

We Affirm.

Contention one is North Korea.

WAR NOW 4 warrants.

1. South Korean preemptive strikes. International relations professor Robert Kelly explains in 2015 that the expansion of North Korea's nuclear program will begin to represent an existential threat to South Korea and politicians will be so scared that they will have to preemptively strike North Korea, resulting in war.
2. Accidents. Harry Kazianis at the National Interest explains in 2016 that continued North Korean missile tests risk an accident where a missile goes off course and hits Japan or South Korea, resulting in retaliation and war.
3. Miscalculation. Gordon Chang at Cornell explains in 2016 that North Korea is doubling down to demonstrate strength to the international community and could miscalculate and start a small violent provocation, mistakenly believing that there will be no international response.
4. Tensions. Leonid Petrov at Australian National University explains in 2016 that due to the recent Kaesong industrial park closure, increased North Korean missile tests that extinguished any hope of negotiations, joint US-South Korean military exercises, and cutting of all communication channels, tensions are at an unprecedented level which inevitably increases the risk of conflict because it puts both sides on hair trigger alert.

Conflict would escalate - Kelly explains in 2015 that North Korea can't harden their locations enough to achieve second strike, meaning their arsenal will always come with "use it or lose it" mindset that incentivizes a nuclear first strike. PhD Kim Chol furthers in 2011 that the Korean peninsula is the most inflammable global flashpoint and any conflict, accident, or miscalculation would become a full-blown nuclear war between the US and North Korea. The slightest incident can lead to war, and North Korea is fully ready to start humanity's first and last nuclear exchange

THAAD solves.

1. Shooting down missiles. Bruce Klingner at Heritage explains in 2015 that THAAD is better than any system South Korea currently has because it patches holes in existing BMD coverage and shoots down missiles at a higher altitude to minimize civilian damage. He furthers in 2017 that THAAD would boost deterrence against nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks, and reduce the need for a US preemptive strike against North Korea. Deterrence is independently key - Richard Fontaine at the Center for New American Security explains in 2017 that THAAD's deterrence boost would ensure North Korea only engages in minor provocations instead of starting a full-on war of aggression.
2. Risk aversion. International Studies professor Bruce MacDonald explains in 2015 that in a crisis, North Korea would not be able to count on the South's BMD not working and would hedge against the possibility that BMD is more effective than expected, resulting in mutual risk aversion that would create crisis stability, regardless of the actual effectiveness of BMD. Additionally, assistant to the secretary of defense John Harvey,

Commented [1]: Trick uq

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finds in 2016 that creating doubt about whether North Korea's nuclear weapons will be effective would push Kim to the negotiating table to denuclearize.

Commented [3]: trick uq

Independently, Scott Snyder at the Council on Foreign Relations explains in 2017 that if South Korea blocks THAAD deployment to protect US troops, it would erode US public support and give Trump pretext to withdraw the US from South Korea.

Two impacts

1. Regime collapse. Tommy Mize at the US Army War College explains in 2012 that North Korea uses the U.S. presence for propaganda purposes to rally the people of North Korea to accept sacrifices and prop up the regime, which prevents the regime from collapsing, which would result in huge refugee flows and some of North Korea's nuclear arsenal being sold on the illicit market to rogue actors. Sungtae Park at the Council on Foreign Relations explains in 2016 that if the regime collapses, Kim will be under enormous psychological pressure and stress, risking an accidental nuclear launch from a miscalculation because during a regime collapse, Kim would be paranoid about a US invasion to secure North Korea's nuclear arsenal.
2. Stopping war. Clint Work at the Diplomat explains in 2014 that US presence in South Korea deters South Korea from taking escalatory actions in response to North Korean actions that would normally be considered acts of war since US leadership doesn't want a war to break out.

Contention two is Prolif.

Bruce Klingner explains in 2011 that ballistic missile prolifer is currently occurring across Asia, but US deployment of comprehensive BMD would reassure allies and discourage prolifer by reducing the perceived need for missiles. International affairs PhD Daniel Pinkston furthers in 2014 that given high internal support for nuclear breakout in South Korea, THAAD plays a critical role in assurance, and South Korean prolifer would cause Japan to follow on. Government professor Steven Brooks explains in 2013 that South Korean and Japanese prolifer would cause arms racing, proxy wars, and cascading proliferation, increasing the chance of nuclear use. Political science professor Stephen Cimbala furthers in 2015 that due to unreliable command and control systems, rogue commanders, faulty intelligence, and huge pressure for preemption, nuclear prolifer in Asia could easily start a nuclear conflict.

Independently, Josh Levinger at MIT explains in 2006 that ballistic missile prolifer raises the chance of accidental launch and rapid escalation since adversaries may not have the advanced military decision process of the US.

Additionally, David Santoro at the CSIS explains in 2015 that failure to reassure US allies in Asia could cause a loss of confidence in the US as a security guarantor, sending shockwaves throughout the global alliance system. Brooks explains that the US alliance system provides the political framework and communication channels for the US to push for cooperation on transnational issues like terrorism, climate change, and pandemics. More specifically, economics professor Tyler Cowen explains in 2013 that US subsidization of a feeling of security

in South Korea is meant to signal alliance credibility to Israel to keep them in line, and if the US wavers on South Korea Israel could respond against Iran. Public Affairs professor Rafael Reuveny explains in 2010 that an Israeli strike on Iran would start a major regional war that would drag in the US, prompting Russia and China to challenge US hegemony, thus starting World War Three.

Summary

Korean war outweighs -

1. Timeframe - modernization takes years whereas our scenario happens in the near future
- timeframe first, you can only go extinct once the faster scenario precludes everything else and means intervening actors can probably solve their impacts
2. Probability - Economic ties, second strike capability, and diplomacy and hotlines make a China war unlikely but those things don't exist for North Korea.
3. Turns case - Cordesman says China would get drawn into a Korean conflict so we access their impact - AND, War on China's doorstep makes them modernize faster than THAAD

Extension options

UQ

Kelley - soko will first strike once noko program is developed enough

Kazianis - noko missile tests will go off course and hit Japan or soko

Chang - Kim will miscalc and cross a red line with a provocation that will escalate fast

Klingner - THAAD stops US from needing to preemptive strike

Fontaine - Deterrence means noko does small provocations instead of outright warr of aggression

Mize and Park - regime collapse causes loose nukes and Kim would preemptively launch nukes

thinking that the US and soko were about to invade to secure the arsenal during collapse

Work - US presence stops soko from retaliating against acts of war by noko which would normally start a war

LINK

Klingner - THAAD patches holes, hits higher, shoots down missiles without harming civilians, creates deterrence

MacDonald - Noko has to assume BMD is more effective because if they assume it doesn't work and are wrong, they're fucked, which de-escalates crises because it creates mutual risk aversion.

Harvey - BMD creates doubts over whether nukes will work and makes them potentially obsolete, so Kim denuclearizes via negotiations so he can cash in for the best deal.

IMPACT

Kelley - noko will never have second strike so any attack looks like it's an attempt to destroy the arsenal and forces them into use or lose framing which causes a nuclear first strike

Chol - any small incident escalates to full nuclear war and extinction and noko is willing to end the world

OR

Prolif outweighs

1. Timeframe - Klingner says it's already happening in the squo whereas modernization takes years - timeframe first, you can only go extinct once the faster scenario precludes everything else and means intervening actors can probably solve their impacts
2. Probability - prolif creates tons of scenarios for nuclear conflict because there are way more actors whereas they only have one scenario about China, AND lack of second strike for new states makes preemption more likely
3. Turns case - Offensive prolif obviously causes faster modernization than defenses like THAAD - AND Klingner says BMD reduces the value of prolif which means China is less likely to modernize.

Extension options

Nuke prolif

Klingner - BMD discourages allied prolif - it creates assurance and reduces the need and value of prolif

Pinkston - THAAD reassures soko, otherwise they'll get nukes and Japan will follow them

Brooks - Soko and Japan prolif causes arms racing and nuclear cascade across the region

Cimbala - bad command and control, bad intel, and pressure for preemption means Asian prolif ends in nuclear war

Missile prolif:

Klingner - conventional allied missile prolif is happening now in Asia, BMD solves - it reassures allies and reduces the need and value of missile prolif

Brooks - Soko and Japan buildup causes arms racing through the region

Levinger - missile prolif causes accidental launch due to underdeveloped military decision processes - goes nuclear since Asian states like India, Pakistan, and China already have nukes and conflicts with US allies due to missile prolif drag in the US.

OR

Alliance system outweighs

1. Timeframe - modernization takes years, our impacts are triggered by the perception that the US isn't doing assurance - timeframe first, you can only go extinct once, the faster scenario precludes everything else and means intervening actors can probably solve their impacts.
2. Probability - Stuart Armstrong at Oxford explains in 2015 that while the risks of extinction-level wars have decreased over time, pandemic risks are increasing due to modern transport and high population density and all the components of a civilization-ending pandemic already exist in nature.
3. Turns case
 - a. Climate change, pandemics, and terrorism are all threat multipliers that make every form of armed conflict more likely, particularly over resources.

- b. Collapse of the alliance system makes the US and its former allies seem weaker which incentivizes China and every other revisionist power to attack.

Extensions

Klingner - BMD reassures allies in East Asia

Pinkston - THAAD reassures soko and Japan

Santoro - failure to reassure Asian allies causes loss of confidence in the US which wrecks the alliance system

Brooks - alliance system creates communication and political framework to do coop on pandemics, climate change, and terrorism.

OR

Israeli strikes outweigh

1. Timeframe - modernization takes years, but Israeli perception that the US is wavering on soko causes immediate strikes on Iran - timeframe first, you can only go extinct once, the faster scenario precludes everything else and means intervening actors can probably solve their impacts.
2. Turns case
 - a. Reuveny says China would go to war with the US because it would look like the US is too busy in the Israeli-Iran war to maintain heg elsewhere - means we access their impact
 - b. Israeli strike would make China modernize faster cuz they'd perceive that the US and its allies are willing to preemptively strike to achieve nuclear disarmament of their adversaries.
3. They dropped all the impact calc

Extensions

Klingner - BMD reassures allies in East Asia

Pinkston - THAAD reassures soko and Japan

Cowen - reassuring soko is key to signal credibility to Israel and keep them in line - wavering on soko causes retaliation against Iran

Reuveny - Israeli strike on Iran starts world war three, causes Russia and China to challenge US heg and start great power war.

Frontlines

AT: War is always deliberate

1. No - National security professor Steven Metz explains every RECENT US war has started from miscalculation and a Korean war could start the same way.

AT: Moon is a pacifist (no soko preemption)

1. Kelley says soko public and politicians will inevitably put enormous pressure for preemption as the noko threat grows and people fear for their lives
2. Doesn't assume US troop withdrawal which results in soko hawks being unchecked

AT: Accident won't happen, testing has happened forever

1. Testing may have happened for a while but it's rapidly increasing - Zach Cohen at CNN reports in 2017 that Kim has already tested more missiles than his father and grandfather combined and testing will only continue to ramp up.
2. Other countries don't matter cuz they weren't launching missiles over other countries so going off course wouldn't do anything

AT: No retaliation to accident

1. They don't have a card, we do - Kazianis says Japan and soko would retaliate against the missile site and North Korea would respond with artillery on Seoul which would cause fast escalation and draw in the US.
2. Doesn't assume US troop withdrawal causing soko to actually respond to acts of war.

AT: No miscalc cuz their strategy stays the same

1. Chang says the strategy is changing cuz Kim needs to demonstrate strength to keep the regime afloat which will cause him to do a provocation that crosses an invisible red line.

AT: Soko won't retaliate to miscalc

1. Irrelevant - Chang says if Kim accidentally crosses the line the INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY will respond ie the US Japan etc.
2. Doesn't assume US troop withdrawal causing soko to actually respond to acts of war.

AT: Noko has NFU

1. Their ev from Sam Kim says Kim Jong Un will only use nukes if noko's sovereignty is encroached on by a nuclear armed foreign power which basically means they use nukes if the US helps soko in a conflict.

AT: Generic won't go nuclear/not suicidal

1. Kelley says noko can't get second strike so a US attack look likes an attempt to destroy their arsenal which triggers use or lose preemption - they may not be suicidal but if it looks like they're going to lose their arsenal both options are suicide
2. They are suicidal - Chol says they're willing to literally cause extinction via nuclear war with the US
3. Kim not being suicidal only proves he won't actively start a war with no provocation, doesn't disprove most of our arguments

AT: THAAD Fails

1. Irrelevant - MacDonald says Noko would have to assume BMD works because if they assume it will fail and are wrong they get absolutely demolished, which causes crisis de-escalation regardless of if BMD is effective
2. It doesn't fail - Klingner says it patches holes and makes BMD more comprehensive - even if it isn't terribly effective it still creates some deterrence

AT: Noko won't do war of aggression

1. Their evidence assumes they won't do it cuz deterrence is too strong and they don't want to die, our Fontaine evidence says deterrence fails absent THAAD which their evidence doesn't account for.

AT: Deterrence fails/bad/etc

1. All of their evidence is generic and not specific to noko - our Fontaine and Klingner evidence are specific to noko and say deterrence works and is important
2. All their "Kim isn't suicidal" arguments prove he's rational and can be deterred

AT: No troop pullout

1. Yes withdrawal - Snyder says if soko blocks THAAD, which defends US troops, the US public would demand withdrawal due to heightened risk from noko and Trump would use it as a pretext to withdraw which is what he's wanted all along
2. Their Heritage ev doesn't say troops have to be there to fulfill the treaty - treaty just requires us to defend soko if they're attacked
3. Their Prins ev says Washington is hesitant which doesn't assume Snyder and doesn't assume Trump's Washington which wants to make allies defend themselves
4. Their Manyin ev just says the US has trade ties with soko which is non-responsive and the US-Soko relationship might be strong but that doesn't determine withdrawal, the ability for the troops to be protected by THAAD does.

AT: No collapse b/c alt causes (Kelley)

1. This assumes nationalism continues but the Mize evidence says the underpinning of nationalism is US troop presence and the propaganda machine would collapse without presence

AT: No impact to collapse

1. Kim would lash out, not because of diversionary war theory but because of huge psychological pressure and paranoia about an invasion causing miscalc so the Yoo ev doesn't apply
2. Even if there's no war, Mize says collapse would allow rogue actors to acquire North Korea's nukes which still causes some form of nuclear strike that escalates.

AT: Soko not aggressive absent US troops

1. Their ev doesn't assume the moderating presence of the US - Work says soko would have retaliated against noko's acts of war if it wasn't for the US presence

2. More ev - David Santoro at the CSIS explains in 2016 that in joint military war games soko tends to want automatic disproportionate retaliation against noko whereas the US tries to hold them back

AT: THAAD harms the alliance (Guy Taylor)

1. The outrage is from soko citizens which explains Moon's election - politicians and soko military officials want THAAD and will prolif without it, that's Pinkston

AT: Alliance stable (Uq)

1. Non-responsive - this argument is about providing assurance to the alliance, not whether the alliance will entirely collapse or not.
2. It's not stable - all our evidence from Klinger, Pinkston, and Santoro says THAAD is key to shoring up the alliance, otherwise the global alliance system will collapse.

AT: Alliance fucked either way (Trump and Moon)

1. False - neither Trump nor Moon have followed through on their rhetoric and there's no reason to think they will in the future BUT absent THAAD soko's security fears will damage the alliance system and trigger prolif

AT: Security umbrellas bad (Friedman)

1. This evidence is soooo generic and not specific to soko - our Work evidence is specific to soko and says the US reigns in their aggressive impulses.

AT: THAAD disagreement between soko and China causes soko prolif (Yoon)

1. No warrant, the card is two sentences - Pinkston is better, says THAAD reassures soko which means they don't perceive nukes as necessary - if they have defense they don't need offense

AT: No soko/Japan prolif (Stangrone/Fitzpatrick)

1. Yes prolif - their ev is 2 years old and doesn't assume new tensions and massive security threat posed by recent noko nuclear development - there's high internal support for prolif in the squo and only THAAD can solve via assurance, otherwise soko will prolif and Japan will follow on

Rebuttal

Alliance system outweighs

4. Timeframe - it takes years to fully develop MIRV, hypersonics etc and then even more time for conflict to breakout but our impacts are triggered by the perception that the US isn't doing assurance to the alliance AND, timeframe first - you can only go extinct once so the faster scenario precludes everything else, AND longer timeframe means more time for intervening actors to solve their impacts. For example, if hypersonics ASATs and MIRV become a problem there will be huge incentives for the creation of treaties like START or the NPT to regulate those forms of proliferation.
5. Probability - Stuart Armstrong at Oxford explains in 2015 that while the risks of extinction-level wars have decreased over time, pandemic risks are increasing due to modern transport and high population density and all the components of a civilization-ending pandemic already exist in nature.
6. Turns case
 - a. Climate change, pandemics, and terrorism are all threat multipliers that make every form of armed conflict more likely, particularly over resources.
 - b. Collapse of the alliance system makes the US and its former allies seem weaker which incentivizes China and every other revisionist power to attack.

Israeli strikes outweigh

4. Timeframe - modernization takes years, but Israeli perception that the US is wavering on soko causes immediate strikes on Iran
5. Turns case
 - a. Reuveny says China would go to war with the US because it would look like the US is too busy in the Israeli-Iran war to maintain heg elsewhere - means we access their impact
 - b. Israeli strike would make China modernize faster cuz they'd perceive that the US and its allies are willing to preemptively strike to achieve nuclear disarmament of their adversaries.

AT: Sanctions

- 1.
2. No impact. Scott **Snyder** at the Council on Foreign Relations explains in 2017 that Chinese sanctions are so narrowly tailored that the vast majority of the Sino-South Korean economic relationship is unaffected. Empirically, Sui-Lee **Wee** of the New York Times explains in 2017, South Korea's exports to China actually rose 12% in the January-August period.

AT: Modernization top shelf

1. No uniqueness. Peter **Brookes** at the Heritage Foundation in 2000 that China's modernization had been occurring for more than 15 years before 2000, which predates

all missile defense debate and dialogues, and modernization will continue regardless of BMD deployment - they don't have a reverse causal internal links saying BMD removal causes China to reverse modernize.

2. WHERE IS THE SCENARIO FOR CONFLICT BREAKOUT - who does China attack and why - this entire argument is just saying it makes escalation faster and increases incentives for preemption but doesn't say how war actually starts or what the motivation is.
3. No escalation - Zachary **Keck** of the Diplomat explains in 2013 that conflict between the US and China wouldn't escalate because leaders know that failure to contain the conflict would end in nuclear war, and would prefer to lose credibility among hawks over the complete destruction of their countries, and backdoor diplomacy would cause de-escalation.

AT: Second strike link

1. Info sharing solves. Tuosheng **Zhang** finds in 2017 that the US could simply lock the THAAD radar and give China technical specs for the system, which would solve China's objection to the system.
2. THAAD won't affect China. Bruce **Klinger** of the Heritage Foundation explains in 2015 that Chinese ICBM trajectories exceed the capabilities of THAAD in terms of range, speed, and altitude, and the radar can only see into a 90-degree arc directed at North Korea, not at China.

AT: Policy shift link

1. Turn - THAAD demonstrates the US wants strategic stability because THAAD is defensive and meant to create mutual risk aversion, and the alternative is offensive proliferation which obviously wrecks strategic stability more.
2. The Colby evidence makes absolutely no sense - conventional US aggression doesn't exist in the squo and there's no reason modernization uniquely increases the US's fear of retaliation

AT: Hypersonics

1. Hypersonics are inevitable due to things like US PGS and railgun development - Bill **Gertz** at the Brookings Institute finds in 2017 that hypersonic missiles are rapidly being developed now in both China, where seven tests having already been performed, and Russia, where several tests have taken place.
2. No link - PhD Erika **Solem** explains in 2016 that THAAD did not prompt Russia and China's Hypersonic Missile program.

AT: MIRV

1. No uniqueness - Tong **Zhao** at the Carnegie Center for Global Policy finds in 2015 that Chinese development of MIRVs is simply a response to US development of the same technology, and that MIRVs represent "the inevitable wave of the future".
2. No impact - **Zhao** continues that China would store MIRV warheads separately from missiles during peacetime to ensure people aren't scared of a Chinese first strike, and would only use them if war had already broken out.

AT: Space Mil

1. No uniqueness - Harsh **Vasani** at the Diplomat reports in 2016 that China is currently developing ASATs, satellite jammers, direct energy weapons, and a host of other space weapons.
2. No impact - Security researcher Brinda **Banerjee** explains in 2015 that a new space hotline set up between China and the US will prevent space militarization from escalating into war.

NO REASON ANYTHING GOES NUCLEAR CAUSES EXTINCTION

FRONTLINES

1. Da doesn't turn case - it's about China not noko no reason MIRV tech gets to noko etc
2. Causes allied prolif is our uq argument from Klingenr only BMD solves

AT: Alliance fucked either way (Trump and Moon)

2. False - Trump hasn't followed through on their rhetoric and there's no reason to think they will in the future BUT absent THAAD soko's security fears will damage the alliance system and trigger prolif

AT: THAAD disagreement between soko and China causes soko prolif (Yoon)

2. No warrant, the card is two sentences - Pinkston is better, says THAAD reassures soko which means they don't perceive nukes as necessary - if they have defense they don't need offense

CASE CARDS

DETERRENCE

North Korea is continually about to collapse and could use nukes if collapse happens

Park 2016 [Sungtae Park is a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations. "When a Collapsing, Paranoid North Korea Turns to Nukes", *The National Interest*, <<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/when-collapsing-paranoid-north-korea-turns-nukes-15201>>] //CJC

On February 7, North Korea conducted another long-range missile test, disguised as a satellite launch. The test comes after a nuclear test on January 6 and a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test in December of last year, indicating that the Kim Jong-un regime is intent on developing a secure and deliverable nuclear deterrent. If the regime achieves its objective, **North Korea could become the most dangerous nuclear-weapons state in the world, not because the Kim regime is irrational, but because North Korea is the only existing nuclear-weapons state that could conceivably collapse at any moment.** Then, U.S. policy makers will have to ask a very, very uncomfortable question: Should the United States come to terms with North Korea as a nuclear-weapons state and seek détente? The conventional logic with regard to nuclear deterrence rests on the principle that states are rational, care about self-preservation above all, and will not willingly commit suicide by attacking another state capable of exacting devastating retaliation. The general idea behind this school is that the destructive potential of nuclear weapons would more or less prevent their use and would reduce, if not eliminate, a state's incentive to start or escalate a destructive conflict. History has so far backed this argument. To be sure, there were the Berlin crises culminating in the Cuban missile crisis, the Able Archer exercise, the India-Pakistan crises and others, which nearly resulted in nuclear wars. Humanity may have been fortunate, rather than wise, with these crises. But strictly speaking, the fact is that nuclear deterrence, at least in today's world with a small number of nuclear-weapons states, has stood its ground so far. According to this principle, North Korea should not be much of a threat. After all, Pyongyang's motive for seeking a secure and deliverable nuclear arsenal is security, as the North Koreans themselves have stated many times. Of course, the Kim regime might launch provocations and even increase them with better nuclear capabilities. According to the logic of nuclear deterrence, however, Pyongyang will make rational calculations and will never escalate to a point where the regime would critically endanger its own security. Moreover, given North Korea's military and economic weakness, the country is in no shape to expand beyond its borders. Unlike China, for example, North Korea will never become a potential regional hegemon or a serious competitor to the United States. **But North Korea is not an ordinary nuclear-weapons state. The country is the only existing nuclear-weapons state that could see a sudden internal collapse.** Critics might argue that predictions about the regime's demise have been wrong before, but this logic does not stand: the fact that an event has not happened yet does not mean that the event will never happen. Indeed, the Iranian revolution began on January 7, 1978—one week after Jimmy Carter touted the country as "an island of stability." How about the Soviet Union, which Robert Gates, during the 1980s, said would never collapse during his or his children's lifetime? Then there is the Arab Spring, which caught the entire world by surprise. The common theme from these cases is that **regime instability could manifest itself before analysts realize that it might be possible.** Only with hindsight, can one point out why these uprisings happened at the time of their occurrence.

[...]

In a collapse scenario, the Kim regime will also be making decisions under enormous psychological pressure and with a great sense of paranoia. The regime understandably sees the United States as bent on seeking regime change in North Korea. The regime also fears that the collapse of the country and implosion of the Kim family's cult of personality might not only mean loss of power, but loss of life, as with the cases of Iraq's Saddam Hussein and Libya's Muammar Gaddafi. According to Andrei N. Lankov in his book, *The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia*, a North Korean bureaucrat once said: "The human rights and the like might be a great idea, but if we start explaining it to our people, we will be killed in no time." Given the uniquely brutal nature of North Korea's totalitarianism, such sentiments are only rational. **During a collapse scenario, these psychological factors could greatly increase room**

for miscalculation or misperception for the Kim regime, particularly if it loses hope for survival and lacks access to reliable information, **creating an environment that might even lead to the accidental launch of nuclear-tipped missiles.** If stable nuclear-weapons states had come close to using nuclear weapons multiple times before, what might a collapsing, paranoid North Korea do with its arsenal?

Weak missile defense independently causes South Korean preemptive strikes – that escalates

Kelly 15 (Robert, associate professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University, 4-13-2015, “South Korea’s THAAD Decision,” <http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/south-koreas-thaad-decision/>) //BS 7-5-2017

Last month, I argued that **North Korea’s combined nuclear and missile program was reaching a tipping point. Previously these systems could be defended—at the outer reaches of rationality,** to be sure—as **protection against possible American-led regime change. In practice, they were primarily tools for the extortion and blackmail of Pyongyang’s** neighbors, most obviously South Korea. **North Korea’s gangsterism, while objectionable, has generally been manageable. But if** (when?) **the Northern program expands into more, faster, and more powerful warheads and missiles (as seems likely), then it would morph into a serious, possibly existential threat to South Korea (and Japan).** A North Korea with a few missiles and warheads is unnerving, an obvious concern for proliferation and blackmail, but not a state- and society-breaking threat to the neighborhood. **But a North Korea with dozens, or even hundreds, of such weapons** (in the coming decades) **is a threat to the** constitutional and even physical **survival of South Korea and Japan.** My greatest concern then for regional stability is that **at some point Seoul elites will be so terrified of a spiraling arsenal of Northern nuclear weapons** (following the logic of the security dilemma), that **they will consider pre-emptive air-strikes** (as Israel has done in Iraq and Syria). **The possibility of a Northern response and slide into war is obvious. There is an alternative** however—the deployment of **robust missile defense.** While hundreds of incoming missiles would overwhelm any current missile defense system, the technology is advanced enough now for **at least modest coverage.** This **would buy time, providing South Korea with at least a basic “roof” against Northern threats.**

Continued NoKo nuclear development cause preemptive strikes –those escalate

Kelly 15 (Robert E. Kelly, associate professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University in South Korea, March 6, 2015. “Will South Korea Have to Bomb the North, Eventually?” <http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/will-south-korea-have-to-bomb-the-north-eventually/>)

As North Korea expands its nuclear arsenal, will Seoul have to consider targeting missile sites at some point? **As North Korea continues to develop** both **nuclear** weapons **and** the **missile technology** to carry them, **pressure on South Korea to take** **preemptive military action will** gradually **increase.** At some point, North Korea may have **so many missiles and warheads** that South Korea considers that capability to be an **existential threat** to its security. This is the greatest long-term risk to security and stability in Korea, arguably more destabilizing than a North Korean collapse. **If North Korea does not arrest its nuclear and missile programs at a** reasonably small, **defensively-minded deterrent,** then Southern elites **will increasingly see those weapons as threats to Southern survival,** not just tools of defense or gangsterish blackmail. During the Cold War, the extraordinary speed and power of nuclear missiles created a bizarre and frightening “balance of terror.” Both the Americans and Soviets had these weapons, but they were enormously vulnerable to a first strike. Under the logic “use them or lose them,” there were enormous incentives to launch first: If A did not get its missiles out of the silos quickly enough, they might be destroyed by B’s first strike. One superpower could then hold the other’s cities hostage to nuclear annihilation and demand concessions. This **countervalue, “city busting”** temptation was eventually alleviated by “assured second strike” technologies, particularly submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). SLBMs ensured the survivability of nuclear forces; hard-to-find submarines could ride out an enemy first strike and still retaliate. So the

military value of launching first declined dramatically. By the 1970s, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had achieved enough survivability through various “hardening” efforts that nuclear bipolarity was relatively stable despite the huge number of weapons in the arms race. **The Korean nuclear race does not have this stability and is unlikely to ever achieve it.** Nuclear Korea today is more like the Cold War of the 1950s, when nuclear weapons were new and destabilizing, than in the 1970s when they had been strategically integrated, and bipolarity was mature. Specifically, North Korea will never be able to harden its locations well enough to achieve assured second strike. North Korea is too small to pursue the geographic dispersion strategies the Soviets tried, and too poor to build a reliable SLBM force or effective air defense. Moreover, U.S. satellite coverage makes very hard for the North to conceal anything of great importance. **North Korea’s nuclear weapons will always be highly vulnerable. So North Korea will always face the “use it or lose it” logic that incentivizes a first strike.**

On the Southern side, its small size and extreme demographic concentration in a few large cities makes the Republic of Korea *an easy target for a nuclear strike*. More than half of South Korea’s population lives in greater Seoul alone (more than 20 million people), and Seoul’s suburbs begin just thirty miles from the demilitarized zone. **This again raises the temptation** value of a Northern strike. Both the Soviet Union and the United States were so large, that only a massive first strike would have led to national collapse. In South Korea by contrast, nuking only about five large cities would likely be enough to push South Korea toward national-constitutional breakdown. Given its extreme urbanization and centralization, South Korea is extremely vulnerable to a WMD and/or decapitation strike. While large-scale North Korean offensive action is highly unlikely – Pyongyang’s elites most likely just want to survive to enjoy their gangster high life – nuclear weapons do offer a conceivable route to Northern military victory for the first time in decades: a first-strike mix of counterforce detonations to throw the Southern military into disarray; limited counter-value city strikes to spur social and constitutional break-down in the South; followed by an invasion and occupation before the U.S. military could arrive in force; and a standing threat to nuke Japan or the United States as well should they intervene. Again, this is unlikely, and I still strongly believe an *Allied victory is likely even if the North were to use nuclear weapons*. But **the more nukes the North builds, the more this threat, and the “use it or lose it” first strike incentives, grow.** It is for this reason that the U.S. has pushed South Korea so hard on missile defense. Not only would missile defense save lives, but it would dramatically improve Southern national-constitutional survivability. (Decentralization would also help enormously, and I have argued for that repeatedly in conferences in Korea, but *it is unlikely*.) A missile shield would lessen the military-offensive value of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, so reducing both first-strike temptations in Pyongyang and preemptive air-strike pressure in Seoul. Unfortunately *South Korea is not hardened meaningfully* to ride-out Northern nuclear strikes. Missile defense in South Korea has become politicized as a U.S. plot to dominate South Korean foreign policy (*yes, really*) and *provoke China*. (Although opinion may, at last, be *changing on this*.) Air drills are routinely ignored. And no one I know in South Korea knows where their shelters are or what to do in case of nuclear strike. **Ideally North Korea would de-nuclearize. And we should always keep talking to North Korea. Pyongyang is so dangerous that freezing it out is a bad idea.** Talking does not mean we must be taken advantage of by the North’s regular bargaining gimmicks. But we must admit that North Korea seems *unlikely to give up its nuclear weapons*. The program goes back decades, to the 1960s. Rumor has it that Pyongyang has devoted more than 5 percent of GDP in the last two decades to developing these weapons. The program continued through the 1990s, even as more than a million North Koreans starved to death in a famine resulting from post-Cold War economic breakdown. The North has repeatedly lied and flimflammed to outsiders like the ROK government and the IAEA to keep its programs alive clandestinely. Recently Kim Jong Un has referred to *nuclear weapons as the “nation’s life.”* We could even go a step further and admit that a few Northern nuclear missiles *are tolerable*. If we put ourselves in Pyongyang’s shoes, a limited nuclear deterrent makes sense. Conventionally, North Korea is falling further and further behind. No matter how big the North Korean army gets quantitatively, it is an increasingly weak shield against high-tech opponents. U.S. regime change in the Middle East has clearly incentivized despots everywhere in the world to consider the ultimate security which nuclear weapons provide. The *North Koreans have openly said* that nuclear weapons ensure their post-9/11 regime security. As distasteful as it may be to us, there is a logic to that. A small, defensive-minded deterrent – say five to ten warhead-tipped missiles that could threaten limited retaliation against Southern cities – would be an objectively rational hedge against offensive action by the U.S. or South Korea. Indeed, this is almost certainly what Pyongyang says to Beijing to defend its program to its unhappy patron. But this is **the absolute limit of responsible Northern nuclear deployment** and it is probably **where the DPRK is right now.** Further nuclear and missile development would exceed even the most expansive definition of North Korean security and **take us into the realm of nuclear blackmail, highly dangerous proliferation, and an offensive first-strike capability.** Pyongyang does not need, for example, *the ICBM it is supposedly working on*. In this context, my greatest fear for Korean security in the next two decades is North Korean nuclearization continuing apace, generating dozens, perhaps hundreds of missiles and warheads, coupled to rising South Korean paranoia

and pressure to preemptively strike. There is no possible national security rationale for Pyongyang to keep deploying beyond what it has now, and if it does, expect South Korean planners to increasingly consider preemptive airstrikes. North Korea with five or ten missiles (some of which would fail or be destroyed in combat) is a terrible humanitarian threat, but not an existential one to South Korea (and Japan). South Korea could ride out, perhaps, five urban strikes, and Japan even more.

North Korean threat is likely and escalates to world war via miscalc - accidents in testing Kazianis 16—former Executive Editor of The National Interest. Mr. Kazianis also serves as Senior Fellow (non-resident) for Defense Policy at the Center for the National Interest, Senior Fellow (non-resident) at the China Policy Institute as well as a Fellow for National Security Affairs at The Potomac Foundation. He previously served as Editor of The Diplomat and as a WSD Handa Fellow at Pacific Forum: CSIS (Harry, "The Real North Korean Threat: An Accidental World War." 1/8/16. rare.us/story/the-real-north-korean-threat-an-accidental-world-war/)

While domestic and international punditry endlessly debates the latest atomic provocation by the so-called "hermit kingdom," *know one thing: the danger presented by North Korea is very real*—but for reasons that are exactly obvious to the untrained observer.¶ Consider this: a 2013 report by Rand Corporation expert Bruce Bennett noted that *just one North Korean nuke detonated in Seoul* with a 10 kiloton yield could very well cause 200,000 or so deaths along with a similar number of serious injuries. *The financial cost could be as high as \$1.5 trillion* and likely much more if South Korea then had to foot the bill to rebuild the North after a war.¶ And while the chances of the so-called Democratic People's Republic ever launching a nuclear blitz against the South, Japan, or America are next to nil, *the possibility of nuclear war still remains*.¶ So how do we go from nil to nuclear holocaust? Simple: war by accident.¶ Consider this: *Kim Jong-boom loves to push the tension meter*, especially when he feels the world is not paying enough attention to his regime. And let's face it: planet Earth has been a little preoccupied with Russia annexing Crimea, the never-ending civil war in Syria, the rise of ISIS, and what seems like China's unfolding master plan to dominate the South China Sea and maybe all of Asia. Nuclear tests are surely the best way to get Pyongyang back in the headlines.¶ *But what happens if Kim one day pushes too far? And what if it happens unintentionally?*¶ If current patterns hold, North Korea could very well test a medium- to long-range missile in the next few weeks. While the DPRK's missiles certainly inspire a tremendous amount of fear, they don't seem to have exactly mastered the fine art known as accuracy. The danger is quite obvious: what happens if a North Korean missile goes off course and slams into South Korea or Japan? While Tokyo and Seoul both sport advanced American-made missile defense systems, *there's always the possibility of an accidental crash landing*—and lives could be lost.¶ What happens next is where things could get dangerous very quickly. South Korea's President *Park*, her own family the victim of Pyongyang's hit squads, *would not take kindly* to losing more of her citizens to North Korean aggression.¶ *Neither would* Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo *Abe*. Imagine if a North Korean rocket accidentally crashed into Japan. *Tokyo would very likely retaliate* in some fashion militarily, considering Abe has done what he can to reinforce the narrative that Japan must become a "normal country"—and that means Tokyo being able to respond against military threats. The recent reinterpretation of Japan's constitution makes this quite clear.¶ *So let's assume the injured party responds—by, say, South Korea launching its own attack against the North's missile complex that fired the weapon*. North Korea, feeling the pressure to up the ante and leave no challenge unmet, then fires 20 or so artillery rounds into Seoul. The city goes into absolute panic. Millions of people clog the streets and mass transit systems to escape the carnage. Hundreds if not thousands die due to panic—not the artillery shells. South Korea would then respond again...and *a cycle of escalation leading to war would begin*.¶ This is where things get really tricky. *The United States is bound by treaty to protect both South Korea and Japan from external threat*, and provides both nations that all important "nuclear umbrella." *China*, while it might not always be happy about it, *is North Korea's only ally*. It would very likely step in to protect Pyongyang if the regime's survival were at stake, as it wouldn't want a united and

eventually powerful Korea led by the South—one that could still have American troops within its borders.¶ **With Beijing and Washington both sporting nuclear weapons**, and with a whole host of pressure points between them, **it would take very little for just one accidental missile launched by North Korea to spark a crisis** no one has any interest in seeing to the bitter end.¶ While North and South Korea are still technically at war, no one wants the ultimate “frozen conflict” to burn red hot thanks to atomic fire. **Kim Jong-un is clearly an international pariah**, but one who could accidentally start a conflict for the history books. We should remember this as the debate over Pyongyang’s nuclear test marches on.

Miscalc is inevitable and coming now---it’s try or die for effective interception like THAAD
Chang, 16 – citing David S. Maxwell, Associate Director of the Center for Security Studies in the School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University AND Dr. Bruce Bechtol, Professor of International Relations at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College – Gordon G. Chang, author of The Coming Collapse of China and Nuclear Showdown: North Korea Takes On the World, syndicated columnist on North Korea issues, 3-22-2016, “North Korea’s Next Missile Test Could Kill”, The Daily Beast, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/03/22/north-korea-s-next-missile-test-could-kill.html>

On Monday, **North Korea fired five short-range missiles eastward**. The projectiles fell into the Sea of Japan, what Koreans call the East Sea. The provocation followed Friday’s launch of two Nodong medium-range missiles, which can put a dent anywhere in South Korea and parts of Japan. The Democratic People’s Republic of **Korea has launched 15 projectiles on four separate occasions since early last month in apparent shows of anger**. Friday’s and Monday’s **belligerent acts follow** a series of **threats to kill all the residents of Manhattan and launch “preemptive and offensive” nuclear strikes**. The regime has also taken the unprecedented step of releasing photographs of leader Kim Jong Un standing next to what it implied is a thermonuclear device. As one friend whose son served on the peninsula in the 1990s told me in the last few hours, **we’re “eyeball-to-eyeball” with the North Koreans at the moment. Tensions are high on the Korean peninsula this month, as** approximately 300,000 **South Korean and 17,000 American personnel participate in annual military exercises. Every year the Kim regime reacts to the drills, but this year its provocations have been “unprecedented,” as David Maxwell of Georgetown University told The Daily Beast today**. Unfortunately for the international community, Mr. **Kim this year has something to prove**. As Maxwell points out, **his provocations of last August—two South Korean soldiers were maimed in the Demilitarized Zone by land mines—were considered a “failure” because he did not anticipate Seoul’s decisive responses. And his belligerence since then has only worsened his predicament. Kim authorized the regime’s fourth nuclear test, on Jan. 6, and a launch of a long-range rocket, on Feb. 7. These acts did not divide the international community as they might have in an earlier time. Instead, Mr. Kim managed to create his nightmare scenario, the uniting of the United States, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China in a loose coalition against him**. Thanks to this coalition, the UN Security Council unanimously imposed a fifth set of sanctions this month, in Resolution 2270, and Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. unilaterally enacted their own coercive measures. As Georgetown’s Maxwell notes, **“I think the regime is doubling down** after 2270 as it did not expect to get sanctioned harder than it had ever been.” **Maxwell sees Kim having “to demonstrate strength to both internal and external audiences for fear of greater international pressure that will further cut access to resources.” To do that, he thinks Kim will have to speed up his nuclear, missile, and satellite programs “in anticipation of the loss of resources.”** No surprise then that there are reports that the North is getting ready for a fifth detonation of a nuclear device. A test so soon after the last one would raise young Kim’s standing with the top brass, but it would not be enough for him to get back in the good graces of the flag officers. Since taking over the regime in December 2011 upon the unexpected death of his father, he has been feuding with the generals and admirals while trying to diminish their power inside ruling circles. As Richard Fisher of the International Assessment and Strategy Center told The Daily Beast in e-mails, **recent provocations have been**

accompanied by purges and executions. The disappearance and reported execution of Ri Yong Gil, the chief of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army, early last month suggests Kim is losing control of the most important institution in North Korea. Ri, if he was in fact killed as South Korea's semi-official Yonhap News Agency reports, would be at least the third four-star put to death in 13 months. In the short term, Kim probably will not do anything other than make threats and fire weapons into the sea. With the ongoing joint military exercises, the U.S. and South Korea are at a high state of readiness. Yet in May, when the exercises are over, he may engage in another "kinetic" incident. Leading North Korean analyst Bruce Bechtol, who told The Daily Beast that he thinks recent provocations are in response to the new "robust sanctions," has studied the history of Pyongyang's belligerence. In an article in Korea Times, he writes that the patterns of the last four decades show the North could very well initiate "a small violent provocation" against South Korea. Alison Evans of IHS Country Risk told USA Today that "increasing economic hardship in North Korea may well make more provocative action a **logical option** for the leadership." Yet it is not only desperation that Washington has to worry about. Young Kim, for instance, could continue to miscalculate. They will hold to the mistaken belief that the international community will not call its bluff and will eventually back down to ensure stability on the peninsula. Maxwell says, referring to the North Koreans. "But I think the times they are a changing and it will not be business as usual as it was for the past six decades." Whether through miscalculation, desperation, or bluff, the North Korean leadership could make a dangerously wrong move. The next batch of North Korean missiles, therefore, could be launched not east toward open sea but south, where 28,500 Americans help guard 49 million South Koreans.

THAAD deployment's necessary to prevent bolt-out-of-the-blue biological or nuclear missile strike by North Korea

Klingner, 15 – Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center, 6-12-2015, "South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense", Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/06/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense>

Growing North Korean Nuclear and Missile Threats Pyongyang asserts that it already has the ability to attack the continental United States, American bases in the Pacific, and U.S. allies South Korea and Japan with nuclear weapons. In March 2015, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su-yong warned that Pyongyang now "has the power of conducting a pre-emptive strike."[2] Pyongyang announced that its February 2013 nuclear test was of a "miniaturized and lighter" nuclear weapon that could fit on a missile, giving the regime the ability to "make a precision strike at bases of aggression and blow them up with a single blow, no matter where they are on earth."[3] North Korea has an extensive ballistic missile force that could strike South Korea, Japan, and U.S. military bases in Asia. Pyongyang has deployed at least 400 Scud short-range tactical ballistic missiles, 300 No-Dong medium-range missiles, and 100 to 200 Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The Scud missiles threaten South Korea, the No-Dong can range a portion of South Korea and all of Japan, and the Musudan can hit U.S. bases on Okinawa and Guam. U.S. experts estimate that Pyongyang currently has 10–16 nuclear weapons.[4] Dr. Siegfried Hecker, former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, has concluded that North Korea could have **20 nuclear weapons by 2016**. [5] Chinese nuclear experts have warned that North Korea may already have 20 nuclear warheads and could enrich enough uranium to double its arsenal by 2016.[6] The Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) has predicted a worst-case scenario of Pyongyang having 100 nuclear weapons by 2020.[7] Enough unclassified evidence is available to conclude that the regime has likely achieved warhead miniaturization—the ability to place nuclear weapons on its No Dong medium-range ballistic missiles—and can threaten Japan and South Korea with nuclear weapons.[8] Following an August 2013 meeting between South Korean Minister of Defense Kim Kwan-jin and U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, a Ministry of Defense official commented that both countries agreed that North Korea could "miniaturize nuclear warheads small enough to mount on ballistic missiles in the near future." [9] In April 2013, U.S. officials told reporters that North Korea "can put a

nuclear weapon on a missile, that they have missile-deliverable nuclear weapons, but not ones that can go more than 1,000 miles.”[10] In October 2014, General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, senior U.S. commander on the Korean Peninsula, told reporters that North Korea has the ability to produce a miniaturized nuclear warhead that can be mounted on a ballistic missile.[11] A South Korean National Assembly member revealed that some of the flight tests of No Dong missiles were flown on a higher trajectory in order to reduce their range to 650 kilometers. As such, a No Dong missile could be used to attack South Korea with a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon.[12] North Korea Threatens Nuclear Attacks **North Korea has repeatedly threatened to use its nuclear arsenal in preemptive attacks against the United States, South Korea, and Japan.** According to a senior North Korean military defector, **in 2012, Kim Jong-un approved a new war plan in which Pyongyang would use nuclear weapons early in a conflict**—prior to U.S. reinforcements arriving—in order to occupy all of South Korea within seven days.[13] In 2013, the regime declared that inter-Korean relations were in a state of war after it revoked the armistice ending the Korean War, all inter-Korean non-aggression agreements, and all previous North Korean commitments to abandon its nuclear weapons. The North Korean People’s Army warned that “the [South Korean] presidential Blue House and all headquarters of the puppet regime will be targeted. If the South recklessly provokes us again, the sea of fire at Yeonpyeong will turn into a sea of fire at the Blue House.”[14] In March 2013, **the North Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee decided: [A]ny military provocation in the West Sea of Korea or along the Military Demarcation Line will not be limited to a local war, but develop into an all-out war, a nuclear war.** [The first strike will reduce] U.S. military bases in South Korea and [South Korean] ruling institutions including [the Blue House] and puppet army’s bases to ashes at once.[15] North Korea also threatened to turn Seoul and Washington into “seas of fire” through a “precise nuclear strike.”[16] Inadequate South Korean Missile Defense The South Korean constitution charges its armed forces with “the sacred mission of national security and the defense of the land.”[17] **Protecting against the catastrophic devastation from a North Korean nuclear attack is a critical responsibility. Despite the growing North Korean threat, successive liberal and conservative South Korean governments resisted deploying adequate missile defense systems and linking its network into a more comprehensive and effective allied BMD framework. Only Low-Level Interceptors.** South Korea is instead developing **the independent** Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system, which **would consist of only a terminal phase, lower tier land-based Patriot-2 missiles and SM-2 Block IIIA/B missiles deployed on Aegis destroyers** without ballistic missile capability. Seoul purchased two Israeli-produced Green Pine radars and announced plans to procure 68 PAC-3 missiles.[18] South Korea is indigenously developing the Cheolmae 4-H long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM). **Resisting an Allied System. Successive South Korean administrations, including President Park Geun-hye, have resisted joining a comprehensive allied program.** In June 2012, Seoul canceled at the last moment the scheduled signing with Japan of a bilateral General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), which would have enabled exchanging intelligence on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. The agreement would have provided Seoul with access to information collected by Japan’s high-tech intelligence satellites, Aegis ships, and early-warning and anti-submarine aircraft, thus improving South Korean defense against North Korean missiles. But lingering South Korean animosities stemming from Japan’s occupation of the Korean Peninsula in the 20th century forced Seoul to cancel the agreement. In December 2014, a modified version of the agreement was signed which allows voluntary passing of intelligence about North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear activities between Japan and South Korea through the U.S. Department of Defense. **Need for Layered Missile Defense A basic precept of air and missile defense is “mass and mix”—having sufficient interceptors from different systems so that any one system’s vulnerabilities are offset by the capabilities of another system. Instead, South Korea insists on relying on only lower-altitude interceptors resulting in smaller protected zones, gaps of coverage that leave fewer citizens protected, and minimal time to intercept a missile—all of which contribute to a greater potential for catastrophic failure.** Successfully destroying a high-speed inbound missile requires intercepting it sufficiently far away from the target. The higher the altitude and range of the interceptor, **the greater the likelihood of success. At low altitude, even a “successful” interception of a nuclear, chemical, or biological warhead could result in the populace still being harmed.** *Seoul’s insistence on only a last ditch interceptor is like a soccer coach dismissing all of the team’s players except the goalie, preferring to rely on only one player to defend against defeat.* The THAAD system is designed to **intercept short-range, medium-range, and**

some **intermediate-range ballistic missiles** trajectories at endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric altitudes **in their terminal phase**. In conjunction with the Patriot missile system, **THAAD would create an essential multilayered defensive shield for South Korea**. THAAD's large-area defense capability with 72 interceptors per battery **would complement Patriot's point defense and enable defense of more** military forces, population centers, and critical **targets**. South Korea's Hannam University conducted a computer simulation that showed **a PAC-2/3 low-altitude missile defense system would have only one second to intercept a North Korean missile** at a range of 12–15 kilometers (km), **while a THAAD medium-range system would have 45 seconds** to intercept a missile at 40–150 km.[19] South Korea's planned indigenous L-SAM would have less altitude and range than THAAD and would not be available for deployment until at least 2023. However, that target date is unlikely since creating a missile defense system is a long, expensive, and difficult process. For example, THAAD took approximately 30 years for the U.S. to fully develop, test, and field. **The THAAD system has already been developed, tested (scoring a 100 percent success rate** of 11 for 11 successful intercepts), **and deployed**. A Lockheed Martin simulation showed that **a single THAAD battery could defend most of South Korea against a North Korean missile attack, while two batteries would protect all of Korea except the southeast** and provide greater protection against multiple missile attacks. Three batteries would cover all of South Korea.[20] **The four most recent senior U.S. commanders in Korea** [21] **have recommended that South Korea should deploy the THAAD system and join the allied missile defense network**. Similarly, **the two most recent South Korean Defense Ministers** Han Min Koo and Kim Kwan-jin have **assessed that THAAD would improve the country's defense**.

THAAD deployment's crucial to avert North Korean war

Klinger 15 (Bruce Klinger is a former CIA Deputy Division Chief on Korean Analysis, April 21, 2015, The Institute for Security and Development Policy, "Why South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense", <http://isdpeu/content/uploads/publications/2015-klingsner-why-south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense.pdf>)

The April 2015 interim nuclear agreement with Iran generated speculation that a similar agreement may be possible with North Korea. However, Pyongyang has made emphatically clear that it will never abandon its nuclear arsenal and declared the Six Party Talks negotiations "null and void." Kim Jong-un and all major senior government entities have vowed to maintain North Korea's nuclear weapons, even amending the constitution to forever enshrine North Korea as a nuclear nation. **North Korea has an extensive ballistic missile force that can strike South Korea, Japan, and U.S. military bases in Asia**. Enough unclassified evidence is available to conclude that the regime has likely achieved warhead miniaturization, the ability to place nuclear weapons on its No Dong medium-range ballistic missiles, and can currently threaten Japan and South Korea with nuclear weapons. Therefore, **the U.S. and its allies need to deploy sufficient defenses** against the growing North Korean missile and nuclear threats. **To deter and defend against ballistic missile attacks, the United States, South Korea, and Japan need a comprehensive, integrated, multilayered ballistic missile defense (BMD) system** capable of multiple attempts at intercepting incoming missiles at various phases. **Having multiple systems providing complementary capabilities improves the likelihood of successful defense against missile attack**. Yet, despite this growing threat, South Korea insists on exposing its citizens to a greater threat than necessary. Seoul resists procuring more effective interceptors, resulting in smaller protected zones, gaps of coverage so fewer citizens are protected, and minimal time to intercept a missile, all of which contribute to a greater potential

for catastrophic failure. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (**THAAD**) **would be more effective than existing South Korean systems to defend military forces, population centers, and critical targets at a higher altitude over a larger area with more reaction time than existing systems in South Korea.** Even the U.S. deployment of THAAD BMD to better protect American troops on the Korean Peninsula has been controversial due to Chinese pressure on Seoul. **The Park Geun-hye Administration pursues a policy of “strategic ambiguity”** in order to postpone public discussion on THAAD deployment. South Korean presidential spokesman Min Kyungwook described Seoul’s position as three ‘no’s’ – **“no [U.S. deployment] request, no consultation, and no decision.”**

But a February 2015 JoongAng Ilbo poll showed that 56 percent of respondents favored deployment of THAAD. Missile defense is most effective when systems are integrated into a seamless and cohesive network. Integrating South Korean, U.S., and Japanese sensors would enable more accurate interceptions by tracking attacking missiles from multiple angles and multiple points throughout the flight trajectory. Yet South Korea resists integrating its system into a more comprehensive allied network due to lingering historic animosities with Japan. In 2014, South Korea advocated delaying the planned transfer of wartime operational control of its military forces because it felt insufficiently prepared to defend itself against North Korean attacks. Postponing the OPCON transfer ensured maintaining a combined allied deterrent and defense effort. It would be illogical for Seoul to prefer going it alone on missile defense rather than availing itself of better interceptors and a more comprehensive allied BMD network. The Institute for Security and Development Policy – www.isdp.eu 2 Rebuffing Beijing’s Disingenuous Objections Beijing claims that THAAD deployment would be against China’s security interests. China overlooks, of course, that North Korean development of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missiles went against South Korean and U.S. security interests. Is Beijing concerned that an improvement of a defensive system would impede North Korea’s ability to attack South Korea, Japan, and the United States? Or is China worried that its own ability to threaten and target the U.S. and allies will be curtailed? While deploying THAAD would improve defenses against a North Korean attack on South Korea, it would not constrain Chinese ICBM missiles. Chinese ICBM trajectories would exceed THAAD interceptor range, altitude, and speed capabilities. THAAD interceptors are designed to attack missiles heading toward the interceptors in the terminal inbound phase, not missiles flying away in the boost and mid-range phases of an outbound ICBM. The THAAD’s accompanying X-Band radar would be unable to see or track the ICBMs. The THAAD X-Band radar—which can only see in a 90 degree arc—would be directed at North Korea, not China. Chinese ICBM trajectories would be outside of the X-band radar range. Washington has emphasized that even its homeland BMD capabilities based in the continental United States provide for defense only from a limited ICBM attack from North Korea and Iran and are not intended or scaled to affect China’s or Russia’s nuclear forces. According to remarks made by Frank A. Rose, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, a comprehensive U.S. defense against the larger and more sophisticated Chinese and Russian arsenals would be “extremely challenging and costly.” THAAD would also be poorly positioned against Chinese medium-range missiles. Examining the locations of Chinese SRBM and MRBMs indicates that THAAD deployed in South Korea could help defend South Korea against a Chinese DF-15 SRBM attack from Tonghua in northeast China since those missiles would be in the same trajectory as those launched from North Korea. However, THAAD would be unable to intercept Chinese DF-21 MRBMs launched from Dengshahe, Lailu, and Hanchang toward South Korea or Japan. The THAAD X-Band radar would have minimal capabilities to monitor Chinese missiles bound for South Korea or Japan. Since Chinese technical objections are without merit and THAAD does not threaten China in any way, Beijing’s true objective becomes apparent—to prevent improving and integrating allied defensive capabilities. The THAAD deployment issue is a microcosm of the greater North Korea problem. Once again, China has shown itself to be more critical of South Korean reactions than to the precipitating North Korean threats, attacks, and violations. On the THAAD issue, China has taken Pyongyang’s side over that of Seoul, disregarding South Korea’s legitimate security concerns and fundamental sovereign right to defend itself against an unambiguous danger. Beijing again characteristically pressures Seoul rather than Pyongyang. In essence, China wants a role in South Korea’s national security decision-making by being able to exercise a veto over Seoul’s defense procurement decisions. China may be Seoul’s largest trading partner, but it is clearly not South Korea’s friend. South Korea should instead articulate to its citizens—as well as the Chinese leadership—the need for a more effective missile defense system to better protect its citizens. Seoul should rebuff Chinese interference in exercising its sovereign right to defend itself against the North Korean threat brought on, in part, by Beijing’s unwillingness to confront its belligerent ally. Conclusion

Deploying THAAD on the Korean Peninsula would enhance South Korea’s defense against potentially catastrophic nuclear, biological, or chemical attacks and well as impede Pyongyang’s ability to engage in coercive diplomacy. The decision to deploy THAAD is a sovereign right that Seoul should base on national security objectives and the defensive needs of the nation. To date, the Park Geun-hye administration has demurred from redressing a national security shortfall out of concern of agitating Beijing. Seoul should not subjugate the defense of its citizens to economic blackmail by Beijing. Seoul and Washington should make clear to Beijing that Chinese pressure tactics would be better applied to its ally North Korea whose development of nuclear weapons and missiles have caused South Korea and the U.S. to take defensive actions.

BMD is stabilizing and leads to crisis stability in the region– deters North Korean nuclear use, regardless of true effectiveness of BMD capabilities.

MacDonald and Ferguson ’15 [Bruce W. MacDonald, Special Advisor to the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Project at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and a USIP Academy professor on nuclear nonproliferation, arms control and space/cyber issues. Also, he is an adjunct professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. In addition, he is Adjunct Senior Fellow for National Security Technology at FAS. He was Senior Director for the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, and Charles D. Ferguson, President of the Federation of American Scientists. Prior to

FAS, Dr. Ferguson served as the Philip D. Reed Senior Fellow for Science and Technology at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Federation of American Scientists, September 2015, Understanding the Dragon Shield: Likelihood and Implications of Chinese Strategic Ballistic Missile Defense]

In contrast, however, **risk aversion appears to play mostly a stabilizing role in crisis management** with a smaller nuclear power **where strategic BMD is concerned**. Facing a threat from a small nuclear power, and aware of its strategic BMD limitations, **the United States cannot count on its missile defenses working reasonably well**. On the other hand, **facing U.S. missile defenses, a small nuclear power cannot count on U.S. BMD not working reasonably well**. **Each side is deterred by the combined effects of confidence/outcome uncertainty and risk aversion, an important island of stability in a chaotic crisis**. This situation is portrayed conceptually in Charts 1 and 2 below, where risk aversion acts as a stabilizing presence in the simplified two-country game. Chart 1 illustrates no risk aversion, while Chart 2 does. The shaded "island" depicted in the figure is the product of the risk aversion of each country in this game-theoretic construct and is labeled as a "risk-averse effect." Both sides in the crisis have the same perceptions in this theoretical case. However, **given the stakes involved, adversaries in the crisis will likely have uncertainty and be averse to risk**. **The greater the stakes, the greater the risk aversion**. Is this stabilizing risk-averse effect robust? No. Is it resilient over time? Probably not. Will it work vis-à-vis China? Not likely, though China should not ignore this important additional dimension of the BMD issue. But **this risk-averse stability effect does not appear to be trivial**; it is better than nothing; and **it should not be ignored**, particularly **where North Korea is concerned**.

It is possible to discern a few deterrent characteristics of thin strategic BMD; there are elements of both fragility and robustness, namely that it is:

Not affected by small changes in either offense or defense;

Affected by large offense increases, where modest defenses are simply overwhelmed;

Potentially affected by important BMD technology changes;

More robust against North Korean offensive technological changes than those by Iran, as Iran can bring far more resources to bear to defeat strategic BMD than can North Korea; and

Subject to being eroded by perceptions of regime survival ("what have I got to lose?").

This purely qualitative analysis suggests that from an "arms race stability" perspective, there are noteworthy, however not decisive, destabilizing aspects to strategic BMD, even modest deployments or even just an active engineering development program. However, **from a crisis management perspective, there are important stabilizing dimensions to a thin strategic BMD posture, where risk aversion on both sides in a confrontation appears to augment the important deterrent effects of nuclear weapons themselves**. This risk-averse effect leads each side to hedge against

the possibility that the other country's systems are more effective than expected, while its own systems are less effective than expected, suggesting that actions to upset the status quo could leave the country significantly worse off versus taking no action at all.

Observations on the strategic implications of thin U.S. strategic BMD are:

BMD performance and capabilities are very important, but they are not the only metric by which BMD should be assessed;

From a crisis stability perspective, limited BMD deployments appear to be stabilizing as long as they remain limited;

From an arms race stability perspective, there are elements of both stability and instability present;

Geopolitically, **it provides a useful tool for messaging and affecting adversary perceptions**, at least at limited deployment levels;

Having no strategic BMD would deny the United States certain strategic and geopolitical benefits that have already advanced U.S. security interests;

North Korea Makes Nuclear War Inevitable—Use it or Lose it

Kelly 15 (Robert Kelly is the Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan University, March 17, 2015, Asian Security Blog, "Will SK eventually feel

compelled to bomb NK Missile Sites?”, <https://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2015/03/17/will-south-korea-eventually-feel-compelled-to-bomb-nk-missile-sites/>)

My growing concern for years now is that the more **nuclear missiles** North Korea acquires (read [this](#) on just how many and when), **the more they threaten South Korea's very existence**. To date, North Korea's missile and nukes have generally been understood as a tool for regime security – to prevent an American 'regime change' attack – or as a gangsterish way for NK to shake-down SK, Japan, and the US for concessions. As Robert Gates and Hillary Clinton both noted, the Norks are great at [selling and re-selling](#) their nuclear program for aid. But, if NK gets dozens, or even hundreds, of nuclear warheads and missiles, then the NK nuclear program is no longer about regime security or blackmail. It would then have grown into **an existential threat to SK as a state and society**. This is why I am such a strong supporter of THAAD. NK is moving from being a frightening rogue state obsessed with survival, to a major threat to the constitutional order and even physical survival of the ROK (and Japan). To be sure, the USSR and US were that to each other **in the Cold War**, but **both developed technologies** (SLBMs mostly) **that allowed them to survive** (or 'ride out' in nuclear parlance) even **a massive first strike and still retaliate**. This 'assured second strike' capability **dramatically reduced the incentive for either side to strike first**, so stabilizing the nuclear competition despite the huge size of the arsenals. By contrast, **neither NK nor SK have assured second strike** (SK might because of the American alliance, but that's not entirely clear) **which therefore incentivizes attacking first**. Further, both NK and SK are very vulnerable to a first strike, so again the incentives to move first are high. NK cannot hide its nuclear weapons; it is too small and US satellite coverage too intrusive. Nuclear facilities are big and vulnerable, and a obvious temptation for an allied preemptive strike. **This creates a 'use-them-or-lose-them' dilemma for Pyongyang**. And **this dilemma worsens as Pyongyang builds more and more**, and spends more and more. The more nukes North Korea deploys, the greater the allied temptation to destroy them before they could be used (this was American thinking during the Cuban Missile Crisis too). **This vulnerability, in turn, incentivizes NK to use them before they're struck**. It's a nasty spiral of paranoia. SK too is vulnerable, which again incentivizes moving first. SK cannot ride out a serious nuclear assault, because it is a small, highly [centralized state with a highly concentrated population](#) defenseless against missile attack. It would not take many nuclear strikes to destabilize the Republic (unlike the US or USSR in the Cold War). As Nork nukes move from a few for security, to many as a state- and society-breaking threat to SK (and even Japan), the incentives to preemptively destroy them first will grow also. This is a [classic nuclear security dilemma](#), straight out of the Cold War in the 1950s. **The best way out of this nasty, worsening game would be** nuclear restraint on the NK part (a pipe-dream, that), and/or robust missile defense on the SK side. **THAAD is really, really important to slow the security dilemma paranoia that accompanies arms build-ups, especially nuclear ones**. The Chinese ought to think about that [before they come out so strongly against THAAD](#): If South Korea is entirely 'naked' or 'roof-less' against missile attack, when NK has 100+ nuclear missiles – a capability that could destroy South Korea in just a few minutes – what does Beijing think will happen? That Seoul will just sit back and do nothing because of trade with China? I doubt it. No SK president could tolerate such a stark, asymmetric threat to the ROK's very existence just to keep the Chinese mollified. That would border on dereliction of duty. Even if SK did not want to strike North Korea's nuclear sites (which I don't think it does), it might feel compelled to out of sheer fear.

Korean escalation will go nuclear

Chol 2011 (Kim Myong Chol is author of a number of books and papers in Korean, Japanese and English on North Korea, including Kim Jong-il's Strategy for Reunification. He has a PhD from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Academy of Social Sciences "Dangerous games" Aug 20 www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MH20Dgo1.html)

The divided and heavily armed **Korean Peninsula remains the most inflammable global flashpoint, with any conflict** sparked there **likely to become a full-blown thermonuclear war** involving the world's fourth-most powerful nuclear weapons state and its most powerful. **Any incident in Korea by design, accident, or miscalculation could erupt into a devastating DPRK-US war, with the Metropolitan US serving as a main war theater**. Rodong Sinmun warned on August 16: "The Korean Peninsula is faced with the worst crisis ever. An all-out war can be triggered by any accident." **Recent incidents illustrate the real danger**

of miscalculation leading to a total shooting war, given the volatile situation on the Land of Morning Calm. The most recent case in point is the August 10 shelling of North Korea by the South. Frightened South Korea marines on Yeonpyeong Island mistook three noises from a North Korean construction site across the narrow channel for artillery rounds, taking an hour to respond with three to five artillery rounds. The episode serves as a potent reminder to the world that **the slightest incident can lead to war**. A reportedly malfunctioning firefinder counter-artillery radar system seems to partly account for the panicky South Korean reaction. South Korean conservative newspaper the Joong Ang Daily reported August 17: "A military source said that radar installed to detect hostile fire did not work last week when North Korea fired five shots toward the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the disputed maritime border, on Aug 10. "We must confirm the location of the source of the firing through the ARTHUR (Artillery Hunting Radar) and HALO (hostile artillery location) systems, but ARTHUR failed to operate, resulting in a failure to determine the source of the fire," said the source." BBC reported on November 25 last year the aggressive nature of troops on the South Korea-held five islands in North Korean waters. "Seen in this sense, they (five islands including Yeonpyeong Island) could provide staging bases for flanking amphibious attacks into North Korea if South Korea ever takes the offensive." 2. **An almost catastrophic incident took place at dawn on June 17 near Incheon**. South Korean marines stationed on Gyodong Island near Incheon Airport fired rifles at a civilian South Korean jetliner Airbus A320 with 119 people aboard as it was descending to land, after mistaking it for a North Korean military aircraft. The Asiana Airlines flight was carrying 119 people from the Chinese city of Chengdu. About 600 civilian aircraft fly near the island every day, including those flying across the NLL, but they face a perennial risk of being misidentified as a hostile warplane. It is nothing short of a miracle that the Airbus A320 was not hit and nobody harmed. 3. On March 26, 2010, the high-tech South Korean corvette Sokcho fired 130 rounds at flocks of birds, mistaking them for a hostile flying object. The innocent birds looked like a North Korean warplane just at a time when an alleged North Korean midget submarine had managed to escape with impunity after torpedoing the hapless Cheonan deep inside security-tight South Korean waters. The South Korean military's habit of firing at the wrong target increases the risk of an incident running out of control. CNN aired a story December 16, headlined: "General: South Korea Drill Could Cause Chain Reaction." F/A-18 pilot-turned Marine Corp General James Cartwright told the press in the Pentagon, "What we worry about, obviously, is if that it [the drill] is misunderstood or if it's taken advantage of as an opportunity. "If North Korea were to react to that in a negative way and fire back at those firing positions on the islands, that would start potentially a chain reaction of firing and counter-firing. "What you don't want to have happen out of that is ... for us to lose control of the escalation. That's the concern." Agence France-Presse on December 11 quoted former chief of US intelligence retired admiral Dennis Blair as saying that South Korea "will be taking military action against North Korea". New Korean war differs from other wars **Obama and the Americans seem to be incapable of realizing that North Korea is the wrong enemy, much less that a new Korean War would be fundamentally different from all other wars including the two world wars. Two things will distinguish a likely American Conflict or DPRK-US War from previous wars.** The first essential difference is that **the US mainland will become the main theater of war for the first time** since the US Civil War (1861-1865), giving the Americans an opportunity to know what it is like to have war fought on their own land, not on faraway soil. The US previously prospered by waging aggressive wars on other countries. Thus far, the Americans could afford to feel safe and comfortable while watching TV footage of war scenes from Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Libya as if they were fires raging across the river. The utmost collateral damage has been that some American veterans were killed or returned home as amputees, with post traumatic stress disorder, only to be left unemployed and homeless. However, this will no longer be the case. At long last, it is Americans' turn to have see their homeland ravaged. An young North Korea in 1950-53 was unable to carry the war all the way across the Pacific Ocean to strike back, but the present-day North Korea stands out as a fortress nuclear weapons state that can withstand massive American ICBM (Intercontinental ballistic missile) attacks and launch direct retaliatory transpacific strikes on the Metropolitan USA. **The second essential difference is that the next war in Korea, that is, the American Conflict or the DPRK-USA War would be the first actual full-fledged nuclear, thermonuclear war that mankind has ever seen, in no way similar to the type of nuclear warfare described in science fiction novels or films.** North Korea is unique among the nuclear powers in two respects: One is that **the Far Eastern country, founded by legendary peerless hero Kim Il-sung, is the first country to engage and badly maul the world's only superpower in three years of modern warfare when it was most powerful, after vanquishing Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.** The other is that **North Korea is fully ready to go the length of fighting [hu]mankind's [the] first and last nuclear exchange with the US.** The DPRK led by two Kim Il-sungs - the ever-victorious iron-willed brilliant commander Kim Jong-il and his heir designate Kim Jong-eun - is different from Russia under Nikita Khrushchev which backed down in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Khrushchev and his company never fought the Americans in war. As a rule, most countries are afraid to engage the Americans. As the case is with them, North Korea is the last to favor war with the Americans. **However, it is no exaggeration to say that the two North Korean leaders are just one click away from ordering a retaliatory nuclear strike on the US military forces in Guam, Hawaii and metropolitan centers on the US mainland.** On behalf of Supreme Leader Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-eun will fire highly destructive weapons of like Americans have never heard of or imagined to evaporate the US. The North Koreans are too proud of being descendants of the ancient civilizations of Koguryo 2,000 years ago and Dankun Korea 5,000 years ago, to leave the Land of morning Calm divided forever with the southern half under the control of the trigger-happy, predatory US. The North Koreans prefer to fight and die in honor rather than kowtow to the arrogant Americans. **At the expense of comforts of a better life, North Koreans have devoted more than half a century to preparing for nuclear war with the Americans. All available resources have been used to convert the whole country into a fortress,** including arming the entire population and indigenously turning out all types of nuclear thermonuclear weapons, and developing long-range delivery capabilities and digital warfare assets. **An apocalyptic Day After Tommorrow-like scenario will unfold throughout the US,** with the skyscrapers of major cities consumed in a sea of thermonuclear conflagration. **The nuclear exchange will begin with retaliatory North Korean ICBMs**

detonating hydrogen bombs in outer space far above the US mainland, leaving most of the country powerless. New York, Washington, Chicago, San Francisco and major cities should be torched by ICBMs streaking from North Korea with scores of nuclear power stations exploding, each spewing as much radioactive fallout as 150-180 H-bombs.

THAAD is key to deterrence, defense against nukes, and reduces the need for preemptive attacks – recent missile tests prove

Bruce **Klingner 17**, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation, 7-18-2017, "The Necessity for THAAD in South Korea," No Publication, <http://journal.georgetown.edu/the-necessity-for-thaad-in-south-korea/>

North Korea's test launch of an ICBM that could target the United States within the next few years has fixated attention on how Washington and its allies should respond to the growing military threat. However, Pyongyang's nuclear and missile capabilities are already an existential threat to South Korea and Japan. Given these circumstances, the United States and its allies must deploy sufficient defenses to deter and defend against the growing North Korean missile and nuclear threats. Shortly after assuming power in late 2011, Kim Jong-un directed the creation of a new war plan to complete an invasion of South Korea within a week using nuclear weapons and missiles. A senior North Korean military defector indicated that the North's strategy would be to quickly occupy the entire South Korean territory before U.S. reinforcements would be able to arrive. In 2016, the regime conducted several successful No Dong medium-range missile tests. North Korean state-controlled media announced that the missile launches were practice drills for preemptive airburst nuclear attacks on South Korean ports and airfields, where U.S. reinforcement personnel would arrive during a military crisis. A North Korean media-released photo showed that the missile's range would encompass all of South Korea, including the port of Busan—a critical site for transiting U.S. reinforcements. Pyongyang has repeatedly vowed, including in my meetings with North Korean officials in June 2017, that it will never abandon its nuclear arsenal and has rejected denuclearization negotiations. The Trump administration, for its part, has promised to increase pressure on the regime, strengthen the U.S. military, and increase deterrence and defense through augmented ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities. With regards to BMD capabilities, the most immediate upgrade should be to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense system to South Korea. In conjunction with the already-deployed Patriot missile system, THAAD would create an essential, multilayered defensive shield for South Korea. THAAD is better than any system South Korea has or will have for decades. The Patriot system only has a 30 km altitude and 35 km range capacity, compared to the 150 km altitude and 200 km range of THAAD. Seoul's planned indigenous long-range surface-to-air missile system would only have a 60 km altitude and 150 km range—both less capable than THAAD—and would not be available for deployment until at least 2023. China continues to argue that THAAD deployment runs counter to Chinese security interests. This, of course, overlooks the fact that North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and missiles—and the repeated threats to use them—is contrary to South Korean and U.S. security interests as well. Beijing asserts that the associated X-band radar would be able to peer deep into China to observe military activity and ICBMs targeting the United States during a conflict. However, Beijing's claims are false and disingenuous. Accordingly, China has refused repeated U.S. and South Korean offers of technical briefings because it already knows that THAAD does not pose a threat to its strategic or tactical missile systems. While deploying THAAD would improve South Korean defenses against a North Korean attack, it would not be able to intercept Chinese ICBMs launched against the United States. Chinese ICBM trajectories would exceed THAAD interceptor range, altitude, and speed capabilities, and THAAD interceptors based in South Korea would offer the wrong interception profile: They are designed to attack missiles heading toward the interceptors in the terminal inbound phase, not an outbound ICBM flying away in its boost and mid-range phases. Moreover, THAAD's X-Band radar, which can only see in a 90 to 120 degree arc, would be directed at North Korea, not China. Chinese ICBM trajectories would therefore be outside the X-band radar range, and would not be seen or tracked. THAAD is also poorly positioned against Chinese medium-range missiles if Beijing decided to attack South Korea or Japan. THAAD missiles would not be able to intercept Chinese DF-21 medium-range missiles launched from eastern China eastward toward South Korea or Japan. Interceptors have to be deployed in front of the radar, making the interception of a "flank-shot" missile not traveling directly toward the radar and interceptors extremely difficult, if not impossible. The THAAD X-Band radar would have minimal, if any, capabilities to monitor Chinese missiles attacking South Korea or Japan.

Deploying THAAD to South Korea is clearly not a threat to China. Beijing's true objective is preventing improvement in allied defensive capabilities and multilateral cooperation. Once again, China has shown itself to be more critical of South Korean reactions than to the precipitating North Korean threats, attacks, and violations of UN resolutions. On the issue of THAAD, China has taken Pyongyang's side over Seoul's, disregarding South Korea's legitimate security concerns and fundamental sovereign right to defend itself against an unambiguous danger. In response to Seoul's decision to deploy the THAAD system, China engaged in economic warfare, including imposing boycotts on South Korean products and closing South Korean stores in China. At the same time, Beijing has refused to fully implement required UN financial sanctions against North Korea for its repeated violations of UN resolutions. China wants to exercise a veto over Seoul's defense procurement and national security decisions. While it may be Seoul's largest trading partner, Beijing clearly does not have South Korea's best security interests at heart. **Deploying THAAD on the Korean Peninsula would enhance South Korea's defense against potentially catastrophic nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks. The deployment would impede Pyongyang's ability to engage in coercive diplomacy and would augment deterrence by reducing the chance of success of a potential North Korean missile strike. The THAAD missile defense system in South Korea would work both to improve protection against the North Korean missile threat and to lengthen the fuse of war by reducing the need for a preemptive attack against the North.** The decision to deploy THAAD is a sovereign right that Seoul should base on the national security objectives and defensive needs of the nation. South Korea had demurred from redressing this national security shortfall out of concern of agitating Beijing. However, Seoul should not subordinate the defense of its citizens to Beijing's economic blackmail. Seoul and Washington should make clear to Beijing that they will not succumb to pressure tactics when it comes to defending national security. Instead, China should focus its ire on North Korea, which has continually defied UN resolutions by developing nuclear weapons and missiles, causing South Korea and the United States to take necessary defensive actions.

THAAD is key to credible deterrence

Richard **Fontaine 17**, president of the Center for a New American Security in Washington, D.C., 7-7-2017, "Time to Lose Your Illusions on North Korea," War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/time-to-lose-your-illusions-on-north-korea/>

The casting aside of these four illusions leaves the United States with a policy built mainly around deterrence, which is premised on Pyongyang's essential rationality – or at least its survival instinct. **The available evidence suggests that Kim Jong Un and his lieutenants seek regime survival, and that their nuclear pursuits and extreme repression are aimed squarely at maintaining it.** In this sense, they are likely more like the Soviets and Maoists than the Islamic State. Yet **mutually assured destruction-type deterrence always represents a bet on the other side's rational calculation of costs and benefits.** It's also undesirable. Americans do not like Russian nuclear missiles pointed at the United States, but they tolerate it because it remains preferable to the alternatives. Moscow and Beijing understand that any nuclear attack on the United States or an ally would result in massive American retaliation. Adding a third country to that number is unpalatable. Yet **deterrence will remain key to ensuring that North Korea's actions represent provocations rather than direct aggression.** Beyond robust deterrence, **other elements should comprise a more realistic approach to the North Korean threat. The United States and its allies should take better steps to protect themselves, including deploying the four remaining THAAD elements in South Korea,** perfecting ballistic missile defense in the United States, and deploying THAAD or Aegis Ashore batteries in Japan. **While Kim's pursuit of nuclear weapons is likely defensive, the possibility that it is prelude to a war of aggression cannot be excluded. The United States must enhance its ability not to just deter North Korea from attacking in the first place, but protecting against any attacks that do occur and defeating its forces decisively.**

Independently, THAAD removal causes US withdrawal

Scott **Snyder 6-11**, senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program on U.S.-Korea Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, 6-11-2017, "South Korea's Decision To Halt THAAD Carries Hidden Risks," Forbes, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottasnyder/2017/06/11/south-koreas-decision-to-halt-thaad-carries-hidden-risks/#2f88c10d429a>

South Korea's new president decided to halt deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system last week—pending environmental review. Why the immediate trigger? Moon's administration discovered the ROK Ministry of National Defense did not brief the incoming president that four additional THAAD launchers scheduled for deployment as components of the battery deployed last April near Seongju had already arrived in-country. The failure to provide critical information regarding South Korea's security rightly incensed Moon, and ensured he will clean house. Increased transparency More broadly, Moon campaign supporters were dismayed by USFK's expedited deployment of the THAAD battery and two launchers only two weeks prior to South Korea's election. Given the Moon campaign's longstanding criticisms that the previous administration had failed to manage the THAAD decision and deployment in a transparent manner, it was inevitable that there would be a domestic review of decisions made by the acting government in the months prior to Moon's election. However, outside observers are skeptical that the review may be a ploy to reverse South Korean public support for the deployment. This despite assurances from the government to the United States that the decision by Moon will not change the outcome of South Korean support for the THAAD deployment. It shouldn't. Barely a day after Moon Jae-in's announcement, North Korea reportedly launched four short-range anti-ship missiles. North Korea's missile advances across the board are cause for concern—and cause for defensive countermeasures. The risks and vulnerabilities are out in the open: South Korea's indigenous missile defense efforts are developing too slowly to counter North Korean progress, and that could put U.S. Forces in Korea at risk. Moon's decision carries risks The Moon administration must find a way to enhance governmental transparency and accountability while upholding its credibility as a strong U.S. security partner. If the perception becomes that the South Korean government is blocking measures necessary to protect American forces, that would rapidly erode American public support for U.S. troop commitments. It could potentially provide President Donald Trump with a pretext to pursue U.S. withdrawal of forces in Korea.

US troop presence key to North Korean regime stability – allows for rally around the flag effect

Mize 12 (Tommy, MA in Strategic Studies @ U.S. Army War College, "U.S. Troops Stationed in South Korea, Anachronistic?," www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA562829)

There are three considerations stationing U.S. military personnel in South Korea have in relation with the collapse of the DPRK. The first is that the presence of U.S. Soldiers does support the DPRK's policy of Songun. North Korea uses the U.S. presence for propaganda purposes to rally the people of North Korea to accept sacrifices associated with so much of their GDP being used to prop up the regime and support the military. The North Korean regime is able to point to the presence of U.S. military personnel in South Korea as an imminent threat to their nation. North Korea consistently issues press releases about the semi-annual exercises conducted in South Korea (Ulchi-Freedom Guardian and Key Resolve) to assert that the U.S. and South Koreans are planning to attack North Korea. This supports their continued reliance on Songun to protect the nation. While one would expect this imminent threat would lead to a „cry-wolf syndrome“ after 60 years, the North is able to point to the preparedness of its military forces as the reason the wolf has been kept at bay. The second consideration is that while Songun may be bad for the people of North Korea, it does ensure stability in North Korea. This is good from a regional security and stability perspective given the potential instability that would be caused by a sudden collapse of the DPRK. A stable DPRK that gradually reforms from within, similar to China and Vietnam, may in fact be the best scenario for the region. The third consideration is that the presence of U.S. forces in South Korea best postures U.S. forces to assist others in the region in responding to a sudden collapse to address a humanitarian crises and issues associated with the DPRK's weapons of mass destruction.

Regime collapse bad – sparks regional instability

Mize 12 (Tommy, MA in Strategic Studies @ U.S. Army War College, "U.S. Troops Stationed in South Korea, Anachronistic?," www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA562829)

Collapse of North Korea. "What is more dangerous than a strong dictatorship, a collapsed one." 56 The unexpected and rapid collapse of the DPRK regime could potentially have a major destabilizing effect on the region. It could include a large influx of refugees into South Korea, China, and Russia. It could result in an armed civil war inside North Korea between those supporting the regime and those against. The resultant humanitarian catastrophe in a country already facing humanitarian crisis could be immense. 57 The North Korean people, who are already undernourished, receive about half of their food from the government. A disruption in the food supply could result in mass starvation and a huge refugee flow. The humanitarian crisis will become more severe the longer people are forced to go without food and medicine. This may cause the refugee problem to spread beyond Korea, cause a civil war or insurgency, and increase the

risk that North Korea's weapons of mass destruction might end up on the international black market.⁵⁸ The collapse of North Korea would potentially have huge impacts to the South Korean economy as evidenced when the two Germanys reunited at the conclusion of the Cold War. **It could place South Korea, China, the United States, Russia, and Japan in a "chaotic situation** where there has been little regional planning...**and could result in creating an unstable, nuclear armed regime** raising questions about command and control of these weapons and the dangers of proliferation."⁵⁹

THAAD prevents NoKo from using recent nuke tests as a regime shield; that's key to negotiations

Harvey 2-15

John R. Harvey (principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs from 2009-2013). "Commentary: Negating North Korea's Nukes." Defense News. 15 February 2016. JDN.
<http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/commentary/2016/02/15/commentary-negating-north-koreas-nukes/80189872/>

North Korea's recent nuclear test has generated much media attention and expert commentary. Notwithstanding legitimate concerns about nuclear weapons in the hands of a rogue regime, **there's been a lot of hand-wringing about what to do. Many urge negotiations to contain or even roll back the nuclear program, but DPRK's leaders have shown no interest.** They say they're going to keep their nukes to avoid what happened to Iraq's Saddam Hussein and Libya's Moammar Gadhafi. Absent agreement on preconditions for talks, President **Obama has wisely chosen not to provide Kim Jong Un with an ill-deserved negotiating forum, and the associated stature** that comes with major power engagement, simply because he **possesses or tests nuclear weapons.** So what should we do? Yes, increase secondary sanctions, freeze overseas bank accounts and seek further to isolate a regime that, as documented by a well-regarded UN panel, has carried out unspeakable crimes against a large segment of its population. Most important, our approach should also include a concerted military-technical effort to deny Kim Jong Un and his crowd the perceived benefits of owning nukes. **We must convey to them credible US capabilities to prevent or otherwise thwart any use of nuclear weapons against our forces or allies.**

What, specifically, are the needed capabilities? • Exquisite intelligence to know when a nuclear ballistic missile launch is being considered or directed, and to prevent or delay a launch order from reaching missile units. • Military capabilities to destroy fixed-based and mobile missiles on the ground before they can be launched or, if any get launched, advanced missile defenses to shoot them down. • Cyber capabilities to disrupt warhead arming and firing systems, or cause flaws to be introduced into warhead designs, so that any arriving warheads are duds. On this last point, foreign "assistance" to North Korea's nuclear program is a problem, but it is also an opportunity. Under such conditions, North Korea's leaders would no longer "own" their nuclear weapons — in a sense, we would. A bit fanciful? Not necessarily. The technologies, subsystems and capabilities exist today to address each one of these goals notwithstanding the need for a bit of luck here and there. It is well within the realm of technical possibility. Consider the problem of hunting mobile missiles. We didn't do a very good job of this during the first Iraq war in 1991. But the North Korean problem is different, and systems and technologies for sensing and locating, on-board high performance computing, precision strike, and command and control, have greatly advanced in 25 years. North Korea has about the same land mass as Virginia, about one-fourth the size of Iraq. From Andrews AFB in Maryland, F-35 aircraft could reach any point in Virginia within 10-15 minutes. F-35s based in South Korea, not that much farther from North Korea than Andrews is from Virginia, could carry out precision conventional strikes within that same time. In theory, just a few stealthy drones, flying at appropriate altitudes and with appropriate revisit rates, could cover the entire country 24/7, cueing strike aircraft shortly after a mobile missile was spotted. Just looking at a map, the North Korean road network is primitive and sparse. If mobile missiles are not easily off-road capable, then an area search problem is reduced to a much more manageable linear search. There are reports that North Korea is developing a submarine-launched ballistic missile that it may consider more survivable than land-based missiles. Given US capabilities to locate and track noisy, older generation submarines, such as those possessed by North Korea, this is not likely to be a prudent investment. The most difficult challenge will be cutting across bureaucratic stovepipes and compartments of US intelligence, defense R&D, and military operations to produce a system of systems able to negate North Korea's makes. A second challenge will be ensuring that North Korea's isolated leaders receive the message, unfiltered by underlings, that they can't count on their nukes so they better not risk using them.

Selected demonstrations of key US capabilities could bolster messaging. Creating doubt about whether nuclear weapons are effective as a regime shield, or as means to coerce others, may lead to more risk-adverse regime behavior. Kim Jong Un may be just a bit more likely to ponder a series of events that end with his being hauled before the International Criminal Court to answer for crimes against humanity. It may also open the door for serious negotiations not just on nukes but on the regime's response to international pressures to restore basic human rights to its people.

U.S. presence deters South Korea from escalating conflict and ensures small provocations don't spark full-scale war---and the U.S. will never initiate a conflict so they can't win offense

Clint **Work 14**, M.A. in International Relations from the University of Chicago's Committee on International Relations, 3/26/14, "North Korea & Human Rights: Tolerating the Intolerable," <http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/north-korea-human-rights-tolerating-the-intolerable/>

The current situation as it stands with the DPRK is one without a military solution. Not only does the maxim "if you break it you own it" (as Paul Whitefield recently noted) apply, but a far a more obvious reason persists. That is, the DPRK has nuclear weapons. No revolution in military affairs is going to guarantee with absolute certainty that such weapons will be eliminated before North Korea could use them. Moreover, the U.S. itself, despite its heavily militarized orientation toward the North, has prevented the ROK from taking escalatory actions in response to what are normally considered acts of war. As Daniel Pinkston writes: The U.S. political and military leaderships are unwilling to fight a full-scale war in Korea over the shooting down of an aircraft, the sinking of a ship, the insertion of KPA Special Forces for limited operations, or firing artillery on a fishing village." Bruce Cuming's describes the U.S. presence as dual deterrence or civil-war deterrence, meaning the simultaneous deterrence of North Korea from starting a conflagration and of South Korea from escalating it. What is more, nuclear weapons notwithstanding, even the DRPK's conventional capabilities (though dated and far less advanced than U.S. and ROK arsenals) make very real Pyongyang's threat to turn Seoul into "a sea of fire." Though an all-out conflict would likely bring about the end of the DPRK as a sovereign state, it would very likely inflict immense damage on the South Korean capital, threaten Tokyo, and potentially bring about larger instability in the region before its demise. In sum, bringing the regime down through greater pressure is not possible, both because key regional powers will not allow it and the military option is untenable in any rational (and moral) calculation. The very real potential for even greater human suffering and destruction is simply too prohibitive a risk. This leaves the third option, engagement.

1AC – Prolif

East Asian BMD is key to check conflict, but **comprehensiveness** is key Klingner 11

Bruce Klingner (Former deputy division chief for Korea for the CIA; testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center). "The Case for Comprehensive Missile Defense in Asia." The Heritage Foundation. 7 January 2011. JDN. <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/01/the-case-for-comprehensive-missile-defense-in-asia>

The United States and its allies are at risk of missile attack from a growing number of states and non-state terrorist organizations. This growing threat is particularly clear in East Asia, where diplomacy has failed to stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them on target, and where China continues the most active nuclear force modernization program in the world. To counter these growing threats, the U.S. should work with its allies, including South Korea and Japan, to develop and deploy missile defenses, including ground-based, sea-based, and air-based components. The United States and its allies are at risk of missile attack from a growing number of states and nonstate terrorist organizations. Today, this once exclusive nuclear club has nine members, and Iran, with its hostile regime and long record of supporting terror-ists, is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. At least 32 countries have ballistic missile capabilities. The U.S. ballistic missile defense review of February 2010 warned: [T]he ballistic missile threat is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively, and is likely to continue to do so over the next decade. Current global trends indicate that ballistic missile systems are becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate, while also increasing in range.¹ Diplomacy, engagement, international condemnation, and United Nations resolutions have not deterred North Korea from developing missile and nuclear weapons capabilities. While Washington continues to seek diplomatic resolutions to the ballistic missile threat, it is critical that the U.S. simultaneously pursue missile defense programs to protect itself and its allies.^[1] Missile Defense Needs To deter and defend against ballistic missile attacks, the United States and its allies need a comprehensive, integrated, multilayered ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. Regrettably, the United States military cannot currently protect all American citizens or all of the homeland—much less its troops, allies, and friends abroad—from ballistic missile attacks. Despite recent deployments and technological advances, the United States still does not have sufficient defenses. U.S. missile defense capabilities “exist in numbers that are only modest in view of the expanding regional missile threat.”^[2] The United States has 30 ground-based interceptors stationed in Alaska and California to defend against long-range missile attacks. The U.S. Navy has equipped 18 Aegis warships with sea-based interceptors and 21 Aegis warships with long-range surveillance and tracking systems. These sea-based interceptors can defeat short-range and medium-range missiles in mid-flight. Many of these ships are stationed in the Pacific and the Sea of Japan. Equipping additional Aegis cruisers would provide an ability to patrol America’s coasts as well. Additional destroyers are needed to perform the new phased-adaptive approach mission in Europe to replace the planned “third site” in Poland and the Czech Republic. The United States currently has the capability to shoot down approximately 10 ballistic missiles launched from North Korea or Iran, but not if Iran and North Korea continued to develop their nuclear capabilities and coordinated an attack. U.S. missile defense systems cannot protect against Russian or Chinese ballistic missiles or against short-range or medium-range missiles launched from ships off the U.S. coast. A comprehensive missile defense system would not only protect the American homeland, but also reassure U.S. friends and allies of Washington’s commitment to their security against steadily rising military risks and threats of coercion or aggression. Missile defense contributes to regional peace and stability and supports international nonproliferation efforts by reducing other nations’ perceived need to acquire nuclear weapons. Conversely, the absence of sufficient missile defenses leaves the U.S. and its allies “limited in their actions and pursuit of their interests if they are vulnerable to North Korean or Iranian missiles.”^[3]

Only THAAD reassures East Asian allies—that's key to avoid allied prolifer

Pinkston, 7-14 – Daniel Pinkston, North East Asia Deputy Project Director with the International Crisis Group, Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Project at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, PhD in International Affairs from UCSD, 7-14-2016, "Why it makes sense to deploy THAAD in South Korea", <https://www.nknews.org/2016/07/why-it-makes-sense-to-deploy-thaad-in-south-korea/>

This type of rhetoric is extremely irresponsible and counterproductive. First, it reveals Beijing's likely intentions in the case of an inter-Korean crisis, and second, it strongly encourages South Koreans who insist that Seoul must acquire its own nuclear deterrent.

Many critics fail to appreciate the role THAAD plays in reassuring Seoul in the shadow of Pyongyang's growing nuclear capabilities. There is strong support in South Korea for nuclear breakout, it almost certainly would occur if not for the U.S.-ROK alliance. If South Korea were to seek a nuclear deterrent, it seems implausible that Japan would not follow. This scenario is not in the interest of China, Russia, the U.S., or any nation with the exception of North Korea.

US commitment is key to prevent allied proliferation---that causes instability and nuclear use

Brooks et al 13, STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, "Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement" <http://www.twc.edu/sites/default/files/assets/academicCourseDocs/22.%20Brooks,%20Lean%20Forward.pdf>, DOA: 7-28-15, y2k

But that outlook is too sanguine. **If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China.** It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington -- notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia -- might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East -- but at what cost? **Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars,** all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. **Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own.** Those countries **regional competitors might** then also **seek nuclear arsenals.** Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, **things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up**

Asian prolifer specifically causes nuclear war

Stephen J. **Cimbala 15**, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University Brandywine, *The New Nuclear Disorder: Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy*, 2015, p. 149

Failure to contain proliferation in Pyongyang could **spread nuclear fever throughout Asia. Japan and South Korea might seek nuclear weapons** and missile defenses. **A pentagonal configuration of nuclear powers in the Pacific basin** (Russia, China, Japan, and the two Koreas—not including the United States, with its own Pacific interests) **could put deterrence at risk and create enormous temptation toward nuclear preemption**. Apart from actual use or threat of use, North Korea could exploit the mere existence of an assumed nuclear capability in order to support its coercive diplomacy.¹⁹ **A five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked**, in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, **to the existing nuclear deterrents of India and Pakistan, and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran. An arc of nuclear instability** from Tehran to Tokyo **could place US proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history and call for more drastic military options, not excluding preemptive war**, defenses and counter-deterrent special operations. In addition, **an unrestricted nuclear arms race in Asia would increase the likelihood of** accidental or inadvertent **nuclear war**. It would do so because: (1) some of **these states** already have histories of protracted conflict; (2) **states may have** politically **unreliable** or immature **command and control systems**, especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation; **unreliable** or immature **systems might permit a technical malfunction that caused an unintended launch, or a deliberate, but unauthorized, launch by rogue commanders; and** (3) **faulty intelligence** and warning systems **might cause one side to misinterpret the other's defensive moves** to forestall attack **as offensive preparations for attack, thus triggering a mistaken preemption**.

Independently, missile prolifer escalates, and accidental launch means deterrence can't check and response is key.

Josh **Levinger 6**, Research Assistant with the Center for Future Civic Media at MIT, Fall 2006, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation Among the "Axis of Evil": Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Pakistan," <http://www.levinger.net/josh/files/range/paper.pdf>

The real threat posed by ballistic missile proliferation is to regional stability. Introducing long range missiles and nuclear warheads into inflamed regions such as the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, and East Asia, opens the possibility for accidental launch and rapid escalation While the United States and the Soviet Union stared each other down at the nuclear threshold for decades, other **adversaries may not have as advanced a military decision process, or the experience of living with the threat of total annihilation**. The future of missile proliferation looks bleak, with the impending disintegration of the NPT and the circumvention of the MTCR. On the other hand, the foreign market for budding missile designers appears to be booming. Perhaps there are job offers waiting for this graduating senior in Pyongyang, Tehran or Islamabad.

Weak US-ROK alliance kills regional stability and global US alliance system

Santoro and Warden 15 (David and John, senior fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS + WSD-Handa fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS, "Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age," Spring, https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Spring2015_Santoro-Warden.pdf)

The end of the Cold War gave rise to hopes—mainly in Western quarters—that nuclear weapons would be relegated to the dustbin of history.⁴ This belief led the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to downsize their arsenals and assist a financially-strapped Russia to do the same. Meanwhile, **several states across Asia**—in Western Asia (the Middle East), South Asia, and East Asia—**developed nuclear and long-range missile programs**.⁵ China's efforts to modernize its nuclear and missile forces continued steadily. India and Pakistan pushed forward with their own programs and, after exploding nuclear devices in 1998, became nuclear-armed states. North Korea conducted several rocket tests during the late 1990s and tested its first nuclear device in 2006. Iran, Syria, and others also developed nuclear and missile programs. By the early 21st century, the Cold War order tightly controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union was replaced by a multiplayer arena with several less experienced nuclear decision-making parties and an epicenter in Asia. As a result, today, while there is less risk of global annihilation—both because major-power relations have improved and because important firebreaks against conflict are in place, including robust crisis management mechanisms and enhanced economic interdependence—**the potential for war, and even nuclear use, is growing**.⁶ Not surprisingly, **these developments have led U.S. allies to seek strengthened assurances that the United States, their main security guarantor, will continue to protect them** from coercion and attack. The assurance challenge is particularly difficult because it turns on more than effective deterrence. Deterrence primarily requires the United States to influence an adversary's calculus at critical moments during a crisis. For allies to be fully assured, however, the United States must, during peacetime, convince them 1) that U.S. extended deterrence will succeed in preventing adversaries from challenging their core interests, and 2) that should deterrence fail, the United States can and will provide for their defense. Hence former British defense minister Denis Healey's formulation that during the Cold War it took "only five percent credibility of U.S. retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety-five percent credibility to reassure the Europeans."⁷ In the second nuclear age, **it is more difficult for the United States to assure its Northeast Asian allies than it was during the Cold War**. James Schoff notes that during the Cold War "the U.S. commitment to counter the Soviet threat was largely unquestioned in Tokyo, and the details about how deterrence worked mattered little."⁸ Today, **the United States must convince allies that it can deter multiple nuclear-armed adversaries**, some of whom have less adversarial relations with the United States than the Soviet Union did. Just as important, **the United States also faces an equally difficult task of convincing its allies that it could and would respond should extended deterrence fail**. North Korea continues to develop long-range missiles and nuclear weapons, and China is modernizing its military and acting increasingly assertively. The United States' relationship with China is also more complex than its Cold War relationship with the Soviet Union, featuring varying degrees of competition and cooperation. At the same time, the United States has shifted from a 1960s deterrent posture of deploying thousands of nuclear weapons, including 3,000 forward deployed in the Asia-Pacific (1,200 in Okinawa), to one with far fewer deployed nuclear weapons and none forward-deployed in Asia.⁹ **U.S. assurance of allies exists along a spectrum, and Washington must carefully balance its desire to reduce allied anxiety against other interests**. There are some allied interests that the United States—rightly—does not deem worthy of risking war. But **if the gap between the United States and its allies becomes too large, allies will lose faith in U.S. assurance**, which could have disruptive consequences. In the worst case scenario for the United States, Japan or South Korea might choose to bandwagon with U.S. competitors in the region. Another slightly better, but still deeply troublesome, possibility is for Tokyo and Seoul to develop nuclear arsenals of their own, which would likely eviscerate the remaining credibility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In either case, **a loss of confidence in the United States as a reliable security guarantor in Northeast Asia would send reverberations across the entire U.S. alliance system**. Development of nuclear weapons by Japan or South Korea is not a far-fetched scenario. Both possess the latent capability to develop weapons programs relatively quickly, and some in South Korea and to a lesser extent Japan have advocated that their countries should go nuclear if the Northeast Asian security environment deteriorates or they lose confidence in the United States as a reliable guarantor.¹⁰ In South Korea, there are also signs of public support for nuclearization. After North Korea's third nuclear test, for example, an Asan Institute poll revealed that 66 percent of people in South Korea wanted nuclear weapons.¹¹

Strong US alliance system is vital to cooperative approaches to resolve existential risks

Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth 13 (Stephen, G John, and John, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and

Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, + Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Foreign Affairs, "Lean Forward," p. EBSCOhost)

By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world's key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers:

on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as a percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals is by many measures growing. On top of all this,

the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises,

as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony--China--and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing.

MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy

and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership.

In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open.

A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred--convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship." More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy.

Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States. The United States' geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country,

such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU's dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk.

CREATING COOPERATION What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy,

organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly,

especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability.

U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the

political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary

issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues: for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. **Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens.** For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds."

Perception of a diminished U.S. commitment to South Korean security causes Israel to escalate against Iran

Tyler **Cowen 13**, professor of economics at George Mason University and at the Center for the Study of Public Choice, Director of the Mercatus Center, 4/5/13, "Why the U.S. helps defend South Korea and what can go wrong,"

<http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2013/04/why-the-u-s-helps-defend-south-korea-and-what-can-go-wrong.html>

Why the U.S. helps defend South Korea and what can go wrong

It is **not because we need to subsidize their defense** per se, to cite one argument which some non-interventionist critics have attacked. **It is so, when North Korea behaves in a ridiculous manner, the South can respond (not respond) with great restraint.** What **we are subsidizing** is a) **a feeling of security,** and b) **not building nuclear weapons in response.** We do something broadly similar for Japan.

The potential problem is when the same U.S. acts which produce a feeling of security in South Koreans produce a feeling of insecurity in North Korean leaders. And **the broader game we are playing, with numerous allies, means we might end up pushing some individual confrontations beyond an optimal point** (e.g., **how would Israel respond with Iran if we wavered on South Korea?**) **Might we have to overinvest in the South Korean feeling of security — from a strictly Korean peninsula point of view — to keep Japan, Israel, Taiwan, the Saudis,** and others **"in line"?**

It would be good if the North Korean leadership would read this blog post, as they would then **realize** that what to their eyes appears to be **American "overstepping" is done for the sake of other audiences.** **It is problematic for the American government to itself communicate this point. Imagine announcing "we don't stand by South Korea as much as it appears, we are just doing this because Israel faces a signal extraction problem** and we can somewhat sway their inference toward relaxing about their own security situation."

It would be bad if the Saudi leadership would read this blog post (or understand this to begin with). The American government would then have to produce a feeling of security for South Korea all the more.

Israeli strikes cause global great power war

Rafael **Reuveny 10**, PhD, Professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University, "Unilateral Strike on Iran could trigger world Depression", Op-ed distributed through McClatchy Newspaper Co, http://www.indiana.edu/~spea/news/speaking_out/reuveny_on_unilateral_strike_Iran.shtml

A unilateral **Israeli strike** on Iran's nuclear facilities **would likely have dire consequences, including a regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash**. For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it **must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force. Such an outcome is extremely unlikely** since the locations of some of Iran's nuclear facilities are not fully known and **known facilities are buried deep underground**. All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians, but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well. By now, **Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities developed early-warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces**. Because **Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike – or even numerous strikes – could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond**. A regional war Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981, **Iran has a second-strike capability** comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon's shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel's numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents. Despite Israel's touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat. In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel's military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973. An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran's capabilities, but **it crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade** in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Middle Eastern **oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle**, as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. **Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United States and Europe. The world economy would head into a tailspin**; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghan citizens might fully turn on the United States, **immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops. Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey** – all of which essentially support Iran – **could be tempted to form an alliance and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony**. Replaying Nixon's nightmare Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama's response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon's nightmarish scenario. **Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States head-to-head**. In contrast, **if the United States leads the attack, Iran's response would likely be muted. If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons, but would probably not risk using force**. While no one has a crystal ball, **leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.**

Korean tensions are higher than ever—prior forecasts underestimate the rate of modernization, and Chinese diplomacy has failed Cohen and Starr 7-28

Zachary Cohen (CNN political correspondent) and Barbara Starr (CNN's Pentagon correspondent). "Trump condemns North Korean long-range missile launch." CNN. 28 July 2017. JDN. <http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/28/politics/north-korea-missile-test/index.html>

President Donald Trump condemned North Korea's launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile on Friday. **"Threatening the world, these weapons and tests further isolate North Korea**, weaken its economy, and deprive its

people." Trump said in a written statement. "The United States will take all necessary steps to ensure the security of the American homeland and protect our allies in the region." The United States detected an intercontinental ballistic missile launch out of North Korea at approximately 10:45 am ET on Friday, the Pentagon confirmed to CNN -- Pyongyang's second such test this month. The North Korea threat. What can Trump do? The missile was launched from Mupyong-ni and traveled about 1000 km before splashing down in the waters off the Japanese coast, according to the Pentagon, which is working with interagency partners on a more detailed assessment. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) determined the missile launch from North Korea did not pose a threat to North America. "Our commitment to the defense of our allies, including the Republic of Korea and Japan, in the face of these threats, remains ironclad. We remain prepared to defend ourselves and our allies from any attack or provocation," a statement from the Pentagon said. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe told Japanese broadcaster NHK: "I have received the first report that North Korea again launched a missile and it possibly landed inside the exclusive economic zone." Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said the missile launched by North Korea possibly flew for approximately 45 minutes. Suga told reporters there is no damage to any vessel or aircraft. South Korea's joint chiefs of staff said they estimate that the intercontinental ballistic missile is more advanced than one launched last month based on the range it traveled. "The altitude is about 3,700 km and the flying distance is about 1,000 km. It is estimated that it was a more advanced type of an ICBM compared to the previous one based on the range," a statement to CNN said. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., and the commander of US Pacific Command, Admiral Harry Harris, called the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Lee Sun Jin in the wake of North Korea's test to express the US' "ironclad commitment" to its alliance with South Korea and discuss military response options. Hours after that call, the US and South Korean military conducted a live fire exercise as a show of force in response to the missile test, according to Pentagon spokesman, Capt. Jeff Davis. The exercise included firing missiles into the ocean. Both militaries conducted a similar show of force, after North Korea's first ICBM test in early July. New US intelligence on North Korea missile program The ongoing assessment from the US intelligence community in recent months has been that North Korea has accelerated its intercontinental range ballistic missile program. The US believes that North Korea will be able to launch a reliable nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by early 2018, a US official familiar with the latest intelligence assessment confirmed to CNN Wednesday. That would be an acceleration of two years from previous estimates that put Pyongyang three to five years from fully developing long-range missile capabilities. Why North Korea still hates the United States: The legacy of the Korean War The official clarified to CNN that while North Korea can currently get a missile "off the ground," there are still a lot of undetermined variables about guidance, re-entry and the ability to hit a specific target. CNN reported earlier this month that US intelligence indicated that North Korea was making preparations for another ICBM or intermediate range missile test. Two administration officials familiar with the latest intelligence at the time confirmed they'd seen indicators of test preparations. "In all honesty, we should not be surprised anymore: North Korea is slowly morphing into a nuclear and missile power right before our very eyes," said Harry J. Kazianis, director of defense studies at the Center for the National Interest and an expert on North Korea. 2017 has been a year of rapid progress for North Korea's missile program. Pyongyang has carried out 12 missile tests since February and conducted its first-ever test of an ICBM on July 4 -- which it claims could reach "anywhere in the world." "North Korea will continue to test over and over again its missile technology and nuclear weapons in the months and years to come in order to develop the most lethal systems it can," Kazianis said. "You can bet every time they do tensions will continue to rise. This is what makes the situation on the Korean Peninsula as dangerous as it is." Less than six years into his reign, Kim Jong Un has tested more missiles than his father and grandfather combined. What are President Donald Trump's options? North Korea's latest test has spurred calls for a response from the Trump administration. "North Korea's latest missile test shows the Trump administration's actions are not changing North Korea's behavior and it's time for the President to articulate a comprehensive strategy to the American people -- so far he's failed to do that," Democratic Rep. Ted Lieu told CNN on Friday. Trump administration officials have warned that "all options are on the table" but a clear path forward has yet to materialize. Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute who specializes in foreign policy, told CNN that North Korea's missile launch shows Pyongyang is "absolutely committed to their missile programs" and not interested in tempering their activities. Bandow, who visited North Korea just last month, said the regime is convinced that developing its missile program as a nuclear deterrent is absolutely necessary -- a mindset that continues to put pressure on President Donald Trump, who finds himself in a situation with no good choices, according to Bandow. Those choices are further complicated by the unpredictable nature of Kim Jong Un, according to Lieu, who also told CNN he "does not know" if Kim would be willing to use a long-range nuclear weapon should he acquire that capability. Trump has often cited China, North Korea's longtime ally, as a key player in reining in North Korea's quest to have long-range nuclear missiles. But diplomatic efforts calling for China to put pressure on Pyongyang or enforce meaningful sanctions on North Korean revenue streams used to fund its missile program have proven ineffective to date. Secretary of State

Rex Tillerson has put countries on notice that if they or their companies help North Korea -- also known as the DPRK -- they'll face penalties. That mostly means China, which accounts for 90 percent of North Korea's trade. That doesn't seem to be working yet. Lawmakers in the US House and Senate have overwhelmingly passed a bill that would expand economic sanctions on North Korea, but the White House has not definitively said Trump will sign the sweeping measure that also tightens restrictions on Iran and Russia. Republican Rep. Mike Turner of Ohio, a senior member of the House Armed Services Committee, implored Trump to sign the bill following North Korea's missile test on Friday. "These missile tests must be met with consequences. Earlier this week, I voted to increase sanctions against North Korea. The Senate has since taken the same action. I urge the President to quickly sign these sanctions into law to thwart further escalation of North Korea's missile systems," a statement from Turner said. Even if Trump does sign the bill there is no guarantee that additional sanctions will slow North Korea's march toward a long-range nuclear missile. Pyongyang's nuclear aspirations have progressed forward rapidly despite previous sanctions, and Kim's regime has resisted any US attempts at negotiation that mandates de-nuclearization upfront. Earlier this year, Beijing called on Pyongyang to suspend its nuclear and missile tests while calling on the US to stop military exercises on and near the Korean Peninsula, which North Korea sees as a threat to its sovereignty. But neither the US nor North Korea has shown any willingness to compromise as the situation has escalated in recent months. Last month, CNN reported that the US military updated its options for North Korea with the goal of giving Trump plans for a rapid response, according to two US military officials at the time. Officials said the options, which include a military response, would be presented to the President if Pyongyang conducted an underground nuclear or ballistic missile test that indicates the regime has made significant progress toward developing a weapon that could attack the US. But a US preemptive attack continues to be highly problematic option because the Pentagon has long believed North Korea would in turn attack South Korea.

Korean war goes nuclear, spills over globally

Steven **Metz 13**, Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department and Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, 3/13/13, "Strategic Horizons: Thinking the Unthinkable on a Second Korean War," <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12786/strategic-horizons-thinking-the-unthinkable-on-a-second-korean-war>

Today, North Korea is the most dangerous country on earth and the greatest threat to U.S. security. For years, the bizarre regime in Pyongyang has issued an unending stream of claims that a U.S. and South Korean invasion is imminent, while declaring that it will defeat this offensive just as -- according to official propaganda -- it overcame the unprovoked American attack in 1950. Often the press releases from the official North Korean news agency are absurdly funny, and American policymakers tend to ignore them as a result. Continuing to do so, though, could be dangerous as events and rhetoric turn even more ominous. In response to North Korea's Feb. 12 nuclear test, the U.N. Security Council recently tightened existing sanctions against Pyongyang. Even China, North Korea's long-standing benefactor and protector, went along. Convulsed by anger, Pyongyang then threatened a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the United States and South Korea, abrogated the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War and cut off the North-South hotline installed in 1971 to help avoid an escalation of tensions between the two neighbors. A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry asserted that a second Korean War is unavoidable. He might be right; for the first time, an official statement from the North Korean government may prove true. No American leader wants another war in Korea. The problem is that the North Koreans make so many threatening and bizarre official statements and sustain such a high level of military readiness that American policymakers might fail to recognize the signs of impending attack. After all, every recent U.S. war began with miscalculation; American policymakers misunderstood the intent of their opponents, who in turn underestimated American determination. The conflict with North Korea could repeat this pattern. Since the regime of Kim Jong Un has continued its predecessors' tradition of responding hysterically to every action and statement it doesn't like, it's hard to assess exactly what might push Pyongyang over the edge and cause it to lash out. It could be something that the United States considers modest and reasonable, or it could be some sort of internal power struggle within the North Korean regime invisible to the outside world. While we cannot know whether the recent round of threats from Pyongyang is serious or simply more of the same old lathering, it would be prudent to think the unthinkable and reason through what a war instigated by a fearful and delusional North Korean regime might mean for U.S. security. The second Korean War could begin with missile strikes against South Korean, Japanese

or U.S. targets, or with a combination of missile strikes and a major conventional invasion of the South -- something North Korea has prepared for many decades. Early attacks might include nuclear weapons, but even if they didn't, the United States would probably move quickly to destroy any existing North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The war itself would be extremely costly and probably long. North Korea is the most militarized society on earth. Its armed forces are backward but huge. It's hard to tell whether the North Korean people, having been fed a steady diet of propaganda based on adulation of the Kim regime, would resist U.S. and South Korean forces that entered the North or be thankful for relief from their brutally parasitic rulers. As the conflict in Iraq showed, the United States and its allies should prepare for widespread, protracted resistance even while hoping it doesn't occur. Extended guerrilla operations and insurgency could potentially last for years following the defeat of North Korea's conventional military. North Korea would need massive relief, as would South Korea and Japan if Pyongyang used nuclear weapons. Stabilizing North Korea and developing an effective and peaceful regime would require a lengthy occupation, whether U.S.-dominated or with the United States as a major contributor. The second Korean War would force military mobilization in the United States. This would initially involve the military's existing reserve component, but it would probably ultimately require a major expansion of the U.S. military and hence a draft. The military's training infrastructure and the defense industrial base would have to grow. This would be a body blow to efforts to cut government spending in the United States and postpone serious deficit reduction for some time, even if Washington increased taxes to help fund the war. Moreover, a second Korean conflict would shock the global economy and potentially have destabilizing effects outside Northeast Asia. Eventually, though, the United States and its allies would defeat the North Korean military. At that point it would be impossible for the United States to simply re-establish the status quo ante bellum as it did after the first Korean War. The Kim regime is too unpredictable, desperate and dangerous to tolerate. Hence regime change and a permanent ending to the threat from North Korea would have to be America's strategic objective. China would pose the most pressing and serious challenge to such a transformation of North Korea. After all, Beijing's intervention saved North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung after he invaded South Korea in the 1950s, and Chinese assistance has kept the subsequent members of the Kim family dictatorship in power. Since the second Korean War would invariably begin like the first one -- with North Korean aggression -- hopefully China has matured enough as a great power to allow the world to remove its dangerous allies this time. If the war began with out-of-the-blue North Korean missile strikes, China could conceivably even contribute to a multinational operation to remove the Kim regime. Still, China would vehemently oppose a long-term U.S. military presence in North Korea or a unified Korea allied with the United States. One way around this might be a grand bargain leaving a unified but neutral Korea. However appealing this might be, Korea might hesitate to adopt neutrality as it sits just across the Yalu River from a China that tends to claim all territory that it controlled at any point in its history. If the aftermath of the second Korean War is not handled adroitly, the result could easily be heightened hostility between the United States and China, perhaps even a new cold war. After all, history shows that deep economic connections do not automatically prevent nations from hostility and war -- in 1914 Germany was heavily involved in the Russian economy and had extensive trade and financial ties with France and Great Britain. It is not inconceivable then, that after the second Korean War, U.S.-China relations would be antagonistic and hostile at the same time that the two continued mutual trade and investment. Stranger things have happened in statecraft.

War games prove presence restrains South Korea from escalating

David **Santoro 16**, senior fellow for nuclear policy at the Pacific Forum CSIS; and John K. Warden, militant Hawaiian secessionist, 2/1/16, "America's Delicate Dance Between Deterrence and Assurance," <http://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/americas-delicate-dance-between-deterrence-assurance-15076>

The fundamentals of extended deterrence and assurance were demonstrated at a track-1.5 table-top exercise that the Pacific Forum CSIS ran in Maui, Hawaii in July 2014. The exercise featured teams of U.S., Japanese and South Korean nationals from academia, think tanks, government and the military managing an escalating crisis on the Korean Peninsula. It began with the sinking of a Japanese vessel by North Korea in the Sea of Japan/East Sea, leading all three teams to recommend that the United States, with logistical support from Japan, strike the North Korean naval base that supported the attack. The U.S. team acted out of concern for Japan's security, the credibility of the U.S.-Japan alliance and, by extension, the credibility of the entire U.S. alliance system. In the second move, North Korea retaliated with an artillery barrage against South Korean farmland north of Seoul (killing several people) and a nuclear detonation over the Sea of Japan/East Sea (with no initial casualties). While the U.S., Japanese and South Korean teams disagreed over how to respond, many felt that the United States needed to put an end to North Korea's active nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. The U.S. team, in line with the 2014 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review, felt it could not allow Pyongyang to "escalate [its] way out of failed conventional aggression." It was also motivated by a desire to hold North Korea accountable for breaking the nuclear taboo and to send a message to other states that future nuclear use would have severe consequences.

The responses of the U.S., Japanese and Korean teams were somewhat predictable and in line with common understandings of extended deterrence and assurance. But the Maui exercise also exemplified that, at times, the United States seeks to discourage, or deter, actions by its allies and, conversely, assure its adversaries.

U.S. efforts to deter allies and assure adversaries should not be surprising. Deterrence—the act of using fear of consequences or punishment to change a country's calculus and inhibit behavior—has been a key feature of alliance relationships, just as assurance—the act of using declarations or guarantees to inspire confidence in how a country will act in particular circumstances—has been central to adversary relationships. But in the twenty-first century, more so than during the Cold War, the United States faces increasingly complex challenges in managing its alliance and adversary relationships.

Deterrence in Alliance Relationships

Elements of deterrence have long been discussed as a key component of alliance relationships. In his study of alliances during the 1815-1945 period, Paul Schroeder concludes that alliances are not only “weapons of power,” but also “tools of management” or, as he puts it, “pactum de contrahendo” (pacts of restraint). But the deterrence factor in alliance relationships was perhaps best captured by nineteenth-century Prussian statesman Otto von Bismarck who, after allying his country with Austria to stop Vienna's provocative policies toward Russia and prevent a major war, famously remarked that in every alliance “there is always a horse and a rider.”

The fundamentals of the current U.S. alliance system are no different. As Victor Cha explains, the United States established tight and deep bilateral alliances with Taiwan, South Korea and Japan after World War Two both to contain the Soviet threat and to exercise control over, as he puts it, potentially “rogue allies” that could entrap the United States in unwanted wars. Washington set up processes that allowed it to persuade allies of the need for caution and mechanisms for joint decisions that constrained their options. Perhaps more important, there was an implicit, background threat: ‘if you escalate too far on your own, the United States may not support you.’ Because allies were militarily dependent on the United States, they were deterred from overreacting when crises arose and, for that matter, from initiating crises in the first place.

The Maui exercise exhibited the tension that sometimes exists between the United States and its allies. Following Pyongyang's attack against South Korea, South Korean participants stressed that retaliation would likely be “automatic”—initiated by commanders in the field before consultation with Washington, and possibly even Seoul—and go beyond a proportionate response, striking “vital” North Korean targets. American participants, while fully recognizing South Korea's right to respond unilaterally at the local conventional level, worried that such a military response would escalate the conflict. Some pointed to the 2013 U.S.-South Korea Counter-Provocation Plan, which includes procedures for consultation for a combined U.S.-South Korean response. Others noted that there may be a difference of interpretation between U.S. and South Korean officials about which North Korean targets should be included in a retaliatory strike. In short, the U.S. team wished to maintain control over South Korea and was prepared to restrain, constrain and possibly even deter, some of Seoul's actions.

Tensions are at an unprecedented high – conflict is inevitable

- Kaesong closure - Missile and Nuclear test - Communication lines cut - THAAD talks - Military exercises

TN 2-17 (Today News, news agency, citing Leonid Petrov, a North Korea expert at Australian National University, Aidan Foster-Carter, a Korea expert at the British, Chang Yong-Seok, a veteran expert at the Research Institute for peace and unification in Seoul National University, South Korean Defense Ministry spokesman Moon Sang-gyun, Giles Hewit, AFP's Asian commentator, February 17, 2016. “The Korean peninsula on the brink of major conflict.” <http://www.todaynews24h.com/the-korean-peninsula-on-the-brink-of-major-conflict/>)

Relations between the two regions of the Korean peninsula into a State of being split by far the deepest, causing conflict could explode at any time. The relationship is not good between the two Koreas appear to continue to suffer serious erosion after the official communication lines between the two sides was cut off and the stress problems appear, signaling the potential risk in the coming time. In theory, North and South Korea are still in a State of war throughout the 6 years of the past decade, and the two countries have also experienced a series of crises in the

past, but the situation never became dangerous as at present. The nuclear test and missile launch by Pyongyang recently extinguished any hope for negotiation and dialogue between the two regions. Despite the harsh response from the international community, North Korea's leader, Kim Jong-un confirms will pursue to the end the development of nuclear weapons, while Seoul declared adamantly responded any provocative move from Pyongyang. The current deadlock situation are increasingly tend to turn into a "cold war" on the North Korean nuclear issue, between China, Russia and North Korea, with the United States, Japan and South Korea. Tension on the Korean peninsula has reached a peak last week when Seoul stopped all cooperation activities at the Kaesong joint industrial park. Despite being a rather sensitive area located on the border of Korea Kaesong maintained, existence after more serious incident in the two countries' relations since this industrial operations since 2004. "It really is a miracle when this industrial zone can exist so long," Leonid Petrov, a North Korea expert at Australian National University, reviews. But now magic has ended and it's hard to hope for recovery. On 10 February, in response to the move Pyongyang orbit satellite launch, Seoul declared retired 124 South Korean businesses in Kaesong, the North Korean workers 53000 will lose jobs. Pyongyang also responded instantly by expelling the entire South Korean business managers and freeze their accounts, at the same time put this industrial park under the supervision of the army. North Korea also claims the whole cutting electricity and water supplies for industrial parks. "I believe that Kaesong can hardly work again. Things have gone too far and North Korea as South Korea were never intended to solve disagreements," said Petrov. The risk of outbreak of conflict The Kaesong industrial zone was established thanks to the diplomatic policy of "sunshine" that South Korea applied with North Korea in the period 1998-2008, with the main aim is to appease Pyongyang with economic assistance and cooperation. South Korea considers this industrial park is a symbol of the partnership the two regions, is the first step in promoting market reforms in North Korea, advance to replicate this model. Many analysts feel the dismay when "door free trade" only one small but very important in the region of the border militarized most closely to this world has been closed. "Kaesong zone, when South Korea and North Korea will not have any platform to maintain regular contact. This is a very serious step backwards", Aidan Foster-Carter, a Korea expert at the British. Chang Yong-Seok, a veteran expert at the Research Institute for peace and unification in Seoul National University, also said that one of the most important contributions of the Kaesong industrial park is contributing to maintain the soft in relations between the two regions. "Both North Korea have benefitted in Kaesong area should they somehow are tempered to maintain the operation of it. But all has ended," said Chang asserted. The opportunity for dialogue between Seoul and Pyongyang as declining than when on 12/2, North Korea announced two severed the last hot line between the two countries. After the move, the South Korean Defense Ministry spokesman Moon Sang-gyun claimed the risk of conflict will inevitably rise in the border areas are militarized thick between the two countries. "The hot line has not been used for diplomatic dialogue, but they are still used to promote and assign the schedule of the talks of the two sides. The last time, despite the stress, they can still be maintained for the purpose of avoiding conflict occurs, but now this chance has not left," Giles Hewitt, AFP's Asian commentator identified Besides that, many analysts believe that North Korea will inevitably negative reaction to the sanctions of the Un Security Council after the nuclear test and missile launch. In March, South Korea and the United States is expected to conduct a series of military exercises that North Korea's annual General considered the actions threatening to territorial sovereignty and instigate tensions escalate. Pyongyang will certainly increase the dynamics responded, especially when Seoul and Washington began to discuss the deployment of high-altitude defense system (THAAD) last stage on the territory of South Korea. "South Korea and the United States of America declared the rehearsal will scale larger than usual and North Korea will certainly have the strong reaction. So, I believe that the world will witness the escalation of unprecedented tension on the Korean peninsula in the coming years," said Chang.