# A2 Neg

## A2 Topicality

### A2: KC = KAMD

#### (1 response)

#### 1. The Korean Herald explains on July 18th that South Korea is developing kill chain separate from the national Korean Air Missile defense system.

Cards:

No Author, Korea Herald, July 18, 2017, ["Korea Herald," http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170718000596&amp;mod=skb, 7-20-2017] // AA

South Korea is pushing for the establishment of a "three-axis" platform to help defend itself against North Korea's growing nuclear and missile threats. The three elements are the Kill Chain pre-emptive strike system, the Korean Air and Missile Defense and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation strategy.

### A2: KC =/= MD

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Delink, Keck of Harvard University explains that Kill Chain is being implemented into the Korean Air Missile Defense System.

Cards:

Zachary Keck [Harvard University]. “South Korea Goes All In On Missile Defense.” The Diplomat. <http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/south-korea-goes-all-in-on-missile-defense/> // AA

What ties all these efforts together is the so-called “Kill Chain.” Seoul’s most ambitious program to date, the Kill Chain is a comprehensive set of indigenous satellites that South Korea hopes to have in place by 2021. These satellites would be integrated with the KAMD system with the goal of being able to detect North Korean missiles launches early enough to allow Seoul’s cruise and ballistic missiles to destroy them preemptively.

### A2: Deploy Later

#### (5 responses)

#### 1. Turn, Perry of Stanford University explains in 2017, for South Korea, time is of the essence, and if they don’t find a solution soon, the crisis could spin out of control leading to a second Korean War, far more devastating than the first.

#### 2. The Institute for Policy Studies explains in June 2017 that South Korea’s president has become caught between North Korea and the United States, and it is now time for the country to move away from its passive policies and become a more active participant.

#### 3. Even if you don’t buy that and you still think that deploying later is better, you’re still affirming because you’re in favor of deployment. The resolution never specifies when the anti-missile systems should be deployed, just whether they’re in South Korea’s best interest.

#### 4. Turn, the longer we wait the worse the problem gets. Su of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2017 indicates that that North Korea has created a new Chinese–US strategic game, which it exploits while focusing on enhancing its power and decreasing international cooperation to counter its nuclear programme. Thus, she concludes that the longer the North Korean nuclear issue goes unresolved, the more dangerous and complicated it becomes.

#### 5. Delink, Bennett of RAND 2015 explains that the deployment of the new THAAD defense systems are critical to defend against possible North Korean nuclear attacks because the THAAD is more accurate than the current system. *This means that a) Dr. Bennett established that there is a threat and b) he gives you a comparative that the new THAAD missile defense is better and more accurate than the previous one. That’s a really easy place for you to vote.*

William J. Perry, the former secretary of defense under the Clinton administration; a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution, is the Michael and Barbara Barbarian Professor at Stanford University, with a joint appointment at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the School of Engineering, [Diplomacy, Not Doomsday, DOA: 24 July 2017] Hoover Digest, Spring 2017 // AA

Time is of the essence. If we don’t find a way—soon to freeze North Korea’s question for a nuclear ICBM, this crisis could all too easily spin out of control, leading to a second Korean War, far more devastating than the first.

[Feffer, John. “How Can South Korea Help Prevent a U.S. Attack on North Korea?” Institute for Policy Studies. June 14, 2017.<https://www.ips-dc.org/how-can-south-korea-help-prevent-a-u-s-attack-on-north-korea/> ]

At the moment, Moon Jae-in is caught in the middle between two missiles – the ones launched by North Korea and the ones the United States has deployed as part of THAAD in South Korea. It’s a frustrating position because South Korea has been largely passive.It’s time for South Korea to become a more active participant.

Fei su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. [http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf //](http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf%20//) AA

Despite this, many Chinese experts recognize the urgency of resolving North Korea’s problems. During one workshop in Jilin in September 2016, a Chinese expert stressed that North Korea has created a new Chinese–US strategic game, which it exploits while focusing on enhancing its power and decreasing international cooperation to counter its nuclear programme.54 According to this view, the longer the North Korean nuclear issue goes unresolved, the more dangerous and complicated it becomes.

Bruce Bennett [PhD California Institute of Technology]. April 2015. “South Korea's Missile-Defense System Decision: Q&A with Bruce Bennett.” RAND Corporation. [https://www.rand.org/blog/2015/04/south-koreas-missile-defense-system-decision-qa-with.html //](https://www.rand.org/blog/2015/04/south-koreas-missile-defense-system-decision-qa-with.html%20//) AA

Once North Korea can deliver a nuclear weapon on a ballistic missile (which it may already be able to do), South Korea has inadequate defenses against such a threat. The North is more likely to deploy a nuclear weapon on a NoDong missile, and THAAD would perform much better against a NoDong missile than would a Patriot interceptor. So yes, THAAD would be critical to defending South Korea against nuclear weapon attacks from North Korea.

### A2: Deploy More

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Delink, General Samuel Greaves of the US military indicates on July 28th, that the currently deployed missile defense systems are sufficient in dealing with current threats.

Cards:

Oriana Pawlyk (Miami University; Military.com), Defense Tech, 7-28-2017, ["US Can Intercept North Korean Missiles, General Says," https://www.defensetech.org/2017/08/10/us-intercept-north-korea-missiles/, 8-10-2017] // AA

When asked directly about North Korea during the Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, Air Force Lt. Gen. Samuel Greaves said, “We believe that the currently deployed ballistic missile defense system can meet today’s threat.”

## A2 China

### A2: General China

#### China’s foreign policy goals revolve around stability and peace in East-Asia, those interests don’t go away with THAAD meaning that China won’t drop SK as an ally. This is because China has important trade routes that hinge on stability, it also doesn’t want a refugee crisis from a war between North and South because it would mean that refugees would flow into Chinese borders. Their impacts never materialized.

#### Turn the argument because halting the deployment of THAAD gives into Chinese coercion. Benjamin Lee of the Diplomat explains in 2016 that if South Korea doesn’t deploy THAAD, a precedent is set in which China believes that it can use its economic influence over the South to control Seoul’s strategic agenda. This is bad because Grant Newsham of the National Interest finds in 2014 that decades of empirical evidence demonstrate that concessions to China encourages more threatening behavior to South Korea and other countries in the region.

#### Mitigate the impact. Robert Kelly of the National interest finds in June that China’s anger over THAAD is guided by meaningless political motives. The frequency with which these quarrels will occur is super often. The problem isn’t important.

Lee 16 [Benjamin Lee, The Diplomat, 12-16-2016. "South Korea’s THAAD Dilemma Continues." Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/south-koreas-thaad-dilemma-continues/] //BH

The leading contender for the presidency, Moon Jae-in, has echoed that demand while also calling for a reassessment of available diplomatic options for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. He also suggested that the deployment of THAAD is a significant decision comparable to a treaty and should be ratified by the National Assembly. Regardless of U.S. commitment and resolve on THAAD deployment, the issue will most likely undergo a renewed intense political debate in the upcoming South Korean presidential election. Given China’s retaliatory measures and the domestic upheaval over President Park and her legacy, the next administration in South Korea will have a chance to revisit its decision to deploy THAAD. The next administration, however, will continue to face an excruciating dilemma as well. If South Korea decides to revoke the THAAD decision, this will set a terrible precedent, which will cause China to believe that it can use its economic influence over South Korea to control Seoul’s strategic agenda. Should South Korea decide to continue the deployment of THAAD, it must be ready for continued and even intensified economic and diplomatic retaliation from China. In addition, South Korea will have to put in a considerable amount of time and effort to restore Sino-South Korean relations, which have been damaged by the THAAD deployment. Neither suspending nor continuing the deployment of THAAD is a palatable choice for the next administration in South Korea. The next administration, however, could find a compromise with China and the United States. The next administration could temporarily halt the deployment of THAAD and propose a trilateral dialogue with China and the U.S. on THAAD deployment in order to seek ways to address China’s concerns. Some Chinese scholars have already proposed technical adjustments to THAAD’s X-band radar system and changes in its operational protocol that could alleviate Chinese concerns. Given that China views the deployment of THAAD as a strategic and not a technical issue, it could easily reject proposals for a trilateral dialogue. But even so, South Korea’s diplomatic initiative would be evidence of its sincere efforts to address China’s position. Should China accept such a proposal, the new South Korean administration, the Trump administration, and Xi Jinping and the new Politburo after the 19th Chinese Communist Party Congress in fall 2017 may be able to find a meaningful way to enhance South Korea’s security against North Korea without endangering China’s strategic interests.

Newsham 14 [Grant Newsham, 9-8-2014. "China, America and the "Appeasement" Question." National Interest. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-america-the-appeasement-question-11226] //BH

US policy towards China over the last 30 years, and particularly in recent times, seems familiar. The United States does its best to understand the PRC’s concerns and its resentments going back to the Opium Wars and the ‘century of humiliation’, to accommodate these resentments, and to ensure China does not feel threatened. Defense and State Department officials enthusiastically seek greater transparency and openness – especially in the military realm – as such openness is perceived as inherently good. In return, the PRC is expected to change, to show more respect for human rights and international law and to become a “responsible stakeholder” in the international community. We now have several decades of empirical evidence to assess this concessionary approach. It has not resulted in improved, less aggressive PRC behavior in the South China Sea or the East China Sea, or even in outer space. Indeed, it seems to have encouraged Chinese assertiveness as manifest in threatening language and behavior towards its neighbors. Nor has the PRC regime shown more respect for human rights, rule of law, consensual government or freedom of expression for its citizens. Serial intellectual property theft continues unabated, as does support for unsavory dictators. Nonetheless, we invite the PRC to military exercises and repeat the “engagement” mantra – expecting that one day things will magically improve. Some argue that letting the PRC see US military power will dissuade it from challenging us. Perhaps, but we are just as likely to be seen as naïve or weak. From the Chinese perspective, there is no reason to change since they have done very well without transforming and the PRC has never been stronger. Indeed, the PRC frequently claims that human rights, democracy, and the like are outmoded Western values having nothing to do with China.

Kelly 17 [Robert E. Kelly, 6-13-2017. "The Real Reason China Wants South Korea to Ditch THAAD." National Interest. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-real-reason-china-wants-south-korea-ditch-thaad-21139] //BH

Chinese (and Russian) objections that it might then penetrate into northeastern China (or the Russian far east) are also specious. The curvature of the earth means that the X-band signal begins to peel away from the earth after several hundred miles, so coverage north of North Korea is limited too. As its name implies, THAAD is a defensive system. It is designed to shoot down incoming missiles as they approach a target. Unless China, or Russia, intend to strike South Korea or Japanese cities, there is no threat to them. Repeating all this, however, is almost besides the point now. The Chinese (and the Russians) know this. Beijing had ample years before the Park deployment decision last summer to raise technical concerns. It forewent all such opportunities. This strongly suggests a political motive, which Moon’s transparently phony excuses to drag out deployment only further verify. Decision Forks. So once again, THAAD is victim to South Korea’s tough position between the United States and China. As China rises, it exerts pressure on its neighboring states, as most large, expanding states do in their locality. Beijing can mask such pressure in bogus technical language—suggesting that THAAD peers into China, or that South Korean imports suddenly require new health and safety inspection—but these are obvious fakeries. And indeed, Beijing may want them to be flimsy enough so that South Korean elites can actually see the steel in the glove.

### A2: Radar

#### (8 responses)

#### 1. Delink, Lyon of the National Interest 2016 explains that the difference between a Missile Defense system in South Korean and one in Japan regarding their impact on China is at best marginal.

#### 2. Delink, Former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry indicates that China’s missile forces are large and sophisticated making them impossible for the THAAD missile defense system to defense against.

#### 3. [Delink / Non-Unique] Panda of Princeton 2016 explains their whole argument relies on China not wanting the US to more effectively surveil the region. However, the take out the link because he furthers that the US already has the Missile Defense systems deployed in Guam, two in Japan, space assets, and other naval deployments all around the region.

#### 4. Delink, Panda of Princeton University explains that the difference between a Missile Defense system in South Korean and one in Japan regarding their impact on China is at best marginal.

#### 5. Delink, Rinehart of the Congressional Research Service indicates that according to U.S. defense officials the THAAD system will be configured in the shorter range “terminal mode” to optimize its ability to identify ballistic missile launches in North Korea and intercept them before they reach targets in South Korea. He furthers that this would shorter range would nullify the radars coverage into China.

#### 6. Delink, Lewis of Cornell University explains in 2017 that China would be able to monitor which mode the THAAD radar is operating in.

#### 7. Delink, Pinkston of Troy University indicates that ‘‘The U.S. does not need a radar in South Korea to acquire and track Chinese missiles early in flight as there are two X-Band radars deployed in Japan, sea-based tracking radars on Aegis ships, and U.S. space-based early warning systems would detect a Chinese missile almost immediately after it was launched.’’

#### 8. Delink, former Secretary of State Blinken indicates that he offered to meet with China to explains the technology and its capabilities. However, China rejected the offer signifying that missile defense deployment is political cover for them and not a major issue.

Cards:

Ankit Panda [Princeton University]. February 2016. “What Is THAAD, What Does It Do, and Why Is China Mad About It?” The Diplomat. <http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/what-is-thaad-what-does-it-do-and-why-is-china-mad-about-it/> // AA

So, from the Chinese perspective, a THAAD deployment could shift the strategic stability needle ever so slightly away from its status quo equilibrium and advantage the United States, giving Washington better early warning and tracking of Chinese ICBMs. That, in itself, doesn’t seem like a serious impingement on China’s security or its nuclear deterrent. What’s interesting is reading China’s worries about a THAAD and AN/TPY-2 deployment on the Korean peninsula together with [murmurs that Beijing is growing increasingly interested in a launch-on-warning nuclear posture](http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/is-china-considering-a-high-risk-change-to-its-nuclear-deterrence-posture/). Does a THAAD deployment affect the credibility of China’s second-strike capabilities by giving the United States a greater early warning edge? Perhaps, but, as Lyon notes above, the difference would be marginal given the AN/TPY-2s already in Japan.

Reuters. April 2017. “China Wary of U.S. Missile System in South Korea because Capabilities Unknown.” Newsweek. [http://www.newsweek.com/china-united-states-north-korea-south-korea-thaad-578669 //](http://www.newsweek.com/china-united-states-north-korea-south-korea-thaad-578669%20//) AA

Former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry told the conference that he believed that China's missile forces were large and sophisticated enough to be impossible to defend against, so THAAD need not be a concern to Beijing.

Ankit Panda [Princeton University]. February 2016. “What Is THAAD, What Does It Do, and Why Is China Mad About It?” The Diplomat. <http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/what-is-thaad-what-does-it-do-and-why-is-china-mad-about-it/> // AA

China’s right to believe that THAAD surveillance data could be transferred to other BMD assets protecting [the continental United States (CONUS)]. Indeed, one of THAAD’s missions would be to strengthen U.S. defenses against the possibility of North Korean ballistic missile attack on CONUS. So it has to be able to transfer data to CONUS-based radars and interceptors. But the United States already has a THAAD battery deployed on Guam, two AN/TPY-2 radars deployed in Japan (at Shariki and Kyogamisaki), space-based assets, plus a range of ship-borne radars and larger land-based radars in other parts of the Pacific theatre. Would a THAAD deployment in South Korea change much? The short answer is that it could improve early tracking of some Chinese missiles, depending on their launch point. Still, that might not make actual interception of those missiles much easier. ICBM warheads move fast. And sophisticated penetration-aids help to confuse missile defenses.

Ankit Panda [Princeton University]. February 2016. “What Is THAAD, What Does It Do, and Why Is China Mad About It?” The Diplomat. <http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/what-is-thaad-what-does-it-do-and-why-is-china-mad-about-it/> // AA

So, from the Chinese perspective, a THAAD deployment could shift the strategic stability needle ever so slightly away from its status quo equilibrium and advantage the United States, giving Washington better early warning and tracking of Chinese ICBMs. That, in itself, doesn’t seem like a serious impingement on China’s security or its nuclear deterrent. What’s interesting is reading China’s worries about a THAAD and AN/TPY-2 deployment on the Korean peninsula together with [murmurs that Beijing is growing increasingly interested in a launch-on-warning nuclear posture](http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/is-china-considering-a-high-risk-change-to-its-nuclear-deterrence-posture/). Does a THAAD deployment affect the credibility of China’s second-strike capabilities by giving the United States a greater early warning edge? Perhaps, but, as Lyon notes above, the difference would be marginal given the AN/TPY-2s already in Japan.

Ian E. Rinehart [Analyst in Asian Affairs], Steven A. Hildreth [U.S. and Foreign National Security Programs] Susan V. Lawrence [Asian Affairs] “Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition.” April 3, 2015. Congressional Research Service. [https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43116.pdf //](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43116.pdf%20//) AA

China has complained that the radar capabilities of the THAAD system could be configured to allow the United States to monitor airspace over Chinese territory, and in February 2015 the Chinese Minister of Defense lodged a protest with his counterpart in South Korea.55 In March 2015, China’s Assistant Foreign Minister publicly warned South Korea to “importantly think about Beijing’s attention to and concerns over the deployment of THAAD to the peninsula.”56 U.S. defense officials assert that the THAAD system will be configured in “terminal mode” (or “engagement mode”) to optimize its ability to identify ballistic missile launches in North Korea and intercept them before they reach targets in South Korea.57 This mode has a shorter radar range and would therefore not have much coverage over Chinese territory, except perhaps for areas near the border with North Korea. Beijing appears to be concerned that the U.S. military may—even for short periods—configure the THAAD radar in “look mode” and rotate it to greatly increase its coverage over Chinese territory, which some Chinese consider a form of “spying.” U.S. officials point out that this configuration would nullify the ability of the THAAD system to intercept missiles from North Korea, the purpose of this potential deployment.

George Lewis, currently  a Visiting Scholar at the Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies at Cornell University, mostlymissiledefense, 17 July, 2016, ["THAAD Radar Ranges (July 17, 2016)," https://mostlymissiledefense.com/2016/07/17/thaad-radar-ranges-july-17-2018/, 7-24-2017] // AA

The above discussion shows that while the United States’ argument that THAAD’s range while operating in its intended terminal mode is very limited is plausible, so is the Chinese claim that the radar is physically capable of observing missile flights deep within its territory.  While China would surely be able to monitor which mode the radar is operating in, there does not appear to be any technical or legal barrier to prevent it from being quickly converted from terminal to forward-based mode.

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. “SECTION 4: CHINA AND NORTH KOREA.” United States Government Publishing Office. 2017. <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Annual_Report/Chapters/Chapter%203%2C%20Section%204%20-%20China%20and%20North%20Korea.pdf> // AA

U.S. government officials and analysts argue Beijing’s concerns are overblown, particularly those related to THAAD’s X-band radar. Troy University professor Daniel Pinkston notes, ‘‘The U.S. does not need a radar in South Korea to acquire and track Chinese [intercontinental ballistic missiles] early in flight. There are two X-Band radars deployed in Japan, and sea-based tracking radars on Aegis ships are in the region as well. Furthermore, U.S. space-based early warning systems would detect a Chinese [intercontinental ballistic missile] almost immediately after it was launched.’’ 79

Amitai Etzioni (Amitai Etzioni is a University Professor and professor of international relations at The George Washington University. He is the author of Avoiding War with China, just published by University of Virginia Press). The Diplomat, Diplomat, 8-10-2017, ["THAAD: Best a Bargaining Chip," http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/thaad-best-a-bargaining-chip/, 8-10-2017] // AA

American officials claim that THAAD serves to protect against a North Korean, not a Chinese, attack. According to a joint statement issued by American and South Korean officials in 2016, the anti-missile system would “ensure the security of the South and its people, and [protect] alliance military forces from North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile threats.” And, most importantly, the system is “focused solely on North Korean nuclear and missile threats and would not be directed towards any third party nations.” American officials sought to ease China’s anxiety by offering a briefing on the technical details of THAAD. As then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken said, “We realize China may not believe us and also proposed to go through the technology and specifications with them…and prepared to explain what the technology does and what it doesn’t do and hopefully they will take us up on that proposal.” Defense Secretary James Mattis told reporters in South Korea simply, “There is no other nation that needs to be concerned about THAAD other than North Korea if they’re engaged in something that’s offensive.”

### A2: US-SK Alliance

#### Ultimately China cares more about its relationship with South Korea than the effects of THAAD, it’ll make sure that that relationship isn’t damaged.

#### Recent history disproves what they would like to tell you. Trance writes in May that the deployment of an Aegis system angered China, but unfortunately for my opponent, none of this threat construction rhetoric has ever materialized. Make them prove to you why South Korea would be any different, otherwise you can’t vote for them.

Trance 17 [F. Trance, 5-28-2017. "Japan to buy U.S. made Aegis missile defense, China is not happy." Blasting News. http://us.blastingnews.com/news/2017/05/japan-to-buy-us-made-aegis-missile-defense-china-is-not-happy-001732621.html] //BH

Aside from this, the Japanese self-defense force is starting to loosen the tight restrictions for a more versatile and active military. Aside from this, Japan is also planning to buy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense or THAAD, which South Korea currently employs as its mainline defense against ballistic missiles. What is China's reaction towards Japan's Aegis plan? China's expansionist policy will be greatly hampered by a strong pro-American Japan. China is planning on building a similar missile defense system that will rival the THAAD. Beijing had enlisted the help of Russia to develop such a weapon, however, with the buildup of U.S. forces in the Korean peninsula, it is slowly becoming an arms race not with North Korea alone, but with the industrial might of China. Japan and the United States plans on expanding sanctions against North Korea U.S. President Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had agreed to expand the current sanctions against North Korea.

### A2: Current Chinese Sanctions Solve

#### (3 responses)

#### 1. Delink, The South Korean Central Bank reports on July 21st that North Korea’s economy is growing at the fastest pace in 17 years.

#### 2. Delink, Recognize that China reported it would suspend coal imports from North Korea in February. This is crucial as Steger of Quartz reports on July 21st that since January, China’s trade with North Korea grew by over 10% to 2.55 billion dollars

#### 3. According to Steger, China maintains that its trade with North Korea does not violate any sanctions.

Cards:

Isabella Steger, Quartz, July 21, 2017, ["North Korea’s economy is booming," https://qz.com/1035363/north-koreas-economy-grew-at-the-fastest-pace-in-17-years-in-2016/, 7-21-2017] // AA

Data released today by South Korea’s central bank (link in Korean) showed that in 2016 North Korea’s economy grew by 3.9% from a year earlier, the fastest pace in 17 years, and bouncing back from 2015 when its economy contracted by 1.1% largely because of drought. North Korea’s trade volume also increased 4.6% from a year earlier; one estimate says that North Korean mineral exports to China accounted for 54% (paywall) of trade with China in the first half of 2016. (North Korea has vast mineral resources.) As China is Pyongyang’s largest trading partner, the latest figures will likely lead to more vocal calls from the international community for Beijing to do more to pressure its increasingly belligerent neighbor. Last week, China said that trade with North Korea grew over 10% to $2.55 billion in the first six months of 2017 from a year ago, but maintained that its trade relationship with North Korea does not violate any sanctions. China in February said it would suspend coal imports from North Korea.

### A2: Current China Pressure Solves

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Turn, Looking at the long term trend, Pilger of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission explains that there were 3 times as many Sino-North Korean in 2014 as in 2009.

#### 2. Turn, Steger of Quartz reports on July 21st that since January, China’s trade with North Korea grew by over 10% to 2.55 billion dollars, which funnels directly into the North Korean nuclear program.

Cards:

Michael Pilger, Research Intern, Security and Foreign Affairs & Caitlin Campbell, Senior Analyst, Security and Foreign Affairs, March 23, 2015, “Diminishing China-North Korea Exchanges: An Assessment.” The U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission. <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Research%20Report_Diminishing%20China-North%20Korea%20Exchanges%20-%20An%20Assessment.pdf> // AA

Trends in the frequency and content of China-North Korea exchanges between 2009 and 2014 appear to support the assessment, widely shared in the China- and North Korea-watching communities, that relations between Beijing and Pyongyang have soured in recent years.2 Since 2010, the number of reported high-, senior-, and presidentiallevel exchanges has fallen significantly, and in 2014 reached its lowest point in six years (see Figure 2). Though OSC reported three times as many China-North Korea exchanges in 2014 as in 2009, this increase was due primarily to the tripling of reported low- and medium-level exchanges, which rarely produced major policy outcomes (see Figure 3).†

Isabella Steger, Quartz, July 21, 2017, ["North Korea’s economy is booming," https://qz.com/1035363/north-koreas-economy-grew-at-the-fastest-pace-in-17-years-in-2016/, 7-21-2017] // AA

Data released today by South Korea’s central bank (link in Korean) showed that in 2016 North Korea’s economy grew by 3.9% from a year earlier, the fastest pace in 17 years, and bouncing back from 2015 when its economy contracted by 1.1% largely because of drought. North Korea’s trade volume also increased 4.6% from a year earlier; one estimate says that North Korean mineral exports to China accounted for 54% (paywall) of trade with China in the first half of 2016. (North Korea has vast mineral resources.) As China is Pyongyang’s largest trading partner, the latest figures will likely lead to more vocal calls from the international community for Beijing to do more to pressure its increasingly belligerent neighbor. Last week, China said that trade with North Korea grew over 10% to $2.55 billion in the first six months of 2017 from a year ago, but maintained that its trade relationship with North Korea does not violate any sanctions. China in February said it would suspend coal imports from North Korea.

### A2: SK Econ Harms General

#### Chinese sanctions are good because they force the South Korean economy to diversify. Huileng Tan of CNBCexplains two days ago that in order to reduce their vulnerability to future Chinese economic measures, South Korean multinationals may decide to diversify their manufacturing supply chain and production facilities to other Asian locations.

[Huileng Tan, 3-15-2017. "Here’s who will benefit from the Beijing-Seoul fallout." CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/15/china-south-korea-spat-heres-who-will-benefit-from-the-beijing-seoul-fallout.html] //BH

Geopolitical tensions in East Asia have escalated in the last year as China uses its considerable soft power to push its neighbors when it feels national interests are threatened. Well, those countries are coming to the conclusion that enough is enough, and they're heading to places like Southeast and South Asia to turn their fortunes around, according to analysts. "South Korean multinationals may decide to diversify their manufacturing supply chain and also production facilities to other Asian locations, in order to reduce their vulnerability to future Chinese economic measures," said Rajiv Biswas, IHS Markit's Asia Pacific chief economist. Currently, South Korea's decision to allow the U.S. to deploy an advanced missile defence system on the peninsula has culminated in a series of retaliatory measures from Beijing, including closing Lotte stores in China, limiting South Korean pop cultural imports and curbing tour groups to its neighbor. South Korean firms have already started investing in the fast-growing Southeast Asia region as its spat with Beijing simmered for a few years. In Vietnam, South Korea has invested heavily in establishing electronics production facilities, and that trend is likely to accelerate following the recent Chinese economic measures against the country, said IHS' Biswas.

### A2: Trade

#### Economic sanctions have no impact on South Korean GDP. In fact, Shuli Ren of Barron’s writes in March that a fully stopping Chinese tourism would only cut out 1.3% of Korea’s GDP and that is the worst case scenario.

#### Christine Kim of Reuters finds that exports to South Korea rose overall in April, so clearly China stopping trade isn’t having that much of an impact, in fact, South Korea is prospering.

#### Mitigate the impact. China doesn’t have an interest in fully sanctioning South Korea. Jun Yang of Reuters finds in January that the bulk of South Korean exports won’t be affected by sanctions because South Korea is the biggest exporter of parts and unfinished goods to China.

[Shuli Ren, 3-5-2017. "China’s Sanctions Over THAAD Can Sink Korea’s Economy." No Publication. http://www.barrons.com/articles/chinas-sanctions-over-thaad-can-sink-koreas-economy-1488773168] //BH

China's travel ban can shave at least 20% off Korea's GDP growth this year, says Credit Suisse. The bank currently forecasts Korea to grow at 2.5%. The reasoning is very simple. Chinese tourists, who come as part of tour groups, contribute $7.3 billion in tourism revenue to Korea's economy, or 0.5% of its total GDP. Individual tourists from China, contribute another $11.3 billion, or 0.8% of its total GDP. So if China just cancels travel groups alone this year, 0.5% of Korea's GDP is gone, or 20% of overall GDP growth estimated by Credit Suisse. And things could get worse. China has asked for a boycott of Lotte Group's products, but China's displeasure has so far only been directed at cosmetics, duty-free shops and Korean casinos. Will China launch sanctions against Korean smartphones and car makers too?

[Christine Kim and Cynthia Kim, 5-1-2017. "South Korea April export growth hits near six-year high, trade surplus with U.S. falls." Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-economy-trade/south-korea-april-export-growth-hits-near-six-year-high-trade-surplus-with-u-s-falls-idUSKBN17X0VR] //BH

South Korean exports rose at a much faster-than-expected pace in April, surging for a sixth straight month helped by robust demand for high-tech memory chips and adding confirmation to perceptions of broad recovery in the global economy. Exports to the United States rose in April but South Korea’s trade surplus with that country declined on an annual basis over the same period, Monday’s data showed, potentially easing concerns Washington may impose protectionist measures that could hurt South Korea’s economy - Asia’s fourth-largest. U.S. President Donald Trump said last week in an interview with Reuters that he was seeking to change a free trade deal with South Korea or scrap it entirely. Preliminary data showed April’s exports soared 24.2 percent from a year earlier to $51.01 billion, while imports surged 16.6 percent to $37.75 billion to create a $13.25 billion trade surplus, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy said. Exports rose at the fastest pace since August 2011 when they gained 25.5 percent. Shipments to the United States rose 3.9 percent on-year in April, rebounding from a 5.0 percent fall in March, the official breakdown showed. South Korea’s trade surplus with the United States was $1.68 billion in April, down from $2.52 billion a year before.

[Jun Yang, 1-12-2017. "China bullies South Korea at its own risk." U.S.. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-china-breakingviews/china-bullies-south-korea-at-its-own-risk-idUSKBN14W14D] //BH

The People’s Republic may also be trying to cut back on tourist flows to the Land of Morning Calm. Regulators have reportedly blocked television shows and brands from South Korea, along with K-pop stars. Blocking access to Chinese consumers is a big blow to these firms, which have capitalized on the popularity of South Korean entertainment and personal care products in the People’s Republic. Major cosmetics maker Amorepacific, for one, has lost a third of its market capitalization since the THAAD decision. But the bulk of South Korean exports to China is probably safe from retaliation. South Korea is the biggest exporter of parts and unfinished goods to China. Such items accounted for more than 77 percent of the $137 billion South Korean product exports to China in 2015, dwarfing 0.8 percent for cosmetics, according to the Seoul-based Institute for International Trade. High-quality, technologically advanced components made in South Korea are crucial for many Chinese brands’ competitiveness. The squabble still highlights a need for rebalancing. South Korean companies depend on China for a quarter of their exports, but sales could slow as growth in the world’s second-largest economy weakens. Southeast Asia could pick up the slack. Chinese firms, for their part, want to climb the value chain and reduce reliance on imported components. But for now, a breakup would be as painful to China as it would be to South Korea.

### A2: Tourism

#### Mitigate their impact. Jethro Mullen explains in 2017 that the unofficial travel sanctions only apply to tourist groups and do not prohibit independent travelers from traveling to South Korea.

[Jethro Mullen, 3-3-2017. "China's 'unofficial' sanctions over THAAD missile system rattle South Korea ." CNNMoney. http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/03/news/economy/china-south-korea-thaad-tourism-trade-sanctions/index.html] //BH

The government in Seoul said it believed Chinese authorities had told travel agencies in Beijing to stop selling trips to South Korea, intensifying fears of a trade war between the neighbors. The Chinese government, which is upset about South Korea's decision to host the THAAD missile defense system, denied any knowledge of such an order. "Instead of chasing shadows that don't exist, we hope the South Korean side will heed the voice of the people and take concrete actions to avoid causing further damage to bilateral relations," said Geng Shuang, a spokesman for China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At least one Chinese travel company, Tuniu, has already stopped sales of South Korean trips with immediate effect. The online travel firm said in a statement Friday that it objected to the THAAD deployment and a decision by the Lotte conglomerate to make land available for the missiles.

### A2: China Leverage Over NK

#### 1. (DON’T READ WITH NEW AFF) China isn’t very good at levying sanctions. Kent Boydston of the Peterson Institute for International Economics finds in May that sanctions aren’t having any effect on China’s exports to North Korea.

#### 2. (DON’T READ WITH NEW AFF) Turn the argument, THAAD increases Chinese diplomatic cooperation with North Korea. Julie Makinen of the LA Times explains that THAAD gives China an opening to improve ties with north Korea because right now, China doesn’t want to be sanctioning North Korea, that comes from pressure from the international community, China really wants to work towards diplomacy which has a higher chance of being effective as sanctions haven’t worked so far. THAAD allows this.

#### 3. Look to recent times when we saw the implementation of THAAD and the implantation of harsher sanctions. Voting aff gets their benefits.

[Kent Boyston, 5-5-2017. "How Good is China at Sanctions Enforcement?." PIIE. https://piie.com/blogs/north-korea-witness-transformation/how-good-china-sanctions-enforcement] //BH

But even assuming robust Chinese coal sanctions enforcement, if North Korea rebalances its cash-generating energies elsewhere—including to other extractive industries—these sanctions could lose their bite. While coal trade officially dropped to nothing in March, iron ore exports were up 270 percent (link is external) in January and February compared to the same period in 2016. This increase doesn’t come close to plugging the coal gap. If we look at year-on-year North Korean exports to China, January and February both saw an uptick followed by a downtick in March, which is to be expected if coal exports dropped to zero. But trade has not dropped to the post-UNSCR 2270 May 2016 figure (see below), the lowest monthly North Korean exports to China since February 2010. It’s also worth noting that while iron ore is banned by UNSCR 2321, China invokes the “livelihood purposes” exemption clause to justify continuing imports, the same game that was played when the coal ban was initially introduced in UNSC Resolution 2270 following the fourth nuclear test. On the other side of the ledger, it does not appear that the sanctions are having any effect on China’s exports to North Korea. In fact, in March 2017, North Korea recorded the largest monthly trade deficit since December 2009, the month of the DPRK’s botched currency redenomination. March is just one month, but North Korea has run annual trade deficits with China for the last several years; According to the latest KOTRA report, the deficit was $743 million in 2015. Because North Korea is able to run a trade deficit China Customs’ monthly figures for total China-North Korea trade (see below) do not yet show a noticeable drop. And because China does not publish crude oil exports to China, these overall trade figures, and particularly North Korea’s deficit, are artificially low. (See last week’s report by Chen Aizhu at Reuters on China’s oil lifeline (link is external) to North Korea.)

[Julie Makinen and Steven Borowiec, 7-8-2016. "U.S. and South Korea agree to deploy THAAD antimissile system to counter North Korea." latimes. http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-korea-thaad-20160708-snap-story.html] //BH

The U.S., Japan and South Korea won backing from China at the United Nations for tighter sanctions on North Korea after Pyongyang’s nuclear test and long-range rocket launch in February. But Delury said South Korea’s decision to embrace THAAD might cause China to be less strict with its unpredictable neighbor. “South Korea is always asking that China enforce sanctions [on North Korea] harder. It’s going to be difficult for them to ask that now, and China will likely be less receptive to those requests,” he said. “It also gives China an opening to try to improve ties with North Korea, which Xi Jinping wants to do even though Kim Jong Un drives him crazy. He’s likely now to seek a way to use Chinese influence more effectively in North Korea." The system will be operated by U.S. forces in South Korea. Ryu, South Korea’s deputy minister of defense, said a joint U.S.-South Korea team had “confirmed the military effectiveness of THAAD” and was working on final preparations to propose the best site for the battery

### A2: China Mediate Negotiations

#### This is non-unique. China always has an incentive to bring North Korea to the negotiating table because it wants peace in East Asia.

### A2: Russia-China Alliance

#### (3 responses)

#### 1. [Mitigate Probability] Ramani of the University of Oxford explains in 2017 that Russia has an incentive to prove it can be an effective mediator independent of China because doing so would increase its credibility as a strategic partner in the region.

#### 2. [Delink – Alternate Causality] Ramani of the University of Oxford explains that the formation of a Russian-Chinese alliance would be due to Russian involvement in the South China Sea not Korea.

#### 3. Turn, Both countries have economic and political incentives to promote regional stability. Thus, even if you buy that a Russia-China alliance will come to fruition, if anything, they will use their collective leverage to prevent conflict.

Samuel Ramani (Samuel Ramani is a DPhil candidate in International Relations at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford. He is also a journalist who contributes regularly to the Washington Post and Huffington Post). July 15, 2017. “Russia’s Korea Strategy.” The Diplomat. <http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/russias-korea-strategy/> // AA

Gaining China’s respect as an equal arbitration partner could have far-reaching positive implications for Russia’s Asia-Pacific strategy. By demonstrating that it can project diplomatic influence in the Asia-Pacific region and act independently from China, Russia increases its credibility as a strategic partner for Southeast Asia countries seeking to hedge their alignments with Washington, like Vietnam, the Philippines, and Thailand.

Samuel Ramani (Samuel Ramani is a DPhil candidate in International Relations at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford. He is also a journalist who contributes regularly to the Washington Post and Huffington Post). July 15, 2017. “Russia’s Korea Strategy.” The Diplomat. <http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/russias-korea-strategy/> // AA

China’s positive view of Russia’s North Korea strategy could remain unchanged even if Moscow flexes its military muscles on the Korean peninsula’s borders. As U.S. Naval War College expert Lyle Goldstein [recently noted](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-russia-could-help-solve-the-north-korean-crisis-20617), Chinese policymakers believe that a Russian Pacific fleet deployment in the Sea of Japan will counter American and Japanese military maneuvers, benefiting China’s regional military strategy. These positive assessments of Russian involvement by Chinese officials suggest that Russia’s expanded involvement in the Korean Peninsula could help transform its partnership with Beijing from an axis of convenience into a genuine alliance.

### A2: Chinese Nuclear Proliferation

#### There’s no legitimate impact when China goes from having 1,000 missiles to having 1,100 missiles.

#### Delink them because Yao Yunzhu of China-US Focus writes in 2013 that China will never rollback its first strike policy meaning that it will never escalate nuclear war to the point of using weapons first because its policy is second strike only.

[Yao Yunzhu, 2013. "China Will Not Change Its Nuclear Policy." China-US Focus. https://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/china-will-not-change-its-no-first-use-policy/] //BH

First, unlike previous editions which all have the title “China’s National Defense”, the latest edition has the specific title: “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces”, indicating that the white paper’s format may have changed from a comprehensive elaboration to a more focused discussion on a specific subject. Major General Chen Zhou, a senior researcher and a key author of the white paper, explained in an interview that this is the first white paper that adopts a thematic approach, so that the subject can be dealt with more thoroughly. Compared with previous editions, this year’s white paper has no section on “National Defense Policy”, which usually carries the nuclear policy and the statement of the NFU commitment. Second, in the section on the “Building and Development of China’s Armed Forces”, the force structure, missions and roles of the PLA Second Artillery Force are specified, stating that its nuclear component is “responsible for deterring other countries from using nuclear weapons against China, and carrying out nuclear counterattacks.” This is in full conformity with China’s NFU policy. In the section on “Defending National Sovereignty, Security and Territorial Integrity”, the preparedness of the Second Artillery Force “in peacetime”, “under a nuclear threat”, and “under a nuclear attack” are respectively described, and the alert posture of the Second Artillery Force is also in full compliance with China’s NFU nuclear policy. It is safe to say that the latest white paper provides more detailed information on how the PLA Second Artillery Force carries out the Nation’s NFU policy. In addition, the most recent re-affirmation of the NFU policy by a Chinese head of state was made by former President Hu Jintao at the March 2012 Nuclear Summit in Seoul. And it has been reiterated in all necessary policy documents and official statements since. There is no sign that China is going to change a policy it has wisely adopted and persistently upheld for half a century.

### A2: China Key

#### (4 responses)

#### 1. Mitigate, Su of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2017 explains in 2017 that many Chinese experts admit that the Chances of convincing North Korea to surrender is nuclear weapons are minute

#### 2. Delink, China is not key to sanctions enforcement – Bernt Berger at the Institute for Security and Development Policy finds in 2015 that the North Korean execution of a key figure in Chinese-North Korean relations represents China’s weak influence in North Korea.

#### 3. Delink, Fontaine of New American Security 17 explains that China isn’t willing to apply the severe pressure required to compel North Korea to denuclearize because such pressure would destabilize the Kim regime risking collapse.

#### 4. Delink, Saalman of UChicago 2017 explains that even Chinese experts emphasize that multilateral talks present the best chance at achieving North Korean denuclearization.

Cards:

Fei Su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. [http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf //](http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf%20//) AA

In terms of negotiations, an overwhelming majority of Chinese experts emphasize that multilateral talks are the best means of achieving denuclearization. Despite this fact, many of the Chinese experts interviewed admitted that the chances of convincing North Korea to surrender its nuclear weapons are minute.49 Further, they argued that even if North Korea were to return to the negotiation table and agree to denuclearization, it would take decades to achieve this goal. Instead, many Chinese analysts have returned to discussing the potential for a nuclear freeze or interim steps, rather than analysing the potential for complete denuclearization.50

Berger 15 (Bernt, Head of the Asia Programme and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Security and Development Policy, July 2015, “Sanctions against North Korea: A tricky Dilemma”, European Union Institute for Security Studies, <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_23_DPRK_sanctions.pdf)> //BS 6-24-2017

As a neighbouring country, China has a special interest in developments on the Korean peninsula. Its primary aims are centred on maintaining stability and the denuclearisation of the whole peninsula. Although China has often been accused of not sufficiently using its leverage over Pyongyang, Beijing has clearly stated its objectives and even initiated the 6PT. Yet recent internal developments – such as the execution of Jang Sung Taek, who used to be a key figure in China-DPRK relations – demonstrate the increasing limits of Beijing’s influence inside the country.

Richard Fontaine [Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies is a division of Johns Hopkins University], War on the Rocks, July 7, 2017, ["Time to Lose Your Illusions on North Korea," https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/time-to-lose-your-illusions-on-north-korea/, 7-21-2017] // AA

China simply will not apply the kind of severe economic pressure to North Korea that might compel significant de-nuclearization or the dismantling of its missile programs. Such pressure would threaten to destabilize the Kim regime, and Beijing knows as well as anyone that the peninsula, if ever reunified, will only do so under Seoul’s auspices. Losing its buffer state and risking American troops stationed just across its border is an obvious Chinese red line. Indeed, China poured its own troops across the Yalu River the last time U.S. forces approached.

Fei Su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. [http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf //](http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf%20//) AA

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### A2: China (General)

#### A quick observation:

#### 1. [Make my opponents prove causality] Bulloch of Forbes 2017 explains that China has never explicitly linked its pressure on South Korea to the deployment of THAAD. If they can’t prove causality, they can’t win todays round.

#### But even if you don’t buy that we have 6 responses:

#### (6 responses)

#### 1. Delink, The Center for Korean Studies at Fudan University writes in April of 2017 that China is becoming less vocal about THAAD which has led to the impression that China’s stance on THAAD has changed.

#### 2. Delink, Jiyong of Global times 2017 states that the Beijing-Seoul relations have entered the post-THAAD era wherein there is no need for China to take countermeasures.

#### 3. Mitigate, Ide of the VOA 2017 explains that the election of President Moon Jae-in has triggered China to soften relations with Seoul.

#### 4. Mitigate, Ide 2017 indicates that China’s opposition to missile defense in South Korea is becoming less shrill signaling a long term trend of normalization.

#### 5. Mitigate, The Voice of America explains in 2017 that China is loosening its sanctions on South Korea.

#### 6. Mitigate, The Chinese President, Xi Jinping stated in April 2017 that he seeks to properly handle any disputes because he desires to put Chinese-South Korean relations back onto a normal track.

#### But even if you don’t buy any of those responses, Bennett of the California Institute of Technology writes in 2017 that China has a vested interest in regional stability to maintain its economic and political prowess. Thus, realize that none of their impact will ever threaten conflict or economic collapse.

Cards:

Douglas Bulloch, 3/2017, “Why China's Bullying Of South Korea Will Have Unanticipated Costs For Both Parties”, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/douglasbulloch/2017/03/24/chinas-bullying-of-south-korea-may-have-unanticipated-costs/#261a231a2691

Ordinarily when such things happen, statements are made and ruffled feathers are smoothed, meaning things return to normal before too long. The pressure exerted on South Korea, however, has got to the point now where they have [lodged a complaint with the WTO](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-china-thaad-idUSKBN16R03D) indicating that they see no end in sight and wish to establish at least a base line for diplomacy. China, for its part, has never explicitly linked this ongoing pressure to the THAAD deployment, speaking instead of a more diffuse "public opinion" that must be taken account of.

Zheng Jiyong (director of the Center for Korean Studies at Fudan University). April 2017. “China remains opposed to South Korea’s THAAD deployment.” Global Times. [http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1042127.shtml //](http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1042127.shtml%20//) AA

Therefore, some South Korean scholar and media believe China has become less vocal about THAAD, which led to the impression that China's stance has changed. Some South Korean media even amplified the voices of a few Chinese scholars who oppose the retaliation against THAAD. A number of Chinese media outlets also promoted such ideas.

Zheng Jiyong, 2017/4/12, Global Times, “China remains opposed to South Korea’s THAAD deployment”, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1042127.shtml

In China, a few scholars have objected to economic retaliation against South Korea. This is normal as there has never been just one voice in China's opinion sphere. However, the South Korean people have all agreed to counter China's "economic retaliation." One especially worrying sentiment is that Beijing-Seoul relations have entered the post-THAAD era, as the deployment of THAAD has become a reality, there is no need for China to take countermeasures.

William Ide, VOA, 5-23-2017, ["Hopes Growing China May Ease Informal South Korea Sanctions," https://www.voanews.com/a/hopes-growing-china-may-ease-informal-south-korean-sanctions/3866996.html, 7-29-2017] // AA

South Korea’s recent election of liberal politician Moon Jae-in as the country’s new president has triggered a shift in China’s approach to relations with Seoul. After months of harsh criticism of South Korea’s decision to deploy a U.S.-made missile defense system and the enactment of harsh economic sanctions, Beijing appears to be changing its tact. Its opposition to South Korea’s deployment of the advanced Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system has not gone away, but is becoming less shrill.

William Ide, VOA, 5-23-2017, ["Hopes Growing China May Ease Informal South Korea Sanctions," https://www.voanews.com/a/hopes-growing-china-may-ease-informal-south-korean-sanctions/3866996.html, 7-29-2017] // AA

And some see signs that China is already beginning to loosen its ban on the import of South Korean cultural products such as television shows and entertainment performances, as well as group travel by Chinese tourists to the country. The shift started with signals from the top late last week. On Friday, when Chinese leader Xi Jinping met with an envoy of South Korean President Moon, he said Beijing was willing to work together with Seoul to “properly handle disputes” and “put China-South Korea relations back onto a normal track.” Over the past few days, reports in the Chinese state media have noted signals that the ice-breaking may have already begun. Two South Korean musicals already have performance dates in Beijing and Shanghai. “Bballae,” which means laundry in Korean, will begin in late June. Performances of another musical, “My Bucket List,” will begin in Beijing and Shanghai in August, reports said.

Bruce W. Bennett [California Institute of Technology]. April 2016. “THAAD's Effect on South Korea's Neighbors.” RAND Corporation. <https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/09/on-northeast-asia.html> // AA

China has been a major proponent of regional security for Northeast Asia. This advocacy is only natural: Truly great powers should pursue more than just their own security. Many had hoped that the Chinese definition of regional security would include Republic of Korea (ROK) security. After all, the ROK is part of the Northeast Asia region and has been heavily threatened on a regular basis by North Korea. Thus many ROK security experts believed that in the aftermath of six summit meetings through 2015 between ROK President Park Geun-hye and Chinese President Xi Jinping, China was committed to stopping North Korean provocations and China was also committed to meeting Chinese international security obligations.

### A2: Halt Incentivized Chinese Sanctions

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Delink, Su of Seoul National University 2017 indicates that China’s implementation and enforcement of sanctions against North Korea are based on its own national interests and its obligations as a UN member state, not a tradeoff with the US

Cards:

Fei su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. [http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf //](http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf%20//) AA

Overall, a July 2016 opinion piece by Liang Lichang, a professor at Huaibei Normal University, could be deemed representative of a prevailing view among Chinese experts.38 He stresses three main points. First, China’s implementation of sanctions on North Korea is based on China’s own national interest and its obligation as a UN member state. It is not a trade-off with the US Government. Second, regardless of the changing circumstances in East Asia, it is important for China to maintain a degree of independence on the North Korea issue to achieve effective sanctions enforcement. Third, THAAD deployment should not be linked with China’s North Korea policy. Nonetheless, Liang stresses that China should take a clear stance in opposition to THAAD deployment, including substantive measures in response to South Korea’s decision.

### A2: Chinese Pressure Solve

#### (3 responses)

#### 1. Delink, According to the US-China Security commission, China agreed to the most stringent UN sanctions ever in January 2016. Their impacts should have already materialized.

#### 2. Delink, China will never fully commit to pressuring North Korea as Yinhong of Renmin University explains that the growing North Korean threat incentivizes china to not seriously and lastingly damaging China-North Korea relations by becoming too alienated from the Pyongyang regime.

#### 3. Delink, the US-China Security Review writes that the only way China can make a difference on North Korea is to halt nearly all economic exchanges, expelling North Korean workers, and taking other measures which will provoke a grave economic crisis in North Korea. However, they further that such a hard blow is unlikely to ever be delivered by China because extreme pressure is more likely to bring about regime collapse than denuclearization, and regime collapse is not what Chinese leaders want to see.

Cards:

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. “SECTION 4: CHINA AND NORTH KOREA.” United States Government Publishing Office. 2017. <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Annual_Report/Chapters/Chapter%203%2C%20Section%204%20-%20China%20and%20North%20Korea.pdf> // AA

On September 9, 2016, North Korea conducted its fifth nuclear test—its second in 2016 and most powerful to date. The test follows a period of increased provocations under Kim Jong-un in defiance of the international community and North Korea’s neighbor and closest partner, China. Since 2012, when Chinese President and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Xi Jinping assumed leadership and Kim Jong-un emerged as the leader of North Korea, China-North Korea relations have become increasingly strained. This downturn has largely been due to the Kim regime’s increased belligerence and rejection of the international community’s efforts to coax North Korea to denuclearize. Since then, bilateral relations have been characterized by growing frustration and downgraded diplomatic ties. In response to Pyongyang’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016, China in March increased pressure on North Korea by agreeing to the most stringent UN resolution on North Korea to date.1 As of the publication of this Report, the UN Security Council was negotiating a new resolution, which appears likely to further tighten economic sanctions, presenting Beijing with another opportunity to join the international community in meaningfully punishing Pyongyang’s behavior.

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. “SECTION 4: CHINA AND NORTH KOREA.” United States Government Publishing Office. 2017. <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Annual_Report/Chapters/Chapter%203%2C%20Section%204%20-%20China%20and%20North%20Korea.pdf> // AA

Beijing’s North Korea policy has always included advocating for denuclearization, but historically it has been least important among its three longstanding policy priorities of ‘‘no war, no instability, no nukes.’’ \* 93 Beijing has increasingly emphasized denuclearization as North Korean provocations have become more frequent in recent years, possibly signaling that China seeks a larger role in realizing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. High-level Chinese officials in meetings with their U.S. counterparts and Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements increasingly stress denuclearization over stability.94 According to one Chinese analyst, China’s prioritization of denuclearization was one of the main drivers compelling it to agree to a more stringent UN resolution in the aftermath of the January 2016 nuclear test.95 Nonetheless, as Renmin University professor Shi Yinhong asserts, ‘‘Beijing . . . [believes] that China must prevent the denuclearization process and its own role within it from seriously and lastingly damaging China-North Korea relations by becoming too alienated from the Pyongyang regime.’’ 96

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. “SECTION 4: CHINA AND NORTH KOREA.” United States Government Publishing Office. 2017. <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Annual_Report/Chapters/Chapter%203%2C%20Section%204%20-%20China%20and%20North%20Korea.pdf> // AA

These views speak to fundamental differences in how China and the United States perceive developments in North Korea, necessarily limiting bilateral cooperation. At the heart of this mismatch in priorities is the debate about China’s ‘‘leverage’’ over North Korea. U.S. officials and experts often refer to the leverage Beijing holds over Pyongyang by virtue of China’s role as North Korea’s primary source of economic and political support. They argue the North Korean ‘‘problem’’ can be solved if China uses its leverage to apply pressure on Pyongyang such that the regime will be forced to change its ways.167 Though this may be true, to do so would undermine Beijing’s ultimate goal: the maintenance of regime stability and the buffer state it perceives it needs between itself and the U.S.-allied South. Seoul-based scholar and long-time North Korea watcher Andrei Lankov explains China’s perceived quandary: From decades of experience China has learned that . . . when the North Korean economy runs into trouble, it is the common people, not the small hereditary elite, who pay the price. And since commoners have no way to influence the government, the North Korean elite is always willing to pursue those policies most conducive to their interests, even if such policies mean economic hardships and starvation of the population at large. . . . Hence, subtle pressures are not efficient in dealing with Pyongyang—and the Chinese know this very well. The only way to make a difference is to strike North Korea really hard, by dramatically reducing or halting nearly all economic exchanges, expelling North Korean workers, and taking other measures which will provoke a grave economic crisis in North Korea. Such a crisis might create a revolutionary situation, thus making the North Korean elite consider serious concessions on the nuclear and missile issues. However, such a hard blow is unlikely to ever be delivered by China. This is because extreme pressure is more likely to bring about regime collapse than denuclearization, and regime collapse is not what Chinese leaders want to see.168

### A2: Chinese Aggression

#### (1 response)

#### 1. [Turn the Link] Chinese aggression will exist in both worlds. However, Dastjerdi of the Harvard Political Review 2015 explains that a stronger United States posture dramatically raises the cost of conflict thus, thus, focing China to back down from further escalation. Our world comparatively decreases the probability that aggression will manifest into conflict.

Cards:

Ali Dastjerdi [Harvard University]. 16 December 2015. “The Case for Credible Chinese Deterrence.” Harvard Political Review. <http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/case-credible-chinese-deterrence/> // AA

Even if a stronger United States posture might cause a reciprocal Chinese response, deterrence is indispensable for ushering in a peaceful future for East Asia. China’s dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Islands is the most likely [flashpoint](http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ISEC_a_00114#.Vkad2oRuHzI) for regional or even global conflict. Since 2013, escalation both on the part of China and Japan has brought the nations to the brink of war. The United States in 2015 [declared](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/24/obama-in-japan-backs-status-quo-in-island-dispute-with-china) that it was willing to defend the islands as a part of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. This explicit declaration by the United States dramatically raised the cost of conflict over the islands and [forced](http://www.cfr.org/japan/us-japan-security-alliance/p31437) China to back down from further escalation.

### A2: Pressure SK

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Turn, Bennett of RAND 2015 indicates that although China might retaliate in the short term either economically or diplomatically, demonstrating independence and unwillingness to be leveraged by China in areas of security, South Korea will avert future Chinese pressure. Prefer the long-term benefit of international political capital which will benefit South Korea’s best interests.

Cards:

Bruce Bennett [PhD]. April 2015. “South Korea's Missile-Defense System Decision: Q&A with Bruce Bennett.” RAND Corporation. [https://www.rand.org/blog/2015/04/south-koreas-missile-defense-system-decision-qa-with.html //](https://www.rand.org/blog/2015/04/south-koreas-missile-defense-system-decision-qa-with.html%20//) AA

China might retaliate against Seoul in the short term either economically or diplomatically for a THAAD deployment. But by demonstrating its independence and unwillingness to be leveraged by China in areas of South Korean security, South Korea would likely avert future Chinese pressure on other issues.

### A2: China Harmed

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Turn, Bennett of the RAND Corporation explains that the deployment missile defense would improve Chinese national security because it would force North Korea to shift its missiles away from China.

Cards:

Bruce W. Bennett [California Institute of Technology]. April 2016. “THAAD's Effect on South Korea's Neighbors.” RAND Corporation. <https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/09/on-northeast-asia.html> // AA

Even then, China does not seem to understand the regional implications of the THAAD missile defense system. One fully-deployed THAAD battery is capable of destroying perhaps 50 North Korean ballistic missiles. North Korean planners, recognizing the THAAD capabilities, would need to shift missiles away from targeting China to rebalance its attacks once THAAD is deployed in Korea. Thus THAAD would likely reduce the number of North Korean ballistic missiles targeted on China, a significant improvement in Chinese and regional security.

### A2: Relations Harmed

#### (4 responses)

#### 1. Delink, Jiyong of the Center for Korean Studies explains in 2017 that China has become less vocal about THAAD which led to the conclusion that China’s stance has changed. He furthers that Beijing has become normalized to the presence of THAAD and no longer will feel pressure to take countermeasures. Follow the trend and in the long term, relations won’t be harmed.

#### 2. Turn, Kim of the East Asia Peace Research Association 2016 indicates that THAAD will only cause a short-term blow in relations and will foster deeper long term relations between the two countries because it can be a stepping stone for a discourse regarding Chinese involvement on the Korean peninsula.

#### 3. Delink, Chen of the Global Public Policy Institute 2016 explains that in the status quo, China is pursuing a closer relationship with South Korea because of its disappointment with North Korea who is not hurting Chinas national interests.

#### 4. Turn, Chen of the Global Policy Institute impacts that the China-South Korea relationship is increasable important and can replace the China-North Korea alliance. Increased cooperation between China and South Korea means less conflict, more economic engagement, and an easy place for you to affirm.

#### 5. [Delink - alternate causal] The Nikkei Asian Review explains that Beijing’s hesitance to hold talks in July is because President Xi Jinping wants to avoid making political waves before his meeting in the fall. Its not about resentment towards South Korea.

Cards:

Zheng Jiyong (director of the Center for Korean Studies at Fudan University). April 2017. “China remains opposed to South Korea’s THAAD deployment.” Global Times. [http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1042127.shtml //](http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1042127.shtml%20//) AA

Therefore, some South Korean scholar and media believe China has become less vocal about THAAD, which led to the impression that China's stance has changed. Some South Korean media even amplified the voices of a few Chinese scholars who oppose the retaliation against THAAD. A number of Chinese media outlets also promoted such ideas.

Zheng Jiyong, 2017/4/12, Global Times, “China remains opposed to South Korea’s THAAD deployment”, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1042127.shtml

In China, a few scholars have objected to economic retaliation against South Korea. This is normal as there has never been just one voice in China's opinion sphere. However, the South Korean people have all agreed to counter China's "economic retaliation." One especially worrying sentiment is that Beijing-Seoul relations have entered the post-THAAD era, as the deployment of THAAD has become a reality, there is no need for China to take countermeasures.

Kim 7/12/16 (Kim Sang Soon – President of the East Asia Peace Research Association – “Can THAAD unite China and South Korea on peninsula strategy?” – 7/12/16 - http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk03600&num=13984)/TK

The author, for his part, intends to focus critical attention on the question: “What kind of direction will the North Korea-China relationship take due to the installation of THAAD?” This is preferable to fixating on THAAD’s ramifications for South Korea-Sino ties.¶ The South Korea-China relationship has been fantastically successful in terms of social exchanges and economic activity over the past 20 years. With regards to political diplomacy, the personal trust built up between South Korean President Park Geun Hye and Chinese President Xi Jinping has raised the trust level between the two countries in general. Therefore, the installation of THAAD will inflict a short term bruise on the relationship, but in the medium to long term, the possibility that this will evolve into a larger conflict is remote.¶ This author sees the South Korea-China relationship as one on the brink of an era of mature strategic cooperation. It is true that the THAAD decision has caused deep doubts on the Chinese side. Rather than worrying about how the THAAD installation will sever or terminate relations, we need to be more concerned about how the strategic relationship between the two countries will evolve as a result of the THAAD development.¶ China’s ambiguous approach to the peninsula is being put to the test by the THAAD emplacement. Compared to South Korea, China has been relatively loose on the matter of denuclearizing the peninsula. The question is: will their increased seriousness on the matter actually bring them closer to the South Korean position. ¶ The ferocity of China’s opposition to THAAD reveals to us that peninsula issues such as denuclearization have become a hot issue of elevated importance to China. It is up to South Korea to devise and propose cooperative measures to China on these matters. To put it another way, China has been intensely focused on issues such as Taiwan Strait affairs and competing claims with Japan on the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, but now that Beijing’s attention has shifted over to the peninsula, there is a chance that the path to solving to the North Korean nuclear problem might be hastened. ¶ The most important element for all sides to focus on is denuclearization. THAAD will not usher in the termination of friendly South Korea-Sino relations. It actually represents a new beginning. In terms of accomplishing the shared goal of denuclearization, THAAD represents a purely defensive measure. But THAAD might also kick start a process in which China changes its strategy on the peninsula. Dialogue between South Korea and China can help both countries to devise and act on a more future oriented and cooperative security policy.¶ It is best for South Korea to avoid involving itself in diplomatic confrontations between America and China. Instead, it should devote its political energy towards two outcomes on the peninsula: denuclearization and peaceful reunification. At long last, the time is right for South Korea and China to have a security dialogue about denuclearizing the peninsula. South Korea should actively try to fulfill this goal. It’s time for China to change from its ambiguous peninsula strategy to a more forward-oriented approach.

Dingding Chen [Global Public Policy Institute]. 2016. “Is a China-South Korea Alliance Possible?” – also has the coolest name ever - 7/8/16 - <http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/is-a-china-south-korea-alliance-possible/> // AA

One major reason why China is now pursuing a warmer relationship with South Korea is China’s disappointment and anger at North Korea. A number of indicators suggest that China is quietly and slowly shifting its policy toward North Korea. Why China is changing its North Korea policy? The fundamental reason is actually quite simple– North Korea is now hurting China’s core national interests. In recent years, there has been a hot debate in China over whether Beijing should abandon North Korea. Several Chinese scholars (here and here) have already argued that China should abandon North Korea for moral and strategic reasons. They include: 1) North Korea’s value as China’s buffer zone is declining as China’s military modernization develops; 2) the China-South Korea relationship is increasingly important and it can replace the China-North Korea alliance relationship; and 3) North Korea has become a troublemaker for China and East Asia stability, thus a negative asset for China.¶ In the meantime, several Chinese scholars (here and here) have advocated for a China-South Korea alliance. According to Professor Yan Xuetong at Tsinghua University, China and South Korea share three mutual security interests: namely, the Japan threat, North Korea’s nuclear threat, and maintaining peace in East Asia. Yan further explains that a China-South Korea alliance does not need to replace South Korea’s alliance with the U.S., thus reducing opposition from the U.S. side. According to Yan, Korea historically maintained alliances with two countries at the same time; so technically a China-South Korea alliance should not be a problem for South Korea-U.S. alliance. In addition, China is already South Korea’s biggest trading partner and South Korea’s future economic development heavily depends on China’s huge market. Most importantly, China now seems to embrace the idea that South Korea can play a leading role in future reunification with North Korea. It is thus natural for South Korea to develop a strong security relationship with China.

Japan's Nikkei Asian Review said Beijing's hesitance to hold talks in July also appears to be because of an upcoming National Congress of the Communist Party, where Chinese President Xi Jinping could get a second term as the party's general secretary. The publication said Xi's camp wants "to avoid making political waves" before that meeting in the fall. Meantime, Moon and Abe are expected to hold brief bilateral talks next week at the G20 meeting in Hamburg, Germany. The two U.S. allies are likely to discuss strategies to deal with the common threat from North Korea, among other things.

### A2: Isolate China

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Delink, Panda of Princeton 2016 explains that China’s recent outcry against a South Korean Missile Defense System is all bark and no bite because after the sharp uptick in the Chinese-Korean relationship, the cost of losing it would be too great. This means we are accessing our impacts on deterring a North Korean attack while maintaining good regional relations.

Cards:

Ankit Panda [Princeton University]. February 2016. “What Is THAAD, What Does It Do, and Why Is China Mad About It?” The Diplomat. <http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/what-is-thaad-what-does-it-do-and-why-is-china-mad-about-it/> // AA

Assessing China’s position on THAAD in light of the system’s real capabilities, we should concede that Beijing does have some legitimate reasons to be upset, but I question if the negative implications for China’s security really outweigh the diplomatic cost to the bilateral relationship with South Korea, [which had seen a sharp uptick over the past year](http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/is-china-tilting-toward-south-korea/). Moreover, it’s clear that South Korea’s security would benefit in important ways from a THAAD deployment–[Pyongyang’s Toksa, SCUDs, and No Dong](https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/698995361700978690) missiles would be a lot less threatening.

### A2: Closer to NK

#### (5 responses)

#### 1. Bennett of the RAND 2016 explains that China has an increasing concern with the threat N. Korean nuclear tests pose to its citizens living near the border. Thus, as time progresses, and tensions escalate, China will be more willing to outwardly support the missile defense system.

#### 2. Delink, Kristian of the Week 2017 explains that China recently reaffirmed their commitment to strive for complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization for the Korean Peninsula.

#### 3. Turn, Lee of NYU 2017 explains that the heightened prospect of U.S. military action in North Korea could encourage China, who fears the fallout of a regional conflict, to take steps to choke off Pyongyang’s economic lifeline

#### 4. Delink, Gale of the NYT 2017 explains that China recently denied imports from North Korea.

#### 5. Delink, Global Times writes in April that if North Korea makes one more provocative move, China will allow the United Nations to adopt severe restrictive measures that have never been seen before.

Cards:

Bruce W. Bennett [California Institute of Technology]. April 2016. “THAAD's Effect on South Korea's Neighbors.” RAND Corporation. [https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/04/the-effect-on-south-koreas-neighbors.html //](https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/04/the-effect-on-south-koreas-neighbors.html%20//) AA

If China's objections are politically motivated, what political dynamics might be driving its behavior? One possible explanation lies in the political relationship between China and North Korea. China has been either unwilling (or more likely unable) to rein in its ally North Korea's growing nuclear and offensive missile threats. China has had substantial motivation to do so, including the concerns of Chinese citizens living near the North Korean border, who are threatened by North Korean nuclear weapon tests.

Bonnie Kristian. June 24, 2017. “U.S., China reaffirm cooperation for 'irreversible' North Korean denuclearization.” The Week. [http://theweek.com/speedreads/708165/china-reaffirm-cooperation-irreversible-north-korean-denuclearization //](http://theweek.com/speedreads/708165/china-reaffirm-cooperation-irreversible-north-korean-denuclearization%20//) AA

The United States and China have reaffirmed their mutual commitment to "strive for the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," Chinese state media agency Xinhua [reported Saturday](http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/339299-trump-administration-pushing-china-on-north-korea-report). The statement comes after Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Defense Secretary James Mattis hosted Chinese diplomats in Washington in an attempt to reach consensus on how to deal with increasing provocation from Pyongyang. Tillerson indicated earlier this week he is asking China, which is North Korea's primary trading partner, to increase its political and economic pressure on the Kim Jong Un regime.

Carol E. Lee [New York University], Alastair Gale [Japanese Editor; New York Times]. March 2017. “White House Options on North Korea Include Use of Military Force.” Wall Street Journal. [https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-explores-options-including-use-of-military-force-to-counter-north-korean-threat-1488407444 //](https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-explores-options-including-use-of-military-force-to-counter-north-korean-threat-1488407444%20//) AA

The heightened prospect of U.S. military action in North Korea could encourage China, which fears the fallout of a military confrontation with its neighbor, to take steps Washington has long sought to choke off Pyongyang’s economic lifeline.

Carol E. Lee [New York University], Alastair Gale [Japanese Editor; New York Times]. March 2017. “White House Options on North Korea Include Use of Military Force.” Wall Street Journal. [https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-explores-options-including-use-of-military-force-to-counter-north-korean-threat-1488407444 //](https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-explores-options-including-use-of-military-force-to-counter-north-korean-threat-1488407444%20//) AA

Chinese and North Korean officials are holding talks in Beijing, the first known high-level meeting in nearly a year, and [Beijing recently curtailed coal imports from North Korea](https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-puts-heat-on-u-s-with-north-korea-coal-crackdown-1487607797).

Global Times. “Is North Korea nuclear crisis reaching a showdown?” Global Times. April 2017. [http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1041998.shtml //](http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1041998.shtml%20//) AA

More and more Chinese support the view that the government should enhance sanctions over Pyongyang's nuclear activities. If the North makes another provocative move this month, the Chinese society will be willing to see the UNSC adopt severe restrictive measures that have never been seen before, such as restricting oil imports to the North. Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program is intended for securing the regime, however, it is reaching a tipping point. Pyongyang hopes its gamble will work, but all signs point to the opposite direction.

### A2: Increased Trade with NK

#### (2 responses)

#### 1. Turn, Saalman of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute explains that increased economic engagement between China and North Korea has promoted marketization and stimulated the emergence of a middle class in North Korea. She furthers that the rising middle class in North Korea will become the backbone of an irreversible force for future economic reform.

#### 2. Delink, trade between the two countries is harming the North Korean economy as the same figures my opponents are citing indicates that China’s imports of North Korean goods fell by 13% and its imported 75% less coal. North Korea is making less money, making the development of their nuclear program unsustainable.

Cards:

Fei su, Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University, and Lora saalman, Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme, February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Outside of sanctions enforcement, China has been expanding economic engagement with North Korea since 2009. The deteriorating bilateral political relations of the early years of Xi Jinping’s presidency and the escalating North Korea nuclear crisis did not affect normal trade between the two countries. Chinese experts argue that the continuation of economic transactions has to some extent promoted the development of marketization and stimulated the emergence of a middle class in North Korea.Chinese experts have also addressed how continued and enhanced Chinese engagement with North Korea could promote a Chinese style reform and opening up. Kim Jong-un’s emphasis on economic development by adopting improvement measures is highly rated by Chinese experts. However, the differences between China’s and North Korea’s domestic and external environments will constrain the substance and modalities of reform implementation. A slowdown of or push back on economic reform will probably occur if the new reforms threaten the stability of the regime. Therefore, Chinese experts are pinning their hopes on the rising middle class in North Korea becoming the backbone of an irreversible force for future economic reform. While some might see South Korea’s shutdown of the KIC as a blow to these trends, it may have actually given more economic weight and impetus to bilateral relations between China and North Korea.

Washington Post, 7-24-2016, ["Chinese figures show trade is up with North Korea, but questions abound," https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinese-imports-from-north-korea-fall-sharply-a-sign-that-beijing-is-cracking-down/2017/07/13/1ff1f49a-6787-11e7-83d7-7a628c56bde7\_story.html?utm\_term=.b94b9844baf8, 7-25-2017] // AA

The value of imports from North Korea fell to $880 million in the six months that ended in June, down 13 percent from a year earlier, according to the figures. Notably, China’s coal imports from North Korea dropped precipitously, with only 2.7 million tons being shipped in the first half of 2017, down 75 percent from 2016.

### A2: Military Spending (China)

#### (2 responses)

#### 1. [Delink – Alternate Causal] Babones of Foreign Policy indicates that China’s military budget is growing because China is growing not because of any specific invasion plans.

#### 2. Turn, China’s increase in military spending is beneficial because Sputnik International 2016 indicates that China is attempting to increase its role in UN peacekeeping.

Cards:

Salvatore Babones, 3-12-2015, "Is China a Threat? The Devil's in the Details," Foreign Policy In Focus, http://fpif.org/is-china-a-threat-the-devils-in-the-details/

Let China modernize its military. China’s neighbors will bulk up in response to any perceived threat, many of them by purchasing expensive U.S. weapons. China’s leadership (much closer to the action than America’s leadership) presumably understands this. If China’s military budget is growing, it is likely because China is growing, not because China has any specific invasion plans.

Sputnik International. 2016. “Dragon Rising: China Building Up for Role as UN Peacekeeping Superpower.” Sputnik International. <https://sputniknews.com/politics/201611251047828924-chinese-peacekeeping-role-growing/> // AA

As the new US administration mulls scaling back America's global role, China is actively seeking to increase its influence in the UN's peacekeeping operations. Speaking to Sputnik, experts explained why Beijing is looking at peacekeeping as an important stepping stone in China's efforts to achieve global leadership.

### A2: Chinese Modernization

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Delink, Babones of Foreign Policy gives two reasons not to worry. First, if China does choose to modernize their military, China’s neighbors will bulk up theirs, most likely with US weapons which would prove counterproductive to their national interests. Secondly, China’s military budget is growing because China is growing not because of any specific invasion plans.

Cars:

Salvatore Babones, 3-12-2015, "Is China a Threat? The Devil's in the Details," Foreign Policy In Focus, http://fpif.org/is-china-a-threat-the-devils-in-the-details/

Let China modernize its military. China’s neighbors will bulk up in response to any perceived threat, many of them by purchasing expensive U.S. weapons. China’s leadership (much closer to the action than America’s leadership) presumably understands this. If China’s military budget is growing, it is likely because China is growing, not because China has any specific invasion plans.

### A2: China Irrelevant

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Delink, Bennett of RAND 2016 explains that China is the largest contributor to North Korea’s decision to escalate tensions.

Cards:

Bruce W. Bennett [California Institute of Technology]. April 2016. “THAAD's Effect on South Korea's Neighbors.” RAND Corporation. <https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/09/on-northeast-asia.html> // AA

While China denounced this January provocation, it refused to take any action against North Korea. The international community has focused on economic sanctions to impose costs on North Korea, but to impose significant costs on the North, China must support such sanctions because China is North Korea's biggest trade partner by far. China's refusal to impose sanctions by early February meant that North Korea had suffered little in the way of costs for its fourth nuclear test. China's inaction apparently made a major contribution to North Korea's conclusion that it could get away with the satellite launch/ICBM test it executed on Feb. 7.

### A2: China won’t cooperate

#### (4 responses)

#### 1. Turn, Bennett of the California Institute of Technology explains that China supported UN Security Council Resolution 270 which imposed serious trade sanctions on North Korea. Signifying, Chinas willingness to work with the west.

#### 2. Turn, Lee of NYU 2017 explains that the heightened prospect of U.S. military action in North Korea could encourage China, who fears the fallout of a regional conflict, to take steps to choke off Pyongyang’s economic lifeline

#### 3. Turn, Gale of the NYT 2017 explains that China recently denied coal imports from North Korea*. This means that China is starting to cooperate.*

#### 4. Turn, Su of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute explain in 2017 that North Korea’s ongoing nuclear development has inspired an increasingly large portion of the Chinese population who support sanctions to get North Korea back to the negotiating table.

Bruce W. Bennett [California Institute of Technology]. April 2016. “THAAD's Effect on South Korea's Neighbors.” RAND Corporation. <https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/09/on-northeast-asia.html> // AA

Thereafter, China did support U.N. Security Council Resolution 2270, which imposed serious trade sanctions on North Korea. But China does not appear to be fully following those sanctions: Trade between China and North Korea reportedly increased about nine percent year-on-year this June.

Carol E. Lee [New York University], Alastair Gale [Japanese Editor; New York Times]. March 2017. “White House Options on North Korea Include Use of Military Force.” Wall Street Journal. [https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-explores-options-including-use-of-military-force-to-counter-north-korean-threat-1488407444 //](https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-explores-options-including-use-of-military-force-to-counter-north-korean-threat-1488407444%20//) AA

The heightened prospect of U.S. military action in North Korea could encourage China, which fears the fallout of a military confrontation with its neighbor, to take steps Washington has long sought to choke off Pyongyang’s economic lifeline.

Carol E. Lee [New York University], Alastair Gale [Japanese Editor; New York Times]. March 2017. “White House Options on North Korea Include Use of Military Force.” Wall Street Journal. [https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-explores-options-including-use-of-military-force-to-counter-north-korean-threat-1488407444 //](https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-explores-options-including-use-of-military-force-to-counter-north-korean-threat-1488407444%20//) AA

Chinese and North Korean officials are holding talks in Beijing, the first known high-level meeting in nearly a year, and [Beijing recently curtailed coal imports from North Korea](https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-puts-heat-on-u-s-with-north-korea-coal-crackdown-1487607797).

Fei su, Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University, and Lora saalman, Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme, February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Faced with North Korea’s ongoing nuclear development, an increasing number of Chinese experts are proposing sanctions on the supply of crude oil to force North Korea back to the negotiation table. Their emphasis demonstrates that while Chinese analysts may support sanctions, they are aimed at garnering North Korean participation in future iterations of negotiations or Six-Party Talks and not seen as a final solution to achieving denuclearization

### A2: Security Dilemma (China)

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Delink, Dastjerdi of the Harvard Political Review 2015 explains that China’s recent actions are inexplicable under a security dilemma framework.

Cards:

Ali Dastjerdi [Harvard University]. 16 December 2015. “The Case for Credible Chinese Deterrence.” Harvard Political Review. <http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/case-credible-chinese-deterrence/> // AA

However, China’s recent actions in the South China Sea are inexplicable under a security dilemma framework. Presented with faltering U.S. commitment to the region, China has pursued highly provocative and destabilizing policies to expand its jurisdiction over what it believes to be its territory. Examples of these action include [patrolling](http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/12/23/national/chinese-patrol-ships-enter-japanese-territorial-waters-off-senkaku-islands/) the disputed Senkaku Islands, moving an oil rig into Vietnamese [territorial waters](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/16/world/asia/chinese-oil-rig-near-vietnam-to-be-moved.html?_r=0), and constructing an [artificial island](http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-has-been-building-in-the-south-china-sea.html)in the South China Sea. These minute territorial gains do not substantively change China’s position in any potential military confrontation and come at the [cost](http://www.japanfocus.org/-Reinhard-Drifte/4154/article.html) of heightened international scrutiny, regional distrust, and increased flashpoints for conflict. Proponents of the security dilemma model have to either adopt the flimsy argument that these gains are strategically important, or the unconvincing argument that Chinese military officials are woefully inept and perceive these gains as beneficial.

### A2: China afraid of Unification

#### 1. Delink, Rosenblum of Politico 2017 explains that the United States is willing to remove troops from a unified Korean peninsula in exchange for China proactively leading a transition to a unified Korea. Meaning the sole barrier to China supporting unification is likely to be removed.

Cards:

Todd Rosenblum (a delegate to the U.S.-China-South Korea-North Korea Four Party Peace Talks in the 1990s. He was a senior official at the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security for the Obama administration from 2009 to 2015. He is a nonresident fellow at The Atlantic Council and serves on the Defense Science Board Task Force on Homeland Defense), Agenda, 7-18-2017, ["How to persuade China to abandon North Korea," http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/07/18/china-north-korea-american-troops-removal-000476, 7-23-2017] // AA

It’s a frightening possibility, one that Trump and other top U.S. policymakers must do everything to avoid. But if we really want to block the North’s nuclear program without another Korean War, it requires us to think carefully about what could actually persuade China to cut off its support for the North Korean regime. And that leads us to a previously unthinkable idea: giving real consideration to removing all American troops from a unified peninsula in exchange for China proactively leading the transition to a unified Korea. Though it has been unthinkable for years—and still may be—such a deal would also create a kind of leverage that nothing else has.

### A2: Chinese Expansionism General

#### (4 responses)

#### 1. Delink, Babones indicates that no country in the world has staged a large-scale amphibious assault since 1950. There is no reason to believe that China will be doing so any time soon. Unless they can give you a probability, there is no reason to give them access to their impacts.

#### 2. Delink, Babones indicates that the Chinese military will never have the capacity to invade countries against armed resistance because of the contemporary military context in which a single cruise missile can sink a transport ship carrying thousands of troops. It makes no sense to worry about something that is not technically possible.

#### 3. Turn, Babones of Foreign Policy turns this because China’s military expansion supports greater Chinese involvement in international peace-keeping, and it could spark more appropriate burden-sharing among America’s Asian allies. This turns the argument because their examples only show a benefit to the US.

#### 4. Delink, Babones indicates that China has recently been courting South Korean technology investment which means that the dependence reduces the probability of conflict. Turn, Because S. Korea benefits China more than the North does which means China would most likely align with the South in the event of a conflict. Which is in South Korea’s best interest.

Cards:

Salvatore Babones, 3-12-2015, "Is China a Threat? The Devil's in the Details," Foreign Policy in Focus, <http://fpif.org/is-china-a-threat-the-devils-in-the-details/> // AA

Political relations across the Taiwan Strait are inevitably dominated by questions over the status of Taiwan. Every election in Taiwan sparks talk about and fears of Chinese invasion. But no country in the world has staged a large-scale amphibious assault since the U.S. landings at Incheon, South Korea in 1950. For more than half a century, even American adventures abroad have been small-scale (Grenada) or launched from land bases (Iraq).

Salvatore Babones, 3-12-2015, "Is China a Threat? The Devil's in the Details," Foreign Policy In Focus, http://fpif.org/is-china-a-threat-the-devils-in-the-details/

The Chinese military will never have the capacity to invade Taiwan against armed resistance — not now, not later, not ever. It just can’t be done in the contemporary military context in which a single cruise missile can sink a transport ship carrying thousands of troops. It makes no sense to worry about something that is not technically possible.

Salvatore Babones, 3-12-2015, "Is China a Threat? The Devil's in the Details," Foreign Policy In Focus, http://fpif.org/is-china-a-threat-the-devils-in-the-details/

There are as yet no signs that China’s military expansion threatens the United States. Quite the contrary: It might support greater Chinese involvement in international peace-keeping, and it could spark more appropriate burden-sharing among America’s Asian allies.

Salvatore Babones, 3-12-2015, "Is China a Threat? The Devil's in the Details," Foreign Policy in Focus, http://fpif.org/is-china-a-threat-the-devils-in-the-details/

For very different reasons, China poses little threat to South Korea. China increasingly views North Korea more as a burden than as an advance column for an attack on the South. And China has recently been courting South Korean technology investment in order to reduce its dependence on Japan.

### A2: China historically fails

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Delink, The US-China Security Commission 2017 explains, despite Beijing always advocating for denuclearization, it has historically been the least important among its priorities for the Korean peninsula. Thus, incentivizing China to prioritize denuclearization will enable it to utilize its leverage which provides the only risk of solvency in the round.

Cards:

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. “SECTION 4: CHINA AND NORTH KOREA.” United States Government Publishing Office. 2017. <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Annual_Report/Chapters/Chapter%203%2C%20Section%204%20-%20China%20and%20North%20Korea.pdf> // AA

Beijing’s North Korea policy has always included advocating for denuclearization, but historically it has been least important among its three longstanding policy priorities of ‘‘no war, no instability, no nukes.’’ \* 93 Beijing has increasingly emphasized denuclearization as North Korean provocations have become more frequent in recent years, possibly signaling that China seeks a larger role in realizing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. High-level Chinese officials in meetings with their U.S. counterparts and Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements increasingly stress denuclearization over stability.94 According to one Chinese analyst, China’s prioritization of denuclearization was one of the main drivers compelling it to agree to a more stringent UN resolution in the aftermath of the January 2016 nuclear test.95 Nonetheless, as Renmin University professor Shi Yinhong asserts, ‘‘Beijing . . . [believes] that China must prevent the denuclearization process and its own role within it from seriously and lastingly damaging China-North Korea relations by becoming too alienated from the Pyongyang regime.’’ 96

### A2: China Sanctions Fail

#### 1. Delink, CNBC reports in 2017 that past Chinese sanctions did not constitute an embargo, accordingly, normal trade between China and North Korea was permissible.

Cnbc, CNBC, 7-11-2017, ["'Distorted': China envoy battles reports of trade growth with North Korea," http://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/11/china-envoy-says-north-korea-trade-growth-picture-distorted.html, 7-26-2017] // AA

At the same time, Cui stressed that U.N. Security Council sanctions on North Korea did not constitute an embargo. "Normal trade ... is not banned by these sanctions," he said.

### A2: China Historically No Help

#### 1. Delink, Su of Seoul National University explains in 2017 that China has been working to achieve North Korean denuclearization through economic engagement and sanctions enforcement.

Fei su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. [http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf //](http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf%20//) AA

Overall, economic engagement and sanctions enforcement are the two main approaches that the Chinese Government has taken in order to achieve its two major objectives in North Korean affairs—stabilization and denuclearization. China has emphasized the importance of achieving both these objectives on the Korean peninsula. Kim Jong-un came to power five years ago, and regime stability is no longer as much of a Chinese concern, in no small part due to the support China has given him during the transition of power.

### A2: Halt Incentivized Chinese Sanctions

#### 1. Delink, Su of Seoul National University indicates that China’s implementation and enforcement of sanctions against North Korea are based on its own national interests and its obligations as a UN member state, not a tradeoff with the US

Fei su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. [http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf //](http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf%20//) AA

Overall, a July 2016 opinion piece by Liang Lichang, a professor at Huaibei Normal University, could be deemed representative of a prevailing view among Chinese experts.38 He stresses three main points. First, China’s implementation of sanctions on North Korea is based on China’s own national interest and its obligation as a UN member state. It is not a trade-off with the US Government. Second, regardless of the changing circumstances in East Asia, it is important for China to maintain a degree of independence on the North Korea issue to achieve effective sanctions enforcement. Third, THAAD deployment should not be linked with China’s North Korea policy. Nonetheless, Liang stresses that China should take a clear stance in opposition to THAAD deployment, including substantive measures in response to South Korea’s decision.

## A2 NK

### A2: Stops Diplomacy

#### Look to our case where we show that negotiations have been opened with THAAD.

#### Even if you buy that formal diplomacy goes away, The New York Daily News reports in August that the Trump administration has been quietly engaging in back channel diplomacy with North Korea. That means that with THAAD deployment we are still negotiating.

The New York Daily, 8/11/17, “US, North Korea having secret talks for months despite war threat”, <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/north-korea-secret-talks-months-war-threat-article-1.3403213> //BB

Beyond the bluster, the Trump administration has been quietly engaged in back channel diplomacy with North Korea for several months, addressing Americans imprisoned in the communist country and deteriorating relations between the long-time foes, The Associated Press has learned. It had been known the two sides had discussions to secure the June release of an American university student. But it wasn’t known until now that the contacts have continued, or that they have broached matters other than U.S. detainees. People familiar with the contacts say the interactions have done nothing thus far to quell tensions over North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile advances, which are now fueling fears of military confrontation. But they say the behind-the-scenes discussions could still be a foundation for more serious negotiation, including on North Korea’s nuclear weapons, should President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un put aside the bellicose rhetoric of recent days and endorse a dialogue.

### A2: NK Won’t Fire Nukes

#### 1. That’s not true. Right now is the ideal time for North Korea to strike. First, because Zack Beauchamp of Vox explains that the North Korean regime is impoverished and deeply insecure. Second, because the US and North Korea are trending towards conflict over recent North Korean missile launches, and Peter Ward of Al Jazeera explains in July that a US strike on North Korea would provoke a counter strike on Seoul - one that has the potential to kill hundreds of thousands.

#### 2. It’s not acceptable to just leave South Korea unprotected- even if North Korea doesn’t attack right now there is no reason why they shouldn’t be protected for the future.

#### 3. Turn, debating whether or not North Korea is a threat is exactly what the Kim regime wants. Friedman of Cornell University 2013 explains that a constant debate among Western analysts over the North's power versus its weakness combines to paralyze policymakers allowing North Korea to continue development of their program.

#### 4. Delink, Friedman of Cornell University 2013 explains that testing weapons increases the probability of someone preemptively striking you increases. Thus, if he was really trying to avoid escalation, he wouldn’t be testing nuclear weapons.

Cards:

George Friedman (City College of New York City; Cornell University; Founder of Stratfor & Geopolitical Features) Stratfor’s Senior, Stratfor Enterprises, 12-24-2013, ["Ferocious, Weak and Crazy: The North Korean Strategy," https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/ferocious-weak-and-crazy-north-korean-strategy, 8-27-2017] // AA

North Korea has been using the threat of tests and the tests themselves as weapons against its neighbors and the United States for years. On the surface, threatening to test weapons does not appear particularly sensible. If the test fails, you look weak. If it succeeds, you look dangerous without actually having a deliverable weapon. And the closer you come to having a weapon, the more likely someone is to attack you so you don't succeed in actually getting one. Developing a weapon in absolute secret would seem to make more sense. When the weapon is ready, you display it, and you have something solid to threaten enemies with.

Cards:

This was a double inoculation. The North Koreans' ferocity with weapons whose effectiveness might be questionable, but still pose an unquantifiable threat, caused its enemies to tread carefully. Why risk unleashing its ferocity when its weakness would bring it down? Indeed, a constant debate among Western analysts over the North's power versus its weakness combines to paralyze policymakers.

[Zack Beauchamp, 7-5-2017. "North Korea isn’t crazy. It’s insecure, poor, and extremely dangerous.." Vox. https://www.vox.com/world/2017/7/5/15922446/north-korea-nuclear-war-casualties] //BH

That’s pretty worrying in and of itself. But the North Korean crisis is even scarier than you think. That isn’t because the country’s supreme leader, 33-year-old Kim Jong Un, is totally irrational — a “crazy fat kid,” as Sen. John McCain once termed him. Instead, it’s that the impoverished North Korean regime is deeply insecure, so worried about its own survival that it is willing to go to dangerously provocative lengths to scare the United States and South Korea out of any potential attack. When you combine this insecurity with the opaque nature of the North Korean regime, you have a situation that could easily spiral into outright conflict in the event that one of North Korea’s frequent military provocations (like the missile test) goes awry. Given North Korea’s massive conventional military and unknown number of nuclear weapons, conflict on the Korean Peninsula would cost hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of lives. That’s not to say that war between the US and North Korea is likely, even after the new missile test. It isn’t. Rather, it’s that the risk of a catastrophic conflict is much higher than anyone should feel comfortable with, arguably more likely than anywhere else in the world.

[Peter Ward, 7-6-2017. "Will Trump strike North Korea?." Al Jazeera. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/07/trump-strike-north-korea-170705123316343.html] //BH

Amid these rising tensions, South Korea's President Moon Jae-in called for more sanctions against the North and for a peaceful resolution. Unlike Trump's administration, Moon's government cannot afford to provoke a military escalation on the Peninsula. It stands to lose a lot. South Korea has lived with the threat of North Korean artillery and more recently shorter-range ballistic missiles hitting (and destroying) Seoul for much of its history. A US strike on North Korea is not in South Korea's interests, since such an attack would provoke a counterstrike on Seoul - one that has the potential to kill hundreds of thousands. Chinese involvement China will not support a strike on North Korea, because it knows that such a strike would destabilise the North Korean government and provoke a war on the Korean peninsula. The last thing China wants is a war in its backyard. If Kim Jong-un were to respond with a counterstrike, then war would begin immediately.

### A2: No Inherency

#### Ask in cross: “Why the fuck are we debating the topic”

### A2: War Unlikely

#### (4 responses)

#### 1. Turn, the probability of conflict is high. The US-China Security commission explains that because the United States, China, and South Korea are not informed of each other’s intentions, there is a high probability of accidents, miscalculation, and thus, conflict.

#### 2. Turn, Byeok, a North Korean defector who formerly worked for the Kim regime indicates that conflict with North Korea is unavoidable for the US-ROK alliance

#### 3. Turn, Bennett of the RAND Corporation reports on July 14th that the recent July 4th launch of an ICBM renewed talks of military intervention.

#### 4. Turn, Friedman of Cornell University 2013 explains that North Korea is irrational and it is likely that they’ll rush to go to war at the slightest provocation.

Cards:

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. “SECTION 4: CHINA AND NORTH KOREA.” United States Government Publishing Office. 2017. <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Annual_Report/Chapters/Chapter%203%2C%20Section%204%20-%20China%20and%20North%20Korea.pdf> // AA

China’s mistrust of the U.S.-South Korea alliance and its unique security priorities vis-a`-vis North Korea restrict its level of engagement with South Korea and the United States in discussions about North Korea collapse scenarios and contingency planning.172 As a result, the countries most likely to intervene in North Korea in the event of regime collapse—the United States, China, and South Korea—are not fully informed of each other’s intentions, which could lead to accidents, miscalculation, and conflict in the event of a contingency.

Chris Pleasance [University of Kent]. May 2017. “EXCLUSIVE: North Korean defector who now mocks Kim in artwork calls on Trump to help topple the dictator, saying war is 'unavoidable.'” DailyMail. [http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4486454/North-Korean-defector-says-Kim-Jong-war-inevitable.html //](http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4486454/North-Korean-defector-says-Kim-Jong-war-inevitable.html%20//) AA

A North Korean defector has called on President Donald Trump to help topple Kim Jong-un's regime by force. Song Byeok, who worked as a propaganda artist before fleeing the brutal regime in 2002, told Mail Online that he believes conflict with the dictator is 'unavoidable'. But Mr Song, who now lives in South Korea, said that war on the Peninsula is a price worth paying in order to being peace and stability back to his home country. With an 'armada' of US warships parked on North Korea's doorstep, Mr Song called on America and other world leaders 'to make a change so the North Korea people can be free.'

Bruce W. Bennett, Fox News, 7-14-2017, ["A surgical strike against North Korea? Not a viable option," http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2017/07/14/surgical-strike-against-north-korea-not-viable-option.html, 7-20-2017] // AA

What are next steps in addressing North Korea? North Korea’s July 4 launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile that could hit American soil has renewed talk of military intervention, with the notion of a surgical strike on Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal once again gaining resonance. But an effective limited military strike with minimal collateral damage and no escalation simply won’t work.

George Friedman (City College of New York City; Cornell University; Founder of Stratfor & Geopolitical Features) Stratfor’s Senior, Stratfor Enterprises, 12-24-2013, ["Ferocious, Weak and Crazy: The North Korean Strategy," https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/ferocious-weak-and-crazy-north-korean-strategy, 8-27-2017] // AA

Hence, we have North Korea's eternal nuclear program. It never quite produces a weapon, but no one can be sure whether a weapon might be produced. Due to widespread perceptions that the North Koreans are crazy, it is widely believed they might rush to complete their weapon and go to war at the slightest provocation. The result is the United States, Russia, China, Japan and South Korea holding meetings with North Korea to try to persuade it not to do something crazy.

### A2: War Avoidable

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Turn, Song Byeok, a former North Korean government official indicates in 2017 that a conflict with North Korea is unavoidable.

Cards:

Chris Pleasance [University of Kent]. May 2017. “EXCLUSIVE: North Korean defector who now mocks Kim in artwork calls on Trump to help topple the dictator, saying war is 'unavoidable.'” DailyMail. [http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4486454/North-Korean-defector-says-Kim-Jong-war-inevitable.html //](http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4486454/North-Korean-defector-says-Kim-Jong-war-inevitable.html%20//) AA

A North Korean defector has called on President Donald Trump to help topple Kim Jong-un's regime by force. Song Byeok, who worked as a propaganda artist before fleeing the brutal regime in 2002, told Mail Online that he believes conflict with the dictator is 'unavoidable'. But Mr Song, who now lives in South Korea, said that war on the Peninsula is a price worth paying in order to being peace and stability back to his home country. With an 'armada' of US warships parked on North Korea's doorstep, Mr Song called on America and other world leaders 'to make a change so the North Korea people can be free.'

### A2: No Threat

#### (9 responses)

#### 1. Bennett of RAND 2015 confirms that there is no place on earth where the United States and its allies face a greater missile threat than in Northeast Asia.

#### 2. Even if you don’t buy that there is an imminent threat of attack right now, Su of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute indicates that that North Korea has created a new Chinese–US strategic game, which it exploits while focusing on enhancing its power and decreasing international cooperation to counter its nuclear programme. Thus, she concludes that the longer the North Korean nuclear issue goes unresolved, the more dangerous and complicated it becomes.

#### 3. Kingston Reif of St. Andrews University 2017 explains that North Korea is an urgent threat and it’s only going to get worse as by 2020 North Korea will have ten times as many nuclear warheads as they do today.

#### 4. Perry of the Hoover Institute explains in 2017 that the more confident North Korea feels in its nuclear program the greater risks the Kim regime will take on, thus increasing the probability North Korea will overplay their hand in a way that could inadvertently lead to a militarized conflict with South Korea.

#### 5. Taylor of Columbia University explains that North Korean state media has reported that the country has practiced attempts to hit U.S. military bases.

#### 6. Mansourov of Johns Hopkins University explains that North Korea will always assume the worst and rush to use nuclear weapons in fear of losing to them to an allied preemption.

#### 7. The threat of a crisis breaking out is very high. The Nautilus Institute explains that the North Korean government has threatened to preempt an allied preemptive.

#### 8. Kirby of the Express explains on July 28th that key North Korean generals are calling for North Korea to wage a dynamic struggle to bring a final victory to the regime.

#### 9. Pak Yong-sik, the minister of North Korea’s armed forces is calling for a nuclear strike on the United States even if Washington does not attack first.

Cards:

Bruce Bennett [PhD California Institute of Technology]. April 2015. “South Korea's Missile-Defense System Decision: Q&A with Bruce Bennett.” RAND Corporation. [https://www.rand.org/blog/2015/04/south-koreas-missile-defense-system-decision-qa-with.html //](https://www.rand.org/blog/2015/04/south-koreas-missile-defense-system-decision-qa-with.html%20//) AA

There is likely no place on earth where the United States and its allies face a greater theater missile threat than in Northeast Asia. Recognizing this, President Obama deployed one battery of THAAD to Guam a year ago to protect it against the North Korean missiles. Like any U.S. military force, the United States can only deploy a portion of the THAAD force in peacetime, leaving the rest as a “rotation base” in the United States.

Fei su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. [http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf //](http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf%20//) AA

Despite this, many Chinese experts recognize the urgency of resolving North Korea’s problems. During one workshop in Jilin in September 2016, a Chinese expert stressed that North Korea has created a new Chinese–US strategic game, which it exploits while focusing on enhancing its power and decreasing international cooperation to counter its nuclear programme.54 According to this view, the longer the North Korean nuclear issue goes unresolved, the more dangerous and complicated it becomes.

Kingston Reif [St. Andrews University]. May 2017. “Missile Defense Can’t Save US from North Korea.” War on Rocks. <https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/missile-defense-cant-save-us-from-north-korea/> // AA

There is no more urgent threat to the global nuclear nonproliferation order than North Korea’s accelerating and unconstrained nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Pyongyang is estimated to possess enough nuclear explosive material for at least 10 nuclear warheads, and in all likelihood already has the capability to deliver some of these weapons on its arsenal of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. By 2020, some experts believe Pyongyang may have enough fissile material for 100 warheads.

William J. Perry, the former secretary of defense under the Clinton administration; a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution, is the Michael and Barbara Barbarian Professor at Stanford University, with a joint appointment at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the School of Engineering, [Diplomacy, Not Doomsday, DOA: 24 July 2017] Hoover Digest, Spring 2017 // AA

I believe that the danger of a North Korean ICBM program is not that North Korea’s leaders would launch an unprovoked attack on the United States; they are not suicidal. But they have been playing a weak hand for decades, and they have demonstrated a willingness to take risks in playing it. The real danger of their ICBM program is that it might embolden them to take even greater risks—that is, overplay their hand in a way that could (inadvertently) lead to a military conflict with South Korea. The South Korean military, backed by US air and naval power (and a small ground force) is more than a match for the large but poorly equipped North Korean military. So if North Korea were to begin losing a conventional conflict, it might in desperation turn to its nuclear weapons.

Adam Taylor [Columbia University]. March 2017. “Why China is so mad about THAAD, a missile defense system aimed at deterring North Korea.” Washington Post. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/07/why-china-is-so-mad-about-thaad-a-missile-defense-system-aimed-at-deterring-north-korea/?utm_term=.4b9e03166b37> // AA

This week, the situation on the Korean Peninsula escalated dramatically. On Tuesday, North Korean [state media reported](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/07/07/pentagon-to-deploy-anti-missile-system-in-south-korea/?utm_term=.726195b949e7) that the country has practiced attempts to hit U.S. military bases in Japan with a number of recently launched missiles. The number of missiles fired suggested that North Korea was training to see how quickly it could set up its extended-range missiles in a wartime setting.

Alexandre. Mansourov, Ph.D. Columbia University; B.A. Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Advanced Diploma, Kim Il Sung National University (DPRK); Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, "Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 16, 2014, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/> // AA

It is noteworthy that the North Korean military doctrine based on the concepts of preemption and total all-out war implies that the Korean People’s Army not only will use nuclear weapons in a retaliatory strike, but it is also ready to take the lead and use the nuclear weapons first to counter the imminent threat of U.S.- ROK conventional invasion. If the North Korean leadership decides that the enemies’ conventional attack is imminent, it is unlikely to split hairs and deliberate long whether it is a limited action aimed at punishing for some earlier provocation or a precursor to regime change. Pyongyang will likely assume the worst and rush to use the nuclear weapons out of fear of losing them to the allied preemption in the early hours of hostilities. The North Korean government is on the record of threatening to preempt the allied preemption if a military crisis erupts on the Korean peninsula.

Will Kirby, Express.co.uk, 7-28-2017, ["BREAKING: North Korea fires missile at Japan," http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/834282/north-korea-missile-japan-kim-jong-un-nuclear-war, 7-28-2017] // AA

The missile is believed to have flown for 45 minutes before landing in Japan's exclusive economic zone, according Japan's chief cabinet secretary Suga. Japan’s chief cabinet secretary says the launch is a clear breach of UN resolutions and declared Japan absolutely cannot tolerate North Korea's repeated provocations. Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe confirmed the launch and is now convening an emergency meeting of officials to address the situation. The Pentagon has also confirmed that it has detected what it assesses was a ballistic missile launch from North Korea. North Korea is notorious for marking key events in its history with missile launches or similar acts of aggression. The most recent warning was issued by one of Kim Jong-un’s key generals, who called on the North Korean military to “wage dynamic struggle to bring final victory” on July 27. Pak Yong-sik, the minister of North Korea's armed forces, carried on the threats and called for a nuclear strike on the United States – even if Washington does not attack first. He said: "If enemies misunderstand our strategic status and stick to options of staging a pre-emptive nuclear attack against us, we will launch a nuclear attack on America's heart as the most relentless punishment without warning or prior notice." Satellite images have also emerged showing that North Korea is not issuing empty threats. Grainy images, at first sight, lead viewers to believe the North Portal at Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility - the tunnel site used for the past four tests - is in a state of vegetation, with little activity and low general maintenance. However experts warn it is clear the site remains ready for the war-mongering kingdom to launch yet another ballistic missile test.

### A2: Weak Econ = No Threat

#### (1 repsponse)

#### 1. Turn, Friedman of Cornell University 2013 explains that North Korean wants us to believe their economy is weak so other countries don’t attempt to undermine the regime through coercion, rather thinking they can let the nation run it course. However, it’s been 30 years and the regime has survived. North Korea is a threat, if you can see through the haze.

Cards:

Many nations have tried to play the ferocity game, but the North Koreans added a brilliant and subtle twist to it: being weak. The North Koreans advertised the weakness of their economy, particularly its food insecurity, by various means. This was not done overtly, but by allowing glimpses of its weakness. Given the weakness of its economy and the difficulty of life in North Korea, there was no need to risk trying to undermine the North. It would collapse from its own defects.

### A2: Cost Deter Military Action

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Delink, according to Joseph Dunford, the highest ranking military official in the Trump administration, a Korean conflict would be horrific loss of life unlike anything we’ve experienced since World War 2. However, he furthers that that doesn’t take military options off the table in response to North Korean provocation.

Cards:

Reiss Smith, Express.co.uk, 7-25-2017, ["North Korea v USA live: Kim Jong-un ‘preparing for V-day missile test’ – latest updates," http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/832753/north-korea-usa-kim-jong-un-donald-trump-missile-nuclear-weapons-war-live-latest-updates, 7-25-2017] // AA

In recent days two US army generals have warned that a North Korean war is a possibility. Joseph Dunford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Donald Trump’s highest-ranking military official, said: “Many people have talked about military options with words like ‘unimaginable’. “I would probably shift that slightly and say it would be horrific, and it would be a loss of life unlike any we have experienced in our lifetimes, and I mean anyone who's been alive since World War II has never seen the loss of life that could occur if there's a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. “But as I've told my counterparts, both friend and foe, it is not unimaginable to have military options to respond to North Korean nuclear capability.

### A2: No Nuke Threat

#### (3 response)

#### 1. Delink, Perry of the Hoover Institute 2017 explains that North Korea’s nuclear program will enable the Kim regime to take even greater risks which increases the probability they will overplay their hand in a way that could inadvertently lead to a militarized conflict with South Korea.

#### 2. Turn, Reif of War on Rocks 2017 explains that North Korea’s missile tests are succeeding at a high rate and that the failures my opponents talk about are concentrated in new systems that had not been previously tested. As of 2015, the Pentagon [estimated](https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Military_and_Security_Developments_Involving_the_Democratic_Peoples_Republic_of_Korea_2015.PDF) that North Korea possessed over 100 launchers for ballistic missiles and that number has likely grown since.

#### 3. Turn, Dr. Kim Beng of Cambridge University explains just last week that North Korea’s latest missile test demonstrated that Pyongyang has overcome its largest obstacle. Which is successful re-entry into Earth atmosphere. In other words, he states: “North Korea has demonstrated an ability to actually hit its targets.”

Cards:

William J. Perry, the former secretary of defense under the Clinton administration; a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution, is the Michael and Barbara Barbarian Professor at Stanford University, with a joint appointment at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the School of Engineering, [Diplomacy, Not Doomsday, DOA: 24 July 2017] Hoover Digest, Spring 2017 // AA

I believe that the danger of a North Korean ICBM program is not that North Korea’s leaders would launch an unprovoked attack on the United States; they are not suicidal. But they have been playing a weak hand for decades, and they have demonstrated a willingness to take risks in playing it. The real danger of their ICBM program is that it might embolden them to take even greater risks—that is, overplay their hand in a way that could (inadvertently) lead to a military conflict with South Korea. The South Korean military, backed by US air and naval power (and a small ground force) is more than a match for the large but poorly equipped North Korean military. So if North Korea were to begin losing a conventional conflict, it might in desperation turn to its nuclear weapons.

Kingston Reif [St. Andrews University]. May 2017. “MISSILE DEFENSE CAN’T SAVE US FROM NORTH KOREA.” War on Rocks. <https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/missile-defense-cant-save-us-from-north-korea/> // AA

Attempting to shoot down a non-threatening missile test would be hugely provocative act and supply invaluable data to adversaries. A miss, which is more likely than an intercept, would be embarrassing and undermine confidence in U.S. defenses. For these reasons attempting to shoot down such a test would appear to be a highly risky decision at best. Furthermore, despite much speculation in the press about the U.S. ability to hack North Korean missile tests, the [data shows](http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/19/the-united-states-isnt-hacking-north-koreas-missile-launches/) that North Korea’s missile tests are succeeding at a high rate and that the failures are concentrated in new systems that had not been previously tested. Also, we sometimes forget North Korea gets a vote. As of 2015, the Pentagon [estimated](https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Military_and_Security_Developments_Involving_the_Democratic_Peoples_Republic_of_Korea_2015.PDF) that North Korea possessed over 100 launchers for ballistic missiles and that number has likely grown since then. North Korea has made [significant progress](https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-koreas-whirlwind-progress-on-missile-sharpens-threat-1495443441) in its ability to design and build launchers and missiles indigenously, which will allow it to more easily expand its missile force.

Phar Kim Beng [PhD; Cambridge University]. 29 June 2017. “North Korea’s Passed a Dangerous Nuclear Threshold – Did Anybody Notice?” South China Moring Post. This Week in Asia. [http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2095533/north-koreas-passed-dangerous-nuclear-threshold-did-anybody //](http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2095533/north-koreas-passed-dangerous-nuclear-threshold-did-anybody%20//) AA

Analysts have long considered the largest obstacles to North Korea’s ballistic missile programme to be achieving re-entry and miniaturising a nuclear warhead to the point it could be mounted on a missile.

Phar Kim Beng [PhD; Cambridge University]. 29 June 2017. “North Korea’s Passed a Dangerous Nuclear Threshold – Did Anybody Notice?” South China Moring Post. This Week in Asia. [http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2095533/north-koreas-passed-dangerous-nuclear-threshold-did-anybody //](http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2095533/north-koreas-passed-dangerous-nuclear-threshold-did-anybody%20//) AA

Scientists in the US, Japan and South Korea concurred that North Korea achieved a “smooth” re-entry. In other words, Pyongyang has demonstrated an ability to have its missiles actually hit their targets.

### A2: High NK Failure Rate

#### (1 response)

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Cards:

Kingston Reif [St. Andrews University]. May 2017. “MISSILE DEFENSE CAN’T SAVE US FROM NORTH KOREA.” War on Rocks. <https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/missile-defense-cant-save-us-from-north-korea/> // AA

Attempting to shoot down a non-threatening missile test would be hugely provocative act and supply invaluable data to adversaries. A miss, which is more likely than an intercept, would be embarrassing and undermine confidence in U.S. defenses. For these reasons attempting to shoot down such a test would appear to be a highly risky decision at best. Furthermore, despite much speculation in the press about the U.S. ability to hack North Korean missile tests, the [data shows](http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/19/the-united-states-isnt-hacking-north-koreas-missile-launches/) that North Korea’s missile tests are succeeding at a high rate and that the failures are concentrated in new systems that had not been previously tested. Also, we sometimes forget North Korea gets a vote. As of 2015, the Pentagon [estimated](https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Military_and_Security_Developments_Involving_the_Democratic_Peoples_Republic_of_Korea_2015.PDF) that North Korea possessed over 100 launchers for ballistic missiles and that number has likely grown since then. North Korea has made [significant progress](https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-koreas-whirlwind-progress-on-missile-sharpens-threat-1495443441) in its ability to design and build launchers and missiles indigenously, which will allow it to more easily expand its missile force.

### A2: Long Way to Go

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Turn, Dr. Beng of Cambridge University explains just last week that North Korea’s latest missile test demonstrated that Pyongyang has overcome its largest obstacle. Which is successful re-entry into Earth atmosphere. In other words, he states: “North Korea has demonstrated an ability to actually hit its targets.”

Cards:

Phar Kim Beng [PhD; Cambridge University]. 29 June 2017. “North Korea’s Passed a Dangerous Nuclear Threshold – Did Anybody Notice?” South China Moring Post. This Week in Asia. [http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2095533/north-koreas-passed-dangerous-nuclear-threshold-did-anybody //](http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2095533/north-koreas-passed-dangerous-nuclear-threshold-did-anybody%20//) AA

Analysts have long considered the largest obstacles to North Korea’s ballistic missile programme to be achieving re-entry and miniaturising a nuclear warhead to the point it could be mounted on a missile.

Phar Kim Beng [PhD; Cambridge University]. 29 June 2017. “North Korea’s Passed a Dangerous Nuclear Threshold – Did Anybody Notice?” South China Moring Post. This Week in Asia. [http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2095533/north-koreas-passed-dangerous-nuclear-threshold-did-anybody //](http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2095533/north-koreas-passed-dangerous-nuclear-threshold-did-anybody%20//) AA

Scientists in the US, Japan and South Korea concurred that North Korea achieved a “smooth” re-entry. In other words, Pyongyang has demonstrated an ability to have its missiles actually hit their targets.

### A2: Empty Threats

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Delink, Kirby of the Express indicates on July 28th that satellite imaging confirms that North Korea isn’t issuing empty threats.

Cards:

Will Kirby, Express.co.uk, 7-28-2017, ["BREAKING: North Korea fires missile at Japan," http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/834282/north-korea-missile-japan-kim-jong-un-nuclear-war, 7-28-2017] // AA

The missile is believed to have flown for 45 minutes before landing in Japan's exclusive economic zone, according Japan's chief cabinet secretary Suga. Japan’s chief cabinet secretary says the launch is a clear breach of UN resolutions and declared Japan absolutely cannot tolerate North Korea's repeated provocations. Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe confirmed the launch and is now convening an emergency meeting of officials to address the situation. The Pentagon has also confirmed that it has detected what it assesses was a ballistic missile launch from North Korea. North Korea is notorious for marking key events in its history with missile launches or similar acts of aggression. The most recent warning was issued by one of Kim Jong-un’s key generals, who called on the North Korean military to “wage dynamic struggle to bring final victory” on July 27. Pak Yong-sik, the minister of North Korea's armed forces, carried on the threats and called for a nuclear strike on the United States – even if Washington does not attack first. He said: "If enemies misunderstand our strategic status and stick to options of staging a pre-emptive nuclear attack against us, we will launch a nuclear attack on America's heart as the most relentless punishment without warning or prior notice." Satellite images have also emerged showing that North Korea is not issuing empty threats. Grainy images, at first sight, lead viewers to believe the North Portal at Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility - the tunnel site used for the past four tests - is in a state of vegetation, with little activity and low general maintenance. However experts warn it is clear the site remains ready for the war-mongering kingdom to launch yet another ballistic missile test.

### A2: Nukes for Peace

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Turn, Mansourov of Johns Hopkins University explains that the Kim Regime emphasizes nuclear weapons as the foundation of its plans to wage war under favorable conditions favoring the North.

Cards:

Alexandre. Mansourov, Ph.D. Columbia University; B.A. Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Advanced Diploma, Kim Il Sung National University (DPRK); Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, "Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 16, 2014, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/> // AA

The North Korean government emphasizes the critical role of nuclear weapons in national security and defense strategies by putting them in the center of its campaign to prevent war and shape peace suitable to Pyongyang and in the foundation of its plans to wage war under the conditions favoring the North. In his speech on 31 March 2013, Kim Jong Un called for increasing the “pivotal role of nuclear weapons in war deterrent strategy and war-waging strategy.”[[8]](http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/" \l "_edn8) According to the DPRK national security doctrine, as part of the overall war deterrent strategy (전쟁억제전략), “the nuclear deterrent enables peaceful development at home and allows North Korea to dictate international trends on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia.” According to the DPRK military doctrine, as part of the war-waging strategy (전쟁수행전략), the nuclear weapons are designed “to beat back any aggressor troops at one strike.” According to the DPRK law, the nuclear weapons “serve the purpose of deterring and repelling the aggression and attack of the enemy against the DPRK and dealing deadly retaliatory blows at the strongholds of aggression until the world is denuclearized.” This stipulation presupposes that nuclear weapons can be used both on the territory of the DPRK against the attacking enemy forces and on foreign soil against the defending enemy forces.

### A2: Deterrence Only

#### (2 responses)

#### 1. Delink, according to the North Korean newspaper Rodong Sinmun if North Korea is pushed over the brink, the Kim regime will strike first.

#### 2. Turn. Heinrichs of the Naval War College explains that North Korea seeks nuclear capabilities to counter US hostility. As a result, once North Korea attains ICBM capabilities it will use them to blackmail US cities because a.) it wants to target the moral structures of the US and b.) To target a city would be technically

Alexandre. Mansourov, Ph.D. Columbia University; B.A. Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Advanced Diploma, Kim Il Sung National University (DPRK); Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, "Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 16, 2014, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/> // AA

경애하는 최고사령관동지께서는 적들이 우리의 자제력을 시험하면서 끝끝내 핵전쟁의 불구름을 몰아오고있다고 하시면서 이제 더는 참을수 없다고, 명령만 내리면 첫 타격으로 모든것을 날려보내고 씨도 없이 재가루로 불태워버리라고 단호히 말씀하시였다 [Translation] The comrades of Supreme Commanders say that enemies are driving our control and are driving the clouds of nuclear war in the end, and now they can not take it anymore. If they give orders, they will blow everything through the first blow and burn them into the flour without seeds. He spoke firmly.

Rebeccah Heinrichs (MA in national security and strategic policy from the U.S. Naval War College; adviser on military matters and foreign policy to Rep. Trent Franks (R-AZ), a member of the House Armed Services Committee, and helped launch the bi-partisan Missile Defense Caucus), Breaking Defense, 6-20-2017, ["North Korea Must Pay Massive Price For Otto’s Murder," http://breakingdefense.com/2017/06/north-korea-must-pay-massive-price-for-ottos-murder/, 7-28-2017] // AA

What the United States demands — that North Korea willingly give up its nuclear program — is not going to happen. No amount of diplomacy will change this. The Kim regime understands that its power to coerce and blackmail the United States of America hinges on its ability to credibly threaten American cities with a nuclear missile. And make no mistake: it [North Korea] would target American cities to maximize loss of civilian life. This is true for two reasons. One, regimes target what their enemy values most, compatible with the moral strictures of the targeting regime. For the United States, what it values most is its citizens. We place a high premium on a single innocent life lost. We have heated political fights over how best to set the conditions for Americans to flourish; we fuss over how best to keep American children healthy and safe; we spend countless hours looking for a single unaccounted for individual when tragedy strikes; we honor our heroic dead, including the nameless, unknown soldier. Where we show indifference toward the unjust taking of human life, we are not being ourselves. And we’ve already established that the North Korean regime, willing to take on more sanctions while it enslaves and starves its people, is not restrained by the same moral considerations. What the totalitarian state did to Otto, it would do to any one of us. The second reason is more straightforward. Targeting cities takes a lot less technical sophistication. So there it is. With a nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile, North Korea would credibly threaten everyday innocent, unsuspecting American families. This is why U.S. officials are absolutely right when they insist that the United States cannot and will not allow Pyongyang to achieve this capability.

### A2: Non-Nuclear states safe

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Delink. Mansourov of Johns Hopkins University explains that North Korea makes an exception to the rule if a non-nuclear state joins forces with a hostile nuclear-armed state such as in the case of the US-ROK alliance.

Cards:

Alexandre. Mansourov, Ph.D. Columbia University; B.A. Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Advanced Diploma, Kim Il Sung National University (DPRK); Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, "Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 16, 2014, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/> // AA

In theory, the North Korean military doctrine identifies an important constraint on the wartime nuclear weapons use: it says “the DPRK shall neither use nukes against the non-nuclear states nor threaten them with those weapons.” But, it makes an exception for those states that “join a hostile nuclear weapons state in its invasion and attack on the DPRK,” which is a veiled reference to the U.S. allies – ROK and Japan.

### A2: Artillery

#### Nautilus Reports that North Korean artillery will have very minimal impact on South Korea for 3 reasons.

#### Only 1/3 of Seoul is in range of the artillery

#### Artillery shelters for 20 million people exist in Seoul meaning that after a short amount of time people will be same. The impact of the artillery

#### It’s not like South Korea can’t fire back. Over the last 50 years South Korea has studied where North Korean artillery tubes are located meaning it wouldn’t take very long before the majority of them are taken out.

#### Prefer a world where North Korea can’t use missiles because currently North Korea has missiles and artillery. When North Korea attacks it’s not like they’re going to use one or the other, it’s going to be both. At the end of the day we win comparatively because we only have artillery, they have both artillery and missiles so they have more deaths.

Roger Cavazos, 6/26/12, “Mind the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality”, Nautilus Institute, <https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/mind-the-gap-between-rhetoric-and-reality/> //BB

If the North Korean Peoples Army (KPA) were to start a doctrinal, conventional artillery barrage focused on South Korean forces, we could expect to see around three thousand casualties in the first few minutes, but the casualty rate would quickly drop as the surprise wears off and counter-battery fires slow down the North Korean rates of fire. If the KPA were to engage Seoul in a primarily counter-value fashion by firing into Seoul instead of primarily aiming at military targets, there would likely be around thirty-thousand casualties in a short amount of time. Statistically speaking, almost eight-hundred of those casualties would be foreigners given Seoul’s international demographic. Chinese make up almost seventy percent of foreigners in Seoul and its northern environs which means KPA might also kill six-hundred Chinese diplomats, multi-national corporation leaders, and ranking cadre children who are students in Seoul. Horrible, but nothing approaching “millions”. Three primary factors and three secondary factors account for the huge discrepancy between rhetoric and reality: Three Primary Factors Range – Only about 1/3 of Seoul is presently in range from artillery along a DMZ trace. The northern reaches of Seoul within artillery range have much lower population densities than Seoul proper; Numbers – Even though KPA has a tremendous number of artillery pieces, only a certain number are emplaced to range Seoul. KPA can’t emplace every weapon near Seoul or the rest of North Korea’s expansive border would be unguarded and even more vulnerable. Moreover, an artillery tube immediately reveals its location as soon as it fires. Therefore only about two-thirds of artillery will open fire at a time. The rest are trying to remain hidden; Protection – Artillery shelters for twenty million people exist in the greater Seoul metropolitan area. After the initial surprise has worn off, there simply won’t be large numbers of exposed people. Even during the initial attack the vast majority of people will either be at work, at home, or in transit. Few people will be standing in the middle of an open field with no protection whatsoever available anywhere nearby. Three Secondary Factors Dud rate – the only numbers available—to the DPRK as well as the rest of the world—indicate a dud rate of twenty-five percent. It’s like immediately taking every fourth artillery tube away. Counter-battery fires – shortly after the KPA artillery begins firing, and the political decision has been made, South Korean artillery, Air Forces, and others will begin destroying artillery at a historical rate of 1% per hour. South Korea has had approximately 50 years to figure out where North Korean artillery tubes are emplaced using every sense available to man and machine. Logistics – in order to move south from the DMZ trace and place the rest of Seoul at risk, KPA must expose approximately 2,500 thin-skinned vehicles each day along three well-defined transportation corridors. Otherwise, KPA grinds to an almost immediate halt without a way to transport fuel, ammunition and spare parts needed to continue moving south. Alternatively, KPA can scavenge from ROK fuel stores and depots if they have not been previously destroyed.

Roger Cavazos, 6/26/12, “Mind the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality”, Nautilus Institute, <https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/mind-the-gap-between-rhetoric-and-reality/> //BB

The KPA cannot simply bypass built up areas.  Built up areas favor the defender by a great margin meaning an attacker would like to outnumber the defender by a ratio of 3:1. The ROK has had 50 years to prepare a labyrinthine series of bunkers, positions, weapons and ranges. The DPRK has also had as long.  So as soon as either country moves from their own positions, they are exposed.

### A2: Reunification

#### 1. They don’t tell you who reunification would be under and that’s a really important differentiation. If it’s under Kim Jong Un that’s certainly not in South Korea’s best interest, that’d be pretty terrible for them but it’s also unlikely that Kim Jong Un would cede his power to Moon.

#### 2. Reunification would be a super expensive process which makes it unlikely and bad for South Korea. In fact, Ian Bremmer of Time Magazine quantifies in June that reunifying the Koreas would cost roughly $2-3 trillion.

[Ian Bremmer, 6-30-2017. "South Korea's Moon Jae-in Is Meeting with Donald Trump. Here Are 5 Things to Know." Time. http://time.com/4839458/moon-jae-in-south-korea-donald-trump/] //BH

How? By sticking to the basics of South Korea’s “sunshine policy”, Seoul’s on-again, off-again plan since the 1980s to thaw relations with North Korea via constructive engagement. This is no progressive, elitist policy proposal, either; nearly 77 percent of South Koreans believe Seoul should restore dialogue with Pyongyang to help “resolve” North Korea’s nuclear program. Moon has gone further, floating the prospect of economic cooperation with Pyongyang as a way of raising living standards for North Koreans and defraying the costs of potential reunification down the road. In a 2013 paper, RAND estimated that reunification between north and south could cost about $2 trillion—$500 billion for military operations, another $500 billion for damages, and $1 trillion for building the North’s economy. Just think: Germany’s reunification in 1990 cost West Germany approximately $1.9 trillion—and East Germany was lightyears ahead of where North Korea is right now.

### A2: Chemical Weapons

#### (If link is through artillery) It’s not like South Korea doesn’t know North Korea has chemical weapons. The Bulletin for Atomic Scientists reports that Seoul has a formidable counter-battery capability to destroy all North Korean artillery batteries meaning this doesn’t matter.

#### Nautilus reports that shelters exist for 20 million people in Seoul. If anything, their impact is very short-term because people can quickly get to shelters meaning their impact gets cut short after 15 minutes.

#### Prefer a world where North Korea can’t use missiles because currently North Korea has missiles and chemical weapons. When North Korea attacks it’s not like they’re going to use one or the other, it’s going to be both. At the end of the day we win comparatively because we only have chemical weapons, they have both chemical weapons and missiles so they have more deaths.

Roger Cavazos, 6/26/12, “Mind the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality”, Nautilus Institute, <https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/mind-the-gap-between-rhetoric-and-reality/> //BB

Peter Hayes and Scott Bruce tackle this subject in much greater detail in their work “Unprecedented Nuclear Strikes of the Invincible Army: A Realistic Assessment of North Korea’s Operational Nuclear Capability”. If North Korea were to use chemical and biological weapons, any conflict would rapidly escalate to one of regime change in Pyongyang and is hence an a-strategic move (there is no strategy other than to cause a great deal of damage) inconsistent with North Korea’s goals of regime survival. Moreover, the vast majority of victims from any chemical and biological attacks would be civilians. Many of them, likely several thousands, of those third country nationals would be primarily Chinese since they represent approximately 70% of third country nationals in Seoul.[3] Moreover, the Chinese in Korea tend to be diplomats, multi-national corporation heads, and students of ranking cadres in China’s Communist Party. The other foreigners in Seoul tend to be U.S. military forces, their families and other support elements. There are many other nationalities represented in the Seoul metropolitan area who are generally students (and children of relatively affluent parents), foreign language teachers, diplomats (Seoul has approximately 100 diplomatic facilities and relations with 170 countries), and those who work in large multi-national corporations. [4] The military forces are relatively well-protected and inoculated. Killing large numbers of Korean and international civilians is another a-strategic move indicative of a complete breakdown or desperation of leadership in Pyongyang. North Korea likely has between 600-800 short range missiles and maybe 100 other longer-range missiles that it can repurpose from MRBM/ICBM to strike Seoul.

Roger Cavazos, 6/26/12, “Mind the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality”, Nautilus Institute, <https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/mind-the-gap-between-rhetoric-and-reality/> //BB

If the North Korean Peoples Army (KPA) were to start a doctrinal, conventional artillery barrage focused on South Korean forces, we could expect to see around three thousand casualties in the first few minutes, but the casualty rate would quickly drop as the surprise wears off and counter-battery fires slow down the North Korean rates of fire. If the KPA were to engage Seoul in a primarily counter-value fashion by firing into Seoul instead of primarily aiming at military targets, there would likely be around thirty-thousand casualties in a short amount of time. Statistically speaking, almost eight-hundred of those casualties would be foreigners given Seoul’s international demographic. Chinese make up almost seventy percent of foreigners in Seoul and its northern environs which means KPA might also kill six-hundred Chinese diplomats, multi-national corporation leaders, and ranking cadre children who are students in Seoul. Horrible, but nothing approaching “millions”. Three primary factors and three secondary factors account for the huge discrepancy between rhetoric and reality: Three Primary Factors Range – Only about 1/3 of Seoul is presently in range from artillery along a DMZ trace. The northern reaches of Seoul within artillery range have much lower population densities than Seoul proper; Numbers – Even though KPA has a tremendous number of artillery pieces, only a certain number are emplaced to range Seoul. KPA can’t emplace every weapon near Seoul or the rest of North Korea’s expansive border would be unguarded and even more vulnerable. Moreover, an artillery tube immediately reveals its location as soon as it fires. Therefore only about two-thirds of artillery will open fire at a time. The rest are trying to remain hidden; Protection – Artillery shelters for twenty million people exist in the greater Seoul metropolitan area. After the initial surprise has worn off, there simply won’t be large numbers of exposed people. Even during the initial attack the vast majority of people will either be at work, at home, or in transit. Few people will be standing in the middle of an open field with no protection whatsoever available anywhere nearby. Three Secondary Factors Dud rate – the only numbers available—to the DPRK as well as the rest of the world—indicate a dud rate of twenty-five percent. It’s like immediately taking every fourth artillery tube away. Counter-battery fires – shortly after the KPA artillery begins firing, and the political decision has been made, South Korean artillery, Air Forces, and others will begin destroying artillery at a historical rate of 1% per hour. South Korea has had approximately 50 years to figure out where North Korean artillery tubes are emplaced using every sense available to man and machine. Logistics – in order to move south from the DMZ trace and place the rest of Seoul at risk, KPA must expose approximately 2,500 thin-skinned vehicles each day along three well-defined transportation corridors. Otherwise, KPA grinds to an almost immediate halt without a way to transport fuel, ammunition and spare parts needed to continue moving south. Alternatively, KPA can scavenge from ROK fuel stores and depots if they have not been previously destroyed.

Reid Kirby, 6/21/17, “Sea of sarin: North Korea’s chemical deterrent”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, <http://thebulletin.org/sea-sarin-north-korea%E2%80%99s-chemical-deterrent10856> //BB

To be sure, South Korea is not defenseless against a sea-of-fire countervalue attack. While it is not logistically or technically feasible for South Korea to directly shoot down 10,800 chemical projectiles and rockets every 15 minutes, Seoul has a formidable counter-battery capability to destroy North Korean artillery pieces. The problem would be responding quickly enough—and prioritizing the destruction of 500 170mm guns, and 200 240mm multiple rocket launchers, in a demilitarized zone crowded with numerous other artillery pieces. The qualitative difference between a nuclear and a chemical deterrent lies in the latter’s mass effect.

### A2: NK Sees SK as its Own

#### North Korea has attacked South Korea in the past, for example, in 2010, Pyongyang bombed the South Korean Yeonpyeong island and killed soldiers. This demonstrates the North Korean willingness to attack the South, and means that they would probably be fine decimating the land and then rebuilding it.

#### \*\*if the neg talks about North Korea being hella aggravated by THAAD and proliferating\*\* It doesn’t make sense to talk about North Korea building up new weaponry in response to THAAD if they never intended to attack South Korea in the first place.

### A2: Cyber Attacks

#### 1. The Center for Strategic and International Studies finds in September that North Korea only possesses the ability to hack poorly defended systems. That’s important because they further that they have only used cyber-attacks on Sony, Media Outlets and Banks, concluding that the attacks have NEVER caused physical damage. These cyber-attacks do nothing.

#### 2. It’s non unique, cyber attacks can happen in both worlds. At the end of the day we increase the number of missile defense systems which marginally decreases the chance of a successful strike.

#### (ONLY READ IF CYBER ATTACKS ON THAAD) 3. THAAD is safe from cyber attacks as Mark Pomerleau of The Army Times reports in June that the Department of Defense has already dedicated a cyber protection team to THAAD. This is why Juliet Perry of CNN details that China’s most recent attempt to hack THAAD was promptly blocked.

Center for Strategic & International Studies, 9/7/17, “The Likelihood of North Korean Cyber Attacks”, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/likelihood-north-korean-cyber-attacks> //BB

However, short of armed conflict, disruptive actions here are unlikely. How disruptive a North Korean cyber attack would be depends on the victim’s weaknesses. North Korean successes depend on relatively basic techniques that exploit vulnerabilities in poorly defended systems. Though the North has used cyber attacks several times against South Korean banks and media outlets, and against Sony in the United States, none of those attacks caused physical destruction or casualties. To be fair, no cyber attack has ever caused casualties, and only three or four resulted in physical damage. North Korea, despite progress in developing its cyber-attack capabilities, does not possess the advanced skills needed to cause physical damage. What the North can do with cyber operations is disrupt data and online services. A 2011 cyber attack on a South Korean bank left customers unable to use ATMs or online services for several days. The action deleted customer accounts and tried to erase evidence of the attack from the bank’s computers. Similar attacks took place in 2013 against banks and media outlets in Seoul, with data erased and services disrupted. The 2014 attack on Sony Pictures also disrupted services and data and saw leaks of embarrassing e-mails. The most recent North Korean cyber incident used false credentials to steal $81 million from the Bangladesh Central Bank. While these count as successes, they may have also increased North Korea’s caution. If you think you are invisible and suddenly discover that you are not, it dampens your enthusiasm for crime. The ability of the United States to identify North Korea in the Sony incident probably led the North to revise upward the risk of cyber action against U.S. targets. We can run through one popular scenario to explore how North Korea might think about cyber attacks. Though it is unlikely that North Korea has the ability to cause blackouts in the United States, if it did have the capability and decided to use it, this would not reduce our ability to retaliate militarily. Blackouts do not produce catastrophe or military advantage. A cyber-induced blackout would, however, put the regime’s survival at risk—in diplomatic parlance, this is called poking a bear with a stick. In any event, the notion of cyber catastrophe is wildly exaggerated, reflecting a popular culture prone to exaggerating risk rather than seriously assessing an opponent’s capability and intent.

Mark Pomerleau, 6/1/17, “Cyber protection teams assigned to THAAD in South Korea”, Army Times, <http://www.armytimes.com/home/2017/06/01/cyber-protection-teams-assigned-to-thaad-in-south-korea/> //BB

HAAD, battery deployed to the Korean Peninsula. The department considers the threat emanating form North Korea, which includes a rapidly evolving nuclear program but more immediately, their ballistic missile threat to the region, as one of if not the greatest near term threat. Eschewing the hermit kingdom's nascent nuclear capabilities, their ballistic missile capabilities have the capacity to eviscerate Seoul, the capital of South Korea — a city of over 10 million people. The Trump administration, following deliberations that spilled over from the previous U.S. administration, deployed the THAAD missile defense battery to the Korean peninsula to guard against missile threats. As has been highlighted by the nature of connected systems and software reliance today, most all weapon systems are vulnerable to cyber intrusions and attacks. The CPTs assigned to THAAD have a "full time mission ... to protect that THADD and things like that," Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson, deputy chief of staff for the Army's G-3/5/7 said June 1 at an AFCEA hosted event in northern Virginia. Anderson noted that cyber teams are tasked out just like fires or aviation, no different than any other enabler based on how many teams an organization physically has. In the cyber domain, he said, the issue becomes who has the teams, who has the capability to deploy them wherever. Cyber protection teams primary mission is defense of DoD networks and critical weapon systems.

Juliet Perry, 4/27/17, “China tried to hack group linked to controversial missile defense system, US cybersecurity firm says”, CNN, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/27/asia/china-south-korea-thaad-hack/index.html> //BB

"China uses cyber espionage pretty regularly when Chinese interests are at stake to better understand facts on the ground," John Hultquist, the director of cyber espionage analysis at FireEye, told CNN's News Stream. "We have evidence that they targeted at least one party that has been associated with the missile placements." A spokesperson with South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs told CNN there was an attempted cyber attack last month on their systems originating from China, but would not comment when asked if THAAD was targeted. The official said "prompt defensive measures" blocked the hackers. China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs told CNN the Chinese government opposes any form of cyber attack, and fights against all form of hacker activity. "This position is consistent, clear, and serious," it said in a statement.

### A2: Spec Ops

#### 1. Nautilus reports that only 19,000 special operation forces can move into South Korea due to their limited transportation but that doesn’t even matter because Seoul is covered by sensors meaning two things

#### A) North Korea sends in a small amount of soldiers that can be undetectable but they would have a minimal impact

#### B) North Korea sends in a large amount of soldiers and will be seen by sensors meaning they get met by South Korean and U.S. Forces

Roger Cavazos, 6/26/12, “Mind the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality”, Nautilus Institute, <https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/mind-the-gap-between-rhetoric-and-reality/> //BB

North Korea has an estimated 200,000 special forces, however, KPA only has the logistical capacity to move approximately 19,000 at any one time. They can move approximately 4,000 by air and about 15,000 by sea. [6] However, Seoul is covered by redundant systems and sensors. Small numbers can slip in undetected, but are so small as to not cause much damage. Large numbers of Special Forces may overwhelm the systems, but at least they’ll trigger alerts – and a welcoming party. At any rate, it is unlikely KPA Special Forces can complete 10 cycles of insertion and exfiltration. Moreover, unless these Special Forces sneak in and assemble a nuclear device in Seoul, they can kill some people, cause mayhem, but can’t create a “sea of fire”. With such a tremendously large number of 200,000 Special Forces out of approximately 1,100,000 soldiers under arms in North Korea and almost no training budget it is easy to imagine that such a large number of these troops are well-disciplined, completely obedient, but likely not so special.

### A2: Recent Talks Solve Now

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Delink, North Korea doesn’t want the talks. Kim of Reuters reports on July 21st that South Korea’s proposed military talks was flat out rejected by the North. Citing that North Korea didn’t even answer the call.

Cards:

Jack Kim, Reuters Editorial, Reuters, 7-21-2017, ["No Korean military talks after North snubs South's call," https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-southkorea-idUSKBN1A6044, 7-21-2017] // AA

SEOUL (Reuters) - South Korea's proposed military talks aimed at easing tension between the two Koreas planned for Friday failed to happen after the North snubbed the call, a setback for new President Moon Jae-in's hopes for dialogue. The North has remained silent on the South Korean proposal, made on Monday, for talks on ways to avoid hostilities along their heavily fortified border. Moon took office in May pledging to engage the North in dialogue, as well as to bring pressure on it to impede its nuclear and missile programs.

### A2: Current Economic Interaction Solves

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Turn, Noland of the Council on Foreign Relations explains that through the economic interactions between the North and South, North Korea received 100 million dollars per year. Which is funding increased North Korean nuclear development and aggression.

Cards:

Marcus Noland, Council on Foreign Relations, 8-14-2013, ["Are North and South Korea Back in Business?," https://www.cfr.org/interview/are-north-and-south-korea-back-business, 7-23-2017] // AA

The only way North and South Korea were really interacting for the last year or two has been through the Kaesong industrial complex, which, weirdly enough, seemed to have a coalition of support both within South and North Korea to keep it going, even if other bad things were happening in the relationship. The North Koreans make about $100 million in hard currency a year from Kaesong. This is not $100 million in wages that goes to the workers—this goes straight to the regime, which then pays the workers a pittance in North Korean currency.

### A2: Moon =/= Conflict

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Turn, Moon is getting more aggressive. The New York Times reports on July 5th that President Moon Jae-in approved a missile launch to test South Korea’s capability to take out North Korea’s leadership. Thus, even if historically, President Moon has advocated for peace talks, the greater threat North Korea poses, the more hardline he will become.

Cards:

Rick Gladstone (United Nations reporter) and Choe Sang-Hun, New York Times, 7-5-2017, ["U.S. Vows Tougher Action on North Korea After Missile Test," https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/world/asia/north-korea-war-us-icbm.html, 7-25-2017] // AA

President Moon Jae-in of South Korea asked President Trump on Tuesday night to endorse the exercise, arguing that the allies had to respond to the North’s provocation with “more than statements,” Mr. Moon’s office said. The South Korean military said the missiles, which had a range of about 185 miles, had been fired to test the ability to launch “a precision strike at the enemy leadership” in case of war. It did not say how far the missiles had traveled.

### A2: Preemptive Unlikely

#### (6 responses)

#### 1. Turn, Su of Seoul National University 17 explains that recent developments in North Korea’s nuclear program have reignited and international for a preemptive strike on North Korea.

#### 2. Turn, Saalman of the University of Chicago 2017 writes that the likelihood of a preemptive strike would be amplified because of the transition to a new, more direct Trump administration.

#### 3. Turn, Su of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 17 indicates that South Korea is exploring the likelihood of a surgical strike to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear facilities following further Northern provocations

#### 4. Turn, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Long concludes that the United States must stake unilateral military action in response to North Korean provocation to show the Kim regime that he will face consequences for his actions and to retrench American credibility. *Prefer this evidence because it comes straight from the US government who would be the party carrying out any possible strike.*

#### 5. Turn, Hun of the New York Times 2017 explains that the United States, in reaction to recent North Korean provocations, has toughened its military pressure and invective against North Korea hinting a possible return to war with the North.

#### 6. Turn, Moon is getting more aggressive The NYT July 5th reports that President Moon Jaw-in approved a missile launch to test South Korea’s capability to take out North Korea’s leadership. Thus, even if historically, President Moon has advocated for peace talks, the greater threat North Kroea poses, the more hardline he will become.

Fei su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. [http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf //](http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf%20//) AA

Chinese analysts provide three main alternatives to break the current deadlock among parties working to solve North Korea nuclear crisis: military options, sanctions and negotiations.39 A military response to North Korea is rarely discussed in China, but following the two nuclear tests by North Korea in 2016, the international debate on whether the USA might conduct a pre-emptive strike on North Korea has increased.40 US and Chinese analysts argue that this perspective would likely be amplified following the transition to a new, more direct US administration,41 while South Korean media explores the likelihood of a surgical strike to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear facilities after the fifth test.42

Fei su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. [http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf //](http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf%20//) AA

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Colin Clark (Editor; BA from Drew University), Breaking Defense, 7-27-2017, ["North Korea Won’t Give Nukes Up ‘At Any Price:’ Top Korea Intel Officer," http://breakingdefense.com/2017/07/north-korea-wont-give-nukes-up-at-any-price-top-korea-intel-officer/, 7-28-2017] // AA

The U.S. simply must pursue its own interests and use military force to show Kim Jung-un he faces consequences for his actions, Long concluded: “What speaks louder than words? Action. The alliances have failed to take a single military action in response to any of North Korea’s provocations. What does that tell you about (our) credibility?”

Rick Gladstone and Choe Sang-Hun, New York Times, 7-5-2017, ["U.S. Vows Tougher Action on North Korea After Missile Test," https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/world/asia/north-korea-war-us-icbm.html, 7-25-2017] // AA

UNITED NATIONS — The United States toughened its military pressure and invective against nuclear-armed North Korea on Wednesday, conducting a missile maneuver with South Korea, hinting of a possible return to war with the North and proposing wider United Nations sanctions against “any country that does business with this outlaw regime.” The American actions came a day after North Korea conducted a successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile that appeared capable of hitting Alaska and Hawaii and was described by the United States as a “dangerous escalation” in what has become a crisis for the Trump administration. Claiming the test had been timed to America’s July 4 holiday, North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, described the missile as a “gift package” to the United States.

Rick Gladstone and Choe Sang-Hun, New York Times, 7-5-2017, ["U.S. Vows Tougher Action on North Korea After Missile Test," https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/world/asia/north-korea-war-us-icbm.html, 7-25-2017] // AA

President Moon Jae-in of South Korea asked President Trump on Tuesday night to endorse the exercise, arguing that the allies had to respond to the North’s provocation with “more than statements,” Mr. Moon’s office said. The South Korean military said the missiles, which had a range of about 185 miles, had been fired to test the ability to launch “a precision strike at the enemy leadership” in case of war. It did not say how far the missiles had traveled.

### A2: Retaliation General

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Delink, Cha of the Center for Strategic International Studies explains in 2016 that US-ROK military exercise including the deployment of military assets such as missile defense have no impact diplomatic relations between North Korean and the US-ROK alliance.

#### 2. Soumil and I would contend that conflict is inevitable in both worlds. Thus, there is a comparative advantage for South Korea, in a world with missile defense compared to a world without because Bennett quantifies that we can save 500,000 lives.

Cards:

Victor Cha, Na Young Lee, and Andy Lim, “DPRK provocations and US-ROK Military Exercises 2005 to 2016,” CSIS Beyond Parallel, <http://beyondparallel.csis.org/dprkprovocations/> // AA

Reports common in the media and in North Korean propaganda statements suggest that the annual U.S.–South Korean military exercises have a provocative effect on Pyongyang’s behavior. To critically test this proposition, Beyond Parallel gathered and compared data on the relationship between the United States Republic of Korea (ROK) military exercises and North Korean provocations. Findings from the original qualitative study of U.S.-ROK spring military exercises over the last twelve years (2005–2016) were published on Beyond Parallel in July 2016. This study was recently expanded to include the fall exercises and their effect on North Korean provocations. The findings of this study are summarized below. 1. Null Effect (Confirmed for Fall Exercises) U.S.-ROK military exercises do not impact diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the DPRK. When extending the original analysis of the study of spring (Foal Eagle) exercises to include the fall (Ulchi-Freedom Guardian) exercises, the pattern still holds for U.S.-DPRK relations. The process of the Six Party Talks (SPT) in 2005, 2007, and 2008 carried on despite the fall exercises taking place in the middle of it. And the years 2006, 2009, 2010, 2012, and 2014 show that negative relations prior to the fall exercises were reinforced with postexercise provocations although the reinforcement effect is not as demonstrable as with spring exercises.

Yi Yong-in, Washington correspondent for Hankyoreh. June 19, 2017. “Moon Chung-in says military exercises could be scaled down if N. Korea suspends nukes.” Hankyoreh. [http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english\_edition/e\_international/799370.html //](http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/799370.html%20//) AA

On June 16, Moon Chung-in, professor emeritus at Yonsei University and President Moon Jae-in’s special advisor on unification, foreign affairs and national security, said that the South Korea-US joint military exercises (which include the deployment of US strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula), could be scaled down if North Korea suspends its nuclear and missile activities.

### A2: Irrational Actor

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Delink, Perry, the former Secretary of Defense during the 90’s negotiations with North Korea explains that the North Korean government is not irrational as they as they make rational decisions to maintain the Kim dynasty and gain international respect.

Cards:

William J. Perry, the former secretary of defense under the Clinton administration; a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution, is the Michael and Barbara Barbarian Professor at Stanford University, with a joint appointment at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the School of Engineering, [Diplomacy, Not Doomsday, DOA: 24 July 2017] Hoover Digest, Spring 2017 // AA

Certainly this is dangerous, but we should try to understand the nature of the danger. During my discussion and negotiations with members of the North Korean government, I have found that they are not irrational, nor do they want to achieve martyrdom. Their goals, in order of priority, are: preserving the Kim dynasty, gaining international response, and improving their economy.

### A2: Siege Mentality

#### (2 responses)

#### 1. Delink, A biased media is the force which fosters the nationalism and mistrust towards the outside world, required for a siege mentality. For them the gain access to this impact, make my opponents tell you how the THAAD missile defense system would exacerbate that.

#### 2. Delink, Bar-Tal of Tel-Aviv University explains that North Korea isolated itself and created its siege mentality because it didn’t want to interact with capitalist countries.

Cards:

Daniel Bar-Tal [Tel-Aviv University]. 2004. “Siege Mentality.” Beyond Intractability. [http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/siege-mentality //](http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/siege-mentality%20//) AA

The siege experience can be evoked by the society's leaders who decide to isolate the society from the world for various internal reasons (e. g., Albania and North Korea). This type of siege mentality depends on the leaders' centralized authority and the needs of the society. It may end with the change of the leadership, or of internal needs, as it happened in the case of Albania. An example of self-initiated siege mentality is the present case of North Korea which, following the changes that took place in Eastern Europe, isolated itself from the rest of the world, attributing especially negative intentions to capitalist countries. The present leader, Kim Jong-Il, the son of Kim I-sung, explained that: [Preventing] imperialist ideology and culture from infiltrating into our country remains the key to protecting our socialism and guaranteeing the development of socialist culture. The imperialists are attempting to infiltrate bourgeois culture into the socialist world, thus to paralyze the revolutionary spirit of the

## A2 US

### A2 Troop Removal Good

#### 1. Trump won’t remove troops. According to political-financial expert Seth Robson of Stars and Stripes, Donald Trump likely won’t follow through on his campaign threat to withdraw American forces from overseas bases seeing as Washington would never support such an action and it wouldn’t be politically viable.

#### 2. There won’t be a big troop withdrawal because US has foreign policy goals in East Asia that remain unchanged with THAAD. If troops leave South Korea (which they don’t prove fully happens), they would just be stationed somewhere else in the region. The US has an incredibly vested interest in checking North Korean aggression, they won’t pull out.

#### 3. Even if you buy that a lot of troops would leave, turn the impact, South Korea needs US troops to protect it and to achieve diplomatic goals in the region. Khang Vu of the National Interest argues in 2016 that US withdrawal creates a power vacuum on the peninsula, prompting more aggression from North Korea. THAAD ensures that the troops stay in South Korea, thus you affirm.

#### 4. Even if troops do leave, withdrawing doesn’t pose a harm. Craig Urquhart of the NK News writes in 2015 that withdrawing troops does not mean weakening the U.S.-South Korean alliance. South Korea can still participate in military training, deploy forces internationally, and coordinate policies with its allies. American troops can be in South Korea at a moment’s notice if North Korea attacks again.

Robson 16 [Seth Robson, 11-17-2016. "Trump won’t withdraw US forces from overseas bases, expert predicts." Stars and Stripes. https://www.stripes.com/news/trump-won-t-withdraw-us-forces-from-overseas-bases-expert-predicts-1.439853#.WbLBKJOGPVp] //BH

A U.S. political-financial expert predicted Thursday that President-elect Donald Trump likely won’t follow through on his campaign threat to withdraw American forces from overseas bases and may negotiate a bilateral trade pact with Japan to partially replace the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal that he opposes. Nomi Prins, author of “All the President’s Bankers: The Hidden Alliances that Drive American Power,” told the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan that she doesn’t foresee changes to America’s overseas military footprint. Trump said during the election campaign that he would consider withdrawing U.S. forces from overseas bases if allies failed to contribute more toward the costs of keeping them there. That has raised worries in Japan and South Korea, where tens of thousands of U.S. troops are stationed at dozens of bases. Prins compared Trump’s threat to his vow to build a border wall with Mexico. The president-elect recently told CBS’ “60 Minutes” that parts of the wall could actually be a fence.

Vu 16 [Khang Vu, 7-10-2016. "The Ultimate Nightmare: U.S. Withdrawal from South Korea." National Interest. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-ultimate-nightmare-us-withdrawal-south-korea-16904] //BH

Since the end of the Korean War, American troops in Korea have been used for two major purposes: first to deter North Korean attacks and second to constrain South Korean unilateralism. This security structure has successfully prevented a few crises from erupting into full-scale wars, namely the North Korean attacks on Cheong Wa Dae in 1968, the assassination of the South Korean first lady in 1974 and the presidential assassination attempt made by North Korean agents in 1983 in Rangoon. In all cases, Washington succeeded in preventing Seoul from launching a counterattack thanks to the U.S. influence on South Korea’s military decision-making process. A U.S. withdrawal would beyond all doubt create a vacuum of power on the Korean Peninsula, prompting North Korea to take on more provocative actions such as testing more missile and nuclear tests, attacking South Korean troops near the DMZ more often or shelling on the South’s ships and islands near the Northern Limit Line. In return, South Korea may respond militarily to avoid losing face, and if initial deterrence fails, the two Koreas will be drawn into another Korean War, an adverse prospect for future U.S. administrations. The U.S. should not worry about being drawn into a conflict with North Korea because the presence of American troops has effectively thwarted North Korean attacks in the first place. In addition, keeping American troops on Korean soil is cheaper than sustaining the same number of troops in America, which helps shoulder some of the budget burden from American taxpayers. Maintaining the presence of American military in Korea is undeniably beneficial to both America and South Korea. Second, withdrawing U.S. troops will not result in any breakthroughs in negotiations with North Korea. Pyongyang’s nuclear bid does not originate from its fear of Washington’s threat; instead, it is the imbalance of power on the Korean Peninsula in Seoul’s favor that pushes Pyongyang to resort to nuclear capability. Even if Washington were to withdraw all its troops from South Korea immediately, the South Korean military would still be able to defeat Northern aggression (though a Pyrrhic victory). Moreover, with the absence of American military, miscalculations between North and South Korea will increase, which poses more threats to Pyongyang after than before U.S. troops’ withdrawal.

Urquhart 17 [Craig Urquhart, 9-8-2017. "American soldiers need to leave South Korea." NK News - North Korea News. https://www.nknews.org/2015/04/american-soldiers-need-to-leave-south-korea/] //BH

### A2 General US Presence Bad

#### Turn the argument, US presence is necessary because it prevents countries from militarizing. Michael Auslin of the Atlantic explains in June that in the face of US withdrawal, both Seoul and Tokyo would immediately begin considering developing their own nuclear and missile programs.

Auslin 17 [Michael Auslin, 6-8-2017. "Is It Time to Reassess the U.S.-South Korea Alliance?." Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/south-korea-alliance-north-korea-kim-moon-trump/532113/] //BH

But if, on the other hand, the United States decided that the risk to its interests was prohibitively high, abrogating or scaling back the alliance would potentially destabilize Asia and beyond. It would hand the Kim regime a major strategic victory, removing the single greatest deterrent to its aggression. Pyongyang would be emboldened to continue trying to blackmail the United States, South Korea, and Japan, leading to future crises. Stripped of the assurance provided by America’s support, South Korea might wind up capitulating to the North’s demands for open-ended economic assistance, or even stand down some of its forces. Japan would worry that it may be the next to be abandoned by America. Even worse, in the face of a U.S. withdrawal, both Seoul and Tokyo would immediately begin considering developing their own nuclear and missile programs, instigating a nuclear-arms race that would spill over to China, Taiwan, and possibly beyond. In the event of a reduced American presence in northeast Asia, China would emerge the big winner. Beijing almost certainly would offer Seoul an alliance of its own, further undermining America’s regional web of alliances, likely tipping the Philippines and Malaysia fully into the Chinese camp.

## A2 Japan

### A2 Proliferation

#### There is no link to this argument for 2 reasons

#### Japan is increasing its military spending to counter Chinese militarization

#### Japan is only focusing on missile defense in response to North Korea (TIME)

#### My opponents need to prove that there is enough support to 1 - change their pacifist constitution and 2 - to militarize offensively. However, Emily Tamkin finds in May of this year that only the slim minority support changes in the Constitution and that there is only support for enhanced self defensive not offensive capabilities (Tamkin - Foreign Policy).

#### Turn the link, voting aff is key to solve Japanese Proliferation. Salem of Slate in 2016 argues that any increase in military related to the US is less likely to trigger an arms race since the US is a superpower. The only way to stop these nukes from being built is to deploy THAAD

NA (TIME Magazine). “Japan Just Approved a Record $43.6 Billion Military Budget to Counter China and North Korea.” December 21, 2016. <http://time.com/4616114/japan-defense-budget-spending-china-military/>

(TOKYO) - **Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's government on Thursday approved an increase in defense spending to record levels to counter growing Chinese military power in the East China Sea and an escalating North Korean ballistic missile threat. Abe's cabinet on Thursday signed off on a 1.4 percent increase in spending to 5.13 trillion yen ($43.66 billion) for the year starting April 1.** If approved by lawmakers, which is highly likely given the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's control of parliament, it will be the fifth straight annual increase in outlays. Under Abe, Japan's Self Defense Forces are pivoting away from guarding the nation's north to reinforce an island chain stretching 1,400 km (870 miles) along the southern edge of the East China Sea. That means fewer tank divisions in favor of building a mobile force equipped with hardware such as tilt-rotor Osprey carriers, ships, amphibious vehicles and mobile missile batteries. **Japan is also spending more to upgrade its ballistic missile defense, in response to advances in North Korea's ballistic missile program.**

Emily Tamkin (Foreign Policy). “Is Japan Moving to Revise its Pacifist Constitution.” May 1, 2017. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/01/is-japan-moving-to-revise-its-pacifist-constitution/>

**Japan’s explicitly pacifist constitution turns 70 on Wednesday.** Ahead of the big birthday, a mail-in survey was conducted as to whether the Japanese population wants the constitution revised — and it seems about half the country does. The Japanese population slightly favors a revision to Article 9, the section of the constitution that renounces war. Some 49 percent of respondents believe Article 9 must be changed, while **47 percent say it shouldn’t be touched. But most do not want it changed now, with 51 percent saying they are against constitutional amendments under Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe**, who then called for his country to make a historic revision to the document on Monday. But all respondents are already living in a country that has a very different relationship to its military than it did in the very recent past. Even without changing the constitution, Abe has deliberately sought to loosen the fetters that bound the Japanese military since World War II — and to play a bigger part in global security. Abe already passed laws that allow Japan to exercise its right to collective self-defense without violating Article 9, and lifted its ban on exporting weapons. Japan unveiled an initiative to further security with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, increasingly concerned as they are about China. On Monday, Japan sent its largest warship to accompany a U.S. supply vessel in Japanese waters. Abe has already “achieved the goals that he wanted in terms of letting Japan be a more ‘normal’ nation” where military and defense are concerned, said Michael Auslin of the American Enterprise Institute. But Abe still has work to do to garner enough support to formally codify the changes to Japan’s security laws through a constitutional change, said Jim Schoff of the Carnegie Endowment. That requires figuring out just what a revised Article 9 would say, and how unfettered Japan’s armed forces would be. That is “the next big step in the staircase,” he said. Still, the fact that it is even up for discussion — with a good degree of public support — is in part a reflection of the changing world around Japan. Tokyo is staring at an erratic North Korea, an unpredictable South Korea, and an increasingly aggressive China, whether in the South China Sea or closer to home in the East China Sea. Capping it all off, Japanese leaders have in recent years sought to reassess their relationship with the United States, fearing too much reliance on Washington could leave them in the lurch. That said, the Japanese people are still pacifistic, **Auslin says. Beefing up the ability to defend themselves doesn’t translate into much appetite for interventions around the world, or even in Asia. A leader who forgets that and tries to turn Japan’s new freedom of maneuver into an interventionist approach might get a reminder — in the form of removal from office.**

Salam 16 Reihan Salam [columnist. Slate], 11-18-2016, "The United States Doesn’t Spend Enough on Its Military," Slate Magazine,<http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2015/11/military_spending_the_case_for_spending_more_not_less.html>

Why does the U.S. extend security guarantees to so many different countries, including rich ones? One way to think about it is that U.S. allies are by definition countries that the U.S. will never have to fight against. Instead of building up their militaries in ways that might threaten the U.S. or their neighbors, former rivals like Germany and Japan have militaries that are almost exclusively devoted to territorial defense. Whereas both Germany and Japan once had imperial designs, neither country could conquer a faraway land if they tried. What they can do is meaningfully contribute to U.S.-led efforts to defend not only their own homelands but also other democracies in their respective regions. **The U.S.-led global alliance has created a vast zone in which interstate conflict is largely unknown, and commerce can flow freely. American leadership allows and encourages our allies to cooperate, and it makes it effectively impossible for them to wage war on each other.** This is a far cry from the years before 1945, when the world’s richest and most powerful countries were at each other’s throats. Could it be that the remilitarization of Germany and Japan outside of the American security umbrella would be welcomed by their neighbors? Might the Middle East be safer if Saudi Arabia had to fend for itself, and it devoted its oil wealth to, say, building its own nuclear arsenal? I’m skeptical, and frankly I think it would be unwise for us to roll the dice to find out. For decades, mainstream Democrats and Republicans have agreed that bearing the costs of U.S. global leadership is preferable to the uncertainty that would arise if the U.S. were to pull back, and so the U.S.-led global alliance has persisted. From Bill Clinton to Barack Obama, every president since the end of the Cold War has actually favored expanding this alliance. The problem we face now is that both Democrats and Republicans don’t seem to appreciate that the costs of U.S. global leadership are rising, whether they like it or not.

## A2 SK

### A2: Domestic Instability

#### (2 responses)

#### 1. Delink, Keeseok of the Kangwon National University indicates that the biggest challenge facing South Korea is the strength of its democracy in the face of corruption. This is really important because it’s a domestic problem not an international. Even if you negate in this round and there’s a world without anti-missile defense systems, its won’t solve South Korean instability.

#### 2. Delink, Frayer of NPR 2017 explains that South Korean voters say they're more concerned about domestic issues like the economy and environment than they are about North Korea.

Cards:

Kim Keeseok [Kangwon National University]. January 2015. “Democracy is the biggest challenge for South Korea in 2015.” East Asia Forum. <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/01/14/democracy-is-the-biggest-challenge-for-south-korea-in-2015/> // AA

But the biggest challenge that now fac[ing]es South Korea will be ensuring [is] the soundness and strength of its democracy. Since Park Geun-hye’s government took office in February 2013, soundness of political democracy requires special attention. South Korea’s liberal democracy is under threat.

Lauren Frayer. May 2017. Domestic Issues Dominate Ahead Of South Korean Election.” NPR. [http://www.npr.org/2017/05/07/527250403/domestic-issues-dominate-ahead-of-south-korean-election //](http://www.npr.org/2017/05/07/527250403/domestic-issues-dominate-ahead-of-south-korean-election%20//) AA

South Koreans go to the polls Tuesday to replace ousted leader Park Geun-hye. Outsiders talk about North Korea, but South Korean voters say they're more concerned about the economy and environment.

### A2: People Disapprove

#### (2 responses)

#### 1. Delink, According to the Institute for Security and Development, 25 percentage points more of the population is in support of THAAD missile defense than is against it.

#### 2. Delink, A recent Gallup Poll found that the portion of the population in support of THAAD was 28% greater than that of those against.

Cards:

Institute for Security and Development Policy. THAAD in the Korean Peninsula Institute for Security & Development Policy – www.isdp.eu BACKGROUNDER - November 2016. [http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2016/11/THAAD-Backgrounder-ISDP-2.pdf //](http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2016/11/THAAD-Backgrounder-ISDP-2.pdf%20//) AA

The people of South Korea have held differing opinions on the decision of THAAD deployment. According to a Gallup Korea poll, after the announcement of THAAD deployment, 50% of the 1,004 respondents were in favor of the decision while 32% were against it.20 Over time, the number of supporters increased, as August 12, 2016 Gallup polls showed that 56% were in favor while 31% were opposed. Those who were in favor of THAAD mentioned national security and safety as their main considerations, while those who are against it were worried that the decision will negatively impact the country’s relationship with China and Russia. Some respondents also expressed a reluctance to be increasingly dependent upon the U.S. military. Almost half of the respondents of the Gallup Korea poll in July supported the idea of hosting the THAAD battery in their neighborhood, compared to the 29% who said that they would be against it.22 However, there were challenges in deciding the location of THAAD. Areas with U.S. military bases were considered, such as Pyeongtaek, Wonju, Waegwan, and Gunsan. Eumseong County and Beolgyo, which are locations without U.S. bases, were also mentioned.23

### A2: Moon Campaign against THAAD

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Delink, Berlinger of CNN explains in 2017 that Moon Jae-in campaigned on a promise of putting the issue of missile defense to parliament not campaigning against it.

Joshua Berlinger and Michael Callahan, Cnn, CNN, 7-11-2017, ["US successfully tests missile defense system," http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/11/politics/us-thaad-missile-defense-test/index.html, 7-24-2017] // AA

But the system has detractors in South Korea, as well. THAAD's deployment was approved by disgraced ex-President Park Geun-hye, who is currently on trial in a corruption scandal. Her more dovish successor, Moon Jae-in, campaigned on a promise to put the issue to the country's Parliament.

### A2: Moon =/= Conflict

#### 1. [Turn, Moon is getting more aggressive] The New York Times reports on July 5th that President Moon Jaw-in approved a missile launch to test South Korea’s capability to take out North Korea’s leadership. Thus, even if historically, President Moon has advocated for peace talks, the greater threat North Kroea poses, the more hardline he will become.

Rick Gladstone (United Nations reporter) and Choe Sang-Hun, New York Times, 7-5-2017, ["U.S. Vows Tougher Action on North Korea After Missile Test," https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/world/asia/north-korea-war-us-icbm.html, 7-25-2017] // AA

President Moon Jae-in of South Korea asked President Trump on Tuesday night to endorse the exercise, arguing that the allies had to respond to the North’s provocation with “more than statements,” Mr. Moon’s office said. The South Korean military said the missiles, which had a range of about 185 miles, had been fired to test the ability to launch “a precision strike at the enemy leadership” in case of war. It did not say how far the missiles had traveled.

### A2: SK Prolif Good

#### (2 responses)

#### 1. Turn, Lockie of the Business Insider 2017 explains that South Korean nuclearization is dangerous because the more nuclear devices on earth, the greater the risk of miscalculation or accident leading to a monumental catastrophe.

#### 2. Turn, realize that South Korean nuclearization would prompt the North to preemptively attack or become more aggressive in their foreign policy.

Cards:

But nuclear proliferation carries heavy risks. Even in the US where nuclear weapons safety is paramount, accidents happen. Simply put, the more nuclear devices on earth, the greater the risk of miscalculation or accident leading to a monumental catastrophe. It speaks volumes about North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship that South Korea and Japan, two countries dedicated to peace and security, are even considering such measures.

### A2: Troop withdrawal Bad

#### 1. Turn, withdrawing troops solves back for the North Korean nuclear threat. Mansourov of Johns Hopkins University explains that all North Korea’s publicly stated targets are of US origin because the United States is the sole threat to North Korea’s sovereignty. Thus, he furthers that a withdrawal from South Korea will rid of the nuclear threat to South Korea because North Korea has no motive in striking the South.

Cards:

Alexandre. Mansourov, Ph.D. Columbia University; B.A. Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Advanced Diploma, Kim Il Sung National University (DPRK); Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, "Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 16, 2014, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/> // AA

1. U.S. military bases in South Korea (남조선주둔 미군기지) 2. U.S. military bases in the Asia-Pacific operational theater (태평양작전전구안의 미제침략군기지) 3. U.S. military bases in Guam (괌도주둔 미군기지) 4. U.S. military bases in Hawaii (하와이주둔 미군기지) 5. U.S. military bases in the U.S. mainland (미국본토주둔 미군기지) (as indicated in the notorious map of the alleged KPA targets on the U.S. mainland). Several characteristics of the above target list are worth mentioning. First, all potential targets are of the U.S. origin, which lends credence to the DPRK public assertion that its nuclear weapons target only the nuclear weapons states threatening the DPRK. Second, the above list does not include any South Korean targets, except U.S. military bases in the South, thereby sending an unambiguous message to Seoul that the North does not plan to employ nuclear weapons against its compatriots in the South, whether they are military or civilian. Third, although some of the targets are clearly located in Japan, the North Koreans never mention Japan by name, making only veiled references to their neighbor, probably because of their sensitivity about Japan’s tragic past experience with the nuclear war.

### A2 Sunshine Policy Link

#### 1. This is non-unique. Jesse Min of Stanford University finds in March that the Sunshine Policy has been implemented in the past during two other presidencies but we didn’t see successful negotiations then.

#### 2. Not only has the Sunshine policy been used in the past, it’s failed. Min furthers that the policy weakened the US-South Korea alliance and didn’t deter North Korea from missile development as it executed its first nuclear experiment in 2006.

Jesse Min, 3/13/17, “The Sunshine Policy of South Korea”, Stanford University, <http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2017/ph241/min2/> //BB

The Sunshine Policy is the policy of South Korea towards North Korea during Kim Dae-jung (See Fig. 1) and Rho Moo-hyun presidency. The formal name of the policy was the "Comprehensive Engagement Policy towards North Korea" and first announced by the 15th South Korean President, Kim Dae-jung, in 1998. The term "Sunshine Policy" was originated from one of Aesop's fables, "The North Wind and the Sun," as the policy aimed for loosening containment on North Korea, embracing North Korea, and eventually making the North Korean government to denuclearize by itself. [1] This policy was striking at the time, because many citizens and scholars had been urging for tougher and more conservative measures against the North. There was widespread antagonism against the North due to its ruthless military provocations against the South and its brutality on its own citizens.

Jesse Min, 3/13/17, “The Sunshine Policy of South Korea”, Stanford University, <http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2017/ph241/min2/> //BB

Many people criticized the policy saying that the South was being played by the North's stick-and-carrot strategy. There were more than 10 major armed provocations of North Korea including the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong in 2002, in which 1 South boat was sunk, 6 men were killed, and 19 were wounded. [6] North Korea executed its first nuclear experiment in 2006 as well. There was a severe criticism on these incidents that South Korea's financial support that mimicked the West Germany's financial support to East Germany was not used for humanitarian purpose for North Korean citizens, but for developing nuclear weapons and military forces. Some conservative-leaning people criticize that a decade of the Sunshine Policy weakened the US-South Korea alliance. After September 11, 2001, President Bush proclaimed that he would punish any kind of terrorist group and clarified his "deep-rooted distrust of Kim Jong II and the North Korean regime." However, by being friendly with North Korea and helping the North with massive amount of financial support, the ROK-U.S. relations were aggravated or at least, did not advance further, which blocked potentials of South Korean economy during early 2000's. Last but not least, some critics believe that the Democrats used the Sunshine Policy as a political gain in domestic politics in the South, but it is controversial.

### A2 Negotiations

#### 1. Delink them, negotiations won’t happen because Kim won’t cooperate. Zack Beauchamp of Vox explains on the 5th that North Korea relies on a strategy for survival that depends on provoking the South and the US. He doesn’t have an interest in peace.

#### 2. Security is a precondition for negotiations. Bender 17 reports that North Korea nuclear technology has progressed so much that disarming it is an unrealistic goal. That means security has to be prioritized before negotiations, otherwise they can either

#### A) Use nukes to their advantage in negotiations by threatening an attack or

#### B) Just not negotiate at all

Write Cal Christian response: basically NK “has come so far w/ its nukes that it won’t put them on the line now” which is a precondition for negotiation meaning that security has to be prioritized because negotiation is impossible

#### 3. There have already been two peace talks since the turn of the century, one in 2003 and another in 2016 and both failed. Make sure my opponents show you not only why there will be another peace talk, but how that peace talk will be different from the others.

#### 4. If peace talks happen, what are the outcomes of these peace talks? Negotiations with South Korea aren’t going to convince North Korea to give up their most powerful weapons. Remember the ultimate goal of North Korea is to absorb South Korea, so unless South Korea essentially concedes power to Kim Jong-un, nothing will come out of these peace talks.

#### 5. But assuming that the peace talks happen and are effective, South Korea having THAAD is going to be a prerequisite to them because North Korea being a security threat allows them to bully South Korea back into a corner during negotiations. We would contend that an Asia where North Korea has that kind of dominance over South Korea, is not a safe or secure Asia at all.

#### 6. Even if you believe that the peace talks happen and are effective, South Korea having THAAD is going to be a prerequisite to them because North Korea being a security threat allows them to bully South Korea back into a corner during negotiations. An Asia where North Korea has that kind of dominance over South Korea, is not a safe or secure Asia at all.

Zack Beauchamp, 7/5/17, “North Korea isn’t crazy. It’s insecure, poor, and extremely dangerous”, Vox, <https://www.vox.com/world/2017/7/5/15922446/north-korea-nuclear-war-casualties> //BB

Nor is the North secure from military attack. While its army is extremely large personnel-wise, with about 1.2 million soldiers, it uses antiquated Cold War technology while its neighbors to the South are equipped with top-of-line modern gear. Moreover, the presence of 23,500 US troops in South Korea means any war between North and South Korea would draw in the world’s only superpower, though with potentially enormous American casualties. Facing the twin dangers of domestic instability and foreign attack, the North has devised a strategy for survival that depends (somewhat counterintuitively) on provoking the South and the United States. The North will do something that it knows will infuriate its enemies, like testing an intercontinental ballistic missile or shelling a South Korean military base. This limit-pushing behavior is designed to show that the North is willing to escalate aggressively in the event of any kind of action from Washington or Seoul that threatens the regime, thus deterring them from making even the slightest move to undermine the Kim regime. It also sends a signal to the North Korean people that they’re constantly under threat from foreign invasions, and that they need to support their government unconditionally to survive as a nation.

Bryan Bender, 8/14/17, “Should the U.S. give up on a nuke-free North Korea?”, Politico, <http://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/14/north-korea-nuclear-weapons-241634> //BB

The United States has insisted for decades that it will never accept a nuclear-armed North Korea — but now some national security experts say it's time to rethink that stance. The debate over the once-unthinkable option has sharpened in recent weeks as a growing number of security experts, former spies and ex-diplomats say North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and advancing missile force have progressed too far to make disarming it a realistic goal. Instead, they say, the U.S. should focus on containing Kim Jong Un's regime, as it did with Josef Stalin’s Soviet Union and Mao Zedong’s China when they went nuclear. In those cases, the U.S. used the threat of overwhelming retaliation to deter them from using their weapons, then later offered incentives for the USSR and China to limit or reduce their nuclear stockpiles.

### A2 Proliferation

#### 1. The US nuclear umbrella solves for SK proliferation. Cheon Seongwhun of the Inha Journal of International Studies notes in 2011 that as an alliance partner under the US nuclear umbrella, South Korea will not develop nor possess nuclear weapons.

#### 2. THAAD strengthens the US-SK alliance which disincentives proliferation. Matthew Cottee of the IISS writes in 2016 that the deployment of THAAD would reaffirm America's commitment to South Korea and undermine calls for indigenous development of nuclear weapons.

#### 3. Turn the argument, THAAD prevents South Korea from proliferating. Daniel Pinkston of the Diplomatexplains in 2015 that if the United States pulls out anti-missile systems, South Korea would attempt to acquire its own deterrent to feel safe.

Cheon Seong Whun, 2011, Inha Journal of International Studies, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pafo.2011.26.issue-1/issuetoc> //BB

If the negotiation track fails to resolve the crisis, then the USA should redeploy a few dozen tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea and offer to hold mutual nuclear disarmament talks with North Korea to barter the withdrawal of US tactical nuclear weapons for the elimination of North Korean nuclear weapons. Finally, the paper explicates South Korea’s non-nuclear weapon policy and proposes a new concept of the alliance security assurance. The alliance security assurance is South Korea’s promise that as an alliance partner under the US nuclear umbrella, it will neither develop nor possess nuclear weapons as long as extended deterrence, including extended nuclear deterrence, is provided.

Matthew Cottee, 3/4/16, “Matthew Cottee: Between a ROK and a THAAD place”, IISS, <https://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2016-9143/march-71d7/between-a-rok-and-a-thaad-place-f193> //BB

It is still unclear who would foot the bill. From Seoul’s perspective, the deployment of the THAAD system could have several symbolic functions. It would reaffirm American commitment to South Korea at a time when extended deterrence is increasingly questioned. Overflights by US B-52s, as well as F-22 deployments, are designed to reassure South Korea while also sending a message of strength to Pyongyang. THAAD represents a further declaration of both allegiance and technological superiority. Relatedly, the deployment of an advanced system such as THAAD may also undermine calls for indigenous development of nuclear weapons in Seoul, which are justified as a necessary defensive tool against the North. Whether feasible or not, and in spite of contradicting [declarations](http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2016/02/18/0301000000AEN20160218000752315.html) regarding the likelihood of deployment, heightened discussion about THAAD suggests that Seoul has now reached a point of such frustration with North Korea that it is willing to provoke a Chinese backlash

Daniel Pinkston, 11/10/15, “Moral Hazard and the US-ROK Alliance”, The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/moral-hazard-and-managing-the-us-rok-alliance/> //BB

We disagree both with Trump’s factually baseless rhetoric and Bandow’s overall conclusions. Although we are sympathetic with Kelly’s views, we believe domestic politics in South Korea would push Seoul to choose internal balancing through increased defense spending, or even to acquire its own nuclear deterrent, before reaching out to Tokyo to replace a terminated alliance with the U.S. While we support South Korea’s efforts to take on an increasingly independent role for its own national defense, we are skeptical regarding proposals for a sudden or fundamental change to such a long-standing and relatively successful security architecture. With this in mind, we hope a critical analysis of the role that moral hazard plays in the alliance, can provide insight for alliance management and the maintenance of peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

### A2 THAAD Ineffective

#### 1. Even if THAAD is not 100% effective deployment is still better than inaction. As put by Robert Kelly of the National Interest, not deploying a missile defense system would leave South Korea vulnerable to Nuclear blackmail or a nuclear first strike in the event of crisis escalation which is why he ultimately concludes that any possible cost of THAAD is outweighed by the risk of inaction

#### 2. THAAD is better than South Korea’s current system. Bruce Klinger of the Heritage Foundation explains that South Korea’s current system has less altitude and range capabilities than THAAD.

#### 3. CHECK FRONTLINES FILE

Robert Kelly, 10/14/16, “Can THAAD Save South Korea?”, The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-thaad-save-south-korea-18047> //BB

Opponents suggest that THAAD will increase North Korean and Chinese anxiety, spurring reprisals. Perhaps, but those are worth the risk now that North Korea is so close to nuclear-tipped missiles and is likely on track to build dozens in the next decade. And it is North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs which are the real challenges to otherwise stable conventional deterrence on the peninsula. Nuclear missilization gives North Korea a growing asymmetric advantage. Failing to respond would leave South Korea more vulnerable to nuclear blackmail, or a nuclear first strike in case of crisis escalation and conflict. Whatever the risks of THAAD deployment, the risks of inaction are greater. THAAD can help mitigate those risks without offensively threatening South Korea’s neighbors.

Bruce Klinger, 1/12/15, “South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense”, The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense> //BB

South Korea’s Hannam University conducted a computer simulation that showed a PAC-2/3 low-altitude missile defense system would have only one second to intercept a North Korean missile at a range of 12–15 kilometers (km), while a THAAD medium-range system would have 45 seconds to intercept a missile at 40–150 km.[19] South Korea’s planned indigenous L-SAM would have less altitude and range than THAAD and would not be available for deployment until at least 2023. However, that target date is unlikely since creating a missile defense system is a long, expensive, and difficult process.

### A2 Doesn’t Protect Seoul

#### 1. Yeah the reason that THAAD doesn’t protect Seoul is because it hasn’t been fully deployed. Lily Newman of Wired explains in April that two or three THAAD systems would cover South Korea, the only way that that is possible is affirming.

#### 2. Also Pac 3 and Patriot make up for the areas where THAAD is lacking

Lily Newman, 4/23/17, “ALL ABOUT THE US MISSILE DEFENSE THAT’LL PROTECT SOUTH KOREA—AND TICK OFF CHINA”, Wired, <https://www.wired.com/2017/04/missile-defense-will-protect-south-korea-make-china-nervous/> //BB

“THAADs are tailored to those medium-range threats that North Korea has in spades—North Korea regularly demonstrates that kind of capability,” says Thomas Karako, the director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “THAADs are exactly the kind of thing that you would want for a regional area.” The only downside? South Korea doesn't have enough of them. In fact, even when fully functional, the current South Korea THAAD "can’t even cover Seoul, let alone catch Chinese missiles going to the US," says Bruce Bennett, a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation. Because the THAAD has a relatively small interceptor range of around 125 miles, it would take two or three of them to cover all of South Korea. Still, the country having some protection against a potential North Korean strike beats having none. Just not if you're China.

### A2 NK Develop Around THAAD

#### Frontlines

### A2 Environment

#### 2. But if you choose not to count environmental reports as a good source, look to an article from the Korea Herald that found that the radiation levels in THAAD deployed areas are lower than global radiation limits. There’s no cause for concern.

Shin Hyon-hee, 7/18/16, “THAAD electromagnetic radiation in Guam near background level”, The Korea Herald, <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160718000845> //BB

The U.S. showed its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery stationed in Guam for the first time to the outside world on Tuesday as South Korea struggles to defuse concerns over the possible health and environmental impact of the system’s planned deployment here. Members of the local press kicked off a three-day tour to the Anderson Air Force Base alongside officials from Seoul’s Defense Ministry with the support of the U.S. military. They were scheduled to look around the battery, its associated AN/TPY-2 X-band radar and other facilities, examining the amount of electromagnetic radiation, the noise level of emergency generators and other possible impacts on the surrounding environment. The unprecedented trip came as rumors have been snowballing that the equipment may cause cancer, infertility and crop damage, since the allies unveiled their decision to deploy it on July 8 and picked Seongju, North Gyeongsang Province, as the location last Wednesday. The county residents expressed staunch opposition, calling for the plan to be shelved. During a demonstration, electromagnetic radiation measured 1.6 kilometers away from the radar peaked at 0.0007 and averaged at 0.0003 watts per square meter over a period of six minutes. The distance is similar to that between the proposed location and closest village in Seongju. The figures are far lower than the 10-watt-per-square-meter limit preserved in local and international guidelines, which indicate that exposure to greater levels could result in body-heat stress and excessive partial tissue heating, officials said. Due to noise from the generator, most conversations could not be heard when approaching the radar. But the noise faded away once arriving at a launch pad some 500 meters away.

### A2 Health

#### 1. The Health risk is completely overblown. Brian Padden of VOA News explains that South Korea’s current missile defense system emits amounts of radiation similar to THAAD and residents living near have developed no health problems

#### 2. Even if you buy THAAD might cause health concerns the South Korean government is taking precautionary measures to ensure it doesn't cause problems. Padden continues that the government has ensured there will be a 100 meter radius safety zone around the radar site and the battery will be placed 1.5 kilometers away from the nearest population center.

Brian Padden, 7/15/16, “THAAD Radiation Fears Spark South Korean Protests”, VOA News, <https://www.voanews.com/a/thaad-radition-fears-spark-south-korean-protests/3419467.html> //BB

Seoul’s Defense Ministry on Thursday tried to answer these concerns by taking a group of reporters to a previously undisclosed Patriot missile defense site in the Chungcheong region south of Seoul. The Patriot site has been in place since 2012 and uses a similar radar system to THAAD. Officials say residents living nearby have developed no health problems from the Patriot radar emissions. Military officials measured the electromagnetic waves being emitted by the Patriot radar during a demonstration for the gathered journalists. From a distance of 30 meters away from the radar system, the output peaked at 0.2658 watts per square meter, which is well below the 10 watts per square meter safety threshold. Officials said local law adheres to the 10 watts per square meter limit set by the International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection’s guidelines.

Brian Padden, 7/15/16, “THAAD Radiation Fears Spark South Korean Protests”, VOA News, <https://www.voanews.com/a/thaad-radition-fears-spark-south-korean-protests/3419467.html> //BB

Officials said local law adheres to the 10 watts per square meter limit set by the International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection’s guidelines. Exposure to waves exceeding this amount would lead to body-heat stress and excessive local tissue heating. Based on U.S. assessment, the South Korean Defense Ministry says it has set a 100 meter radius safety zone around the radar site. The military assured the residents the THAAD battery will be placed 1.5 kilometers away from the nearest population center and will not cause any adverse effects on the local community. The prime minister also apologized to Seongju residents for making the THAAD deployment decision “with prior notice.” Protesters in Seongju discount the government assurances and remain opposed to THAAD being deployed near their communities.

## A2 MD Bad

### A2: MD Bad General

#### 1. Turn, Brad Roberts of the Security Studies Center gives five reasons in on why Missile Defense is uniquely beneficial for curbing threats to national security:

#### 1. It creates uncertainty about the outcome of an attack in the mind of an attacker, thus raising the bright line for an attack to occur.

#### 2. Increases the raid size required for an attack to penetrate, thereby, undermining a strategy of firing one or two missiles and threatening more, thus reducing coercive leverage.

#### 3. Provides some assurance to allies and third party nations of some protection against some risks of precipitate action by the aggressor.

#### 4. Buys leadership time for choosing and implementing courses of action, including time for diplomacy.

#### 5. Reduces the political pressures for preemptive strikes.

Cards:

Brad Roberts. June 2014. “On the Strategic Value of Ballistic Missile Defense.” Security Studies Center. Proliferation Papers no. 50. [http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp50roberts.pdf //](http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp50roberts.pdf%20//) AA

In an emerging political-military crisis, one potentially transitioning from the gray zone to the red zone, missile defense has various strategic values. It: 1. It creates uncertainty about the outcome of an attack in the mind of an attacker. 2. Increases the raid size required for an attack to penetrate, thereby, undermining a strategy of firing one or two and threatening more, thus reducing coercive leverage. 3. Provides some assurance to allies and third party nations of some protection against some risks of precipitate action by the aggressor. 4. Buys leadership time for choosing and implementing courses of action, including time for diplomacy. 5. Reduces the political for preemptive strikes. In short, BMD helps to put the burden of escalation in an emerging crisis onto the adversary, thus helping the United States and its allies from escalation decision that might seem premature.

### A2: Escalate Tensions

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Turn, Roberts of the Security Studies Center 2014 explains that in a time of escalating tensions, a missile defense system is beneficial for 5 reasons: 1. It creates uncertainty about the outcome of an attack in the mind of an attacker. Thus, deterring them from doing so. 2. Increases the raid size required for an attack to penetrate, thereby, undermining a strategy of firing one or two and threatening more, thus reducing coercive leverage. 3. Provides some assurance to allies and third party nations of some protection against some risks of precipitate action by the aggressor. 4. Buys leadership time for choosing and implementing courses of action, including time for diplomacy. 5. Reduces the political pressure for preemptive strikes.

Cards:

Brad Roberts. June 2014. “On the Strategic Value of Ballistic Missile Defense.” Security Studies Center. Proliferation Papers no. 50. [http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp50roberts.pdf //](http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp50roberts.pdf%20//) AA

In an emerging political-military crisis, one potentially transitioning from the gray zone to the red zone, missile defense has various strategic values. It: 1. It creates uncertainty about the outcome of an attack in the mind of an attacker. 2. Increases the raid size required for an attack to penetrate, thereby, undermining a strategy of firing one or two and threatening more, thus reducing coercive leverage. 3. Provides some assurance to allies and third party nations of some protection against some risks of precipitate action by the aggressor. 4. Buys leadership time for choosing and implementing courses of action, including time for diplomacy. 5. Reduces the political for preemptive strikes. In short, BMD helps to put the burden of escalation in an emerging crisis onto the adversary, thus helping the United States and its allies from escalation decision that might seem premature.

### A2: Ineffective Deterrent

#### (5 responses)

#### 1. Turn, Bennett of the RAND Corporation 2016 explains that the missile defense system would increase the uncertainty of an attack thereby enhancing the deterrence of North Korean provocations.

#### 2. Turn, Kelley of Pusan National University indicates that the increased coverage provided by new missile defense deployments will be a massive improvement, given the obvious destructive capabilities of a ballistic missile, even if a 50/50 probability. Impacting that the increased assurance will reduce the paranoia that might encourage preemptive airstrikes. *This means that not only do we turn their link, but we solve for preemptive strikes which is a really easy place for you to vote pro.*

#### 3. Turn, Macias 2016 explains that South Korea is likely to deploy the most advanced system on the planet with a 100% success rate when neutralizing its target. If North Korea knows its missile strikes will fail, they won’t launch them in the first place.

#### 4. Turn, Newman of NYU 2017 explains that the deployment of a missile defense system in South Korea that is a powerful symbolic step, signifying that it cannot be coerced, thus, deploying missile defense will act as a deterrent to future conflict.

#### 5. Turn, Missile Defense from the USA reaffirms commitment. Dastjerdi of the Harvard Political Review 2015 explains that a stronger United States posture will extend deterrence through the US military dramatically raising the cost of conflict and forcing potential adversaries to back down from further escalation.

Cards:

Bruce W. Bennett [California Institute of Technology]. April 2016. “THAAD's Effect on South Korea's Neighbors.” RAND Corporation. [https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/04/the-effect-on-south-koreas-neighbors.html //](https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/04/the-effect-on-south-koreas-neighbors.html%20//) AA

More broadly, there are logical security arguments for China to favor THAAD deployment to South Korea. THAAD should enhance deterrence of North Korean provocations, including limited attacks, thereby helping to stop threats to regional instability from North Korea that China does not seek. Overall, China's objections appear to be motivated more by politics than meaningful military security concerns.

Dr. Robert E. Kelly [Pusan National University in South Korea]. April 2015. “South Korea’s THAAD Decision.” The Diplomat. April 13, 2015. thediplomat.com/2015/04/south-koreas-thaad-decision/ // AA

For perspective, it is worth nothing that South Korea does already have some local missile defense coverage from Patriot missiles (PAC-2 and -3), but these only provide narrow and low altitude defense. Similarly, Korea has tried on and off for years to develop its own Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), but it has never really panned out. It would cost a great deal and likely simply replicate most of what the Americans are offering right now for almost nothing. Meanwhile the case for high altitude defense grows more obvious with each day that North Korea’s programs continue. Whereas the PAC-3s would provide some defense just as the inbound missile approached its target, THAAD would reach higher up, giving South Korean defenders more chances to shoot down the missile. Technologically this is extraordinarily difficult. Missile defense is often likened to “hitting a bullet with another bullet,” and neither THAAD, PAC-3, nor Israel’s Iron Dome provide anything close to absolute coverage. But given the obvious destructive power of nuclear weapons, even 50/50 coverage would be a massive improvement in South Korean security and reduce the paranoia that might encourage preemptive airstrikes. (For technical details on THAAD, try here and here.)

Amanda Macias 16 [Editor; Business Insider - Military and Defense]. July 9, 2016. North Korea will now have America's most advanced missile system in its backyard (<http://www.businessinsider.com/thaad-missile-defense-south-korea-north-2016)> // AA

The most advanced missile system on the planet can hunt and blast incoming missiles right out of the sky with a 100% success rate — and it appears to be headed to North Korea's backyard. On the heels of bilateral sanctions by Seoul and Washington, plus layers of UN sanctions, the Pentagon agreed to equip South Korea with the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile-defense system. "North Korea's continued development of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction require the alliance to take this prudent, protective measure to bolster our layered and effective missile defense," US Army Gen. Vincent Brooks, commander of US forces in South Korea, said in a statement. The pressure to deploy THAAD began after North Korea tested its fourth nuclear bomb on January 6 and then launched a long-range rocket on February 7. "Oh, it's going to happen. It's a necessary thing," US Defense Secretary Ash Carter said during a discussion at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in April. "We need to defend our own people. We need to defend our own allies. And we're going to do that."

Lily Hay Newman [NYU]. May 2017. “South Korea’s New Missile Defense Tech Isn’t A Cure-All For North Korea.” WIRED. <https://www.wired.com/2017/05/south-koreas-new-missile-defense-tech-isnt-cure-north-korea/> // AA

A YEAR AFTER it was first announced, the United States-provided missile defense system meant to guard [in] South Korea is fully operational. The device has sparked controversy and pushback from China, but it's [is] a powerful symbolic step that should provide some legitimate protection from an increasingly volatile North Korea. It also has some important limitations.

Ali Dastjerdi [Harvard University]. 16 December 2015. “The Case for Credible Chinese Deterrence.” Harvard Political Review. <http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/case-credible-chinese-deterrence/> // AA

Even if a stronger United States posture might cause a reciprocal Chinese response, deterrence is indispensable for ushering in a peaceful future for East Asia. China’s dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Islands is the most likely [flashpoint](http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ISEC_a_00114#.Vkad2oRuHzI) for regional or even global conflict. Since 2013, escalation both on the part of China and Japan has brought the nations to the brink of war. The United States in 2015 [declared](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/24/obama-in-japan-backs-status-quo-in-island-dispute-with-china) that it was willing to defend the islands as a part of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. This explicit declaration by the United States dramatically raised the cost of conflict over the islands and [forced](http://www.cfr.org/japan/us-japan-security-alliance/p31437) China to back down from further escalation.

### A2: No Protect Seoul

#### (6 responses)

#### 1. [Terminal Defense] My opponent’s argument about Seoul not being protected only applies to one specific class of missile defense. However, once you factor in the Aegis, Patriot, and THAAD missile defense systems together, Seoul is protected.

#### 2. Turn, Newman of NYU 2017 explains that the missile defense system is placed to protect US troops because in the event of an attack from North Korea, protecting the force that will be leading the defense is in South Korea’s best interest.

#### 3. Delink, Ali of Reuters 2017 explains that South Korea controls enough of its that infrastructure that they could make it not worth it for the U.S. to set up a single isolated and poorly-sited THAAD battery. If you buy that Missile defense is good, we can always change their locations.

#### 4. Turn, Bennett of the California Institute of Technology 2016 quantifies that the missile defense system in South Korea could potentially save up to 500,000 lives, and saving a life in any part of the country is the same, Seoul or not.

#### 5. Turn, If my opponents only problem with missile defense is that we don’t have enough, that is conceding that missile defense works. That’s a really easy place for you to vote affirmative.

#### 6. [Turn – Good for ensuring National Security] Pickston of Rider University 2016 explains that the current placement of THAAD is key to ensuring the survivability and retaliatory capability of South Korea against a North Korean attack. Which he indicates is key to preventing North Korea from becoming more militarily adventurous.

Cards:

Lily Hay Newman [NYU]. May 2017. “South Korea’s New Missile Defense Tech Isn’t A Cure-All For North Korea.” WIRED. <https://www.wired.com/2017/05/south-koreas-new-missile-defense-tech-isnt-cure-north-korea/> // AA

"That’s the area through which US forces would flow to Korea if they were coming to help the South Koreans defend the country. They would come through Busan, not Seoul," Bennett says. "The US also figured that if South Korea really wants to defend Seoul, they can buy a THAAD battery of their own." The US only had one THAAD to offer so it went to a place that prioritized US interests. President Trump indicated that he thought it would be "appropriate" for South Korea to pay for the installed system, but national security adviser H.R. McMaster confirmed this week that the US would bear financial responsibility.

Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali. March 10, 2017. “U.S. forges ahead with South Korea missile defenses, despite upheaval.” Reuters. [http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-politics-usa-thaad-idUSKBN16H29S //](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-politics-usa-thaad-idUSKBN16H29S%20//) AA

North Korea missile expert John Schilling, a contributor to the U.S. monitoring group 38 North, said any future South Korean leader would have a hard time objecting to THAAD if it meant jeopardizing the alliance with the United States. But he noted that South Korea still had leverage. "THAAD works best when it is operated in conjunction with existing Patriot and Aegis missiles and an integrated command and control system," Schilling said. "South Korea controls enough of that infrastructure that they could make it not worth the bother for the U.S. to set up a single isolated and poorly-sited THAAD battery."

Bruce W. Bennett [California Institute of Technology]. April 2016. “THAAD's Effect on South Korea's Neighbors.” RAND Corporation. <https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/09/on-northeast-asia.html> // AA

Regardless, THAAD offers the ROK important protection against the North Korean missile and nuclear weapon threat. Of the 50 North Korean ballistic missiles that THAAD could destroy, if only five carried nuclear weapons aimed at ROK cities, THAAD could potentially save the lives of half a million or more ROK citizens. How can anyone say that such an outcome would not enhance regional security?

Daniel Pinkston [Rider University]. July 2016. “Why it makes sense to deploy THAAD in South Korea.” NK News. <https://www.nknews.org/2016/07/why-it-makes-sense-to-deploy-thaad-in-south-korea/> // AA

Some South Koreans are critical of THAAD because it will provide protection for U.S. military facilities but no protection for Seoul. THAAD will not provide missile defense for Seoul and no protection against thousands of artillery tubes aimed the Seoul-Incheon metropolitan area. However, the survivability of U.S. and ROK military facilities in the middle and southern part of the country is critical for the execution of a counter-strike against a North Korean attack. Without that survivability, deterrence would be undermined and the leadership in Pyongyang might decide that military adventurism would further its strategic goals, which are completing the revolution in the South and unifying Korea under the leadership of the Korean Workers Party.

### A2: Overconfidence

#### (3 responses)

#### 1. Delink, historical precedence, Realize we’ve had missile defense for 30 years in South Korea alongside a constant North Korean threat, yet, the two have never resulted in an overconfident South Korea invading the North.

#### 2. Turn, Robert Kelley of Pusan University in 2015 explains that missile defense given the destructive power of nuclear weapons, would be a massive improvement in South Korean security thus, reducing the paranoia that encourages preemptive. Even if South Korea and the United States feel more confident in conducting a strike, in a world with missile defense, we solve for the possible intent to preemptively strike North Korea.

#### 3. Turn, Mazza of the American Enterprise Institute explains in 2017 that if the goal of the Unite States is to denuclearize the Korean peninsula, it must diverse the North of its leader. This means that we concede that the US wants denuclearization currently which means the probability of a preemptive strike to overthrow the Kim regime is already high even in a world without missile defense.

Cards:

Dr. Robert E. Kelly [Pusan National University in South Korea]. April 2015. “South Korea’s THAAD Decision.” The Diplomat. April 13, 2015. thediplomat.com/2015/04/south-koreas-thaad-decision/ // AA

For perspective, it is worth nothing that South Korea does already have some local missile defense coverage from Patriot missiles (PAC-2 and -3), but these only provide narrow and low altitude defense. Similarly, Korea has tried on and off for years to develop its own Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), but it has never really panned out. It would cost a great deal and likely simply replicate most of what the Americans are offering right now for almost nothing. Meanwhile the case for high altitude defense grows more obvious with each day that North Korea’s programs continue. Whereas the PAC-3s would provide some defense just as the inbound missile approached its target, THAAD would reach higher up, giving South Korean defenders more chances to shoot down the missile. Technologically this is extraordinarily difficult. Missile defense is often likened to “hitting a bullet with another bullet,” and neither THAAD, PAC-3, nor Israel’s Iron Dome provide anything close to absolute coverage. But given the obvious destructive power of nuclear weapons, even 50/50 coverage would be a massive improvement in South Korean security and reduce the paranoia that might encourage preemptive airstrikes. (For technical details on THAAD, try here and here.)

Michael Mazza (research fellow in foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute), Inside Asia, Forbes, 7-4-2017, ["Neither Negotiation Nor Nuclear Strike: How The U.S. Can Disable The North Korean Threat," https://www.forbes.com/sites/insideasia/2017/08/09/neither-negotiation-nor-nuclear-strike-how-the-u-s-can-disable-the-north-korean-threat/#74404539534f, 8-10-2017] // AA

The administration made an early error in concluding that Kim Jong Un could be coaxed or coerced into giving up his nuclear weapons. He cannot. My AEI colleague Nicholas Eberstad [explains why](https://www.nationalreview.com/nrd/articles/431156/seeing-north-korea): "In Pyongyang’s thinking, the indispensable instrument for achieving the DPRK’s grand historical ambitions must be a supremely powerful military: more specifically, one possessed of a nuclear arsenal that can imperil and break the foreign enemies who protect and prop up the vile puppet state in the south, so that the DPRK can consummate its unconditional unification and give birth to its envisioned earthly Korean-race utopia." Put simply, Kim can’t give up his nukes without threatening the very legitimacy -- such as it is -- of his rule. The only way to divorce North Korea of its nuclear weapons is to divorce it of it of its ruler.

### A2: Radiation

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Delink, Elich of the Korean Policy Institute 2016 explains that when Korean officials tested the electromagnetic radiation from the same missile defense systems in Guam, the highest dosage was far below any conceivable level of risk.

Cards:

Gregory Elich. August 2016. “THAAD Comes to Korea, But At What Cost?” Korean Policy Institute. <http://stopthaad.org/post-316/> // AA

The key question for those living in Seongju is the threshold level they will be exposed to. In order to allay concerns, U.S. and South Korean military officials arranged for Korean reporters to visit Guam, which hosts a THAAD battery. There, electromagnetic waves were measured at a distance of 1.6 kilometers from the AN/TPY-2 radar. The population of Seongju is said to live a similar distance from the proposed site of the THAAD battery. Reassuringly, it was reported that the highest measurement taken during the Guam demonstration was 0.0007 watts per square meter, far below any conceivable level of risk. [[ix]](http://kpolicy.org/thaad-comes-to-korea-but-at-what-cost/" \l "_edn9) Since electromagnetic waves become weaker with distance, as confirmed by the low reading, the matter of health hazard would seem to have been put to rest.

### A2: Artillery Threat

#### (4 responses)

#### 1. Delink, South Korea just created a solution. Pickrell of the Daily Caller 17 explains that South Korea has developed a new radar system to detect and protect South Korean cities from North Korean artillery.

#### 2. Delink, Mizokami 2017 writes that operational issues of the North Korean artillery mitigate the threat. He furthers that only a third of North Korea’s artillery can be fired at a time.

#### 3. Delink, Mizokami 2017 explains that North Korea will not use its artillerty because it would soften up its border defenses against US-ROK counter measures.

#### 4. Turn, Anti-Missile systems solve. Anti-missile systems are any device designed to combat the offensive power of missiles. Thus, advanced radar that can detect the origin of artillery fire leading to a quicker neutralization of the threat solves back.

Cards:

Ryan Pickrell, 4/24/2017, “South Korea’s Got A New Weapon Against North Korean Artillery”, Daily Caller, http://dailycaller.com/2017/04/24/south-koreas-got-a-new-weapon-against-north-korean-artillery/

**South Korea has developed a new radar system to detect North Korean artillery units, an immediate and ever-present threat.** While North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs receive the most attention, North Korean artillery poses a serious threat to South Korea. The North is said to have one of the world’s largest artillery forces, and most of the artillery pieces — of which there are thousands — are already in position, entrenched and camouflaged. Some observers suspect that in the event of a conflict, North Korea could destroy Seoul in less than two hours. South Korea **appears to have** found a new defensive tool to protect its cities from North Korean artillery.The South’s new radar system can detect North Korean artillery units over 40 miles away. The South Korean military presently has a number of ARTHUR (Artillery Hunting Radar) units with ranges around 25 miles, South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration revealed in a statement, according to Yonhap News Agency. The radar can also run for eight hours straight, about two hours longer than its Swedish predecessor. **“With the successful development of the counter-battery radar, our military has laid the groundwork for destroying the origin of the enemy’s provocations, if carried out, in the early stage of combat, through immediate counter-fire,”** Army Colonel Kim Dong-ho, a senior DAPA official, told reporters.

Kyle Mizokami, 4/25/2017, “Could North Korea Annihilate Seoul with Its Artillery?”, National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/could-north-korea-annihilate-seoul-its-artillery-20345?page=2

A 2011 study by the Nautilus Institute throws a considerable amount of cold water on this scenario. While the sheer number of artillery tubes could theoretically kill a large number of civilians, operational issues complicate matters and push the number of civilian casualties greatly downward. Despite the thousands of artillery pieces, **only 700** heavier guns and rocket launchers, plus the newer 300-millimeter MRLs, have the range to strike Seoul. Only a third would normally be fired at once, and notional rates of fire would be slowed tremendously by the need to withdraw guns into their hardened artillery sites (HARTS) to shelter them from counter battery fire.

Kyle Mizokami, 4/25/2017, “Could North Korea Annihilate Seoul with Its Artillery?”, National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/could-north-korea-annihilate-seoul-its-artillery-20345?page=2

Finally, **the North would face a strategic dilemma. Artillery used to bomb Seoul could not be used to soften up border defenses for a general invasion, and in wartime it would be critical to capture the enemy capital quickly as possible.** An all-out bombardment of the South Korean capital might very well leave Pyongyang without the ability to actually capture it, while at the same time **ensuring a U.S./South Korean counteroffensive that would spell the end of the regime of Kim Jong-un. Even if a million civilians were killed in Seoul it would ensure Kim’s untimely demise, and from his perspective that is still almost certainly a very bad trade.**

### A2: Submarines

#### 1. Delink, Starr of CNN reports on July 20th that North Korea's submarine fleet is believed to encompass around 70 submarines, however THEY CONTAIN SOVIET ERA TECH AND NONE OF THEM CAN FIRE MISSILES.

#### 2. Turn, Yun of Johns Hopkins University concludes missile defense promotes cooperation between Japan and South Korea. Thankfully, he furthers that Japan’s Self-Defense Forces have world class anti-submarine capabilities. We solve back.

Cards:

Barbara Starr and Ryan Browne, Cnn, CNN, 7-20-2017, ["US intelligence shows North Korean preparations for a possible missile test," http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/19/politics/north-korea-possible-missile-test/index.html, 7-22-2017] // AA

North Korea's submarine fleet is believed to encompass around 70 subs, though the majority are quite old and likely cannot fire missiles. When taken together, these developments are concerning because North Korea says it is trying to develop a missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to the United States. Pyongyang has long maintained the ability to legitimately threaten the United States with a nuclear attack is the only way to protect itself against any US-led attempts at regime change. Land-based and submarine-based missiles are considered two-thirds of what is known as the "Strategic Triad," a theory that a state must have land, air and sea based nuclear attack capabilities to successful deter an enemy from trying to attack it.

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In this respect, Seoul has every reason to cooperate with Tokyo. Japan’s Self-Defense Force (SDF) already operates four intelligence satellites to monitor the northern part of the Korean Peninsula. Japan is planning to increase the number of satellites up to 10 in the coming years. In addition, the SDF [Japan] possesses world-class anti-submarine capabilities. This is especially important now that North Korea is developing its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) program. Last but not least, South Korea’s grand strategy is predicated upon its alliance with the United States, which deems Japan as the cornerstone of its Asia policy. As a result, any sensible South Korean policymakers who care about national security would, whether they like it or not, pursue the GSOMIA.

### A2: THAAD Ineffective

#### (2 responses)

#### 1. Turn, Bennett of RAND 2016 explains that one THAAD missile defense system can destroy 50 North Korean ballistic missiles at a time. We’re the only ones securing South Korea, affirm right there.

#### 2. Turn, Dr. Park of RAND concludes that improved missile defense systems are required to deny North Korea its military objectives and take away what leverage it already has. She concludes that having an advanced missile defense system is the most feasible and practical solution to the North Korea problem. *You should prefer this evidence because it is COMPARATIVE as Park empirically compared the expected utility of a world with versus that without the Missile Defense Systems and accounted for various economic, political, and militaristic decisions that North Korea may make.*

Cards:

Bruce W. Bennett [California Institute of Technology]. April 2016. “THAAD's Effect on South Korea's Neighbors.” RAND Corporation. <https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/09/on-northeast-asia.html> // AA

Even then, China does not seem to understand the regional implications of the THAAD missile defense system. One fully-deployed THAAD battery is capable of destroying perhaps 50 North Korean ballistic missiles. North Korean planners, recognizing the THAAD capabilities, would need to shift missiles away from targeting China to rebalance its attacks once THAAD is deployed in Korea. Thus THAAD would likely reduce the number of North Korean ballistic missiles targeted on China, a significant improvement in Chinese and regional security.

Ki-Tae Park [PhD; Pardee RAND Graduate School]. “Analyzing North Korea's Decision-Making Process on its Nuclear Weapons Programs with the Rational Choice and Cognitive Choice Models.” 2010.

\*\* [Pg. 3-31] Prefer this evidence because Park empirically compared the expected utility of a world with versus that without the Missile Defense Systems to identify the better scenario. Accounting for various economic, political, and militaristic decisions that may be made to most accurately identify the best policy options.\*\*

Improve[d] Missile Defense Systems. Some measures to effectively intercept incoming North Korea’s ballistic missiles are needed to deny North Korea its military objectives. The ROK military has currently decided to replace its antiquated aerial defense systems with advanced Pac-3 systems in an effort to defend its key military assets, including air bases. But it seems to be quite limited in achieving its strategic goal of denying North Korea because it is designed to defend limited military establishments. Considering North Korea’s limited capability in missile accuracy, its missiles are supposed to be aimed at major cities in Korea and Japan to maximize fears and chaos in an effort to press each government to sever its alliance with the United States, though one would not absolutely rule out targeting military installations. As a result, expanding the area coverage of air defense against North Korea’s incoming ballistic missiles is an important step to deny Pyongyang’s military objectives and participating in a joint TMD (Theater Ballistic Missile Defense) project with the United States and Japan appears to be one of the most feasible and practical solutions to address this problem.

### A2: THAAD Inaccurate

#### (5 responses)

#### 1. Delink, The Hong Kong Economic Journal explains on July 12th that THAAD successfully intercepted an incoming missile that is faster and more difficult to target to hit that short-range missiles North Korea is developing.

#### 2. Turn, The Economist explains that even if you buy that missile defense is inaccurate, conservative estimates indicate it will shoot down 90% of missiles. Concluding that South Korea is safer in a world with missile defense compared to a world without.

#### 3. Turn, Elleman of 38North in her empirical analysis explains that each THAAD battery can take down 20-50 missiles simultaneously. Even if you buy missile defense is inaccurate, empirically, missile defense will mitigate the impact of a strike, thus, comparatively saving more lives.

#### 4. Turn, Roberts of the Security Studies Center 2014 explains that the deployment of THAAD has symbolic significance past its effectiveness. Such as reassuring allies of protection against North Korean provocations and reducing the political pressure for preemptive strikes. We are preventing a conflict from breaking out which means 0 missiles will reach the South Korean people. That’s just as good as 100% accuracy.

#### 5. Turn, Macias 2016 explains that the THAAD missile defense system is the most advanced system on the planet with a 100% success rate for neutralizing its target. While Klingner 2015 furthers that the THAAD has an 11 out of 11 success rate in testing.

Cards:

Hang Kong Economic Journal, Jul 12, EJ Insight, 7-12-2017, ["THADD missile defense thwarts mock attack: US," http://www.ejinsight.com/20170712-thadd-missile-defense-thwarts-mock-attack-says-us/, 7-24-2017] // AA

The United States said it has shot down a simulated, incoming intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) similar to the ones being developed by countries like North Korea, in a new test of the nation’s THAAD missile defenses, Reuters reports. Planned months ago, the US missile defense test over the Pacific Ocean has gained significance after North Korea’s July 4 launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) heightened concerns about the threat from Pyongyang. Tuesday’s test was the first-ever of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system against an incoming IRBM, which experts say is a faster and more difficult target to hit than shorter-range missiles.

The Economist. March 2017. “Why China is wrong to be furious about THAAD.” [https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21719485-deployment-american-anti-missile-system-south-korea-does-not-threaten-chinas-nuclear //](https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21719485-deployment-american-anti-missile-system-south-korea-does-not-threaten-chinas-nuclear%20//) AA

It is also wrong to suggest that THAAD does nothing to protect South Korea from the North. In a paper for 38 North, a website, Mr Elleman and Michael Zagurek calculate that faced with 50-missile salvoes, a layered defence consisting of South Korea’s Patriot system and two THAAD batteries (another may be deployed when it is available) would probably destroy 90% of incoming land-based missiles. The threat that one of the 10% getting through might be carrying a nuclear warhead would not be eliminated. But South Korea is a lot safer with THAAD than without it.

Bruce Klingner, 9-1-2015, "THE IMPORTANCE OF THAAD MISSILE DEFENSE.: EBSCOhost." <http://web.a.ebscohost.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=40f0c29c-3dcb-49ce-aa2b-a4fc5cf254c8%40sessionmgr4002&amp;vid=1&amp;hid=4112>(Bruce Klingner specializes in Korean and Japanese affairs as the senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center.)

A basic precept of air and missile defense is “mass and mix”- having sufficient interceptors from different systems so that any one system’s vulnerabilities are offset by the capabilities of another system. South Korea’s insistence on relying on only lower-altitude interceptors will result in smaller protected zones, gaps of coverage that leave fewer Korean citizens protected, and minimal time to intercept a missile—all of which contribute to a greater potential for catastrophic failure. Successfully destroying a high-speed inbound missile requires intercepting it sufficiently far away from the target. The higher the altitude and range of the interceptor, the greater the likelihood of success. Seoul’s insistence on only a last ditch interceptor is like a soccer coach dismissing all of the team’s players except the goalie, preferring to rely on only one player to defend against defeat. The THAAD system is designed to intercept short-range, medium-range, and some intermediate-range ballistic missiles trajectories at higher altitudes in their terminal phase. In conjunction with the Patriot missile system, THAAD would create a multilayered defensive shield for South Korean military forces, population centers, and critical targets. South Korea’s planned indigenous L-SAM would have less altitude and range than THAAD and would not be available for deployment until at least 2023. However, that target date is unlikely since creating a missile defense system is a long, expensive, and difficult process. For example, the THAAD took approximately 30 years for the U.S. to fully develop, test, and field. The THAAD has already been developed, tested (scoring a 100 percent success rate of 11 for 11 successful intercepts), and deployed.

Brad Roberts. June 2014. “On the Strategic Value of Ballistic Missile Defense.” Security Studies Center. Proliferation Papers no. 50. [http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp50roberts.pdf //](http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp50roberts.pdf%20//) AA

In an emerging political-military crisis, one potentially transitioning from the gray zone to the red zone, missile defense has various strategic values. It: 1. It creates uncertainty about the outcome of an attack in the mind of an attacker. 2. Increases the raid size required for an attack to penetrate, thereby, undermining a strategy of firing one or two and threatening more, thus reducing coercive leverage. 3. Provides some assurance to allies and third party nations of some protection against some risks of precipitate action by the aggressor. 4. Buys leadership time for choosing and implementing courses of action, including time for diplomacy. 5. Reduces the political for preemptive strikes. In short, BMD helps to put the burden of escalation in an emerging crisis onto the adversary, thus helping the United States and its allies from escalation decision that might seem premature.

Michael Elleman and Michael J. Zagurek, Jr. “THAAD: What It Can and Can’t Do.” March 10, 2016. 38North. [https://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/2016-03-10\_THAAD-What-It-Can-and-Cant-Do.pdf //](https://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/2016-03-10_THAAD-What-It-Can-and-Cant-Do.pdf%20//) AA

While THAAD can provide an important additional capability to protect for South Korea, a critical question is whether Pyongyang’s large missile inventory will afford it opportunities to overwhelm the postulated one-to-two THAAD battery architecture. A single THAAD battery holds a limited number of ready-to-launch interceptors, likely ranging from 48 to 96. Spare interceptors can be stockpiled, though at great expense. This implies that one THAAD battery can defend against 20 and 50 attacking missiles if two interceptors are assigned to each incoming warhead. If additional interceptors are available, the launch canisters can be reloaded within an hour or so. However, there is no assurance that North Korea would pause firing its missiles to allow THAAD to reload. And given that North Korea has hundreds of Hwasong and Nodong missiles, one can easily recognize how large the defenses would have to be if the mission was to attempt intercepts on all incoming missiles over an extended time. Further, the AN/TPY-2 firecontrol radar is limited in terms of the number of objects it can track while also providing updated guidance information to the interceptors in flight. Once again, if North Korea launches more than roughly 20 missiles simultaneously, this would likely saturate the radar, as it would necessarily be tracking 60 objects at once. The precise limitations are classified, though it is clear that if the objective is to blunt large salvos from North Korea, at least two or more THAAD batteries would be required.

Amanda Macias 16 [Editor; Business Insider - Military and Defense]. July 9, 2016. North Korea will now have America's most advanced missile system in its backyard (<http://www.businessinsider.com/thaad-missile-defense-south-korea-north-2016)> // AA

The most advanced missile system on the planet can hunt and blast incoming missiles right out of the sky with a 100% success rate — and it appears to be headed to North Korea's backyard. On the heels of bilateral sanctions by Seoul and Washington, plus layers of UN sanctions, the Pentagon agreed to equip South Korea with the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile-defense system. "North Korea's continued development of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction require the alliance to take this prudent, protective measure to bolster our layered and effective missile defense," US Army Gen. Vincent Brooks, commander of US forces in South Korea, said in a statement. The pressure to deploy THAAD began after North Korea tested its fourth nuclear bomb on January 6 and then launched a long-range rocket on February 7. "Oh, it's going to happen. It's a necessary thing," US Defense Secretary Ash Carter said during a discussion at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in April. "We need to defend our own people. We need to defend our own allies. And we're going to do that."

### A2: THAAD Long Range

#### (2 responses)

#### 1. Delink Elleman of 38North explains that THAAD would be incorporated into a multilayered missile defense architecture that would successfully intercept missiles at all altitudes.

#### 2. Delink, The Hong Kong Economic Journal explains on July 12th that THAAD successfully intercepted an incoming missile that is faster and more difficult to target to hit that short-range missiles North Korea is developing.

Cards:

Michael Elleman and Michael J. Zagurek, Jr. “THAAD: What It Can and Can’t Do.” March 10, 2016. US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University. 38North. [https://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/2016-03-10\_THAAD-What-It-Can-and-Cant-Do.pdf //](https://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/2016-03-10_THAAD-What-It-Can-and-Cant-Do.pdf%20//) AA

While two THAAD batteries can be deployed in such a way to cover all of South Korea, an additional critical question is how effective will the system be in destroying incoming missiles. Because THAAD intercepts targets at altitudes above 50 km and is capable of protecting large areas, it ideally complements the lower-tier PAC-3, which protects point targets. In essence, intercepting targets at multiple levels, or tiers, offers more opportunities to succeed and improves intercept efficiency, which is the calculated number of interceptors needed to achieve a specified measure of protection. Interceptor efficiency is governed primarily by the probability an individual interceptor will collide with and destroy a missile or warhead. It is often referred to as the “single-shot probability of kill,” or SSPk. Historically, missile-defense designers at the US Missile Defense Agency have sought to achieve SSPk values of between 0.8 and 0.9, which means a single interceptor should succeed 80 to 90 percent of the time. Recent development and validation testing of THAAD indicate a kill probability of 0.8 is feasible, though design goals and test results may not be replicated under wartime conditions. Nonetheless, assuming an SSPk of 0.8 offers a measuring stick for evaluating the theoretical benefits of deploying THAAD in South Korea.

Hang Kong Economic Journal, Jul 12, EJ Insight, 7-12-2017, ["THADD missile defense thwarts mock attack: US," http://www.ejinsight.com/20170712-thadd-missile-defense-thwarts-mock-attack-says-us/, 7-24-2017] // AA

The United States said it has shot down a simulated, incoming intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) similar to the ones being developed by countries like North Korea, in a new test of the nation’s THAAD missile defenses, Reuters reports. Planned months ago, the US missile defense test over the Pacific Ocean has gained significance after North Korea’s July 4 launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) heightened concerns about the threat from Pyongyang. Tuesday’s test was the first-ever of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system against an incoming IRBM, which experts say is a faster and more difficult target to hit than shorter-range missiles.

### A2: Aegis Ineffective

#### (4 responses)

#### 1. Delink, Even if you buy that the Aegis Missile Defense System is poor individually, the resolution asks us to look at missile defense holistically. And Reuters 2017 indicates that each missile defense works best when operating in conjunction with the other existing systems. Thus, make them tell you why all missile defense is bad, not just one of the three primary systems.

#### 2. Delink, Lockheed Martin explains that the aegis missile defense system is currently being upgraded to BMD 4.0.1, enabling the U.S. Missile Defense Agency and the Navy to defeat more complex ballistic missile threats and also introduces the upgrade includes a new signal processor, which improves target identification. Or put simply the upgrades make Aegis more accurate and effective and we’re solving the problems they talk about now.

#### 3. Delink, Lendon of Ohio State explains that the AEGIS missile defense system is able to accurately track and fire interceptors at 100 missiles simultaneously and has proved its success by destroying a spy satellite that was crashing to Earth and would have released toxic gas.

#### 4. Delink, The SagaMore Institute explains that the Aegis missile defense system has an 83% success rate.

Cards:

Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali. March 10, 2017. “U.S. forges ahead with South Korea missile defenses, despite upheaval.” Reuters. [http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-politics-usa-thaad-idUSKBN16H29S //](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-politics-usa-thaad-idUSKBN16H29S%20//) AA

North Korea missile expert John Schilling, a contributor to the U.S. monitoring group 38 North, said any future South Korean leader would have a hard time objecting to THAAD if it meant jeopardizing the alliance with the United States. But he noted that South Korea still had leverage. "THAAD works best when it is operated in conjunction with existing Patriot and Aegis missiles and an integrated command and control system," Schilling said. "South Korea controls enough of that infrastructure that they could make it not worth the bother for the U.S. to set up a single isolated and poorly-sited THAAD battery."

No author. 2010. “Lockheed Martin Successfully Completes Formal Testing of Second-Generation Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Capability.” Lockheed Martian. [http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/press-releases/2010/september/091610\_aegis\_bmd.html //](http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/press-releases/2010/september/091610_aegis_bmd.html%20//) AA

Lockheed Martin (NYSE: LMT) recently demonstrated the second generation of its Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability in a formal U.S. Navy test event. This configuration, known as Aegis BMD 4.0.1, enables the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Navy to defeat more complex ballistic missile threats and also introduces the BMD signal processor, which improves target identification. Aegis BMD 4.0.1 marks the beginning of the transition to the Navy's open architecture – a transition that will be complete with software upgrades, known as Advanced Capability Build 12, scheduled for 2012. "This milestone represents the continuing evolution of Aegis that will lead to the merger of Aegis open architecture and Aegis BMD in 2012," said Nick Bucci, Lockheed Martin director of BMD development programs. "This next-generation signal processor upgrade provides a leap-ahead capability that improves system effectiveness against expanding enemy threats." This upgrade is enhanced by the Aegis system's ability to incorporate commercial off-the-shelf computing technology and open architecture standards. Further testing – a tracking exercise this fall and an at sea intercept test in March 2011 – will result in certification and deployment in September 2011. The MDA and the Navy are jointly developing and fielding Aegis BMD as part of the United States' BMD system. Recently the Navy's independent operational test agent assessed the first generation Aegis BMD and SM-3 Block IA system to be operationally effective and operationally suitable.

Brad Lendon, Ohio State University. March 2017. "How US could stop a North Korean missile." CNN. [http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/14/politics/us-north-korea-aegis-ballistic-missile-defense/index.html //](http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/14/politics/us-north-korea-aegis-ballistic-missile-defense/index.html%20//) MC

When North Korea launched the missile on February 12, the US Navy had two destroyers in the Sea of Japan with the ability to shoot it down, a US defense official said. The guided missile destroyers, USS Stethem and USS McCampbell, are equipped with the Aegis ballistic missile defense system, which is able to track 100 missiles simultaneously and fire interceptors to take out an enemy's ballistic projectiles. "The Aegis system is very capable at tracking and engaging ballistic missile systems," said Carl Schuster, a Hawaii Pacific University professor and former director of operations at the US Pacific Command's Joint Intelligence Center. In what some say is the system's most noteworthy success, Aegis was used to destroy an inoperable spy satellite in 2008 when officials feared the satellite could crash to Earth and potentially release a cloud of toxic gas.

Alan W. Dowd. 2 June 2015. "Capstones: Missiles, Mistakes and Madmen." Saga More Institute. [http://www.sagamoreinstitute.org/blog/capstones-missiles-mistakes-and-madmen //](http://www.sagamoreinstitute.org/blog/capstones-missiles-mistakes-and-madmen%20//) MC

In testing, this system of systems has scored successes on 66 of 82 hit-to-kill intercept attempts since 2001. That’s an 80-percent success rate. The Aegis sea-based system has achieved 29 successful intercepts in 35 attempts. The ground-based interceptor (which targets inbound threats near their highest point) has hit 9 of 17 intercept attempts. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD, which targets threats near the end of their flight trajectories) has scored a perfect 11 out of 11 in testing.

### A2: Patriot Ineffective

#### 1. Delink, Even if you buy that the Patriot Missile Defense System is poor individually, the resolution asks us to look at missile defense holistically. And Reuters 2017 indicates that each missile defense works best when operating in conjunction with the other existing systems. Thus, make them tell you why all missile defense is bad, not just one of the three primary systems.

#### 2. Delink, Osborn of Columbia University 2017 explains that the Patriot Missile Defense system is now being upgraded to increase the range of threats it can destroy. The new upgrade includes new tech which will increase the accuracy and efficacy of the system.

Cards:

Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali. March 10, 2017. “U.S. forges ahead with South Korea missile defenses, despite upheaval.” Reuters. [http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-politics-usa-thaad-idUSKBN16H29S //](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-politics-usa-thaad-idUSKBN16H29S%20//) AA

North Korea missile expert John Schilling, a contributor to the U.S. monitoring group 38 North, said any future South Korean leader would have a hard time objecting to THAAD if it meant jeopardizing the alliance with the United States. But he noted that South Korea still had leverage. "THAAD works best when it is operated in conjunction with existing Patriot and Aegis missiles and an integrated command and control system," Schilling said. "South Korea controls enough of that infrastructure that they could make it not worth the bother for the U.S. to set up a single isolated and poorly-sited THAAD battery."

Kris Osbron [Columbia University]. February 2017. “U.S. Army Upgrades PATRIOT Missile to Kill Multiple Threats.” The National Interest. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/us-army-upgrades-patriot-missile-kill-multiple-threats-19308 // AA

The US Army and key allies around the world are now analyzing a radar and targeting upgrade to the Patriot missile able to increase the range of threats it can destroy -- to include a wider range of drones, rotary wing aircraft, cruise missiles, extended range tactical ballistic missiles and high-speed aircraft. The Raytheon prototype upgrade includes the addition of new technology designed to keep pace with fast-emerging threats well above and beyond the tactical ballistic missiles for which the weapon was initially designed.

### A2: KC Bad

#### (3 responses)

#### 1. Turn, In the event of a conflict, kill chain is the only way to ensure that we can maximize the number of lives saved. As it would allow South Korea to eliminate the North’s offensive capabilities thus, preventing a missile launch before it happens.

#### 2. Turn – No Backlash, Fontaine of the War on Rocks 17 explains that the Kim regime would likely absorb an attack without striking South Korea or Japan for fear of incurring an American campaign aimed at ending the regime.

#### 3. Turn, Former assistant Defense Secretary Long explains in 2017 that kill chain is able to destroy any missile larger than a SCUD, before liftoff. Thus, kill chain is a comprehensive missile defense system that can rid of any risk of a missile harming South Korea.

Cards:

Ryan Pickrell [Central China Normal University]. 4/2017, “What Would Happen If Kim Jong-Un Launched A Nuclear Strike?”, Daily Caller, http://dailycaller.com/2017/04/14/what-would-happen-if-kim-jong-un-launched-a-nuclear-strike/

The U.S. and its allies in the region are by no means unprepared for a North Korean nuclear attack. The U.S. and South Korea both have preemptive strike plans for a situation in which a North Korean nuclear attack appears imminent, and while Japan is considering new options, it still relies heavily on U.S. defense. South Korea has a three-stage defense system, the first stage of which is a **preemptive strike option designed to eliminate the North’s offensive capabilities. The “Kill Chain”** preemptive strike **system detects signs of an impending** nuclear **missile launch and strikes the North’s** nuclear **weapons sites and missile bases[.]** with cruise missiles and other weaponry.

Richard Fontaine, War on the Rocks, July 2017, ["Time to Lose Your Illusions on North Korea," https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/time-to-lose-your-illusions-on-north-korea/, 7-21-2017] // AA

There is a two-stage military approach that could, theoretically, eliminate the North’s nuclear and missile sites. In this concept, the United States would strike only those sites (assuming all could be located) and would telegraph to Pyongyang the limited nature of its attack. Washington would further signal to the Kim regime that any retaliation – would lead to its forcible destruction. It is theoretically possible that the regime would passively absorb the attacks without striking South Korea or Japan, for fear of incurring a far broader American campaign aimed at ending the regime.

Colin Clark (Editor; BA from Drew University), Breaking Defense, 7-27-2017, ["North Korea Won’t Give Nukes Up ‘At Any Price:’ Top Korea Intel Officer," http://breakingdefense.com/2017/07/north-korea-wont-give-nukes-up-at-any-price-top-korea-intel-officer/, 7-28-2017] // AA

Mary Beth Long, former assistant Defense Secretary and advisor to presidential candidate Mitt Romney, argued that we should send the message to Pyongyang that “any missile bigger than a Scud” would be destroyed before liftoff. That message doesn’t mean just a diplomatic cable or a presidential statement, she told me after the session. She thinks we need to act and destroy the missiles on the pad.

### A2: KC Miscalculation

#### (4 responses)

#### 1. Delink, Misokami of the National Interest 2017 explains that the kill chain surveillance system would look to detect preparations for an attack like the dispersal of mobile missile launchers, mass evacuations from North Korea’s cities, and migration to underneath Pyongyang. Before they can access any impacts make them give you a probability of making a mistake with these criteria.

#### 2. Delink, Green of Columbia University explains, for kill chain to effectively it must pass through 6 levels of checks and balances to ensure there are no miscalculations.

#### 3. Terminal Defense, Green explains that kill chain is useless because it is only intended to annoy the North Koreans. Meanwhile, furthering that kill chain cannot and will not work in the Korean peninsula theater.

#### 4. Turn, Schoff of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 17 writes that an offensive build up by South Korea is best under the pretext of a strong alliance framework, because it minimizes the risk of miscalculation.

Cards:

Kyle Mizokami. July 10, 2017. “This Is How South Korea Plans to Stop a Nuclear Attack from North Korea.” National Interest. [http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-south-korea-plans-stop-nuclear-attack-north-korea-21472 //](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-south-korea-plans-stop-nuclear-attack-north-korea-21472%20//) AA

Typically, a surveillance asset like Global Hawk would likely be the first to detect preparations for nuclear attack. This might be a mass dispersal of North Korea’s mobile missile launchers, particularly those carrying the short-range KN-01 Toksa, Hwasong-6 and Hwasong-7; medium-range Nodong-1; and intermediate-range Hwasong-12 missiles. The presence of fuel-truck convoys to support liquid-fueled missiles would be another tipoff. A mass evacuation of North Korea’s elite from the cities, or their migration into shelters underneath Pyongyang, could be another sign. Alternately, it could be North Korea’s ballistic-missile submarines putting to sea, which for now amount to one experimental Gorae-class boat.

Christopher Green [Columbia University Press]. 2013. “The “Myth” of the Kill, Kill, Kill Chain.” SinoNK. <http://sinonk.com/2013/10/27/the-myth-of-the-kill-kill-kill-chain/> // AA

With evident doubt, Choi then proceeds to list the major temporal goals that must be attained if “Kill Chain” is to work effectively: 1. Within one minute, South Korean intelligence must pick up signals that North Korea intends to attack preemptively; and 2. Within one minute, South Korea must establish what and where North Korea intends to attack preemptively; and 3. Within three minutes, the supreme commander of the ROK military must be able to hand down an order to strike preemptively against North Korean targets; and 4. South Korea must attack the relevant sites in North Korea before North Korea has time to launch its own attack; and 5. South Korea must be able to establish whether its initial strikes were sufficient to eliminate the source of the intended North Korean strike; and 6. South Korea must be capable of responding to immediate North Korean counterstrikes from elsewhere.

Christopher Green [Columbia University Press]. 2013. “The “Myth” of the Kill, Kill, Kill Chain.” SinoNK. <http://sinonk.com/2013/10/27/the-myth-of-the-kill-kill-kill-chain/> // AA

However, to (mostly but not exclusively progressive) adherents of the “slingshot thesis,” talk of preemptive strikes and being able to “take things out on the launchpad” is worse than useless; its only measurable output is the extent to which it annoys the North Koreans. They are sure that “Kill Chain,” in spite of its fiery rhetorical accompaniment, cannot and will not work in the Korean peninsula theater.

Rod Lyon, National Interest, 7-24-2017, ["Japan and South Korea Want More Military Firepower (Thanks to China and North Korea)," http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/japan-south-korea-want-more-military-firepower-thanks-china-21643, 7-24-2017] // AA

Itsunori Onodera visited Washington in May to argue in support of a recalibration of roles in the US–Japan security alliance—namely, a greater sharing of the ‘spear’ role between the partners, instead of the current division of responsibilities with the US as spear-carrier and Japan as shield-bearer. Onodera specifically proposed that Japan have better ‘counterstrike’ capabilities, clearly hoping to deflect concerns about possible pre-emptive attacks on North Korea. James Schoff, a former defence official now at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, suggested that both Japan’s worries and potential regional concerns about Japanese rearmament might be met by ‘a measured investment in strike capabilities within the existing alliance framework’.

### A2: Satellites Bad

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Turn, Dorell of Temple University writes on July 17th that currently satellites do not have precision tracking or targeting. However, the missile defense agency plans to launch a constellation of smaller satellites that would enhance the abilities of ground based missile defense systems by providing exact locations of threatening missiles. Which would allow multiple attacks on the same missile.

Oren Dorell (Temple University), Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 7-17-2017, ["U.S. missile defense plans to zap North Korean threats," http://www.jsonline.com/story/news/world/2017/07/17/united-states-missile-defense-north-korea-threats/470177001/, 7-22-2017] // AA

Current satellite technology recognizes a missile launch and a general “fan-shaped” area that it is likely to target, said retired lieutenant general Henry “Trey” Obering III, a former head of the Missile Defense Agency who is now executive vice president at Booz Allen Hamilton. Satellites “do not provide precision tracking and targeting today,” Obering said. The Missile Defense Agency plans to launch a “constellation” consisting of multiple small satellites. These would augment a series of ground-based monitors and provide enough tracking information to target threatening missiles while they are outside the atmosphere with one of the military’s interceptors. The new satellites would enable multiple attacks on the same threatening missile if necessary, Obering said.

with foreign powers. If such a moment comes in North Korea, most of the regime’s security officials will likely be thinking about how to survive reunification (something we should be encouraging them to consider), not how to follow their leader to oblivion. In any case, an eventual challenge to the stability of the regime is inevitable. I would rather face it sooner, while the regime’s military capacity to lash out is less developed, than later when the danger will be greater. I’d rather that North Koreans’ misery end sooner than later, too.

### A2: Arms Race General

#### 1. Delink, Arms Races make conflict too expensive and costly. Diehl of the University of Michigan concludes that there is no meaningful correlation between arms races and dispute escalation. In fact, he quantifies that 3 times less conflict started with and arms race than without.

#### 2. Delink, Sundstrom of the Diplomat 2015 explains that the regions defense budgets were at 25 year lows in 2014 while we’ve had missile defense in South Korea for 3 decades.

#### 3. [Delink – alternate causality] Soumil and I would contend that an arms race is more likely to begin by the deployment of offensive artillery or militaristic threats from one nation to another moreso than deploying a defensive protection system.

#### 4. Turn, National Defense Panel in 2014 finds that increasing military presence, and reaffirming our commitment to the region, has played a key role in preventing arms races, especially in Asia, because it forces accountability and prevents dangerous military competition among regional rivals.

Cards:

Paul Diehl of the University of Michigan. "Arms races and escalation: a closer look." Journal of Peace Research 20.3 (1983): 205-212. <https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/68822/10.1177_00223433830?sequence=2> // AA

The determination of a mutual military buildup or its absence for each dispute was combined with the outcome of that dispute and the aggregated results are presented in Table II. No meaningful covariation exists here between mutual military buildups and dispute escalation. Only 25 % of the disputes which were preceded by a mutual military buildup escalated to war, while almost 77% of the major power wars constituting this sample population were preceded by periods in which there was no incidence of joint and rapid spending increases by the protagonists. Of the three disputes which fit the escalation hypothesis, one is World War I and the other two led to the Second World War. However, even these cases raise questions about the impact of mutual arms buildup on the outbreak of war. There were five other disputes prior to World War II which were preceded by this type of buildup and yet did not escalate to war. This suggests that the cases which support the escalation model might only be the product of a spurious association. Overall, it appears that most serious disputes do not involve previous dual military spending increases and most serious disputes do not escalate to war; but there does not seem to be any connection between these facts. The Yule’s Q value is .36 indicating a much weaker positive relationship than Wallace reported. However, the more conservative 0 coefficient is only .11 and the Chi-square value is not significant at any meaningful level.

Ian Sundstrom. January 2015. “An East Asian Arms Race: Does It Even Matter?” The Diplomat. <http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/an-east-asian-arms-race-does-it-even-matter/> // AA

It is difficult to say whether there is an ongoing arms race in East Asia. Some take it as a given that China and the United States are engaged in an arms race, and that the [U.S. is losing](http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/09/16/Here-s-Proof-We-re-Losing-Arms-Race-Russia-and-China). Others argue that China’s increased defense spending will lead the rest of the region to [follow suit](http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9d83bf62-b9b9-11e3-a3ef-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3O4IDXFFe), or that China’s development of MIRVed nuclear missiles will [spark a regional nuclear arms race](http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/asias-coming-nuclear-arms-race/). Still others [note](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/looming-arms-race-east-asia-10461) that most of the region’s defense budgets were at 25 year lows as a percentage of GDP in 2014 while China’s defense spending continues to increase.

William Perry and John Abizaid [National Defense Panel]. 2014. “National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review; Ensuring a Strong US Defense for the Future.” United States Institute for Peace. [http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Ensuring-a-Strong-U.S.-Defense-for-the-Future-NDP-Review-of-the-QDR.pdf //](http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Ensuring-a-Strong-U.S.-Defense-for-the-Future-NDP-Review-of-the-QDR.pdf%20//) AA

Preservation of reasonable stability in key regions of the world. World War II demonstrated that America cannot isolate itself from conflict overseas that threatens our vital interests and allies. Both our security and prosperity are enhanced by peace and stability in key regions. This is a fundamental reason why America has remained actively engaged abroad since World War II. And since America is a military power without peer that has no interest in taking or subjugating other lands, its forward military presence and commitments to allies have greatly lessened the likelihood of arms races and damaging military competitions among regional rivals. Absent America’s leadership, large parts of the world would likely evolve to dangerous imbalances, particularly in Eurasia, threatening American trade and investment and potentially leading to conflicts greatly damaging to the United States.2

### A2: Arms Race Now (Asia)

#### (2 responses)

#### 1. Delink, Feffer of the Institute for Policy Studies 2010 indicates that the acquisition of weaponry in Asia is not occurring fast enough or being implemented in a tit-for-tat fashion; both of which are conditions of an arms race.

#### 2. [Delink – Alternate Causality] Feffer empirically indicates that in Northeast Asia, countries no longer increase their military spending solely in response to a narrowly confined set of signals. For instance, in South Korea, the US is facilitating the modernization and streamlining of their current systems which is the largest factor for their current spending increase.

Cards:

John Feffer [Director of Foreign Policy; Institute for Policy Studies]. 2010. “An Arms Race for Northeast Asia?” Foreign Policy in Focus. May 7, 2010. <http://www.ips-dc.org/an_arms_race_for_northeast_asia/> // AA

Although the "China threat" continues to serve as a justification for large-scale weapons production in the United States, great-power rivalry is no longer the central driver behind the military spending increases in Washington, Beijing, or Moscow. A New Kind of Arms Race In the 1990s, Desmond Ball analyzed the post-cold war surge in spending and concluded that the acquisition of weaponry in Asia was neither sufficiently rapid nor implemented in a reciprocal fashion to amount to a proper arms race. Countries were increasing their spending not as part of a tit-for-tat process but for a variety of other external and internal factors. "There are few unambiguous cases of particular acquisitions in one country leading to either imitative or offsetting acquisitions by others," Ball concluded. The same argument applies today. Few speak of an arms race in Northeast Asia today. Russia, after all, has increased its military budget to regain some of the prestige it lost during the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union and, subsequently, its economy. The United States launched two wars in the last decade along with a global war on terror, none of which had much to do with Northeast Asia. China, South Korea, and Japan, although historically subject to competitive military spending, have articulated different reasons for the recent modernization of their militaries.

John Feffer [Director of Foreign Policy; Institute for Policy Studies]. 2010. “An Arms Race for Northeast Asia?” Foreign Policy in Focus. May 7, 2010. <http://www.ips-dc.org/an_arms_race_for_northeast_asia/> // AA

Even the conditions that would ordinarily give rise to an arms race don't seem to apply. Take the case of the Korean peninsula. The two countries-the Republic of Korea in the south and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the north-have fought one short hot war and subsequently waged one long cold war for control of the peninsula. It would seem natural that the two countries would be engaged in an arms race given the history of tensions and the increasingly sharp divide between the two systems. But the spending patterns of the two countries no longer match up. North Korea doesn't have the resources to keep up with South Korean spending. As Chung-in Moon and Sangkeun Lee explain in their essay on the reasons for South Korea's growing military budget, an asymmetric pattern has emerged since the mid-1970s, with South Korea increasing its spending and North Korea reducing its spending. In Northeast Asia, it would seem that countries no longer increase their military spending solely in response to a narrowly confined set of signals from adversaries-what Ball defines as "an interactive process in which the arms requirements of one country depend upon the known, assumed, or anticipated capabilities of the forces of the other party or parties." In the case of the Korean peninsula, for instance, South Korea has been increasing its military spending not as a direct response to North Korean spending patterns but for a set of different external and internal reasons. One of the principal external reasons is Seoul's relationship with Washington. As Jae-Jung Suh argues in his essay on the impact of alliance politics on military spending, South Korea has had to increase its spending simply to keep up with the modernization of U.S. forces. The pressures of meshing with U.S. weapons systems and C4 (command, control, communications and computers)-the challenge of interoperability-has been a more effective driver of military spending than any perceived external threat to South Korea.

### A2: Korean Arms Race

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Feffer of the Institute for Policy Studies provides two reasons there isn’t an ongoing Korean arms race: First, the spending patterns of the two countries empirically don’t match up. Second, North Korea doesn’t have the resources to keep up with South Korean spending.

#### 

Cards:

John Feffer [Director of Foreign Policy; Institute for Policy Studies]. 2010. “An Arms Race for Northeast Asia?” Foreign Policy in Focus. May 7, 2010. <http://www.ips-dc.org/an_arms_race_for_northeast_asia/> // AA

Even the conditions that would ordinarily give rise to an arms race don't seem to apply. Take the case of the Korean peninsula. The two countries-the Republic of Korea in the south and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the north-have fought one short hot war and subsequently waged one long cold war for control of the peninsula. It would seem natural that the two countries would be engaged in an arms race given the history of tensions and the increasingly sharp divide between the two systems. But the spending patterns of the two countries no longer match up. North Korea doesn't have the resources to keep up with South Korean spending. As Chung-in Moon and Sangkeun Lee explain in their essay on the reasons for South Korea's growing military budget, an asymmetric pattern has emerged since the mid-1970s, with South Korea increasing its spending and North Korea reducing its spending. In Northeast Asia, it would seem that countries no longer increase their military spending solely in response to a narrowly confined set of signals from adversaries-what Ball defines as "an interactive process in which the arms requirements of one country depend upon the known, assumed, or anticipated capabilities of the forces of the other party or parties." In the case of the Korean peninsula, for instance, South Korea has been increasing its military spending not as a direct response to North Korean spending patterns but for a set of different external and internal reasons. One of the principal external reasons is Seoul's relationship with Washington. As Jae-Jung Suh argues in his essay on the impact of alliance politics on military spending, South Korea has had to increase its spending simply to keep up with the modernization of U.S. forces. The pressures of meshing with U.S. weapons systems and C4 (command, control, communications and computers)-the challenge of interoperability-has been a more effective driver of military spending than any perceived external threat to South Korea.

### A2: Nuclear Arms Race

#### (1 response)

#### 1. [Impact Turn] Diehl of the University of Michigan explains that a nuclear buildup would tremendously increase the cost of war, further entrenching the Mutually Assured Destruction Doctrine. Thus, Diehl quantifies that conflicts occur 3 times less frequently with and arms race than without.

Cards:

Paul Diehl of the University of Michigan. "Arms races and escalation: a closer look." Journal of Peace Research 20.3 (1983): 205-212. <https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/68822/10.1177_00223433830?sequence=2> // AA

The determination of a mutual military buildup or its absence for each dispute was combined with the outcome of that dispute and the aggregated results are presented in Table II. No meaningful covariation exists here between mutual military buildups and dispute escalation. Only 25 % of the disputes which were preceded by a mutual military buildup escalated to war, while almost 77% of the major power wars constituting this sample population were preceded by periods in which there was no incidence of joint and rapid spending increases by the protagonists. Of the three disputes which fit the escalation hypothesis, one is World War I and the other two led to the Second World War. However, even these cases raise questions about the impact of mutual arms buildup on the outbreak of war. There were five other disputes prior to World War II which were preceded by this type of buildup and yet did not escalate to war. This suggests that the cases which support the escalation model might only be the product of a spurious association. Overall, it appears that most serious disputes do not involve previous dual military spending increases and most serious disputes do not escalate to war; but there does not seem to be any connection between these facts. The Yule’s Q value is .36 indicating a much weaker positive relationship than Wallace reported. However, the more conservative 0 coefficient is only .11 and the Chi-square value is not significant at any meaningful level.

### A2: China Arms Race

#### (2 responses)

#### 1. Delink, Zhu Feng indicates that China is comfortable with a U.S.-centric security system. Moreover, Feffer of the Institute for Policy studies corroborates in 2010 that China’s military spending increases are internally directed to maintain territorial integrity and entrench the leadership’s legitimacy in the eyes of the people.

#### 2. Delink, Blanchard of Reuters 2016 explains that China has experienced its lowest economic growth in 25 years. This is crucial because of its decelerating economy, China is slowing its military buildup and does not have the economic capacity to increase it. Thus, China lacks the means for an arms race.

Cards:

John Feffer [Director of Foreign Policy; Institute for Policy Studies]. 2010. “An Arms Race for Northeast Asia?” Foreign Policy in Focus. May 7, 2010. <http://www.ips-dc.org/an_arms_race_for_northeast_asia/> // AA

China, argues Zhu Feng in his article on the implications of military spending for regional politics in Northeast Asia, is comfortable with a U.S.-centric security system. It is not spending money on modernizing its military in order to upend the status quo, retake "lost" territory, or even expand its sphere of influence. The military spending increases are largely internally directed: to maintain territorial integrity and buttress the leadership's legitimacy in the eyes of the population. A great-power rivalry similar to the cold war conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is not in China's interest, particularly given its knowledge of how vulnerable the Soviet Union became when it attempted to keep pace with U.S. military spending increases. The other country currently involved in the Six Party Talks that increased its military spending dramatically over the last decade is Russia. To make up for the deterioration of its capabilities during the economic collapse of the 1990s, Russia poured funds from its energy sales into an ambitious modernization program. Despite the economic crisis, and early indications that Russia would have to cut its military budget as a consequence, Russia in fact boosted its military spending by 25 percent in 2009, a post-Soviet record. It has increased subsidies to military contractors and pushed to increase its arms exports. Russia is a chief military supplier of China as well as a close collaborator in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a regional security organization. According to General of the Army Nikolay Makarov, the rapprochement of Moscow and Beijing is at least in part due to the increase in military spending in Japan and South Korea. Great-power rivalry has been a chief driver of arms races in the past two centuries. For the moment, however, this disease seems to have gone into at least partial remission. Although Russia is concerned with NATO expansion and has balked at significant nuclear reductions because of upgrades in U.S. conventional power projection, Moscow no longer has any ambitions beyond its near abroad or, frankly, the resource base to restart an arms race with Washington. China, meanwhile, is considered a more serious threat than Russia in certain Pentagon circles, but Washington is too dependent on Beijing's economic largesse to risk an all-out confrontation. Beijing, on the other hand, is mindful of the lessons of the Soviet Union's demise and unwilling to challenge the United States even in the Pacific region much less anywhere else in the world.

Ben Blanchard. March 4 2016, “China’s 2016 Defense Budget to Slow in Line with Economy.” Reuters. [http://www.reuters.com/article/china-parliament-defence-idUSKCN0W60A5 //](http://www.reuters.com/article/china-parliament-defence-idUSKCN0W60A5%20//) AA

China's defence budget this year is likely to rise at its slowest pace since 2010, in line with the decelerating economy and by a much lower figure than had been expected in military and diplomatic circles. Fu Ying, spokeswoman for China's parliament, said the figure would increase by about seven to eight percent from 2015, following a nearly unbroken two-decade run of double-digit budget increases. China's military build-up has rattled nerves around the region, particularly because China has taken an increasingly assertive stance in its territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. Fu told a news conference the defence budget would be released on Saturday, when the annual session of China's largely rubber-stamp legislative body opens. It will be the first single-digit rise in spending since 2010, when the military budget logged a 7.5 percent increase. Defence spending last year was budgeted to rise 10.1 percent to 886.9 billion yuan ($135.39 billion), which still only represents about a quarter of that of the United States. The U.S. Defense Department budget for 2016 is $573 billion. China's leaders have routinely sought to justify military modernisation by linking defence spending to rapid GDP growth. But growth of 6.9 percent last year was the slowest in 25 years, and a further slowdown is widely expected in 2016.

### A2: No MAD

#### (2 responses)

#### 1. Delink, Former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry indicates that China’s missile forces are large and sophisticated making them impossible for the THAAD missile defense system to defense against.

#### 2. Delink, Even if you buy that the MAD doctrine will deteriorate, make my opponents prove to you that there is an imminent threat of a nuclear strike by the United States, China, or North Korea, because Soumil and I would argue that a.) there is no intent to start a nuclear war and b.) missile defense wont fully erode each countries second strike capabilities.

Cards:

Reuters. April 2017. “China Wary of U.S. Missile System in South Korea because Capabilities Unknown.” Newsweek. [http://www.newsweek.com/china-united-states-north-korea-south-korea-thaad-578669 //](http://www.newsweek.com/china-united-states-north-korea-south-korea-thaad-578669%20//) AA

Former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry told the conference that he believed that China's missile forces were large and sophisticated enough to be impossible to defend against, so THAAD need not be a concern to Beijing.

### A2: NK Build Up

#### (3 responses)

#### 1. Delink, Feffer of Foreign Policy in Focus 2010 empirically confirms that the spending patterns of North and South Korea no longer match up.

#### 2. Delink, Feffer explains that North Korea doesn't have the resources to keep up with South Korean spending.

#### 3. Turn, Bandow of the CATO institute indicates that South Korea has twice the population and 40 times the GDP of North Korea, as well as about every technological, financial, and diplomatic advantage imaginable meaning South Korea does not need America’s assistance. This means that a war would most likely result in a South Korean victory and the disposal of the North Korean threat which is in South Korea’s best interest.

Cards:

John Feffer [Director of Foreign Policy; Institute for Policy Studies]. 2010. “An Arms Race for Northeast Asia?” Foreign Policy in Focus. May 7, 2010. <http://www.ips-dc.org/an_arms_race_for_northeast_asia/> // AA

Even the conditions that would ordinarily give rise to an arms race don't seem to apply. Take the case of the Korean peninsula. The two countries-the Republic of Korea in the south and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the north-have fought one short hot war and subsequently waged one long cold war for control of the peninsula. It would seem natural that the two countries would be engaged in an arms race given the history of tensions and the increasingly sharp divide between the two systems. But the spending patterns of the two countries no longer match up. North Korea doesn't have the resources to keep up with South Korean spending. As Chung-in Moon and Sangkeun Lee explain in their essay on the reasons for South Korea's growing military budget, an asymmetric pattern has emerged since the mid-1970s, with South Korea increasing its spending and North Korea reducing its spending. In Northeast Asia, it would seem that countries no longer increase their military spending solely in response to a narrowly confined set of signals from adversaries-what Ball defines as "an interactive process in which the arms requirements of one country depend upon the known, assumed, or anticipated capabilities of the forces of the other party or parties." In the case of the Korean peninsula, for instance, South Korea has been increasing its military spending not as a direct response to North Korean spending patterns but for a set of different external and internal reasons. One of the principal external reasons is Seoul's relationship with Washington. As Jae-Jung Suh argues in his essay on the impact of alliance politics on military spending, South Korea has had to increase its spending simply to keep up with the modernization of U.S. forces. The pressures of meshing with U.S. weapons systems and C4 (command, control, communications and computers)-the challenge of interoperability-has been a more effective driver of military spending than any perceived external threat to South Korea.

Doug Bandow, 11-26-2014, "U.S. Filled Okinawa with Bases and Japan Kept Them There: Okinawans Again Say No," Cato Institute, [http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-filled-okinawa-bases-japan-kept-them-there-okinawans-again-say-no //](http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-filled-okinawa-bases-japan-kept-them-there-okinawans-again-say-no%20//) AA

Devoting only one percent of its GDP to defense has allowed Tokyo to create a potent “Self-Defense Force.” Spending more would enable Japan to build a military well able to deter Chinese adventurism. South Korea has twice the population and 40 times the GDP of the so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as well as about every technological, financial, and diplomatic advantage imaginable. Seoul does not need America’s assistance.

### A2: SK Build Up

#### (2 responses)

#### 1. [Alternate Causal]. Not an indication of conflict. Feffer of the IPS 2010 indicates that South Korea has been increasing its military spending not as a direct response to North Korea, rather, for a set of different external and internal reasons. Primarily, Seoul's relationship with Washington, causing S. Korea to modernize and streamline its military operations.

#### 2. Delink. Schoff of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 17 writes that an offensive build up by South Korea is best right now under the pretext of a strong alliance framework with the United States, because it minimizes the risk of miscalculation.

Cards:

John Feffer [Director of Foreign Policy; Institute for Policy Studies]. 2010. “An Arms Race for Northeast Asia?” Foreign Policy in Focus. May 7, 2010. <http://www.ips-dc.org/an_arms_race_for_northeast_asia/> // AA

Even the conditions that would ordinarily give rise to an arms race don't seem to apply. Take the case of the Korean peninsula. The two countries-the Republic of Korea in the south and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the north-have fought one short hot war and subsequently waged one long cold war for control of the peninsula. It would seem natural that the two countries would be engaged in an arms race given the history of tensions and the increasingly sharp divide between the two systems. But the spending patterns of the two countries no longer match up. North Korea doesn't have the resources to keep up with South Korean spending. As Chung-in Moon and Sangkeun Lee explain in their essay on the reasons for South Korea's growing military budget, an asymmetric pattern has emerged since the mid-1970s, with South Korea increasing its spending and North Korea reducing its spending. In Northeast Asia, it would seem that countries no longer increase their military spending solely in response to a narrowly confined set of signals from adversaries-what Ball defines as "an interactive process in which the arms requirements of one country depend upon the known, assumed, or anticipated capabilities of the forces of the other party or parties." In the case of the Korean peninsula, for instance, South Korea has been increasing its military spending not as a direct response to North Korean spending patterns but for a set of different external and internal reasons. One of the principal external reasons is Seoul's relationship with Washington. As Jae-Jung Suh argues in his essay on the impact of alliance politics on military spending, South Korea has had to increase its spending simply to keep up with the modernization of U.S. forces. The pressures of meshing with U.S. weapons systems and C4 (command, control, communications and computers)-the challenge of interoperability-has been a more effective driver of military spending than any perceived external threat to South Korea.

Rod Lyon, National Interest, 7-24-2017, ["Japan and South Korea Want More Military Firepower (Thanks to China and North Korea)," http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/japan-south-korea-want-more-military-firepower-thanks-china-21643, 7-24-2017] // AA

Itsunori Onodera visited Washington in May to argue in support of a recalibration of roles in the US–Japan security alliance—namely, a greater sharing of the ‘spear’ role between the partners, instead of the current division of responsibilities with the US as spear-carrier and Japan as shield-bearer. Onodera specifically proposed that Japan have better ‘counterstrike’ capabilities, clearly hoping to deflect concerns about possible pre-emptive attacks on North Korea. James Schoff, a former defence official now at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, suggested that both Japan’s worries and potential regional concerns about Japanese rearmament might be met by ‘a measured investment in strike capabilities within the existing alliance framework’.

### A2: Hypersonic

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Delink. Panda of the Diplomat indicates that China began testing hypersonic missiles in 2014, three years before the deployment of THAAD.

Cards:

Ankit Panda (Princeton University). January 14, 2014. “China Tests Hypersonic Missile Vehicle.” The Diplomat. <http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/china-tests-hypersonic-missile-vehicle/> // AA

Last week, the Chinese military successfully concluded the first test flight of a hypersonic missile vehicle, according to U.S. defense officials at the Pentagon. The hypersonic missile is intended to deliver warheads through U.S. missile defenses, [according to The Free Beacon](http://freebeacon.com/china-conducts-first-test-of-new-ultra-high-speed-missile-vehicle/). The hypersonic missile could be a major milestone for China as it modernizes its military technology for strategic nuclear and conventional military purposes. Citing U.S. officials, The Free Beacon reports that “the new hypersonic vehicle was detected traveling at extremely high speeds during the flight test over China.” According to reports, the hypersonic vehicle is designed to detach from one of China’s existing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) at a near-space altitude and then accelerate to speeds 10 times the speed of sound during its descent towards its target.

### A2: Nuke War

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Make my opponents give you a baseline probability of a nuclear war from transpiring because the consensus is that it’s infinitesimal.

#### 2. Even when global tensions were the highest, and second strike capabilities were minimal during the Cold War, nuclear war never broke out.

## A2 Conflict Impacts

### A2 Arms Race

#### 1. THAAD is in response to the North Korean nuclear arms race, it’s not a cause of it. Countries in East-Asia are ramping up their military buildup in response to North Korea now, THAAD doesn’t escalate that.

#### 2. Non-unique. North Korea has already started the race and South Korea is fully part of it. North Korea has been testing missiles for more than 10 years and Ben Wescott of CNN reports that so far in 2017 Kim Jong Un has fired 16 missiles in 10 tests. As a result South Korea has began to fire back as Bill Chappell of NPR reports that in June of 2017 South Korea has begun to test missiles, with the South Korean president saying it is time to be able to dominate North Korea.

#### 3. There’s no impact because of mutually assured destruction. The Organization for World Peace explains that nuclear weapons are so destructive that their only benefit is as a deterrent against an attack and that North Korea has this in mind. (Ex: Cold war)

#### A) As irrational as Kim Jong Un may be, he will not send his country to certain defeat against the strongest military in the world.

#### 4. INDICT RIDER: Yes the probability might increase by 331%, but the actual numbers Rider uses are a 1.9% baseline probability of war going to a 6.2% chance of war. The increase in probability might be big, but the probability itself is not. But second, Rider does not account for the factor of MAD in his calculations.

Ben Westcott, 6/8/17, “North Korea launches 4 anti-ship missiles, fourth test in a month”, CNN, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/07/asia/north-korea-missiles-launch/index.html> //BB

"We assess that North Korea intended to show off its various missile capabilities, display its precise targeting capability, in the form of armed protests against ships in regard to US Navy carrier strike groups and joint naval drills," Roh Jae-cheon, a spokesman for South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staffs told reporters. North Korea has launched 16 missiles in 10 tests so far in 2017, and Thursday's test was the fourth since new South Korean President Moon Jae-in took office in May. Analysts say each launch, successful or not, improves missile technology and ultimately provides information that helps bring North Korea closer to its goal of building a missile that could reach the US.

Bill Chappell, 6/23/17, “South Korea Tests Missile As President Speaks of Need to ‘Dominate’ North”, NPR, <http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/23/534098607/south-korea-tests-missile-as-president-speaks-of-need-to-dominate-north> //BB

South Korean President Moon Jae-in watched his military test-fire a ballistic missile on Friday, after a string of North Korean missile tests were blamed for raising tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The military said the missile, a Hyunmoo-2 with a range of up to 800 kilometers (nearly 500 miles), hit its target accurately. When Moon won South Korea's presidency last month, he was seen as likely to return to the "Sunshine Policy" of engaging with North Korea through dialogue and economic aid. But today he said "dialogue is only possible when we have a strong military, and engagement policies are only possible when we have the security capability to dominate North Korea," according to the Associated Press. The president's remarks were relayed by Blue House spokesperson Park Soo-hyun. Saying that he wanted to evaluate South Korea's missile capability for himself, Moon added that he is now reassured. Friday's missile test is the fourth of six evaluations that will take place "before official weaponization" of the Hyunmoo-2, according to The Korea Herald.

Anton Anin, 3/22/17, “They Must Be MAD: Why Is North Korea Developing Nuclear Weapons?”, The Organization for World Peace, <https://theowp.org/reports/they-must-be-mad-why-is-north-korea-developing-nuclear-weapons/> //BB

It may seem counter-intuitive, but when it comes to deterring nuclear war, many in strategy and security circles believe that more nuclear weapons make for a safer world. To support this, they cite the theory of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). MAD theory argues that nuclear weapons are so destructive that their only tactical benefit is as a deterrent against an attack from an enemy state. No state would engage in total war with a super power like the United States or Russia for fear that they would retaliate with nuclear weapons, wreaking terrible destruction on the attacking state’s civilian population. In order to protect one’s self from such retaliation, a state must develop their own nuclear weapons program, because an enemy surely would not launch a nuclear attack knowing that equally destructive retaliation is likely. Thus, according to MAD, states may still engage in armed conflict, but the risk of nuclear war is lessened by the mutually assured destruction that would follow escalation beyond conventional armed conflict. North Korea has this theory in mind in developing their nuclear program. They are increasingly finding themselves alone in the world, surrounded by perceived enemies in US allies, like South Korea and Japan, and suffering under economic sanctions. Thus, they are developing nuclear weapons to ensure their own security. Ironically, the North Korean nuclear program is largely cited as the reason for these sanctions by the international community.

### A2 Chinese Arms Race

#### 1. China won’t do large-scale nuclear modernization in response to THAAD because Bruce MacDonald of the Federation of American Scientistsfinds in 2015 that China deliberately avoids provoking an arms race and instead focuses on low-cost countermeasures.

Bruce MacDonald, September 2015, “Understanding the Dragon Shield: Likelihood and Implications of Chinese Strategic Ballistic Missile Defense”, Confederation of American Scientists, <https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/DragonShieldreport_FINAL.pdf> //BB

Notably, in August 1999, the Central Committee approved the “998 Project” that renewed China’s R&D for technologies that could support an eventual deployment of Chinese BMD. It is important to emphasize that this project involved many weapons technologies, not just BMD, that could give China asymmetric countermeasures, especially in response to the U.S. revolution in military affairs. The project has also been known as the “Assassin’s Mace Program.” 26 Several Chinese scholars who are affiliated with prominent academic institutions have assessed how China could respond to the challenges of U.S. strategic BMD.27 These analysts have largely agreed with each other as to what China could do. The options include using countermeasures, such as decoys and chaff; deploying more ICBMs; placing MIRVs on these ICBMs; deploying more mobile ICBMs; and building more SSBNs and making sure that enough are deployed at sea. On the other hand, they are mindful (as a group) of China’s “No First Use Policy” and the international perception of China. That is, they would not want China and the United States to engage in a heated arms race. However, they agree that China must have an assured nuclear deterrent retaliatory force. Notably, these scholars tend to prefer that China choose relatively low cost countermeasures as much as possible. Hui Zhang, physicist and arms control analyst, has described in detail the potential passive countermeasures against U.S. missile defense:

### A2: Preemptive Strike (General)

#### (5 responses)

#### 1. [Delink, no regional support] China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi stated in February 2016 that one of the fundamental principles China will adhere to when addressing the Korean Peninsula is that a military option would be unacceptable.

#### 2. [Delink, Chinese Deterrent] Jai Qinguo of Peking University warned the US and South Korea that China would not be complacent in the event of military actions on North Korea because it would be directly impacted by the fallout of a preemptive strike. Chinese involvement will act as a deterrent to any preemptive action, don’t let them garner any offense off of this.

#### 3. Delink, John Delury of Yale explains in 2016 that a preemptive strike would likely drive Beijing to side with the North in accordance with their 1961 treaty wherein China would militarily support North Kroea.

#### 4. [Delink, retaliation deter] John Delury of Yale explains in 2016 that a preemptive strike would incite furious military retaliation from Pyongyang. Which is problematic as he furthers that South Korea and the United States could not count on Beijing’s support and would face Chinese intervention on the peninsula

#### For all these reasons, Delury concludes that a preemptive strike would rapidly descend into a bloodbath reigniting a war.

Fei su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. [http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf //](http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf%20//) AA

At the official level, the Chinese Government remains opposed to a kinetic response to North Korea’s nuclear tests. China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, made a clear statement during an interview in February 2016 that one of the principles adhered to by China in addressing issues on the Korean peninsula is that a military option would be unacceptable.43 Nonetheless, Chinese experts such as Jia Qingguo, dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, warn that China cannot afford to be complacent, particularly since it would be directly affected by a surgical strike against North Korea by the USA.44

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John Delury (a senior fellow of the Center on U.S.-China Relations and an Assistant Professor of International Studies at Yonsei University. He has taught Chinese history and politics at Columbia, Brown, and Peking University, and received a PhD in Chinese history at Yale), 38 North, October 31, 2016, ["The "China Factor"," 38North, School of Advanced International Studies, http://www.38north.org/2016/10/jdelury103116/, 7-28-2017] // AA

To be sure, North Korea would be on its own if it were to attack US allies or assets in the region, let alone US territory. But if the United States launches a pre-emptive strike not to prevent a specific, imminent missile attack, but rather to prevent North Korea from perfecting an intercontinental nuclear strike capability, it is unlikely to meet Beijing’s standard for jus ad bellum. On the contrary, a strike of this nature could likely drive Beijing to side with the North in accordance with their 1961 treaty. In the furious military retaliation that Pyongyang would muster after a US strike, South Korea and the United States could not count on Beijing’s support and indeed may face Chinese intervention on the peninsula, as in October 1950. “Surgery” would rapidly descend into a bloodbath. “Pre-emption” would start a war.

### A2: MAD Deter PS

#### 1. Turn, Former Army Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters explains that first target of a preemptive strike would be the North’s air defenses and command, control, and communications infrastructure to mitigate any response. Thus, the US government thinks it can reduce the impact of retaliation and is more likely to conduct an attack.

Cards:

Ralph Peters (a retired Army lieutenant colonel, Graduate of Pennsylvania State University), New York Post, 8-9-2017, ["Here’s how to take out North Korea’s nukes," http://nypost.com/2017/08/09/heres-how-to-take-out-north-koreas-nukes/, 8-10-2017] // AA

Initially, we’d launch a surprise air and naval campaign, with ground forces deployed only in defense of South Korea. Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile-development facilities and arsenals wouldn’t be in the initial target set. First, we’d have to overwhelm and destroy North Korea’s air defenses, while simultaneously degrading Pyongyang’s military command, control and communications to cripple any response.

### A2: Allied Preemptive More Likely

#### (6 responses)

#### 1. Non-Unique, We would contend that North Korea has remained hostile towards the South for 60 years and not deploying one missile defense system won’t solve the root cause of North Korea’s threat. Thus, if the threat of a preemptive strike remains the same in both world, Soumil and I would contend that a preemptive strike with missile defense is more palatable than in a world without.

#### 2. Mitigate, Even if there is a preemptive strike from North Korea, Bennett of the California Institute of Technology 2016 indicates that the South Korean missile defense system offers South Korea protection and he quantifies that the THAAD system will save more than 500,000 lives. Thus, he concludes that there is no possible way missile defense in South Korea does not promote regional stability.

#### 3. Turn, Pikston of Rider University 2017 explains that one of the best aspect of THAAD is its ability to counter North Korean coercion thus, preventing the escalation that would lead to a preemptive strike in the first place.

#### 4. Turn, Kelley of Pusan National University writes that the threat of a strike is high now, however, deploying missile defense will reduce the anxiety that would lead to a preemptive strike.

#### 5. [Mitigate short term risk] Mansourov of Johns Hopkins University explains that North Korea is developing mobile launch platforms, constructing a major ICMB launch facility near its Chinese border, and is developing a submarine-launched ballistic missile force to ensure a preemptive strike can’t take out all of North Korea’s second strike capabilities. The probability of a successful preemptive strike is decreasing as we speak. Make my opponents give you a probability that the US-ROK alliance will conduct a strike it knows will be unsuccessful.

#### 6. [Terminal Defense] Lee of the of Tufts University writes that conducting war with North Korea would be political suicide for a US administration. Because a.) The Pentagon reports that it would cost tens of thousands of South Korean and American lives. And b.) would put out ally’s capitol in range of North Korea’s artillery batteries which would risk global economic stability.

Cards:

Bruce W. Bennett [California Institute of Technology]. April 2016. “THAAD's Effect on South Korea's Neighbors.” RAND Corporation. <https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/09/on-northeast-asia.html> // AA

Regardless, THAAD offers the ROK important protection against the North Korean missile and nuclear weapon threat. Of the 50 North Korean ballistic missiles that THAAD could destroy, if only five carried nuclear weapons aimed at ROK cities, THAAD could potentially save the lives of half a million or more ROK citizens. How can anyone say that such an outcome would not enhance regional security?

Daniel Pinkston [Rider University]. July 2016. “Why it makes sense to deploy THAAD in South Korea.” NK News. <https://www.nknews.org/2016/07/why-it-makes-sense-to-deploy-thaad-in-south-korea/> // AA

THAAD is not infallible. It does not provide perfect air defense against ballistic missiles. Critics cite this as a decisive flaw. What critics fail to realize is that the greatest benefit of THAAD would be in its non-use. This is counter-intuitive for those who evaluate THAAD in a vacuum with various types of simulated attacks. “It can’t work against artillery. It can’t work against short-range rockets. It could be susceptible to counter-measures. It can’t intercept a submarine-launched ballistic missile that fires outside of the tracking radar azimuth.” However, this micro-analysis does not consider the broader concept of strategic interaction and attempted coercion in a crisis. The North Korean leadership has strategic goals, and it will utilize all of its instruments of national power to achieve those goals. Given the relative decline of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) in its conventional forces, Pyongyang increasingly relies upon its asymmetric capabilities including cyber, long-range artillery, special operations forces (SOF), ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, and chemical weapons. In a crisis, North Korea would threaten or use the asymmetric tools that Pyongyang views as advantageous. To counter North Korean coercive threats, the national command authorities in Seoul and Washington, and the combatant commanders will need a range of tools to counter and deter North Korean coercive threats, and if deterrence fails, take action to restore deterrence as soon as possible. THAAD is one of those tools, but others include cyber-security and resiliency, civil defense, anti-submarine warfare, and counter-strike capabilities, for example.

Dr. Robert E. Kelly [Pusan National University in South Korea]. April 2015. “South Korea’s THAAD Decision.” The Diplomat. April 13, 2015. thediplomat.com/2015/04/south-koreas-thaad-decision/ // AA

For perspective, it is worth nothing that South Korea does already have some local missile defense coverage from Patriot missiles (PAC-2 and -3), but these only provide narrow and low altitude defense. Similarly, Korea has tried on and off for years to develop its own Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), but it has never really panned out. It would cost a great deal and likely simply replicate most of what the Americans are offering right now for almost nothing. Meanwhile the case for high altitude defense grows more obvious with each day that North Korea’s programs continue. Whereas the PAC-3s would provide some defense just as the inbound missile approached its target, THAAD would reach higher up, giving South Korean defenders more chances to shoot down the missile. Technologically this is extraordinarily difficult. Missile defense is often likened to “hitting a bullet with another bullet,” and neither THAAD, PAC-3, nor Israel’s Iron Dome provide anything close to absolute coverage. But given the obvious destructive power of nuclear weapons, even 50/50 coverage would be a massive improvement in South Korean security and reduce the paranoia that might encourage preemptive airstrikes. (For technical details on THAAD, try here and here.)

Alexandre. Mansourov, Ph.D. Columbia University; B.A. Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Advanced Diploma, Kim Il Sung National University (DPRK); Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, "Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 16, 2014, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/> // AA

North Korea’s decision to field mobile land-based missile launch platforms, construction of a major ICMB launch facility near the border with China, and its interest in the development and deployment of an operational submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force suggest that Pyongyang wants to increase the survivability of its nuclear forces and acquire the second strike capability that will ensure that at least some of its nuclear units will survive the preemptive attack in order to retaliate.  In the future, this may impact the nuclear command and control system and complicate the nuclear weapons use authorization procedures because the KPA Supreme Commander will have to entrust the captain of a submarine or a commander of a road-mobile missile unit with the authority to launch an operational nuclear-armed missile at the time of crisis when they will most likely be cut off from the national leadership.

Christopher Woolf [World Reporter for the BBC], Public Radio International, 5-1-2017, ["Is North Korea really a threat to the United States?," https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-05-01/north-korea-really-threat-united-states, 7-19-2017] // AA

Lee adds that a war with North Korea could be political suicide for a US administration, too. Even without weapons of mass destruction, a conflict on the Korean Peninsula would cost the lives of tens of thousands of South Koreans, and thousands of Americans, according to Pentagon studies. The South Korean capital, Seoul, is well within range of the North’s massed artillery batteries. The damage to the world economy could be catastrophic.

### A2: US Preemptive More Likely

#### (6 responses)

#### 1. Delink, Barenklau of the Diplomat 2017 indicates that the THAAD system won’t change the US’ decision-making calculus about a preemptive strike. Because it won’t slow the development of the North Korean nuclear capabilities or solve for the decision making calculus of the North Korean leadership.

#### 2. [Even if, Turn] Lee of NYU 2017 explains that the heightened prospect of U.S. military action in North Korea could encourage China, who fears the fallout of a regional conflict, to take steps to choke off Pyongyang’s economic lifeline

#### 3. Turn, Kelley of Pusan National University explains that with missile defense in place it would ease the paranoia that would motivate a preemptive strike in the first place. *We solve for the motivation to conduct a preemptive.*

#### 4. [No Impact– No Backlash] Fontaine of the War on Rocks 17 explains that the Kim regime would likely absorb an attack without striking South Korea or Japan for fear of incurring an American campaign aimed at ending the regime.

#### 5. [Long Term Decrease] Everard of CNN 2017 explains that as time progresses, a US preemptive becomes less likely because when North Korea attains the ability to strike a US city, America will no longer seek Kim’s overthrow, nor support its South Korean ally against Northern aggression.

#### 6. Delink, former secretary of Defense William Perry explains in 2017 that a preemptive strike is unlikely because the US would have to be granted approval by the liberal President Moon because South Korea would face the brunt of any retaliatory action, and he concludes that the risk is to0 great for Moon to accept.

Cards:

Ryan Barenklau. May 2017. “THAAD Is Operational in South Korea. What Next?” The Diplomat. <http://thediplomat.com/2017/05/thaad-is-operational-in-south-korea-what-next/> // AA

THAAD is up and running, but that likely won’t change U.S. thinking about a preemptive strike.

Carol E. Lee [New York University], Alastair Gale [Japanese Editor; New York Times]. March 2017. “White House Options on North Korea Include Use of Military Force.” Wall Street Journal. [https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-explores-options-including-use-of-military-force-to-counter-north-korean-threat-1488407444 //](https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-explores-options-including-use-of-military-force-to-counter-north-korean-threat-1488407444%20//) AA

The heightened prospect of U.S. military action in North Korea could encourage China, which fears the fallout of a military confrontation with its neighbor, to take steps Washington has long sought to choke off Pyongyang’s economic lifeline.

Christopher Woolf [World Reporter for the BBC], Public Radio International, 5-1-2017, ["Is North Korea really a threat to the United States?," https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-05-01/north-korea-really-threat-united-states, 7-19-2017] // AA

Lee adds that a war with North Korea could be political suicide for a US administration, too. Even without weapons of mass destruction, a conflict on the Korean Peninsula would cost the lives of tens of thousands of South Koreans, and thousands of Americans, according to Pentagon studies. The South Korean capital, Seoul, is well within range of the North’s massed artillery batteries. The damage to the world economy could be catastrophic.

Richard Fontaine, War on the Rocks, July 2017, ["Time to Lose Your Illusions on North Korea," https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/time-to-lose-your-illusions-on-north-korea/, 7-21-2017] // AA

There is a two-stage military approach that could, theoretically, eliminate the North’s nuclear and missile sites. In this concept, the United States would strike only those sites (assuming all could be located) and would telegraph to Pyongyang the limited nature of its attack. Washington would further signal to the Kim regime that any retaliation – would lead to its forcible destruction. It is theoretically possible that the regime would passively absorb the attacks without striking South Korea or Japan, for fear of incurring a far broader American campaign aimed at ending the regime.

John Everard, CNN, 7-5-2017, ["What will it take to stop North Korea?," http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/05/opinions/what-will-it-take-to-stop-north-korea/index.html, 7-23-2017] // AA

The North Korean leadership seems to believe that its nuclear and missile programs are vital to its survival. It is convinced (is it wrong?) that when it can credibly threaten to obliterate an American city, Washington will no longer dare to seek its overthrow, nor will the US attempt to reinforce its South Korean ally, should North Korea attempt to reunify the peninsula by force.

William J. Perry, the former secretary of defense under the Clinton administration; a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution, is the Michael and Barbara Barbarian Professor at Stanford University, with a joint appointment at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the School of Engineering, [Diplomacy, Not Doomsday, DOA: 24 July 2017] Hoover Digest, Spring 2017 // AA

What can we do to mitigate that danger? During the time I was defense secretary, I considered a pre-emptive conventional strike on the Yongbyon nuclear facility. We rejected that option in favor of diplomacy. Such a strike could still destroy the facilities at Yongbyon but probably would not destroy nuclear weapons, likely not located there. In 2006, Ashton B. Carter (who would become President Obama’s last secretary of defense) and I recommended that the United States consider striking North Korea’s ICBM launch facility. I would not recommend either of those strikes today because of the great risk for South Korea; at the very least, any suck plan would have to be agreed to by South Korea’s leadership, since their country would bear the brunt of any retaliatory action.

### A2: US seek regime Change

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson states that the US objective in North Korea is denuclearization not regime change.

Cards:

Ryan Pickrell. April 2017. “Tillerson: US Does Not Want To Topple Kim Jong-Un.” The Daily Caller. <http://dailycaller.com/2017/04/10/tillerson-us-does-not-want-to-topple-kim-jong-un/> // AA

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said Sunday that the U.S. objective in North Korea is de-nuclearization, not regime change. North Korea argues that it needs nuclear weapons to preserve the regime. Tillerson has been trying to send the message that the country’s justification for the development of nuclear weapons in violation of international restrictions is flawed. “We have been very clear that our objective is a denuclearized Korean Peninsula,” he explained Sunday, “We have no objective to change the regime in North Korea; that is not our objective.” “They’re working their way towards the test of an intercontinental ballistic missile. And these are the kinds of progress that give us the greatest concerns. So we have been quite clear with the regime in Pyongyang that that’s what we want them to cease,” Tillerson added.

### A2: PS Good

#### (7 responses)

#### 1. Mitigate, The Irish Examiner explains in August that a preemptive strike would fail because North Korea’s missile and facilities are scattered underground throughout its mountainous terrain. Thus, its improbable and you can mitigate their strength of link. However, even if it was conducted, you can turn the argument becaues it would leave 10s of millions of people vulnerable to missile and artillery strikes.

#### 2. Turn, Bader of the Brookings Institute explains in August that a U.S. preemptive strike to take out North Korea’s nuclear weapons would invite devastating retaliation by North Korea against South Korea. Moreover, with 15,000 conventional artillery launchers within 50 miles of Seoul, North Korea is capable of causing mass casualties in the South.

#### 3. Turn, If the United States initiated a conflict, Bader of Brookings 17 explains that there would be angry calls in South Korea for terminating the US-ROK alliance which would risk having a new and vastly more capable Korea foe.

#### 4. Delink, because there’s no regional support. China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi stated in February 2016 that one of the fundamental principles China will adhere to when addressing the Korean Peninsula is that a military option would be unacceptable.

#### 5. Delink, Chinese acts as a deterrent, Jai Qinguo of Paking University 2017 warned the US and South Korea that China would not be complacent in the event of military actions on North Korea because it would be directly impacted by the fallout of a preemptive strike. Chinese involvement will act as a deterrent to any preemptive action, don’t let them garner any offense off of this.

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#### For all these reasons, Delury concludes that a preemptive strike would rapidly descend into a bloodbath, reigniting a war.

Cards:

Thursday, August 10, 2017, Irish Examiner, 8-10-2017, ["Is war between the US and North Korea likely? " http://www.irishexaminer.com/viewpoints/analysis/is-war-between-the-us-and-north-korea-likely-456704.html, 8-10-2017] // AA

It probably wouldn’t work. North Korea’s missiles and nuclear facilities are dispersed and hidden throughout the country’s mountainous terrain. Failing to hit them all would leave 10m people in Seoul, 38m people in Tokyo, and tens of thousands of US military personnel in northeast Asia vulnerable to missile attacks — either by conventional or nuclear warheads. Even if the US wiped out everything, Seoul would still be vulnerable to attacks from North Korea’s artillery.

Jeffrey A. Bader, Brookings, 8-8-2017, ["Why deterring and containing North Korea is our least bad option," https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/08/08/why-deterring-and-containing-north-korea-is-our-least-bad-option/?utm\_campaign=Brookings%20Brief&amp;utm\_source=hs\_email&amp;utm\_medium=email&amp;utm\_content=55099247, 8-9-2017] // AA

A U.S. preemptive strike to take out North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Such a strike would invite devastating retaliation by North Korea against South Korea and perhaps Japan. With some 15,000 conventional artillery launchers within 50 miles of Seoul, North Korea is capable of causing mass casualties in the South, even without resorting to nuclear missiles. An all-out war in the Korean peninsula would likely produce large-scale American casualties. Additionally, even if such a war were successful, there would be angry calls in South Korea for terminating the alliance with the United States in the wake of a U.S.-triggered conflict; there could be a risk that we would have traded a dysfunctional North Korean enemy for a vastly more capable Korean foe.

Fei su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. [http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf //](http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf%20//) AA

At the official level, the Chinese Government remains opposed to a kinetic response to North Korea’s nuclear tests. China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, made a clear statement during an interview in February 2016 that one of the principles adhered to by China in addressing issues on the Korean peninsula is that a military option would be unacceptable.43 Nonetheless, Chinese experts such as Jia Qingguo, dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, warn that China cannot afford to be complacent, particularly since it would be directly affected by a surgical strike against North Korea by the USA.44

Fei su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. [http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf //](http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf%20//) AA

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John Delury (a senior fellow of the Center on U.S.-China Relations and an Assistant Professor of International Studies at Yonsei University. He has taught Chinese history and politics at Columbia, Brown, and Peking University, and received a PhD in Chinese history at Yale), 38 North, October 31, 2016, ["The "China Factor"," 38North, School of Advanced International Studies, http://www.38north.org/2016/10/jdelury103116/, 7-28-2017] // AA

To be sure, North Korea would be on its own if it were to attack US allies or assets in the region, let alone US territory. But if the United States launches a pre-emptive strike not to prevent a specific, imminent missile attack, but rather to prevent North Korea from perfecting an intercontinental nuclear strike capability, it is unlikely to meet Beijing’s standard for jus ad bellum. On the contrary, a strike of this nature could likely drive Beijing to side with the North in accordance with their 1961 treaty. In the furious military retaliation that Pyongyang would muster after a US strike, South Korea and the United States could not count on Beijing’s support and indeed may face Chinese intervention on the peninsula, as in October 1950. “Surgery” would rapidly descend into a bloodbath. “Pre-emption” would start a war.

### A2: US Preemptive Good

#### (1 response)

#### 1. [Terminal Defense] Lee of the of Tufts University writes that conducting war with North Korea would be political suicide for a US administration. Because a.) The Pentagon reports that it would cost tens of thousands of South Korean and American lives. And b.) would put out ally’s capitol in range of North Korea’s artillery batteries which would risk global economic stability.

Christopher Woolf [World Reporter for the BBC], Public Radio International, 5-1-2017, ["Is North Korea really a threat to the United States?," https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-05-01/north-korea-really-threat-united-states, 7-19-2017] // AA

Lee adds that a war with North Korea could be political suicide for a US administration, too. Even without weapons of mass destruction, a conflict on the Korean Peninsula would cost the lives of tens of thousands of South Koreans, and thousands of Americans, according to Pentagon studies. The South Korean capital, Seoul, is well within range of the North’s massed artillery batteries. The damage to the world economy could be catastrophic.

### A2: SK Preemptive

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Turn, Kelley of Pusan National University writes that the presence of missile defense replaces the need for South Korea to engage in a militarized dispute with the North. Because missile defense erodes the paranoia associated with the threat of a Northern strike. *Our world is comparatively less likely to contain preemptive war, you can affirm right there.*

Cards:

Dr. Robert E. Kelly [Pusan National University in South Korea]. April 2015. “South Korea’s THAAD Decision.” The Diplomat. April 13, 2015. thediplomat.com/2015/04/south-koreas-thaad-decision/ // AA

For perspective, it is worth nothing that South Korea does already have some local missile defense coverage from Patriot missiles (PAC-2 and -3), but these only provide narrow and low altitude defense. Similarly, Korea has tried on and off for years to develop its own Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), but it has never really panned out. It would cost a great deal and likely simply replicate most of what the Americans are offering right now for almost nothing. Meanwhile the case for high altitude defense grows more obvious with each day that North Korea’s programs continue. Whereas the PAC-3s would provide some defense just as the inbound missile approached its target, THAAD would reach higher up, giving South Korean defenders more chances to shoot down the missile. Technologically this is extraordinarily difficult. Missile defense is often likened to “hitting a bullet with another bullet,” and neither THAAD, PAC-3, nor Israel’s Iron Dome provide anything close to absolute coverage. But given the obvious destructive power of nuclear weapons, even 50/50 coverage would be a massive improvement in South Korean security and reduce the paranoia that might encourage preemptive airstrikes. (For technical details on THAAD, try here and here.)

### A2: China Conflict

#### (4 responses)

#### 1. Mitigate, Bennett of RAND 2016 explains that China is a major proponent of Northeast Asia’s regional security. As a result, China won’t the one initiating any conflict. Rather, they will make decisions that will prevent conflict not start one.

#### 2. Delink, Bennett of RAND 2016 explains that China’s notion of regional security includes insuring the security of South Korea. Thus, it won’t unnecessarily provoke conflict.

#### 3. Mitigate, Allison of Harvard University 2017 explains that only one year of a US-Chinese War would decrease the Chinese GDP by 10% and the Chinese Economy by 35%. This is a deterrent to war as both President Trump and Xi have promised to make their respective economies, great again.

#### 4. Delink, Grebe of the Bonn International Center explains that Chinese leadership recently announced plans to downsize its armed forces by 300,000 by the end of this year.

Bruce W. Bennett [California Institute of Technology]. April 2016. “THAAD's Effect on South Korea's Neighbors.” RAND Corporation. <https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/09/on-northeast-asia.html> // AA

China has been a major proponent of regional security for Northeast Asia. This advocacy is only natural: Truly great powers should pursue more than just their own security.

Bruce W. Bennett [California Institute of Technology]. April 2016. “THAAD's Effect on South Korea's Neighbors.” RAND Corporation. <https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/09/on-northeast-asia.html> // AA

Many had hoped that the Chinese definition of regional security would include Republic of Korea (ROK) security. After all, the ROK is part of the Northeast Asia region and has been heavily threatened on a regular basis by North Korea. Thus many ROK security experts believed that in the aftermath of six summit meetings through 2015 between ROK President Park Geun-hye and Chinese President Xi Jinping, China was committed to stopping North Korean provocations and China was also committed to meeting Chinese international security obligations.

Graham Allison [Professor; Harvard University]. April 12, 2017. “How America and China Could Stumble to War.” The National Interest. [http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-america-china-could-stumble-war-20150 //](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-america-china-could-stumble-war-20150%20//) AA

In the years ahead, could a collision between American and Chinese warships in the South China Sea, a drive toward national independence in Taiwan or jockeying between China and Japan over islands on which no one wants to live spark a war between China and the United States that neither wants? It may seem hard to imagine—the consequences would be so obviously disproportionate to any gains either side could hope to achieve. Even a non-nuclear war conducted mostly at sea and in the air could kill thousands of combatants on both sides. Moreover, the economic impact of such a war would be massive. A 2016 RAND study found that, after just one year, American GDP could decline by up to 10 percent and Chinese GDP by as much as 35 percent—setbacks on par with the Great Depression. And if a war did go nuclear, both nations would be utterly destroyed. Chinese and American leaders know they cannot let that happen.

Jan Grebe, Max M. Mutschler. 2015. “GLOBAL MILITARISATION INDEX 2015.” Bonn International Center for Conversation. [https://www.bicc.de/uploads/tx\_bicctools/GMI\_2015\_EN\_2015.pdf //](https://www.bicc.de/uploads/tx_bicctools/GMI_2015_EN_2015.pdf%20//) AA

The Chinese leadership has recently announced plans to downsize the armed forces by 300,000 by the end of 2017, which will leave around 1.9 million soldiers in service. This will affect the level of militarisation and free up resources over the medium to longterm. However, it is also likely savings will then be invested in developing and procuring modern weapon systems for the Chinese Air Force and Navy as part of the ongoing modernisation. Modernisation costs together with investment in military research and development will probably entail a further expansion of China’s defence budget.

### A2: Russian Conflict

#### (3 responses)

#### 1. Delink, Because of the Sanctions placed on Russia, they cannot afford to wage a full out war with the United States.

#### 2. Delink, After the cold war, Russia will be reluctant to risk a conflict with the United States because they don’t want to risk the reputational harm affiliated with loosing.

#### 3. Delink, Kofman of the Center of Naval Analysis reports that the Russian defense budget has been cut by over 7% because of its struggling economy. Thus, Russia cannot afford to maintain its own military spending, much less help build up the North Korean military.

Cards:

Dave Majumdar, 3-20-2017, "Did Russia Just Cut Its Defense Budget by a Whopping 25 Percent?," National Interest, [http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/did-russia-just-cut-its-defense-budget-by-whopping-25-19831 //](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/did-russia-just-cut-its-defense-budget-by-whopping-25-19831%20//) MC

“Russian defense budget is going from 3.07 trillion RUB in 2016, to 2.84 trillion RUB in 2017, a reduction of ~7%, which is about 1% harsher than announced in October of last year,” Michael Kofman, a research scientist specializing in Russian military affairs at the Center for Naval Analysis writes. “The original estimate for the 2017-2019 budget plan was a 6% reduction over that period of defense spending. The difference now is about 230 billion RUB.” One of the problems that Moscow faced, Kofman notes, is that the Russian defense industrial complex was weighted down by commercial debt and interest payments. “This was no small issue, the interest rate + inflation resulted in some notable costs to the manufacturers, and financing this debt was having a waterfall effect on the state armament program,” Kofman writes.

### A2: Regime Stronger

#### 1. Turn. Clark of Breaking Defense explains in 2017 that North Korea is experiencing an influx of foreign information which is currently degrading the Kim regime’s monopoly of information. He concludes that the influx will increase the likelihood of regime collapse in North Korea, much to the likes of East Germany after the breach of the Berlin wall.

Colin Clark (Editor; BA from Drew University), Breaking Defense, 7-27-2017, ["North Korea Won’t Give Nukes Up ‘At Any Price:’ Top Korea Intel Officer," http://breakingdefense.com/2017/07/north-korea-wont-give-nukes-up-at-any-price-top-korea-intel-officer/, 7-28-2017] // AA

However, in addition to the push to improve his country’s military, Kim is opening it to market forces, creating “a more profit-driven consumerist, materialistic, individualistic” society. As part of that change, information from the outside world is “flowing” into the Hermit Kingdom and the regime “no longer has a monopoly on information.”  Because of those factors, “internal changes could come very quickly and very unexpectedly.” That would seem to raise the specter of a North Korean collapse, much as East Germany and its neighbors fell apart with the astonishing breach of the Berlin Wall.

### A2: Collapse Imminent

#### (2 responses)

#### 1. Delink, Su of Seoul National University explain in 2017 that the Kim regime has stabilized under Kim’s rule, making collapse unlikely.

#### 2. Delink, Saalman of UChiacago17 explains that North Korea’s stability remains a high priority for China, because regime collapse would destabilize the whole region. Thus, even if collapse is possible, China will take drastic measures to ensure that the Kim regime maintains power.

Cards:

Fei su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. [http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf //](http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf%20//) AA

In contrast, the international community continues to discuss the unlikelihood of resuming the Six-Party Talks and implications of regime change or collapse in North Korea. In response to these debates, Chinese experts tend to argue that since the current regime has stabilized under Kim’s rule, collapse is unlikely. Moreover, they maintain that North Korea’s stability remains a high priority for China. Since a shock to the regime could substantially increase the instability of the whole region, most Chinese analysts do not consider it to be a practical or desirable option.53

Fei su (SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme; Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University ; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies; BA from University of Chicago; Director - SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. [http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf //](http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf%20//) AA

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### A2: Collapse Good

#### (2 responses)

#### 1. Kazanias of the National Interest 2016 explains that if the current regime collapses factions would develop to take control of the country. All of which would purposefully attack South Korea with ballistic, chemical, and even nuclear, weapons to retaliate.

#### 2. Isaac Fish Foreign Policy concludes that the collapse of North Korea is the South greatest fear for three reasons:

#### First, hundreds of thousands of refugees that would destabilize the region.

#### Second, China would be threatened by the idea of unification and democracy creeping closer to its doors so it would militarily intervene.

#### Third, possible American troops entering North Korea would provoke China potentially leading to a major conflict.

Cards:

Harry Kazanias, 1/7/2016, “Asia's Worst Nightmare (or World War III): What If North Korea Fell?”, National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/asias-worst-nightmare-or-world-war-iii-what-if-north-korea-14839

“The alternative kind of collapse would be a government collapse. In this case, the Kim family regime would fail or be [is] overthrown, and no single individual or group would be able to form a new central North Korean government. Most likely, factions would develop, each trying to control parts of the country, with some possibly having very weak control even over their own areas. Many central government functions would fail, including much of the control system. “A civil war in North Korea and especially the use of WMD could spill over into the ROK and cause serious damage. Factional forces could cause considerable damage with artillery and special forces attacks on the ROK, especially if nuclear and/or biological weapons are used. In addition, one or more North Korean factions could purposefully attack [South Korea] the ROK, potentially as a form of revenge if they perceive themselves unlikely to survive. Thus, [with] ballistic missile attacks against [South Korean] ROK cities—especially ones using nuclear weapons or even chemical or biological weapons—could cause damage across the ROK. Besides the physical damage done, the ROK economy and society could be significantly affected. All these consequences could make it difficult for the ROK to pay for and manage unification. From a [South Korean] ROK perspective, the worst outcome could be destabilization of all of Korea, including the ROK, as crime and insurgency spread, if the ROK is unable to contain and defeat them.”

Isaac Fish [Columbia University & Editor of Foreign Policy], 2017, “Is THAAD the Start of a U.S.-China Arms Race?”, China File, http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/thaad-start-of-us-china-arms-race

Picture North Korea as a robber who pulls out a gun, points it at his own head, and says, “Stop or I’ll shoot.” Surprisingly for many in the United States, the biggest threat that Pyongyang poses [to] is not the extremely unlikely eventuality of a North Korean missile attack on the United States or its allies South Korea and Japan. Rather, the greatest threat Pyongyang poses is that the government, and perhaps even the country, will collapse, leaving other countries to contain the chaos.

Isac Stone Fish [Editor; Foreign Policy], Graham Webster [The China Center at Yale Law School], Sheila Smith [Fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations], Sheena Greitens [Center for East Asian Policy]. March 2017. “Is THAAD the Start of a U.S.-China Arms Race?” China File. [http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/thaad-start-of-us-china-arms-race //](http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/thaad-start-of-us-china-arms-race%20//) AA

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### A2: Collapse Bad

#### (3 responses)

#### 1. Turn, Smith of the Council on Foreign Relations 2017 explains that in the long-term South Korea would gain has it would double its territory, increase its population by roughly 50 percent, gain access to vast unmined deposits of natural resources, and Greater Korea would be linked overland with Eurasia.

#### 2. Turn, Malinowski of the State Department 2017 explains that the collapse of North Korea is inevitable and that it’s better to face regime collapse now than later because the Kim regime’s capacity to lash out is less developed. We risk saving more lives.

#### 3. [We outweigh] Malinowski of the US State Department 2017 explains that the geopolitical risks that will arise from the collapse of North Korea are preferable to the dangers of a divides Korea considering the unstable nuclear-armed dictatorship in the North.

Cards:

Isac Stone Fish [Editor; Foreign Policy], Graham Webster [The China Center at Yale Law School], Sheila Smith [Fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations], Sheena Greitens [Center for East Asian Policy]. March 2017. “Is THAAD the Start of a U.S.-China Arms Race?” China File. [http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/thaad-start-of-us-china-arms-race //](http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/thaad-start-of-us-china-arms-race%20//) AA

But unlike Beijing, Seoul would gain handsomely after the dust settled. Not only would it more than double its territory, increase its population by roughly 50 percent, and gain access to vast unmined deposits of natural resources, but Greater Korea would be linked overland with Eurasia.

Tom Malinowski, as assistant secretary of state for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, POLITICO Magazine, 7-24-2017, ["How to Take Down Kim Jong Un," http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/07/24/how-to-take-down-kim-jong-un-215411, 7-24-2017] // AA

But would an impending loss of power, for which North Korea’s leaders will blame us whatever our actual role, be the thing that pushes it to start the war we all fear? Of course, we can’t be sure. But experience suggests that in their final moments, dictators, and more important, those to whom they give orders, are preoccupied with getting themselves, their families and their money to safety—goals that are generally not advanced by starting last minute wars with foreign powers. If such a moment comes in North Korea, most of the regime’s security officials will likely be thinking about how to survive reunification (something we should be encouraging them to consider), not how to follow their leader to oblivion. In any case, an eventual challenge to the stability of the regime is inevitable. I would rather face it sooner, while the regime’s military capacity to lash out is less developed, than later when the danger will be greater. I’d rather that North Koreans’ misery end sooner than later, too.

Tom Malinowski, as assistant secretary of state for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, POLITICO Magazine, 7-24-2017, ["How to Take Down Kim Jong Un," http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/07/24/how-to-take-down-kim-jong-un-215411, 7-24-2017] // AA

Fears of a sudden refugee crisis if the North Korean regime crumbles are also somewhat exaggerated. North Koreans will not be able to cross the DMZ to South Korea in the way that Berliners could walk through Checkpoint Charlie; China can control its border if it wants; and in any case, the vast majority of North Koreans (like the vast majority of people everywhere) do not now and will not then want to be homeless refugees, unless mass violence leaves them with no choice. The greater challenges would likely come after reunification. South Koreans will bear huge costs. North Koreans will face painful adjustments. There will be new geopolitical risks, given China’s fears of a U.S.-allied unified Korea. But again, these cannot be put off forever, and we should prefer them to the dangers of a divided Korea with an unstable nuclear-armed dictatorship in the North. Trying to influence and prepare for change is a better option than pretending it will never happen.

### A2: Refugees Bad

#### (2 responses)

#### 1. Mitigate, Malinowski of the US State Department writes on January 24th that the fear of a sudden refugee crisis causing regional instability if the North Korean regime collapses is exaggerated because North Koreans will not be able to walk across the DMZ and China can control its border.

#### 2. Mitigate, Malinowski of the State Department 2017 explains that most North Koreans will not leave their homes to be homeless refugees, unless massive violence leaves them with no choice

Cards:

Tom Malinowski, as assistant secretary of state for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, POLITICO Magazine, 7-24-2017, ["How to Take Down Kim Jong Un," http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/07/24/how-to-take-down-kim-jong-un-215411, 7-24-2017] // AA

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### A2: Last Minute Strike

#### 1. [Delink, Historical Precedence]. Malinowski of the State Department explains in 2017, historically precedence suggests that in their final moments, dictators, and those to whom they give orders, are preoccupied with getting themselves, their families and their money to safety over starting last minute wars with foreign powers. He furthers that if such a moment comes in North Korea, most of the regime’s security officials will likely be thinking about how to survive reunification, not how to follow their leader to oblivion.

Cards:

Tom Malinowski, as assistant secretary of state for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, POLITICO Magazine, 7-24-2017, ["How to Take Down Kim Jong Un," http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/07/24/how-to-take-down-kim-jong-un-215411, 7-24-2017] // AA

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## A2 Relations Impacts

### A2: Regional Instability General

#### (2 responses)

#### 1. Turn, Klinger of the Heritage Foundation explains that missile defense would greatly contribute to regional stability because it would reassure allies of America’s commitment to their security against steadily rising military risks and threats of coercion and aggression. As a result, missile defense contributes to regional peace and stability and supports international nonprolifera­tion efforts by reducing other nations’ perceived need to acquire nuclear weapons.

#### 2. Turn, Wicker of the University of Texas 2016 explains that the deployment of missile defens provides a unique opportunity to skew the Northeast Asian regional landscape in South Korea’s favor. Thus, he concludes, deploying missile defense allows for the laying of a foundation vital to countering North Korean aggression.

Cards:

Bruce Klingner [Senior Research Fellow, Northeast Asia; Heritage Foundation]. January 2011. “The Case for Comprehensive Missile Defense in Asia.” The Heritage Foundation.

A comprehensive missile defense system would not only protect the American homeland, but also reassure U.S. friends and allies of Washington’s commitment to their security against steadily rising military risks and threats of coercion or aggression. Missile defense contributes to regional peace and stability and supports international nonprolifera­tion efforts by reducing other nations’ perceived need to acquire nuclear weapons.

McDaniel Wicker [University of Texas]. April 2016. “Security in Unity Between the United States, South Korea and Japan.” The Wilson Center Asia Program. [https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/completing\_the\_triangle-mcdaniel\_wicker.pdf //](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/completing_the_triangle-mcdaniel_wicker.pdf%20//) AA

North Korea’s recent provocations have reinforced the need for closer cooperation to counter Pyongyang. The rogue nation’s fourth nuclear test on January 6 and its missile launch a month later have resulted in significant policy shift by President Park. The president was previously reluctant to allow a U.S. deployment of the advanced Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system to South Korea, but working-level talks are now underway to iron out the details of the installation.2 Park’s tone toward the North has changed sharply from her previous focus on reunification and trust building,3 while she has also increased communication with Prime Minister Abe. The two leaders spoke immediately after both North Korean provocations and called for ongoing coordination to counter the Kim regime, including closely working together on the latest UN sanctions and issuing unilateral sanctions.4 These changes offer[ing] a unique opportunity to reshape the security landscape in Northeast Asia. While the United States has long managed defense relations through the so-called hub and spoke system of bilateral ties centered around Washington, the Obama administration should use its final year to move toward a new trilateral security relationship to enhance security in the region. Action cannot be delayed until the next administration since the conditions allowing for stronger trilateral ties will likely have changed by next year. Indeed, senior national security leaders in all three countries’ and several U.S. foreign policy experts believe the window of opportunity to build a new U.S.-ROK-Japan relationship may be closed as soon as this summer.5 Nor can the United States hope for progress in the bilateral relationship given the historical issues and governmental inertia. Instead, U.S. officials must seize on this confluence of events to lay the foundation for the long-lasting trilateral relationship that is vital to countering North Korea.

### A2: Alliance Improbable

#### 1. Turn, Rinehart of the Congressional Research Office 2015 explains that the United States seeks deeper missile defense cooperation and has made a multilateral approach a major emphasis in their approach to North Korea.

Cards:

Ian E. Rinehart [Analyst in Asian Affairs], Steven A. Hildreth [Specialist in U.S. and Foreign National Security Programs], and Susan V. Lawrence [Specialist in Asian Affairs]. April 3, 2015. “Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition.” Congressional Research Office. [https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43116.pdf //](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43116.pdf%20//) AA

The persistent threat of a missile attack from North Korea has led U.S. policymakers to seek deeper BMD cooperation with Asia-Pacific allies. This trilateral and [Moreover, this] multilateral approach remains the major emphasis of [the United States] U.S. officials and can be viewed as aligning with the goals of the strategic rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region. The “Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Vision 2020” policy guidance document, which DOD released in December 2013, urges the U.S. military to integrate air and missile defense capabilities with partner countries and to leverage partners’ contributions.62

### A2: Anti-China Alliance

#### (2 Reponses)

#### 1. Realize that South Korea has deployed anti-missile systems since the Reagan era, yet there has been a corresponding increase in South Korean – Chinese engagement for the past 30 years. Make my opponents explains to you why China is just starting to retaliate.

#### 2. Delink, Pollack of the Brookings Institution 2014 explains that the continued enhancement of Chinese-Korean relations has been at no discernible cost to the US-ROK alliance, which has rarely if ever seemed closer than at present. Concluding, claims that China’s larger goal is to degrade Seoul’s alliance with Washington have no validity

Cards:

Jonathan Pollack. September 2014. “The Strategic Meaning of China-ROK Relations: How Far Will the Rapprochement Go and with What Implications?” The Brookings Institute. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-strategic-meaning-of-china-rok-relations-how-far-will-the-rapprochement-go-and-with-what-implications/> // AA

The ROK discounts these concerns and rejects the zero sum argument that it must make a choice between China and the United States. The continued enhancement of Chinese-Korean relations has been at no discernible cost to the US-ROK alliance, which has rarely if ever seemed closer than at present. Claims that China’s larger goal is to degrade Seoul’s alliance with Washington have no validity so long as Korea’s leaders unambiguously convey to Beijing that its first order strategic interests are not negotiable. The Chinese, for example, have expressed clear objections to continued US-ROK military exercises on the peninsula and to pending possibilities of enhanced US missile defense deployments there. There is every reason to conclude that the ROK will determine its interests and preferences in both areas and (should Beijing raise objections) fully defend its policy decisions, which are not directed at China.

### A2: MOU = Trilat NonUnique

#### (2 responses)

#### 1. The argument we make is about missile defense promoting trilateral cooperation, not just the THAAD system. Thus, make them give you examples of trilateral cooperation from before missile defense was first deployed in the 80’s.

#### 2. Park of Johns Hopkins indicates that there were four problems with the Memorandum of Agreement that my opponents are talking about.

#### a. The MOU only covers nuclear threats that North Korea poses, thus limiting cooperation overall.

#### b. The MOU was signed between vice ministers not between governments, and thus is no legally binding.

#### c. The memorandum stipulates that Korea and Japan share military intelligence through the United States instead of cooperating directly.

#### d. The Park administration of South Korea which crafted the deal only did so for fear of domestic political backlash.

Jaehan Park (is a Ph.D. student at the Johns Hopkins’ Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Prior to SAIS, Park served in the Republic of Korea Army as an officer) & Sangyoung Yun (is a Masters graduate from Johns Hopkins SAIS and currently a research assistant at the US-Korea Institute at SAIS). November 24, 2016. “Korea and Japan's Military Information Agreement: A Final Touch for the Pivot?” The Diplomat. <http://thediplomat.com/2016/11/korea-and-japans-military-information-agreement-a-final-touch-for-the-pivot/> // AA

There are[several technical differences](http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/634757.html) between the MOU and the GSOMIA. First, the former only covers nuclear weapons and missiles, while the latter applies to the entire universe of threats posed by North Korea. Second, the MOU was signed between vice ministers, not governments, of the two countries, and [thus is not legally binding](http://defense.na.go.kr/site?siteId=site000002503&pageId=page000002635&bd_mode=read&bd_pageNumber=1&bd_searchTerm=&bd_searchKeyword=&bd_recordId=2016060054066). Third, the memorandum stipulates that Korea and Japan would share military intelligence through the United States, instead of cooperating directly. It is not inconceivable that the officials in the Park administration were aware of these issues, but they proceeded with the MOU perhaps for fear of domestic backlash against the bilateral agreement.

### A2: Pivot to Asia Solves

#### 1. [Mitigate their strength of link] Park of Johns Hopkins explains that the American pivot to Asia is incomplete at best.

#### 2. [Missile Defense Unique] Yun of the Diplomat indicates that the pivot to Asia is based on a series of alliances. However, the most important alliance between the ROK-and Japan hasn’t materialized because of gridlock.

#### For these reasons, we need to deploy missile defense to spur multilateralism.

Cards:

Jaehan Park (is a Ph.D. student at the Johns Hopkins’ Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Prior to SAIS, Park served in the Republic of Korea Army as an officer) & Sangyoung Yun (is a Masters graduate from Johns Hopkins SAIS and currently a research assistant at the US-Korea Institute at SAIS). November 24, 2016. “Korea and Japan's Military Information Agreement: A Final Touch for the Pivot?” The Diplomat. <http://thediplomat.com/2016/11/korea-and-japans-military-information-agreement-a-final-touch-for-the-pivot/> // AA

Notwithstanding all the rhetoric, Obama’s “pivot to Asia” [has been incomplete at best](https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/03/the-legacy-of-obamas-pivot-to-asia/). Thus far, U.S. foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific has been predicated upon a network of alliances [often characterized as the “hub-and-spokes” system](https://www.amazon.com/Powerplay-American-Alliance-Princeton-International/dp/0691144532/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1479882250&sr=8-1&keywords=powerplay+victor+cha). In the face of rising tensions in the region — from the increasingly aggressive China to the last survivor of the “axis of evil” — the success of “pivot” hinges on Washington’s ability to put together two of its most important “spokes”: South Korea and Japan. While American policymakers have been pushing forward this agenda for some time, Tokyo and Seoul failed to forge a modus vivendi with regard to the ever-needed trilateral security cooperation, owing in part to their unfortunate past. For this reason, some senior officials of the Obama administration have expressed [frustration over the gridlock](https://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2015/238035.htm).

### A2: Taking Sides

#### (2 responses)

#### 1. Delink, Pollack of the Brookings Institution 2014 explains that the continued enhancement of Chinese-Korean relations has been at no discernible cost to the US-ROK alliance, which has rarely if ever seemed closer than at present. Concluding, claims that China’s larger goal is to degrade Seoul’s alliance with Washington have no validity

#### 2. South Korea’s relationship isn’t zero sum. Zhimin of Fudan University 2012 explains that over the past 20 years China has become dramatically closer to South Korea in tandem with the US security alliance.

Cards:

Jonathan Pollack. September 2014. “The Strategic Meaning of China-ROK Relations: How Far Will the Rapprochement Go and with What Implications?” The Brookings Institute. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-strategic-meaning-of-china-rok-relations-how-far-will-the-rapprochement-go-and-with-what-implications/> // AA

The ROK discounts these concerns and rejects the zero sum argument that it must make a choice between China and the United States. The continued enhancement of Chinese-Korean relations has been at no discernible cost to the US-ROK alliance, which has rarely if ever seemed closer than at present. Claims that China’s larger goal is to degrade Seoul’s alliance with Washington have no validity so long as Korea’s leaders unambiguously convey to Beijing that its first order strategic interests are not negotiable. The Chinese, for example, have expressed clear objections to continued US-ROK military exercises on the peninsula and to pending possibilities of enhanced US missile defense deployments there. There is every reason to conclude that the ROK will determine its interests and preferences in both areas and (should Beijing raise objections) fully defend its policy decisions, which are not directed at China.

Chen Zhimin (is professor of international politics and Jean Monnet Chair Professor of European foreign policy in the Department of International Politics, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University, Shanghai). (2012) Embracing the Complexities in China-ROK Relations: A View from China. Asian Perspective: April-June 2012, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 195-218. <http://journals.rienner.com/doi/abs/10.5555/0258-9184-36.2.195?code=lrpi-site> // AA

China's relations with the Republic of Korea have undergone twenty years of remarkable development since the two countries established formal diplomatic relations in 1992. Since the political relationship was upgraded to a “strategic partnership” in 2008, with ever-deepening economic interdependence and intensive societal exchanges, the two countries have entered a new and more complicated stage. The ROK's closer economic relationship with China is now coupled with a closer security alliance with the United States, while intensified societal exchange is being accompanied by the decline of positive feelings in Sino-Korean mutual perceptions. While the two sides have been able to manage the fallout of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong tragedies in 2010, greater efforts are needed to place the relationship on a solid basis in the context of China's rise and the ROK's desire to find a larger international role for it self.

### A2: Russian Involvement

#### 1. Turn, Russian involvement in Korea will be a net positive because Ramani of Oxford writes in July 2017 that Russia’s approach to solving Korean tensions emphasizes inter-Korean diplomacy.

#### 2. Non-unique, Ramani of Oxford explains that Russia has been attempting to facilitate negotiations and restart the 6 party talks since 2016, long before THAAD was deployed.

#### 3. Turn, Ramani explains that the South Korean president seeks Russian involvement in facilitating peace between the Korea’s, that’s a direct link into the resolution.

Samuel Ramani (Samuel Ramani is a DPhil candidate in International Relations at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford. He is also a journalist who contributes regularly to the Washington Post and Huffington Post). July 15, 2017. “Russia’s Korea Strategy.” The Diplomat. <http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/russias-korea-strategy/> // AA

The recent intensification of tensions between Russia and the United States over North Korea can be explained by two factors. First, Russia’s preferred strategy to combat the North Korean threat contrasts markedly with Washington’s use of coercive diplomacy. Moscow has emphasized the importance of promoting inter-Korean diplomacy and has urged South Korea to desist from participation in U.S.-led security measures on the Korean peninsula, which antagonize North Korea. Second, Russia is expanding its stake in the North Korean crisis to strengthen its increasingly important strategic partnership with China.

Samuel Ramani (Samuel Ramani is a DPhil candidate in International Relations at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford. He is also a journalist who contributes regularly to the Washington Post and Huffington Post). July 15, 2017. “Russia’s Korea Strategy.” The Diplomat. <http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/russias-korea-strategy/> // AA

While Moscow’s leverage over North Korea remains limited, Russia’s attempts to extract compromises from both Pyongyang and Seoul underscore the strength of the Kremlin’s commitment to inter-Korean diplomacy. As Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has called for the [revival of Six Party Talks](https://sputniknews.com/politics/201604271038746503-lavrov-north-korea-talks/) on the North Korean crisis since April 2016, tangible progress towards inter-Korean diplomatic dialogue will represent the fulfillment of a long-standing Russian goal.

### A2: Russia Support NK

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Turn, Ramani of the University of Oxford explains that Russia will use its leverage over North Korea to extract compromises to reaffirm its commitment to inter-Korean diplomacy.

Samuel Ramani (Samuel Ramani is a DPhil candidate in International Relations at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford. He is also a journalist who contributes regularly to the Washington Post and Huffington Post). July 15, 2017. “Russia’s Korea Strategy.” The Diplomat. <http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/russias-korea-strategy/> // AA

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## A2 Diplomacy Impacts

### A2: Diplomacy Solves

#### (1 observation)

#### 1. Realize that Missile defense and diplomacy are not 0 sum. The US and South Korea will always look to diplomacy first. In fact, we’ve had missile defense in South Korea since Reagan and since then there have been many multi-lateral attempts at diplomacy. None of their offense is unique.

#### (10 responses)

#### 1. Delink, Mansourov of Johns Hopkins University explains that it was the dying wish of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il that Kim Jong Un never give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons, because doing so would be national treason and would dishonor his forbearers and their revolutionary inheritance.

#### 2. Delink, Mansourov of Johns Hopkins University explains that the Kim family views its survival to be intimately linked to its nuclear weapons program. That’s why Kim Jong Un believes that nuclear weapons guarantee North Korea’s peace, economic prosperity, and the people’s happy life.” Denuclearization isn’t an option. Diplomacy won’t work.

#### 3. Delink, Kim of the Associated Press 2017 writes that South Korea may be overly cautious in approaching negotiations as it worries of possible weakening international pressure.

#### 4. Mitigate Probability, Kim of the Business Insider reports on July 21st that ROK-North Korean talks wouldn’t produce any major breakthroughs because the South is unwilling to give up military drills or major weapons tests.

#### 5. Mitigate Probability, Kim of the Business Insider writes on July 21st that North Korea has higher expectation for what it can get from president Moon.

#### 6. Turn, Noland of the Council on Foreign Relations explains, despite the north agreeing to reopen talks, they were just attempting to buy time and signal to the world that they weren’t the bad guys. Despite, abruptly ending the negotiations after one day.

#### 7. Turn, Moon’s desperation will inevitably lead to exploitation. Kim of the Associated Press reports on July 21st that South Korea is desperate for talks right now, while the north is going to exploit the South’s desperation because it has an incentive to maximize its nuclear ability to alter current political and security dynamics in the region.

#### 8. Mitigate, Su of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute explains in 2017 that many Chinese experts admit that the Chances of convincing North Korea to surrender is nuclear weapons are minute

#### 9. Mitigate, Saalman of UChicago17 explains that even if North Korea were to return to the negotiation table, at best, it would take decades to achieve total Northern denuclearization. Thus, my opponents can’t solve regional tensions nor promote South Korean national interests in the short term.

#### 10. Delink, Mazza of the American Enterprise Institute explains in 2017 that Pyongyang sees obtaining nuclear weapons as an indispensable instrument for achieving their historical ambition. Thus, Kim Jong Un cannot give up his nukes without threatening the legitimacy of his rule.

Cards:

Hying-Jin Kim and Kim Tong-Hyung, Associated Press, Business Insider, 7-21-2017, ["North Korea has been silent after South Korea offered rare face-to-face talks — here's what that may mean," <span class="skimlinks-unlinked">http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-ap-explains-whats-behind-n-korean-silence-to-talks-offer-2017-7</span>, 7-22-2017] // AA

Analyst Park Hyung-joong at Seoul's Korea Institute for National Unification is skeptical about the prospects of talks. "It's South Korea that is desperate for talks right now, not the North. Pyongyang's goal is to maximize its nuclear ability so that it could alter political and security dynamics in the region — it wants to create more tension, while the South wants to reduce it," Park said.

Hying-Jin Kim and Kim Tong-Hyung, Associated Press, Business Insider, 7-21-2017, ["North Korea has been silent after South Korea offered rare face-to-face talks — here's what that may mean," <span class="skimlinks-unlinked">http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-ap-explains-whats-behind-n-korean-silence-to-talks-offer-2017-7</span>, 7-22-2017] // AA

If held, the talks would likely start with rounds of working-level meetings between colonel-level officers. And if they continue, general-grade officers would later meet to try to work out steps to reduce tensions. But they won't likely produce any major breakthrough if North Korea sticks to its demand for the end of South Korea-U.S. drills or conducts major weapons tests. The outlook for family reunion talks is more pessimistic unless North Korea stops demanding the return of a dozen women who worked for a North Korean-run restaurant in China.

Hying-Jin Kim and Kim Tong-Hyung, Associated Press, Business Insider, 7-21-2017, ["North Korea has been silent after South Korea offered rare face-to-face talks — here's what that may mean," <span class="skimlinks-unlinked">http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-ap-explains-whats-behind-n-korean-silence-to-talks-offer-2017-7</span>, 7-22-2017] // AA

The prospects for Moon's efforts to improve ties with North Korea don't appear bright. The North has higher expectations for what it can get from Moon, the first liberal leader in South Korea in about 10 years, and an elevated assessment of its own status as a nuclear weapons state. Moon will also be cautious about reaching out, because there are worries that his overture might weaken international pressure on the North. The North's state media on Thursday described Moon's overall North Korea policy as "nonsense," noting that South Korea also supports U.S.-led efforts to strengthen sanctions against the North.

Hying-Jin Kim and Kim Tong-Hyung, Associated Press, Business Insider, 7-21-2017, ["North Korea has been silent after South Korea offered rare face-to-face talks — here's what that may mean," <span class="skimlinks-unlinked">http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-ap-explains-whats-behind-n-korean-silence-to-talks-offer-2017-7</span>, 7-22-2017] // AA

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Marcus Noland, Council on Foreign Relations, 8-14-2013, ["Are North and South Korea Back in Business?," https://www.cfr.org/interview/are-north-and-south-korea-back-business, 7-23-2017] // AA

The North Koreans said in June they were open to talks to reopen the complex, but when the South Koreans reached the meeting in July, the North Koreans behaved obstreperously, and the meetings closed after one day with nothing accomplished. There was a lot of discussion at the time whether the South Koreans were blowing this up out of a fit of diplomatic pique, but in retrospect, the more plausible explanation is that the North Koreans felt compelled to show they were doing something positive before President Obama and Chinese president Xi Jinping met in California—so when Obama and Xi walked into that meeting together on June 7, the last news they had heard from the Korean peninsula was that the North Koreans were behaving more responsibly.

Alexandre. Mansourov, Ph.D. Columbia University; B.A. Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Advanced Diploma, Kim Il Sung National University (DPRK); Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, "Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 16, 2014, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/> // AA

The principal purpose of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program is to ensure the favorable environment for regime survival and national development by deterring external threats against the country’s sovereignty and leadership and by freeing internal resources for economic growth and individual consumption. The survival of the ruling Kim family is intimately linked to the nuclear weapons development program because nuclear arms help legitimize Kim Jong Un’s hereditary rule, keep his foreign foes at bay, and allow the DPRK government to prop up the civilian economy with the additional resources previously spent on conventional military arms. On March 31, 2013, Kim Jong Un said, “Nuclear weapons guarantee peace, economic prosperity, and people’s happy life.”[[4]](http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/" \l "_edn4)

Alexandre. Mansourov, Ph.D. Columbia University; B.A. Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Advanced Diploma, Kim Il Sung National University (DPRK); Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, "Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 16, 2014, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/> // AA

Internal political and economic considerations obviously play an important role in providing the domestic rationale for continued development of nuclear weapons. As Kim Jong Un said on a number of occasions, it was the dying wish and eternal legacy of both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il,[[18]](http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/" \l "_edn18)[[19]](http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/" \l "_edn19) and he would never give it up because it would be tantamount to national treason, the repudiation of his forebearers and their revolutionary inheritance. In addition, Kim asserted that the development of nuclear weapons should help DPRK avoid the costly arms race, reduce military spending and foster economic development.[[20]](http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/" \l "_edn20)

Fei su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. [http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf //](http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf%20//) AA

In terms of negotiations, an overwhelming majority of Chinese experts emphasize that multilateral talks are the best means of achieving denuclearization. Despite this fact, many of the Chinese experts interviewed admitted that the chances of convincing North Korea to surrender its nuclear weapons are minute.49 Further, they argued that even if North Korea were to return to the negotiation table and agree to denuclearization, it would take decades to achieve this goal. Instead, many Chinese analysts have returned to discussing the potential for a nuclear freeze or interim steps, rather than analysing the potential for complete denuclearization.50

Fei su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. [http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf //](http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf%20//) AA

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Michael Mazza (research fellow in foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute), Inside Asia, Forbes, 7-4-2017, ["Neither Negotiation Nor Nuclear Strike: How The U.S. Can Disable The North Korean Threat," https://www.forbes.com/sites/insideasia/2017/08/09/neither-negotiation-nor-nuclear-strike-how-the-u-s-can-disable-the-north-korean-threat/#74404539534f, 8-10-2017] // AA

The administration made an early error in concluding that Kim Jong Un could be coaxed or coerced into giving up his nuclear weapons. He cannot. My AEI colleague Nicholas Eberstad [explains why](https://www.nationalreview.com/nrd/articles/431156/seeing-north-korea): "In Pyongyang’s thinking, the indispensable instrument for achieving the DPRK’s grand historical ambitions must be a supremely powerful military: more specifically, one possessed of a nuclear arsenal that can imperil and break the foreign enemies who protect and prop up the vile puppet state in the south, so that the DPRK can consummate its unconditional unification and give birth to its envisioned earthly Korean-race utopia." Put simply, Kim can’t give up his nukes without threatening the very legitimacy -- such as it is -- of his rule. The only way to divorce North Korea of its nuclear weapons is to divorce it of it of its ruler.

### A2: Diplomacy Historically Successful

#### (3 responses)

#### 1. Delink, Perry of Stanford University 2017 explains that we can’t look to the past to predict how negotiations would pan out in the status quo because it is easier for leaders to forgo weapons they do not yet have than ones they do.

#### 2. Delink, Kim is different. Garlauskas, the North Korea officer for the Director of National Intelligence explains that Kim Jong Un has diverged from the policies of his predecessors and is unwilling to make any concessions on the North Korean nuclear program.

#### 3. Delink, Mazza of the American Enterprise Institute explains in 2017 that Pyongyang sees obtaining nuclear weapons as an indispensable instrument for achieving their historical ambition. Thus, Kim Jong Un cannot give up his nukes without threatening the legitimacy of his rule.

Cards:

William J. Perry, the former secretary of defense under the Clinton administration; a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution, is the Michael and Barbara Barbarian Professor at Stanford University, with a joint appointment at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the School of Engineering, [Diplomacy, Not Doomsday, DOA: 24 July 2017] Hoover Digest, Spring 2017 // AA

The regime has demonstrated—over and over again—that it is willing to sacrifice its economy to ensure that the dynasty is preserved. During negotiations in 1999 and 2000, we found a way to achieve all three of their goals without nuclear weapons. I believe that the North Korean government was ready to accept out proposal (it is easier for leaders to forgo weapons they do not yet have), but we can never be certain of that—nor that Pyongyang in fact would have compiled with an agreement—because the Georgie W. Bush administration cut off the talks in 2001.

Colin Clark (Editor; BA from Drew University), Breaking Defense, 7-27-2017, ["North Korea Won’t Give Nukes Up ‘At Any Price:’ Top Korea Intel Officer," http://breakingdefense.com/2017/07/north-korea-wont-give-nukes-up-at-any-price-top-korea-intel-officer/, 7-28-2017] // AA

Markus Garlauskas, the North Korea officer for the Director of National Intelligence, told the Strategic Command’s annual deterrence conference that the tubby young leader has diverged from the policies of his predecessors. They were willing to make concessions on their nuclear program — without ever giving it up — in exchange for economic concessions from the international community.

Michael Mazza (research fellow in foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute), Inside Asia, Forbes, 7-4-2017, ["Neither Negotiation Nor Nuclear Strike: How The U.S. Can Disable The North Korean Threat," https://www.forbes.com/sites/insideasia/2017/08/09/neither-negotiation-nor-nuclear-strike-how-the-u-s-can-disable-the-north-korean-threat/#74404539534f, 8-10-2017] // AA

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### A2: Diplomacy Historically Unsuccessful

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Delink, Su Ge of the China Institute of International Relations, indicates that the framework of the Six-Party Talks, is the best solution to the North Korean nuclear issue. Even if you think that the probability of success is low, it’s the best chance we have.

Cards:

Fei su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. [http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf //](http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf%20//) AA

In February 2016, Wang Yi advocated a new approach to get the relevant parties back to the negotiating table. The essence of this proposal involves denuclearizing North Korea, while holding talks on a peace agreement between the US and North Korea. Wang Yi suggested setting minor goals at different stages of the negotiation, with this point receiving a positive response in China.51 Su Ge, director of the China Institute of International Relations, among other Chinese experts, has argued that this approach should be conducted under the framework of the Six-Party Talks, which he still considers the best solution to the North Korean nuclear issue.52

### A2: Diplomacy Solves Short Term

#### (1 response)

#### 1. Delink, Su of Seoul National University 2017 explains that at best, even if North Korea were to return to the negotiating table it would take decades to achieve denuclearization.

Cards:

Fei su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. [http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf //](http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI-China's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf%20//) AA

In terms of negotiations, an overwhelming majority of Chinese experts emphasize that multilateral talks are the best means of achieving denuclearization. Despite this fact, many of the Chinese experts interviewed admitted that the chances of convincing North Korea to surrender its nuclear weapons are minute.49 Further, they argued that even if North Korea were to return to the negotiation table and agree to denuclearization, it would take decades to achieve this goal. Instead, many Chinese analysts have returned to discussing the potential for a nuclear freeze or interim steps, rather than analysing the potential for complete denuclearization.50

### A2: Zero Sum

#### (2 responses)

#### 1. Delink, Klinger of the Heritage Foundation explains that historically diplomacy, engagement, international condemnation, and the United Nations have failed to deter nuclear development in North Korea. So, make them tell you why taking a new approach is such a bad idea.

#### 2. Non-Unique, Klinger indicates that even if you buy that diplomacy is the best option, America, South Korea, and other parties are continuing to find diplomatic solutions right now, just because South Korea is defending itself, doesn’t make them isolationists.

Cards:

Bruce Klingner [Senior Research Fellow, Northeast Asia; Heritage Foundation]. January 2011. “The Case for Comprehensive Missile Defense in Asia.” The Heritage Foundation.

Diplomacy, engagement, international condem­nation, and United Nations resolutions have not deterred North Korea from developing missile and nuclear weapons capabilities. While Washington continues to seek diplomatic resolutions to the bal­listic missile threat, it is critical that the U.S. simul­taneously pursue missile defense programs to protect itself and its allies.[[1]](http://www.heritage.org/node/13198/print-display" \l "_ftn1)

### A2: Chinese Diplomacy

#### (2 responses)

#### 1. Delink, Wright of the Union of Concerned Scientists 2017 explains that efforts to get China to negotiate with and pressure North Korea won’t solve the problem because China doesn’t have as much leverage as the U.S. thinks it has over North Korea. Furthermore, China also views this as an issue between the U.S. and North Korea must negotiate between themselves.

#### 2. Turn, the Irish Examiner explains in August that China fears both a refugee crisis and US troops on its border, and thus seeks to prop up the Kim regime.

Card:

David Wright [co-director and senior scientist with the Union of Concerned Scientists’ Global Security Program] & Larry Greenemeier [associate editor of technology for Scientific American]. July 6, 2017. “North Korea Missile Test: Best Response May Be Surprisingly Low-Tech.” Scientific American. // AA

What is the best path forward for the U.S.?  
The U.S. called for a U.N. Security Council meeting on Wednesday, which is what I would have expected them to do. The Security Council meeting is intended to marshal international forces against North Korea, but I don’t think that solves the problem. Efforts to get China to negotiate with and pressure North Korea on behalf of the U.S. won’t solve the problem either. China doesn’t have as much leverage as the U.S. thinks it has over North Korea. China also views this as an issue between the U.S. and North Korea and, while it’s happy to help, China sees this as something that the U.S. and North Korea have to negotiate between themselves.

Thursday, August 10, 2017, Irish Examiner, 8-10-2017, ["Is war between the US and North Korea likely? " http://www.irishexaminer.com/viewpoints/analysis/is-war-between-the-us-and-north-korea-likely-456704.html, 8-10-2017] // AA

If Kim somehow were targeted for removal, the ruling clique would have to go as well, making for a long kill list. China, fearing both a refugee crisis and US troops on its border, would likely seek to prop up the existing regime.

### A2: Multilat (LINK)

#### (2 responses)

#### 1. Turn, Kapstein of Princeton University explains that the US’ deployment of missile defense to allies such as Japan, Australia and South Korea, pulls two states unlikely to cooperate with each other multilaterally into an agreement resembling a collective-security network.

#### 2. Turn, Anders Corr of Forbes 2016 explains that the deployment of the THAAD missile defense system has united the U.S., Japan, South Korea, and Australia together against North Korea. *Prefer this evidence because we give you a 100% probability of multilateral action stemming as a result of missile defense in South Korea.*

Cards:

Jonathan D. Caverley (Fellow - Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and a Research Associate in Political Science and Security Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) & Ethan B. Kapstein (Associate Director of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Program at Princeton University). 2016. “Who’s Arming Asia?” Survival – Global Politics and Strategy. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2016.1161911?journalCode=tsur20> // AA

That said, like the aristocratic Tancredi, the United States can adapt to a changing environment and preserve its privileged position. The US will continue to aggressively sell advanced products to wealthy allies such as Japan, Australia and South Korea. Japan and South Korea’s participation in the Aegis-based missile-defence system, for example, pulls two states unlikely to cooperate with each other bilaterally into something resembling a collective-security network. The United States remains the unrivalled producer of certain systems and services that make existing weapons more capable, and which even less-powerful states want. It still enjoys unmatched expertise in intelligence collection and information management. Even the anti-access weapons discussed above require significant upgrading in terms of both the human capital and the information-intensive C4SIR capability of small states’ militaries.37 As with the larger US economy, providing military software and services may not bring with it the domestic employment advantages of bending metal, but it can still enhance American interests.

Anders Corr, 2016, “Asia Spirals Toward Military Conflict As China, Russia And North Korea Ally Against THAAD”, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2016/08/12/asia-spirals-towards-military-conflict-as-china-and-north-korea-close-ranks-with-russia-over-thaad/#7f11105a17f3

On the flip side of this authoritarian alliance, Chinese, North Korean, and Russian belligerency is uniting the Asian democracies. Japan and South Korea, along with the U.S. and Australia, are increasingly tough on China and North Korea. In what is spiraling towards a potential military conflict , or at the very least an arms race and media war, South Korea plans to have the U.S. deploy[ment of that] THAAD in its territory, and Japan wants to speed up purchase of a THAAD system under its own operational control. THAAD is the latest issue to unite[s] the U.S., Japan, South Korea, and Australia, against China and North Korea[.], which are increasingly isolated from world public opinion.

### A2: Multilat (Impact)

\*\*Contradict Link turns\*\*

#### (2 responses)

#### 1. Turn, because of the multilateral negotiations entail off multiple countries banding together against North Korea. Further entrenching their idea that they are alone in the world. The perpetuation of the siege mentality, has increased the North’s aggression and is why we are on the verge of conflict.

#### 2. Turn, Multilateral Negotiations mean superpowers will be the one brokering the deal. This is problematic as Nicolas Rost empirically finds that if superpowers try to mediate conflict, the odds of peace failure increased by 352% because the settlements are superficial and antagonists use the peace to buy time and build up their weapons.

Nicolas Rost, 2008, “Mediating Civil War Settlements and the Duration of Peace”, Routledge, https://web-a-ebscohost-com.proxy.library.emory.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&sid=5f857c7a-a03a-4208-9876-be193096781d%40sessionmgr4008

Three of the mediation variables are found to significantly impact the duration of peace across both models—and two of them reduce the duration of peace. Mediated agreements increase the probability of a new war. The coefficient for this variable suggests that it increases the odds of peace failure by more than 200%. This finding underlines the differences between shortterm and long-term mediation success and the necessity to distinguish between these two aspects conceptually. Possibly, powerful mediators sometimes drive the antagonists into concluding an agreement without them being sufficiently committed to peace. In line with this, **superpower mediation** is found to reduce the duration of peace (superpower involvement as a mediator **increases the odds of peace failure by** 219% and **352%** in the Cox and Weibull models, respectively). **Superpowers, with their greater political, military, and economic resources, but also their own interests, might drive the fighting parties into concluding a relatively superficial peace agreement that only holds in the short run but does not address core issues of the conflict**—neither those related to greed nor to grievances. An alternative explanation would be that **antagonists sometimes do have “devious objectives” (Richmond, 1998) and use mediation to gain time or international recognition.**

### A2: Solve Denuke

#### (1 response)

#### 1. [Mitigate Probability] According to North Korean public announcements, Pyongyang will only denuclearize when two preconditions are met. First, the US must fully withdraw from South Korea. Second, global denuclearization. Make my opponents give you a probability of both if they are to garner any offense off of this contention.

Cards:

Alexandre. Mansourov, Ph.D. Columbia University; B.A. Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Advanced Diploma, Kim Il Sung National University (DPRK); Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, "Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 16, 2014, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/> // AA

According to the DPRK’s authoritative pronouncements, in the future, Pyongyang may contemplate peaceful denuclearization on the Korean peninsula only when two preconditions are met: (1) The “U.S. hostile policy” is terminated, as evidenced by the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, lifting of all sanctions and embargoes, and normalization of bilateral relations. According to the MOFA spokesman statement on 4 October 2014, “The nuclear deterrence of Songun Korea can never be given up and bartered for anything unless the U.S. hostile policy and nuclear threat are fundamentally terminated.”[[64]](http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/" \l "_edn64) According to the MOFA spokesman statement on 4 October 2014, in the past, the DPRK agreed to work for the denuclearization of the peninsula because the U.S. expressed its will to respect the DPRK’s sovereignty, stop the nuclear threat against it and coexist in peace. [[65]](http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/" \l "_edn65) But now, the discussion of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula will be meaningless as the U.S. is set to bring down the DPRK’s state system at any cost. (2) “Global nuclear disarmament is achieved,” as evidenced by “the abolition of nuclear weapons worldwide.”[[66]](http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/" \l "_edn66) Since neither of the two preconditions are likely to be met, the international community should be ready either to compel the North’s nuclear disarmament or to live with a nuclear North Korea in the foreseeable future. In the meantime, it is important to continue to probe Kim Jong Un’s nuclear intentions, to prod Pyongyang to be more transparent with respect to its nuclear doctrine and plans, and to try to negotiate some caps on North Korea’s growing nuclear capabilities, while devising a mutually acceptable formula for the DPRK’s return to the Non-proliferation Treaty and international nuclear safeguards and inspections, encouraging the DPRK government to reaffirm its “no first use” commitment, and deterring Pyongyang from nuclear provocations in crisis situations.

### A2: Militarize FoPo

#### (4 responses)

#### 1. Delink, False choice. Just because we deploy a missile defense battery to South Korea doesn’t mean South Korea and the United States will not always prioritize diplomacy. Rather, we would contend that deploying artillery that is defensive by nature is better than an alternative where either South Korea is vulnerable to North Korea, or the South will go on the offensive to protect itself.

#### 2. Turn, Pinkston of Rider University explains that the alternative to THAAD missile defense is nuclear proliferation. If the South sought a nuclear deterrent, Japan would follow, which would foster regional instability.

#### 3. Delink, Without missile defense, South Korea and Japan are building offensive capabilities as Lyon of the National Interest explains on July 24th that the development of North Korea’s missile program has spurred the growth of offensive strike capabilities in South Korea.

#### 4. Turn, The presence of anti-missile systems in South Korea allow for more effective diplomatic approaches because they can be used as a bargaining chip at the negotiating table.

#### 5. Delink, Klinger of the Heritage Foundation explains that historically the soft power approach to dealing with North Korea though diplomatic mean has failed. This means my opponents have to provide uniqueness as to why now is the optimal time for negotiations. Moreover, he concludes that the only option we have to counter the threat posed by North Korea is through the deployment of missile defense.

Cards:

Daniel Pinkston [Rider University]. July 2016. “Why it makes sense to deploy THAAD in South Korea.” NK News. <https://www.nknews.org/2016/07/why-it-makes-sense-to-deploy-thaad-in-south-korea/> // AA

This type of rhetoric is extremely irresponsible and counterproductive. First, it reveals Beijing’s likely intentions in the case of an inter-Korean crisis, and second, it strongly encourages South Koreans who insist that Seoul must acquire its own nuclear deterrent. Many critics fail to appreciate the role THAAD plays in reassuring Seoul in the shadow of Pyongyang’s growing nuclear capabilities. There is strong support in South Korea for nuclear breakout, it almost certainly would occur if not for the U.S.-ROK alliance. If South Korea were to seek a nuclear deterrent, it seems implausible that Japan would not follow. This scenario is not in the interest of China, Russia, the U.S., or any nation with the exception of North Korea.

Rod Lyon, National Interest, 7-24-2017, ["Japan and South Korea Want More Military Firepower (Thanks to China and North Korea)," http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/japan-south-korea-want-more-military-firepower-thanks-china-21643, 7-24-2017] // AA

Too often, current tensions in Northeast Asia are seen through one of two dominant lenses: either the growing strategic competition between China and the US—‘destined for war’?—or the sharper and more immediate concerns posed by North Korea. But I want to focus here on a different point: namely, the specific effect that both the North Korean situation and the relentless modernisation of China’s military forces are having in spurring the growth of offensive strike capabilities in Japan and South Korea.

Bruce Klingner [Senior Research Fellow, Northeast Asia; Heritage Foundation]. January 2011. “The Case for Comprehensive Missile Defense in Asia.” The Heritage Foundation.

Abstract: The United States and its allies are at risk of [a] missile attack [is] from a growing number of states and non­state terrorist organizations. This growing threat is partic­ularly clear in East Asia, where diplomacy has failed to stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them on target, and where China continues the most active nuclear force modernization pro­gram in the world. To counter these growing threats, the U.S. should work with its allies, including South Korea and Japan, to develop and deploy missile defenses, including ground-based, sea-based, and air-based components.

### A2: Diplomacy Tradeoff

#### (2 responses)

#### 1. Turn, Kapstein of Princeton University explains that the US’ deployment of missile defense to allies such as Japan, Australia and South Korea, pulls two states unlikely to cooperate with each other multilaterally into an agreement resembling a collective-security network. This is crucial because greater regional cooperation increases diplomatic efforts. In fact, Valesco quantifies that regional organizations are 6.7 times more likely to reach a long-term peace deal.

#### 2. Delink, Yong-in of Hankyoreh writes that four months ago President Moon states he would draw back current military exercises if the North Koreans were willing to negotiate. However, the olive branch was met with an acceleration of the Northern Nuclear program.

Cards:

Jonathan D. Caverley (Fellow - Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and a Research Associate in Political Science and Security Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) & Ethan B. Kapstein (Associate Director of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Program at Princeton University). 2016. “Who’s Arming Asia?” Survival – Global Politics and Strategy. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2016.1161911?journalCode=tsur20> // AA

That said, like the aristocratic Tancredi, the United States can adapt to a changing environment and preserve its privileged position. The US will continue to aggressively sell advanced products to wealthy allies such as Japan, Australia and South Korea. Japan and South Korea’s participation in the Aegis-based missile-defence system, for example, pulls two states unlikely to cooperate with each other bilaterally into something resembling a collective-security network. The United States remains the unrivalled producer of certain systems and services that make existing weapons more capable, and which even less-powerful states want. It still enjoys unmatched expertise in intelligence collection and information management. Even the anti-access weapons discussed above require significant upgrading in terms of both the human capital and the information-intensive C4SIR capability of small states’ militaries.37 As with the larger US economy, providing military software and services may not bring with it the domestic employment advantages of bending metal, but it can still enhance American interests.

Yi Yong-in, Washington correspondent for Hankyoreh. June 19, 2017. “Moon Chung-in says military exercises could be scaled down if N. Korea suspends nukes.” Hankyoreh. [http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english\_edition/e\_international/799370.html //](http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/799370.html%20//) AA

On June 16, Moon Chung-in, professor emeritus at Yonsei University and President Moon Jae-in’s special advisor on unification, foreign affairs and national security, said that the South Korea-US joint military exercises (which include the deployment of US strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula), could be scaled down if North Korea suspends its nuclear and missile activities.

### A2: Prevent Diplomacy

#### (3 responses)

#### 1. Mitigate Impact, North Korea won’t cooperate. Scott Snyder of the Council on Foreign Relations explains on June 26th, “Despite Moon’s desire to renew relations with Pyongyang, North Korean missile tests—conducted only four days after Moon’s election—served as a wake-up call” that North Korea will not cooperate.

#### 2. Turn, Mansourov of Johns Hopkins University explains that North Korea is pursuing nuclear capabilities to have an upper hand at the negotiating table. Deploying missile defense means South Korea can neutralize the nuclear threat and can effectively level the playing field regarding negotiations. A world with missile defense is the only world with a chance at successful negotiations.

#### 3. Turn, Etzioni of American University explains in August that best option in dealing with the North Korean threat is leveraging missile defense as a bargaining chip with China. Thus, deploying missile defense will incentivize China to push for North Korea to denuclearization.

Snyder 17 (Scott, senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, 6-26-2017, "Is the U.S.-South Korea Alliance in Trouble?", National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-us-south-korea-alliance-trouble-21323) //BS 7-21-2017

Second, North Korea under Kim Jong-un is different from the North Korea that his father Kim Jong-il led a decade ago. Despite Moon’s stated desire during the campaign to cultivate dialogue and renew economic relations with Pyongyang, North Korean missile tests—conducted only four days after Moon’s election—served as a wake-up call. North Korea long ago abandoned denuclearization negotiations and has rebuffed early Moon administration efforts to reopen nongovernmental exchanges. North Korea under Kim Jong-un has appointed military leaders focused on subversion to handle relations with South Korea and has shown little interest in dialogue.

Alexandre. Mansourov, Ph.D. Columbia University; B.A. Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Advanced Diploma, Kim Il Sung National University (DPRK); Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, "Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 16, 2014, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/> // AA

Intriguing are occasional references to the possible offensive purposes for the nuclear weapons program aimed at effecting the strategic outcomes favoring the North in its relations with the South and the United States. In particular, nuclear weapons should help the North compel the South to accept reunification on the terms agreeable to Pyongyang. Kim Jong Un likes to say that “Nuclear weapons are the sword that advances the cause of Korean reunification.”[[21]](http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/" \l "_edn21) The North Korean leaders also envision an important role for nuclear weapons in a reunified Korea. In his address to the WPK CC Plenary Meeting held on 31 March 2013, Kim Jong Un said that “The nuclear weapons are a treasure of a reunified country which can never be traded with billions of dollars.”[[22]](http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/" \l "_edn22)Concerning the United States, Pyongyang sometimes talks about its intention to “advance the anti-U.S. cooperation in the nuclear field,” which raises the question whether this threat means the proliferation of nuclear technology and materials to “all the countries and peace-loving people who are interested in dismembering the U.S. imperialists in all parts of the world,” since its propagandists insist that “The nuclear forces of the DPRK will demonstrate unimaginably tremendous might in effecting worldwide anti-U.S. cooperation.”[[23]](http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/" \l "_edn23)

Amitai Etzioni (Amitai Etzioni is a University Professor and professor of international relations at The George Washington University. He is the author of Avoiding War with China, just published by University of Virginia Press). The Diplomat, Diplomat, 8-10-2017, ["THAAD: Best a Bargaining Chip," http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/thaad-best-a-bargaining-chip/, 8-10-2017] // AA

The U.S. cannot simply remove the THAAD system, because of the very serious North Korean threat to U.S. forces in the region, to South Korea and Japan, and soon to the U.S. mainland. These batteries do seem to be able to mitigate such a threat to some extent. However, their destabilizing side effects strongly compel the U.S. to intensify the quest for more effective and compensative ways to deal with the North Korean nuclear threat. As I suggested here, such a drive best entails a major deal with China – in which the removal of THAAD can serve as one bargaining chip. The bargain entails a commitment from the U.S. that if China helps defang the North Korea threat – the U.S. will have no reason to keep THAAD in South Korea.

### A2: Diplomacy Ineffective

#### 1. Turn, diplomacy is historically effective. Armstrong of Columbia University explains that the Agreed Framework on October 1994 halted North Korea’s plutonium processing for nine years.

Charles K Armstrong, a Professor of Korean studies at Columbia university, Guardian, 1-7-2016, ["Diplomacy alone will defuse North Korea. The US must lead the way," https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/07/diplomacy-alone-defuse-north-korea-us-must-lead-way, 7-26-2017] // AA

Critics will argue that agreements with North Korea have never worked in the past, but in fact the US-DPRK Agreed Framework of October 1994 halted North Korea’s plutonium processing for nine years.

### A2: Sunshine Policy

#### (6 responses)

#### 1. Delink, Mansourov of the Nautilus Institute explains that North Korea will not relinquish its nuclear weapons even for a meaningful package of credible incentives. Moreover, Kim Jong Un stated that “[North Korea’s] nuclear arsenal is not a bargaining chip and cannot be negotiated away, regardless of the price.” The Sunshine Policy cannot and will not work.

#### 2. Delink, Hemmings of the East Asia forum indicates that the Sunshine policy failed to link warmer relations to progress on denuclearization, political liberty, or human right. He furthers, that as Seoul operated under liberal policies, the North continued to build up its military, withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and continued research on its missile program.

#### 3. [Mitigate Impact] Reuters explains that the Sunshine Policy toward North Korea failed, as there were no positive changes to Pyongyang’s behavior despite a decade of massive aid packages and encouragement.

#### 4. Delink, The Sunshine Policy is predicated on the false assumption that political liberalization follows free market reform. However, Hemmings 12 explains that the Sunshine Policy won’t fundamentally change the militarized goal of the Kim regime. This is because the Kim family derives support from a hyper nationalist ideology, upheld by the military.

#### 5. Delink, Warden of the East Asian Policy Institute explains that North Korea is unwavering in their resentment towards the South and cannot be trusted not to initiate a conflict. Thus, he concludes that the United States and South Korea must strengthen their defenses in preparation for future North Korean provocation.

#### 6. Turn, Unless my opponents can solve for the intention by North Korea to provoke the South they can’t garner any offense here because Soumil and I would argue that providing a hostile regime more aid increases their means to develop their nuclear arsenal.

Cards:

Alexandre. Mansourov, Ph.D. Columbia University; B.A. Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Advanced Diploma, Kim Il Sung National University (DPRK); Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, "Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 16, 2014, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/> // AA

The DPRK government has stated recently that it is willing to return to the nuclear negotiation table without any preconditions. However, careful study of its emerging nuclear doctrine leaves no doubt that North Korea will not relinquish its nuclear weapons even for a meaningful package of credible incentives. Kim Jong Un stated that “our nuclear arsenal is not a bargaining chip and cannot be negotiated away, regardless of the price.”

John Hemmings (Center for Strategic International Studies), East Asia Forum, 3-12-2012, ["South Korea: a return to the Sunshine Policy could prove dangerous," http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/03/12/south-korea-a-return-to-the-sunshine-policy-could-prove-dangerous/, 7-21-2017] // AA

All of this sounds very promising and hopeful, but it is unlikely to work. And even if it did, it could cause serious unintended consequences. There are two reasons for this. First, the Sunshine Policy failed to produce the desired results the first time round because it never linked warmer relations with the North to progress on the nuclear issue, political liberalism or human rights conditions. It therefore did not push North Korea to shift its own strategy. North–South ties became less acrimonious, but this arguably came at great cost to South Korea’s security. While Seoul operated under Kim and Roh’s liberal policies, the North continued to build up its military, withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (2003), tested a nuclear device (2006), continued research and development on its short-range and long-range missile program, and withdrew from the Six-Party Talks (2007). The cost-benefit ratio for symbolic goods was simply too high for the South.

John Hemmings (Center for Strategic International Studies), East Asia Forum, 3-12-2012, ["South Korea: a return to the Sunshine Policy could prove dangerous," http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/03/12/south-korea-a-return-to-the-sunshine-policy-could-prove-dangerous/, 7-21-2017] // AA

Second, the Sunshine Policy rests on the false assumption that political liberalisation naturally follows on from market reforms. This may not always be true. Supporters of the Sunshine Policy often point to the success the West had in opening up Chinese markets, and the changes wrought on Chinese society since Mao. This misses an important point: is the region really better off now that China is rich? Certainly, it is a real achievement that so many Chinese people have been lifted from poverty, but a rising China has also presented the region with many new security challenges. States along China’s coastline, including Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan, are now dealing with a bolder, more assertive China. This illustrates that there are unintended consequences to everything. Do we really wish to enrich North Korea and give it the modern military that it thinks it deserves? Those who wish to rely on the liberal assumption are overlooking not only the unintended consequences, but also the fundamental nature of the regime. The Kim family derives its support from a uniquely Korean nationalist ideology, *Juche* (Self-reliance), adopted and upheld by the military. According to North Korea’s highest-ranking defector, Hwang Jang-yop, the regime derives its support from the military, with the implicit promise that [the state’s ultimate purpose is to unify Korea](http://www.fas.org/news/dprk/1997/bg152.html). Would the regime jettison this belief simply because there was more money in the bank?

Reuters Editorial, Reuters, 11-18-2010, ["Sunshine Policy failed to change North Korea: report," https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-sunshine-idUSTRE6AH12520101118, 7-21-2017] // AA

SEOUL (Reuters) - South Korea's peaceful "Sunshine Policy" toward North Korea failed, a government report has found, saying there have been no positive changes to Pyongyang's behavior despite a decade of mass aid and encouragement. Aid shipped to the North during the administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun from 1998-2008 also failed to make a difference to the lives of destitute North Koreans, said the Unification Ministry white paper, seen by Reuters on Thursday.

John Warden, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July-19-2011, ["[Full Summary] PL2-1: Crisis Management on the Korean Peninsula," http://en.asaninst.org/contents/forums/full-summary-pl2-1-crisis-management-on-the-korean-peninsula/, 7-22-2017] // AA

And finally, the United States will continue to match action with action. North Korea must receive good for good and bad for bad. If North Korea carries out provocations or violates United Nations Security Council resolutions, the United States will respond with political isolation and increased sanctions, through both multilateral and unilateral efforts. At the same time, the United States remains open to engaging with the North Koreans if they show that they are committed to more responsible behavior. Sanctions cannot work unless North Korea is offered a path to more prosperity. The United States is willing to resume the Six-party Talks once North Korea has demonstrated that it’s ready to improve North-South relations. Until such a breakthrough occurs, however, the United States and South Korea must strengthen defenses and remain vigilant in preparation for future North Korean provocations.

## A2 General

### A2 Kill-Chain

#### Kill-chain is not an anti-missile system by definition. Merriam Webster defines an antimissile system as “a missile for intercepting another missile in flight,” citing the example of an antiballistic missile. Unfortunately, what my opponents fail to fully articulate is that kill-chain is a policy, rather than a missile. In fact, Jun Jay-hi of the Korea times writes in November of last year that Kill-chain is a pre-emptive strategy that relies on offensive missiles that would strike Korea first, and that Kill-chain is part of South Korea’s general defense strategy against North Korea rather than their anti-missile defense strategy. We’d argue that you should turn this argument on face; if anything, it’s another reason to affirm.

#### The internal link to this argument is that Kill-Chain will work in conjunction with KAMD. There are a couple of problems with this:

#### First, we would say that there’s time to prevent these impacts from occurring. Rahul Raj of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies writes in 2016 that KAMD won’t be ready until at least 2023. We’d tell you that the threat of a North Korean attack is much more immediate, meaning that by the time KAMD is ready, there will be a completely different political atmosphere so it’s hard for them to project the future since they don’t have a crystal ball.

#### Second, we’d argue that KAMD won’t ever be fully deployed. Kang Seung-woo of the Korea times indicated back in 2014 that locally produced KAMD missiles would trade off with THAAD if it were ever to be implemented. It’s 2017 now and we’ve already seen THAAD deployment begin to manifest. That’s important because we would argue that THAAD is on the brink of being deployed, meaning that KAMD and thus Kill-chain, will never fully materialize.

#### South Korea doesn’t even want Kill-chain. Regardless of whether or not you consider kill-chain a missile defense system, the new South Korean president Moon Jae-in doesn’t want a pre-emptive strike on North Korea, per Nesbit on June 30th. At that point, you can delink them from any sort of probability of this occurring, because what Moon says goes.

#### The more immediate missile defense, THAAD, is really good at stopping kill-chain from ever occurring. Klinger of the Heritage foundation confirms in 2015, writing that by deploying THAAD, South Korea would be less reliant on their own military forces and probably wouldn’t ever have to bring kill-chain to fruition. We’d contend that’s the more probable situation considering the military relationship between South Korea and the US and that you shouldn’t vote off of such an improbable situation.

Merriam Webster nd [No Author, xx-xx-xxxx. "Definition of ANTIMISSILE MISSILE." Merriam-Webster. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/antimissile%20missile] //BH

Definition of antimissile missile : a missile for intercepting another missile in flight; especially : antiballistic missile

Jun Jay-hi 16 [Jun Jay-hi, 11-1-16. “3 military systems to counter N. Korea: Kill Chain, KAMD, KMPR.” The Korea Times. <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/11/205_217259.html>] //BH

While North Korea has been apparently upgrading its nuclear and missile capabilities daily, eyes are on which measures South Korea holds to cope with such threats. In response to security concerns heightened especially after Pyongyang's fifth and most powerful nuclear test on Sept. 9, the military said it will deal with the reclusive state and its possible nuclear attack using South Korea's three-pronged defense system. The three elements are the Kill Chain preemptive strike system, the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) plan. Kill Chain is a system to carry out a preemptive strike against Pyongyang's nuclear and missile facilities if Seoul is faced with an imminent threat, while the KAMD would trace and shoot down North Korean ballistic missiles heading for South Korea. The KMPR would be used to punish and retaliate against North Korea if it strikes South Korea. The government initially planned to deploy the three systems in the mid-2020s. But after the North claimed that during the latest test it detonated a miniaturized nuclear warhead that can be mounted on a ballistic missile, the government said on Oct. 18 it will hasten the system's introduction by a couple of years.

Raj 16 [Rahul Raj, 8-1-2016. "THAAD and South Korea-China-US Dynamics." Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies - South Korea, China, US, THAAD, North Korea,. http://www.ipcs.org/article/defence/thaad-and-south-korea-china-us-dynamics-5093.html] //BH

After Seoul and Washington decided to initiate official discussions about THAAD, the response from Beijing was predictably harsh. China’s ambassador to South Korea, Qiu Guohong, warned that there would be instant fallout in bilateral relations. For China, opposition to THAAD has become a bigger issue than controlling North Korea because it feels that the missile defence system will upset the balance of power in the region. China also fears that the AN/TPY-2 radar used in THAAD, which has a range of about 1,800 km, could snoop on its military installations and missile locations, posing a threat to its national security. In order to assuage Beijing’s security concerns, both Seoul and Washington have reiterated that the sole focus of the THAAD system in South Korea would be North Korean nuclear and missile threats and would not target any other countries. Although there have been suggestions of alternatively deploying the South Korean made Korea Advanced Missile Defence (KAMD) in order to deflect Chinese ire, a recent study by Hannam University in Daejeon suggests that the Korean system would not be sophisticated enough to counter a North Korean missile threat even if it were upgraded. In any case, KAMD would not be ready until 2023. Another area of concern for the US is that North Korean nuclear threats have stimulated the interests of Japan and South Korea in developing nuclear weapons. In April, the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced that the Japanese constitution does not ban the possession of nuclear weapons. In June, US Vice President Joe Biden, during a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, suggested that in the face of North Korea's nuclear threats, Japan may seek nuclear weapons of its own. It is no secret that South Korea has tried to acquire nuclear weapons in the past, and in the aftermath of North Korea's nuclear tests, the South Korean newspaper Chosun Ilbo reported that voices calling for the development of nuclear weapons have been getting louder. Although both Japan and South Korea are signatories to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it would not prevent them from acquiring nuclear weapons if they felt that US extended deterrence was not enough to meet their national security concerns. Hence, THAAD would not only counter North Korea's perennial threats but help the US protect its allies without setting off a nuclear arms race in Asia.

Seung-Woo 14 [Kang Seung-woo, 5-27-2014. “Seoul rebuffs US missile defense.” The Korea Times. <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2014/05/116_157967.html>] //BH

The Ministry of National Defense said Tuesday that the U.S.-led missile defense (MD) system is not South Korea's option in deterring North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. "We are still clinging to our position that Korea will not join the U.S.-led MD system," said defense ministry spokesman Kim Min-seok. Instead of the U.S. MD, Korea is building an independent, low-tier missile shield called the Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system with a plan to upgrade PAC-2 missiles to PAC-3. His remarks come as the United States appears to be pushing Korea to join its missile defense system, which mainly aims to contain a rising China in the region. The U.S. House of Representatives passed the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) last week and it requires the secretary of defense to explore ways to strengthen trilateral cooperation with Korea and Japan on ballistic missile defense, including system integration and more information sharing. The NDAA is a U.S. federal law related to the budget and expenditures of the Department of Defense. "The secretary of defense shall conduct an assessment to identify opportunities for increasing missile defense cooperation among the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea," it said. It also requires the military chief to submit a report to Congress no later than 180 days after the act takes effect. However, the defense ministry spokesman believes that the passage of the NDAA was prompted by North Korea's ceaseless pursuit of long-range missiles and nuclear weapons, rather than designed to call on the South to follow in Japan's footsteps. Japan joined the U.S. MD system in 2005.

Nesbit 17 [Jeff Nesbit, 6-30-2017. "South Korea, With 'Kill Chain,' Wants to Up Its Guard Against North Korea." US News & World Report. https://www.usnews.com/news/at-the-edge/articles/2017-06-30/south-korea-with-kill-chain-wants-to-up-its-guard-against-north-korea] //BH

"Kill Chain" is the first pillar of the new, pre-emptive military strategy designed to meet North Korea's nuclear missile ambitions that was first referenced in a South Korean government strategy paper released late last year. It involves using satellite reconnaisance to identify when and where North Korea is manufacturing missiles and nuclear warheads, and a pre-emptive strike capability to destroy those facilities before they go operational. Moon Jae-In, however, South Korea's new president has publicly expressed reservations about such a pre-emptive military approach, and has indicated a preference for a diplomatic approach to North Korea. President Donald Trump, on the other hand, continues to hint at the need for a military solution. The two men met at the White House on Friday, and the "Kill Chain" was almost certainly discussed. During joint remarks in the Rose Garden, Trump said he has lost patience with North Korea. The second and third prongs of South Korea's defense strategy include missile defense and retaliatory strikes from aircraft in the event North Korea launches a missile. They include the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system, and the Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMRR) plan. KAMD is a controversial plan to develop a system to intercept short-range missiles. KMRR is a concept for destroying Pyongyang in the event of a North Korean nuclear first strike.

Klinger 15 [Bruce Klingner, 6-12-2015. "South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense." Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense] //BH

In 2012, the Director-General for Asian Affairs in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “building a missile defense system in the Asia-Pacific region will have negative effects on global and regional strategic stability, and go against the security needs of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region.”[36] Yet China is developing its own missile defense system. Beijing publicly announced that it conducted ground-based mid-course BMD tests in 2010, 2013, and 2014.[37] Moreover, Beijing is attempting to sell its FD-2000/HQ-9 BMD to Turkey. The FD-2000 interceptor has a range of 125 km and altitude of 27 km.[38] China Should Not Be Concerned with a Defensive System.Beijing should be less concerned with THAAD than with Seoul’s “Kill Chain” strategy. While THAAD is a defensive system, the latter is a pre-emptive attack strategy. By not deploying THAAD, Seoul would be more reliant on a tripwire, escalatory policy that requires perfect intelligence to identify and track a North Korean mobile missile in the field, discern the type of warhead, and assess the North Korean leadership’s intentions (training, political gesture, or imminent attack) with sufficient time to attack before the missile launch. The Kill Chain strategy assumes that the South Korean president would authorize a preemptive attack on North Korea and thus be potentially responsible for triggering an all-out war on the Korean Peninsula with a nuclear-armed enemy. Implications of Chinese Pressure Deploying THAAD to South Korea would clearly not threaten China in any way. One is left to conclude that, if not extraordinarily ill-informed, Chinese technical objections can only be disingenuous, and Beijing’s true objective is preventing improvement in allied defensive capabilities and multilateral cooperation. The THAAD deployment issue is a microcosm of the greater North Korea problem. Once again, China has shown itself to be more critical of South Korean reactions than to the precipitating North Korean threats, attacks, and violations. On the THAAD issue, China has taken Pyongyang’s side over that of Seoul, disregarding South Korea’s legitimate security concerns and fundamental sovereign right to defend itself against an unambiguous danger.