

We affirm.

### **Contention one is the Indo-American alliance.**

India today is in the perfect position to assert its position in the international system. **Sanghoo** at Fortune finds in 2017 that a fifth of the world's population lives in the country, with rapid economic modernization, including a transport infrastructure overhaul, expanded human capital, and technological development meaning it already stands as the world's third largest economy. As a result, **Allison** of the Belfer Center for International Affairs writes in 2011 that India is the most important swing state in global governance, with its influence having broad ramifications across the international community.

However, India has thus far failed to take advantage of their potential. **Fanell** at the Naval War College writes in 2019 that a weakening American security relationship with India has directly enabled China's rise in the Indo-Pacific by reducing the naval confidence of the US-India-Japan-Australia quadrilateral alliance and allowing China to take a lead on regional multilateral efforts. **Dalpino** at Georgetown confirms in 2018 that there is increased movement among Southeastern Asian nations to form a regional coalition to challenge China, and that while India nominally supports the coalition, a closer relationship with the West is necessary to strengthen the Indo-Pacific coalition and avert the risk of war in the South Pacific.

Fortunately, voting affirmative will restore India's confidence in the West, allowing them to effectively challenge China. **Kraugthammer** at the National Review finds in 2010 that a permanent seat on the Security Council would carry "totemic significance" for India, confirming its status as the most important American ally in the region. For example, **Carpenter** of the CATO Institute reports in 2010 that Obama's commitment to push for permanent membership led to an immediate strengthening of relations. As a result, **Miller** at Boston University, citing interviews with top Indian foreign policy officials, finds in 2013 that granting India a permanent seat on the Security Council would be the perfect way to legitimize India's global leadership, spurring both domestic and international action towards a more powerful Indian state. **Dabhade** at Jawaharlal Nehru University concludes in 2017 that permanent membership would be an equalizer in the India-China rivalry, establishing India as the democratic alternative to China's authoritarian ideology and enabling effective containment of China.

Ultimately, **Curtis** at the Heritage Foundation in 2011 reports that an increased role for India in the American alliance network will facilitate broader US-India security cooperation and set strategic redlines on China, deterring expanded regional aggression, in particular in the South China Sea. There will be two dramatic consequences for regional security absent the American security umbrella.

1. First, regional conflicts. **Malik** at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in 2012 finds that increased Chinese regional assertiveness as a result of a weakened American presence would force India to respond by increasing its support for proxy groups in East Asia, carrying the risk of millions of deaths and massively increasing regional tensions.

2. Second, challenging terrorism. **Perkovich** at the Carnegie Endowment in 2014 finds that that, when reassured of American commitment to the alliance, India would be willing to accept a greater American role in intelligence gathering and counterterrorism, which would not only challenge Pakistani-sponsored terrorist groups but also improve India's ability to respond to a Pakistani first strike, deterring such a strike from ever happening. Furthermore, **Joshi** at the Heritage Foundation in 2013 writes that stronger US-India security cooperation would help to modernize Indian nuclear command and control facilities reducing the risk of a Pakistani-sponsored terrorist group stealing a nuclear weapon.

### **Contention two is foreign aid.**

In the United Nations security council, larger developed nations often trade foreign aid, investment and economic support to developing nations in exchange for their support on key issues. In fact, **Dreher** 06 of Karls University writes that when a country gets a Security Council seat, average US aid increases by 54 percent. The incentive to contribute aid exists to a higher degree when India is a permanent member of the security council, as **Werker** 05 of the Journal of Political Economy finds that the incentive to bribe permanent security council members is higher, as they have a higher concentration of power due to their respective vetoes. Aid is beneficial because it increases Indian access to healthcare. **Ayres** 17 for CFR writes that the Trump administration has focused its aid initiatives in India around healthcare. Healthcare aid is critical to preventing loss of life. A report from **USAID** in 2018 reports that by combatting the effects of malnutrition, TB, and maternal and child mortality, US aid to India is directly responsible for saving 2 million total lives every year.

Cards:

### **India is on the rise – confluence of economic indicators**

Sanghoo 15 (Sanjay, 1-25-2015, "India: The next superpower?", Fortune, <http://fortune.com/2015/01/25/india-the-next-superpower/>, BS 3-24-2019)

But despite all this, the promise of a brighter future for India still holds firm. There are three reasons for this: The first is economic. Modi's initiatives aimed at revamping India's restrictive business regulations and creating a real free market seem to be working. Even though GDP growth in the third quarter of 2014 slowed slightly from the summer to 5.3%, it was still much higher than that of the last several years. India's \$1.9 trillion economy is projected to expand by 6.4% this year, according to the International Monetary Fund, and **the country has already outpaced Japan as the world's third largest economy** in terms of purchasing price parity, a measure that adjusts for price differences between economies, according to the World Bank. In addition, falling oil prices have reduced the risk of inflation and will enable the country to cut its costly fuel subsidies. Every a \$10-a-barrel decline could increase GDP by 0.1%, lower inflation by 0.5%, and narrow the current account deficit, Nomura economists led by Sonal Varma wrote in an October report. Further bolstering the economy is the billions of dollars in increased foreign investments, including \$33 billion from private and public sources in Japan, aided by the raising of investment caps by the government and a stable interest rate environment. The second part of Modi's plan is to improve India's national infrastructure. This includes a proposed increase in infrastructure spending of \$800 billion to reach targeted economic growth of 7% as well as enabling banks to buy infrastructure bonds to spur trading activity in the debt markets. Late last year, Modi also secured a \$20 billion infrastructure investment from China. Collectively, **these initiatives could enable India to upgrade its overtaxed transport system, bring stable water supply and electricity to more areas, and expand the use of technology throughout the country**. But **the most important aspect of India's infrastructure is its human capital**. What makes India's population so valuable is its large pool of young workers — 65% of India's population is 35 or under, giving the country a strong competitive edge in the coming decades. To realize the potential of this human capital, the government has launched several initiatives aimed at improving education, retraining rural workers for skilled jobs in other sectors, providing bank accounts to all Indians to teach personal financial planning, offering free life insurance, encouraging the wider use of computers and the Internet, and generally modernizing the workforce for the big jobs boom coming up in the fast-growing healthcare, information technology, telecom, and retail sectors. **The final factor that could position India as a superpower is its geopolitical advantage**. Since his election, Modi has made a concerted effort to strengthen ties with Russia, Japan, and the U.S. For each of them, India is a valuable trading partner with a vast consumer base and labor pool waiting to be tapped. But even more significant is the strategic importance of its alliance with all those nations. Reeling from Western economic sanctions and low oil prices, Russia needs India's partnership more than ever to bolster its economic foothold in Asia and counter U.S. influence. Similarly, the U.S. would like to expand bilateral trade with India, which reached \$95 billion in 2013, while also using the democratic nation to balance the power of China in the region. By extending the hand

of friendship to all of them, Modi is being diplomatic; but he is also **keeping his options open to forge partnerships that will maximize the benefit to India**, both financially and politically. India may not reach its desired destination in a straight line or in the timeframe that Modi has set for it, but odds are pretty good that it will become a leading player in the economic and geopolitical spheres fairly soon.

### **US India cooperation strengthen international norms and ensures Asian stability**

Graham Allison et al, 2011, (the director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, served as a special adviser to the secretary of defense under President Reagan, twice received the highest civilian honor awarded by the Department of Defense) "The United States and India, A Shared Strategic Future" //ALB

On issues of global governance, India will remain the most important swing state in the international system. Importantly, India is genuinely committed to a world order based on multilateral institutions and cooperation and the evolution of accepted international norms leading to accepted international law. Despite being a rising power with some complaints regarding the existing global governance structure, India seeks to reform the present system and not to overturn it. U.S. and Indian national interests naturally overlap on many of these issues, given India's commitment to a stable Asia, democracy, market-driven growth, the rule of law, and opposition to violent extremism. India's capability extends well beyond the realm of military, economic, and global diplomatic power. Indian culture and diplomacy has generated goodwill in its extended neighborhood. New Delhi has positive relations with critical states in the Middle East, in Central Asia, in Southeast Asia, and with important middle powers such as Brazil, South Africa, and Japan—**all of strategic value to the United States.** India's soft power is manifest in wide swaths of the world where its civil society has made a growing and positive impression. This includes the global spread of its private corporate sector, the market for its popular culture, its historical religious footprint, and the example of its democracy and nongovernmental institutions. In addition, India has demonstrated an enduring commitment to democratic values. Indian democracy has prospered despite endemic poverty; extraordinary ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity; and foreign and internal conflicts. It has provided Indian society the resilience and adaptability necessary to overcome and respond to the myriad challenges the nation has faced since independence. India and the United States share the objective to strengthen pluralist and secular democracies worldwide, and India's rise as a democratic great power promotes that profound global objective. For many of the reasons indicated, a stronger India inevitably makes managing a stable balance of power in Asia significantly easier for the United States. Although other friendly countries in the region writ large will also play a critical role, **over the next two decades India may well become the most important Asian partner for the United States in ensuring that the broad balance of power that serves Asia so well is preserved.**

**Fannell, professor at the Naval War College writes in 2019:** [Fannell, J.E. (2019). China's global naval strategy and expanding force structure: Pathways to hegemony. *Naval War College Review*, 72(1), pp. 49-50]

Given my estimate that the future size of the PLAN **[China's navy] will be about 550 warships and submarines by 2030—twice the size of today's U.S. Navy—it is clear the U.S. Navy is at great risk of not being adequately sized or outfitted to meet American national security**

**commitments in the Indo-Pacific, let alone around the globe.** Therefore, to accomplish all the above missions, to provide a credible deterrent against PRC hegemony, and to be able to fight and win wars at sea, the U.S. Navy must get bigger. **The evidence that a strategic gap between the U.S. Navy and the [Chinese navy] PLAN is on the verge of exploding over the next decade** and a half **is overwhelming.** Because of this gap, it seems clear to me that to keep even a modicum of parity with the Chinese the U.S. Navy will require more than 355 ships. **The bottom line is that America needs to get back to being a maritime power supported militarily by strong allies.**—something that has been sorely neglected since the fall of the Soviet Union. **Without that accomplishment, expect China to push us ever farther from Asia. Expect to lose more allies and influence across the Indo-Pacific.**

**Dalpino, professor of international relations at Georgetown University, 2018** [Dalpino, C. (2018). US-Southeast Asia relations: Caught in the crossroads of major power tensions. *Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations*, 20(2), p. 45]

**With or without the United States, many Southeast Asian countries have growing reasons to support an Indo-Pacific community.** First, **[T]hree regional powers—Japan, Australia, and India—also support it, and Southeast Asians are attempting to forge closer relations with all three, to balance against China.** but also to compensate for a perceived lack of interest in the region on the part of the United States. Second, **[M]any Southeast Asian leaders (particularly Myanmar, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia) fear that the Chinese strategic focus is expanding beyond the South China Sea [in]to the Bay of Bengal in the Indian Ocean, and that maritime conflict will spread southwest. Stronger relations with India, as well as having regional powers pay closer attention to this new threat through the Indo-Pacific framework, will help reduce the risk of conflict for Southeast Asia.**

Kraughthammer '10 Kraughthammer, Charles (Winner of Pulitzer Prize and Nationally Syndicated Columnist). “Why Obama Is Right about India.” *National Review*, 12 November 2010,

<https://www.nationalreview.com/2010/11/why-obama-right-about-india-charles-krauthammer/#>.

[Premier]

The visit to India was particularly necessary in the light of Obama's bumbling over-enthusiasm in his 2009 trip to China, in which he lavished much time, energy, and praise upon his hosts and then oddly tried to elevate Beijing to a G-2 partnership, a kind of two-nation world condominium. Worse, however, was Obama's suggesting a Chinese role in South Asia — an affront to India's autonomy and regional dominance, and a signal of U.S. acquiescence to Chinese hegemony. This hegemony is the growing source of tension in Asia today. Modern China is the Germany of a century ago — a rising, expanding, have-not power seeking its place in the sun. The story of the first half of the 20th century was Europe's attempt to manage Germany's rise. We know how that turned out. The story of the next half-century will be how Asia accommodates and/or contains China's expansion. Nor is this some far-off concern. China's aggressive territorial claims on resource-rich waters claimed by Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Japan are already roiling the neighborhood. Traditionally, Japan has been the major regional counterbalance. But an aging, shrinking Japan cannot sustain that role. Symbolic of the dramatic shift in power balance between once-poor China and once-dominant Japan was the resolution of their recent maritime crisis. Japan had detained a Chinese captain in a

territorial-waters dispute. China imposed an embargo on rare-earth minerals. Japan capitulated. That makes the traditional U.S. role as offshore balancer all the more important. China's neighbors, from South Korea all the way around to India, are in need of U.S. support of their own efforts at resisting Chinese dominion. And of all these countries, *India*, which has fought a border war with China, is the most *natural anchor* for such a U.S. partnership. It's not just our inherent affinities — democratic, English-speaking, free-market, dedicated to the rule of law. It is also the coincidence of our strategic imperatives: We both face the threat of radical Islam and the longer-term challenge of a rising China. Which is why Obama's dramatic call for India to be made a permanent member of the Security Council was so important. However useless and obsolete the U.N. may be, a Security Council seat carries *totemic significance*. It would elevate India, while helping bind it to us as our most strategic and organic Third World ally. China is no enemy, but it remains troublingly adversarial. Which is why India must be the center of our Asian diplomacy. And why Obama's trip — coconuts and all — was worth every penny.

Carpenter '10 Carpenter, Ted G. (Vice President for Defense and Foreign-Policy Studies at the Cato Institute,). "Long Overdue: Adding Permanent Members to the UN Security Council." *Cato Institute*, 8 November 2010, <https://www.cato.org/commentary/long-overdue-adding-permanent-members-un-security-council>

In his address to India's parliament on Monday, President Obama explicitly endorsed New Delhi's bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. It was an effective diplomatic move from the standpoint of Washington's bilateral relationship with India. Not surprisingly, the audience gave that portion of the speech a thunderous ovation. More significant, though, is that Obama's endorsement sends a clear signal that the United States acknowledges India as not only a rapidly rising economic power, but a significant political and security player in the international system as well. The president's comments also reduce concerns that the arms control crowd in his administration might roll back the improved relationship that had developed between the two countries during the Bush years. Arms control zealots have never forgiven India for deploying a nuclear arsenal and striking a blow against the fraying nonproliferation system. Because that faction seemed to have greater influence in the Obama administration than it did in the previous administration, there were legitimate worries that the nonproliferation issue could create a chill in U.S.-Indian relations. That prospect now seems less likely.

Dabhade 17 (Manish, Assistant Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament in the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, August 2017, "India's Pursuit of United Nations Security Council Reforms", <http://risingpowersproject.com/quarterly/indias-pursuit-united-nations-security-council-reforms/>, BS 3-29-2019)

Further, the seat on the high table, at the UN's premier, powerful body would provide it the much needed leverage to expand its global geo-political and geo-economic clout. It would serve

as an equaliser to China, its rival and an emerging hegemon in Asia, and an ever increasing strategic and security concern in its immediate neighbourhood and beyond. India has always seen itself as a democratic alternative to the authoritarian China. India's millennia old civilizational existence also demands it to be at the top of the international hierarchy of states.

**Curtis & Cheng 11** (Curtis, Lisa. Senior research fellow on South Asia in The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center. Cheng, Dean. The Heritage Foundation's research fellow on Chinese political and security affairs." *The China Challenge: A Strategic Vision for U.S.–India Relations*". The Heritage Foundation. July 18<sup>th</sup>, 2011.

<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/07/the-china-challenge-a-strategic-vision-for-us-india-relations>)

India is keeping a wary eye on China's rapid global ascent. Unresolved border issues that resulted in the Sino–Indian War of 1962 have been heating up again in recent years. Indian policymakers are scrambling to develop effective policies to cope with a rising China by simultaneously pursuing both a robust diplomatic strategy aimed at encouraging peaceful resolution of border disputes and forging strong trade and economic ties and an ambitious military modernization campaign that will build Indian air, naval, and missile capabilities. By bolstering its naval assets, India will solidify its position in the Indian Ocean and enhance its ability to project power into the Asia Pacific. New Delhi also will continue to boost its medium-range missile programs to deter Beijing and to strengthen its air capabilities to deal with potential flare-ups along their disputed borders. Meanwhile, China has also been paying increasing attention to India. China's interests on its southern flank have led the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to strengthen its forces in the Lanzhou and Chengdu Military Regions bordering India. The U.S. must keep a watchful eye on the trend lines in Sino–Indian relations and factor these into its overall strategies in the broader Asia region. A strong India able to hold its own against China is in America's interest. China's increased assertiveness in the East and South China Seas over the past year has been accompanied by a hardening position on its border disputes with India. Last summer, India took the unprecedented step of suspending military ties with China in response to Beijing's refusal to grant a visa to an Indian Army general serving in Jammu and Kashmir. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to New Delhi last December helped tamp down the disagreement, and military contacts have since resumed. Still, the incident shows the fragility of the Sino–Indian rapprochement and the potential for deepening tensions over the unresolved border issues to escalate. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's visit to India this week for Strategic Dialogue talks provides an opportunity to take India's pulse on China and to discuss new diplomatic and security initiatives that will contribute to maintaining a stable balance of power in Asia. The U.S. should demonstrate support for Indian military modernization and enhanced U.S.–Indian defense ties. Despite U.S. disappointment over India's decision to de-select two American companies from its Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition, the U.S. is bound to conclude other major defense deals with India as it pursues an ambitious defense modernization campaign, which includes spending plans of around \$35 billion over the next five years. Indeed, this year, the two sides finalized a deal worth nearly \$4 billion for the U.S. to provide India with enough C-17 aircraft to give India the second-largest C-17 fleet in the world. Enhancing Indo–U.S. cooperation in maritime security in the Indian Ocean region is also an area of mutual interest that is ripe for new initiatives. India's rejection of the MMRCA has added a dose of realism to Indo–U.S. relations and reminded U.S. officials that the burgeoning partnership will not always reach the full expectations of either side. Still, the growing strategic challenge presented by a rising China will inevitably drive the U.S. and India to increase cooperation in defense and other key sectors, such as space, maritime security, and nuclear nonproliferation.

**Malik 12** (Malik, Mohan. Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. "China and India Today: Diplomats Jostle, Militaries Prepare". World Affairs Journal. July/August 2012. <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/china-and-india-today-diplomats-jostle-militaries-prepare>)

In short, maritime competition is intensifying as Indian and Chinese navies show the flag in the Pacific and Indian oceans with greater frequency. This rivalry could spill into the open after a couple of decades, when one Indian aircraft carrier will be deployed in the Pacific Ocean and one Chinese aircraft carrier in the Indian Ocean—ostensibly to safeguard their respective trade and energy routes. In turn, India's "Look East" policy is a manifestation of its own strategic intent to compete for influence in the wider Asia-Pacific region. Just as China will not concede India's primacy in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, India seems unwilling to accept Southeast and East Asia as China's sphere of influence. Just as China's rise is viewed positively in the South Asian region among the small countries surrounding India with which New Delhi has had difficult relations, India's rise is viewed in positive-sum terms among China's neighbors throughout East and Southeast Asia. Over the last two decades, India has sought to enhance its economic and security ties with those Northeast and Southeast Asian nations (Mongolia, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and Australia) that worry about China more than any other major power. As China's growing strength creates uneasiness in the region, India's balancing role is welcome within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in order to influence China's behavior in cooperative directions. While the Southeast Asian leaders seek to deter China from utilizing its growing strength for coercive purposes and to maintain regional autonomy, Indian strategic analysts favor an Indian naval presence in the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean to counter Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. On maritime security, Southeast Asians seem more willing to cooperate with India than China, especially in the Strait of Malacca. A key element of India's Pacific outreach has been regular naval exercises, port calls, security dialogues, and more than a dozen defense cooperation agreements. India has welcomed Vietnam's offer of berthing rights in Na Trang Port in the South China Sea, and news reports suggest that India might offer BrahMos cruise missiles and other military hardware at "friendship prices" to Vietnam. The conclusion of free-trade agreements with Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, Japan, and the ASEAN, coupled with New Delhi's participation in multilateral forums such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Plus Eight defense ministers' meetings, have also reinforced strategic ties. India's determination to strengthen its strategic partnership with Japan and Vietnam, commitment to pursue joint oil exploration with Hanoi in the South China Sea waters in the face of Chinese opposition, and an emphasis on the freedom of navigation are signs of India maneuvering to be seen as a counterweight to Chinese power in East Asia. New Delhi is also scaling up defense ties with Tokyo, Seoul, and Canberra. The US-India partnership is also emerging as an important component of India's strategy to balance China's power. India seeks US economic and technological assistance. It helps this relationship that India's longtime security concerns—China and Pakistan—also now happen to be the United States' long-term and immediate strategic concerns as well. Both the Bush and Obama administrations have encouraged India's involvement in a wider Asian security system to balance a rising China and declining Japan. **Apparently, US weakness—real or perceived—invites Chinese assertiveness.** Since the United States does not wish to see Asia dominated by a single hegemonic power or a coalition of states, India's economic rise is seen as serving Washington's long-term interests by ensuring that there be countervailing powers in Asia—China, Japan, and India, with the United States continuing to act as an "engaged offshore power balancer." The "India factor" is increasingly entering the ongoing US policy debate over China. Asia-Pacific is now the Indo-Pacific, a term underlining the centrality of India in the new calculus of regional power. The 2010 US Quadrennial Defense Review talked of India's positive role as a "net security provider in the Indian Ocean and beyond." India's "Look East" policy, which envisions high-level engagement with "China-wary" nations (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Australia), dovetails with the US policy of



establishing closer ties with countries beyond Washington's traditional treaty partners to maintain US predominance. The US-Indian strategic engagement, coupled with India's expanding naval and nuclear capabilities and huge economic potential, have made India loom larger on China's radar screen. An editorial in a Shanghai daily last November lamented the fact that "*India will not allow itself to stay quietly between the US and China*. It wants to play triangle affairs with the duo, and will do anything it can to maximize its benefit out of it. Therefore, China will find it hard to buy India over." The Chinese fear that the Indian-American cooperation in defense, high-tech R&D, nuclear, space, and maritime spheres would prolong US hegemony and prevent the establishment of a post-American, Sino-centric hierarchical regional order in Asia. This tightening relationship, and the possibility that what is presently a tilt on India's part could turn into a full-fledged alignment, is a major reason for recent deterioration in Chinese-Indian relations. Although these relations remain **unstable and competitive**, both have sought to reduce tensions. Despite border disputes, denial of market access, and harsh words against the Dalai Lama, leaders in both countries understand the dangers of allowing problems to overwhelm the relationship. Burgeoning economic ties between the world's two fastest-growing economies have become the most salient aspect of their bilateral relationship. Trade flows have risen rapidly, from a paltry \$350 million in 1993 to \$70 billion in 2012, and could surpass \$100 billion by 2015. Several joint ventures in power generation, consumer goods, steel, chemicals, minerals, mining, transport, infrastructure, info-tech, and telecommunication are in the works. Intensifying trade, commerce, and tourism could eventually raise the stakes for China in its relationship with India. On the positive side, both share common interests in maintaining regional stability (for example, combating Islamist fundamentalists), exploiting economic opportunities, and maintaining access to energy sources, capital, and markets. Despite ever-increasing trade volumes, however, **there is as yet no strategic congruence between China and India**. As in the case of Sino-US and Sino-Japanese ties, **Sino-Indian competitive tendencies, rooted in geopolitics and nationalism, are unlikely to be easily offset even by growing economic and trade links**. In fact, the economic relationship is heavily skewed. The bulk of Indian exports to China consist of iron ore and other raw materials, while India imports mostly manufactured goods from China—a classic example of the dependency model. **Most Indians see China as predatory in trade**. New Delhi has lodged the largest number of anti-dumping cases against Beijing in the World Trade Organization. **India is keener on pursuing mutual economic dependencies with Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian nations through increased trade, investment, infrastructure development, and aid to bolster economic and political ties across Asia that will counter Chinese power**. Even as a range of economic and transnational issues draw them closer together, the combination of internal issues of stability (Tibet and Kashmir), **disputes over territory, competition over resources (oil, gas, and water), overseas markets and bases, external overlapping spheres of influence, rival alliance relationships, and ever-widening geopolitical horizons forestall the chances for a genuine Sino-Indian accommodation**. Given the broad range of negative attitudes and perceptions each country has for the other, it is indeed remarkable that China and India have been able to keep diplomatic relations from fraying. How long this situation can last is more and more uncertain as each country is increasingly active in what would once have been seen as the other's "backyard" and both engage in strategic maneuvers to checkmate each other. Just as China has become more assertive vis-à-vis the United States, Indian policy toward China is becoming tougher. India's evolving Asia strategy reflects the desire for an arc of partnerships with China's key neighbors—in Southeast Asia and further east along the Asia-Pacific rim—and the United States that would help neutralize the continuing Chinese military assistance and activity around its own territory and develop counter-leverages of its own vis-à-vis China to keep Beijing sober. At this point, the two heavyweights circle each other warily, very much aware that their feints and jabs could turn into a future slugging match.

Miller