

Ilana and I negate the resolution.

Our sole contention is aggravation

There will be two inherent consequences to India joining the UN security council as a permanent member.

First, India's regional rivals would lose comparative power.

[Nikola Pijovic in the Turkish Journal of International Relations in 2012](#) writes

What is evident from this examination of regional rivalries and the methods employed by states in undermining each other's SC membership aspirations is that no matter which region of the world they are from, and no matter how economically developed and interdependent they are on cooperation and trade, **when it comes to perceptions of power and self-importance in international affairs, most states are guided by a logic of relative gains in maintaining a status-quo of power and prestige, or diminishing the potential increase in these aspects of their neighbors.**

Second, India would become emboldened.

[David Scott from Brunel University in 2014](#) highlights

**Under Modi, India's attitude and role in international organisations will most likely continue to reflect a drive for Great Power status**

, an ingrained stress on "strategic autonomy", and mixed regional competition and global cooperation with China. With regard to India's immediate neighbourhood, the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has to date proved of limited success, and Modi will need to decide how much energy to put into galvanising the organisation. His invitation to other SAARC leaders to attend his inauguration in May 2014 suggested he might be so inclined. However, China's push for SAARC entry is something that India is likely to be reluctant over. India's efforts may instead go into galvanising BIMSTEC as a useful bridgehead to Southeast Asia, given that BIMSTEC membership is the same as SAARC minus a problematic Pakistan but plus Myanmar.

This increased presence will have disastrous consequences in two areas:

a) Subpoint a is Pakistan

Conflict with Pakistan will escalate in two ways

1. Terrorism

Shahid for the Diplomat in 2019 writes that the Pakistani state both funds terrorists and donates soldiers to them as a deterrent when they view India as taking steps towards expansion. Ingbar for NPR in 2019 furthers that Pakistani terrorists use perceived expansion by India to justify their killings. Thus, acceding to the security council will increase both the number, and the fury of terrorists. Even one terror attack can be deadly as is demonstrated with the recent brutalities, which took the lives of 60 innocent civilians. If India joined the UNSC terror attacks would rise exponentially, killing hundreds of thousands.

2. Skirmishes

Pakistan strongly rejects India's bid for a permanent seat, as the Economic Times reports in 2018, Pakistan feels that it will be the first steps towards further Indian expansion. Jaffrelot, for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018 writes that historically the biggest trigger for ceasefire violations in the Kashmir region is Pakistani frustration at India.

However in the status quo there is an incentive to de-escalate these skirmishes, which will go away if India accedes. Nawaz '18 writes that as long as India is not on the UNSC, Pakistan views the possible threat of or actual mediation of their actions by the UNSC, as a legitimate source of power, and is dissuaded from escalating. Simultaneously, India is less likely to escalate as long as it is not on the council. Kim in 2012 writes that India de-escalates tensions with Pakistan when they arise in order to make more favorable its bid for a permanent seat on the UN security council.

This increase in mistrust between the two historically antagonistic and distrusting nations would likely tip the balance on the current tensions and be the spark that lights the flame. Mizokami, for the National Interest in 2019 writes that if the two countries went to war, a major conventional war would be likely to erupt, killing hundreds of thousands. Even more concerning, he follows that the Pakistanis would be likely to rely on nuclear weapons to aid their conventional forces in order to address the disparity in forces between them and India. Siddique in 2019 for Gandhara writes, that even small nuclear warfare would not only ruin the lives of some 1.6 billion people living in India and Pakistan, but would have grave, lasting, consequences reaching across South Asia and beyond.

#### b) Subpoint b is China

Dabhade 2017 writes that China views Indian accession to the UNSC as a statement that they are equal in power status to them, which upsets them greatly. This frustration will manifest itself in three areas.

##### 1. Pakistan

China has indicated that if India were to move into a space of greater international influence, that it would react angrily. One likely manifestation of this is in increasing arms sales to Pakistan. The Center for Strategic International Studies in 2018 reports that China often uses its arms sales to Pakistan to achieve its strategic political goals in the region. This reactionary arms build-up is definitionally an arms race. Ryder from Texas Tech writes in 2011 that when an arms race occurs between two historically antagonistic nations, the probability of war go up by 331%.

##### 2. Hydro-Hegemony

Kim in 2012 writes that India bites its tongue when they have differences with China, in order to guarantee that China does not veto their accession to the UNSC. While both countries informally agreed in 2017 to respect the disputed territory between them, this agreement has been interrupted by skirmishes when mistrust between the two nations is high. Skirmishes between the two countries often turn fatal, as Das from the South China Morning Post finds in 2018 that China cut off crucial river data to India in retaliation for the Doklam incident and it killed over a hundred people and left three million stranded.

##### 3. Military Skirmish

Markey for CFR in 2015 writes that a border skirmish between the two countries could also become military, saying that if miscalculation or misunderstanding were to happen between the two nations at

the border during a period of heightened tension, such as after India acceded or if India were to make a move in the UNSC that China didn't like, China and India would be pressured to militarily escalate in order to not appear weak.

Thank you,  
We negate.

## CASE CARDS

### India has capabilities to beat China in war

Mizokami, National Interest, June 2018

<https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-war-between-china-india-not-unthinkable-would-be-total-26238>

Both countries' "No First Use" policies regarding nuclear weapons make the outbreak of nuclear war very unlikely. Both countries have such large populations, each over 1.3 billion, that they are essentially unconquerable. Like all modern wars, a war between India and China would be fought over land, sea, and air; geography would limit the scope of the land conflict, while it would be the air conflict, fought with both aircraft and missiles, that would do the most damage to both countries. The trump card, however, may be **India's unique position to dominate a sea conflict**, with **[would cause] dire consequences for the Chinese economy**. A war between the two countries would, unlike the 1962 war, involve major air action on both sides. Both countries maintain large tactical air forces capable of flying missions over the area. People's Liberation Army Air Force units in the Lanzhou Military Region would fly against Punjab, Himchal Pradesh and Uttarakhand and from the expansive Chengdu Military region against India's Arunachal Pradesh. The Lanzhou district is home to J-11 and J-11B fighters, two regiments of H-6 strategic bombers, and grab bag of J-7 and J-8 fighters. A lack of forward bases in Xinjiang means the Lanzhou Military Region could probably only support a limited air campaign against northern India. The Chengdu Military Region is home to advanced J-11A and J-10 fighters but there are relatively few military airfields in Tibet anywhere near India. Still, China does not necessarily need tactical aircraft to do great damage to India. China could supplement its aerial firepower with ballistic missiles from the People's Liberation Army Rocket Forces. The PLARF overseas both nuclear, conventional and dual-use ballistic missiles, and could conceivably move up to two thousand short- and medium-range DF-11, DF-15 and DF-21 ballistic missiles into positions adjacent to India. These missiles could be used to blitz Indian strategic targets on the ground, at the cost of making them unavailable for contingencies in the South and East China Seas.

Meanwhile, **India's air forces are in a better position to contest the skies than their Chinese counterparts**.

While the war would take place on China's sparsely manned frontier, New Delhi is only 213 miles from the Tibetan frontier. **India's air fleet** of 230 Su-30Mk1 Flankers, sixty-nine MiG-29s and even its Mirage 2000s **are competitive with or even better than most of China's aircraft in theater**, at least until the J-20 fighter becomes operational. **India likely has enough aircraft to deal with a two-front war, facing off with Pakistan's Air Force at the same time**. India is also fielding the Akash medium-range air defense missile system to protect air bases and other high-value targets. While India could be reasonably confident of having an air force that deters war, at least in the near term, it has no way of stopping a Chinese ballistic-missile offensive. Chinese missile units, firing from Xinjiang and Tibet, could hit targets across the northern half of India with impunity. India has no ballistic-missile defenses and does not have the combined air- and space-based assets necessary to hunt down and destroy the missile launchers. India's own ballistic missiles are dedicated to the nuclear mission and would be unavailable for conventional war. The war on the ground between the Indian and Chinese armies might at first glance seem like the most decisive phase of the war, but it's actually quite the opposite. Both the western and eastern theaters are in rugged locations with little transportation infrastructure, making it difficult to send a mechanized army through. Massed attacks could be easily stopped with artillery as attacking forces are funneled through well-known valleys and mountain passes. Despite the enormous size of both armies (1.2 million for the Indian Army and 2.2 for the Chinese Army) **fighting on the ground would likely be a stalemate with little lost or gained**. The war at sea would be the decisive front in a conflict between the two countries. Sitting

astride the Indian Ocean, India lies on China's jugular vein. **The Indian Navy**, with its force of submarines, aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya and surface ships **could easily curtail the the flow of trade between China and Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. It would take the Chinese Navy weeks to assemble and sail a fleet capable of contesting the blockade. Even then, the blockade would be hard to break up, conducted over the thousands of square miles of the Indian Ocean.** Meanwhile, **shipping to and from China would be forced to divert through the western Pacific Ocean, where such diversions would be vulnerable to Australian, Japanese, or American naval action. 87 percent of the country's petroleum needs are imported** from abroad, particularly the Middle East and Africa. **China's strategic petroleum reserves, once completed sometime in the 2020s, could stave off a nationwide fuel shortage for up to seventy-seven days—but after that Beijing would have to seek an end to the war however possible.**

## **India courts p5 and also cares abt UNGA**

**Stuenkel, Professor of International Relations at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation, 2010**

<https://ri.fgv.br/sites/default/files/publicacoes/10d7bc9faa.pdf> // ICW

**India's UNSC reform strategy has two main components: Garnering support in the UN General Assembly and reducing resistance in the UN Security Council. \* rough India's continued leadership in the G77, India hopes to assure widespread support in the UN General Assembly. India's strong stance on defending sovereignty and criticizing "the responsibility to protect" can be understood in this context. At the same time, India's recent rapprochement with China, its historic deal with the United States, and its continued historic friendship with Russia are all meant to assure that none of the permanent members would block India's entry.**

Since the G4's failure in 2005, India has continued to focus on UNSC expansion. When the so-called "Small 5" or "S5", a group made up of Switzerland, Singapore, Jordan, Costa Rica and Liechtenstein, submitted a proposal that sought not to expand the UNSC but change its procedures to some degree, India rejected it as it would shift focus away from expansion.<sup>92</sup> India has, together with Brazil and South Africa, created an IBSA faction within the Working Group set up by the General Assembly (called "Open Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council"), but its impact has not been substantial.<sup>93</sup>

## **Scott 14**

**Scott, LSE, September 2014**

<https://www.economist.com/leaders/2013/03/30/can-india-become-a-great-power>  
//JF

Under Modi, **India's attitude and role in international organisations** will most likely continue to **reflect[s] a drive for Great Power status**, an ingrained stress on "strategic autonomy", and mixed regional competition and global cooperation with China. With regard to India's immediate neighbourhood, the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has to date proved of limited success, and Modi will need to decide how much energy to put into galvanising the organisation. His invitation to other SAARC leaders

to attend his inauguration in May 2014 suggested he might be so inclined. However, China's push for SAARC entry is something that India is likely to be reluctant over. India's efforts may instead go into galvanising BIMSTEC as a useful bridgehead to Southeast Asia, given that BIMSTEC membership is the same as SAARC minus a problematic Pakistan but plus Myanmar. Modi might look to India's maritime neighbourhood and put more energy into revitalising the Indian Ocean Rim Association. However, its economic potential remains largely unrealised. Consequently, Modi may find the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium a more practical Look South focus, especially as China is not a member. Such maritime levers for presence and influence may also be reflected in Modi active pushing the IBSA mechanism with South Africa and Brazil; a self-avowedly South-South democratic grouping which does not involve China, and which has already initiated trilateral naval exercises since 2008.

## **Press Trust of India, Economic Times, July 2018**

[//economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/55314383.cms?utm\\_source=contentofinterest&utm\\_medium=text&utm\\_campaign=cppst](http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/55314383.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst)

**Seeking to block India's bid for permanent membership to the UN Security Council, Pakistan has said it remains "firmly opposed" to the creation of new seats in the 15-member body as it would only "satisfy the hunger" of a few states for "power and privilege".**

## **Jaffrelot, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018**

<https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/24/ceasefire-violations-in-kashmir-war-by-other-means-pub-77573>

**The number of ceasefire violations (CFVs) in Kashmir has sharply increased in recent years, and even more dramatically since 2017.1 India and Pakistan have not fought each other openly since the 1999 Kargil conflict and have oscillated between military tension and peace talks,2 but the growing number of violations since 2013 threatens to push the countries back to the dangerous posturing of the late 1990s and early 2000s.** The government of India has informed the Lok Sabha (India's lower house of parliament) that **881 ceasefire violations took place in Kashmir in 2017, compared to only 449 in 2016.** Of these 881 incidents, 110 occurred along the international border (which Pakistan calls the working boundary) and 771 along the Line of Control (LoC)—the de facto border that separates Indian- and Pakistani-controlled segments of the disputed territory.<sup>3</sup> **Figures provided by the Pakistani army in late October 2017 were even higher.** The Inter-Services Public Relations office (ISPR), the media arm of Pakistan's armed forces, counted 1,140 violations in 2017, compared to just 382 in 2016. Pakistan's director general of military operations (DGMO) recorded 1,299 CFVs in 2017.<sup>4</sup> Interestingly, written in the margins of the printout provided by the ISPR was, "Highest CFVs in 2017 any other year since 2003"<sup>5</sup>—the date of the last ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan. **This article examines why the number of CFVs has risen so sharply in recent years, drawing on extensive interviews with dozens of key informants based in Pakistan.5 Scholars have recently argued that the variation in CFVs can be explained by local factors on either side of the border. While those factors undoubtedly play a role, the Pakistani perspectives presented here suggest that CFVs also reflect the quality of bilateral relations between India and Pakistan as well as the security policies and strategies adopted by their leaders. Leadership changes can have a material impact on the timing and intensity of CFVs.**

## **Military border skirmishes with India and China can turn fatal**

### **Markey, 2015, CFR**

<https://www.cfr.org/report/armed-confrontation-between-china-and-india>

**This pattern of border incursion, response, negotiation, and withdrawal is one that both sides will continue to exhibit. Both China and India have expanded and modernized their military forces**

devoted to the border region. In 2013, the Indian government authorized a new mountain strike corps of forty thousand troops to address the perceived threat of China's border presence. Along a more heavily militarized border, miscalculations and accidents will have greater potential to escalate from nonviolent tussles to tit-for-tat incidents of harassment and even exchanges of fire. A brief skirmish, perhaps resulting from surprise or accident in the heat of multiple disputes, would not necessarily inflict more than dozens of casualties and would permit forces to stand down without escalating to a wider war. That said, both sides would also fear the domestic political backlash of appearing weak. Under routine circumstances, China and India would seek diplomatic and economic means of retaliation. For example, Beijing would curtail its plans for investment in India, and New Delhi would back away from new multilateral institutions spearheaded by China, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. However, if a border clash were to occur during a period of heightened tension, the likelihood of a military crisis would grow, and the potential for it to escalate beyond an initial skirmish could not be ruled out.

Chan-Wahn, **Kim**. (Head of the Department of Indian and ASEAN Studies, **Hankuk University** of Foreign Studies) "India's quiet diplomacy seeking a permanent UN Security Council seat" POSRI Chindia Quarterly, Winter **2012**. *PSR*

[https://www.posri.re.kr/files/file\\_pdf/71/273/2881/71\\_273\\_2881\\_file\\_pdf\\_1201-06\\_03\\_Issue.pdf](https://www.posri.re.kr/files/file_pdf/71/273/2881/71_273_2881_file_pdf_1201-06_03_Issue.pdf)

Quiet diplomacy is also seen in India's relations with Pakistan. Pakistan has invaded India as many as four times. It has directly or indirectly supported militant groups that constantly conduct terrorist activities against India, primarily in Kashmir. A series of terrorist attacks in Mumbai were allegedly conducted by Pakistan-based terrorist groups. India took a harsh stance immediately after the attacks, but returned to its usual soft stance over time. India's primary reasons for maintaining appeasement policies toward Pakistan are national security and peace-building in South Asia, but Pakistan's continuing opposition to India's bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC was another reason. In order to ease Pakistan's opposition, India tried to address issues quietly rather than amplifying conflicts with Pakistan.

**Siddique, Gandhara, February 2019**

<https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/weighing-the-chances-of-war-between-pakistan-and-india/29783462.html>

Such retaliatory strikes could eventually escalate into a full-fledged war. The two nuclear-armed countries have already fought three wars and spend a large part of their national resources on maintaining two of the world's largest militaries. While experts say a conflict is likely, whether it would escalate into a war remains a question. A conventional war has the potential to morph into a nuclear nightmare, one that could not only ruin the lives of some 1.6 billion people in India and Pakistan but have grave consequences for South Asia and beyond. Shashank Joshi, The Economist's defense editor in London, says the

likelihood of an Indian military response is high given the severity of the attack and its timing months ahead of a hotly contested parliamentary election.

**Dabhade 17** (Manish, Assistant Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament in the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, August 2017, "India's Pursuit of United Nations Security Council Reforms", <http://risingpowersproject.com/quarterly/indias-pursuit-united-nations-security-council-reforms/>, BS 3-29-2019)

Further, the seat on the high table, at the UN's premier, powerful body would provide it the much needed leverage to expand its global geo-political and geo-economic clout. **It would serve as an equaliser to China, its rival and an emerging hegemon in Asia, and an ever increasing strategic and security concern in its immediate neighbourhood and beyond.** India has always seen itself as a democratic alternative to the authoritarian China. India's millennia old civilizational existence also demands it to be at the top of the international hierarchy of states.

### **Center for International Studies, 2018**

<https://chinapower.csis.org/china-global-arms-trade/> // ICW

Close military ties have paved the way for **China to suppl[ies] Pakistan with more arms than any other country.**

**These exchanges are often tied to political objectives.** Due in large part to growing cooperation between Beijing and

Islamabad on counter-terrorism initiatives, sales surged from \$250 million in 2008 to over \$750 million in 2009. In March 2018, Beijing

announced the sale of sophisticated optical tracking systems that could be used for nuclear missiles with multiple warheads. This

announcement came just weeks after India successfully tested the Agni-V long-range ballistic missile in mid-January. Other purchases highlight

close levels of collaboration between China and Pakistan, such as the co-developed JF-17 aircraft.

### **Rider, Texas Tech, 2011**

[http://www.michael-findley.com/uploads/2/0/4/5/20455799/jpr\\_2011\\_ar-rivalry.pdf](http://www.michael-findley.com/uploads/2/0/4/5/20455799/jpr_2011_ar-rivalry.pdf)

As should be clear from the results reported in Model 7, the phase in which the arms race occurs matters when predicting war onset.<sup>10</sup> The arms race component term is negative, suggesting that arms races that occur early in the life of the rivalry are unlikely to be followed by war; but the relationship does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Yet, the probability of war is 78% lower for an infant rivalry that has experienced an arms race as compared to rivalry in the same phase without an arms race.<sup>11</sup> In addition, rivalry phase alone appears to be a poor predictor of war. The interactions between arms race and the latter two, however, are both positive and statistically significant.<sup>12</sup> Arms races that occur in those phases are much more likely to go to war than those occurring in the first phase. An adolescent rivalry that has experienced an arms race has a 68% greater probability of war onset over the baseline; a mature rivalry has a 222% increase in the probability of war over the baseline.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, later phase rivalries that have experienced an arms race have a greater risk of war than similar rivalries that have not experienced an arms race. The probability of war increases by 147% when moving from an adolescent stage rivalry without an arms race to one with an arms race; **a similar change from a mature rivalry without an arms race to one with an arms race increases the probability of war by 331%.**<sup>14</sup> In Model 8, Table V we again estimate a selection model to determine whether these relationships hold after accounting for selection into rivalry. Stage 1 of Model 8 yields results similar to Model 6 (as well as Model 3 and stage 1 of Model 5). Stage 2 of Model 8 and Model 7 are very similar, except that the interaction between arms race and adolescent rivalry is no longer statistically significant. Notably, the arms race component term is not statistically significant, indicating it exercises no independent impact on dispute escalation to war. The only significant impact of arms races is confined to the third phase of rivalry. Once one controls for rivalry phase, the significant findings on the arms race component in Table V disappear and the sign of the coefficient is reversed. Thus, only arms races that occur in the last stage of rivalry, those most enduring rivalries, are more likely to be followed by war than arms races that occur in earlier stages; nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of cases are likely to remain below the war threshold.

## Das, SCMP, September 2018

The early warning China issued to India in August on the rising waters of its Tsangpo river – which hit its highest level in 150 years – gave the Indian authorities enough time to prepare. The Tsangpo, which originates in Tibet, flows downstream to what India considers its easternmost state of Arunachal Pradesh (the region China considers a province of South Tibet), where it is called Siang, and then to Assam, where it is known as the Brahmaputra. Thousands of people in scores of districts in Assam and Arunachal have been affected in the latest floods, but the losses are minimal in comparison with **the devastation** last year, which **killed 130 people and left three million people stranded**. New Delhi had then blamed China for breaking an earlier agreement to share hydrological data. In 2006, **India and China had signed a pact under which China would share hydrological data** from May 15 to October 15 every year for the Brahmaputra and Sutlej rivers, both of which originate in Tibet. The two sides renewed the agreement in memorandums of understanding signed in 2013 and in 2015. But **when floods struck northeastern India last year**, reports surfaced that **China was not adhering to the agreement**. There was speculation that **China held back on the data in retaliation for the 73-day military stand-off between Indian and Chinese soldiers in Doklam near Bhutan around the same time**. On its part, China said its hydrological systems were washed away by floods, as a result of which it was unable to share data.

## **India would probably not bring Pakistan issues forward, instead hedge against China bringing them forward**

Dabhade, 2015

<https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-pursuit-united-nations-security-council-reforms/> // iCW

Indian strategic interest in the Council seat has also been shaped by its history of interacting with the Security Council. **In the early years of its independence during its armed conflict with Pakistan on Kashmir, India paid the price for being “idealistic” to take the Kashmir issue to the UN wherein it had to battle hard realpolitik of Cold war years leading to UN interventions over the Kashmir dispute. To prevent this negative outcome ever again, the Indian presence at the Security Council, it is hoped will ensure Indian interests are not sacrificed at the altar of great power politics.** Most importantly, **it will stall any possible intervention by China, a permanent member at the behest of its ally Pakistan.**

## **Pakistan not taking substantial action against terrorists**

The Financial Action Task Force, a global watchdog in Paris, criticized Pakistan in February for making “limited progress” on a plan to combat terrorism financing eight months after the country was placed on a watchlist that could lead to serious consequences for the nation’s banks to do business abroad.

*warrant:*

Pakistan’s top brass see the proxy fighters, along with nuclear weapons, as a bulwark against an Indian military that would probably overwhelm Pakistan in a conventional land war. The army has never forgotten that it lost East Pakistan because of Indian intervention. **The fear of Indian dominance is the**

**main reason for Pakistan's alleged support for the Afghan Taliban, a force that opposes what Islamabad sees as an India-friendly administration in Kabul. Arguably it's hard for the military, which has directly ruled Pakistan for almost half of its existence and continues to pull strings behind the scenes even in the current democratic government, to be weaned off its proxies and an indoctrinated hatred of India**