We negate the resolution.

Contention 1 is transregional appeal.

The Electoral College prevents candidates from focusing too much of their campaign on any single state or region.

Posner 2012 of UChicago finds

“The Electoral College requires a presidential candidate to have transregional appeal. **No region** (South, Northeast, etc.) **has enough electoral votes to elect a president. So** **a solid regional favorite**, such as Romney was in the South**, has no incentive to campaign heavily in** those states **[one region],** for he gains no electoral votes by increasing his plurality in states that he knows he will win. This is a desirable result because a candidate with only regional appeal is unlikely to be a successful president. The residents of the other regions are likely to feel disfranchised—to feel that their votes do not count, that the newa president will have no regard for their interests, that he really isn’t their president.”

Instead, Ross 2009 of the Heritage Foundation explains that

“As the system stands today, presidential candidates have no incentive to poll large margins in any one state. Winning 50.1 percent of the votes in a state is as effective as winning 100 percent of the votes. **Presidential candidates therefore tour the nation**, campaigning in all states and **seeking** to build a national coalition that will enable them **to win a majority of states' electoral votes**.”

Candidates appeal to states across the country by making compromises that satisfy diverse regional interests.

Boylan 2008 of Winthrop University writes that

Madison’s extended republic has become a nation of remarkable breadth and diversity, and has provided a moderating impulse that political parties cannot ignore. In clear contrast with European Parliamentary democracies, the extended American republic, coupled with the evolution of the two-party system, has forced parties and candidates to seek broad, moderate, coalitions in order to win elective office (Raye, 2001, 63). **In order to appeal to interests across the nation, presidential candidates and the parties they represent must** “move to the middle,” **aggregate interests and make their appeal to a host of different concerns. Parties and their nominees must seek and achieve a national consensus in order to win political office**. As a result, a winning coalition must attract and secure the votes of an identifiable majority of the electorate.

Ross 2009 of the Heritage Foundation explains the importance this multiregional campaigning, writing that

**Given the** general **inability to obtain majority consensus, the Electoral College provides the country with the next best alternative. Electing Presidents by states’ votes, rather than individuals**’ votes, **creates a** method of electing **a President who is a good compromise** candidate **for the majority of Americans**.

The imperative to satisfy diverse regional interests would not exist under a popular vote system, where candidates would attempt to rack up as many votes as possible, even if those votes were concentrated in a few states. If anything, candidates would prefer to campaign in one region where they could turn out voters in huge numbers by adopting a specific regional platform.

Hardaway 2014 of the University of Denver explains

A direct election system, by contrast, would not require any efficiency in the distribution of votes. A majority of individuals’ votes—no matter where those individuals reside—would be sufficient for victory. Candidates would thus have less motivation to reach out to such a wide variety of voters. To the contrary, **candidates might find it easier and more efficient to tailor a message to one type of voter. With** such **a direct election system in place,** for instance, **a** popular regional demagogue **[candidate] could strive for an overwhelming popular vote advantage in his region.** If he successfully ekes out a narrow, national popular vote *plurality*, he wins a spot in the runoff—or perhaps the presidency itself60—**despite being opposed in** all **other regions** of the country.61 Such campaigns failed in the mid-1900s with the Electoral College system in place.62

Ross 2009 of the Heritage Foundation confirms that under a popular vote, candidates would prefer to win by large margins in a single friendly state rather than campaign for multiple wins in less familiar states.

“Direct popular elections, by contrast, would present different incentives. Suddenly, **winning 100 percent of the votes is better than winning 50.1 percent of the votes.** In fact, **it may be easier to rack up votes in a friendly state than to gain 50.1 percent of votes in each of two states of similar size, although the payoff would be essentially the same**.”

Such a shift away from multiregional campaigns would produce candidates who fail to represent the nation.

Ross argues that when candidates campaign in a single region, rather than across the country they

By the time a President got himself elected under such a system, he would be indebted to–and **would** essentially **represent­–isolated regions, not the country as a whole**. In this scenario, **a handful of states** (or heavily populated cities) **win, while the remaining states suffer significantly.**

Because regional interests would fracture, rather than coalesce under a popular vote, Ross concludes

Direct popular election proponents sound plausible when they argue for election President by a “majority” of the people. In reality, however, **a President elected by the majority of citizens will rarely be achievable, [as]** unless the election system itself incentivizes compromise.[307] Given the choice of any candidate, **a majority will never agree on the ideal candidate**. Individuals’ opinions vary too widely.

Posner 2012 of UChicago finds

The Electoral College requires a presidential candidate to have transregional appeal. No region (South, Northeast, etc.) has enough electoral votes to elect a president. So a solid regional favorite, such as Romney was in the South, has no incentive to campaign heavily in those states, for he gains no electoral votes by increasing his plurality in states that he knows he will win. This is a desirable result because **a candidate with only regional appeal is unlikely to be a successful president.** The residents of the **other regions are likely to feel disfranchised—**to feel **that their votes do not count, that the new president will have no regard for their interests,** that he really isn’t their president.

Such illegitimacy is empirically harmful for governance, as Rivers 1985 of Caltech finds

Correlations between legislative support scores and presidential popularity do not accurately reflect the relationship between public opinion and presidential influence in Congress. Presidents make strategic choices to expend their public prestige to obtain congressional approval of programmatic initiatives. Previous studies have ignored such choices as well as other features of the strategic environment which tend to lower the apparent legislative success rates of popular presidents. A model of presidential and congressional behavior is proposed, and it is estimated that **a 1 percent increase in a president's public support level increases the** **president's** legislative approval **rate [of legislative success] by approximately 1 percent** (holding program size fixed).

Contention 2 is a moderate voice.

Under the Electoral College, candidates limit their focus on “safe” states for the very reason that they’re safe for one party, so changing the margins of victory won’t affect electoral outcomes. Instead, candidates focus on ideologically neutral battleground states where either party could prevail.

Schultheis 2016 of CBS News points out

“Swing states” draw politics toward the middle. In fact, an electoral system based on the popular vote would also encourage candidates to further play to their respective bases rather than actually trying to persuade new voters. The reason **“battleground states”** have earned that term is because they really **are** oftenvery **evenly split between parties -- and the winner-take-all** natureof the **Electoral College** gives candidatesincentives **[incentivizes candidates] to** workto **reach out to undecided voters and tip the scales in their favor** in those states.

However, if the Electoral College was replaced with a popular vote, candidates would stop campaigning towards undecided voters, and start campaigning to mobilize their ideological support base, because it would be the most cost effective way to turn out as many voters as possible.

Calderaro 2014 of the University of Mississippi explains

“Currently, the candidates compete for the 4-5% of voters that determine the election outcome in each state, by directing campaign resources, especially advertising, at them. This Comment contends that **if the country adopts the** NPV**[popular vote],** the current **swing voter tactics will be replaced by campaigns that** will **focus on motivating party loyalists to get to the polls**. This will have several deleterious effects including ignoring lukewarm voters who need some encouragement to vote and causing the parties to pander more intensively to their respective bases, leading to an even more polarized electorate. If the Electoral College is replaced by an NPV, **campaigns will find it more economically sound** to use ads **to drive turnout of likely Republican or likely Democratic voters, instead of reaching out to independents, [and] moderates**, and first-time voters.

The result of this focus on more ideological voters is more ideologically polarized presidency. Monaldo 2001 of Regis University concludes that without the moderating influence of swing states,

The Bush-Gore presidential election was incredibly close. Whoever would have ultimately been the victor, would have had popular appeal over a broad number of states. If the election had been based only on the popular vote, both would have engaged in a different campaign strategy. Bush would have concentrated his efforts in Texas and some populace midwestern states where he might have accumulated even larger majorities. Likewise, Gore would have focused in the Northeast trying to generate enough votes to offset Bush's advantages elsewhere. Bush would have had to tack further to the right of the political spectrum, while Gore would have fled to the left. Both candidates would have had less incentive to appeal to the middle. The Electoral College arrangement forced both candidates to contest states where both had a chance for victory. This forced Bush and Gore to hone their messages for more moderate and mainstream voters. In the end, both the **candidates** and the country **would** have **be**en **more polarized with a direct popular vote**. Less polarization may displease strong-minded advocates, however reducing polarization enhances political stability.

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This polarization would spill over across government, as Galvin 2014 of Northwestern explains,

The preceding sections have sought to illustrate how **presidents,** through their instrumental efforts to bring inherited party structures into closer alignment with their incentives and purposesin the near term,contributed to long-term party developments” And that “their actions **reconfigure**d party arrangements and altered their trajectories, influencing **the choices made by subsequent presidents and other political actors.**

Structural polarization would undermine our republic, because lawmakers fail cooperate for the common good when they grow more ideologically extreme. Barber 2013 of BYU confirms

The **negotiation failures resulting from polarization** have done much to **undermine governance** in the United States **through gridlock and lower-quality legislation** and by harming the functioning of the executive and judicial branches. The Task Force on Negotiating Agreement in Politics was tasked not only with rekindling scholarly interest in political negotiation and bargaining but also with making concrete suggestions on how to improve the negotiation infrastructure in ways that enhance good governance.