# Sjostrom/Verska – NDCA Affirmative vs Blake JG

## Our Sole Contention is Preventing an Endless Conflict

#### Andres Oppenheimer indicated this week that the UN Security General:

Andres Oppenheimer, 4-10-2019, "U.N. Secretary General has finally found his voice on Venezuela. Now he must find the backbone to get aid to its suffering people," Miami Herald, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/andres-oppenheimer/article229175489.html, Date Accessed 4-14-2019 // JM

Until now, U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres had been shamelessly silent about Venezuela, refusing to even consider a full-scale U.N. response to the country’s humanitarian crisis. But that may be changing. On April 10, for the first time, Guterres stated in a tweet that, “7 million people in Venezuela need humanitarian assistance. We are working to expand our assistance, in line with the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.” The statement was in stark contrast with Guterres’ previous comments, which ignored the depth of Venezuela’s tragedy. Guterres had met with the Venezuelan dictatorship’s foreign minister, Jorge Arreaza, at least three times in recent weeks and largely played along with Arreaza’s efforts to minimize the crisis. But, as it became clear in a newly released 71-page joint report by the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and the Human Rights Watch advocacy group, the situation in Venezuela not only is creating a regional refugee crisis, it also is putting a large number of lives at risk in Venezuela. As happened in Yemen and Syria, almost 3.5 million Venezuelans have fled Venezuela in recent years. Luis Almagro, head of the Organization of American States, told me recently that the figure may reach 10 million over the next four years. And contrary to the latest narrative of Venezuela’s dictator Nicolás Maduro that U.S. sanctions are to blame for Venezuela’s disaster, the Johns Hopkins-HRW report shows that the country collapsed long before the Trump administration imposed oil sanctions on Venezuela in January. Venezuela’s catastrophe is entirely due to Maduro’s corruption-ridden and chaotic rule. Consider some of the figures in the report: - Between 2008 and 2015, only one case of measles was recorded in Venezuela. Between June 2017 and 2019, there have been more than 9,300 reported cases of measles. - Malaria cases have skyrocketed from fewer than 36,000 in 2009 to more than 414,000 in 2017. - In 2016, maternal mortality rose 65 percent, and infant mortality rose 30 percent from a year earlier, according to Venezuelan government figures. The Maduro government has since stopped releasing maternal and infant mortality figures. - In 2018, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization said that 3.7 million people in Venezuela were undernourished. That was 12 percent of the population, up from 5 percent a few years earlier. After years denying that Venezuela is facing a humanitarian crisis, and after recently sending troops to stop food and medicine donations from the United States and other Western countries from entering, Maduro is now accepting help from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC.) The ICRC has vowed to expand its budget for emergency healthcare in Venezuela from $9 million to $24 million. But that’s just enough to help about 650,000 Venezuelans, or less than 10 percent of the estimated 7 million who need urgent health assistance, according to a U.N. report leaked to the media last month. Human-rights activists are asking that Guterres stop behaving like a wimp and push through a drastic increase of U.N. humanitarian relief operations in Venezuela, instead of waiting for Maduro’s permission to do so. Contrary to U.N. officials’ claims that only the Security Council or the General Assembly can order a major escalation of U.N. relief efforts in Venezuela, Guterres could do a lot by himself, human rights groups say. “We’re asking Guterres to show leadership, and make a factual declaration calling Venezuela what it is: a severe humanitarian emergency requiring a U.N. system-wide scale up,” says Lou Charboneau, of Human Rights Watch. “It’s impossible to imagine that the U.N. system would not mobilize to respond” to such a request, Charboneau told me. Indeed, if Guterres declared Venezuela a high-level humanitarian emergency, like he did recently with Yemen, it would help unlock vast U.N. resources to help Venezuelans at risk. Such a move by the U.N. Secretary General would also put unprecedented pressure on Maduro to accept the aid. If Maduro doesn’t allow it, he would pay a high political price, and be further exposed to the Venezuelan people for what he is: a ruthless and incompetent tyrant.

#### Joel Rubin explains in 2019 this change of course has been led because:

Joel Rubin, Axios, 1-24-2019, "A multilateral approach could smooth transition in Venezuela," https://www.axios.com/multilateral-approach-could-smooth-transition-venezuela-1ba05902-66be-492c-8d76-d42620e5cfbe.html, Date Accessed 4-14-2019 // JM

President Trump has taken a firm position on Venezuela by officially recognizing opposition leader and National Assembly head Juan Guaidó as the country's president. This declaration could mark a moment either to draw a red line and walk away or to further amplify the U.S.' voice through a multilateral approach in opposing Nicolás Maduro. The big picture: Maduro is already claiming the anti-gringo mantle, despite the rise of a domestic opposition leader legally empowered to demand his removal. To ensure long-term stability, the U.S.' most promising approach is to work with regional allies who together will bolster Guaidó's efforts to legally succeed Maduro. Between the lines: Because Maduro's anti-gringo card is his key to survival, Trump would have to take actions that maintain the legitimacy of Guaidó’s position without adding risk by raising the American profile. There could be several dimensions to such a strategy: Economic and political incentives: A robust economic aid package dependent on a new leader being installed could make it clear to Venezuelans that their economic pain will subside once Maduro is gone. Amnesty to those willing to switch sides against Maduro could also be offered. Humanitarian assistance: The U.S. could signal that it stands with Venezuelans by increasing humanitarian assistance to refugees and expediting its asylum process. Non-militarism: A call for non-violence is critical. Maduro and his cronies should know that they will be held accountable for any violence on their part. Any hint of U.S. military activity could play into Maduro’s hands. Multilateralism has been effective and remains the clearest path to resolving the crisis. It will ensure that those who can actually achieve the goal of displacing Maduro — the Venezuelan people, armed forces and politicians — are viewed as legitimate both inside the country and abroad. What to watch: The next step for the U.S. is to build a robust package activities backed by regional partners — and potentially the UN — that further incentivize Venezuelans to push out Maduro. There's a real sense of urgency, as Venezuelans themselves will face greater risks without support from the international community.

#### Unfortunately, China and Russia stand in the way as obstacles to UN package. DW argued on March 1 that:

Deutsche Welle, 3-1-2019, "Venezuela: US resolution vetoed by Russia, China at UN Security Council," DW, https://www.dw.com/en/venezuela-us-resolution-vetoed-by-russia-china-at-un-security-council/a-47734238, Date Accessed 4-14-2019 // JM

The UN Security Council voted on two resolutions on Venezuela but failed to pass either one as the United States, Russia, and China clashed over the issue on Thursday. Out of 15 Council members, nine countries, including Germany, France and the UK, voted in favor of the US-pitched draft which calls for a "peaceful restoration of democracy" and [fair presidential elections](https://www.dw.com/en/us-vp-mike-pence-meets-venezuelas-juan-guaido-at-lima-group-summit-in-colombia/a-47684395), and expressed "deep concern" over aid blocks. However, Russia and China vetoed the document, with Russian envoy Vassily Nebenzia saying the text was "written for regime change, disguised as care for people." "We have all seen this already in Libya, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan," he said. Moscow put forward a rival document, which also called for a solution "through peaceful means," but noted concern over [threats to use military force against the government](https://www.dw.com/en/us-planning-venezuela-military-intervention-russian-official/a-47688778) led by Nicolas Maduro. The document also proposed all humanitarian aid deliveries be agreed with Maduro's officials. Russia's draft only received backing from four of the members: Russia, China, South Africa and Equatorial Guinea. The United States also signaled it would use its veto if the document gained a majority. US envoy for Venezuela Elliott Abrams decried countries that "continue to shield Maduro and his cronies and prolong the suffering of the Venezuelan people." "Please Europe, do not be deaf" Separately, Uruguay's former-President Jose Mujica warned of danger of a "new interventionist step" starting a war in Venezuela. In an exclusive video column for DW, Mujica claimed that the political standoff was in large part motivated by geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China for control over Venezuela's vast oil reserves. [Mujica](https://www.dw.com/en/uruguays-mujica-mulls-million-dollar-bid-for-his-old-vw-beetle/a-18046445) called for using "politics to stave off war." "There are possibilities to negotiate, if Europe wants it, if it asserts itself and helps," he added. The ex-politician called for negotiations which would include all different factions of Venezuela's and lead to elections. The UN would need to provide guarantees for the process, he added. He also repeatedly emphasized the "responsibilities of Europe, to whom we turn with desperation, so it would not let our Latin America become enveloped in a conflict which based on, unfortunately, on geopolitics." "Please Europe, do not be deaf," Mujica said.

#### In a world where UN action continues to fail and Trump is unable to pass a declaration on Venezuela, he resorts to unilateral military action. Gregory Weeks shared on March 25 that when asked about Venezuela:

Gregory Weeks, 3-25-2019, “The U.S. is thinking of invading Venezuela. That’s unlikely to lead to democracy.,” Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/25/us-is-thinking-invading-venezuela-thats-unlikely-lead-democracy/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4577208c577d>, 4-14-2019 // JM

When President Trump took questions at his March 19 news conference with Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, a reporter asked what he thought about possibly using military force to remove Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Trump’s [answer](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-president-bolsonaro-federative-republic-brazil-joint-press-conference/) was, “I think of all possibilities. All options are open.” The Trump administration has repeatedly stated the United States will not “[rule out](https://www.rollcall.com/news/whitehouse/trump-takes-questions)” military intervention in Venezuela because “[every option is on the table](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/12/every-option-on-the-table-to-deliver-democracy-to-venezuela-pompeo.html).” Two months ago, Trump recognized National Assembly leader [Juan Guaidó](https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/meet-new-face-venezuelas-opposition), who declared himself Venezuela’s interim president in January. Increasing numbers of Venezuelans — and foreign governments — have backed Guaidó and rejected the contested presidency of [Maduro](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19652436), but the country remains in a political stalemate. What happens next? Debate over whether to invade a Latin American country has been far less common in this century than the last, but there is currently a [high-level](https://twitter.com/secpompeo/status/1103872530450771968) [public](https://twitter.com/AmbJohnBolton/status/1103461881044484096) discussion around the [world](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-russia/us-denies-russian-accusation-it-is-preparing-venezuela-intervention-idUSKCN1QF14K) about whether to [use force](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/01/24/trumps-challenge-to-venezuelas-president-could-lead-to-a-military-occupation-heres-why-and-why-thats-dangerous/?utm_term=.b610fcf496c6) in Venezuela to end the Maduro regime. Venezuelans are suffering from hunger, lack of electricity and medicine, hyperinflation and political repression — and the humanitarian crisis has put the country in the global media spotlight. Why is the United States so involved? And what would an armed intervention mean for the future of Venezuelan democracy? Here’s what you need to know. 1. The U.S. has historically involved itself in Latin American politics There’s a long history here. Most analyses of U.S.-Latin American relations share common assumptions that there is a power imbalance, and that the United States will play a central role in any Latin American political crisis, perceiving the region as its [backyard](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/America%27s_Backyard). There are many examples of U.S. intervention, including use of [military](https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB513/) [force](https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB443/docs/area51_22.PDF). Depending on your theoretical or empirical tastes, these factors matter because the United States will seek to project [economic power](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2015.1109435), choose [unilateral options](https://books.google.com/books/about/No_Higher_Law.html?id=MTR-HFgwhZsC), and perceive an [inferior Latin America](https://books.google.com/books?id=N-5hDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=schoultz+in+their+own+interest&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjHlLzE2ZDhAhUFh-AKHbPmALgQ6AEIKjAA#v=onepage&q=schoultz%20in%20their%20own%20interest&f=false) in need of U.S. improvement — or employ force to [appease domestic constituents](https://books.google.com/books/about/U_S_Presidents_and_Latin_American_Interv.html?id=DJMnAQAAMAAJ). At the same time, U.S. power should not blind us to Latin American agency, which [influences U.S. policy decisions](https://books.google.com/books?id=UM3ZCgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=tom+long&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiS65aK3JDhAhUmnOAKHZ00C2wQ6AEIMDAB#v=onepage&q=tom%20long&f=false) and [autonomous foreign policy capacity](https://books.google.com/books?id=-ILZBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA74&lpg=PA74&dq=autonomy+and+international+relations+thinking&source=bl&ots=qLoINEA-Ll&sig=fle2mFZWwQxMR0zZ3kbBrlTtICs&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjI6aCt_dTWAhWBMSYKHfu_BkoQ6AEISDAF#v=onepage&q&f=false) in the region. Latin American influence can both shape and strengthen U.S. initiatives. Latin American leaders have successfully argued or cajoled to inject their opinions into U.S. policy deliberations. In 2015, the Obama administration [declared Venezuela a national security threat](https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/09/fact-sheet-venezuela-executive-order), following months of protests and subsequent government repression. That declaration opened the door for sanctions against individuals in the Maduro government. The administration’s logic was that economic pressure would encourage military defection and compel the regime either to democratize or collapse, but neither happened. In 2017, President Trump stated that his administration had “many options for Venezuela, including a possible military option, if necessary,” which added a credible threat of violence. However, neither sanctions nor threats produced regime change or free elections. Citing the fraudulent 2018 presidential election, in early 2019 Guaidó controversially invoked the constitution to proclaim Nicolás Maduro as usurper and himself as interim president. The Trump administration then recognized Guaidó as the legitimate leader of Venezuela and expanded sanctions further to include the state-owned oil company, which is Venezuela’s source of hard currency. The U.S. policy logic remained focused on military defection, ramping up the pressure on the Venezuelan economy.

#### Edgardo Lander argues on March 16 that:

Edgardo Lander, 3-16-2019, "Preventing Civil War and US Intervention in Venezuela," Truthout, https://truthout.org/articles/preventing-civil-war-and-us-intervention-in-venezuela/, Date Accessed 4-14-2019 // JM

We expect the left internationally to understand the complexity of the situation we are facing in Venezuela, a confrontation between a corrupt, increasingly repressive, undemocratic militaristic government on one hand, and active US intervention on the other. A rejection of imperialist intervention can in no way justify unconditional support for the Maduro government. Support for the Maduro government from the international left will do profound harm to the future of popular struggles, because, as was the case with the Soviet Union, people will identify this repressive regime as constituting “the left.” For this reason, unconditional solidarity with the Maduro government can do much harm, both to the Venezuelan population and to the future of popular anti-capitalist struggles. What we need today is not solidarity with Maduro, nor support for an imperialist intervention, but solidarity with the Venezuelan people. At this moment this means basically two things. First, to do everything possible to prevent a civil war or a military invasion in Venezuela. This means actively rejecting economic sanctions and the threat of military intervention and pushing for a negotiated solution with multilateral participation, not unilateral intervention. And second, to recognize that there is an extremely severe social crisis in the country, that a multilateral solidarity effort has to be made to help provide Venezuelan’s with food and medicines, as an alternative to the politically motivated, militarily backed “humanitarian” US aid that is today threatening the country.

#### Weeks continues that a unilateral military intervention would be catastrophic – he argues that there is a:

Gregory Weeks, 3-25-2019, “The U.S. is thinking of invading Venezuela. That’s unlikely to lead to democracy.,” Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/25/us-is-thinking-invading-venezuela-thats-unlikely-lead-democracy/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4577208c577d>, 4-14-2019 // JM

3. U.S. armed intervention has been bad for Latin Americans Research on U.S.-Latin American relations point to the historical use of [force](https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=6FivSpNY2fkC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=invasion+latin+america+democracy&ots=F2hkvRF6ys&sig=hdds2qI4_Tl_IT-CzlnOxGYp510#v=onepage&q&f=false) in bilateral relations and how it consistently [undermined](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1065912911417831) Latin American democracy. It contributed to militarization and violence (even to the point of fostering a “[killing zone](https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Killing_Zone.html?id=0qeecQAACAAJ)”), increased state repression, privileged the [military over civilians](https://revistas.uniandes.edu.co/doi/pdf/10.7440/res15.2003.05) and strengthened [economic elites](http://www.scielo.org.co/pdf/anpol/n22n65/v22n65a06.pdf). What would this mean in Venezuela? There’s a high risk that U.S. military intervention would [involve long-term occupation](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/01/24/trumps-challenge-to-venezuelas-president-could-lead-to-a-military-occupation-heres-why-and-why-thats-dangerous/?utm_term=.927370cde415), and undermine democracy and [increase violence](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-47118139) in the long term. Latin American political leaders long ago advocated multilateralism and nonintervention as core elements of foreign policy, [simply for self-protection](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13533312.2010.516938?needAccess=true). Military action against Venezuela would therefore sour regional relations — particularly since even [allies](https://thehill.com/latino/431473-brazil-vp-says-us-will-not-be-allowed-to-use-territory-to-invade-venezuela) have [spoken out](https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/colombia-no-alienta-ninguna-provocacion-venezuela-cancilleria-articulo-841132) against this approach.

#### This war becomes a proxy war for all geopolitical tensions. Gladys McCormick wrote on February 6 this:

Gladys McCormick, 2-6-2019, “What the U.S. Can Do to Help Venezuela,” U.S. News & World Report, <https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2019-02-06/commentary-what-the-us-can-do-to-help-venezuela>, Date Accessed 4-14-2019 // JM

The U.S. has chosen to side with Guaidó. Yet, the naming of Elliot Abrams as special envoy for this crisis with his tarnished history in the region (e.g. Iran/Contra debacle), gives pause. Abrams helped organize the covert funding of the Contras, defended U.S. aid to Guatemalan dictator Efrain Montt and was accused of (and denied) covering up atrocities committed by the Contras, making his appointment a confusing signal from Washington. Even more worrisome is Secretary of State's Mike Pompeo's hawkish declaration that it is time for nations "to pick sides" on Venezuela, and National Security Adviser John Bolton's supposed slip-up in showing reporters his notepad with "5,000 troops to Colombia" written on it. Such rhetorical escalation taps into larger geopolitical tensions. Is the Trump administration using Venezuela as a smokescreen for the internal discord within the Republican party over the president's call to withdraw troops for Syria? Does Venezuela's massive oil reserves factor into the U.S. government's heavy-handed response? This type of posturing by the U.S. government raises the specter of a possible return to the Cold War. In December, news media reported the sighting of Russian nuclear-capable bombers in Venezuela and raised concerns the Kremlin may be attempting to establish a military base in the region. In addition, there are currently three Russian naval ships off the coast of Nicaragua, another government friendly to Maduro. So much attention in the area by the Russians raises serious concerns of what the U.S. government's role in the Venezuelan crisis should be. What is clear is that the U.S. government has an extensive track record of interfering in the domestic affairs of its neighbors to the south, in what the long-defunct Monroe Doctrine referred to as the U.S.'s "backyard." The list of U.S. intervention in the region is long and, most recently, includes Haiti, Nicaragua, and Honduras. In virtually every case, such interference did not end well and, if anything, fueled greater discord. Other protagonists – such as the Organization of American States and the United Nations – may do a better job of supporting the Venezuelan people. Rather than using what is taking place in Venezuela as a proxy for larger geopolitical conflicts [becoming], we should urge the Trump administration to practice a policy of restraint, working toward getting Marudo and Guaidó to the negotiating table to arrive at a solution that de-escalates the conflict instead of taking on another costly, long-term intervention (Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq) or a short, ill-conceived one (Libya, Honduras). Maduro's position is weakening by the day, especially as sectors of the military, which have long supported him, are starting to peel off. Without their backing, Maduro may be pushed to the negotiating table sooner rather than later. U.S. military interference or the escalation of Cold War rhetoric will clearly jeopardize this possibility.

#### However, this can all be avoided by voting aff. Granting permanent membership to India allows declarations against Maduro to get passed and overcomes the obstacles for two reasons. First, India’s permanent seat silences China. Rajagopalan explains in 2017 that:

Rajesh Rajagopalan, 9-14-2017, "India’s Strategic Choices: China and the Balance of Power in Asia," Carnegie India, https://carnegieindia.org/2017/09/14/india-s-strategic-choices-china-and-balance-of-power-in-asia-pub-73108, Date Accessed 4-4-2019 // WS

The third strategic tool at India’s disposal is multilateral diplomacy. India could potentially use multilateral institutions such as the United Nations to undermine the legitimacy of and constrain any aggressive Chinese behavior in the international arena. In addition, although India is not a permanent UNSC member, New Delhi could conceivably garner support on issues it deems important from other states, especially more powerful ones like the United States, \, in so doing, attempt to isolate Beijing and deter China from acting against India’s interests. Admittedly, China could opt to veto such proceedings in the UNSC, but it would likely pay a diplomatic cost for doing so, and such veto power does not extend to the UN General Assembly. Meanwhile, in some situations, New Delhi could also conceivably partner with Beijing in such venues, in order to give China an incentive to be more accommodating of India’s interests.

#### As a result of India silencing China – India can win over Russia’s vote. In a two for one deal, David Hutt indicates Russia empirically has ALWAYS supported India in the name of decreasing Chinese hegemony. He argues in 2017 that:

David Hutt, 11-16-2017, "Why Russia Won't Choose Sides Between China And India," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhutt/2017/11/16/why-russia-wont-choose-sides-between-china-and-india/#7b7bbf686d7a, Date Accessed 4-14-2019 // JM

A few weeks after a [military standoff](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/world/asia/dolam-plateau-china-india-bhutan.html?_r=0) between Chinese and Indian troops began near the Doklam plateau in June, the China Global Television Network, a 24 hours English-language state-owned news channel, [asked](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OnKgoKLXpqk) why Russia had been “silent” on the matter. Granted, Moscow had made few public comments about the border tensions. But so, too, had America and the EU, both of which knew that siding with one party would anger the other. However, RT, a Kremlin-funded news agency that often ventriloquizes the thoughts of the Russian state, did produce a number of reports about the dispute and most were rather balanced between China and India’s interests. The standoff eventually dissipated in August when [the two nations agreed to withdraw their troops](https://www.forbes.com/sites/douglasbulloch/2017/08/25/has-india-called-chinas-bluff-over-doklam/#652be1b22d35). But the geopolitical fallout leaves pertinent questions. If tensions between China and India are to become a new normal, as some analysts think, then how do other nations respond? Just as important, how are Asia’s superpowers, including China, India and Russia, going to balance competing interests? Is Moscow Meddling? In April, before the border dispute began, news [emerged](https://www.rbth.com/international/2017/04/12/china-snubs-russian-request-for-trilateral-defense-meeting-with-india_740367) that the Russian government had tried to bring together the Indian and Chinese defense ministers for a meeting in Moscow. Beijing, however, reportedly refused to send along Defense Minister Chang Wanquan, who was already in the Russian capital for an international security conference. Some [believe](http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-russia-talk-doklam-before-brics/articleshow/60149973.cms) this was because India had recently hosted the Dalai Lama in Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian state that borders China’s “autonomous” region of Tibet. Others saw it as an indication of Beijing’s distrust of Moscow’s real motives. In July, Global Times, a jingoistic Chinese state-run tabloid, [opined](http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1054882.shtml)that New Delhi “wants to weigh which is more important to Russia: China or itself.” There is the opinion that Moscow wants a more assertive India to counterbalance China’s growing hegemony in Asia . Russia has long [supported](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/us-likely-to-raise-issue-of-indias-security-council-membership-at-un/articleshow/59910717.cms) India’s ascension to having a permanent seat in a “reformed” UN Security Council, for example. And, in March, the Kremlin publicly backed India’s bid to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a coalition of 48 nuclear supplier countries that control the export of nuclear equipment and technology. For India, which possesses nuclear power, inclusion in the group is important given that its northern enemy, Pakistan, also has nuclear capabilities. Moreover, nuclear energy is an economic concern for India-Russia relations. Moscow and Delhi signed an [agreement](https://www.rbth.com/politics/2017/03/24/russia-strongly-backs-indian-entry-to-nuclear-suppliers-group_726296) in 2014 that aims to build 12 Russia-designed nuclear power stations in India. But China has opposed India’s accession to the group since it first tried to join last year. Formally, it says this is because New Delhi is not yet a signatory to the Non-Nuclear-Proliferation Treaty. China’s opposition was successful, and India has to wait another year to apply to join the group. Russia is also thought to have backed India’s successful ascension, in July, to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a Eurasian security and economic bloc. Derek Grossman, a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation, an American think tank, [claimed](http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/china-will-regret-indias-entry-into-the-shanghai-cooperation-organization/) that Russia sponsored India “mainly to constrain China’s growing influence in the organization.” He added, in his article for the Diplomat, that Russia is concerned the post-Soviet SCO members like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan “are drifting too far into China’s geostrategic orbit.” This is clearly a view supported by some Chinese intellectuals. “Does Russia support India’s accession to the SCO for the sake of common development, or for counterbalancing China?” a Global Times editorial [asked](http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1054882.shtml)in July. More Than Bilateralism Russia’s relationship with India has been solid since the Soviet era and this year marks the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations. But relying on the past might not be enough, according to a joint [report](http://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/VIF-RIAC-Joint-Pape-70th-anniversary-of-russia-indi-relations-new-horizons-of-privileged-partnership.pdf) published recently by two think tanks, the Russian International Affairs Council and India’s Vivekananda International Foundation. “Giving a new impetus to Moscow-New Delhi relations would allow Russia to diversify its efforts in Asia. It is necessary for India and Russia to prevent third countries from exerting significant influence on their bilateral ties,” it reads. Clearly, this is intended to indicate concerns within Moscow and New Delhi that the other party is gravitating towards their adversaries. Russia knows India wants to form closer ties to the U.S. and European nations. Just this week, India [took part](https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/us-japan-india-and-australia-hold-working-level-quadrilateral-meeting-on-regional-cooperation/) in talks with Japan, America and Australia over reforming the disbanded Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, an ostensible counter-China pact that seeks to curb Beijing’s expansionism in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean.

#### Second, China and Russia want a multipolar world more than they support Venezuela. Vijay Prashad indicated on March 20 that:

Vijay Prashad, Asia Times, 3-20-2019, "Asia Times," https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/03/opinion/venezuelas-future-depends-on-china-russia/, Date Accessed 4-14-2019 // JM

Neither China nor Russia is willing to see the United States overthrow the government in Venezuela. Both have commercial interests in the country. Both also seek to deepen a more diversified global order, with the United States no longer seen as a viable policeman. The test for their commitment to multipolarity will be in how China and Russia hold the line on the United States’ attempt to squeeze Iran and Venezuela. If China and Russia are able to withstand the US pressure – and build alternative financial mechanisms – then a multipolar order can come into being. If they fail, then the world will remain under unipolar dominance.

#### Voting affirmative creates a cooperative, legitimate UN solving all regional conflicts – the alternative is endless future conflicts with no international body to solve. Erin Dunne argues in 2019 that:

Erin Dunne, 1-30-2019, “Cold War-like tensions escalate as world powers take sides in Venezuela,” 1-30-2019, Washington Examiner, <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/cold-war-like-tensions-escalate-as-world-powers-take-sides-in-venezuela>, Date Accessed 4-14-2019 // JM

Embattled Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro said he was willing to negotiate on Wednesday in an interview with a Russian television program. “I am ready to sit at the negotiating table with the opposition," Maduro said on RIA Novosti, "so that we can talk for the good of Venezuela, for peace and its future.” His words, however, were not all forward-looking and optimistic. Indeed, in the same interview, he accused President Trump of plotting to have him killed, although he gave no evidence to support the claim. Russia also took advantage of its ties to Caracas to push back on what it likely sees as heavy-handed U.S. influence in negotiations with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov demanding that preconditions for talks be dropped: “We call on the opposition to refuse ultimatums and to work together independently, guided only by the interest of the Venezuelan people.” China, which like Russia has investments tied up in Venezuela, also has criticized U.S. involvement. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang warned, "We believe that Venezuela’s affairs must and can only be chosen and determined by its own people, and we oppose unilateral sanctions." He added, "China will continue to advance across-the-board cooperation with Venezuela to deliver more benefits to the people in both countries." In the United States, President Trump made clear that U.S. support for opposition leader Juan Guaido wasn't going away. On Wednesday he spoke with Guaido and offered additional public support after imposing new sanctions against Maduro on Monday, tweeting: Donald J. Trump @realDonaldTrump Maduro willing to negotiate with opposition in Venezuela following U.S. sanctions and the cutting off of oil revenues. Guaido is being targeted by Venezuelan Supreme Court. Massive protest expected today. Americans should not travel to Venezuela until further notice. 77.8K 5:02 AM - Jan 30, 2019 Those split alliances, with Russia and China siding with Maduro and the United States and its allies backing Guaido, form the subtext for Maduro's calls for international mediation. Any successful talks would require cooperation from both sides and their international backers. Should those negotiations be successful, paving the way for new elections, a peaceful transition, and setting Venezuela on the path of recovery, that would be a tremendous victory for diplomacy and demonstrate that the world is not yet so polarized that world powers cannot work together to solve regional crises. The other possibility, of course, is that entrenched differences and escalating tensions between Washington and Beijing and Moscow make negotiations impossible, leading to an ongoing standoff in Venezuela — or something worse. Given the billions of dollars at stake in lost investments, competing interests in Venezuela's vast oil reserves, and the lure of a foothold in Latin America for Russia and China, that's not an unlikely outcome. However the negotiations on Venezuela's future play out, the international interests at play make the conflict a key indicator of global stability and the reality of renewed Cold War-style tensions. It's surely a fight to watch with broad implications for future conflicts.

## Extra

#### This multilateral effort has been started as PTI indicated on March 30 that:

PTI, 3-30-2019, "Considerable amount of cooperation from India on Venezuela: US," Moneycontrol, https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/world/considerable-amount-of-cooperation-from-india-on-venezuela-us-3730341.html, Date Accessed 4-14-2019 // JM

There has been a considerable amount of cooperation from India on the US efforts to restrict export of Venezuelan oil, a top American diplomat said Friday as the Trump administration tightened its noose over President Nicolas Maduro's regime of the Latin American country. "I would say that we have had contacts with Indian companies and with the government of India, and that we have found there to be a very considerable amount of cooperation, which we are very happy to see," US Special Representative for Venezuela Elliott Abrams told reporters at a news conference. The Trump administration has recognised opposition leader Juan Guaido as oil-rich country's interim leader against President Maduro. As part of its effort to squeeze the Maduro regime, the US had asked countries, including India, across the world to stop importing oil from Venezuela or face American sanctions. Several Indian companies have stopped importing oil from the country. In recent weeks, the Trump administration has appreciated Indian cooperation in this regard. Early this month, the Venezuelan Oil Ministry had said that it has suspended export of oil to India.

#### Jacob indicates that in 2019 that in the status quo:

Alka Acharya and Jabin Jacob, 3-22-2019, "What can India do to influence China on Masood Azhar?," Hindu, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/what-can-india-do-to-influence-china-on-masood-azhar/article26600833.ece, Date Accessed 4-7-2019 // JM

India has taken a much calmer tone than what we have seen in public on China’s refusal to allow the listing at the UNSC of Masood Azhar. Do you think this will work? Alka Acharya: I don’t see why not. Yelling and screaming was not helping the issue. I think the significant thing to understand is that the Chinese have not provided any indication as to whether they are going to change on this particular issue. Whereas, on other issues they have — for instance, blacklisting the organisation (JeM), or putting Pakistan on the Financial Action Task Force Grey List. So, there are also various shades to China’s stand and actions at the global level. Professor Jacob, would you agree? That China’s objections to listing Azhar are probably not ideological, and therefore, there is some room for flexibility? Or would you say that China is essentially giving a strong message by refusing to list him for the fourth time in a decade, and India should take that message. Jabin Jacob: Yes, definitely. India should take a message from that. It’s not ideological, but I would say there is a larger issue here, which is of politics. Clearly this is a different China that we’re dealing with. It’s not the same China that we’ve seen over the last 10 years. I think the problem is that India is too subtle. If India does not take a consistent position, or a position that appears to evolve into something, the Chinese are not going to take you seriously. While we say that China is not supporting us on this aspect, we also have our annual counter-terrorism exercise with China. I think that sort of mixed messaging doesn’t work. On the one hand, if you seem too conciliatory with China, then it may see that as a sign of weakness and therefore not change its position. Is this actually a larger challenge for India when it comes to China? A.A.: I don’t agree that because China has chosen to block Azhar’s listing, it amounts to its contradictory stand on other issues with us. China has tried to take a consistent position as to why it has to blacklist an individual, whereas it is taking a slightly different position with regard to the organisation (JeM). The fact is that the India-China dialogue has expanded. It has now brought terror on board, but we need to be discussing this more because I don’t think we are on the same page as far as terror is concerned. It is a part of the strategic dialogue and that’s a start. We are together on many multilateral platforms, so we could start communicating our position to the Chinese much more clearly, but at the same time not permit this issue to derail what is a much larger process. In India there is no stomach for any kind of dialogue with Pakistan. And yet with China, every time there is a pushback from China, this is pretty much in your face when China refuses to list Masood Azhar despite the kind of push India has made diplomatically after the Pulwama attack. How do you explain this dichotomy? A.A: In the last five years, the whole situation with Pakistan has become more rigid. So, if in the past we did see an attempt to balance no terror or no dialogue till the terror attack stopped, but at the same time you are opening up other channels. Increasingly, you are seeing that the Chinese are becoming more and more significant players in this region, so you are in a bit of a dilemma. Because you need to ensure that your relationship with China doesn’t get derailed. There is a lot of suspicion about how the Chinese are preparing to support Pakistan. You can’t shut that door because then you are really only dependent on the Americans. It’s not just about China, India and Pakistan. It’s about the Americans wanting to disengage; the Russians wanting to get into Afghanistan via Pakistan. Do you think the Americans are going to play our game with the Pakistanis for us? I’m not too sure. Why does China continue to stand firm on the Azhar issue in particular? J.J.: This is clearly tactical as far as the Chinese are concerned. The BRICS forum in Goa refused to allow any mention of terror in the joint declaration. But the next year, in China, they were willing to go along. So, it’s up and down. And I suppose the Chinese are not completely at home in Pakistan, so they also need to put pressure on the Pakistanis and tell them to behave vis-a-vis Chinese influence. The larger issue is about communication. What is the communication that India has with China on this particular issue? At the end of January, we had the 8th India-China Joint Working Group Meeting on Counter-Terrorism. And if you look at the MEA website... it doesn’t really inform you about what is going on. The Chinese can get away with that. But in India the government needs to communicate to the strategic community and to the public. You can’t deal with the Chinese using Chinese methods and ignore how the system works at your end. Do you think the diplomatic capital that India is using when it comes to the Azhar issue is worth it? J.J.: There are two parts to this. The first is, of course, this is an overkill, because we don’t have the capacity to follow up. The kind of effort that we have to put into this is only worthwhile if we can follow up with other global capitals, even the small players, through the year. But on the other hand, there is a certain value that the people in the Ministry dealing with China understand — that China is not comfortable being named and shamed and sticking out as the only objector in this. Don’t you think that’s the old China? I think the new China doesn’t have a problem sticking out. J.J.: True, but we don’t know if we have come to that realisation. A.A.: I would say it’s the reverse. I think today China is far more wary of its international image and therefore the need not to stand out like a sore thumb, especially when there is a global consensus on certain issues. Now, does the Azhar issue actually dent that image, or does it really show China as a power which has double standards? How much of an impact did the U.S.’s open statements challenging China have on China’s own decision? Or do you think China’s mind was made up? J.J.: Yes, the Chinese do take the Americans seriously and that’s again a question of capacity because the Americans can follow up. They can put others under pressure to follow what the Americans think is in their interest. In the case of terrorism or the Nuclear Suppliers Group, these are important for India perhaps, but they are not important to other states. And it is possible to keep the other states interested if we [they] have the capacity to consistently put pressure. As long as that’s not the case, the Chinese will not be moved. On the question of political wrangling... on the one hand, you have the government accusing the Congress party leader of meeting the Chinese Ambassador. You have criticism from the Opposition that, despite the Wuhan summit, the Prime Minister has been unable to get any concessions from China. How much is this political issue over China playing out in Beijing as well? A.A.: There are three dimensions here. One, over a period of time the Chinese have seen that there is a fairly consistent position in India. Whichever government has been in power has more or less taken the same framework, which is one of engaging and moving the relationship forward. Therefore, I am sure many people in China do not take this internal wrangling very seriously. I think on the whole these charges are of necessity, purely political. So, you will have to say, ‘Wuhan is in tatters’. I don’t agree with that. Wuhan was about something else. The second point is that we have not yet grasped that the China-Pakistan relationship is undergoing a major transformation, and we continue to take this anti-India perspective as the dominant one, which it is not. China is far too invested in Pakistan. Anti-India is lower down, it’s not the top priority. And the final point is that China-India relations are also not static. And the best way to beat this is to get the India-China game up.

#### And

# Frontlines

## Top of The Docket Thumper

#### The biggest problem for Blake in this round is that they don’t assume immediacy of the resolution. Voting affirmative interjects India into the status quo security council politics. Security council politics is NOT dealing with Pakistan right now, rather it is dealing with Venezuela.

#### This is really important because it means their links that require perception about discussions on Pakistan do not get triggered until the Venezuelan crisis is handled. Our argument is that the affirmative scenario happens immediately – this means the Dunne impact card from case gets proven that diplomacy can actually work. This takes out any escalation of their impacts because EVEN IF India deals with Pakistan second on the docket – which they don’t read a card says will happen – other countries and diplomats will step in to resolve this conflict.

## AT: Trump won’t attack

#### Several reasons why this is true

#### **Weeks in case says Trump has repeatedly said all options are on the table.**

#### Elliot Abrams is his advisor and is known for wanting to brutalize Venezuela.

Jon Schwarz, 1-25-2019, "Elliott Abrams, Trump’s Pick to Bring “Democracy” to Venezuela, Has Spent His Life Crushing Democracy," Intercept, https://theintercept.com/2019/01/30/elliott-abrams-venezuela-coup/, Date Accessed 4-15-2019 // JM

The choice of Abrams sends a clear message to Venezuela and the world: The Trump administration intends to brutalize Venezuela, while producing a stream of unctuous rhetoric about America’s love for democracy and human rights. Combining these two factors — the brutality and the unctuousness — is Abrams’s core competency.

#### Lander indicates that:

Edgardo Lander, 3-16-2019, "Preventing Civil War and US Intervention in Venezuela," Truthout, https://truthout.org/articles/preventing-civil-war-and-us-intervention-in-venezuela/, Date Accessed 4-14-2019 // JM

The threat of a US military intervention is more than just paranoia. The US government has stated again and again that every option is on the table, and President Donald Trump has explicitly stated — and repeated almost daily — that one of those is a military intervention. The recent experience of Iraq, Libya and Syria would indicate that this is not a far-fetched possibility.

## AT: Russia veto

#### Call for our Hutt evidence – Russia falls in line with India ANYTIME that Chinese hegemony can be threatened – this is empirically proven when Russia begged India to be added to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization - Babones proves that.

Salvatore Babones, 11-29-2017, "Why Is Democratic India Joining Russia And China's 'Anti-Western' Club, The SCO?," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/salvatorebabones/2017/11/29/why-is-democratic-india-joining-russia-and-chinas-anti-western-club-the-sco/#eb1fd504cac7, Date Accessed 4-15-2019 // JM

India is understandably nervous about encirclement, and looking for all the powerful friends it can get. So Russia took the opportunity to pull India into the SCO as a counterweight to China. China responded by insisting that its ally Pakistan be included too. As a result, both countries [were admitted](http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/india-pakistan-join-sco-as-members/article18952872.ece) to the organization this June at the SCO heads of state meeting in Astana. Balance achieved. Or perhaps not. Pakistan doesn't change much in the balance at the SCO, which already has four other Muslim-majority police states as members. India is different. As a vibrant democracy with an independent civil society and an unruly free press, India may not play by the SCO's authoritarian rules. It is unlikely to cause trouble, but it is [also unlikely](https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/china-will-regret-indias-entry-into-the-shanghai-cooperation-organization/) to fall into line on the security issues that are the mainstay of the SCO's program. With the SCO already riven by [ethnic conflict](http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/06/kyrgyzstan-violence-2010-201463016460195835.html) between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, [water disputes](http://www.geocurrents.info/geopolitics/the-cold-war-between-tajikistan-and-uzbekistan) between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and a [running political battle](https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-presidential-election-atambaev-babanov-sariev-jeenbekov/28794893.html) between the presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, it is hard to see how the organization will be able to accommodate a new member that has traded punches with [China](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/20/india-china-border-brawl-superpowers-throw-stones-tensions-heighten/) and live fire with [Pakistan](http://www.france24.com/en/20171002-two-children-killed-india-pakistan-trade-fire-kashmir) in the short period between being admitted and attending its first summit. Russia wanted India in the SCO to prevent the organization sliding under China's control. Instead it is likely to complete the organization's slide into irrelevance. As of last week, the agenda for the meetings to take place November 30 and December 1 had [reportedly](https://chelorg.com/2017/11/11/the-council-of-the-sco-in-sochi-will-give-new-momentum-to-cooperation-said-the-secretary-general-of-the-organization/) not yet been finalized. The eight heads of government meeting in Sochi will certainly talk about something, but it's difficult to imagine them agreeing on much.

## AT: Venezuela war not bad

#### this war outweighs all else. Robert Farley wrote in 2019 that:

Robert Farley, 1-17-2019, “Check Out All of the Places World War III Could Start in 2019,” The National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/check-out-all-places-world-war-iii-could-start-2019-41817>, Date Accessed 4-14-2019 // JM

Unpredictable? As a colonel at the U.S. Army War College memorably phrased the problem, “the United States has wrongly predicted every conflict since the Korean War. Why should we expect World War III will [to] be any different?” Great powers tend to devote diplomatic, military, and political resources to what they regard as the most serious conflicts on their plates. Less critical conflicts don’t receive as much attention, meaning that they can sometimes grow into serious confrontations before anyone quite notices what’s going on. Disruptive conflict could emerge in the Baltics, in Azerbaijan, in Kashmir or even in Venezuela, but the United States, China and Russia only have so much focus. If World War III comes about, it may well come from a completely unexpected direction. Final Thoughts: Is the world more dangerous today than it was a year ago? Perhaps not, although the decay of the relationship between China and the United States portends ill for the future. The flashpoints may change over time, but the fundamental foundations of conflict—the decay of U.S. military hegemony and of the global international order that has accompanied it—mean that the near future will likely become more hazardous than the recent past.

## AT: Regime Change Bad

#### The international community supports a regime change they just haven’t created an effort with multilateral support- our Prashad evidence indicates there is more broad support for working as a multilateral front than there is support for Maduro.

## AT: R2P Turn

#### The R2P doctrine failed in Libya thus proving that the precedent is bad and would not be followed for Venezeula. None of our offense is dictated though off the UN intervention working, instead our offense is dictated off the method that the Venezeulan regime change happens – since its inevitable, its either going to happen through a multilateral front or a US unilateral front. At best for the neg, they will win a risk that multilateral operations through an R2P will lead to <their impact> but here is why our impact outweighs.

Short version – Iraq is worse than Libya – voting neg creates