/files/research/documents/Bass_YJIL.pdf) (YZ)

**Many Indian elites have criticized the “Responsibility to Protect” as** veiled **neo imperialism.**507 Confronted with a hard choice about voting for U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 authorizing NATO force in Libya, India abstained.50 But no matter the configuration of great power relationships, **large scale violations of human rights are going to continue to happen, and neighboring states will probably bear the brunt of them. These neighbor states may be dragged into local conflicts** by a variety of political mechanisms: preexisting interstate antagonisms, cross-border solidarities, or refugee flows. As India’s experience demonstrates, **it will not just be hegemonic or Western states which are driven toward unilateral self-help** in such circumstances. These **neighbor states might be tempted to undertake their own unilateral actions**— with concomitant threats to regional order and damage to the Charter regime516—**unless the international community can manage to offer more effective multilateral relief and rescue.**

1. **Delink: Libya did not set a precedent for future R2P intervention**

[Einsiedel 2015](http://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU%3A6112/UNSCAgeofPowerRivalry.pdf)

While the killing in Darfur and the Council’s failure to act was an early test to the R2P concept, the biggest controversy - and challenge to the R2P norm itself – has undoubtedly arisen from the 2011 NATO campaign in Libya. When the Council authorized an intervention against the Gaddafi regime in Libya in March 2011 in the name of R2P, it was the first time the Council had ever mandated the use of force against the de jure government of a UN member state for the purpose of protecting civilians.26 **While** broader transformations in **the Security Council’s view of civilian protection facilitated the intervention in Libya**, Bellamy and Williams have argued that **it would not have been possible without a number of factors specific to the Libyan case, which suggests that such interventions will remain extremely rare**.27

## A2 India is super peaceful

1. **Delink: India has used brinkmanship in the past**

[Jaspal 2014](http://www.issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/1299649036_25635225.pdf)

In addition, the Indian Air Force flights on

the India-Pakistan international border on December 14, 2008 indicated that New Delhi

could launch surgical strikes against selected targets inside Pakistan. The deliberate violation of Pakistani airspace by Indian fighter jets was a tactical move to test Pakistan‟s alertness and response. Though the instant response of Islamabad was lenient, subsequently it increased air surveillance. It was a clear message that if the Indian air force crossed the border, it would be challenged with full force. These crisis **[Past crises] demonstrated grave** foreign and domestic **threats to** the **Indian national interests which Indian leaders believed could only be overcome through an aggressive foreign policy towards Pakistan.** Many analysts opine that **the political weakness of leaders** as distinct from instability of the political system as a whole **provided the incentive for brinkmanship** in both these crisis. **The Indian** ruling **elite used brinkmanship** to seek a foreign policy victory in order **to buttress their domestic position.** The brinkmanship, however, contains the potential to destabilize nuclear stability between India and Pakistan.

1. Turn: Increasing India’s global influence encourages them to use brinkmanship against Pakistan

 [Gettleman of NYT 19](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/25/world/asia/kashmir-india-pakistan-pulwama.html) (YZ)

**India believes it “can afford brinkmanship given its growing global influence,’’** said Zahid Hussain, a senior fellow at the Jinnah Institute, a Pakistani research organization. But, he warned, “reckless action could easily spiral out of control.”

## A2 Countering Pakistan/Resolving Kashmir

1. **Turn: India-Pakistan peace talks bad**

[Tellis 2017](https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/09/20/are-india-pakistan-peace-talks-worth-damn-pub-73145)

However tempting such an inference may be, it should be resisted—not because an India-Pakistan rapprochement would not be beneficial for both parties and for the United States, but because **an end to the [India-Pakistan] dispute is currently**, and for a long time to come, **beyond** Washington’s **reach** and perhaps beyond New Delhi’s and Islamabad’s as well. This depressing conclusion should give U.S. policymakers pause whenever they are tempted to either ritualistically exhort India and Pakistan to engage in a dialogue or, even more problematically, contemplate U.S. intercession in their bilateral dispute. Such U.S. **intervention could not only be futile but also counterproductive to the cause of peace because it encourages [Pakistan]** Rawalpindi **to persist in waging subconventional war against India in** the**hope [of]** that Washington decisively intervenes to finally **[producing] outcomes favorable to Pakistan.**

1. Turn: India would be less willing to go to the peace table if it believes UNSC gives them more legitimacy in taking Kashmir

(YZ)

**Kashmir is a major dispute between the two regional rivals and it is on U.N. agenda** too. Both countries have fought three wars over Kashmir. **Pakistan further argues that a permanent seat at the UNSC would heavily tilt the balance of power in the region in favor of India.**

**As a permanent member of the UNSC, India can influence favorable decisions at the UNSC over Kashmir. Furthermore, India, due to its strong conventional military, can resort to the use of force** on the pretext of pre-emption or hot pursuit **to coerce Pakistan to change its stance on Kashmir in favor of India. India** has been able to draw out the issue of Kashmir for over 68 years, **intend[s]**ing **to wait for the opportune moment** to accrue maximum benefit. **The permanent seat at the Council is one such moment through which India can extract a favorable outcome.**

## A2 Debt Diplomacy (BRI)

1. Debt is unlikely to be significant - similar to other infrastructure projects

[**Hurley 18**](https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf)

**Our analysis finds that BRI is unlikely to cause a systemic debt problem in the regions of the initiative’s focus. While the aggregate numbers look large, when assessed in the context of the size of the economies that are likely to benefit from BRI investments, the amounts are consistent with current levels of infrastructure investment.** Over a 20-year span, an $8 trillion investment program for BRI countries would amount to less than 1.5 percent of GDP per annum, and about 2.5 percent excluding China. It is also likely that some of the China-sourced financing will merely substitute for other sources. These levels are modest in comparison to the ADB’s estimated infrastructure financing “needs” in Asia, which are projected to be 5.1 percent of the region’s GDP

## A2 Gridlock good/UNSC bad

## A2 Gets India into NSG

1. India’s presence would weaken NSG’s credibility as it has violated international norms of nuclear testing in the past and continues to do nuclear testings

 [Kimball 11 of Arms Control Association](https://www.armscontrol.org/print/7985) (YZ)

**Resolution 1172 calls on Pakistan and India to refrain from further testing, sign the CTBT, stop producing fissile material for weapons and undertake other nuclear risk reduction measures. To date**, neither Pakistan nor **India has halted fissile material production for weapons or signed the CTBT.**

Before even considering membership options for India (or Pakistan or Israel), **NSG members should actively encourage India to take concrete steps to end the production of weapons-usable nuclear material**, translate its existing nuclear test moratorium into a legally binding ban by**signing the CTBT, and freeze further development of long-range ballistic missiles that could carry nuclear weapons.**

**2. China will still block since India hasn’t joined the NPT - Western support is irrelevant**

[The Hindu 2019](https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/india-must-sign-npt-to-gain-entry-into-nsg-says-china/article26139795.ece)

India must sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to gain entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group, China said on Thursday, asserting that “patient negotiations” were required for New Delhi’s admission into the group as there is no precedent for the inclusion of non-NPT countries. **China has been opposing India’s entry into the 48-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on the ground that India is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), though the other P5 members, including the US and Russia backed its case based on New Delhi’s non-proliferation record.**

**3. NSG inclusion has no concrete benefits to the nuclear industry.**

**First Post, 6/11/16** -First Post India, Indian News Source, Jun 11, 2016, “Will India's inclusion in NSG group make a difference? No, say analysts”, http://www.firstpost.com/world/will-indias-inclusion-in-nsg-group-make-a-difference-no-say-analysts-2828938.html)

New Delhi: India is rejoicing over news that Prime Minister Narendra Modi has brokered deals with US officials to bring New Delhi closer to its long-held dream of joining an elite group of nations allowed to control the global trade in nuclear materials, equipment and technology. Newspapers have run daily front-page stories heralding progress on the nuclear front after President Barack Obama came out in support of Indian membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which led other nations including Mexico and Switzerland to suggest they, too, were on board. Diplomats in Vienna suggested Thursday that India is closer than ever to joining the NSG, despite never fulfilling the requirement of signing a global treaty aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons technology. But would India's entry into the club make any difference? Some analysts say no, at least not from a technical standpoint. India has already managed to secure access to nuclear fuel and technology to build power plants it says it needs to boost energy capacity and drive economic growth for the nation of 1.25 billion people. Analysts say joining the NSG is chiefly a matter of pride and desire to be taken seriously by some of the world's most powerful nations. Since prompting international technology sanctions and limits on exports by conducting nuclear tests in 1998, India has been eager to gain legitimacy as a nuclear power. "In practical terms, there is nothing extra that the NSG will give India other than a seat at the nuclear high table," said Rakesh Sood, a retired diplomat closely associated with India's nuclear negotiations over the past decade. India already has deals with more than eight countries for supplies of uranium, and has signed agreements for reactors with France, Russia and the United States

#### **Membership in the NSG does nothing for India**

**Ramesh, 16** (M Ramesh, 6-16-2016, "Why India’s NSG entry is no big deal," Hindu Business Line, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/why-indias-nsg-entry-is-no-big-deal/article8737568.ece)

The diplomatic jostle around India securing a membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group makes one feel the membership is like a magician’s box, capable of endless supplies of goodies. NSG is touted to be a technology storehouse for a member to dip into. That is quite not the case. The fact is, **NSG membership has little to do with India’s nuclear programme**. Examine the issue closely, two facts emerge. One, **India’s NSG membership is very unlikely to happen, and**, two, **it does not matter**. Chinese checkers To say that China is not going to let India in offers no major insights. Some observers note China was not happy with giving India the one-time waiver, and had to fall in line only under the US pressure. Optimists hope for an encore. Some others hold China is just posturing, taking a hard stance against India, only to sacrifice its position later in the hope of muting global opposition to its moves in the South China Sea. There is also hope that China may trade-off its opposition in return for its own membership into the Missile Technology Control Regime. However, going by Beijing’s statements, it is clear that China will agree only if Pakistan is also admitted into the NSG. But nobody will let that happen given the country’s terrible proliferation track record. Now, **what does NSG membership mean to India’s nuclear programme? Nothing.** Two former chairmen of India’s Atomic Energy Commission BusinessLine spoke to, MR Srinivasan and RK Sinha, expressed themselves almost identically: “Heavens are not going to fall if India does not get NSG membership.” India has access to technology, thanks to the waiver granted in 2008. No foreign nuclear reactor supplier is waiting for India to get a NSG membership. In fact, a long list of deal-breaker challenges hamper progress of foreign companies selling their hi-tech reactors — nuclear liability issue, Japan’s distaste for nuclear (both GE and Westinghouse are today Japanese-owned), local opposition and pricing. ‘NSG membership’ has never shown up in the list. Indeed, with the sole exception of Russia’s Rosatom, it is difficult to see any foreign companies selling their reactors to India, even assuming that local opposition to nuclear plants could be overcome. According to an India-briefing document of World Association of Nuclear Operators, Areva was seeking a tariff of ₹9.18 a kWhr, while the Department of Atomic Energy would not go beyond ₹6.50. In contrast, Kudankulam units three and four are expected to sell at ₹3.90 a kWhr. **Energy from India-built nuclear plants are much cheaper**.**For GE-Hitachi and Westinghouse-Toshiba, the liability issue is a big risk, and if they factor the risk in costs, their energy will also be pricey. It is difficult to see any foreign reactors other than the Russians’ coming up in India.** India’s nuclear roll-out will most likely be limited to Nuclear Power Corporation’s 12 Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (including four under construction), a few fast neutron reactors and whatever the Russians supply at Kudankulam. What NSG can offer These are the bigger issues in India’s massive expansion of its nuclear capacity, not NSG membership. **Nor is NSG likely to matter materially in terms of uranium supply. India has hammered out agreements with Canada** (April 2013) **and Australia** (November 2014), and other countries such as Kazakhstan have been supplying too. NSG membership is an assertion of right. When the one-time NSG waiver was granted to India in 2008, India agreed that it would abide by any rules that NSG may make in the future. Being inside would mean participating in that rule-making. Besides, NSG membership will give India a chance to expose Pakistan’s terrible proliferation record. In a recent editorial, the New York Times observed that if India gets the membership, it will forever block Pakistan. It observed that Pakistan once provided nuclear technology to North Korea and Iran, and giving India a membership and denying it to Pakistan will give “new incentives to misbehave”. Now, such talks are reward enough for India. In the unlikely event of India getting in, it will be in a position to use its veto to hamper Pakistan. If it doesn’t get in, India can keep the spotlight shining on Pakistan and show China as a supporter of it. Either way, it is a victory.

**4. Turn: Indian Membership frees resources for Military Development**

[Sundaram 16](http://www.catchnews.com/pov/dangerous-folly-the-case-against-india-s-bid-for-an-nsg-seat-1466497163.html/fullview)-KUMAR SUNDARAM, The author is a researcher with the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace., 21 June 2016, “Dangerous folly: the case against India's bid for an NSG seat”, http://www.catchnews.com/pov/dangerous-folly-the-case-against-india-s-bid-for-an-nsg-seat-1466497163.html/fullview)

This poser ignores that India has a much larger stockpile of weapons-grade/reactor-grade fissile material. Even going by the mainstream logic of deterrence, India ought to need considerably fewer weapons vis-a-vis Pakistan given the neighbouring country's much smaller size. For its part, Pakistan's development of battlefield nukes to deter conventional attacks adds another unwarranted stimulus to this regional arms race. Both sides are, thus, culprits in their own ways. **"NSG was set up in 1975 in response to India's nuclear tests, which violated international legal agreements " Apart from the "prestige" factor, membership of the NSG will give India greater access to fissile material and dual use technologies, thus freeing up domestic uranium for military use.** Pakistan is not alone in pointing this out

**5. Turn: India joining the NSG causes a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan.**

**Iqbal 16** (correspondent for Dawn, Anwar, “India joining NSG will escalate nuclear race in South Asia: US senator,” <http://www.dawn.com/news/1260656/india-joining-nsg-will-escalate-nuclear-race-in-south-asia-us-senator>, 5/26/16, DD)

WASHINGTON: A key US Senator, Ed Markey, has warned that enabling India to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) would cause a “never-ending” nuclear race in South Asia. The NSG is a multinational body, which seeks to reduce nuclear proliferation by monitoring the export, re-transfer and protection of sensitive materials. “What you are doing is creating an action-reaction that is leading to a never-ending escalation cycle that ultimately leads to development of nuclear weapons including battlefield nuclear weapons,” Senator Markey warned US Assistant Secretary for South Asia Nisha Biswal. At a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on US-India Relations on Tuesday evening, Senator Markey reminded the US official that the Obama administration’s policy of helping India join NSG was a dangerous and unnecessary. “Making these exemptions further infuriates Pakistan into further expanding its nuclear capacity. It is a very dangerous long-term trend, especially when we are so concerned on the spectre of nuclear weapons falling in the hands of non-state actors,” he said.

# A2 Neg

## A2 Pakistan/Kashmir tensions/war

1. **Delink: Border clashes don’t escalate**

[Jaspal 2014](http://www.issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/1299649036_25635225.pdf)

Rasul Bakhsh Rais argues: “**No country can make an abrupt transition from border clashes to nuclear strikes**, particularly when the adversary is also armed with nuclear weapons. What we expect from a nuclear deterrent is the prevention of the outbreak of a total war because of **the inherent risks of escalation to nuclear exchanges**, which in the case of India and Pakistan, **would be suicidal**.” Secondly, the dependence on the external deterrence stabilizer(s) not only gives an initiative to the outsider in the crisis management, but also limits the choices of deterring power.

1. **NU: American withdrawal from Kashmir conflict means Indo-Pak war increases in squo**

[Chaudhary 2019](https://thehill.com/opinion/international/432031-better-late-than-never-us-comes-to-its-senses-on-india-pakistan)

“We support India’s right to self-defense,” U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton said after Pakistan-based militant organization Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked Indian paramilitary forces in Kashmir on Feb. 14. We should all remember this statement as the moment Bolton reset India-Pakistan relations as we’ve known them since 1947. **Once a deliberate** and cautious **backchannel intermediary** on security flare-ups between the nuclear-armed rivals**, the United States has taken yet another step back from Pakistan and one closer to India.**What happens when the United States gives up its traditional role for one that, according to some in Pakistan, exacerbates the conflict? The consequences of that approach play out as we speak.This week’s Indian retaliatory strike in Balakot, Pakistan represents just the third instance in history that a nuclear power has hit another nuclear power with conventional forces. The rarity of the situation should concern the United States, but **a shifting geopolitical environment inevitably draws the Americans closer to India**, regardless of the details of the current flare up. **India proves useful in American attempts to contain China**, which only continue to strengthen.Also, the complete U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan means the United States will rely on Pakistan less for use of its transit routes to support the war, expanding the political space to exert greater U.S. pressure on Pakistan’s links to anti-India militants.**In the long-run, a nuclear-armed India unfettered by** the same **American pressures may find it can act on its security interests more directly and forcefully than the past.** But it runs the risk of creating new challenges for itself, in particular how a more confrontational relationship with Pakistan will hover like a dark cloud over its global ambitions.**A perpetual state of Indo-Pak war** also **bodes ill for the** rest of the **region**, especially Afghanistan, where the two countries remain embroiled on opposite sides of the conflict. The stakes there only stand to intensify if India and Pakistan increasingly resort to more hostile tactics instead of actual conflict resolution. History shows that U.S. intervention in India-Pakistan conflict yields positive results, as it did during the Kargil War in 1999. And despite Pakistan’s complicated relationship with the United States, it welcomes the American involvement.

**3. Pakistan isn’t financially sound enough to retaliate and risk econ collapse**

[**Aamir SCMP 2019**](https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2188233/india-and-pakistan-are-not-going-war-any-time)

Moreover, **Pakistan cannot afford to be adventurous on its eastern border given its own state of crisis. Pakistan is in the midst of a** [**severe economic crisis**](https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2180498/pakistan-secures-further-us2b-funding-china-avoid-economic) – the country is facing a severe devaluation of its currency and running out of foreign exchange reserves to pay for imports.

After assistance [from China](https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2180498/pakistan-secures-further-us2b-funding-china-avoid-economic), Pakistan has now turned to [Saudi Arabia](https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/south-asia/article/2169911/desperate-pakistan-welcomes-saudi-arabias-us6-billion-bailout) to keep its economy functioning. Therefore, on the eve of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s [visit to India](https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/south-asia/article/2186992/saudi-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman-agrees-work-india), **Pakistan has no incentive to sanction an attack against Indian paramilitary forces. Pakistan cannot afford an intense confrontation with India due to its economic woes.**

**4. War would decimate Indian economic investments**

[Quartz](https://qz.com/india/990579/for-all-the-chest-thumping-india-cannot-win-a-war-against-pakistan/)

Politically too, India is in no position to consider a short war. The current political dispensation is only just gathering momentum on its electoral manifestoes, the lynchpin of which is economic development. That necessitates a stable and peaceful environment. **War clouds are an antithesis for economic investments. Even preparation for war costs billions of dollars in terms of resources and mindshare, a diversion that India can scarcely afford when millios of youth are entering the job market whose un-channelised energies is another potential risk.**

**n**

5. Indian instigation would risk Chinese response, especially because there are a lot of Chinese nationals living in Pakistan

[Quartz](https://qz.com/india/990579/for-all-the-chest-thumping-india-cannot-win-a-war-against-pakistan/)

Firstly, the only area where India could try a meaningful riposte to Pakistan-sponsored insurgency would be Baluchistan. By tying in China’s stake of keeping Baluchistan under control, Pakistan has made it extraordinarily difficult for India to make any aggressive move in its south without threatening Chinese interests. The same is true for **any Indian military action in the theatres of Kashmir or Punjab**. Any Indian operation that **endangers thousands of Chinese citizens working on the CPEC project in Pakistan will draw the wrath of China** and give them the loco standi to initiate hostilities against India. **So beyond shallow skirmishes all along the border, India really has no operational or strategic options without the risk of drawing China into a two-front war.**

<https://thewire.in/security/narendra-modi-pakistan-india-pulwama-war>

Moreover, **a war between India and Pakistan would quickly involve China too in some form. Since the Pakistan Army is responsible for security of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which is the designated flagship of President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative, the People’s Liberation Army’s support to General Headquarters, Rawalpindi against India is assured.**

6. International backlash would occur

<https://www.commondreams.org/views/2019/02/27/war-coming-south-asia>

Happymon Jacob

**If the two sides fail to de-escalate on their own, the international community, especially the** [**United States**](https://www.aljazeera.com/topics/country/united-states.html)**, the** [**European Union**](https://www.aljazeera.com/topics/organisations/european-union.html)**,** [**China**](https://www.aljazeera.com/topics/country/china.html) **and** [**Russia**](https://www.aljazeera.com/topics/country/russia.html)**, will step in decisively and pressure the two sides to disengage,** given that they are both armed with nuclear weapons and the danger of a nuclear war is real.

**7. War is domestically unpopular in Pakistan**

[**https://www.thenation.com/article/india-pakistan-kashmir-peace/**](https://www.thenation.com/article/india-pakistan-kashmir-peace/)

**Yet peace, or the desire for it, caught on in Pakistan. On Thursday, the day after Pakistan captured the Indian pilot, peace rallies were held all over Pakistan**, and the hashtag #SayNoToWar trended on Twitter. Groups of Pakistani women [photographed themselves](https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/lifestyle/women-in-pakistan-are-persuading-indian-women-to-say-no-to-war/) holding placards asking women across the border to #SayNoToWar. Aman Ki Asha, a group that has been working on peace efforts for decades by facilitating dialogue between ordinary Indians and Pakistanis, distributed a peace petition. Imtiaz Alam, the secretary general of the South Asian Free Media Association, [appealed to Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan](https://twitter.com/ImtiazAlamSAFMA/status/1100755778275852294) to release the captured Indian pilot. **For a country whose military has a reputation for being “**[**pro-conflict**](https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/28/asia/imran-khan-india-pakistan-crisis-intl/index.html)**,” and where in the past the masses have rallied behind calls for holy war against Indians, this outstretched olive branch is a stunning development and promising moral victory.** **Even the director general of Inter-Services Public Relations, who provides the Armed Forces’ perspective in military-loving Pakistan, seemed circumspect. “There are no winners in war. Only humanity loses,”** he said from behind his podium, looking at the faces of surprised journalists. Pakistani celebrities got into the peace-championing mood. “[Nothing uglier, nothing more ignorant than cheering for war](https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/lifestyle/saynotowar-pakistani-celebrities-urge-for-peace-in-wake-of-indian-aggression/),” tweeted actress Mahira Khan. “We need peace,” tweeted singer Hadiqa Kiani.

8. Pakistan can’t afford a war

<https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2188233/india-and-pakistan-are-not-going-war-any-time>

Moreover, Pakistan cannot afford to be adventurous on its eastern border given its own state of crisis. Pakistan is in the midst of a [severe economic crisis](https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2180498/pakistan-secures-further-us2b-funding-china-avoid-economic) – the country is facing a severe devaluation of its currency and running out of foreign exchange reserves to pay for imports.

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9. Pakistan can’t even destroy all of India’s nukes

<https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2019/03/07/why_india_and_pakistan_avoided_nuclear_war_112984.html>

To develop a more credible second-strike capability, India and Pakistan have been investing in submarines. **India is now believed to have a nuclear-armed submarine, the INS Arihant.** It’s unclear whether the Arihant is fully functional, but it is clear that India is close to having SLBM capability. Pakistan is developing a nuclear submarine too, but it’s not as far along as India. **An Indian nuclear-armed submarine guarantees a credible second strike against Pakistan, essentially ensuring Pakistan’s destruction if it strikes first. The rationale is that this decreases Pakistan’s willingness to use any nuclear weapons first, since doing so would be suicide.**

10. NU: Pakistan and Indian war inevitable as the indus river dries up

[**Bloomberg 18**](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/modi-government-lays-groundwork-for-water-war-in-battle-with-rival-pakistan/articleshow/54936280.cms)

**India certainly requires more water. More than 600 million Indians face water shortages as rivers and lakes dry up. Under the treaty, Pakistan utilizes 80 percent of the Indus basin’s six rivers, while India only uses 20 percent.**

[**Nesbit 18**](https://www.sciencefriday.com/articles/pakistan-faces-a-water-war-on-the-horizon/)

**That’s the backdrop for the growing conflict between Pakistan and India over freshwater and the Indus River. Nearly all of agriculture in Pakistan relies on the Indus**. So do Pakistani households and industries. **If India continues to create large-scale diversions of water that flow into the Indus, the potential for conflict between India and Pakistan will become very real**. Verbal jousting will turn into water riots or even armed conflict.

Glacier melting is responsible for roughly half of the water flowing in the Indus, making the situation worse. The health of the Himalayas in the face of the Earth’s changing climate is a real, and growing, concern.

**“Given the rapid melting of the Himalayan glaciers that feed the Indus River… and growing tensions with upriver archenemy India about use of the river’s tributaries, it’s unlikely that Pakistani food production will long keep pace with the growing population**,” Steven Solomon wrote in *The New York Time*s.

**The potential for conflict—including military conflict—between India and Pakistan over the Indus River is** one of the reasons that former President Barack Obama and his then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton added “water” as **a** diplomatic **priority** early in the previous administration.

Insofar as a water war is inevitable, it might as well happen now rather than wait for India and Pakistan to build up even more.

### A2 Pakistan supports terrorists

1. International Pressure forcing them to crack down ‘

[Hashim 2019](https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/03/pakistan-targets-terrorists-anti-india/584566/)

Officials insist that they are serious about taking action after the latest crisis. **Last week, the government passed a new bureaucratic regulation authorizing the application of UN sanctions on Pakistan-based militant groups** (though this new order remains subject to judicial appeal). LeT offices in the eastern cities of Lahore and Muridke have also been shut down. And the authorities have detained at least 44 people, including the son and brother of Masood Azhar, the JeM chief, and have sealed scores of JeM properties across the country. Azhar himself remains a free man, but Fawad Chaudhry, Pakistan’s information minister, told me that the government is considering whether to allow Azhar to be listed on a UN sanctions list, a long-standing demand of India that has been consistently blocked by Pakistan’s ally China. “**The steps we have taken have never been taken before**,” Chaudhry said. “These steps are actually big.” **The government has outlined a three-pronged approach to dealing with these militant groups**: It will take over administrative control of all mosques, seminaries, and humanitarian-relief facilities run by JeM, LeT, and other groups; it plans to offer avenues to earning a livelihood for those not deemed an armed threat; and it will encourage members of these groups to enter mainstream politics. Critics—India chief among them—argue that they have seen this all before, and to some extent, they have. The JeM-run al-Noor mosque and seminary in the eastern city of Sialkot, for example, was sealed by police on Tuesday. Three years ago, the same facility was closed after JeM claimed responsibility for an attack on an Indian air base in Pathankot. **Still, among analysts and diplomats, there seems to be a consensus that things are changing in Pakistan due to factors in and out of its control.**

### A2 India goes crazy with power and attacks

1. India expects international powers to help them, not hurt them

[Yusuf 2018](https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/10/954587-india-pakistan-mumbai-terror/)

The trouble is that all previous crises occurred at a time when U.S. global supremacy and moral legitimacy were far more entrenched, and great-power competition had not resurged the way it has in the past two years. In past instances of crisis management, states like China and Russia did not try to outcompete the United States. In fact, all third-party states prioritized de-escalation over their larger foreign-policy and security interests, presenting a united front to India and Pakistan and preventing them from playing one third party against the other. This third-party convergence proved crucial to ensuring de-escalation of crises. **The situation is radically different today**. The U.S. National Defense Strategy now explicitly points to great-power rivals as the greatest threat to U.S. national security—ahead of terrorism and nuclear cataclysm. **Competition between the United States, China, and Russia for influence in South Asia is only intensifying.** In Afghanistan, their competitive policies are directly undermining prospects for peace—even though all three countries profess to be working toward the common goal of a stable and peaceful Afghanistan. These new great-power dynamics can easily weaken U.S. resolve and ability to lead and coordinate a crisis management approach in the region. **Shifting alliance structures in South Asia may further complicate the management of India-Pakistan crises**. India now sees the U.S. role in a crisis with Pakistan as a litmus test of America’s sincerity as a strategic partner. **The U.S.-Indian partnership**—as well as the all-but-broken U.S.-Pakistani relationship—**has raised expectations among many in India that Washington will back New Delhi to punish Islamabad in a future crisis.** **Pakistani leaders, for their part, hope that China will come to their country’s rescue.** If great-power competition influences third parties to prioritize these alliances or to use India and Pakistan as proxies for their great-power gains over the immediate goal of crisis termination, they could transform from being agents of de-escalation to drivers of escalation.

### A2 Khan

1. Scroll up. Khan is a Lieutenant Colonel in the Pakistani army.

### A2 Indo-Pak Peace Talks

1. **Turn: Peace talks bad**

[Tellis 2017](https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/09/20/are-india-pakistan-peace-talks-worth-damn-pub-73145)

However tempting such an inference may be, it should be resisted—not because an India-Pakistan rapprochement would not be beneficial for both parties and for the United States, but because **an end to the [India-Pakistan] dispute is currently**, and for a long time to come, **beyond** Washington’s **reach** and perhaps beyond New Delhi’s and Islamabad’s as well. This depressing conclusion should give U.S. policymakers pause whenever they are tempted to either ritualistically exhort India and Pakistan to engage in a dialogue or, even more problematically, contemplate U.S. intercession in their bilateral dispute. Such U.S**.a intervention could not only be futile but also counterproductive** to the cause of peace **because it encourages [Pakistan]** Rawalpindi **to persist in waging subconventional war against India in** the**hope [of]** that Washington decisively intervenes to finally **[producing] outcomes favorable to Pakistan.**

## A2 Indus Water Treaty/IndoPak Water Wars

1. India doesn’t have the storage capacity to immediately divert the Indus river.

[Parvaiz 2016 from Quartz](https://qz.com/india/790885/narendra-modi-led-india-simply-cannot-afford-to-scrap-the-indus-water-treaty-with-pakistan/) (JW)

Swain also said that **India does not have enough storage facility to create a supply problem immediately for Pakistan.** “It has to raise its dam structures and that will take time. There is also another angle to it. India, **even if it wants to, cannot take the water out of Kashmir Valley.** So, the water of the three rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) will remain in their basin and **India cannot divert that to other areas due to geographical reasons. India can stop the supply for some time, but cannot divert it.”**

2. Diverting the Indus would cause major flooding in the northwest

[Kugelman 2016 from Foreign Policy](https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/30/why-the-india-pakistan-war-over-water-is-so-dangerous-indus-waters-treaty/) (JW)

Second, **if India decided to maximize pressure on Pakistan by cutting off or reducing river flows to its downstream neighbor, this would bottle up large volumes of water in northern India, a dangerous move that according to water experts could** [**cause**](http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/india-pakistan-relation-indus-water-treaty-terrorism-3044967/) **significant flooding in major cities** in Kashmir and in Punjab state (for geographical reasons, India would not have the option of diverting water elsewhere). Given this risk, some analysts have [proposed](http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/india-pakistan-relation-indus-water-treaty-terrorism-3044967/)that New Delhi instead do something less drastic, and perfectly legal, to pressure Islamabad: build dams on the western rivers of the Indus Basin. The IWT permits this, even though these water bodies are allocated to Pakistan, so long as storage is kept to a minimum to allow water to keep flowing downstream. In fact, according to Indian media [reports](http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Blood-and-water-cant-flow-together-PM-Modi-chairs-meeting-on-Indus-Waters-treaty/articleshow/54525094.cms), this is an action Modi’s government is now actively considering taking.

3. India is worried about Chinese retaliation

[Kugelman 2016 from Foreign Policy](https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/30/why-the-india-pakistan-war-over-water-is-so-dangerous-indus-waters-treaty/) (JW)

Third, **if India ditches the IWT to punish its downstream neighbor, then it could set a dangerous precedent and give some ideas to Pakistan’s ally, China. Beijing has never signed on to any transboundary water management accord, and New Delhi constantly worries about its upstream rival building dozens of dams that cut off river flows into India. The Chinese, perhaps using as a pretext recent Indian defensive** [**upgrades**](http://swarajyamag.com/defence/the-indo-china-borders-defences-are-ramped-up-as-india-displays-new-confidence) **in the state of Arunachal Pradesh — which borders China and is claimed by Beijing — could well decide to take a page out of India’s book and slow the flow of the mighty Brahmaputra River.** It’s a move that could have disastrous consequences for the impoverished yet agriculturally productive northeastern Indian state of Assam. The Brahmaputra flows southwest across large areas of Assam. Additionally, Beijing could retaliate by cutting off the flow of the Indus — which originates in Tibet — down to India, depriving New Delhi of the ability to limit the river’s flows to Pakistan.

4. (Case-dependent “we link”) Indo-Pak Terroris]m/Tensions cause Water Cutoffs

[Johnson 19 Foreign Policy](https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/25/are-india-and-pakistan-on-the-verge-of-a-water-war-pulwama-kasmir-ravi-indus/)

With tensions rising between India and Pakistan**in the wake of a deadly terrorist attack** earlier this month that killed more than 40 Indian police officers in Kashmir, **New Delhi has decided to retaliate in part by cutting off some river water that flows downstream to Pakistan.** The decision to build a dam **on the Ravi River,** whose waters are allocated to India by treaty but a portion of which had been allowed to flow through to Pakistan, adds an extra source of conflict between two nuclear-armed neighbors that have repeatedly clashed over the disputed Kashmir territory.

SA: Both. One reason why Partition so immediately created a water conflict in the Indus basin is that it was already one of the most thoroughly engineered hydraulic systems in the world at that time. But Kashmir was crucial to the conflict from the very outset—something that Daniel Haines’s excellent book, Rivers Divided, shows very clearly. The waters of the Chenab and the Jhelum—awarded to Pakistan under the IWT—flow through Indian-administered Kashmir before they flow into Pakistan.**This meant that negotiations over water were always bound up with concerns over territorial sovereignty—and it is one reason why tensions in Kashmir very quickly escalate conflicts over water, as has happened in this case.**

## A2 Chinese War

1. Limited in scope

[Chakrahborty 2018](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/why-china-cant-subdue-india-despite-its-obvious-military-superiority/articleshow/59679615.cms) (DS)

But that doesn't mean China can subdue India. **Governments on both sides believe that the next India-China conflict would be limited in scope and short in duration instead of a protracted, large-scale, force-on-force campaign. That's due to the threat of nuclear attack as both the countries have sufficient nuclear capability.**

1. sfsdf

## A2 China-India Water Wars/Brahmaputra River

1. China doesn’t have the engineering capacity to divert the Brahmaputra

[Wuthnow 2016 from the National Interest](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/water-war-river-could-sink-china-india-relations-15829) (JW)

Second are Indian concerns that China might build dams capable of diverting the Yarlung Tsangpo away from India. These concerns have circulated in India for years, most notably in Brahma Chellaney’s writings on the coming Sino-Indian “water wars.” In fact, Chinese academics have considered a variety of river diversion plans focused on alleviating domestic water shortages, including one by a former PLA officer titled Tibet’s Waters Can Save China that received much domestic and international attention. However, other Chinese experts contend that **the costs are far too high and the engineering challenges too complex to undertake this feat, and instead argue that there are other, better ways to solve domestic water shortages** (such as increasing agricultural efficiency). Moreover, Chinese officials have frequently reiterated that China is building only “run-of-the-river” dams on the Yarlung, with no ability to impound or divert water. Yet in the context of the unending border dispute and low Sino-Indian strategic trust, many in India remain unconvinced of China’s intentions.

2. There are domestic pressures that prevent China from diverting the Brahmaputra

[Zhang 2015](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/wat2.1123) (JW)

Third, **the Chinese government has become more aware of the futility of water diversion projects as a solution to China's water shortages as there has been increasing criticism from scholars of the Three Gorges Dam and SNWD projects.43, 44 Concurrently, there has been growing public resistance toward major water infrastructures projects with the rapid rise of civil society in China and public awareness of the potentially negative impacts of these mega water projects on the environment.** It is increasingly clear that the Chinese government is placing more emphasis on potential environmental impacts as well as sustainability of major water projects.

3. Even if China diverted 100% of the water (which is impossible), it contributes such a small volume of water to the Brahmaputra basin that only 50% of total water would be affected.

[Zhang 2015](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/wat2.1123) (JW)

Even if the radical Grand Western Water diversion plan proposed which was discussed in previous sessions, not all water in Brahmaputra River generated in the Chinese territory will be diverted. The GWWDP intended to divert around 20% of total water flows from six rivers in south western China, including the Mekong, Brahmaputra River, and the Salween.[26](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/wat2.1123#wat21123-bib-0026) As for the Brahmaputra River, even to discard the proposed water diversion volume, at maximum, around 50% of the water discharged will be affected as the diversion plan would start roughly in the middle part of the Brahmaputra River in Chinese borders. That is to say, **even when 100% of the water at that point was diverted, an impossible scenario, it would only affect around 50% of the total water discharge originating from China.**

## A2 Stops UNSC Reform

1. **Turn: More non-permanent members worsens great power conflict**

[Bosco 2014](https://acuns.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/05-GG204-Bosco.pdf)

Finally, a concert approach offers a different perspective on the perennial question of Security Council reform and enlargement. Those who argue for significant Council expansion often cast these arguments in terms of legitimacy and respect for the Council’s decisions.A more representative Council, it is asserted, will command greater respect and ultimately be more effective. Arguments in favor of Council reform therefore lean heavily on a governance conception of the Council’s role and usually pay little heed to its concert utility. From a concert perspective, Council reform might be quite beneficial if it extends the benefits outlined above to other major powers. Yet membership reform might also pose a danger to the concert dynamic. Some proposals would significantly **expand[ing] the number of nonpermanent seats** and produce a total membership of up to thirty members. Reform of this type **might alter the diplomatic balance considerably and discourage major powers from using the Council as often as they do now.** If so, **the push for a more representative** and effective **Council could inadvertently undermine** one of **the institution**’s hidden values.

It is essential that powerful states remain invested in the UNSC, as Bosco states,

This article distinguishes between the UN Security Council’s “governance” and “concert” functions and argues that the latter is important in assessing the body’s diplomatic value. It presents data suggesting that serving together on the Council deepens diplomatic linkages between permanent members. It also argues that Council membership may offer several benefits for managing relations between the permanent members. Specifically, **the Council provides a mechanism through which permanent members have slowed the pace of crises that might threaten their relations**, used ambiguity to **produce[d] exits from potentially dangerous situations, and mitigated diplomatic humiliation.** The article contends that many proposals for Council reform pay little attention to this concert function and, if adopted, may unwittingly diminish a key benefit of the institution. KEYWORDS: United Nations, diplomacy, Security Council

1. **Turn: Transparency reform worsens great power conflict**

[Bosco 2014](https://acuns.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/05-GG204-Bosco.pdf)

The Council’s working methods have come under intense scrutiny during the past several decades. A number of voices have argued that the Council needs to increase its transparency. 41 The body’s informal consultations— where most major decisions are made—have been a particular focus of criticism. These meetings, which became standard practice in the late 1970s, occur without any record of discussion and often without a formal agenda. In response to persistent criticism, the Council has agreed to provide regular updates on its informal meetings and to create certain avenues for civil society input. From a governance perspective, this emphasis on transparency is understandable. A legitimate governing body’s methods and procedures must be clear to the public. Whether transparency is unambiguously beneficial from a concert perspective is less clear. **Some of the Council’s most effective moments have resulted from off-the-record** informal **consultations, particularly between permanent members. A relentless transparency drive** that discourages, for example, regular consultations among the permanent members **might sacrifice important Council benefits on the altar of good governance**. As Voeten argues, “**Successful reforms to make the Security Council more transparent may [make]** actually have adverse effects in that **powerful states** may **flee the forum**

It is essential that powerful states remain invested in the UNSC, as Bosco states,

This article distinguishes between the UN Security Council’s “governance” and “concert” functions and argues that the latter is important in assessing the body’s diplomatic value. It presents data suggesting that serving together on the Council deepens diplomatic linkages between permanent members. It also argues that Council membership may offer several benefits for managing relations between the permanent members. Specifically, **the Council provides a mechanism through which permanent members have slowed the pace of crises that might threaten their relations**, used ambiguity to **produce[d] exits from potentially dangerous situations, and mitigated diplomatic humiliation.** The article contends that many proposals for Council reform pay little attention to this concert function and, if adopted, may unwittingly diminish a key benefit of the institution. KEYWORDS: United Nations, diplomacy, Security Council

1. **Turn: the membership issue distracts from more important reform issues**

[GPF](https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council-reform/49885.html?itemid=1321)

**While the issue of membership** seems to **hold[s]** observers' **attention in the media, the issues of transparency** and working methods **and veto power are just as important. Currently, only permanent members have veto power** and they are unlikely to give up this right. **Lack of transparency** in the Council's working methods place emphasis on how the Council goes about making decisions and the lack of information that they are required to provide to other parts of the UN. Furthermore, the subsidiary bodies of the Council do not include UN members unless they are members of the Council at the time. As a result, **[leaves] many countries** that have not served, or are not currently serving, on the Council are being left **out of the decision-making process.**

2. Reform isn’t happening in squo anyways

[Mazumdaru 2017](https://www.dw.com/en/will-the-un-security-council-ever-be-reformed/a-41045697)

-If another group of permanent members are added to the UNSC, would it increase the council's legitimacy or undercut accountability by reinforcing privilege? Would merely expanding the UNSC qualify as a reform of the body? Given the complexities involved, **observers see little scope for any reform of the UNSC membership in the foreseeable future.** "I think that the chances are quite slender, especially **given the intransigence of China and Russia and the likely covert opposition of France and the United Kingdom**," said Ganguly.

## A2 Promoting Indian HR violations

## A2 Terrorism

1. Pakistan further fueling terrorism would have heavy economic and international relations consequences.

[Khan 18](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/double-game-why-pakistan-supports-militants-resists-us-pressure-stop) (find better card later)

**The United States and the international community have accused Pakistan of sponsoring militant groups in** Afghanistan and **Indian**-administered Jammu and **Kashmir** for decades—a charge Pakistan vehemently denies. Pakistan does, in fact, support three prominent jihadi militant groups in Jammu and Kashmir: the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jaish-e-Mohammad, even though these groups are officially banned by the Pakistani government. The United States has also routinely criticized Pakistan for supporting the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network (a U.S.-designated terrorist group), both of which frequently attack U.S. troops and coalition forces in Afghanistan. Why does Pakistan continue to sponsor militant groups in the face of considerable U.S. pressure to stop? This question has plagued U.S.-Pakistan relations for decades. President Trump has rebuked Pakistan, inflaming an already tense relationship when he tweeted about decades of U.S. aid to Pakistan with “nothing but lies & deceit” in return. **The Trump administration subsequently reduced security and military aid to Pakistan, campaigned to add Pakistan to an intergovernmental watchlist for terrorism financing, and imposed sanctions on seven Pakistani firms involved in prohibited nuclear activities.**

1. Pakistan has begun a crackdown of terrorist since the airstrikes in February

[Al Jazeera 19](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/india-pakistan-tensions-latest-updates-190227063414443.html) (YZ)

**Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan has said no armed group would be allowed to operate on Pakistani soil and carry out attacks abroad**. "This government will not allow Pakistan's land to be used for any kind of outside terrorism," Khan said while addressing a public rally in southern Pakistan."We will not allow any militant group to function in our country now."**Pakistan began a crackdown against armed groups this week amid growing international pressure in the wake of a bombing in India-administered Kashmir** by Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed.

1. **Negotiations don’t solve terrorism**

[Tellis 2017](https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/09/20/are-india-pakistan-peace-talks-worth-damn-pub-73145)

Continual bilateral engagement can induce the Pakistani military to negotiate **an end to terrorism against India**.23 6 The notion that Rawalpindi can be induced to abjure terrorism **through negotiations is** certain to be **rejected outright by New Delhi because it would be**tantamount to **a moral hazard: rewarding the Pakistan Army** to eschew **[for ending] something that it ought to abstain from in the first place**. Even if such principled considerations are out of place in international politics, there are sound pragmatic reasons for India to refuse any negotiations with Pakistan over the cessation of terrorism because such a bargain would only ensure that New Delhi remained a victim of continuous blackmail by Rawalpindi. In effect, **the Pakistan Army’s strategy of bleeding India would be vindicated** by such a discussion**, permitting the generals to turn the tap of terrorism on and off as appropriate to secure** those **concessions** that might otherwise not be forthcoming at the diplomatic table. For this reason, India has consistently rejected any suggestion that it negotiate an end to Pakistani terrorism through dialogue, insisting instead that Rawalpindi must end its low-intensity conflict against India as a precondition for any peace process to even begin.

## A2 IMF

1. India would most likely raise the conditions for a bailout rather than attempt to destroy Pakistan. This would be effective in reducing terrorism and preventing war.

[Perkovich and Dalton 2016 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace](https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/07/28/how-india-can-motivate-pakistan-to-prevent-cross-border-terrorism-pub-64203)

**From these diplomatic and economic effects, Indian strategists can find the seeds of a strategy for non-violent “compellence”: the martialing of state diplomatic, economic, and social resources to build and sustain international pressure on Pakistan to force changes in its behavior**. Through an anti-terrorism social media campaign that broadcasts the horrors of the terrorist attacks to the world, India could mobilize international public opinion against the actions of the Pakistani state. **To impose further political isolation, India could convince its partners to postpone bilateral meetings with Pakistan or delay visa processing**. In more tangible **economically** terms, **India** and its partners **could seek to raise the prominence of anti-terrorism issues at the IMF to condition further financing for Pakistan on cracking down on terrorist groups that attack other states.** Furthermore, India could seek an advance commitment from the United States and other **[or convince] major powers** to cut security assistance to Pakistan after another terrorist attack in India, or **to cease doing business with Pakistan Army-owned businesses.** Such targeted penalties would strike directly at the coffers of the Pakistan Army. The punitive benefits of this strategy may be less direct than military action, but they also come with far lower risks of an escalating conflict that could result in damage to India far greater than the instigating event. With a clear comparative advantage over Pakistan in economic clout and soft power**, India can utilize these tools to isolate Pakistan internationally, which could in turn motivate meaningful counterterrorism action within Pakistan.**

**Pakistan is especially vulnerable economically right now - they have to listen**

<https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Pakistan-China-and-terrorism>

For Pakistan, however, China's close embrace is becoming a tight squeeze financially. Fast-rising debt to Beijing has contributed to Pakistan's dire financial situation today. **With its economy teetering on the brink of default, Pakistan is urgently seeking a $12 billion bailout from the International Monetary Fund [which it cannot survive without].** However, despite securing billions of dollars in recent emergency loans from China, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan cannot do without a large IMF bailout. This will be Pakistan's 22nd IMF bailout in six decades, and the largest ever. Pakistan's cycle of dependency on the IMF has paralleled the rise of its military-Islamist complex. **Unless the latest IMF bailout is made contingent upon concrete anti-terror action, it will, as past experience shows, help underpin Pakistan's collusion with terrorist groups.** This is especially so because a new IMF bailout will also support the Sino-Pakistan link, including by freeing up other resources in Pakistan for debt repayments to Beijing. **[which is why] democratic powers,** especially the U.S., which holds a dominant 17.46% voting share in the IMF, **must now insist on setting tough conditions [for lifting pressure on pakistan], including making Pakistan take credible, verifiable and irreversible steps against the terrorist groups that its military has long nurtured.** Among other things, an honorable U.S. exit from Afghanistan hinges on the success of such treatment.

## A2 Gridlock

1. **(this is weird don't read without reading) Decision making doesn’t change when new members enter UNSC since new members tend to have the same policy preferences.**

[**Alexopoulos and Bourantonis 07**](http://www.arisalexopoulos.gr/files/Can%20expansion%20lead....pdf)(hf with these names)

 Nevertheless, we conducted both one and multi-dimensional spatial analysis, to take into account the different and competing suggestions of the relevant literature. **In all cases, we come to the conclusion that the proposed reform does not lead to a less efficient decision-making.** The core of such an expanded UNSC is always smaller if not the same with the core of the current Council, due to the fact that most of the potential new members belong to the middle or upper level of economic development.

In this way, it has been shown that it is misleading to connect expansion with less decision capacity in the UNSC. **IR scholars**, who argue that it is better not to increase the number of the members of the UNSC, **make the** same  **mistake** as those scholars of comparative politics. They express the view **that potential veto points of a political system coincide with the actual number of veto players. They** pay attention only to the institutions of a political system, while **omit**ting **that the system consists of players who have preferences over policy outputs that might be convergent.** Hence, **when we study the decision capacity of international organizations we have to take into account** not only the decision rule and  **the**  number of involved veto players but also their **policy preference**.

1. **T/Disad?: Gridlock is good because then India can stop dumb interventions.**

[Sidhu 13](http://www.hkrdb.kar.nic.in/documents/Downloads/Good%20Reads/Waheguru%20Pal%20Singh%20Sidhu%2C%20Pratap%20Bhanu%20Mehta%2C%20Bruce%20Jones%20-%20Shaping%20the%20Emerging%20World.%20India%20and%20the%20Multilateral%20Order.pdf) - Shaping the Emerging World: India and the Multilateral Order (YZ)

First, **India envisages a more just and equitable multilateral order** that takes into account the aspirations of a rising, democratic, and peaceful nation such as itself. In the UNSC, this means **a permanent seat with veto power,** which **would allow India to temper the organization’s impulse toward intervention and refocus attention on questions of economic development.**

**3. (If link to gridlock is veto) Turn: Veto power encourages cooperation**

[Krastev 2015](http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/un-security-council-veto-option-does-more-good-than-bad/)

The analysis of the recent uses of veto power in the UN Security Council will reveal some interesting trends. First,**the use of veto has dramatically declined after the end of the Cold War.** The Soviet Union was the first one to cast veto in February 1946. And in the days of the Cold war permanent members of the UN Security Council have used their veto right 240 times. In striking contrast **in the first post-Cold war decade only nine draft resolutions were vetoed**. In the recent years the veto was used more actively and Russia ended up being the one most ready to veto while France and Britain never used their veto right after 1989. But what is **more important, the** “pocket veto” (the explicit or implicit **threat of veto**) **was an important incentive for finding solutions** in the face of some of the most difficult crises the world has been facing. So, we can see that **when veto power is exercised, it comes at a high cost for the respective country while at the same time the treat of veto forces cooperation.**

# Politics

## A2 Modi loses now

## DL: After Feb attacks, Modi is literally gonna win

[Gramar 1](https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/27/india-kashmir-airstrikes-jem-battling-for-re-election-modi-takes-the-fight-to-pakistan/)9 (YZ)

“**With general elections just weeks away, the conflict gives Modi and the [Bharatiya Janata Party] a clear advantage**,” said Vaishnav. “**Modi’s calling card is projecting strength, decisive leadership, and nationalism. This crisis allows him to tap into all three.**”

[Punj March 1st, 2019 of India Time](https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-today-conclave-pollsters-elections-2019-bjp-nda-1468374-2019-03-01) (YZ)

**A majority of leading pollsters in the country predict a comfortable win for the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and agreed that the Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government stands to gain from the Pulwama attacks**

Gupta **predict[ing]**ed **over 300 seats for the NDA**. Verma and Deshmukh predicted 270 seats.

## A2 Aff = Modi wins

1. NU: He’s on track to winning anyways ^ stuff above too

 [Das 19 Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-politics-analysis/with-worries-of-war-and-an-upcoming-election-support-surges-for-indias-modi-idUSKCN1QL1KZ) (YZ)

Indian Prime Minister Narendra **Modi has slammed opposition parties for demanding evidence about last week’s military strike inside Pakistan, and support for him is rising,** pollsters say, despite the questions about how successful it was.

Opinion polls conducted **before the tensions with Pakistan broke out mostly predicted Modi’s Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) would struggle to win a majority because of a slowing economy**, low rural incomes and the government’s inability to provide more jobs.

**But** pollsters and political analysts say **Modi’s support is now rising, mainly because right-wing parties like the BJP typically have an advantage over others on national security issues.**

## A2 Modi/BJP Bad

1. **Turn: Peace in Kashmir only happens if Modi wins reelection**

[Economic Times 2019](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/elections/lok-sabha/india/pakistan-pm-sees-better-chance-of-peace-talks-with-india-if-modis-bjp-wins-election/articleshow/68804856.cms)

**Pakistan's Premier Imran Khan has said he believes there may be a better chance of peace talks with India** and settle the Kashmir issue **if** Prime Minister Narendra **Modi**'s party BJP **wins the general elections.** India will go to elections in seven phases beginning from Thursday. "Perhaps if the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party)....wins, some kind of settlement in Kashmir could be reached," Khan told a small group of foreign journalists in an interview. **He said other parties would be afraid of right-wing backlash in case of settlement on the Kashmir issue.**

1. **Weak Modi causes escalation with Pakistan as a diversion**

[Stratfor 19](https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/india-and-pakistan-pull-back-brink-kashmir-attack#/entry/jsconnect?client_id=633726972&target=%2Fdiscussion%2Fembed%3Fc%3D1551962800184%26vanilla_category_id%3D1%26vanilla_identifier%3D295746%26vanilla_url%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fworldview.stratfor.com%252Farticle%252Findia-and-pakistan-pull-back-brink-kashmir-attack)

In the short term, **whether New Delhi ups the ante again against Pakistan will depend largely on Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's re-election campaign.** Modi and the BJP face a tough election due by May, amid India's economic travails and lackluster job creation, as well as growing angst among the country's farmers. **To shore up more support ahead of time, Modi will use the latest episode in Kashmir to position himself as a strong and decisive leader, best capable of defending the nation against Pakistan.** In justifying these tactics, he will paint anyone who accuses him of politicizing the issue for electoral gain as abetting Pakistan — thereby putting the nearly two dozen opposition parties running against the BJP in the upcoming election on the defensive. And indeed, Modi has already begun to incorporate these themes on the campaign trail, as evidenced by his recent speeches at rallies in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh — two of India's most populous states, and key battlegrounds for the BJP’s quest to achieve another parliamentary majority in the next vote.**But even if Modi's strong-willed words don’t spark another escalation in the coming months, India and Pakistan's history, along with Islamabad's continued support of Kashmiri militants, make the next crisis in the disputed territory all but certain — with India striking back, prompting Pakistan to again respond in kind.**And depending on the size of India's next retaliation, the two rivals could very well move toward a sharper confrontation that tests the limits of their aversion to another war.

## A2 Modi/BJP Good

1. **Turn: BJP violates human rights**

[HRW 2019](https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/india)

**In 2018, the** government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party **(BJP) harassed and** at times **prosecuted activists, lawyers, human rights defenders, and journalists** for criticizing authorities. **Draconian sedition and counterterrorism laws were used to chill free expression.** Foreign funding regulations were used to target nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) critical of government actions or policies.

**The government failed to prevent** or credibly investigate **growing mob attacks on** religious minorities, **marginalized communities**, and critics of the government—often carried out by groups claiming to support the government. At the same time, some **senior BJP leaders publicly supported perpetrators of such crimes**, made inflammatory speeches against minority communities, **and promoted Hindu supremacy and ultra-nationalism, which encouraged further violence.**

1. **Turn: BJP fuels Kashmir violence**

[Shukla 19 of The Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/mar/03/kashmir-in-perilous-state-because-of-indias-pivot-to-nationalism) (YZ)

**Modi**’s **encourage**ment, or at least toleration, of **a profoundly anti-Muslim agenda**.**There is an acute awareness of the discrimination faced by Kashmiri youth who seek work outside the state**, such as difficulty in renting houses and even targeted violence after incidents such as the recent suicide attack. **These anti-Muslim themes are reinforced by lack of economic opportunity and the absence of political engagement, which causes estranged young people to pick up the gun.** Unsurprisingly, **this has led to steadily escalating levels of violence in** the province of Jammu and **Kashmir. [Leading to casualties on all fronts doubling since the BJP came into power]** [India](https://www.theguardian.com/world/india) claims credit for “neutralising” 276 militants last year, more than double the 114 that were killed in 2014, the year the BJP came to power. But the number of soldiers killed has more than doubled too – from 46 in 2014 to 95 last year. Worse, more security personnel have died in the first two months of this year than in all of 2014. Meanwhile, the number of civilians killed has tripled from 28 in 2014 to 86 last year.

1. **Turn: Modi and BJP sucks at everything and fuels tension v Pakistan**

[Bali 19 of Quartz](https://qz.com/india/1563206/modi-may-benefit-from-india-pakistan-conflict-in-2019-elections/) (YZ)

**The Indian economy is suffering from** [**the long-term effects**](https://www.adamsmith.org/blog/the-very-real-impact-of-indias-demonetization) **of the decision to demonetise in 2016 and the inability to generate new jobs.** The BJP was also defeated in five state elections in 2018, including [key states of the Hindi belt](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/11/modi-bjp-election-defeats-hindi-heartland-rajasthan-chhattisgarh-madhya-pradesh) such as Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh.

**With Modi’s supposed record of economic competence and good governance under challenge, he has increasingly relied on his party’s version of extreme nationalism to keep people’s support.** The BJP’s [Hindutva ideology](https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-are-the-origins-of-todays-hindu-nationalism-55092) sees India as a Hindu country and believes all Indian Muslims should have been forced to move to Pakistan in 1947, and now constitute a fifth column in the country. **So an attack such as the recent suicide bombing**—whether or not it was actually instigated by Pakistan—**plays into Modi’s narrative.**

**4. Modi’s Economic Reforms Bad**

Shikha Dalmia, 4-26-2019, "India's Prime Minister Plays the Fear Card After Botching Economic Reforms," Reason, https://reason.com/2019/04/26/indians-prime-minister-plays-the-fear-card-after-botching-economic-reforms/

The main reason **Modi is in trouble is that he has failed to deliver on any of his economic promises** and usher his much-hyped "acche din" (good times). Even if one buys the goosed up government figures, the Indian economy grew on average 7.3 percent annually over the last five years (compared to 6.7 percent at the tail end of the previous government). The actual figure is at least 1 to 2 percent lower than the official estimate. But even the rosy estimate is nowhere close to the 10 percent that India has the potential to grow every year. **Meanwhile, Modi's promise to create 10 million jobs every year to absorb the legions of young people annually entering the labor force—65 percent of the country's population is under 35—was never close to being kept. In fact, government data that Modi tried to suppress shows that unemployment is at a 45-year high. The reason for Modi's economic failure is that the reforms he attempted were badly botched and the reforms that were sorely needed he didn't attempt**. Sure, he improved India's "ease of doing business" ranking and built roads and other infrastructure, although nowhere near what the country needs. But all that was nullified by **Modi's demonetization stunt, which without forewarning or forethought scrapped big denomination bills—80 percent of the national currency—overnight**. The ostensive purpose of the exercise was to flush out "black money"illicitly hoarded by the rich and powerful. In fact, **it wiped out poor farmers, the self-employed, and small mom-and-pop establishments that held their savings in cash. The fat cats were left unscathed.**

# Peacekeepers

## A2 India Stops R2P (which is good)

1. The alt is ignoring genocide

Scott Sheeran, 8-11-2014, "The U.N. Security Council veto is literally killing people," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/08/11/the-un-security-council-veto-is-literally-killing-people/

**We should also not forget that an estimated 150,000 people have now died in the protracted and brutal Syrian conflict, for which the international community has largely been a bystander.** The Council (or more accurately the U.S. and Russia) agreed a program to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons and, helped by Australia, Jordan and Luxembourg, has also achieved humanitarian aid delivery within certain boundaries agreeable to Assad’s regime. From the low expectations of diplomats born of experience, this is naturally seen as positive. In the context of the UN’s objectives and the Security Council’s stated role it is unequivocally a failure. **It is tragic this scale of civilian death could be allowed to happen today, after the mea culpa and “never again” of the genocide in Rwanda. But the Russian veto and alliance with Syria has been the block to serious action. The growing regularity of these high-profile situations in which the U.N. and international law plays little or no role due to the veto is cause for concern. The international community, its decision makers and the public risk becoming normalized to such immense injustice and human suffering.**

2. Same thing happened in the congo

Such differences of opinion over the role of UN peacekeepers were replicated 12 years later in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as rebels advanced on the eastern town of Goma. The Indian commander of part of the largest peacekeeping force in the world ignored orders from UN officials to defend the town and called the Indian defence ministry in New Delhi to ask what he should do. He was told not to resist. The rebels seized Goma to the anger of Ban Ki-Moon, who regarded it as a “personal humiliation”, according to a senior UN official.

By then members of the wider UN mission in the DRC had come to look like bystanders to mass killing, rape and terror. Richard Gowan, until recently research director at the Centre on International Cooperation, a thinktank in New York that works closely with the UN on peacekeeping, said Indian forces in Sierra Leone and the DRC were taking orders from the defence ministry in New Delhi, not the UN commanders on the ground.

“It’s very clear that there are directions from New Delhi to avoid all risk, and that there are parallel lines of command between New Delhi and their guys in the field. That’s true of a lot of countries. A lot of field officers, if they get any order to take a significant risk in a peace operation, they’ll immediately phone home. That’s making it almost impossible for some force commanders to get anything done because they have no true control over their own units,” he said.

“When permanent members of the security council can’t agree to stand up to an abusive government such as Sudan’s, and you have weak peacekeeping troops on the ground, it’s almost a perfect storm where peacekeepers are not going to protect civilians properly,” he said.

“Permanent members of the security council routinely prioritise their national interest over the needs of the UN peacekeeping missions they have mandated, as a result often undermining them. Russia and China have done this by opposing more sanctions against the Sudanese government even when it pushes peacekeepers around in Darfur.”

The responsibility to protect has had a more positive impact elsewhere. Peacekeepers in South Sudan turned their bases into de facto refugee camps protecting tens of thousands of people. That would have been unlikely 20 years ago.

## A2 Aff increases peacekeepers

1. **Permanent membership on the UNSC would cause India to reduce peacekeeping contributions**

[Mohan and Gippner 2015](http://www.dahrendorf-forum.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2-MohanGippner-Chinese-and-Indian-Approaches-to-UN-Peacekeeping.pdf)

To sum up, in the aftermath of the Brahimi Report on the practice of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations from 2000, there has been a critical assessment of India’s role in peacekeeping looking at negative and positive drivers behind participation in IPKO (Sidhu, 2011). While the positive drivers include aspirations for a permanent seat in the UNSC and the desire to be seen as a ‘responsible global actor’, peacekeeping is instrumentalized for sustaining India’s position as an emerging power as well as negotiating for a greater role in the UN system. The Indian Foreign Secretary, Sugata Bose, emphasized in his speech in 2010 that “India has been at the forefront of this move, seeking an enhanced global role as a permanent member of the reformed Security Council, commensurate with its size, capabilities, contribution to UN peacekeeping operations and impeccable track record in upholding the UN system” (Bose, 2010). At the same time, it is worth noting that **a major critique of peacekeeping participation** under the UN**is gathering momentum in** policy circles in **India. It is increasingly viewed as a mission for underdeveloped countries such as Bangladesh and Pakistan, since permanent members of the Security Council make a limited contribution to** troop numbers in the **UN peacekeeping operations.**1

1. **Delink: There’s no money for more peacekeepers**

[Goldberg 2019](https://www.undispatch.com/un-peacekeeping-faces-massive-funding-shortfall/)

In a letter to United Nations Ambassadors, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres warned of an urgent cash crisis facing the UN in general — and UN peacekeeping in particular. As of January 11, he says, **the United Nations faces a $2 billion shortfall in UN Peacekeeping funding**; the cash it has on hand can fund less than two months of UN Peacekeeping operations around the world. “Active peacekeeping missions are soon expected to face liquidity gaps due to late payments and increasing arrears,” Antonio Guterres wrote in the letter, seen by UN Dispatch. “As of today, arrears are nearing US$2 billion and are likely to keep growing. Current cash balances cover less than two months of operations, compared to four months last year.” Peacekeeping is funded through dues payments from member states to the United Nations. The problem is that **UN member states are not paying their dues on time and in full. If this trend continues** much longer**, the United Nations will simply run out of money to pay for all the peacekeeping operations it deploys around the world**, which includes about 100,000 troops deployed to 14 global hotspots The top contributors to UN Peacekeeping include the United States, China, Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Of these, the United States is by far the largest single contributor, and is assessed at nearly 28% of the cost of UN Peacekeeping. The problem is, **the Trump administration** has not been paying its dues in full and **has** consequently **wracked up arrears to UN Peacekeeping of** about **$750 million** — a significant portion of the $2 billion shortfall.

## A2 Aff decreases peacekeepers (leverage)

1. **Delink: India has a lot of incentives to stay in UN Peacekeeping**

[Williams 2013](https://www.stanleyfoundation.org/articles.cfm?id=769&title=A%20Smarter%20Approach)

But **a number of factors have kept India from pulling out**—**maybe the most important as a reaction to the resurgence of China as a world power.** While Beijing was against any involvement in peacekeeping operations in the past, it has had a change of heart. **The number of Chinese peacekeepers is** nowhere near India’s, but it is **growing**. Much like India in its early peacekeeping days, China was swayed by the opportunities that sending troops abroad provided such as training its soldiers and increasing its standing in the international community.

**Another issue** that will likely keep Indian peacekeepers on UN missions in the future **is New Delhi’s continued goal to be a world power.** In many regards, India’s bureaucracy is slow to articulate—much less execute—the country’s foreign policy strategies, making **peacekeeping [is] one of the** South Asian giant’s **few [Indian] foreign policy strategies that is both highly visible and well executed.**

If a withdrawal is out of the question, then India’s only recourse against the dangers of peacekeeping is a smarter approach to its present and future contributions. India will likely take more care in choosing new missions by instituting a reform process. Another key strategy, and challenge, will be encouraging other countries to step up their contributions. India does not want to see UN peacekeeping end, nor does it want to play any role in weakening the foundations of present or future missions. The South Sudan attack has not unleashed a wave of cynicism in India. Instead, it has highlighted the changing nature of peacekeeping as India seeks to start what will hopefully be a worldwide discussion about a smarter approach to using blue helmets.

1. **India sends so many peacekeepers because it wants permanent seat**

[Dominguez 2016](https://www.dw.com/cda/en/what-drives-south-asians-to-peacekeeping/a-18970732)

Besides financial incentives, experts note, these countries gain diplomatic benefits by committing to peacekeeping operations. "It shows that they are committed to the UN," says Anit Mukherjee, an assistant professor in the South Asia Program of the Singapore-based S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS). "When these nations have an active peacekeeping profile, they enhance their image. They can argue that they are doing their part to help promote international stability," he said. And **in the case of India,** some analysts argue, **part of the motivation may also be linked to the South Asian giant's aspirations as a global power.** "**New Delhi has often built its case for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council on the back of its contributions to UN peacekeeping**," Princeton's Mukherjee told DW.

## A2 Peacekeepers good

1. **Peacekeeping doesn’t decrease conflict.**

[Brosig 2018](https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.576/)

First, when measuring security comprehensively, the legacy of peacekeeping missions is somehow less impressive than the existing quantitative literature implies. **The number of violent deaths still increases in the initial years of deployment.** **Other forms of violence,** measured in terms of in the number of conflict events, **domestic unrest and violence against civilians, remain unchanged.** **So too does the number of refugees, as well as, governance indicators in the area of the rule of law and accountability**. These are rather sobering findings. Peacekeeping missions struggle to deliver in their core field of competence on the promise of pacifying conflicts and creating conditions for a peaceful post-conflict environment. Second, peacekeeping does not bring about unitary effects. Reactions are diverse and levels of violence do both increase and decline. There are some countries that respond significantly better to international deployments than others. **Deploying into continuing armed conflict** as it is the case in Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan or the DRC, and to some extent also in CAR and Mali, **thwarts the chances of establishing comprehensive peace in the mid-term**. Indeed, **during the deployment of stabilisation missions the number of battle deaths, domestic unrest and refugees is increasing**, while scores for personal safety are decreasing. In the long-run, such a situation is unsustainable. However, there are also positive cases. If there is a working peace agreement, the chances of a positive impact are significantly higher. Burundi, Liberia, Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone have responded fairly well to international peacekeeping by displaying mostly stable positive trends in our key security indicators. The impact of peacekeeping depends to a fair degree on the end or at least control of violent conflict prior to deployment. Creating peace in a violent environment is a more challenging task than accompanying a country in which violent conflict has come to an end. As such this is no new finding, but it becomes an ever more pressing concern considering the record number of deployed peacekeepers, and the growing trend of deploying stabilisation missions into intractable conflicts. If these missions continue to produce a high number of casualties and are unable to address domestic unrest, they are likely to lose support from troop contributing countries and the local population, curbing their chances of success significantly. Indeed, the new leadership that has taking office in 2017 at the UN, AU and US have taken a somewhat critical position towards the latest generation of stabilisation missions as well as key troop contributing countries such as India. Starting a debate on the affects of missions on the ground is essential for strengthening their positive impacts and to avoid a drastic, and potentially dangerous, scaling down of peacekeeping operations. Third, **what brings down non-lethal forms of violence might be less related to the deployment of a peacekeeping mission and more about the quality of security governance in a country.** We could show that higher scores in the quality of security governance are positively related to lower numbers of domestic unrest. If peacekeepers aim at reducing violence, a stronger focus on governance issues is needed.

1. **TURN: Peacekeepers do more harm than help; they engage in torture, sex-trafficking rings, and sexual exploitation.**

[Autesserre (Foreign Affairs) 2018](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-12-11/crisis-peacekeeping)  (DS)

Worst of all, some **peacekeepers harm those they are meant to help**. **In the Central African Republic, Congo, and Somalia, they have engaged in torture. In Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo, they have been implicated in sex-trafficking rings. In fact, over the past 12 years, the UN has received nearly 1,000 allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation by peacekeepers.** Those who commit such horrible acts are a minority, but the bad apples have done grave harm to the UN’s reputation.

[Bastick 07 of the Geneva Centre](https://dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/sexualviolence_conflict_full.pdf) Reports indicate that in their efforts to crush the militant separatist movement in Kashmir, both **Indian security forces and paramilitary groups systematically committed human rights violations, including sexual violence**. **Indian security forces reportedly raped women in Kashmir during search operations**, attacks on villages, during reprisal attacks and in places of detention. One much-publicised incident was an attack on a wedding party and the rape of the bride and another woman by Indian border security forces in 1990. Kashmiri militant groups also committed rape. Sexual violence committed by Pakistani security forces against Kashmiri detainees in Azad Kashmir has also been reported. **The Indian security forces allegedly used rape as a form of retaliation for militant attacks.** Women were raped and killed after being held hostage in exchange for male relatives. There have also been reports of women and girls abducted and brought to soldiers’ camps, where they were held for sexual slavery and often killed. While most victims seem to be women, reports exist of sexual violence against men, mainly as a form of torture.

1. **F2: Indian peacekeepers don’t engage in sexual assault.**

[Sabha 2010](https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/the-peacekeepers-child/277848) (DS)

**The reprehensible phenomenon of sexual misconduct in Congo envelops not only the lowly jawan, but also includes Indian army officers who, because of their lavish salaries, violate the UN code of conduct with wily sophistication, in greater secrecy.**

1. **Peacekeepers artificially end wars, and don't solve the root cause**

[Weinstein 2005](https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/2731_file_WP57.pdf) (DS)

Table 2 examines the variation in war outcomes in Africa during the same period. Using a strict definition of a stable peace – war does not recur within 10 years of the conflict coming to an end – the data confirm Licklider’s earlier findings. **In the absence of a UN intervention, 46% of civil wars do not recur. When the UN gets involved, only a quarter of wars do not resume**. Importantly, neither intervention nor non-intervention appears particularly well-suited to reducing low-levels of political violence which, while they do not rise to the level of civil war, nonetheless impose significant costs on political stability and the prospects for development.

1. **Turn: India undercuts the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations**

[The Guardian 2015](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/17/un-united-nations-peacekeepers-rwanda-bosnia)

Such differences of opinion over the role of UN peacekeepers were replicated 12 years later **in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as rebels advanced on the eastern town of Goma. The Indian commander of**part of **the** largest **peacekeeping force** in the world **ignored orders from UN officials to defend the town and called the Indian defence ministry in New Delhi to ask what he should do. He was told not to resist. The rebels seized Goma** to the anger of Ban Ki-Moon, who regarded it as a “personal humiliation”, according to a senior UN official. By then members of the wider UN mission in the DRC had come to look like bystanders to mass killing, rape and terror. Richard Gowan, until recently research director at the Centre on International Cooperation, a thinktank in New York that works closely with the UN on peacekeeping, said **Indian forces in Sierra Leone and the DRC were taking orders from the defence ministry in New Delhi, not the UN commanders on the ground.** “It’s very clear that**there are directions from New Delhi to avoid all risk**, and that there are parallel lines of command between New Delhi and their guys in the field. That’s true of a lot of countries. A lot of field officers, if they get any order to take a significant risk in a peace operation, they’ll immediately phone home. That’s **making it almost impossible for** some**[UN] force commanders to get anything done because they have no** true **control over their own units**,” he said.

1. **F2: Peacekeeper sexual violence has gone down**

[Anderlini 2017](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2017-06-09/un-peacekeepers-sexual-assault-problem)

Yet the reports rarely if ever made it to the Security Council. And **the girls and women who name their male accusers are too often ignored or discredited**. In the case of Haiti, **local women have given up on reporting cases.** As Femi Oke, a reporter for Fault Lines, said, “**The UN claims the number of assaults has gone down, but after** almost **two decades of impunity**, these **women** told us they **just saw no point in reporting the crimes.**”

## A2 Peacekeepers bad

1. **Delink: Indian Peacekeepers have a clean record on sexual violence**

[Kaul 2018](https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-among-peacekeeping-forces-and-indias-response/)

Indian UN peacekeepers have not been immune from allegations of SEA, with [three cases of SEA](http://www.firstpost.com/world/three-sexual-abuse-cases-indian-peacekeepers-un-report-2298534.html) registered against them between 2010 and 2013. However, it is important to note that **while being the one of the largest contributor of troops**, with almost [200,000 troops spanning 50 missions](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/2300-army-personnel-to-join-un-peace-keeping-mission-in-south-sudan/articleshow/62890612.cms), **India has one of the lowest cases of** SEA **[sexual exploitation] and has not faced any allegations after 2013**. **This has been achieved by ensuring a strict adherence to the UN’s** [**‘zero tolerance policy**’](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/standards-of-conduct) against SEA **and making considerable changes to the way Indian peacekeepers are recruited, trained and prosecuted**. This suggests that the Indian experience may indeed have much to offer by way of lessons to the rest of the world.

[Economic Times 2018](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/outgoing-un-peacekeeping-chief-herve-ladsous-praises-indian-troops/articleshow/57826339.cms?from=mdr) (DS)

**Indian peacekeepers have maintained a clean record as the world body investigates allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation against the Blue Helmets. India has** said it has **a policy of zero tolerance against sexual abuse and exploitation by peacekeepers.**

1. No, they prevent war.

[Gilligan 2007](http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/beck/pkocausal_qjps.pdf) (DS)

According to the estimates from the Cox regression on the matched sample, **a UN presence results in the reduction of the hazard rate of war by over 85 percent** or by a factor of 0.144. Hence, for instance, if the monthly probability of returning to war without a UN intervention were 1 percent, our results show that that same probability with a UN intervention would be only .144 percent, a huge effect. Furthermore the comparable estimate from the unmatched sample is that UN intervention reduces the hazard rate of transition to war by a factor of 0.297, which indicates that estimates of the effect of UN intervention, when they do not correct for the nonrandom assignment of the UN intervention are biased.

[Fortna 2004](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25054273.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A5d327a54d388ba1fae7e1651813cc088) (DS)

Table 4 shows the effect of peacekeeping broken down by mission type. **Unarmed monitoring missions reduce the risk of another war by 85 percent relative to no peacekeeping, armed peacekeeping missions, by 90 percent.** The effects are jointly significant. The hypothesis that peace lasts longer when peacekeepers are present is strongly supported

1. Even if funding/troop numbers go down, this doesn’t mean there will be less Peacekeeper missions. This just means that peacekeeper operations will be spread more widely and thinly, leaving less resources for each mission. Crucial as Peacekeeping missions need a lot of people in order to be successful.

[Hultman 2013](https://www.jstor.org/stable/23496662?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) (DS)

Does United Nations peacekeeping protect civilians in civil war? Civilian protection is a primary purpose of UN peacekeeping, yet there is little systematic evidence for whether peacekeeping prevents civilian deaths. **We propose that UN peacekeeping can protect civilians if missions are adequately composed of military troops and police in large numbers. Using unique monthly data on the number and type of UN personnel contributed to peacekeeping operations, along with monthly data on civilian deaths** from 1991 to 2008 in armed conflicts in Africa, **we find that as the UN commits more military and police forces to a peacekeeping mission, fewer civilians are targeted with violence. The effect is substantial**—the analyses show that, on average, **deploying several thousand troops and several hundred police dramatically reduces civilian killings. We conclude that although the UN is often criticized for its failures, UN peacekeeping is an effective mechanism of civilian protection.**

1. India is super important because they provide helicopters that no other country does.

[Lynch 2011](https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/14/india-threatens-to-pull-plug-on-peacekeeping/) (DS)

**India, however, has stood apart from other developing countries because of its capacity to deploy combat helicopters and other advanced military gear in Africa and the political will to use them.**

India’s decision to scale back its military commitment in Congo comes as France is preparing to introduce a Security Council resolution calling on the U.N. peacekeeping mission there to play a greater role in ensuring the protection of civilians in the months leading up to the election. But the absence of combat helicopters will limit the mission’s ability to carry out such responsibilities, and may even force the U.N. to close some of its more remote outposts in eastern Congo, according to human rights activists and U.N. officials. “I am obliged to note that [the U.N.’s] military operations are being negatively impacted by the shortage of military helicopters,” Roger Meece, the U.N. Special Representative in Congo warned the Security Council last week. “This problem will become worse absent new contributions.”

“It seems the [Government of India] has determined it has no desire to continue placing its troops in harms way in a country where they are not wanted,” said one U.S. cable “**A withdrawal of Indians troops and helicopter assets would be absolutely devastating to MONUC ability to carry out its mandate.”**

1. **UN Peacekeeping is empirically effective and could be more effective with further funding**

[Hegre of the Peace Research Institute Oslo 2018](https://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/653/c_653796-l_1-k_pko_prediction_preprint_main.pdf)

**Our findings indicate that peacekeeping is much more effective than found in previous studies. In a scenario where the UN completely shuts down** its **peacekeeping** practice**from 2001** and **onwards, we estimate that 3–4 more countries had been in major conflict in 2013** relative to what the world saw given the actual level of peacekeeping activity.1 **The effect of peacekeeping in the short run is to limit the amount of violence, but we also find clear evidence that less violent conflicts are easier to end conclusively a few years down the road.** In a given year, this means that for each conflict that the UN manages to transform from a major conflict to a minor one, another conflict ends. We find that UN peacekeeping policies over the last 15 years have been effective; however, we also show that the UN could have done considerably better. **The more the UN is willing to spend on peacekeeping, and the more missions are provided with a strong mandate, the greater is the conflict-reducing effect.**In the most ambitious scenario we explore, in terms of budgets and mandates, we find that the UN could have transformed another 4–5 conflicts from major conflict to minor conflict in 2013. This represents **a 70% reduction**from the 6 **[in] major conflicts** in Afghanistan, D. R. Congo, Iraq, Nigeria, Syria, and Pakistan recorded in 2013 to only two or three. **Over** the **[a] 13-year period**, the ambitious policy could have transformed 60 more country-years of major conflict into minor conflict compared to the observed policy and at least as many minor-conflict years would have been turned into peace-years of less than 25 deaths.2 This ambitious but effective scenario would not be exorbitantly expensive – according to our simulations, it**would require maintaining a UN peacekeeping budget at about 17 billion USD every year**, **or twice the level of what it spent in 2012**.3 Accumulated over the 13-year period the simulated peacekeeping costs would have amounted to 205 billion USD compared to 59 billion in actual budget expenses over the 13 years. This is a substantial investment, but the required budget would decline in the future since peacekeeping reduces considerably the global future risk of conflict.

1. **Peacekeeper Reform is Happening Now through A4P - increases effectiveness and monitoring**

Alison Giffen, 7-6-2018, "Five Reform Areas for Effective Peacekeeping Performance," IPI Global Observatory, <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2018/07/five-reform-areas-effective-peacekeeping-performance/>

**United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres rightly prioritizes performance by including it as one of the five pillars of his Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) reform initiative.** Peacekeeping operations are a principal tool, and one of the most expensive and visible ways, that the UN intervenes to prevent and mitigate conflict. Improving peacekeeping performance is thus essential, but it will not be easy. A4P aims to mobilize partners and stakeholders, including member states, to strengthen peacekeeping. Member states are in the process of agreeing on efforts to which they will publicly commit as part of the A4P initiative. As part of the pillar on performance, they should focus on matching mission mandates with adequate uniformed, civilian, and financial capacity and giving the secretary-general the political support he needs to **ensure better monitoring of mission effectiveness, increased accountability, and implementation of key management reforms.**I outline below **five critical reform efforts—already underway**—that belong at the top of the performance pillar of A4P. However, **the military and police are only one element of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation**. As set forth in the 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report and later echoed by member states, “Lasting peace is not achieved nor sustained by military and technical engagements, but through **political solutions.”** The political objectives of peacekeeping missions **are largely pursued through the civilian components of a mission in close coordination with uniformed personnel, UN agencies and programs, and other bilateral and multilateral initiatives. The effective protection of civilians similarly hinges on a mission’s civilian component, integrated operations, and coordination with external stakeholders.** Since 2017, the Security Council has increasingly included detailed language in its resolutions related to peacekeeping reform and renewals of mission mandates, including MONUSCO in the DRC, the UN Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), and the UN Stabilization Mission in Mali. As importantly, this year’s report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations also included language requesting the Secretariat to develop, “**an integrated performance policy framework for mandate implementation.” These welcome developments can push the Secretariat and peacekeeping operations toward a culture of monitoring, evaluation, and learning, which is fundamental to improved planning, budgeting, and impact.**

# Veto

## A2 India gets a veto

1. American position is to not give the veto to India

[Bosco 2010](https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=131168880)

Prof. BOSCO: Well, it's kind of a complicated question, because so many people think the U.N. Security Council is relatively ineffective. Prestige is definitely a factor, but the council is involved in security issues all across the globe and if a country wants to have a regular say, there's just nothing better than having a permanent seat at the table. SIEGEL: Is the assumption, by the way, that any additional permanent member would have veto power as the five current permanent members exercise? Prof. BOSCO: No. In fact, that's an issue that's quite contested. **The U.S. position is that the veto should not be extended to the new members. If the council were to be expanded, probably the new permanent members would not have the veto power.** SIEGEL: India is hardly the only country to be proposed as a new permanent member. There's been talk about first Germany and Japan, which aren't there because they were the defeated powers in World War II, but also Brazil has been talked about.

1. Wouldn’t be incentivized to use the veto because they don’t like gridlock.

[Economic Times 2018](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-suggests-voting-to-break-unsc-reform-deadlock/articleshow/66731460.cms) (DS)

**India's** Permanent **Representative** Syed Akbaruddin **told the General Assembly** on Tuesday: **"Naysayers cannot be allowed to cast a dark shadow over the entire membership and hold the overwhelming majority back.**

1. They provide troops so clearly they down wit it
2. The US uses aid as leverage to get countries to vote with them at the UN, this would be no different (India wants the aid). Thus, they’d be unlikely to veto proposals supported by the US.
3. **Turn: Veto power reduces conflict**

 [Davies 2014](https://theconversation.com/dont-be-too-quick-to-condemn-the-un-security-council-power-of-veto-29980)

There are also grounds for thinking that **the veto** might **inhibit[s] the escalation of local or regional crises** – one of the purposes for which it was intended. Given the radicalisation of elements of Syria’s opposition, manifested in the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ([ISIS](http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Aug-06/266198-isis-takes-brutal-revenge-on-tribal-insurgents-in-syria.ashx#axzz39ftWkZDt)), it is at least plausible to argue that tougher one-sided measures against the Assad regime might only have made the situation worse by strengthening the hands of groups even more callous than Assad.

**The veto allows Security Council members to set aside those issues on which they cannot agree but to remain engaged on** those others – **the great majority of cases – where they can.**

1. **Turn: Veto power encourages cooperation**

[Krastev 2015](http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/un-security-council-veto-option-does-more-good-than-bad/)

The analysis of the recent uses of veto power in the UN Security Council will reveal some interesting trends. First,**the use of veto has dramatically declined after the end of the Cold War.** The Soviet Union was the first one to cast veto in February 1946. And in the days of the Cold war permanent members of the UN Security Council have used their veto right 240 times. In striking contrast **in the first post-Cold war decade only nine draft resolutions were vetoed**. In the recent years the veto was used more actively and Russia ended up being the one most ready to veto while France and Britain never used their veto right after 1989. But what is **more important, the** “pocket veto” (the explicit or implicit **threat of veto**) **was an important incentive for finding solutions** in the face of some of the most difficult crises the world has been facing. So, we can see that **when veto power is exercised, it comes at a high cost for the respective country while at the same time the treat of veto forces cooperation.**

1. **Delink: India is willing to forgo the veto**

[Dabhade 2017](https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-pursuit-united-nations-security-council-reforms/)

On the most important question of veto, **India**’s position is fully aligned with the G4, L.69 and Africa who have **[has] called for the abolition of veto** and till it exists, it needs to be provided for all members of the permanent category of the Security Council, which should have all prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership in the permanent category, including the right of veto. (March 2016) The Indian position is not one of quantity, viz. extending it immediately to new permanent members, but talks about quality, viz., of introducing restrictions. **India**, showing a marked flexibility, has argued that it supports new members with the same responsibilities and obligations as current permanent members as a matter of principle. It **is open to not exercising the veto by new permanent members until a decision is taken during a review process.**

## A2 India doesn’t get a veto

1. India wouldn’t accept this

[Jabeen 2010](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320700560_Indian_Aspirations_for_Permanent_Membership_in_UN_Security_Council_and_American_Stance) (DS)

**Indian Prime Minister Manmohan stated to his parliament that India would accept the Security Council seat with full veto power only. [This is because] Non-veto membership would mean that India was low in capability than China**. It also meant**[and] that Indian would get involved in all disputes**, many of the peripheral interest to it, **while it might not be able to protect its own vital interests.** It was further expressed by Natwar Singh that his country would not accept any discrimination between the old P-5 and new members (Hindu, 2005, April 11).

1. Sdfsdf

# Generic Impact Thing

## A2 OBOR Good

1. China puts developing countries in massive debt, forcing them into default -- this hurts their ability to obtain loans and forces them to turn to the IMF for help

[Zhang 2019 from the Epoch Times](https://www.theepochtimes.com/the-false-promise-of-beijings-one-belt-one-road-initiative_2804522.html) (JW)

Despite the frustrations of the masses at home and potential financial losses, Beijing’s BRI is all about political calculations. **The debt-trap diplomacy, with billions of dollars in infrastructure investments in participating countries in Central Asia, Europe, South Asia, and Africa, has** purchased some friendship around the world. That has allowed the CCP, at least temporarily, to gain some relevance and to exert geopolitical influence. But the recipients aren’t necessarily happy about the debts they can’t afford, and they feel **trapped [recipients with debts they can’t afford].**

[Greer 2018](https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/06/bri-china-belt-road-initiative-blunder/) (JW)

If the party leadership was willing to pour extra resources into target countries each time power changed hands, they might be able to blunt this sort of opposition. Beijing has not proven willing to do this. The helter-skelter nature of BRI investment has caused other problems for party leadership: **while local Chinese governments and state-owned enterprises are willing to lend** [**so much that BRI investments threaten to drive some countries towards default**](https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf)**,** the central government is not willing to be the lender of last resort for the countries thus driven. Like Pakistan last month, **most countries forced to this extremity will have only one option left: come crawling to the International Monetary Fund in hopes of a solution. For such countries, the end result of Chinese investment is an even stronger dependence on the Western-led financial system.**

1. China aids authoritarian governments that crack down on their people

[Nantulya 2019](https://africacenter.org/spotlight/implications-for-africa-china-one-belt-one-road-strategy/)(JW)

**In its attempt to neutralize threats to its investments, Beijing has also provided technologies to build local capacity for intelligence collection, surveillance, monitoring, and response.** This includes [facial recognition technologies](https://www.cfr.org/blog/exporting-repression-chinas-artificial-intelligence-push-africa), which were recently supplied to Angola, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe. **This is** [**causing apprehension in Africa**](https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/how-chinas-ai-technology-exports-are-seeding-surveillance-societies-globally/)**, given the tendency for some governments to use intrusive technologies against political opponents and activists.**

1. China takes away critical sources of revenue

[Nantulya 2019](https://africacenter.org/spotlight/implications-for-africa-china-one-belt-one-road-strategy/) (JW)

One Belt One Road has troubling implications for debt sustainability. According to the Johns Hopkins China Africa Research Initiative, [East African countries borrowed about $29 billion](http://www.sais-cari.org/data-chinese-loans-and-aid-to-africa) from China for infrastructure, energy, and construction projects. Beijing appears in some cases to have attached more importance to acquiring strategic assets than debt repayment from its partners. **In 2017, Sri Lanka handed over Hambantota port to Chinese state-owned companies on a 99-year lease after defaulting on an infrastructure loan.** **Pakistan handed over Gwadar port on a 40-year lease in an arrangement where the Chinese partner also retained 90 percent of its revenues.**

[~~Retika 2018~~](https://www.c3sindia.org/geopolitics-strategy/asia-africa-growth-corridor-aagc-an-initiative-strong-enough-to-balance-out-the-maritime-silk-road-msr-by-retika-v/) ~~writes that China is currently better positioned to invest in Africa compared to the AAGC because Africa sees China as the regional super power.~~

1. China isn’t even investing in good projects

[Greer 2018](https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/06/bri-china-belt-road-initiative-blunder/) (JW)

As the Belt and Road Initiative is only five years old (and many of its main members have been involved for a far shorter time) its full results cannot yet be judged. However, a preliminary assessment can be offered for BRI projects in South and Southeast Asia, the region [described by Chinese leaders](https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/us/articles/4406_Belt-and-road-initiative/4406_Embracing-the-BRI-ecosystem.pdf) as the “main axis” of the Belt and Road Initiative. It is here that BRI investment is strongest and has been around longest. The picture is not promising. **The hundreds of billions spent in these countries has not produced returns for investors, nor political returns for the party.** Whether Chinese leaders actually seek a financial return from the Belt and Road Initiative has always been questionable—[the sovereign debt of 27 BRI countries is regarded as “junk”](https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/us/articles/4406_Belt-and-road-initiative/4406_Embracing-the-BRI-ecosystem.pdf) by the three main ratings agencies, while another 14 have no rating at all. Investment decisions often seem to be driven by geopolitical needs instead of sound financial sense. In South and Southeast Asia expensive port development is an excellent case study. A [2016 CSIS report judged](https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180717_FunaioleHillman_ChinaMaritimeSilkRoad.pdf?kdf7YyYgl03PljV8PHzZsiZt3_UxnBPo) that **none of the Indian Ocean port projects funded through the BRI have much hope of financial success.** They were likely prioritized for their geopolitical utility. Projects less clearly connected to China’s security needs have more difficulty getting off the ground: [the research firm RWR Advisory Group notes](https://www.ft.com/content/e7a08b54-9554-11e8-b747-fb1e803ee64e) that **270 BRI infrastructure projects in the region (or 32 percent of the total value of the whole) have been put on hold because of problems with practicality or financial viability.** There is a vast gap between what the Chinese have declared they will spend and what they have actually spent.

5. Many countries are outright rejecting the OBOR

[Greer 2018](https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/06/bri-china-belt-road-initiative-blunder/) (JW)

This might not matter if BRI projects were driving favorable political outcomes. They aren’t. **Prolonged exposure to the BRI process has driven opposition to Chinese investment and geopolitical influence across the region.** In the Maldives, the pro-Beijing Progressive Party of Maldives was unseated this year by the Maldivian Democratic Party, which ran on an explicitly anti-BRI platform. The Maldives’ new president [calls the BRI](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-maldives-china-debt/maldives-nasheed-vows-to-renegotiate-china-loans-if-opposition-wins-september-poll-idUSKCN1J01J6) “a big cheat” and a “debt trap” that must be abandoned or renegotiated.

## A2 OBOR Bad

## A2 IndoPak War

**Pakistan won’t fight - no money or intl support**

[Gokhale 2019](https://www.rediff.com/news/interview/pakistan-cant-sustain-even-3-4-days-of-war/20190227.htm) He has authored four books on military, conflicts and wars. He also makes documentaries and is a regular visiting faculty at top defence institutions in the country.

**Pakistan faces a very dire financial situation. They cannot sustain even three-four days of conventional war, as war is a costly business. More than that, Pakistan has read straws in the winds. Almost no one (country) has condemned the Indian action. In fact, Pakistan will be disappointed certainly which it will not show that China, instead of condemning the Indian action, has urged restraint. China has told India and Pakistan, but Pakistan mainly, to initiate a dialogue and start the reconciliation process.** Today, the Russia, China and India trilateral statement also spoke about ending terrorism by all countries. United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also said very clearly that Pakistan must end terrorism emanating from its soil. **So, nobody is with Pakistan now. The international pressure on Pakistan is tremendous.**

**India won’t fight - kills econ growth**

[Gokhale 2019](https://www.rediff.com/news/interview/pakistan-cant-sustain-even-3-4-days-of-war/20190227.htm) He has authored four books on military, conflicts and wars. He also makes documentaries and is a regular visiting faculty at top defence institutions in the country.

It is not in India's interest either to go for war. If it is imposed on India, we can sustain it longer as we are in a far better place -- economically and militarily -- but **war will set India's economic progress and development back. Even India doesn't want war for very different reasons, as we are on a high growth trajectory and the economy is doing well. War will be a setback for economic progress and development. War is absolutely the last option, not only because both of us have nuclear weapons, but also it is a costly affair.** Therefore, India doesn't want war and neither does Pakistan -- for different reasons. Pakistan would rather have low cost, high impact, options against India like a proxy war which it has been doing in Jammu-Kashmir or do proxy terror strikes across India like it did from 2003 to 2013. That is why I don't think war is the final outcome or final road towards the problem between the two countries. There are two steps in between the sub-conventional war that Pakistan wages against India through proxies and what India did in terms of going and striking. So basically there is an option that India still retains of hitting the targets again in Pakistan.

 **No escalation—recessed deterrence**

[**Ghoshal 16**—](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2016.1170487)Research Associate at the Delhi Policy Group (Debalina, “India’s Recessed Deterrence Posture: Prospects and Implications,” The Washington Quarterly, 39:1, 159-170, dml)

The theory behind India’s nuclear missile program is ‘induction without deployment.’ 15 As Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, another nuclear expert, writes, the Indian military is clear that induction is meant for peacetime, while deployment is a wartime activity.16 A **recessed deterrent posture**, hence, puts a lesser burden on its command and control and enables New Delhi to **clarify for the world** the difference between its induction program and a deployment program (should New Delhi wish to deploy the weapons). Nuclear deterrence usually comes just from the mere possession of such weapons. Therefore, the need to keep these nuclear weapons in a ready deterrent posture does not make sense, but instead adds to insecurity and instability. In fact, Lt. General B.M. Kapur has argued that “if range, target, yield, and mobility of nuclear weapons are made known to the enemy, that is the beginning of deterrence. Openness is itself deterrence.” 17 For instance, even though the Agni-V missile is neither deployed nor mated with nuclear warheads, the fact that New Delhi declares that the missile is capable of reaching targets in China—and that they are survivable against an enemy’s first-strike—could itself strengthen deterrence. Therefore, t here is no need for India to keep nuclear weapons in ready deterrent posture to strengthen deterrence. Recessed deterrence thus enables India to adopt a strategy that is an amalgamation of both **openness** and **ambiguity**. India declared a state of possessing nuclear weapons, which is an openness that enabled New Delhi to strengthen its deterrent capability. However, the unassembled and semi-assembled states of its nuclear weapons and missile systems open the window of ambiguity regarding India’s nuclear weapons command and control issues (especially in the case of seabased deterrence) as well as its survivability and ability to launch a counterstrike, thereby further strengthening deterrence. Moreover, India has always projected itself as a firm supporter of nuclear disarmament. India has been the only state to call for a Nuclear Weapons Convention that would ban and eliminate nuclear weapons. While adopting a no-first-use policy is considered to be another vital step toward nuclear disarmament, nofirst-use is best ensured when states decide to not to keep their arsenal in a ready deterrent posture. How Can Recessed Deterrence Help? A posture of recessed deterrence offers a variety of benefits: Allows for **rational thinking**: When warheads are not mated with their delivery systems, it gives a state **more time** to **act rationally** during times of crisis. This has even more relevance when a state has a first-use policy. However, India, with a no-first-use policy, also gains from a recessed deterrence posture. In addition to the reasons given above, the belief that India’s warheads are not mated with their delivery systems could give Pakistan **reason not to clandestinely mate** their own nuclear warheads with their delivery systems. As former Defense Minister George Fernandes points out, if Pakistan strikes initially, the effects could be cataclysmic: “we [India] may [lose] a part of our population.” And after India’s retaliatory strikes on Pakistan, “Pakistan may [be] completely wiped out.” 18 This irrationality and catastrophe to an extent has **been prevented** not just because of New Delhi’s no-first-use policy, but also because of its posture of keeping the nuclear weapons **de-mated** and **de-alerted**. This provides a **certain trust to Pakistan** that New Delhi’s nuclear weapons are **not meant for warfighting**. Similarly, China has always been keen on avoiding nuclear “adventurism,” and a de-mated and de-alerted nuclear weapons posture coupled with no-first-use provides China the room to do so. With both **New Delhi** and **Beijing** adopting a nofirst-use policy (though the policy is conditional), their **de-mated** and **de-alerted** nuclear weapons posture could leave **less scope** for an **irrational launch** by either state, thereby keeping the nuclear threshold **high**. Prevent an all out nuclear war: Choosing **not to mate** delivery systems with nuclear warheads could **prevent** an all out **nuclear war**. This posture is conducive for both Pakistan and India since both states could **feasibly engage** in **limited conflict** under a nuclear umbrella. Tensions between India and Pakistan regarding border issues and cross-border infiltration have **always been** at a **heightened state**, and episodes like the Kargil Conflict in 1999 could escalate to nuclear brinkmanship or even confrontation. In this case, the fact that the nuclear arsenals of both countries were not in a ready deterrent posture provided **sufficient time for de-escalation**. As Air Commodore Jasjit Singh wrote, a recessed deterrent posture provides “a **fire-break in escalation** of tensions **beyond a certain level** since the adversary will have to **calculate the consequences** of its actions in terms of Indian responses.” Could reduce reliance on nuclear weaponry: Since nuclear warheads are not mated with delivery systems for Pakistan and for India, there will always be a sliver of doubt about their nuclear weapon preparedness during crises. Hence, each country will also rely heavily on conventional capability. Both India and Pakistan are making an effort to improve their conventional capabilities. In fact, in 2011, former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf stated that since both India and Pakistan have “conventional strength to meet the challenges of war,” they do not have to “go unconventional right away.” 20 In fact, both New Delhi and Islamabad should aim to ban short-range nuclear capable missile systems and convert them into conventional roles, thus reducing reliance on nuclear weapons. Enhances survivability: Not only must a nuclear arsenal be survivable against a first strike by the potential adversary, but the adversary must perceive it to be so.21 With India’s posture of recessed deterrence, an adversary may need to choose whether to destroy nuclear warheads or their delivery systems—not only are delivery systems de-mated, the missile components and nuclear warheads may be situated far away from each other. This choice could prevent adversaries from fully destroying each others’ nuclear forces—destroying nuclear warheads could prevent nuclear catastrophe that could have been inflicted in the adversary’s territory. On the other hand, an adversary could still launch a cataclysmic strike with the delivery systems by arming them with precision guided munitions, electromagnetic pulse weapons, or even cluster guided munitions. For example, in 2011 Musharraf raised doubts on the U.S. ability to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear weapons since they were de-mated. De-mated and de-alerted nuclear weapons could ensure strong modes of survivability of the nuclear arsenals. Prevents accidental launch of nuclear weapons: De-mating the nuclear warheads from their nuclear delivery systems could **reduce the chances of an accidental launch** of nuclear weapons. It could also **prevent nuclear weapons** from **accidentally falling into the hands of non-state actors**. It also **reduces the burden** on command-andcontrol systems, like Permissive Action Links (PALs) or bomber switch control systems, during peacetime.

**Conventional and nuclear deterrence prevent conflict escalation between India and Pakistan.**

 [S. Paul **Kapur &** Sumit **Ganguly 16**, Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School,](https://books.google.com/books?id=UGtACwAAQBAJ&pg=PA273&lpg=PA273&dq=he+territory+of+Kashmir,+where+Pakistan+supports+an+anti-Indian+insurgency;+they+have+also+trained+sizable+nuclear+arsenals+on+one+another.10+Nonetheless,+Pakistan+suffers+from+too+many+handicaps+to+pose+a+significant+strategic+threat.+These+include+economic+stagnation,+sectarian+and+ethnic+violence,+a+relatively+small+territorial+and+population+base,+and+a+dysfunctional+government+that+is+increasingly+unable+to+provide+its+people+with+basic+public+goods+(Lieven+201+1:+3%E2%80%9440;+Bajoria+2009).+In+the+military+realm,+Pakistan+possesses+highly+capable+conventional+and+nuclear+forces.+These+forces,+however,+are+mainly+defensive+and+seek+to+prevent+India+from+leveraging+its+superior+conventional+military+capabiliti&source=bl&ots=gr5niGeQJ2&sig=ACfU3U1ZdUnIMiHD5BdmBC94jIfATSf5Ow&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiWpdT5ku3hAhUF7qwKHZhQAWgQ6AEwDHoECAYQAQ#v=onepage&q=he%20territory%20of%20Kashmir%2C%20where%20Pakistan%20supports%20an%20anti-Indian%20insurgency%3B%20they%20have%20also%20trained%20sizable%20nuclear%20arsenals%20on%20one%20another.10%20Nonetheless%2C%20Pakistan%20suffers%20from%20too%20many%20handicaps%20to%20pose%20a%20significant%20strategic%20threat.%20These%20include%20economic%20stagnation%2C%20sectarian%20and%20ethnic%20violence%2C%20a%20relatively%20small%20territorial%20and%20population%20base%2C%20and%20a%20dysfunctional%20government%20that%20is%20increasingly%20unable%20to%20provide%20its%20people%20with%20basic%20public%20goods%20(Lieven%20201%201%3A%203%E2%80%9440%3B%20Bajoria%202009).%20In%20the%20military%20realm%2C%20Pakistan%20possesses%20highly%20capable%20conventional%20and%20nuclear%20forces.%20These%20forces%2C%20however%2C%20are%20mainly%20defensive%20and%20seek%20to%20prevent%20India%20from%20leveraging%20its%20superior%20conventional%20military%20capabiliti&f=false)

This minimalist approach is changing, however. Today, **India is increasing all aspects of its nuclear weapons capability**. For example, **India is expanding fissile material production**: India and Pakistan are the only countries in the world that are currently believed to be doing so (Crail 2011). **India** probably possesses enough weapons-grade plutonium to produce 100—130 nuclear warheads. It **is increasing its production capacity with projects such as an unsafeguarded fast breeder reactor** under construction near Kalpakkam (Kristensen and Norris 2012). The **Indians are** also **improving their weapons-delivery capabilities**. For example, **the Agni V intermediate range ballistic missile**, which the Indians recently tested, **will have a range of** approximately **5000 km**, enabling it to reach targets anywhere in China. The **BRAHMOS** cruise **missile**, jointly developed with Russia, **will be able to strike targets at ranges of 300**—**500km** with conventional or nuclear warheads at supersonic speeds (Rahyuhin 2012). The **Indians are also working to acquire sea-based launch capabilities**, in addilion to land- and air-based platforms, to ensure that they are able to field a full nuclear triad (Davenport 2012; Kristensen and Norris 2012: 96). **India is doing this** mainly **for security-related reasons** — reasons largely **unconnected with** its oft-cited nemesis, **Pakistan**. **Although analysts tend to focus their attention on the Indo-Pakistani conflict**, the **Pakistanis do not pose a serious**, long-term **strategic threat to India**. **The rivalry between the two countries is**, of course, **real**. **They have fought four wars** against each other and they continue to battle one another over the territory of Kashmir, where Pakistan supports an anti-Indian insurgency; they have also trained sizable nuclear arsenals on one another.10 Nonetheless, **Pakistan suffers from too many handicaps to pose a significant strategic threat**. **These include economic stagnation, sectarian and ethnic violence, a relatively small territorial and population base, and a dysfunctional government** that is increasingly **unable to provide its people with basic public goods** (Lieven 201 1: 3—40; Bajoria 2009). **In the military realm, Pakistan possesses highly capable conventional and nuclear forces**. **These forces**, however, **are** mainly **defensive and seek to prevent India from leveraging** its superior **conventional military capabilities** to attack Pakistan." **In addition** to its strategic nuclear arsenal, **Pakistan is developing a battlefield nuclear capacity** consisting of small, short-range weapons **stationed close to the Indo-Pakistani border**. This will increase the likelihood of nuclear escalation in the event of any Indo- Pakistani conventional confrontation and may discourage India from undertaking aggressive military action against Pakistan (Khan 2011: 279; Basrur 2011). **There is little likelihood**, however, **even with the addition of** a **battlefield capability**, **that Pakistan will** be able to **use** its **nuclear weapons to** capture significant portions of Indian territory, to **erode India's nuclear second-strike capability, or** otherwise to **achieve** coercive **leverage over India**.

####  **No Indo-Pak war – nuclear deterrence**

**White 16**

(David White is a writer for Inter Press Service, citing Pakistan’s former president and army chief Pervez Musharraf, “Pakistan and India Unlikely to Move to All-out War: Musharraf,” December 3, 2016,<http://www.ipsnews.net/2016/12/pakistan-and-india-unlikely-to-move-to-all-out-war-musharraf/>)

High levels of both conventional and *nuclear deterrence* are likely to *prevent* the recent surge in *clashes between India and Pakistan from escalating* into all-out war, according to Pakistan’s former president and army chief Pervez Musharraf.

In an exclusive interview with IPS in London, Musharraf predicted that *low-intensity conflict would continue* in disputed border areas. But he *did not share the belief* of many Pakistanis that hostilities could *slide into full-scale war* between the two nuclear-armed countries.

“Any military commander knows the force levels being maintained by either side,” he said. “*I don’t think war is a possibility* because the lethality and accuracy of weapons has increased so much.”

Although Pakistan has reserved the right to make a nuclear first strike, he said it had sufficient controls to ensure that its nuclear weapons, including new short-range tactical missiles, *were not used accidentally or stolen* by terrorist groups. “They are in good hands, in secure hands.” he said.

## A2 China Joins IndoPak War

**War is terrible for china- they will push to de escalate**

Ben Westcott and Steven Jiang, Cnn, 2-28-2019, "Why China doesn't want a India-Pakistan conflict," CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/28/asia/pakistan-india-china-crisis-intl/index.html

Meanwhile, China's long-running trade war with the US has forced Beijing to look for alternative trading partners. As result, China has started to rebuild ties with rival rising power India and Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Last year Modi made two visits to China. Steve Tsang, director of the China Institute at SOAS University of London, said there was no benefit to China on any front if tensions between India and Pakistan spiraled."They have to do something to show that they are helping to keep things under control, while not appearing unreliable as Pakistan's ally," Tsang said. Turkey condemns China&#39;s &#39;torture and political brainwashing&#39; in Xinjiang Turkey condemns China's 'torture and political brainwashing' in Xinjiang But Beijing doesn't want to overplay its support of Pakistan and push India into the arms of US President Donald Trump. China experts said the country's best option was to join the US in working to defuse tensions between Pakistan and India. "China's message is clear to both sides: exercise restraint," she said. "China's interest lies in the stability of South Asia."

## A2 Nuclear Winter

1. **Nuclear winter is scientifically debatable, there is no climatological basis for it**

[Seitz 2011](https://www.nature.com/articles/475037b)

Alan Robock's contention that there has been no real scientific debate about the '**nuclear winter**' concept is itself debatable (Nature 473, 275–276; 2011). This potential climate disaster, popularized in Science in 1983, **rested on the output of a one-dimensional model that was later shown to overestimate the smoke a nuclear holocaust might engender**. More refined estimates, combined with **advanced three-dimensional models** (see http://go.nature.com/kss8te), h**ave dramatically reduced the extent and severity of the projected cooling.** Despite this, Carl Sagan, who co-authored the 1983 Science paper, went so far as to posit “the extinction of Homo sapiens” (C. Sagan Foreign Affairs 63, 75–77; 1984). Some regarded this apocalyptic prediction as an exercise in mythology. George Rathjens of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology protested: “**Nuclear winter is** the worst example of the **misrepresentation of science to the public** in my memory,” (see http://go.nature.com/yujz84) and climatologist Kerry Emanuel observed that the subject had “become notorious for its lack of scientific integrity” (Nature 319, 259; 1986). **Robock's single-digit fall in temperature** is at odds with the subzero (about −25 °C) continental cooling originally projected for a wide spectrum of nuclear wars. Whereas Sagan predicted darkness at noon from a US–Soviet nuclear conflict, Robock projects global sunlight that is several orders of magnitude brighter**for a Pakistan–India conflict** — literally the difference between night and day. Since 1983, the projected worst-case cooling has fallen from a Siberian deep freeze spanning 11,000 degree-days Celsius (a measure of the severity of winters) to numbers **[is] so** unseasonably **small as to call the very term 'nuclear winter' into question.**

## A2 Miscalc

#### **Miscalculation is a myth – all conflict is rationally decided & miscalculations don’t escalate**

[**Stashwick 15** The Diplomat](http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-china-sea-conflict-escalation-and-miscalculation-myths/)

The threat of “miscalculation” is again in vogue. What was once a preoccupation of accidental war theorists has resurfaced in discussions about maritime disputes in Southeast Asia and Sino-U.S. relations. During the Cold War, policymakers and scholars worried about nuclear annihilation sparked by misinterpreted warnings, rogue officers, technical glitches in command and control systems, or a lower-level confrontation spiraling out of control. Absent the Cold War’s looming nuclear threat, today’s oft-repeated concerns focus on “miscalculation” causing a local or tactical-level incident between individual ships or aircraft (harassment, collision, interdiction, and so on) to lead to broader military confrontation. Some variation of this theme has been featured in public remarks by former U.S. Defense Secretaries Gates, Panetta, Hagel, and current Defense Secretary Carter, as well as Commanders of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and the U.S. Pacific Command, and was a topic of policymaker discussion going back at least to the 1996 Taiwan Strait incident. These concerns are likewise found in too many op-eds, reports, interviews, commentaries, and articles to count (see also here, here, here, and here, etc.) However, while history shows that strategic miscalculations can lead states to war, or dangerously close to it, **evidence does not support the worry that miscalculation may cause a local or tactical-level incident to spiral out of control**. To understand the risks associated with miscalculation, we must distinguish between miscalculation at the strategic level and miscalculation stemming from a localized incident between naval or air forces. **At the strategic level** – that is, a nation’s a priori willingness to escalate a conflict and use military force to achieve its objectives – **no country starts a war expecting to los**e. Yet, “most wars…end in the defeat of at least one nation which had expected victory,” implying all wars result from some degree of strategic miscalculation. That may be a plausible danger in Southeast Asia, but a distinct one. Instead, much of the discourse about localized maritime incidents in the South China Sea conflates strategic and local miscalculation risks, focusing on the latter’s potential to lead to a wider conflict. This concern over local miscalculation nonetheless reflects a longstanding view of the danger “incidents at sea” poses to peace stretching back to the Cold War. Both U.S. and Soviet leaderships were concerned that an incident between “peppery young ship captains” could “lead people to shoot at each other with results that might…be impossible to control,” in the words of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations in the 1970s. Back then, the U.S. and Soviets were openly adversarial and serious incidents between their ships and aircraft were almost commonplace. Yet d**espite explicit mutual, strategic, and existential antagonism between the U.S. and U.S.SR, none of the hundreds of maritime incidents that occurred over the four decades of the Cold War escalated into anything beyond a short diplomatic crisis**. It is possible that they avoided a nuclear spiral in these incidents through diligent diplomacy and luck. But more likely, **it suggests that this type of maritime incident is insufficient on its own to lead to the worst-case scenarios envisioned. Mitigating the miscalculation concerns** of officials and the extreme scenarios of some commentators **is that these maritime incidents do not occur in a vacuum, de-coupled from explicit national interests. In a famous 1988 Cold War incident**, Soviet vessels in the Black Sea shouldered the U.S. warships Yorktown and Caron (a controlled collision meant to push a ship off-course) while the latter were deliberately contesting what the U.S. deemed excessive Soviet legal claims over maritime rights. The Soviets knew the U.S. vessels were there to intentionally flout their claims, and the U.S. knew the Soviets would likely try to enforce them. Even if the firmness of the Soviet response was unanticipated (or deemed unlikely), there was no mystery to either side’s objectives. Thus, neither side was going to start shooting in confusion; the Soviet vessels even radioed their intention to strike the U.S. ships. While not “safe” in the strictest sense (ships do not like to “swap paint” with each other), footage from the Yorktown and Caron being pushed shows the actions to be intense but deliberate, professionally executed, and clearly of an enforcement nature, rather than a prelude to combat. **While a serious diplomatic incident, both sides understood the situation, which served to moderate concern over escalation.** Similarly**, a shouldering incident between the U.S. cruiser Cowpens and a Chinese warship** in 2013, while concerning to the U.S. from a safety-at-sea perspective, **was understood to be motivated by Chinese sensitivities around testing their new aircraft carrier, not a precursor to hostilities.** Nonetheless, concerns over maritime incidents, miscalculation, and spiraling conflict contain enough intuitive logic to have endured. A shared Cold War concern over miscalculations led to accords that are still in effect, such as the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas (INCSEA) and Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (DMA) agreement, and may be credited with helping keep incidents between the U.S. and U.S.SR under “control.” However, the fact that agreements were reached at all is likely more significant than their content. Such agreements indicated a shared belief between U.S. and Soviet military leaderships that despite their feverish preparations for war against one another, neither wanted war to come as the result of a tactical-level incident between individual ships and aircraft. This suggests neither would let an incident, however serious, become an independent casus belli. The substance of these accords (and those reached in the South China Sea) further strengthens this thesis. While INCSEA and DMA contained rules of behavior, these were, again in Zumwalt’s words, “little more than a reaffirmation of the [maritime] Rules of the Road” (international rules that direct how ships stay safe around each other at sea). What was groundbreaking was that in concluding the accords, the U.S. and U.S.SR implicitly recognized their intentions to violate those rules and practices when advantageous (consider the Yorktown and Caron). The accords created new parallel rules by which each could do so “safely,” as well as new communications protocols to inform one another of their intentions. Together, this affirms that both sides were playing a (serious) game to establish positions and assert rights more than they were interested in war. Of course, incidents intended to reinforce maritime claims and hostile actions can look the same right up until ordnance is exchanged, but now both sides could be more confident that if shooting did start, it was an intentional act of war. Precedent for Restraint **In Asia, there is recent and dramatic precedent for restraint, even after an unambiguously hostile local event, which belies theoretical arguments about the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation. When the South Korean warship Cheonan was sunk in 2010, South Korea determined that North Korea was responsible.** Far from a mere ‘incident’ of the sort worried over in the South China Sea, this was a belligerent act against South Korea’s armed forces. And yet, there was no miscalculation-fueled conflict spiral, and instead a strategically calibrated response. It remains unknown whether the sinking of the Cheonan was ordered by the North Koreans (they continue to deny any responsibility), the act of a renegade, or, perhaps least plausibly, an accident. What is clear is that **despite a sunken ship and 46 sailors killed, the incident did not spiral out of control.** This suggests that South Korea’s political calculus did not view militarily punishing North Korea worth the risk of a renewed – and potentially nuclear – war, which is to say that an extraordinary but tactical-level event did not trump strategic preferences. Even so, some take the miscalculation-escalation dynamic so far as to suggest that incidents between fishing vessels and coast guards in the South China Sea might lead to war. In view of the Cold War record and the recent Cheonan example, such propositions are drastically overstated. It is conceivable that a state already resolved to escalate a dispute militarily might view a local maritime incident as a convenient casus belli. But in that emphatically calculated case, no institutional impediments to such incidents would prevent the hostility. On the contrary, the prevalence of coast guards and fishing vessels is actually a sign of restraint. For a front so often considered a “flashpoint,” it is notable how few incidents in the South China Sea are between naval assets. This is not accident or luck, but instead suggests that regional players deliberately use lightly armed coast guard and other para-military “white hull” vessels to enforce their claims. Because these units do not have the ability to escalate force the way warships do, it in fact signals their desire to avoid escalation. And while “gray hull” naval vessels may be just over the horizon providing an implicit threat of force, they can also provide a further constraint on potential incidents; their very presence compels parties to consider how far to escalate without inviting more serious responses. As in the Cold War, parties in the South China Sea have sought diplomatic mitigation of maritime incidents, principally through the perennially-stalled Code of Conduct, the year-old Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), and the bilateral Military Maritime Consultative Agreement between the U.S. and China. But underpinning concerns about miscalculation and escalation­, and mitigation efforts like CUES, is the idea that by avoiding incidents the region will avoid war. This belief is dangerous insofar as it conflates the symptoms of the disputes (incidents at sea) with the terms of the dispute itself (maritime rights and sovereignty). Incidents and the activities that precipitate them help establish new and accepted regional norms and “facts on the ground” (bloodlessly, if inelegantly). In that sense, avoiding incidents sets back the de facto resolution of the disputes. Since the balance of these evolving norms and facts on the ground appears to favor China’s efforts (e.g., using its coast guard to eject fishing vessels from disputed waters and island reclamation projects), it is neither surprising that China’s regional rivals propose institutional remedies like CUES and the Code of Conduct, nor that China only agrees to them after negotiating away any legally binding provisions. **The record suggests that miscalculation concerns over incidents in the maritime realm are exaggerated** and can artificially increase tensions, raise threat perceptions, and justify arms build-ups. **Whether an incident is deliberate, or a true organic accident, if it occurs within a dispute context where neither side desires armed conflict, it will not escalate at the strategic level.**However, because of the very seriousness of that perceived escalation threat, the miscalculation narrative can also motivate positive diplomatic efforts like INCSEA, DMA, and now CUES (not to overstate their realistic contribution to resolving disputes). Further, for all its conceptual and historical problems, and not least its potential to feed narratives of aggression, another possible advantage of focusing on “miscalculation” in the South China Sea is that it allows countries to maintain ambiguity about the real terms of dispute. Avoiding war is a distinct objective from “solving” disputes; war is a dispute resolution mechanism after all. But if peace is the priority, ambiguity may be preferable if all that clarity reveals is just how intractable those disputes may be. Clarity can rob governments of the flexibility to equivocate to their domestic audiences (and competitors) and force a choice between escalating a conflict and backing down from their claims. Then open conflict might become more realistic. Conversely**, if all parties are more or less content to live with ambiguity in the region’s maritime claims, then a somewhat mutually dissatisfying peace prevails, but peace nonetheless. Everyone wants to win, but as long as everyone also wants to avoid losing even more, occasional incidents do not have to fuel strategic tension.**

## A2 No Nuclear War

1. **BMDs kill deterrence**

[Anjum 2016](http://sci-hub.tw/https%3A//www.researchgate.net/publication/295899619_Implications_of_Indian_Ballistic_Missile_Defence_BMD_on_Strategic_Stability)

Pakistan’s security interests are inseparably tangled with India’s Military posture32. The 10 year agreement signed on 28 June 2005, between India and US, called New Framework of US-India Relations (NFDR), visualizes joint weapons production, cooperation on ballistic missile defence (BMD), and lifting of US export controls for sensitive military and civilian nuclear technologies. The most critical element is cooperation in field of BMD, India’s acquisition of BMD would strike at the heart of the theory of ‘nuclear deterrence in South Asia’33. Indian and Pakistani authors mainly agree on the impact of BMD in South Asia. Raja Menon says “An Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) acquisition will immediately push up the launch vehicles on the other side, and encourage the development and manufacture of MIRVs (Multiple independently targeted vehicles) and decoys. An ABM is assured encouragement to an arms race and to the expenditure of major sums of money for what might be a dubious return”34. **Possession of BMD** will **upset[s] “the delicate balance of power and undermine[s] Pakistan's security”**35. It is not the fully developed shield but even some of its components when operational, have implications for Indo-Pak stability36. **Psychologically, Indian missiles defence will create a sense of vulnerability for Pakistan, at the same time reducing** or minimising the **Indian vulnerability, thus reducing deterrence in the region**. The BMD defences create doubts in the mind of adversary regarding the deterrent value of existing nuclear arsenal.

1. **BMDs inherently incentivize nuclear first strike**

[Anjum 2016](http://sci-hub.tw/https%3A//www.researchgate.net/publication/295899619_Implications_of_Indian_Ballistic_Missile_Defence_BMD_on_Strategic_Stability)

At the conceptual level ballistic missile defence works on the basis of deterrence by denial and not on deterrence by punishment. **Deterrence** by denial **is a highly uncertain proposition when the opposing side has nuclear weapons**30. **The ballistic defence system cannot guarantee** the **interception** of incoming missiles therefore **[however] the system is workable in support of [an] offensive [first] strike**. With Indian acquiring BMD systems, Precision Guided munitions and reconnaissance capability through satellite, providing better coverage of Pakistan’s military installations, the possibility of counter-force first strike cannot be ruled out, especially when Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is small and its delivery systems are located in known sites31. **When the** counter force **[first] strike would have destroyed enemy missiles and few would be able to survive, it would be possible to deal with surviving missiles with BMD system**. The above scenario would be counter to Indian nuclear doctrine or first strike strategy would be adopted by India.

1. **BMDs decrease stability during crisis, increases chances of miscalc**

[Anjum 2016](http://sci-hub.tw/https%3A//www.researchgate.net/publication/295899619_Implications_of_Indian_Ballistic_Missile_Defence_BMD_on_Strategic_Stability)

In crisis situation stability between two nuclear weapons states would be prone to be the precarious. Crisis stability is an incentive not to strike or escalate the nuclear ladder preemptively in a crisis. **When the incentives to strike first are low**, crisis stability is considered high and vice versa43. It implies that **stability remains robust during crisis** i.e. during periods in which unexpected threats to core interests materialize in a form closest to eruption of violence44. **Crisis stability is expected to decrease with the** induction and **deployment of BMD in the region**. After the withdrawal of US from the ABM Treaty in 2002, Russia tested and deployed new missiles and improved her networking systems to counter American defensive shield45. Induction of **Indian ballistic missile [defence]** system in the region **is a security dilemma for Islamabad**. Pakistan is likely to take necessary steps to penetrate the defensive shield, which may include enhancing her existing nuclear arsenal and launchers or improving her existing single warhead into multiple warheads or launchers with multiple tubes for simultaneous firing. **Indian BMD may compel Pakistan to alter her nuclear posture** from pre-deployed stage **to** deploy or **‘hair-trigger’**46 **stage. The deployment has an inbuilt destabilizing influence, as it might require delegation of authority at various** command **levels.**

1. **The brink is much lower than they say it is- just one Pakistani tactical nuke could cause all-out nuclear war**

[Keck 2019](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/billions-dead-thats-what-could-happen-if-india-and-pakistan-wage-nuclear-war-44682)

**With nuclear weapons introduced, Delhi’s no-first-use doctrine no longer applies. Indian leaders,** knowing they’d **face incredible domestic pressure to respond**, would also have no guarantee that Pakistani leaders didn’t intend to follow the tactical use of nuclear weapons with strategic strikes against Indian cities. Armed with what they believe is reasonable intelligence about the locations of Pakistan’s strategic forces, highly accurate missiles and MIRVs to target them, and a missile defense that has a shot at cleaning up any Pakistani missiles that survived the first strike, **Indian leaders might** be tempted to **launch a counterforce first strike**. As former Indian National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon wrote in his memoirs (which Narang first drew people’s attention to at the Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference in March): “India would hardly risk giving Pakistan the chance to carry out a massive nuclear strike after the Indian response to Pakistan using tactical nuclear weapons. In other words, **Pakistani tactical nuclear weapon use would effectively free India to undertake a comprehensive** first **strike against Pakistan**.”

1. **The impact is too high magnitude to risk, ignore the probability weighing because even a small chance of impact triggering means billions dead**

[Roblin 2019](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/india-building-deadly-force-nuclear-missile-submarines-42532)

Does this make the world a more dangerous place? **India, China and Pakistan between them have a population of 2.92 billion people**—nearly 39 percent of all human beings on the planet. **A nuclear conflict could easily claim** tens, or **hundreds of millions of lives.**

1. **Nuclear war leads to nuclear famine- risk of existential threat should outweigh any of their impacts**

**Nuclear war triggers global famine**

[Mills 2014](https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/2013EF000205)

We present the first study of the global impacts of a regional nuclear war with an Earth system model including atmospheric chemistry, ocean dynamics, and interactive sea ice and land components. **A limited, regional nuclear war between India and Pakistan** in which each side detonates 50 15 kt weapons **could produce about 5**Tg **[trillion grams] of black carbon** (BC). **This would** self‐loft to the stratosphere, where it **would spread globally, producing a sudden drop in surface temperatures** and intense heating of the stratosphere. Using the Community Earth System Model with the Whole Atmosphere Community Climate Model, we calculate an *e*‐folding time of 8.7 years for stratospheric BC compared to 4–6.5 years for previous studies. Our **calculations show** that**global ozone losses of 20%–50% over populated areas**, levels unprecedented in human history, would accompany **the coldest average surface temperatures in the last 1000 years.** We calculate summer enhancements in UV indices of 30%–80% over midlatitudes, suggesting widespread damage to human health, agriculture, and terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems. Killing frosts would reduce growing seasons by 10–40 days per year for 5 years. Surface temperatures would be reduced for more than 25 years due to thermal inertia and albedo effects in the ocean and expanded sea ice. The **combined cooling and enhanced UV would put significant pressures on global food supplies and could trigger a global nuclear famine**. Knowledge of the impacts of 100 small nuclear weapons should motivate the elimination of more than 17,000 nuclear weapons that exist today.

1. **India’s nuclear sub force is incompetent- increased chance of miscalc**

[Keller 2018](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-just-one-simple-human-error-almost-destroyed-missile-24026)

The Hindu reported yesterday that **the [Indian Missile Sub] Arihant has been out of commission since suffering “major damage”** some 10 months ago, **due to** what a navy source characterized as a **“human error”** — to wit: allowing water to flood to sub’s propulsion compartment after failing to secure one of the vessel’s external hatches.

Water “rushed in as **a hatch on the rear side was left open by mistake [allowing water to rush in]** while [the Arihant] was at harbor” in February 2017, shortly after the submarine’s launch, The Hindu reports. Since then, the sub “has been undergoing repairs and clean up,” according to the paper: “Besides other repair work, many pipes had to be cut open and replaced.”

**Analysis- If India’s sub force isn’t even capable of keeping the hatches closed, how are they supposed to handle a possible nuclear war?**

1. **India’s nuclear subs shorten the chain of command, increases chance of miscalc by a low-level officer**

[Prakash 2018](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/view-one-ins-arihant-does-not-make-for-a-credible-nuclear-deterrence/articleshow/67190229.cms?from=mdr)

Secondly, as a measure of prudence, **India's** (and perhaps Pakistan's) **policy has**, so far,**kept nuclear warheads** separate from delivery vehicles, **in a "de-mated" state. The final assembly is undertaken by scientists** of the Departments of Defence Research (DRDO) and Atomic Energy (DAE) and the completed weapon handed over to the military **just prior to launch**.

However, INS Arihant and her sisters **[Indian subs] will carry their missiles in sealed containers, with pre-mated warheads.** **Scientists having been eliminated from the chain,** **custody and control of weapons will now devolve on the submarine's captain**. No doubt a "fail-safe" electronic permissive action links (PAL) must be in place, to prevent accidental launch and ensure instant compliance with an authorised launch command.

1. **The recent India-Pakistan border crisis underlines the danger of miscalc**

[Miglani 2019](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-crisis-insight/india-pakistan-threatened-to-unleash-missiles-at-each-other-sources-idUSKCN1QY03T)

**Diplomatic experts said that the latest crisis underlined the chances of misread signals and unpredictability [between Indian and Pakistan]** in the ties between the nuclear-armed rivals, and the huge dangers. It still was not clear whether India had targeted a militant camp in Pakistan and whether there were any casualties, they said “**Indian and Pakistani leaders have long evinced confidence that they can understand each other’s** deterrence **signals and can de-escalate at will**,” said Joshua White, a former White House official who is now at Johns Hopkins. “The fact that some of the most basic facts, intentions and attempted strategic signals of **this crisis** are still shrouded in mystery ... **should be a** sobering **reminder that neither country is in a position to** easily **control a crisis once it begins.**”.

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1. **Even if you don’t buy nuclear winter there are still first-order casualties from the nukes themselves**

[**Roblin 2019**](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-so-called-limited-nuclear-war-between-india-and-pakistan-would-devastate-planet-46532)

The Little Boy bomb alone killed around 100,000 Japanese—between 30 to 40 percent of Hiroshima’s population—and destroyed 69 percent of the buildings in the city. But **Pakistan and India host some of the most populous and densely populated cities on the planet, with population densities** of Calcutta, Karachi and Mumbai at or **exceeding 65,000 people per square mile. Thus, even low-yield bombs could cause tremendous casualties. A 2014 study estimates that the immediate effects of the bombs**—the fireball, over-pressure wave, radiation burns etc.—**would kill twenty million people**. An earlier study estimated a hundred 15-kiloton nuclear detonations could kill twenty-six million in India and eighteen million in Pakistan—and concluded that escalating to using 100-kiloton warheads, which have greater blast radius and overpressure waves that can shatter hardened structures, would multiply death tolls four-fold.

## A2 No Nuclear Terrorism

1. **Complacency is the enemy - dismissing nuclear terrorism as impossible only increases the threat of it happening**

[Mowatt-Larssen 2009](https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/preventing-nuclear-terrorism-securing-pakistani-nuclear-weapons)

**Denying terrorists a nuclear capability is particularly important in Pakistan's** rough **neighborhood**. Fundamentally, terrorists have three pathways to a nuclear bomb: they can steal a bomb; attack a facility; or steal enough material to build a bomb. The first groups known to possess nuclear intent were the Japanese doomsday cult group Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda. Both groups began actively seeking the capability to produce a mushroom cloud in the early 1990's -- before the world was watching. Al Qaeda's intent remains firm to this day. Fortunately, terrorists appear thus far to have failed in their efforts to acquire a nuclear bomb. Indeed, it is very difficult for any group to achieve a nuclear capability -- but it is not impossible. **Our biggest adversary is complacency.** Time favors terrorist intent -- **if the world does not maintain constant vigilance and take the threat seriously, we will fail.** Terrorists can wait patiently for opportunity to knock -- in the form of a fatal breakdown in nuclear security somewhere in the world that enables them to acquire a bomb, or sufficient materials to build a bomb. **The nuclear terrorism threat is not theoretical -- it is real. Over the past fifteen years, there have been nineteen publicized seizures of weapons usable nuclear materials globally**. These seizures were serendipitous. The materials were not reported missing from their facility of origin. Historically, there has been a notable lack of resolve -- in Pakistan and elsewhere -- in dealing firmly with insiders and smugglers in nuclear weapons-related capabilities. The widespread lack of stiff penalties emboldens terrorists and fails to deter those who are willing to aid and abet a nuclear terrorism plot.

1. **Margin for error on nuclear terrorism is incredibly low - err on the side of caution**

[Mowatt-Larssen 2009](https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/preventing-nuclear-terrorism-securing-pakistani-nuclear-weapons)

**The problem is not the quality of** Pakistan's **nuclear security efforts. The problem is that the standard for success is so unforgiving**. In a world in which terrorists are actively seeking weapons of mass destruction, there can be no breakdown in security that enables terrorists to obtain a nuclear bomb. The challenge is daunting: **states must be successful every time in denying terrorists a nuclear capability; terrorists only have to succeed once**. And as an added incentive to be on our toes, we must always bear in mind that there is no such thing as perfect security.

1. **Nuclear terror is low probability right now but we have to keep it that way**

[Hellman 2008](http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)

The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. **A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe of immense proportions: “A 10-kiloton bomb** detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day **would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage**. America and its way of life would be changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an attack is also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, “We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... **A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can’t live in a world where it’s anything but extremely low-probability**.” [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the “probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years,” with 79 percent of the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than by a government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because **[nuclear] terrorism is one of the** potential **trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war**, the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce which- ever risk(s) warrant attention.

## A2: Nuclear Terrorism

1. **Pakistan wouldn’t arm nuclear terrorists for two reasons: ease of identification, and lack of control**

[Wilson Quarterly 2013](http://archive.wilsonquarterly.com/in-essence/whos-afraid-nuclear-terrorism)

**Any leader plotting an attack on the United States would worry** first **about whether an accomplice terrorist group could be identified**. Using a database of more than 18,000 terrorist attacks worldwide between 1998 and 2008, Lieber and Press ran the numbers to see how often**perpetrators were identified**. Offenders were named in about 75 percent of all attacks worldwide that caused more than 100 fatalities. The record was even better—**[in] 97 percent**—when analysis was limited to **[of terrorist] attacks that occurred on the soil of the United States** and its allies, and incidents that killed 10 or more people were included. Doomsayers might argue that a nuclear blast would be different, since it would wipe out so much of the evidence. But it’s also true that “the victim would use every resource at its disposal—money, threats, and force—to rapidly identify the source of the attack.” And the international community would rush to provide assistance, including adversaries anxious to clear their names from the suspect list, as Iran and Pakistan did when they helped the United States gather intelligence after 9/11. **Once the terrorists were identified, finding the accomplice regime would be child’s play,**Lieber and Press conclude. The universe of malevolent countries armed with nukes is very small. **Of the six states that sponsor terrorist groups, only Pakistan currently has nuclear capabilities**, and only Iran plausibly could soon. **There’s a more fundamental problem**with the sponsorship plan—**a regime would be handing immense power to people it couldn’t control**. Only a terror group that “had repeatedly demonstrated its reliability, competence, and ability to maintain secrecy” could be considered for the job. Even then, **the regime would have to accept the** disturbing **possibility that the terrorists would divulge the origin of the weapons or even pick a different target.**

1. **No motivation or capabilities for nuclear terror**

**Mueller 11/1**

John Mueller, Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist at Ohio State University and a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, “Nuclear Weapons Don’t Matter But Nuclear Hysteria Does,” Foreign Affairs. November/December 2018.

As for nuclear terrorism, ever since al Qaeda operatives used box cutters so effectively to hijack commercial airplanes, alarmists have warned that radical Islamist terrorists would soon apply equal talents in science and engineering to make and deliver nuclear weapons so as to destroy various so-called infidels. In practice, however, *terrorist groups have exhibited only a limited desire to go nuclear and even less progress in doing so*. Why? Probably because developing one’s own bomb from scratch requires *a series of risky actions*, all of which have to go right for the scheme to work. This includes *trusting foreign collaborators* and other criminals; *acquiring* and *transporting* highly guarded fissile material; establishing a sophisticated, professional machine shop; and moving a cumbersome, untested weapon into position for detonation. And all *of this has to be done while hiding* from a vast global surveillance net looking for and trying to disrupt such activities.

Terrorists are unlikely to get a bomb from a generous, like-minded nuclear patron, because *no country wants to run the risk* of being blamed (and punished) for a terrorist’s nuclear crimes. *Nor are they likely to be able to steal one*. Notes Stephen Younger, the former head of nuclear weapons research and development at Los Alamos National Laboratory: “All nuclear nations take the security of their weapons very seriously.”

The grand mistake of the Cold War was to infer *desperate intent from apparent capacity*. For the war on terrorism, it has been to *infer desperate capacity from apparent intent*.

2. The risk of nuclear terror is one in 3 billion

Mueller 10 (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html)

the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to *one in* well over *three billion*. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “*loose nuke*“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that *none exist*.

## A2: Other countries would join with India

1. China will always block Japan

[Harris 2014](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-japan-will-never-be-permanent-member-the-un-security-11014) (DS)

For years, Japan has proceeded cautiously and relatively successfully when it comes to pressing its case for reform of the UNSC. Tokyo has the support of many nations large and small, and has made common cause with both Brazil and India (and Russia, for that matter)—China’s supposed allies in the BRICS bloc. But Japan’s efforts never will be enough.  **There is only one vote that matters when it comes to determining Japan’s future as a prospective permanent member of the Security Council and it is to be found in Beijing**, not anywhere in Latin America. **Another round of non-permanent membership is thus the best that any number of Abe’s diplomatic offensives can buy.**

1. India way more likely than other countries such as Brazil and Japan.

[Pillalamarri (The Diplomat) 2015](https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-should-back-india-for-a-permanent-un-security-council-seat/) (DS)

**India’s bid in particular is strong as it only faces significant opposition from Pakistan** and some misgivings on the part of China**. Brazil, on the other hand, faces opposition from other Latin American countries like Mexico and Argentina. Japan, in particular, has faced the opposition of its neighbors including China and both the Koreas. It is highly** [**unlikely**](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-japan-will-never-be-permanent-member-the-un-security-11014) **that Japan will join the Security Council as a permanent member anytime soon due to China’s ability to veto such a proposal.** Furthermore, as the recent Japanese hostage debacle in Syria has demonstrated, Japan is simply not ready to wield the diplomatic and military clout that comes with being a permanent member of the Security Council.

1. sdfsdf

## A2: Cyberterror

####  **3. No impact to cyber-terror --- countermeasures, system patches, deterrence, and deferral.**

**Chuipka 17**—Junior Policy Officer at Transport Canada (the Canadian equivalent of an Assistant Secretary at the US Dept. of Transportation) and a MA in Public and International Affairs from the University of Ottawa [Adam, “The Strategies of Cyberterrorism: Is Cyberterrorism an effective means to Achieving the Goals of Terrorists?” 11 Jan, https://www.ruor.uottawa.ca/handle/10393/35695]

These cases illustrate that the threat from cyberterrorism is real but can be *vastly overstated*. Most of the damage or disruption caused by the cyber-attack was *quickly undone*, therefore the *potential* threat could be considerable but the *actual threat* is *significantly lower*. While *attrition* has proven to be the only likely strategy that cyberterrorists could pursue, its overall effectiveness is *unconvincing* and *counterterrorism measures* could make it *even less effective*. First, cyberterrorism attacks are *unlikely* to be repeated as the vulnerabilities from that specific attack are *patched* up, making future threats of cyberterrorism less credible. Second, if a terrorist attempts to threaten cyberterrorism, governments can immediately *search for vulnerabilities* and patch them, essentially making the attack fail – this may be easier said than done in most cases though warning always provides the chance to gain an advantage. In some cases you can *simply go offline* since an established connection is required for cyberterrorism to ultimately work. Third, Cyberterrorism is only possible because of vulnerabilities, by *hardening systems* and *patching vulnerabilities* – the chances of cyberterrorism occurring is *decreased*. This is one of the ongoing efforts by governments around the world. Fourth, it is also critical that governments are constantly *removing zero day vulnerabilities* from the market to prevent terrorists from obtaining them – they are key in a successful surprise cyber-attack. Fifth, if worst comes to worst and a cyber-attack has proven successful, one of the most effective strategies against cyber-terrorism is *simply deny*ing that the event was caused by terrorism. Regardless of a terrorist organizations claim, if the cyber-attack is *downplayed* by governments as *just a “glitch”* in the system, it can *take away* the desired impact of terrorists and *deter* future attempts at cyberterrorism.

Even if a terrorist successfully conducted a cyber-attack and claimed to be the perpetrators, cyberattacks have yet to demonstrate they can actually cause terror – an essential element for a terrorist attack to be considered a success. Given that high-level cyber-attacks capable of being violent *requires* *vast resources*, *intelligence*, *skill*, and *time* – ultimately *too much can go wrong* in conducting a cyber-attack and the *costs-benefit analysis* weighs heavily towards terrorist use of kinetic weapons for the time being.

## A2: Structural Violence

1. **War turns structural violence**

[Goldstein 2001](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam031/2001277554.pdf)

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, "if you want peace, work for justice". Then if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. **War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender,** innate aggression**, or any** other **single cause,** although all of these influences wars' outbreaks and outcomes. **Rather, war has** in part fueled and **sustained these and other injustices.** So, "if you want peace, work for peace." Indeed, **if you want justice** (gener and others), **work for peace.** Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes toward war and the military may be the most important way to "reverse women's oppression" The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book's evidence, **the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.**

1. **Turn: addressing existential threats erases divisions and social fragmentation (which turns structural violence, discrimination, etc.) and addresses root causes of social injustice**

[Cerutti 2015](http://sci-hub.tw/https%3A//onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8675.12120)

Not in the sense that we can do as well do so by acting on egoistic grounds: were this the¶ main reason to take action, we were justified to limit our effort to the less costly adaptation policies instead of funding the restructuring of the economy necessary for mitigation, the only way-out from global warming for generations of the far future. To be true, addressing the limitation of global warming or the neutralization of nuclear weapons requires wide-ranging undertakings that can be justified only on grounds of a moral attitude towards future generations rather than of our enlight- ened self-interest. But **doing what we can for the survival of humankind can give ourselves reassurance that our individual life** (also seen in the context of our gen- eration’s) **is meaningful** beyond the limits of our own existence on earth, **because doing so helps us shed our isolation as single individuals or single generation and become partners in a wider** transgenerational covenant of **solidarity**.¶ 3. That the interest to live and to raise children in de- cent conditions we attribute to future generations ought to be translated into a right is not self-evident. It is not simply that we should abstain from transforming every reasonable claim into a right, and instead reserve this category for the essentials that make the associated life of individuals in the polity possible and acceptable ac- cording to each evolutionary stage.11 **More importantly, doubts may also arise as to whether it is wise to translate any goal of social and political struggles into a right**, that is to “juridify” it **instead of focusing on the underlying conflict dynamics and the participation of the conflicting parties**.

1. **Extinction util outweighs any morality fw the other side brings**

[Cerutti 2015](http://sci-hub.tw/https%3A//onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8675.12120)

This article’s main thesis1 is that, **given the existence of** at least two global threats, **nuclear weapons** and climate change, **which endanger the life of humankind as a** civ- ilized **species, its right to survive should be asserted as its first** human or rather **fundamental right.**

...

**Humanity’s right to survival is** a meta-right rather than being the first right and sharing the same founda- tion with the others.18 Therefore, its foundation is for- mal rather than rooted in a substantive view of what is human: acknowledging this right is **the pre-condition for making all other rights possible**. It is their Bedingung der Mo ̈glichkeit, to put it as Kant might have done. Not only in the trivial but sturdy physical sense that **human rights can only apply to a living humankind,** but **not to** a ”republic of **insects and grass”** (Jonathan Schell on the state of the earth after a large nuclear war19). **T**he meta-right as a pre-condition has rather to be un- derstood in the moral sense: **no foundation of morality** or legality (except in a totally positivistic view of the latter) **makes sense if it cannot** rely on the **respect** of **the fundamental rights of those** (poor populations al- ready affected by global warming, **future generations as victims of nuclear war** or extreme climate change) **harmed by our acts and omissions**. Here I mean morality at large, regardless of its being based on a conception of the right or the good. In other words, the two global challenges, which have received so little attention in the mainstream philosophy of the last decades, have indeed philosophical implications capable of undermining the business-as-usual attitude in moral and political theory;

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Mk | Please do stuff |
| Daniel | Please do stuff |
| Jackie | Please do stuff |
| Jennifer | Please do stuff |
| Donovan | Please do stuff |
| Yizhen | Please don’t do stuff |
| Noah | Please do stuff no |
| Viswa | Please do stuff |
| Brandon | Please do stuff |
| Nihar | Please do stuff |

Pro

- UNSC Collapse

 - Increased legitimacy

 - Expansion of permanent/non-permanent member states/reform

 - India’s role as a mediator b/w developed & developing countries

 - Peacekeeper reform/more effective peacekeeping

- Countering China

 - democratic alternative to Chinese authoritarianism (see Maldives, Nepal, etc.)

 - More FDI/access to economic benefits to counter OBOR

 - stops Chinese Lawfare tactics (??)

 - India doesn’t feel the need to adopt cautious fopo over fear of Chinese UNSC power

- Politics

 - Modi loses elections w/o UNSC seat; Modi good

- FDI & FA

 - US sends India more FA to sway its UNSC vote

 - India gets more influence over IMF/World Bank

 -

Con

- Indo-Pakistani War

 - prevent UN intervention to stop Kashmir violence

 - stall Chinese intervention on behalf of Pakistan

 - allows India to use military force w/o fear of retaliation

 - perception of Indian power forces Pakistani retaliation

- Indo-Chinese Conflict/Chinese retaliation

 - perception of Indian power forces Chinese retaliation

 - China needs to use force to enforce their regional goals (as opposed to relying on UNSC veto/power)

- Politics

 - Modi loses elections w/o UNSC seat; Modi bad (Indian nationalism)

- UNSC Collapse

 - Disrupts the trajectory of reform

 - India loses the incentive to reform things like the veto now that they have the power to veto; veto bad

- India vetoes humanitarian aid attempts (see Syria and Libya)

- UNSC possibility acts as leverage, incentivizes India to do things like funding, troops, hum aid, etc.

- Impact turns

 - Foreign Aid Bad

 - Peacekeepers Bad

 - OBOR Good

 - Chinese Hegemony Good