# Milly North Neg Cut Cards Case

## Our Sole Contention is Asian Geopolitics

### Indian membership on the Security Council unravels the current power dynamic in 2 ways.

### Subpoint A- is Kashmir

#### [Rajan ‘5 of Michigan State] The international community pressures India to assume responsibility over global security by resolving their own disputes, like that in Kashmir. In order to improve its international reputation and hoping to achieve great power status, India complies.

Sheila Rajan,4-15-2005, No Publication, http://www.law.msu.edu/king/2005/2005\_Rajan.pdf, //CJ

If a mediation process is proposed that addresses India’s concerns, it may be willing to accept third-party facilitation and meet the limitations of the Simla Agreement. India’s concern over impartial mediation by an official government representative is not entirely without merit. Bercovitch argues that “[w]hether we are studying ethnic, internal or international conflict, we should resist the tendency to think of mediation as a totally exogenous input, as a unique role and a distinct humanitarian response to conflict in which a well-meaning actor, motivated by altruism, is keen to resolve a conflict.”96 Furthermore, “[m]ediators are political actors; they engage in mediation and expend resources because they expect to resolve a conflict and gain something from it.”97 This impartiality may be neutralized or diffused by employing a consortium of influential countries or diplomats, chosen by both parties, to collaboratively mediate the dispute. A country or countries with a strong influential relationship with one party or the other could contribute a behind-the-scenes role, without a direct presence in the mediation team.98 SAARC may also be a possible outside influence on mediation efforts. Although the SAARC framework does not lend itself to “any discussion of bilateral or contentious issues,” the organization may be instrumental in establishing a cooperative network.**Another vital component in re-engaging India in facilitated discussions is international pressure through UN initiatives and diplomatic influence by independent nations. The international community should remind India that if it would like to be recognized as a global player, then it must assume a greater responsibility in maintaining international security. The first step to this end, is to make good-faith efforts toward resolving contentious issues within its own backyard. India has a strong interest in maintaining and expanding its reputation in the international community. Pressure by the international community, will push India toward polishing its tarnished image and making a stronger commitment to establishing peace.**

#### [Ashraf 19] The only reason why the Indo-Pakistan conflict has been deescalated in the past was because of international intervention, as the two parties don’t trust one another.

Sajjad Ashraf, Ashraf was an adjunct professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, 3-14-2019, "The psychology of India-Pakistan conflict", Gulf News, https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-eds/the-psychology-of-india-pakistan-conflict-1.62633241 // CJ
India and Pakistan have seemingly pulled back from the edge of a war. But, the reasons for the tension that followed the partition following the British withdrawal from the subcontinent in 1947 remain. Psychologically obsessed with each other, they have fought four wars. They continue to ratchet up their nuclear and missile capabilities by conducting missile tests periodically. Every few years they are into a tense standoff and withdraw from the brink of a conflict only after interventions from international community. Determining peace between India and Pakistan is complex and a multi-layered process. The conflict is based on identity and the exercise of power demonstrated by the respective governments. Professor Stephen Cohen, a South Asia expert at the Brookings Institute, underscores the divide vividly. “One of Pakistan’s ‘India problems’ is its belief that India wants to wipe the Pakistani state out of existence. Among India’s ‘Pakistan problems’ is lingering resentment towards partition; one Indian scholar calls it ‘one of the ten modern catastrophes’.” Why does the conflict continue to drag indefinitely, with little sign of resolution? Born amid a bloody partition that left about a million dead and 12 million displaced, and yet, amid millions of victims no one was found guilty. The partition’s mistrust between India and Pakistan led them into the dispute over the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. It was India who took the dispute to the United Nations and it remains on the UN agenda as a disputed territory. It is the Kashmir dispute, more than any other that now symbolises the divide between the two countries. Consequently, a destructive equilibrium has emerged where even peace gestures by either are viewed with suspicion. This increased scepticism between them stiffens positions making chances of a peace breakthrough harder. The partition, as much a mental division, shattered the social geography of the subcontinent affecting the communities seeking refuge on either side of the dividing line. Inability to form similar community structures anew created social distancing that contributed to anger and urge for reclaiming the lost. The psychological scars have therefore, multiplied affecting the post partition generations also. The Muslim refugees who came over to Pakistan at least had the satisfaction of moving to a country they had chosen to create, which actually tempers their anger. That is perhaps why the non-Muslims who migrated out of Pakistan in compulsion live with bigger scars. What puts the two in a different category is how much they mistrust each other and are unable to feel a whiff of sincerity in the other, when making a peace overture. Mutual suspicion and antagonism have moved both India and Pakistan in the opposite direction. With each country creating its own public memory of its historic experiences a lot of poisonous knowledge has been created that divides the ordinary folks between ‘us’ and ‘them’ always in opposition to the other. The roots of their mutual anathema lie in early 11th century Mahmoud Ghaznavi’s (Central Asian ruler, first to assume the title of sultan) invasions of India and then the shared history of Muslims and Hindus since the 13th century when sultanates were first established in India. Indian historians do not brand this period as colonisation. Yet, 800 years of Muslim rule over parts of India has left a deep psychological damage on many ‘nationalists’ in India. India is a behemoth in South Asia that lived through bloody invasions through history. While smaller countries in the region obligingly kowtow to New Delhi, the lone defiant note is often struck by Pakistan. The two countries have therefore, remained in a perpetual battle mode. Notwithstanding all the everyday troubles between the two countries there is a tremendous amount of convergence based on historic societal behaviour and culture that binds the two people. Resolution of the Kashmir dispute alone, according to the wishes of the Kashmiri people, could pave the way for peace between the two estranged neighbours. Peace lovers hope this will generate irresistible political momentum for normalisation of relations between the two estranged neighbours, enabling them to focus on development of their countries.

#### [Nawaz ‘18 of the ISSI] Giving India a permanent seat would re-embolden Delhi, giving it free rein in Kashmir.

,Nawaz Shamsa. “Violation of the UN Resolutions on Kashmir: India’s Quest for UNSC Permanent Membership” e Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad. <http://www.issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/10-SS_Shamsa_Nawaz_No-1_2018.pdf>,//CJ

**Kashmiris want an honourable space for themselves according to the UN Charter**. In 1990, when a popular uprising broke out, the most shouted slogan was, ‘until a plebiscite is held, our struggle will continue.’37 The history has seen large processions heading towards the UNMOGIP headquarters demanding for their independence. The protests were relodged on August 18, 2008, and called for the implementation of the UN resolutions. On March 1, 1990, more than one million Kashmiris marched towards the UNMOGIP headquarters and called for the UN-supervised plebiscite. **More than 600 memoranda were submitted for the UN Secretary General to urge India to grant Kashmiris their right of self-determination.38 The disputed status of Kashmir and the continuous denial of India to their right of self-determination have further strengthened their national identity.** 37 The Plebiscite Movement, originated by the Plebiscite Front in 1955, has greatly contributed to **keeping** the demand **alive** along with **the presence of the UN resolutions.** It represents the popular demand. On the other hand, the role of the UN has been invalidated with the passage of time. The most recent UN attempt was made in 2002, when Indo-Pak forces confronted each other at the borders. India mobilised half a million troops to pressurise Pakistan, not to side with the Kashmiri freedom fighters on their principle demand. However, **the current wave of atrocities by India to suppress the movement after the extrajudicial killing of the freedom fighter, Burhan Wani, in July 2016, and the use of pellet guns to blind several have not been able to stir the world’s conscience. The use of the brutal force by India is impertinence to an international organisation**. It compounds vulnerability for peaceful world governance. **The functions and the powers of the UNSC under the UN Charter are to maintain international peace and security and investigate the disputes, which eventually might lead to any international friction.** The threats, which might violate peace, are also determined and terms of settlement are recommended. The UN needs to assume its role more assertively. Furthermore, the US support to **India’s bid for a permanent seat in the UNSC would give a free rein to India to continue with the violation of international norms and further lead to the failure of yet another crisis management body**

#### [Chapman ‘7 of Emory University] explains that states that are members on the UNSC are more expansionist.

Terrence Chapman,2-1-2007, Department of Political Science Emory University, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/27638541.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ade2497a3e57432f8ee77900df802b559&amp;seq=1&amp;loggedin=true, //CJ

Revisionist institutions may be better equipped to constrain leaders in the sense that leaders will attempt to avoid proposing policies that encounter their disap proval. In other words, while institutions such as the UNSC may be better equipped to provide legitimacy through authorization, institutions in which it is easier to pass resolutions may be better equipped to force restraint through the threat of disap proval. Once again, this statement is contingent on issue-specific preferences, since public statements by NATO members may have made NATO also appear conser vative in 2003 to U.S. citizens. **There may be a trade-off, as suggested in observation 4, between an institution capable of providing legitimacy through authorization, thus providing incentives for states to seek compromise to obtain authorization, and one whose disapproval deters states from proposing aggressive foreign policies. Although conservative institutions such as the UNSC may be "uniquely positioned" (Malone 2004, 639) to confer legitimacy on foreign policy actions, they may be less effective at con straining expansive policies.**

#### [Khan ’15 of the Naval War College]

Aamir Hussain Khan, has masters in Strategic Studies from Naval Postgraudate School, “UNSC’S EXPANSION: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGIONS AND THE WORLD”, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2015, [https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632266.pdf,//CJ](https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632266.pdf%2C//CJ)

Both India and Pakistan have failed to resolve their disputes peacefully and have fought four major wars over these disputes since 1947. As an influential regional state, **India has failed to play the required leadership role to amicably solve its problems with its small neighbors. India**, however, **considers that its neighbours are its enemies and regards them as subordinate states. Thus, India’s permanent membership of the UNSC will have serious implications for the South Asian region. India will pursue its own interest and objectives and will not pay any heed to regional issues**, involving smaller regional states. In the past, India has violated UNSC’s resolution and is not likely to respect these resolutions in the future as well. **India can isolate and intimidate smaller regional states through economic strangulation and by involving them in political problems and disputes. India can politically and militarily interfere in the internal affairs of smaller regional countries on various pretexts, and at the same time can prevent U.N. intervention through India’s influence as a permanent member. Giving a permanent seat to India at this stage would likely raise the chances of serious armed conflicts in the region**. [...] Without resolution of the Kashmir dispute, India does not qualify to be a member of the UNSC. India has refused to implement the resolutions of the UNSC over settlement of the Kashmir dispute. It would be unjust to award membership of the council to a country that has violated its resolution. **As a permanent member of the UNSC, India can influence favorable decisions at the UNSC over Kashmir. Furthermore, India, due to its strong conventional military, can resort to the use of force on the pretext of pre-emption or hot pursuit to coerce Pakistan to change its stance on Kashmir in favor of India.**

#### [Sadat ’17 of the National Interest]

Mir Sadat,12-25-2017, America Needs India to Become a Great Power, National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-needs-india-become-great-power-23782, //CJ

The United States should support India’s membership in the G7, **support India’s effort to become a permanent non-veto UNSC member**, and support its effort to join APEC. While China may test these efforts, **the immediate impact would result in backlash from Pakistan because an empowered India endangers the very existence of Pakistan.** An elevated India would level the influence of China and send a strong message about democracy, freedom-of-navigation operations, and open trade. A democratic and diverse India—one that provides economic prosperity to its people—serves as an alternative model to developing nations that might be attracted to authoritarian models.

#### [Wilson 19] There is a low threshold for nuclear war in the region – Pakistan has developed nuclear weapons for the sole purpose of responding to conventional attacks. These are intended to deter India, but that fails historically, escalates, and will cost two billion lives.

Geoff Wilson, 3-6-2019, "India and Pakistan on the Brink: A Nuclear Nightmare in South Asia," The National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/india-and-pakistan-brink-nuclear-nightmare-south-asia-46302> // CJ
India and Pakistan possess two of the fastest growing nuclear arsenals in the world. Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists, [estimates](https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/) that India possesses some 140 nuclear weapons, while Pakistan has around 150. Of particular concern is Pakistan’s growing inventory of smaller, tactical nuclear weapons. According to Kristensen, these weapons are part of an effort “to create a full-spectrum deterrent that is designed not only to respond to nuclear attacks, but also to counter an Indian conventional incursion onto Pakistani territory.” This is extremely concerning. Just possessing nuclear weapons meant to be used against conventional forces, could lower the threshold for their use during a conflict. The Trump administration agrees, with officials having gone on the record [saying](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/us-worried-pakistans-nuclear-weapons-could-land-up-in-terrorists-hands-official/articleshow/60220358.cms?from=mdr), “we are particularly concerned by the development of tactical nuclear weapons that are designed for use [on the] battlefield. We believe that these systems… increase the likelihood of nuclear exchange in the region.” These fears are more than just hyperbole. Earlier this week a retired Pakistani general [told his colleagues](https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/1100602068111376385) that in order to deter India, “our response should be to escalate and push the envelope of hostilities so that nuclear war is a likely outcome.” We know that this sort of thinking is misguided. Why? Because the United States once had a similar strategy. During the Cold War the United States stockpiled thousands of tactical nuclear weapons, including nuclear bazookas, landmines and artillery shells as a counter to Soviet conventional superiority in Europe. The plan was simple. If an army of Soviet tanks rolled through the Fulda Gap, we would counter with small scale nuclear weapons. The theory went that by showing you were willing to use a small nuke, the enemy would consider that you might just be crazy enough to use your big ones too, causing them to back down. This strategy was unironically referred to as the Madman Theory. Unfortunately, under scrutiny, it turned out to be just that, mad. In 1955, the Department of Defense conducted a wargame called [Carte Blanche](https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a260378.pdf) in which more than three hundred simulated tactical nuclear weapons were used against Soviet targets on German soil with the aim of halting an advancing Soviet army. When the simulated dust settled, an estimated 1.7 million Germans had been killed, with 3.5 million wounded and incalculable number of additional casualties resulting from radiological fallout. When the results of the exercise were leaked to the press, they “produced widespread unrest and agitation” in West Germany over the proposed U.S. nuclear strategy. The Reagan administration tested the premise again in 1983 with the wargame Proud Prophet. This scenario saw NATO launch limited nuclear strikes against Soviet targets in response to a conventional provocation. But instead of backing down, the Soviet team doubled down. “The Soviet Union team interpreted the nuclear strikes as an attack on their nation, their way of life and their honor. So they responded with an enormous nuclear salvo at the United States,” [writes](https://books.google.com/books?id=zkhRjTumZTkC&pg=PA84&lpg=PA84&dq=to+make+it+as+realistic+as+possible,+actual+top-secret+U.S.+war+plans+were+incorporated+into+the+game&source=bl&ots=dWV_bAm24_&sig=7YRzYmYCjh2FZHGdvgKDBrSLlwA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi1_o6t8o_SAhXCJCYKHZMnCDIQ6AEIIzAB#v=onepage&q=to%20make%20it%20as%20realistic%20as%20possible%2C%20actual%20top-secret%20U.S.%20war%20plans%20were%20incorporated%20into%20the%20game&f=false) Department of Defense advisor and nuclear historian Paul Bracken. “The United States retaliated in kind. The result was a catastrophe that made all the wars of the past five hundred years pale in comparison... a half-billion human beings were killed in the initial exchanges and at least that many more would have died from radiation and starvation. NATO was gone. So was a good part of Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union. Major parts of the Northern Hemisphere would be uninhabitable for decades.” The results reportedly shocked President Ronald Reagan so badly that his schedule had to be cleared for the rest of the day. A few months later, he famously told the American people that, “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” The lessons of these wargames apply to the Indian subcontinent as well. Recent studies have estimated that regional nuclear war, such as one between India and Pakistan, could lead to the deaths of some 2 billion people worldwide. To prevent this nightmare from becoming a reality, the international community must condemn further acts of violence and build space for the conflict to be mediated, before the situation escalates further out of hand. It is not without irony that as President Trump negotiates a nuclear agreement with North Korea, another nuclear crisis is unfolding out on the same continent. Under normal circumstances the United States would have already dispatched mediators to the region to defuse the crisis. As it stands, Washington has been painfully slow to respond. The current crisis is a symptom of a larger problem. The last five years have seen a dramatic increase in tensions between nuclear weapons states across the board. The U.S.-Russian relationship has soured to a point not seen since the Cold War, and a cornerstone of the international arms control regime, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty, has been abandoned. Russia and NATO forces have engaged in direct [hostilities](https://warisboring.com/sleepwalking-toward-nuclear-war/) in Syria, even leading to the [downing](https://warisboring.com/we-should-all-worry-about-russias-confrontation-with-turkey/) of a Russian fighter-bomber. The number of confrontations between U.S. and Chinese assets in the South China Sea have reached an all-time high. Sooner or later our luck will run out and the unthinkable will happen.

### Subpoint B- is China

#### [Rajagopolan ’17 of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace] China is winning over the influence of other regional actors.

Rajesh Rajagopalan,9-14-2017, India’s Strategic Choices: China and the Balance of Power in Asia, Carnegie India, https://carnegieindia.org/2017/09/14/india-s-strategic-choices-china-and-balance-of-power-in-asia-pub-73108, //CJ

Second, **China’s power in international institutions ranging from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)** to the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) **has** at times **proved to be an obstacle to Indian foreign policy ambitions.** Most recently, in 2016, China thwarted India’s efforts to join the NSG. China is likely to continue to obstruct India in this manner, and its capacity to do so will only grow as its power increases. Moreover, as its power grows, China has also started establishing international institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and has also been shaping other multilateral organizations to promote Chinese interests, such as the BRICS (a group consisting of Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Third, China’s willingness to play the role of an external balancer against India in South Asia is a serious challenge, and, in some cases, a military threat. China’s support has bolstered Pakistan’s military capabilities and (at the very least) accelerated the development of Islamabad’s nuclear weapons and missile programs. Moreover, the possibility of a two-front conflict pitting India against China and Pakistan simultaneously also worries Indian national security policymakers, a concern accelerated by the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Parts of this infrastructure corridor traverse Indian-claimed territory in Pakistan-occupied portions of Kashmir. **Aside from Pakistan, the enhancement of China’s relations with some other Indian neighbors—including Bangladesh, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka—provides an understandable temptation for these smaller states to attempt to use China to counter India’s natural domination of the region.**

#### [Izuyama 17] India and China are vying for influence in Sri Lanka.

Mari Izuyama, 2017, "Security in the Indian Ocean Region: Regional Responses to China’s Growing Influence", East Asian Strategic Review, http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/pdf/2017/east-asian\_e2017\_02.pdf // CJ
Pakistan, a long-standing ally of China, has further deepened that friendship in recent years, and is actively cooperating with China’s entry into the Indian Ocean region through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) initiative. In that context, the Pakistani Army, which virtually controls the country’s security policy, has demonstrated keen interest in maximizing the strategic utility of CPEC, to pull China to the Pakistani side in the context of Pakistan-India dispute. Also, in order to counter Indian influence, Pakistan has a strong interest in facilitating the PLAN’s presence in the Indian Ocean. In that respect, the reference made by a Pakistan Navy official in November 2016 to the deployment of PLAN ships to Gwadar Port attracted much attention. Although some observers had expected that Sri Lanka would shift away from China after its newly-elected president Maithripala Sirisena took office at the start of 2015, the new administration has found it impossible to alienate China altogether due to the importance of its economic relationship with that country. The government of Sri Lanka is now being forced to engage in a difficult balancing act between two major neighbors: China, upon which it has become increasingly reliant economically, and India, with which it has traditionally developed a multifaceted relationship. 1. Complex Strategic Environment in the Indian Ocean Region (1) Overview of the Indian Ocean Region The Indian Ocean region refers to the coastal states and islands lying in contact with the Indian Ocean, which occupies one-fifth of the world’s total ocean area. On the west, it extends from the eastern African coast to the Gulf countries, while in the center it includes the Indian subcontinent, and on the east comprises the Southeast Asian archipelago down to Australia. The geographical range considered as the Indian Ocean region depends on the perspective of the person who discusses it. Anthony Cordesman, whose geographical range is broadest, has divided the Indian Ocean region into five subregions, including thirty-two countries into his analysis.1) Cordesman’s interest is risk assessment, based on such factors as population dynamics, economic growth, and energy trends. Meanwhile, John Garofano and Andrea J. Dew, whose main argument revolves around the competition between China and India, virtually restrict the Indian Ocean region to the eastern and western coasts of the Indian subcontinent, that is to say, the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal.2) Although the geographical scope of the Indian Ocean region varies depending on the expert, as described above, they do share, as initial point of interests, the fact that the region functions as a global trade route as well as a source of oil supply. It could be said that its nature as a transportation route provides a functional definition of the Indian Ocean region.

#### [Theys ’18 of the London School of Economics] A frozen border dispute between China and India erupted into a military clash.

Sarina Theys ,1-15-2018, Running hot and cold: Bhutan-India-China relations, South Asia @ LSE, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2018/01/25/running-hot-and-cold-bhutan-india-china-relations-doklam/, //CJ

**The summer of 2017 was marked by a frozen border dispute that turned hot between Bhutan, China and India. The disputed area is a geographical space known as the Doklam Plateau which is believed to be part of Bhutan’s territory.** Causes of the flare-up are contested. Some commentators argue that **the conflict erupted after China was caught building a motorable road in the disputed area whereas others blame the destruction of Indian bunkers by the Chinese army located in the same area.** A look at the map below shows the disputed area which is located near the tripoint where the three countries meet: China’s Chumbi Valley in the north, Bhutan’s Haa valley to the east and the Indian state of Sikkim to the west. The Context: A Historical Hangover The dispute is a hangover of historical events such as the annexation of Tibet by China in 1959. China’s control over Tibet not only changed the nature of the shared border between Bhutan and Tibet but also the nature of China’s relationship with some of its immediate neighbours. Mao claimed that Tibet was the palm of China’s hand of which the five fingers were identified as Bhutan, Ladakh, Sikkim, Nepal, and Arunachal Pradesh. In other words, Tibet became a strategic platform from which China tried to enlarge its territory and by doing so, aimed to increase its sphere of influence in the region. The map below depicts Tibet and the so-called five fingers. China failed to annex the so-called five fingers. Bhutan and Nepal managed to maintain their sovereignty and territorial integrity, Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh remained Indian states, whereas Sikkim was annexed by India in the 1970s. Formal border talks between Bhutan and China started in 1984 and a peace agreement was signed in the 1990s entitled the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity in the Bhutan-China Border Areas. This agreement was important for Bhutan as it officially recognised its sovereign status. The border dispute between the two Asian hegemons and the small Buddhist kingdom has been going strong for more than six decades. Besides the Doklam Plateau, disputed areas include the Jakarlung and Pasamlung valley in the north of Bhutan. The latter two are important to China given their proximity to Tibet, and the former is salient to both China and India as it overlooks the Chumbi Valley and the Siliguri Corridor, also known as the Chicken’s Neck. The Siliguri Corridor is strategically important to India as it is a gateway to India’s north-eastern states. Chinese control over the Doklam Plateau is therefore perceived by India as a major security threat as it may result in isolating the north-eastern states from India’s mainland**. The 2017 border dispute was not the first confrontation between India and China. Hot phases also occurred in 1962 and 2014. Contrary to the 1962 Border War, the 2017 skirmish was solved peacefully**. There was no ‘physical scuffle’ between the Indian Army and China’s People’s Liberation Army. The conflict was solely expressed through antagonistic rhetoric and verbal threats. Although both sides claimed victory and the status quo was restored, it was reported that ‘the Chinese got what they wanted’ as they only ‘went back 250 metres to maintain peace while India had to give up patrolling the area where two destroyed bunkers had existed.’

#### [Ayoob ’18 of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute] India and China have had several skirmishes (in particular, over their border), but have suppressed their hostility to prevent full scale conflict from breaking out.

Mohammed Ayoob,2-26-2018, India’s relations with China: suppressed hostility, not open antagonism, Strategist, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/indias-relations-china-suppressed-hostility-not-open-antagonism/, //CJ

**Although there have been several border clashes between India and China since the 1962 war, both sides have been careful not to let those skirmishes escalate into full-scale conflict**. The last military casualty on the border occurred in 1977. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in 1988 broke the ice between the two neighbours and set up a framework that helped isolate the border dispute from the wider gamut of economic and political relations between the two countries. However, small-scale tensions on the border have continued, including the recent clash at Doklam at the junction of India, Bhutan and China after China tried to construct a road in the area claimed by Bhutan—India’s ally (and de facto protectorate). This occurred on territory that’s very strategically important to India because of its proximity to the narrow ‘chicken neck’ corridor that connects the Indian northeast (some of it claimed by China) with the rest of the country. The 10-week standoff was resolved on 28 August 2017 after China stopped its road construction but didn’t explicitly renounce its claim. In the meantime, economic relations between the two Asian giants have been thriving. Despite the absence of a free trade agreement between the two countries, China has become India’s largest trading partner with total trade in 2016 amounting to more than US$69 billion. However, **this is heavily skewed in China’s favour**. It exports goods worth US$60 billion to India and imports goods worth only US$9 billion. While trade has helped bind the economies together to some extent**, its lopsided nature has also created tensions.** Nonetheless, **it’s strategic factors rather than economic ones that create tensions in India–China relations. Indian suspicion of China’s designs in its neighbourhood, especially Beijing’s cultivation of strategic relations with Myanmar and Sri Lanka, is a catalyst for renewed Indian misgivings.** China’s increasingly intimate economic and political relations with India’s nemesis, Pakistan, have been perennial points of contention between the two countries. China’s massive financial commitment—US$500 million—in grants to build the Gwadar port facilities in Baluchistan is seen in India as part of Beijing’s strategic policy of extending its reach to the Persian Gulf, but it also bolsters Pakistan’s capacity to confront India in the future. China, for its part, suspects that the US and India are colluding to curb China’s growing influence in the Asia–Pacific. The Trump administration’s active wooing of New Delhi to achieve this end is an open secret. The renaming of the Asia–Pacific region as the Indo-Pacific region in American official parlance since 2017 is seen by China and other countries in the region as a public endorsement of India’s regional primacy. US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson sent a clear signal in a speech last October that Washington considers India not only a strategic ally, but also a partner in building a ‘rules-based order’ in the international system. In the same speech, Tillerson characterised China as a ‘destabilising force’ in the region and accused Beijing of ‘provocative actions in the South China Sea [that] directly challenge the international law and norms that the United States and India both stand for’. China must have taken note of the contrasting way in which the secretary of state portrayed the two countries. While the Indians didn’t openly dispute Tillerson’s thesis on China (and indeed probably agreed with it in their heart of hearts), they didn’t endorse it publicly. This cautionary policy reflects Indian ambivalence towards China. On the one hand, **New Delhi considers Beijing to be its principal rival and competitor. On the other, economic and—even more—geographic compulsions preclude India from openly taking an antagonistic stance vis-à-vis China.** The Sino–Indian border is too long and, despite India’s advances in bolstering its military capability, the gaps between the two countries’ GNP and military technology are too great for India to openly pursue a hostile policy towards China. Consequently, Sino–Indian relations in the foreseeable future will include elements of conflict and cooperation that are unlikely to see an open clash between the two Asian giants. **One can possibly describe the relationship, at least on the Indian side, as one of ‘suppressed hostility’ that will continue at least over the next couple of decades, or until India is able to appreciably narrow the economic and technological gaps with China.**

#### [The Monthly Review] India will only be emboldened to aggress against China if it sees itself as a great power.

Research Unit For Political Economy,3-1-2006, Monthly Review, Monthly Review, https://monthlyreview.org/2006/03/01/why-the-united-states-promotes-indias-great-power-ambitions/?fbclid=IwAR3eVjxO67ACsBPJcgyWhaQfdg4qGuYuAt2iPRvG55QQk3tTYKjFhnRsFJU, //CJ

The U.S. War College study spells out the benefits of an **“Asian NATO”**: What’s in it for the United States? For one, the proposed security system is principally an in-region solution for dealing with two of the biggest international security threats—an over-ambitious China and the spread of Talibanised Islam. Second, this scheme being entirely indigenous, there is none of the odium that attends on US troops deployed locally as in South Korea and Japan….And, finally, it in no way precludes the presence in the extended region of the US armed forces or limits US military initiatives. **However—and this is crucial—the entire scheme will fall apart if India does not nurse great power ambitions. Only if India sees itself as a great power, a “counterpoise to China in the region,” will it want to promote a broad anti-China alliance. And so the United States must push India to pursue its “manifest destiny”: But crucial to making this system work is India’s being convinced of its ‘manifest destiny’ and for it to act forcefully. It will require in the main that New Delhi think geostrategically and give up its diffidence when it comes to advancing the country’s vital national interests and its almost knee-jerk bias to appease friends and foes alike.** The corrective lies in the Indian government expressly defining its strategic interests and focus and, at a minimum, proceeding expeditiously towards obtaining a nuclear force with a proven and tested thermonuclear and an ICBM reach. Nothing less will persuade the putative Asian allies that India can be an effective counterpoise to China in the region, or compel respect for India in Washington. India’s great-power ambitions, then, are crucial to the success of U.S. plans for Asia. Indeed, the further Indian foreign policy is subordinated to U.S. strategic designs, the better India’s chances of winning U.S. backing at last for its single-minded drive to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. While admitting that the United States had not supported India’s claim to UNSC membership, Manmohan Singh told Parliament that “when the time comes, I have reason to believe that we will not be ignored.”

#### [Rehman ‘9 of the Journal for Asian Security] If the bipolar system collapses (by India becoming a great power), India and China will compete until they overlap, bringing conflict.

Iskander Rehman,5-28-2009, Keeping the Dragon at Bay: India's Counter-Containment of China in Asia, Taylor &amp; Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14799850902885114, //CJ

**In conclusion**, it would seem that a detailed analysis of Sino-Indian relations indicates that the end of the Cold War has not lessened the validity of realism. With **the collapse of the bipolar system, regional heavyweights such as India and China seek to attain regional hegemony, gradually expanding their “areas of interest” until they overlap, bringing about conflict**. Sino-Indian relations provide a textbook example of the potentially negative consequences of this “overlap effect.” China no longer views its sphere of influence as being solely comprised of the Asian continent's eastern periphery, and seeks to assert its dominance over the entire continent, including India's South Asian backyard. China has thus increasingly displayed what John Mearsheimer termed “offensive realism” 110 110. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 5. View all notes in its quest for superpower status, containing India in South Asia and sidelining it from global and pan-Asian organizations, while shoring up Pakistan's military capabilities. India's engagement of ASEAN, its efforts to promote Vietnam as a bulwark against Chinese hegemony in Southeast Asia, as well as to wrest Myanmar from China's sphere of influence; its developing of military ties with both Australia and Japan, and, last but not least, its forays into Mongolia, all point to the development of an ambitious Indian policy of counter-containment aimed at its Chinese neighbor. Slowly but surely, India is asserting itself in the Asian region, spreading its influence and reinforcing its ties beyond its traditional subcontinental sphere, making forays not only into Southeast Asia, but also beyond. The ROI is positioning itself, with the encouragement of many states in the region, as the sole Asian power capable of acting in the future as a counterweight to the Chinese juggernaut. Just as Great Britain strove during the fabled Great Game in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to prevent its tsarist Russian rival from holding sway over the entirety of Central and Northwestern Asia, India's newly elaborated China strategy, which both accompanies and checks the latter's expansion, **should ensure a healthy balance of power in the region for many years to come. One can only hope, after all, that the Asian continent is large enough to harbor more than one superpower.**

The Kunming Initiative is a Chinese project aiming to develop the Mekong river area, and to include Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, as well as India's beleaguered northeastern provinces in its sphere of cooperation. Determined not to let China become the sole promoter of multilateralism in the region, India unveiled its own project for Mekong–Ganga Cooperation or MGC in 2000, which included India, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, with the notable exclusion of China. Involving exactly the same states as the Kunming Initiative, the MGC had simply replaced China by India at the head of the project, in a symbolic gesture of defiance that did not go unnoticed by the Chinese. 28 28. Mohan Malik, “India and China,” p. 142. View all notes **On a global level, whereas Jawaharlal Nehru once actively campaigned for China's permanent seat at the UN, the Chinese have refused to reciprocate the gesture 50 years later by openly supporting India's bid. Beijing has not formally voiced its rejection of India's claims, but neither has it come out in India's support, despite constant Indian urgings to do so. Instead, China has endeavored to mollify Indian concerns by playing with semantics, claiming that it would be happy to “see India play a greater role at the UN.**” 29 29. “A Shared Vision for the 21st Century.” Retrieved February 2008 from http://www.meaindia.nic.in/. View all notes **China may not be actively lobbying against India's bid, as it is doing vis-à-vis Japan's, but it is clear that it has no desire to see a change in the status quo. For the time being, China is the only voice at the UNSC for Asia and the “developing world,” and it has no inclination whatsoever to see its influence “diluted” in any way by the integration of another Asian state, and, what is more, by a state with which it has often had conflictual relations in the past. As one analyst has aptly put it, quoting an old Chinese saying, “One mountain cannot accommodate two tigers**.” 30 30. J. Mohan Malik, “The India–China Divide.” Available at http://www.arts.monash.edu. View all notes For the time being, the US, unlike Great Britain, France or Russia, has been reluctant to support India's claims, and has lobbied in favor of Japan, a historically more reliable American partner than India. China has been quite content so far to brush the issue under the carpet with a smile and ride behind American ambivalence.

#### The Impact is war

#### [Wignaraja ’19 of the East Asia Forum] The economies across the Indian Ocean region are expected to grow rapidly and double in per capita income; skirmishes would end this prosperity.

Ganeshan Wignaraja, Dinusha Panditaratne,1-31-2019, Sri Lanka’s quest for a rules-based Indian Ocean, East Asia Forum, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/01/31/sri-lankas-quest-for-a-rules-based-indian-ocean/, //CJ

Sri Lanka’s quest for a rules-based Indian Ocean 31 January 2019 Authors: Ganeshan Wignaraja and Dinusha Panditaratne, LKI The evolution of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy since the election of a unity government on 8 January 2015 merits interest. Changes include the country’s engagement with a wider range of international partners, as well as a commitment to address the country’s post-conflict concerns. Sri Lanka's navy fires a gun salute during the Sri Lanka's 70th Independence day celebrations in Colombo, Sri Lanka, 4February 2018 (Photo: Reuters/Dinuka Liyanawatte). These changes have been pursued within a new and overarching foreign policy framework that is perhaps less well-known — a framework of positioning Sri Lanka to become a vibrant and prosperous centre of the Indian Ocean. Developed by the post-2015 government in view of increasing prosperity and competition in the Indian Ocean, this foreign policy framework builds on Sri Lanka’s established status as a non-aligned, South Asian nation. **The rise of Asia, spearheaded by China’s rapid growth, has transformed the Indian Ocean into one of the world’s busiest East–West trade corridors. It carries two-thirds of global oil shipments and a third of bulk cargo. Growth in the Indian Ocean is robust, benefiting from a rich natural resource base, vast fish stocks and a talent pool of educated youth. Economic reforms in India, Sri Lanka and others are unleashing the private sector as the engine of growth. The 28 dynamic economies that border the Indian Ocean across Asia, Africa, the Middle East and the Pacific are expected to collectively grow at about 6 per cent per year in the next few years, compared with only 3.7 per cent for the fragile world economy.** Per capita income in the Indian Ocean region is expected to nearly double from US$3200 to US$6150 between 2017 and 2025, which would make it an upper-middle income region. This represents a huge economic opportunity for Sri Lanka, which is strategically located in the Indian Ocean. Sri Lanka relies on open sea lanes for its imports of petroleum, food and machinery, and its exports of tea, apparel and rubber products. Sri Lanka plans to become a regional trading, logistics and finance hub, situated between the leading hubs of Dubai and Singapore. Among other initiatives, cutting red tape and prudent macroeconomic management aim to give birth to an international financial centre in Colombo Port City, which would complement the shift towards services-led development**. But four external risks threaten to compromise regional peace and prosperity. First, the Indian Ocean is at risk of heightened competition between big powers, similar to what is transpiring in the South China Sea. An impasse between these powers or a skirmish at sea could disrupt regional trade**. Second, natural resources and fisheries are being depleted at unsustainable rates. Third, there are difficulties in containing maritime crimes such as people smuggling, drug trafficking and piracy. Fourth, trade protectionism is on the rise, partly due to a backlash against globalisation, disruptive technological change and a simmering emerging-market debt crisis.

#### [400 million people in the Indo-Pacific live in extreme poverty.]

Thin Lei Win,3-29-2017, Despite growth, one in 10 Asians live in extreme poverty, U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asiapac-economy-poverty/despite-growth-one-in-10-asians-live-in-extreme-poverty-idUSKBN1702M9, //CJ

 BANGKOK (Thomson Reuters Foundation) - Some **400 million people, a tenth of Asia Pacific’s population, live on less than $1.90 a day - the global definition of extreme poverty** - despite the region’s impressive economic growth, the United Nations and the Asian Development Bank said on Wednesday. Taking into account wider indicators of poverty such as health, education and living standards for the same period from 2010 to 2013, the number of poor was far higher at 931 million, or one in four, said a report released at a forum in Bangkok. In addition, around 11.7 million people were subject to forced labor in the region in 2012, the highest in the world, while nearly a billion worked in poorly paid jobs with no social protection, the report added. “We are still not at a stage where we can claim that our successful economic and social gains are irreversible,” Shamshad Akhtar, executive secretary of the U.N. regional office in Asia, told the Asia Pacific Forum on Sustainable Development. Corruption, lack of human rights protection and rising inequality pose systemic barriers for the region in building an inclusive and prosperous future, the report said. Climate change, meanwhile, is adding to the uncertainties faced by Asia Pacific, which contains nine out of 15 countries listed as most vulnerable to natural hazards, the report added. In 2015 alone, the region experienced 155 disasters that caused more than 6,700 deaths and nearly $32.6 billion in economic damages, it said. Asia Pacific has made significant gains in reducing poverty this century. Between 2000 and 2004, the number of people living in extreme poverty was nearly three times higher.

#### [Farrington of the ODI]- Rapid and sustained growth in Asia could end absolute poverty within the next 20 years- uniqueness is on our side.

John Farrington,3-9-2006, Promoting Growth and Ending Poverty in Asia, ODI, https://www.odi.org/publications/4634-promoting-growth-and-ending-poverty-asia, //CJ

Over the past two decades, more people have been lifted out of poverty in Asia than in any other region at any other time in history. In the next decade, there is the chance to fulfil the potential of this success story - the world is presented with an historic opportunity to end poverty in Asia. Despite Asia's success, two thirds of the world's poor still live in the region, held back by poor nutrition and health, limited educational opportunities and lack of access to water and sanitation. Tackling these issues will require sustained economic growth, good governance and visionary leadership. The private sector, ranging from large corporate to small-scale enterprises, operating within a favourable state-led enabling environment, has been a dominant force in Asia’s successful economic growth and poverty reduction. But most of Asia’s poor still live in rural areas, and the story of growth and poverty reduction is uneven – both between and within countries, and over time. **Rapid growth means that Asia has the potential to eradicate absolute poverty within a generation, that is, in the next 20 years**. But there can be no assurance that high growth rates will continue up to and beyond 2015. Growth can be derailed by adverse changes in global trade and financial markets, by rapidly rising prices for primary commodities, (particularly energy), by environmental problems, by inadequate infrastructure, by the civil unrest that may accompany growing inequality, and by lack of institutionaldynamism to make enabling environments adapt to rapid global change. Moreover, growth alone is not everywhere sufficient to ensure sustained poverty reduction. The more agroecologically difficult areas tend to be left behind. Marginalised groups and the near-destitute, both there and elsewhere, cannot always participate directly in the benefits of growth. Such ‘lagging’ areas require focused infrastructure and growth policies, but also measures to support out-migration to growth areas, and policies to ensure that migrants can access health, education and sanitation services once there. Marginalised groups will be best served by improved enabling environments, by addressing issues such as governance, social inclusion, and citizenship, and more specifically by improvement in the quality and quantity of services and of social protection. Rapid growth usually implies a change from predominantly rural and agricultural to predominantly urbanbased, industrial (and, later, service-based) economies, along with demographic and fertility transitions. Without new ideas, and the resources to back them up, government and development agency policy is unlikely to prevent the spread of chronic poverty in rural areas, or an upsurge in numbers of economically and socially disenfranchised in urban areas. Given the development challenges facing Asia and the risks to be managed, there is clear scope for continued and intensified partnerships both within Asia and between Asian countries and the rest of the world. For the poorer countries and areas, these will involve new ways of managing conventional development assistance. For others, they are likely to be based on the shared agendas which are emerging around such issues as energy, environment, science and technology, disaster management, financial stability, investment climate and migration. The challenge for all is to identify how best to manage these up to and beyond 2015.

#### [Mizokami ’17 of the National Interest explains] India would seize the opportunity to cut off Chinese trade to the rest of the world and coerce its allies to cut economic ties with China, forcing millions of Chinese workers into poverty. China would retaliate with ballistic missile attacks on major Indian cities

Kyle Mizokami,5-27-2017, If 2.6 Billion People Go To War: India vs. China, National Interest,https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/if-26-billion-people-go-war-india-vs-china-20875,//CJ

The war at sea would be the decisive front in a conflict between the two countries. Sitting astride the Indian Ocean, **India lies on China’s jugular vein. The Indian Navy**, with its force of submarines, aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya and surface ships **could easily curtail the the flow of trade between China and Europe, the Middle East, and Africa**. It would take the Chinese Navy weeks to assemble and sail a fleet capable of contesting the blockade. Even then, the blockade would be hard to break up, conducted over the thousands of square miles of the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, shipping to and from China would be forced to divert through the western Pacific Ocean, where such diversions would be vulnerable to Australian, Japanese, or American naval action. **87 percent of the country’s petroleum needs are imported from abroad, particularly the Middle East and Africa.** China’s strategic petroleum reserves, once completed sometime in the 2020s, **could stave off a nationwide fuel shortage for up to seventy-seven days—but after that Beijing would have to seek an end to the war however possible.** **The second-order effects of the war at sea would be India’s greatest weapon. War jitters, the shock to the global economy, and punitive economic action by India’s allies—including Japan and the United States—could see demands for exports fall, with the potential to throw millions of Chinese laborers out of work.** Domestic unrest fueled by economic troubles could become a major problem for the Chinese Communist Party and its hold on the nation. China has no similar lever over India, except in the form of a rain of ballistic missiles with high-explosive warheads on New Delhi and other major cities.

#### [Tikhonova ’17 of Oxford University] Conflict between India and China would risk the lives of millions and would likely become the most devastating war in history.

Polina Tikhonova,7-18-2017, China vs. India War Hovers Over The Indian Subcontinent, ValueWalk, https://www.valuewalk.com/2017/07/china-vs-india-war/, //CJ

China and India are clashing over a remote Himalayan territory in a stand-off that could trigger China vs. India war. In the world so obsessed with the nuclear capability of North Korea, many have missed the fiery confrontation between Beijing and New Delhi in recent days, something that could spark a devastating nuclear war and leave millions dead. As China holds military drills using live ammunition in Tibet – a clear warning to the Indian soldiers – the two nations enter their worst stand-off in decades. Beijing and New Delhi have sent their soldiers to the remote Doklam plateau, a disputed China-administered area.A number of Chinese and Indian soldiers have lined up “eyeball to eyeball” on the disputed territory in an apparent readiness to respond to threats militarily. In the dispute that has been reignited in June, Chinese and Indian troops remain locked on the tri-junction with Bhutan, with many experts in China and India warning that the chance of military confrontations is higher than ever. China vs. India War Would Be the Most Devastating War For 2.6 Billion People It was China’s construction of a new road on the disputed plateau that has infuriated the Indians. Beijing believes New Delhi sent its troops to Bhutan, their tiny mountain neighbor, to prevent the road’s construction. The road was supposed to give the Chinese easier access to the disputed plateau. The road’s construction was launched close to the chicken neck at the so-called “tri junction” where China’s frontier connects to both India and Bhutan, where Beijing believes India has its troops stationed in the neighboring kingdom to prevent the Chinese from building the road. Bhutan has a small army of its own and India is its key military ally. China urges India to withdraw its troops from Bhutan to prevent Indian soldiers from being close to the Chinese-controlled territory. The 400km long has been the subject of many conflicts between Beijing and New Delhi throughout the past many decades, but the current situation raises serious concerns of a **China vs. India war. A war between China and India – the world’s two most populous countries with more than 2.6 billion people combined – would most likely become the most devastating war in history. China’s nuclear arsenal accounts for more than 250 warheads, while its enemy has more than 100 nuclear missiles.**

# Frontlines: Subpoint A

## Link Level

### AT: India still cares about international image

#### Even if India still cares about its international image, it believes it has the backing of the international community to the extent that it would become more aggressive. Empirically, P5 countries are extremely aggressive/expansionist. For example – China may care about its image to some extent, but not enough to prevent it from aggressing into the SCS.

### AT: India becoming/is a world power

#### It doesn’t see itself as one because it lacks membership on one of the most important international bodies— the Security Council. And it won’t start behaving like a great power until it perceives itself as a great power.

### AT: India is already a global hegemon

#### Ayers from case answers this: India may have internal power (e.g. economic), but it lacks external validation (that is, international political influence bestowed on it by the international community).

### AT: India is already a regional hegemon

#### Even if India is a regional hegemon, its power is localized and it still must be sensitive to the whims of the international community.

### AT: US emboldens India now

#### Even if the U.S. has supported India in some instances, the international community at large has obviously not endorsed them against Pakistan.

### \*AT: Membership isn’t the brink for great power status

### AT: (T) More Scrutiny

#### India is always subject to international scrutiny, it’s just a question if whether their emboldened enough by their great power status not to care. E.g. Russia in Crimea, China in SCS.

### AT: (T) Intimidates Pakistan 🡪 Pakistan gives up

#### Chaudhary ’14 of Johns Hopkins writes that Pakistan views India as an existential threat and believes India wants to destroy the Pakistani state. Pakistan thus feels like it has to meet Indian aggression with more aggression. Indeed, when India gains power, Falak ’17 of NDU confirms that Pakistan attempts to balance against it.

**Chaudhary 14**(Shamila Chaudhary, Senior Advisor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and Senior South Asia Fellow at New America, also serving as Director of Afghanistan and Pakistan at the White House National Security Council from 2010 – 2011, “Why India and Pakistan Hate Each Other”, 4 Feb 2014,<https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/04/why-india-and-pakistan-hate-each-other/> DOA 3/11/19

Instead of favoring one explanation for the rivalry, Shooting for a Century opts for all of them, accurately conveying just how complicated India-Pakistan relations are. But the real strength of Shooting for a Century is its ability to detail the often-enigmatic psychology of the conflict in both Indian and Pakistani minds. For example, Cohen bluntly states that ***one of Pakistan’s "India problems" is its belief that India wants to wipe the Pakistani state out of existence. Among India’s "Pakistan problems" is lingering resentment towards partition;*** one Indian scholar calls it "one of the ten modern catastrophes*."* **It is no wonder that the Pakistanis see India as an existential threat.**

**Falak, 2017** (Jawad Falak is an MS scholar of IR from NDU. He is currently working as Deputy Director Operations Stratagem. 2017. “INDIAN HEGEMONY: ROOTS OF SOUTH ASIAN CONFLICT.” Stratagem.<https://stratagem.pk/setting-the-record-straight/indian-hegemony-roots-south-asian-conflict/#respond> DOA 03/25/19)

It may be concluded that ***the conflict between India and Pakistan*,** while owing some part to factors such as the Kashmir dispute, ***is largely due to the anarchic structure of international relations. India being the strongest nation in South Asia is acting as a hegemon which puts it on a path of conflict with Pakistan which is the second strongest country in South Asia; this forces Pakistan to pursue a policy of external balancing in order to stave off New Delhi’s hegemonic actions.***

### AT: UN mediation bad

#### Our argument isn’t about U.N. mediation – it’s that India fears international disapproval and backlash. This takes a variety of forms, but the idea is simple: historically, the international community has intervened in some way.

### AT: (T) Diplomatic conflict preferable

#### Diplomatic conflict won’t happen for two reasons

#### Pakistan will perceive any mediation as biased towards India, so they won’t agree to treaties in the first place.

#### Even if diplomacy occurs, it’s just a temporary solution and doesn’t solve the root cause of the issue. Sputnik International finds that even with current talks, Pakistan is increasingly insecure.

## Internal Link/Impact

### AT: MAD Solves

#### 1. Ahmed ’16 of the Carnegie Endowment finds that, whether or not they are effective, India’s ballistic missile defense emboldens them to become more aggressive because they believe themselves to be safe from nuclear attack.

#### 2. Jayasekera ’19 of WSWS writes that on April first of this year, India developed anti-satellite capabilities meant to eliminate Pakistani surveillance and communications in a conflict. Because this would leave Pakistani forces blind and unable to retaliate in a conflict, Gettlemen and Kumar ‘19 explain that this could upset the long-standing doctrine of MAD in the region.

**Ahmed 2016** (Mansoor Ahmed, Stanton Nuclear Security Junior Faculty Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, "Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Their Impact on Stability," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 6-30-2016,  [https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/pakistan-s-tactical-nuclear-weapons-and-their-impact-on-stability-pub-63911 DoA 4/5/19](https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/pakistan-s-tactical-nuclear-weapons-and-their-impact-on-stability-pub-63911%20DoA%204/5/19))

Pakistani planners have chosen to plug this perceived deterrence gap by introducing TNWs, while simultaneously attempting to plug gaps in conventional forces where possible. **Indian claims of the successful development and deployment of a ballistic missile defense shield around New Delhi, its possible extension to other major population centers, and plans for developing cruise missile defenses will also further erode deterrence and crisis stability in the region.106 Any missile defense, effective or not, can lead Indian planners to mistakenly believe that fighting a conventional war does not threaten major population and industrial centers with a Pakistani countervalue strike. Emerging asymmetries in technology and military strength will likewise contribute to India’s false sense of superiority and lead India to pursue escalation dominance** during a limited conventional conflict, seeking to terminate hostilities on its terms.

Deepal **Jayasekera**, Journalist at the WSWS, 1 April 2019, *WSWS*, "Preparing for “tomorrow’s wars,” India shoots down satellite", <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2019/04/01/spac-a01.html>)

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a special “address to the nation” last Wednesday to boast that **India had become only the fourth ever country to shoot down a satellite.** The Defence Research and Development Organisation’s success in using an indigenously-developed missile to shoot down an Indian satellite in low-Earth orbit would, Modi claimed, “have an historic impact on generations to come.” “We are now a space power,” he thundered in a speech broadcast on television, radio and social media. **Modi’s ordering of a demonstration of India’s “space war” capabilities and his subsequent hyping of the test’s success in a nationwide address were driven by both strategic and immediate domestic political considerations. In late February, India came to the brink of all-out war with Pakistan, after Modi ordered air strikes inside Pakistan for the first time since the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war. New Delhi’s demonstration of a potential to “blind” Pakistan by eliminating its space-based surveillance and communications satellites in any future conflict was certainly meant to frighten Islamabad.**

(Jeffrey Gettleman, a winner of the Pulitzer Prize in 2012 for international reporting, is The New York Times’s South Asia bureau chief, Hari Kumar is a reporter in the New Delhi bureau of The New York Times, “India Shot Down a Satellite, Modi Says, Shifting Balance of Power in Asia”, *The New York Times*, March 27th 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/27/world/asia/india-weather-satellite-missle.html. DOA: April 1st 2019)

Another factor may have been archrival Pakistan. Last year, **China helped Pakistan launch a remote sensing satellite. India’s test showed it could blast apart the Pakistani eye in the sky, turning it into space garbage. This could make the bitter regional contest between India and Pakistan even more dangerous. Before this test, the two militaries were widely viewed as comparable. Each side has been reluctant to start a major conflict**, fearing that the other could stage a devastating counterattack. But some analysts said that **India might now be able to stage a pre-emptive attack on Pakistan’s satellites. That could unsettle the longstanding doctrine of mutually assured destruction that both countries have followed, and put Pakistan even more on edge.**

### AT: Hotline solves

#### 1. Miller ’19 of International Crisis Group writes that New Delhi and Islamabad have no hotline between them.

**Miller 19** (Laurel Miller "Calming India and Pakistan’s Tit-for-Tat Escalation," . 2-28-2019, International Crisis Group, [https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/kashmir/calming-india-and-pakistans-tit-tat-escalation DoA 4/5/19](https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/kashmir/calming-india-and-pakistans-tit-tat-escalation%20DoA%204/5/19))

**For his part, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan called for restraint and diplomatic engagement and at the same time vividly highlighted the risks inherent in the current situation. The same day as his country’s planes launched strikes across the Line of Control, Khan elliptically referenced the nuclear capabilities in a television interview and said, “With the weapons you have and the weapons we have, can we afford miscalculation? Shouldn’t we think that, if this escalates, what will it lead to?” He also offered to release the captured Indian pilot and to cooperate with India in investigating the Pulwama attack. New Delhi and Islamabad should immediately and urgently revive the hotline between their Directors General for Military Operations, a crucial mechanism to prevent unintended and inadvertent conflict escalation. There is little foreseeable prospect, no matter how desirable, of the top Indian and Pakistani leaderships re-establishing direct communication channels and bilateral dialogue. These have been frozen since the 2016 terror attacks in Indian Punjab and Indian-administered Kashmir, which New Delhi attributed to Pakistan-based militants. Nevertheless, New Delhi and Islamabad should immediately and urgently revive the hotline between their Directors General for Military Operations, a crucial mechanism to prevent unintended and inadvertent conflict escalation. Despite Khan’s acknowledgement of escalation risks, and Indian and Pakistani claims of responsibility and restraint, their armies are continuing to clash with artillery shelling and small arms fire along the Line of Control. Meanwhile, tensions are also high within J&K due to an Indian crackdown on Kashmiri dissidents, which could provoke more alienated youth to join militants. This apparently was the case of the 14 February suicide bomber, who came from a village close to the site of the Pulwama attack.**

### AT: India fears asymmetric response

#### 1. See MAD

### AT: Blockade timeframe

#### 1. Narayanan explains that India’s navy vastly surpasses Pakistan. That’s crucial, *as soon as* their surrounding waters becomes a conflict zone, trade would decrease, insurance premiums would skyrocket, people would begin to hoard food and the civilian populace would feel a heavy burden right down to the poorest.

### AT: Pakistan doesn’t want war (econ decline)

#### 1. Chaudry Pakistan views India as an existential threat, because they have an interest in preserving their country it would be their number one priority, which is why Foreign Policy ’19 finds that Pakistan is ramping up its military spending.

### AT: Pakistan could destroy a blockade

#### Even the conflict necessary to destroy a blockade would be enough to disrupt trade and trigger our impacts.

1. **Mizokami ’19 of the National Interest** writes that India could conduct surveillance and lay mines in the sea to keep up a blockade. And India would have the upper hand at sea: **Mitra ’19 of The Diplomat** writes that India has a 5:1 advantage in naval combat.

Kyle Mizokami, 2-18-2019, "Millions Could Perish: 5 Weapons India Would Use in a War Against Pakistan," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/millions-could-perish-5-weapons-india-would-use-war-against-pakistan-44907> // JJ
While INS Vikramaditya would be the visible symbol of a naval blockade, perhaps the real enforcers would be India’s force of 14 attack submarines. The most powerful of India’s submarines is INS Chakra, an Akula-II nuclear-powered attack submarine. INS Chakra would be able to fulfill a variety of wartime tasks. It would be a real threat to Pakistan’s Navy, particularly her 11 frigates and eight submarines, only three of which are reasonably modern. Chakra is also capable of covertly laying mines in Pakistani waters and conduct surveillance in support of a blockade. Construction of the submarine that would become Chakra began in 1993, but stalled due to lack of funding. In 2004 the Indian Navy agreed to fund the sub to completion—at a cost of $900 million—in exchange for a future 10 year lease with an option to buy. Delivery to the Indian Navy was supposed to take place in 2010, but transfer was delayed after a [2008 accident](http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/11/09/us-russia-submarine-idUSTRE4A738V20081109) that killed 20 Russian Navy personnel and wounded another 21. At 8,000 tons displacement, Chakra is as large as U.S. Virginia-class nuclear submarines. It has a maximum speed of 30 knots with a maximum operating depth of reportedly 520 meters. The sub not only has a customary large sonar hydrophone array on the bow, but also active and passive arrays scattered over the rest of the hull. Chakra also features a pod-mounted towed hydrophone array. INS Chakra is armed with not only four standard diameter 533 torpedo tubes but also another four 650mm torpedo tubes. Armament includes the VA-111 Shkval supercavitating torpedo, a high speed torpedo capable of traveling at 220 knots to ranges of up 15 kilometers. Missile armament is in the form of 3M54 Klub anti-ship missiles. Chakra can carry up to 40 torpedo tube launched weapons, including mines. (Five merchant ships were struck by mines during the 1971 India-Pakistan War.) For defensive purposes, Chakra has six external tubes, each carrying two torpedo decoys.

Joy Mitra, The Diplomat, 2-19-2019, "After Pulwama: What Are India’s Retaliation Options?," Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/after-pulwama-what-are-indias-retaliation-options/ // JJ
One last tool in the military kit merits a closer look: a naval blockade. The naval balance of power resides heavily in India’s favor. Pakistan’s Navy has [played](https://sputniknews.com/asia/201802281062092689-pakistan-naval-exercises-aging-fleet/) little to no role in past conflicts with India, and its [fleet](https://sputniknews.com/asia/201802281062092689-pakistan-naval-exercises-aging-fleet/) is mostly outdated and vulnerable to a first strike by BrahMos cruise missiles. Overall India has a 5:1 [advantage](https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/in-navy-development.htm) in the naval domain in terms of combat vessels and manpower. Specifically, India’s submarine arm is far more [potent](https://www.navalanalyses.com/2018/07/infographics-37-asian-submarine-forces.html) than Pakistan’s both in numbers and force structure. Although India lacks [heavy torpedoes](https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/indias-submarine-fleet-still-lacks-modern-heavyweight-torpedoes/), it makes up for this with varied [Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)](https://m.dailyhunt.in/news/india/english/defence%2Blover-epaper-defence/how%2Bgood%2Bis%2Bindian%2Bnavy%2Banti%2Bsubmarine%2Bwarfare%2Bcapabilities-newsid-89196013) capabilities for which it has range of platforms and armament. India operates aircraft carriers among other capital ships that let it exercise effective sea-control. Pakistan has invested in [limited](https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/in-navy-development.htm) sea denial capabilities, and this too is [shore-based](https://www.janes.com/article/79542/pakistan-navy-releases-images-of-zarb-coastal-defence-system) with cover provided by the Zarb weapon system and JF-17 fighters, which are short legged. Even without a literal blockade, which is greatly escalatory, the presence of a few warships will tremendously increase the insurance cost of the shipping and act as a deterrent. The insurance costs of shipping are bound to rise as almost 60 percent of [export-import cargo](https://tribune.com.pk/story/1136469/imports-exports-trade-via-karachi-port-records-15-increase/) is handled by a single Karachi port, while the rest is shared between Qasim and Gwadar. Pakistan’s economy, already in tatters, can ill-afford to bear such a cost.

### AT: Pakistan wouldn’t use nukes general

#### Wilson from case writes that Pakistan has developed tactical nuclear weapons for the sole purpose of responding to Indian conventional aggression.

# Frontlines: Subpoint B

### A2 China Containment Good

1. No uniqueness- Hemmings of Real Clear Defense in 2018 explains that Chinese actions in the status quo are a response to what they view as containment. There is no unique reason why India’s containment would be different.
2. US Won’t be Down for Containment- Hemmings furthers that America policy makers have continually disavowed such a strategy against China saying it would be impossible and undesirable due to China’s integration with the global economy
3. Historical Precedence proves that China reacts Negatively- Hemmings furthers that in response to a US-Australia-India- Japan quadrilateral in 2008, China framed the pact as containment and used pressure against Australia to end the agreement.

John Hemmings, 3-9-2018, "The Myth of Chinese Containment," No Publication, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/03/09/the\_myth\_of\_chinese\_containment\_113175.html

China’s most successful strategy, perhaps, has been to attack any response to its actions with the “containment” concept. The Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia”; trade deals such as the TTP and TTIP; U.S.–Republic of Korea exercises; the Japan–India nuclear agreement; the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”; various U.S. presidential visits to the region; U.S. reactions to Chinese moves in the South China Sea; the U.S.–Japan–India–Australia Quadrilateral; and even Western values and the Nobel Prize have been seen as “containment” by China’s diplomats and media.

John Hemmings, 3-9-2018, "The Myth of Chinese Containment," Real Clear Defense, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/03/09/the\_myth\_of\_chinese\_containment\_113175.html

As a concept, containment dates back to the beginning of the Cold War and U.S. diplomat George Kennan’s infamous Long Telegram which first articulated the outlines of a policy that could be used to peacefully contain Soviet efforts to globalise their ideology and influence. American policymakers have continually disavowed such a strategy against China, as have Australian counterparts, saying it would be impossible and undesirable due to China’s integration with the global economy. This, however, has had little effect on the use of the term by Chinese policymakers and diplomats. It’s not difficult to tell why.

John Hemmings, 3-9-2018, "The Myth of Chinese Containment," Real Clear Defense, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/03/09/the\_myth\_of\_chinese\_containment\_113175.html

In terms of strategic messaging, “containment” has sown confusion among Western trading and security policy elites about how to react to the less positive aspects of China’s rise. The concept has been used to shift responsibility and agency from China itself to the West: “China isn’t behaving assertively, it’s reacting to an unfair containment policy”. The decision by Australia to abandon the U.S.–Japan–Australia–India Quadrilateral under Chinese pressure in 2008 was a reaction to Chinese pressure, and its resurrection nearly nine years later saw Chinese diplomats attempt to reframe it as “containment” or “NATO-in-Asia”.

### Nationalism Controls Political Calculus

1. **Crossley ‘19 of Dartmouth** explains that Chinese foreign policy is controlled by nationalism, as even with the current amounts of territorial expansion the people are pushing for more. This is why, **Sheng ‘14 of UChicago** notes that China will never cede land in the SCS, and **Smith ‘15 of the APSC** concludes that any attempt at checking, or balancing China is viewed as an extreme act of disrespect, and the people within China create mass pressure to take action like what happened in 2009 when Malaysia and the Philippines responded to China, and China became more aggressive.

Pamela Kyle Crossley,1-29-2019, Xi’s China Is Steamrolling Its Own History, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/29/xis-china-is-steamrolling-its-own-history/, //CJ

But it is not foreign historians or diplomats who need to be—or can be—convinced by Xi’s version of history. The intended audience is in China. Denunciations of “nihilism” have become louder as **Xi pushes his programs for reification of Chinese “tradition.”** The party history factory has identified historiography as a primary field of battle between the CCP and its enemies and exhorts Chinese historians to “strike” more frequently and more forcefully against foreign colleagues.  Among the most recent and ominous of these strikes is a recent editorial in the official journal Historical Research (Lishi yanjiu)—republished in both the print and online versions of the party organ People’s Daily—titled “Firmly grasp the right to speak of the history of the Qing dynasty.” The editorial states that too many Chinese historians have fallen under the sway of foreign nihilists, producing a gusher of new scholarship on the Qing that **in ideological potency has nevertheless been “far from sufficient to meet the needs of the party and the people.” It prescribes a** “Qing history research system with Chinese characteristics, Chinese tastes, and Chinese style”**—the** essentializing **narrative that Xi uses to glamorize himself and his foreign ventures.**  Many scholars of Chinese affairs decry Xi’s ruthless war on the cultures and communities of Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia. That has nothing to do with history but **is a matter of humanity and conscience in the present. No pile of historical claims to control of territory can excuse such abuses, in China or elsewhere.**  “Historical nihilism” is nothing more than a denial that the past is fundamentally a resource to be plundered by the present. **Xi’s imagined** history of the Qing as a **huge empire of wealth and glory without conquest or tears may seem inane, but Western historians should note the seriousness of the CC**P and the Qing History Project, because their Chinese colleagues surely do. China, after all, has a rich record, past and present, of imprisoning historians, many of whom do not emerge from custody. In the “firmly grasp” of the editorial’s title, the character used (lao, 牢) literally means “grip, fix, trap, imprison.” In that grasp can be held both the history prescribed by Xi and the historians who might resist it.

### India Uniquely Threatens China

1. **Mizokami ‘17** explains that India lies on the jugular vein for China and has the potential to cut of 87% of China’s oil imports which would fundamentally threaten China. Problematically, **Shullman ‘19 of the Brookings Institute** explains that the economy is the lynchpin to legitimacy for the CCP and controls the actions that it takes. This would be disastrous, as the threat of this alone leads **Collins ‘18 of Rice University** to find that this would create conflict in the South China Sea and have massive impacts that would reverberate globally.

David Shullman,1-22-2019, Protect the Party: China’s growing influence in the developing world, Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/protect-the-party-chinas-growing-influence-in-the-developing-world/, //CJ

While the Party’s primary focus remains on domestic issues such as corruption deemed central to its legitimacy, Chinese leaders have sharpened their focus on those aspects of developing country relationships deemed likely to bolster the Party’s fortunes amid this turbulence.[4] Two significant areas in which the CCP has stepped up influence efforts to benefit Party control are the economic and information domains.[5] First, Beijing wants to mitigate mounting economic challenges and slowing growth in China through overseas investment and the creation of markets abroad for Chinese goods and materials. **The [CCP’s]** Party’s **legitimacy depends on the health of China’s economy.[**6] Access to resources needed to feed China’s growing economy has long driven its engagement with the developing world, but China’s economy is now struggling. Chinese leaders are therefore looking to further boost overseas investment and trade, which have been growing for years but have been partially rebranded under the BRI. As part of its broader economic development strategy, Beijing is using BRI to export massive quantities of steel and aluminum, find new markets for Chinese products, and help keep indebted state-owned enterprises (SOEs) afloat.[7] BRI projects, many of which are implemented through provincial governments eager to capitalize, facilitate the expansion of Chinese companies’ international footprint.[8] These efforts are viewed as critical to propping up growth and employment as China endures an uncertain transition from a manufacturing focus to services and consumption, including potential reforms likely to result in layoffs

Kyle Mizokami,5-27-2017, If 2.6 Billion People Go To War: India vs. China, National Interest,https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/if-26-billion-people-go-war-india-vs-china-20875,//CJ

The war at sea would be the decisive front in a conflict between the two countries. Sitting astride the Indian Ocean, **India lies on China’s jugular vein. The Indian Navy**, with its force of submarines, aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya and surface ships **could easily curtail the the flow of trade between China and Europe, the Middle East, and Africa**. It would take the Chinese Navy weeks to assemble and sail a fleet capable of contesting the blockade. Even then, the blockade would be hard to break up, conducted over the thousands of square miles of the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, shipping to and from China would be forced to divert through the western Pacific Ocean, where such diversions would be vulnerable to Australian, Japanese, or American naval action. **87 percent of the country’s petroleum needs are imported from abroad, particularly the Middle East and Africa.** China’s strategic petroleum reserves, once completed sometime in the 2020s, **could stave off a nationwide fuel shortage for up to seventy-seven days—but after that Beijing would have to seek an end to the war however possible.**

Gabriel Collins,5-2-2018, No Publication, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&amp;httpsredir=1&amp;article=1735&amp;context=nwc-review, //CJ

Second, **China**’s economic weight means that, unlike a country such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, or Syria, it c**annot be cut off from the global economy with relatively little systemic consequence.** An enduring lesson of past U.S. military actions abroad is that we are at our most powerful when we act with a critical mass of like-minded nations supporting us and facilitating the translation of national wealth into combat power. Unless China conducted a Pearl Harbor–style first strike, the United States likely would find it very difficult to line up sufficient international support for—or at least extended tolerance of—an economically destructive maritime oil blockade against China that likely would need to last for twelve months or longer to have full strategic effect. **The global economic injury incurred simply would far outweigh the upside of supporting a prolonged campaign whose genesis most likely would come from a highly local miscalculation in a place such as the East or South China Sea, where the conflict is bilateral but the consequences would reverberate globally.** Third, China has multiple supply-side and demand-side options for buying itself strategic space and time to cope with a cutoff of seaborne oil and refined products imports. Its crude-oil inventories now likely exceed six hundred million barrels, equal to roughly a hundred days’ worth of seaborne crude-oil imports. 11 Despite China’s growing absolute and relative dependency on imported crude oil, it also remains one of the world’s largest producers, pumping more than 3.5 million barrels per day (bpd) from its own fields. With Kazakh and Russian assistance, it also likely could surge secure overland crude-oil imports by several hundred thousand barrels per day on relatively short notice