

Chazan 13: Canel helps with economic reforms, does reform w/o communist backlash (frontline for communist party controls Chazan)

Chazan 13 - former news producer and editor (Jackie, examiner.com, "Cuba soon to have a president not named Castro", Feb 26, 2013, <http://www.examiner.com/article/cuba-soon-to-have-a-president-not-named-castro>) //CJC

This is a major change in Cuba, not just generational," said Arturo Lopez-Levy, an analyst at the University of Denver who used to work for the Cuban interior ministry on intelligence issues and U.S. relations. "The promotion of Diaz-Canel should be seen as part of an institutional change in the way the Cuban elite is promoted."¶ **Diaz-Canel's experience will help Castro advance reforms designed to make the economy more efficient and bring in more foreign currency,** without loosening the Communist Party's political control.¶ He was brought to Havana in 2009 to become minister of higher education and then a vice president of the Council of Ministers. He is seen within the Communist Party as incorruptible, a staunch communist, and a nationalist loyal to the Castros' revolutionary vision.¶ **He has a reputation as an effective manager and for negotiating the fine line between** Raul Castro's reform **agenda and** the sometimes more dogmatic **doctrine** of provincial party members resistant to change.

Frank 13: Canel Has Political Power Independently of Castro

Frank 13 [, "Analysis: Castro Successor Lacks Charisma but is Experienced Manager", Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-castro-diaz-canel-idUSBRE91P00W20130226>] //BS

Before joining the government in Havana, **Diaz-Canel held top** Communist Party **posts in two important provinces**, Villa Clara and Holguin, **centers of the booming tourism industry as well as new private-sector activity, both key elements of** an **economic reform** process being pushed by Raul Castro.

That experience makes Diaz-Canel well-equipped to help Castro **advance** those **reforms**, designed to make the economy more efficient and bring in more foreign currency, **without loosening the Communist Party's political control.**

"He has ties to the provincial tsars of the party. **Those leaders are very important,**" said Lopez-Levy. "They don't appear in the international media, but they are a very strong power in the island. They are kings in their own provinces."

In Cuba, there is no political campaigning, so proven loyalty and strong connections inside the party and the military are more valuable than a media-savvy style.

US Department of State, nd. [US Department of State, "Mission Statement of the U.S. Department of State", *US Department of State*, <https://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/23503.htm>] //AKC

Mission Statement

Create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community.

American diplomacy in the 21st century is based on fundamental beliefs: our freedom is best protected by ensuring that others are free; our prosperity depends on the prosperity of others; and our security relies on a global effort to secure the rights of all. The history of the American people is the chronicle of our efforts to live up to our ideals. In this moment in history, we recognize that **the United States has an immense responsibility to use its power constructively to advance security, democracy, and prosperity around the globe.** We will pursue these interests and remain faithful to our beliefs.

Brady 15 [Sebastian Brady of Brookings Institute, “Is Guantanamo Really a Major Recruiting Tool for Jihadists?”, *Lawfareblogs*, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/guantanamo-really-major-recruiting-tool-jihadists>] //BS

In terrorists’ propaganda, **Guantanamo is emphasized less relative to other things.** It is one thing to note references to Guantanamo in varied extremist media. It is another to figure out where the prison fits in terrorists’ broader narrative. To get at the latter, we used a basic word-scoring method to determine how often the word “Guantanamo” appears, relative to other jihadist trigger words. It turns out **Guantanamo appears in jihadist propaganda far less frequently than** these **other**, seemingly **more favored terms**. To the extent repetition implies relative importance, then, it seems **Guantanamo might not be all that central a propaganda item** after all.

In Dabiq’s nine issues, for example, **the word “Guantanamo” appears just four times.** “Israel,” “Jew,” and “Zion” together appear 133 times, and “Crusade,” 387. Even “Kashmir” and “India” together make ten appearances, while “Drone” shows up seven times. In the eighth issue of Dabiq, Guantanamo is only used in passing to mention that a mujahid was once held there. However, the word “hijrah,” or the call to immigrate to the Islamic State, is invoked 38 times. **Considering that one of the four appearances of “Guantanamo” is in a footnote and that the other references appear almost incidental, it becomes obvious that Guantanamo is not a primary driver of ISIS’s English-language print propaganda.**

Joscelyn 15 [Thomas Joscelyn, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and an expert in counterterrorism, quoted by Lauren Carroll of Politifact, “Is Guantanamo a ‘key component’ of terrorist propaganda?”, *PolitiFact*, <http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2015/dec/30/stephen-hayes/guantanamo-key-component-terrorist-propaganda/>] //BS

Hayes pointed us in the direction of **Thomas Joscelyn, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and an expert in counterterrorism.**

"Guantanamo plays an insignificant role in the jihadis' propaganda" Joscelyn told PunditFact. **"It is rarely mentioned."**

Joscelyn's conclusion is based on statistical analyses of keywords used in ISIS and al-Qaida propaganda, which he has followed closely for the past decade. Over the years, he has amassed a database of messages, videos, transcripts of audio statements and publications produced in multiple languages, predominantly Arabic.

For example, Joscelyn found just **four mentions of Guantanamo out of 12 issues** — or more than **700 pages** in English — **of ISIS' monthly magazine**, Dabiq. Not one article included Guantanamo as a main theme. **None of the four mentions were in a recruitment context; one was in a footnote.**

RT 16 ["Pentagon names 13 possible sites in US to replace Gitmo", *Russia Times*, <https://www.rt.com/usa/333376-pentagon-gitmo-replacement-sites/>] //BS

The Pentagon officially submitted to Congress a proposal to close the military detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. **The plan refers to 13 unspecific prisons in the US where the government could transfer** up to 60 **detainees** at a cost of \$475 million.

Micro Loans have absurdly high interests rates.

Kentaro Toyama 2011, The Atlantic: Lies, Hype, and Profit: The Truth About Microfinance <https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/01/lies-hype-and-profit-the-truth-about-microfinance/70405/>

To understand the backlash, let's go back to August 2010. **SKS Microfinance**, the country's most rapidly successful microcredit organization, **held a public IPO that** made millions for its founder, ex-McKinsey-consultant Vikram Akula. **Many hailed** the achievement as proof that microcredit could be financially self-sustaining. Local politicians saw it **as Robin Hood inverted - a plot to steal from the poor and give to the rich.** They persuaded borrowers to stop paying back their loans. Another controversy occurred in Mexico in 2007. Banco Compartamos, a non-profit organization turned for-profit bank, raised nearly half a billion dollars in its IPO.

Compartamos makes loans at an APR in the range of 75-100%. Yunus blasted Compartamos, saying, "Microcredit was created to fight the money lender, not to become the money lender." **Most microfinance institutions justify their high rates by arguing that they need to absorb costs of administration. Compartamos further adds that if it were to drop rates any lower, it would shut out its competitors, who charge even higher interest rates.** I recently spoke with Alvaro Rodriguez, chairman of Compartamos, who claims, "We need to encourage an ecosystem of microcredit. We can't serve everyone who needs loans on our own."

Internet Gives Money to Castros

Kalathil, 2001 [Shanthi Kalathil, author, "The Internet and State Control in Authoritarian Regimes: China, Cuba, and the Counterrevolution", *First Monday*, <http://firstmonday.org/article/view/876/785>] //AKC

In this paper we illustrate how two authoritarian regimes, China and Cuba, are maintaining control over the Internet's political impact through different combinations of reactive and proactive strategies. These cases illustrate that, contrary to assumptions, different types of **authoritarian regimes may be able to control and profit from the Internet**. Examining the experiences of these two countries may help to shed light on other authoritarian regimes' strategies for Internet development, as well as help to develop generalizable conclusions about the impact of the Internet on authoritarian rule.

Weidmann, 2015 [Nils Weidmann, "Empowering activists or autocrats? The Internet in authoritarian regimes", *Journal of Peace Research*, <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343314555782>] //AKC

The reported role of social media in recent popular uprisings against Arab autocrats has fueled the notion of 'liberation technology', namely that information and communication technology (ICT) facilitates organization of antigovernment movements in autocracies. Less optimistic observers, on the other hand, contend that **ICT is a tool of repression in the hands of autocrats, imposing further restrictions on political and social liberties**. We investigate whether the liberation- or the repression-technology perspective can better explain empirically observed patterns. To this end, we analyze two outcomes. First, we look at which autocracies are more likely to adopt and expand the Internet. In line with the repression technology expectation, we find that regimes aiming to prevent any independent public sphere are more likely to introduce the Internet. Second, we study the effects of the Internet on changes towards democracy. **This analysis reveals no effect of the Internet on political institutions. These findings provide moderate support for the 'repression technology' perspective, and suggest that the Internet has not – at least in its first two decades of existence – contributed to a global shift towards democracy.**

NU: Embargo already allows for trade of internet technologies

Klapper, 2015 [Bradley, "United States loosens embargo against Cuba", *PBS*, <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/united-states-loosens-embargo-cuba/>] //AKC

WASHINGTON — The Obama administration is putting a large dent in the U.S. embargo against Cuba as of Friday, significantly loosening restrictions on American trade and investment.

Only Congress can end the five-decade embargo. But **the measures give permission for Americans to use credit cards in Cuba and U.S. companies to export telephone, computer and Internet technologies**. Investments in some small business are permitted.

General tourist travel is still prohibited, but Americans authorized to visit Cuba need no longer apply for special licenses.

Gomez, 2015 [Alan Gomez, "Red flags in Cuba slow investment", *USA Today*, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/03/01/cuba-us-banking-telecommunications-challenges/24124895/>] //AKC

Cuban officials will likely want assurances that the telecom equipment they're offered hasn't been tampered with by the U.S. intelligence agencies, or they may **ask for "backdoor" access to monitor the Internet after it's installed. Telecom companies may find those requests difficult to meet, he said.**

Cuba has tightly controlled Internet access since it first surfaced in the mid-1990s.

Setting up an Internet system that allows Cuban officials to control its usage would go against Obama's goal of using connectivity as a way to empower Cuban citizens, Kavulich said. "The lack of statements by the Cuban government should be a very large yellow caution flag," he said.

Until Cuba signals a willingness to connect its people, all the telecom firepower and know-how in the USA won't make a difference, said Larry Press, professor of information systems at California State University-Dominguez Hills, who has studied Cuba's Internet.

Infrastructure k2 internet

Fisher, 2015 [Anthony, "A Truly Egalitarian Internet: In Cuba, the Web Is Terrible for Almost Everyone", Reason.com, <http://reason.com/archives/2015/04/09/a-truly-egalitarian-internet-in-cuba-the>] //AKC

The headline, however, obscures the more relevant fact that the government did not open a public hotspot to the public. Rather, authorities gave permission to the sculptor Kcho—sometimes referred to as "Fidel Castro's favorite artist"—to share the wi-fi access endowed upon him with the general public visiting his Havana cultural center building.

Allowing free, possibly unrestricted Internet access is something to be celebrated. But unless 11 million Cubans are planning on cramming themselves into Kcho's building to siphon off a single, low-powered Internet connection, this is a rather insignificant gesture by the regime.

Even if Raul Castro allowed for more information to freely flow through to the citizenry, Cuba has a bigger access problem: its non-existent Internet infrastructure. Once relying exclusively on satellites, in 2012 Cuba finally connected fiber optic cable with the outside world via Jamaica and Venezuela.

Infrastructure root cause of no internet

Fantacchioti, nd. [Mariela Machado, "Internet Fixed Infrastructure", *Columbia*, <https://ict4cuba.wikischolars.columbia.edu/Internet+Fixed+Infrastructure>] //AKC
Fixed Internet Services

Fixed Internet encompasses all services offered for in-home Internet, including dialup and broadband. Fixed services also include WiFi hot spots. **The fixed Internet infrastructure in Cuba is outdated and provides very limited access at an extremely high cost.** According to Cuba's 2011 official government statistics, a mere 25% of the population is connected to the Internet. However, Freedom House suggests that only 5% of the population is really connected.

Cuban Gov does not want internet

Elgan, 2016 [Mike, "Why even Google can't connect Cuba", *Computerworld*, <http://www.computerworld.com/article/3056627/internet-of-things/why-even-google-cant-connect-cuba.html>] //AKC

It's not as if Cuba would have ubiquitous, affordable and fast Internet access if it just had the money or expertise to make it happen. The problem is that Cuba is a totalitarian Communist dictatorship.

The outrageous price charged for Wi-Fi in Cuba can't possibly reflect the cost of providing the service. **The price is really a way to restrict greater freedom of information to those who benefit from the Cuban system.**

The strange Wi-Fi card system is also a tool of political control. In order to buy a card, you have to show your ID, and your information is entered into the system. Everything done online using a specific Wi-Fi card is associated with a specific person.

[...]

The Cuban government uses high prices and draconian laws to prevent the majority of Cubans from having any access to the Internet at all. **The government actively prevents access as a matter of policy. It's not a technical problem. It's a political one.**

In other words, Cuba doesn't need Google to provide hotspots. If the Cuban government allowed hotspots, Cubans would provide them.

Cuba commits to greater internet freedoms

Fisher, 2016 [Max, "9 questions about Cuba you were too embarrassed to ask", *Vox*, <http://www.vox.com/2014/12/18/7408819/cuba-deal-us-embargo>] //AKC

A little over a year after the US and Cuba revealed their historic deal to take major steps toward ending their 50-plus years of hostility, which they had negotiated in secret, President Obama is in Cuba — the first president to visit since 1928.

This is a huge moment for Cuba, for President Obama, and for the US-Cuba relationship. But you might reasonably be wondering why this is happening now. How did things get so bad between the US and Cuba in the first place, and why has that lasted for such a long time? What is actually changing now, and what does it mean for the two countries? What follows is a guide to your most basic questions about the US and Cuba.

The deal between the US and Cuba is three things.

First, it's an exchange of concessions: The US will roll back parts of its economic embargo on Cuba, **Cuba will allow greater internet freedom**, both countries released some prisoners, things like that. The terms of the deal are not, in themselves, revolutionary. The embargo is still in place, and so is the travel ban, meaning US tourism to Cuba is still restricted, though those restrictions have been falling away rapidly since the deal was first announced.

Public Wi-Fi spots and lower cost

Rodriguez, 2017 [Andrea, "Cuba sees boom in internet access as ties with U.S. grow", *The Denver Post*, <http://www.denverpost.com/2017/01/14/cuba-internet-access-ties-us/>] //AKC

While Cuba remains one of the world's least internet-connected societies, ordinary citizens' access to the internet has exploded over the last two years. **Since the summer of 2015, the Cuban government has opened 240 public Wi-Fi spots in parks and on street corners across the country. Cubans were previously restricted to decrepit state internet clubs and hotels that charged \$6-\$8 for an hour of slow internet.**

In a country with an average monthly salary of around \$25, **the price of an hour online has dropped to \$1.50**, still steep but now well within the range of many Cubans with private income or financial help from relatives abroad.

Cuban people built their own internet

Weissenstein, 2014 [Michael, "Young Cubans build own internet after being cut off by wifi ban and trade embargo", *Independent*, <http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/young-cubans-build-own-internet-after-being-cut-off-by-wifi-ban-and-trade-embargo-10006332.html>] //AKC

Cut off from the Internet, young Cubans have quietly linked thousands of computers into a hidden network that stretches miles across Havana, letting them chat with friends, play games and download hit movies in a mini-replica of the online world that most can't access.

Home Internet connections are banned for all but a handful of Cubans, and the government charges nearly a quarter of a month's salary for an hour online in government-run hotels and Internet centers. As a result, most people on the island live offline, complaining about their lack of access to information and contact with friends and family abroad.

A small minority have covertly engineered a partial solution by pooling funds to create a private network of more than 9,000 computers with small, inexpensive but powerful hidden Wi-Fi antennas and Ethernet cables strung over streets and rooftops spanning the entire city. Disconnected from the real Internet, the network is limited, local and built with equipment commercially available around the world, with no help from any outside government, organizers say.

Hundreds are online at any moment pretending to be orcs or US soldiers in multiplayer online games such as "World of Warcraft" or "Call of Duty." They trade jokes and photos in chat rooms and organize real-world events like house parties or trips to the beach.

No Freedom of Expression from Internet

Vivanco, 2014 [Jose, "Lifting the Embargo Means Cuba Can No Longer Play Victim", *Time*, <http://time.com/3642109/us-cuba-embargo/>] //AKC

The government controls all media outlets in Cuba and **tightly restricts access to outside information, severely limiting the right to freedom of expression.** Only a very small fraction of Cubans are able to read independent websites and blogs because of limited access to – and the high cost of – the Internet.

AboutMicrofinance 2015 ["CUBA : A case for microfinance?," Date Accessed: February 17, 2017 <http://www.aboutmicrofinance.com/cuba-case-microfinance/>] //WGC

"With a growing microenterprise economy, Prof. Triana Cordovi believes that the time may be right for the introduction of microfinance as a "non-state" undertaking, especially in light of **the government's failed attempts to deliver microloans** following the banking reforms of 2012. These reforms **permitted three state banks** (BANDES, BPA and Banco Metropolitano) **to engage in microcredit.** Prof. Diaz Fernandez, a recent visiting scholar at Columbia University, noted that the microcredits introduced by the government were intended to build microenterprises in Cuba. **Loans started** at 1,000 Cuban pesos (approximately US\$1,000) for 3-month working capital **at interest rates of 3.5%-4.25%,** and loans for investments for up to 10 years were set at 8% to 10%. **But few Cuban entrepreneurs took advantage of such loans despite attractive interest rates** (when compared to loan rates in Latin America which can be up to 195%). According to Prof. Triana Cardovi less than **100 loans for small business** were actually awarded in 2013. **Both Prof. Triana Cardovi and Prof. Diaz Fernandez attribute the low response for microloans** offered by the state banks **to a number of factors, including a limited credit culture in Cuba;** lack of awareness of the existence of microloans; **fear of submitting financial statements to banking officials;** **inadequate** guarantees or **collateral;** the absence of specialized microfinance institutions; and **credit guarantees that are linked to monetary distortion problems.** While a credit culture is still nascent in Cuba, Prof. Triana Cordovi noted that savings accounts increased by 55% between 2007 and 2012.

Writing in 2012 on "**Microfinance in Cuba**", Dr. Vidal Alejandro, noted that the credit policy introduced in 2011 was principally for private farmers and home repairs while 10% was set aside to address micro-businesses. The aim of the new credit policy, however, was to encourage the growth of

the private sector by offering microloans and microfinance. Besides providing new financial resources, the new policy was meant to increase efficiency in the allocation of resources, reinforce credit mechanisms domestically, and decrease informal financial activities. Yet, the uptake by microentrepreneurs has been minimal.”

Microloans just don't work. Not even used for development.

Beck and Ogden, September 2007. Beware of Bad Microcredit

<https://hbr.org/2007/09/beware-of-bad-microcredit>

Consider these facts: Many heads of microfinance programs now privately acknowledge what **John Hatch, the founder of FINCA International (one of the largest microfinance institutions), has said publicly: 90% of microloans are used to finance current consumption rather than to fuel enterprise.** **Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo**, of MIT's Poverty Action Lab, recently **evaluated dozens of rigorous studies on the economic lives of the poor, finding that regardless of country or continent, very little of each additional dollar of disposable income is spent on any form of investment, or even on food and shelter.** **In Bangladesh, where in 2001 approximately one out of four households had at least one microloan, microcredit seems to have had little impact on the country's relative development performance.** **In 1991, for example, Bangladesh ranked 136th on the UN Development Programme's Human Development Index (a measure of societal well-being); 15 years later it ranked 137th.** **And aside from the shortage of data showing benefits, there is evidence that some microcredit programs may actually be harmful, plunging the poor deeper into debt.**

Awawory 2014 [Sefa K. Awawory, “Impact of Microfinance Interventions: A Meta-analysis,” *Monash University Business and Economics*, March 2014

<http://business.monash.edu/economics/research/publications/2014/0314impactawaworyi.pdf>
/WGC

“We conduct a meta-analysis to review 25 empirical studies with a total of 595 estimates of the impact of microcredit and access to credit on poverty and microenterprises. We formulate four hypotheses to examine the empirical evidence and to provide a general conclusion on the impacts of microfinance, while addressing issues of within and between-study variations. The hypotheses examined are: 1) Microcredit has a positive impact on poverty (H1), 2) Microcredit has a positive impact on microenterprises (H2); 3) Access to microcredit has a positive impact on poverty (H3); 4) Access to microcredit has a positive impact on microenterprises (H4). We consider consumption/expenditure, assets, income and income growth as proxies for poverty, and labour supply, business profits and revenue for microenterprises. Overall, we find no robust evidence of any significant impact on microenterprises. **With regards to impact on poverty, there is no evidence any strong positive impact.** **Evidence mainly suggest an insignificant impact however, exceptions can be made for** impacts on assets, which is positive but weak, with practically no economic relevant, and also **impact on income growth, which is negative.”**

Not using microloans for investment makes them useless. Similar to US financial crisis.

Hugh Sinclair Wharton interview. 2012. The Dark Side of Microfinance: An Industry Where the Poor Play 'Cameo Roles'

<http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-dark-side-of-microfinance-an-industry-where-the-poor-play-cameo-roles/>

Knowledge@Wharton: You quote someone from the microfinance community in your book as saying that nine out of 10 microfinance loans are for consumption rather than to start or grow an enterprise or even to buy food or clothing. Doesn't that undermine the whole basis, the whole theoretical underpinning, of microfinance?

Sinclair: It does totally. And it was [said] by a noted expert, John Hatch from FINCA, one of the biggest networks in the world, in the Harvard Business Review. Yes, it does totally undermine it.

No one really knows [the numbers] because there is no good data on how much is used for consumption and investment. But very rarely do you have anyone saying [spending on consumption] is under 50%. John Hatch suggests it's 90%. I have no idea where it is within that range, but yes, large amounts of money are used for nothing other than to buy a new TV or to some new clothes. in addition to that, you have to take into account the amount of money that is used simply to repay off other loans.

Knowledge@Wharton: Right. Poor people borrow from one bank, at a high interest rate, and then borrow from another bank to pay off the first bank, and then they get into serious debt. You also talk about mission drift, the idea that microfinance has forgotten its mission to serve the poor and really exists to make a profit for the officials running the programs. Is this common?

Sinclair: Yes it is, and increasingly so. What happened at the end of the 1990s and this century was the era of so called commercialization, when large banks and profit-motivated specialist investment funds piled into the microfinance sector, aware of potentially vast profits at the bottom of the pyramid. We saw the first big \$100 million, \$200 million IPOs with massive payouts to individual people.

Mission drift is a very, very serious problem, and it has been so since the beginning of the microfinance movement. But it's really accelerated in the last few years. There are people who are very well aware of it, and institutions that actively manage mission drift. It's something that has to be actively managed. You have to constantly be aware of it and fight it every day to stop yourself drifting. But yes, it is pervasive.

Knowledge@Wharton: That gets to the whole question of the role of big banks and investment funds in all of this. It sounds like the banks, the investors, the ratings agencies, the MFIs themselves are almost in a conspiracy to enrich themselves and hide what's really going on, at least with some of the programs that you cite. Or is this too harsh?

Sinclair: I think that's too harsh, particularly with the ratings agencies. Actually I think the specialized ratings agencies for the microfinance sector are, if anything, something that other ratings agencies could learn from because they have demonstrated on a number of occasions that their [information] ... is extremely accurate, often more accurate than the information that the microfinance investment funds themselves [have].

But it is true, [especially] when you think of the financial crisis that has happened in Europe and the United States recently involving large, supposedly regulated Wall Street banks and these sorts of profit-motivated institutions, and you look at the mess that they have caused in the developed world. Is it really much of a surprise that if you take these same players and you place them into a totally unregulated market with much more vulnerable clients who lack the protection of a regulator acting in the best interest of its citizens, is it really much of a surprise that things have gone wrong?

Financial liberalization causes poverty

UN 2010 [United Nations, "Economic liberalization and poverty reduction", *UN*, <<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/rwss/docs/2010/chapter6.pdf>>] //CJC

The situation has been made worse by the closing of Government-run specialized financial institutions for agriculture and small and medium-sized enterprises as part of financial deregulation. Furthermore, previously Government-owned privatized banks have closed rural branches deemed not to be profitable, as there is no longer any requirement to ensure rural banking services. These measures have reduced credit availability for farmers and small producers, and have contributed to the rising costs of needed working capital, thereby exacerbating rural distress. In rural India, for example, there is strong evidence that the deep crisis in farming communities—resulting in farmer suicides, mass migration and even deaths from hunger—has been related to the decline of institutional credit, forcing farmers to turn to usurious private moneylenders. A study by the Inter-American Development Bank (2007) of 17 Latin American countries for the period 1977-2000 found that financial liberalization has had a significant effect on increasing inequality and poverty

Cuba Developing Home Internet, 25% down cost

Fingas, 2016 [Jon, associate editor, "Cuba tries offering home internet access", *Engadget*, <https://www.engadget.com/2016/12/20/cuba-home-internet-access/>] //AKC

Home internet access isn't an option, so most residents have to either crowd around public WiFi hotspots or sit down at an internet terminal. Things are looking up, though: Cuba's state-owned telecom ETECSA is launching a trial for home internet access. About 2,000 homes in

Havana will go online for at least two months, with promises that the test will expand if it goes well during the initial period.

The trial coincides with a 25 percent lower internet access fee.

Internet = Surveillance

Freedom of the Net, 2015 [Freedom of the Net, “Cuba Freedom on the Net 2015 PDF version”, *Freedom of the Net*, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2015/cuba>] //AKC

Surveillance, Privacy, and Anonymity

Surveillance of ICTs in Cuba is widespread, and dissident bloggers are subject to punishments ranging from fines and searches to confiscation of equipment and detentions. Anonymity and encryption technologies are strictly prohibited in Cuba,[91] and **web access points, such as those found in cybercafes and access centers, are closely monitored** and users are required to register with their identification information.[92]

Despite constitutional provisions that protect various forms of communication and portions of the penal code that establish penalties for the violation of the secrecy of communications, **users’ privacy is frequently violated. Tools for content surveillance are likewise pervasive.** **Under Resolution 179/2008, ISPs are required to register and retain the addresses of all traffic for at least one year.[93] The government routes most connections through proxy servers and is able to obtain all user names and passwords through special monitoring software called Avila Link, which is installed at most ETECSA and public access points.[94]** In addition, delivery of email messages is consistently delayed, and it is not unusual for a message to arrive without its attachments.

Web use at “cyber points” and “navigation halls” remains tightly controlled. A recent decree from the Ministry of Communications reaffirmed the government’s continued monitoring of internet traffic, stating that ETECSA will immediately end a user’s access if he or she commits “any violation of the norms of ethical behavior promoted by the Cuban state.”[95] Users must show their national ID cards and sign an agreement stating that they will not use the service for anything “that could be considered ... damaging or harmful to public security”—a vague term that could presumably extend to political dissent.[96]

If users attempt to send email with attachments, ETECSA’s own NAUTA interface system greets them with a pop-up window reminding them that “other people may see what you are sending” and asking if they wish to continue. Although the pop-up window is marked “Internet Explorer” and appears to be a real message generated by the search engine, several Cuban online users have said that they had never seen such a message when using internet cafes in Havana’s tourist hotels. Such claims suggest that ETECSA may have programmed computers at its new access points to prompt users as a reminder that the government is monitoring their online activities.

Intimidation and Violence

Although the majority of cases of physical violence against activists in Cuba appear to be in retaliation for public protests rather than online activity,[97] **prominent online users have faced violence from police forces, and users who have been jailed for extended periods**

of time report being mistreated and tortured. For example, **in June 2014, a member of the state security reportedly attacked Roberto de Jesus Guerra, the founder of Hablemos Press, as he walked to an embassy office to file a story online. Guerra and his wife have also begun receiving anonymous death threats.**[98]

Two individuals recently released from prison after being arrested for ICT-related activities—the prominent blogger Ángel Santiesteban Prats, who was jailed on trumped up charges, and the U.S. contractor Alan Gross, who was charged with distributing illegal communication technologies—reported that they had experienced severe mistreatment and abuse during their detention.

Market Liberalization DOESN'T lead to democratization

Senik 2009 [Claudia, “Democracy, Market Liberalization and Political Preferences,” *Paris School of Economic*. Accessed at: <https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00596078/document>.] //DNP

This paper questions the conventional wisdom concerning the sequencing of political and economic reforms in developing countries. We exploit the specific situation of frontier-zones as well as the considerable regional variations in culture and economic development in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. We estimate the impact of market development and democratization on subjective political preferences. Taking **advantage of a new survey conducted in 2006** by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank **in 28 post-transition countries**, we find a positive and significant effect of democracy on support for a market economy, but **no effect of market liberalization on support for democracy**. Our results are **robust to the use of various indices of market liberalization and democracy and alternative measures of political preferences**.

Liberalization leads to democratic reversals

Quinn 2000 [Dennis, “Democracy and International Financial Liberalization,” *Georgetown University*. Accessed at: <http://faculty.msb.edu/quinn/papers/demfin.PDF>.] //DNP

I further proposed that capital account liberalization is a risk factor to democracies. The results from the PCSTS models showed the **higher levels of capital account openness were indeed robustly** 31 **associated with decreasing democratization** many years later. The VAR models showed that for some countries, particularly those with **higher levels of income inequality, capital account liberalization led to subsequent de-democratization**.

China Pulls away now

Andres **Oppenheimer** [Columbia University]. December **2016**. “China filling the vacuum created in Latin America.” *Albuquerque Journal*. <https://www.abqjournal.com/917278/china-filling-the->

[vacuum-created-in-latin-america.html](#)

Judging from what I hear from Latin American presidents and diplomats, Xi sees an opportunity to increase China's presence in Latin America despite the recent decline in Chinese-Latin American bilateral trade and investments. **China's trade with the region**, which soared over the past 10 years and reached its peak in 2013, **declined by 11 percent over the past two years, largely because of China's economic slowdown**, according to U.N figures. In addition, China is stuck with billions in bad loans to Venezuela and Cuba.

No more medicine restrictions

Cashman 2015 [Katy Cashman at Matter, a non profit, "Matter Among First to Ship medical equipment to Cuba", *Matter*, <<https://www.matter.ngo/matter-among-first-to-ship-medical-equipment-to-cuba/>>] //CJC

As diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba are being opened for the first time in more than 50 years, Matter is poised to be among the first bring **updated medical equipment to Cuban hospitals**. Matter has a fifteen year history of **shipping medical**

equipment and supplies to developing hospitals and clinics around the world. This month, Matter is partnering with Pittsburgh-based Global Links, a nonprofit with 20+ years of experience in Cuba, to provide supplies and equipment to a medical school in Havana. Under the US Embargo, Cuba is not been able to purchase products, merchandise, machinery, or equipment which contains more than 10% North American components. This has made several medicines, materials and supplies inaccessible to the Cuban market. Although the country allocates 8.6% of its GDP to health care, Cuba is not able to keep up with the demands of medical equipment, supplies, and medicines needed to deliver optimal health care to more than 11 million of Cubans. Minnesota 3rd District Congressman Erik Paulsen supports the work of Matter to expand access to health care in Cuba. "The work that groups like Matter and Global Links will be doing show why improving relations with Cuba is in the best interest of both the United States and the Cuban people," said Paulsen. "Empowering Cuban citizens through access to health care, education, and trade means placing the future of the country firmly in their hands. This collaboration of nonprofits will be an important first step in growing the relationship between Minnesota and

Cuba." **Many of the supplies being sent to Cuba include training equipment** for medical students.

The first shipment from the United States to Cuba is scheduled for September and will contain training and medical items sourced by Matter, many of which will be sent to the Escuela Latinoamericana de Medicina in Havana.

CimaVax is in clinical trial

Mulcahy 2016 [Nick Mulcahy at Medscape, FDA Approves US Trial of Cuban Lung Cancer Vaccine", *Medscape*, <<http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/871110>>] //CJC

The US Food and Drug Administration has approved a US clinical trial of a lung cancer vaccine developed in Cuba. New York Governor Andrew Cuomo announced the approval on October 26 at a press conference at the Roswell Park Cancer Institute in Buffalo, where the trial will be conducted. **The vaccine, CimaVax**, was developed for non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) and has been available in Cuba since 2011. The newly approved study will be phase 1/2 trial of CIMAvox in combination with the anti-PD1 checkpoint inhibitor nivolumab (Opdivo, Bristol-Myers Squibb) in patients previously treated for advanced NSCLC. Roswell Park anticipates that the trial will take 3 years to complete and will enroll 60 to 90 patients.

Only a lack of dissenters kept Cuba from collapsing when Soviet Bloc tanked their economy. S-Quo levels of dissent could prompt Civ War.

Gorrell, 5 - Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted for the USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT (Tim Gorrell, "CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?" <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074> //WGC

“Since the mid-1970s each administration has been surprised by a major unanticipated strategic crisis: Carter in Iran; Reagan in Central America; Bush in the Persian Gulf; Clinton in the Balkans and Africa; and the current Bush administration with the global war on terrorism (GWOT). **Cuba, specifically post-Castro Cuba, could very well trigger the next unanticipated crisis** even though the writing is on the wall. Fidel Castro is 78 years old, the current life expectancy of a Cuban male. When Castro dies, it is questionable whether his designated successor can hold power, so **anarchy is a real possibility. The Cuban infrastructure and economy may implode** with or without Castro”

“PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT POLICY Cuba presents the U.S. with a unique challenge. U.S. policy makers have allowed their animosity toward Castro (or Castro’s animosity toward the U.S.) to cloud policy decisions. During the Cold War, U.S. isolation of Cuba was appropriate because Cuba was indeed a threat to U.S. interests. For the U.S., isolating Cuba through sanctions and employing covert activities to undermine the Castro regime were among the ways that the U.S. was pursuing its Cold War ends. **When the Soviet Union fell, Cuba lost heavily. Gone were significant foreign aid and an essential trading partner**; the collapse of communism left Cuba literally alone among the few remaining isolated Communist regimes in the world. **However, Cuba was a different communist regime. Unlike the regimes in Eastern Europe, Castro had no real political opposition**, at least none at the level of the Solidarity movement in Poland and the Charter 77 movement in Czechoslovakia.¹⁵ **Cuba’s dissident community was not well established within the country or among the exiles and no obvious leader has emerged.**

“Regardless of the succession, **under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen**. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of **the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war.** Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. **When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach.**

The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.²⁶ Many were criminals; this time the number could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis. Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.²⁷ While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S.

could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably. **In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases.** If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. **Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American**

sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems."

Reforms are irreversible

George 13 – writer for Se Mancha (Samuel, Se Mancha, "Cuba in Transition, United States Stuck in Yesterday", March 3, 2013, <http://semancha.com/2013/03/03/cuba-in-transition-united-states-stuck-in-yesterday/>)/CJC

Fidel Castro, who removed himself from power in 2008 due to ill health, made a rare appearance at the National Assembly meeting on Sunday where Diaz-Canel's appointment was made, appearing to add his seal of approval to the choice.¶ Yet compelling indicators suggest that **Diaz-Canel is more than a party hack, and that he will continue Raúl's progress towards economic liberalization.** Diaz-Canel has distinguished himself for his pragmatism. He is believed to have played a key role in facilitating foreign investment in Cuban hotels. As Minister of Higher Education, he gained the respect of his peers by listening and probing, rather than dictating. The ascension of Diaz-Canel represents a break from the geriatric revolutionary leaders – a break that was likely a precondition for any serious modernization.¶ Moreover, Diaz-Canel would struggle to hold a hard line even if he wanted to.¶ **Raúl's reforms have been slow and halting, but they have also been irreversible.** The Economist reports that "much of Cuban farming" has been privatized and that, by 2015, one-third of the workforce will be in the private sector. With cars, computers and phones already traded, the momentum of commercialization – the allure of possession – will be difficult to stymie. The Castros' success in containing reform momentum owes much to personal allegiance and veneration. Diaz-Canel will command no such respect.

Alt causes to law relations — Plan Colombia and Honduras

Tang 2016 [Ming Tang at the Center for Economic and Policy Research, "U.S.-Latin American relations are at an all-time low", *The Hill*, <<http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/281277-us-latin-american-relations-are-at-an-all-time-low>>] //CJC

When former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton sat down with the New York Daily News editorial board in April, she was asked what must have been a surprising and unwelcome question. In the years since **the 2009 coup in Honduras, there has been remarkably little scrutiny in the major media of how Clinton's State Department handled it,** and she has had to answer few questions about it. But Juan González asked why she resisted cutting off aid to the coup regime and instead brokered a deal for new elections. Clinton controversially doubled down on defending the coup, outrageously suggesting that the oligarchs and generals who had forced President Manuel Zelaya out had a legal justification. Worse, she suggested that **Honduras emulate Plan Colombia: the U.S.-funded war on drugs and guerrillas that sparked the**

biggest internal refugee crisis in the world outside of Syria, involved the deliberate killing of thousands of innocent civilians by Colombian armed forces, and fostered death squads now poised to stick around even as the country nears an end to its civil war.

Honduras also pops up in Clinton's memoir, "Hard Choices." The paperback edition, published shortly after she launched her presidential campaign, is roughly 100 pages shorter than the original hardcover edition, but some of the abridgments seem rather convenient. In her original account of the coup and its aftermath, which was entirely deleted from the paperback, Clinton openly admits to having intervened directly to prevent Zelaya from returning to office: In the subsequent days [after the coup] I spoke with my counterparts around the hemisphere, including Secretary Espinosa in Mexico. We strategized on a plan to restore order in Honduras and ensure that free and fair elections could be held quickly and legitimately, which would render the question of Zelaya moot and give the Honduran people a chance to choose their own future. Clinton's declassified emails shed light on her role in prolonging negotiations so that elections would occur before Zelaya returned to office. In an email a week after the coup, Assistant Secretary for

Western Hemisphere Affairs Tom Shannon raises the possibility of former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias serving as mediator. **This enabled the U.S. to**

avoid working through the Organization of American States (OAS), where most governments insisted on restoring

Zelaya to the presidency and isolating the coup regime. A July 31 email from Craig Kelly, Shannon's deputy, makes it clear that this was indeed the U.S.' motive: "The OAS meeting today turned into a non-event — just as we hoped. We want Arias out front. We will keep at it." When Zelaya attempted to return to Honduras from exile, via the Nicaragua border on July 24, Clinton condemned it as "reckless" and counterproductive "to the broader effort to restore democratic and constitutional order." And whereas

the U.S. was quick to suspend aid following Madagascar's March 17, 2009 coup, it would take months before the State Department would act in a similar fashion with Honduras.

Notably, the U.S. suspended Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) money three days after Madagascar's coup, but declined to hold up the more than \$190 million of MCC funds designated for Honduras. As secretary of state, Clinton chaired the MCC board of directors at the time. **The split between the U.S. and its neighbors widened when, on September 28,**

2009, U.S. State Department officials blocked the OAS from adopting a resolution on Honduras that would have refused to recognize Honduran elections without the prior restoration of the country's elected president. While Latin America — seeing the inherent danger from the precedent of a successful military coup — demanded Zelaya's "immediate and unconditional" restoration, the U.S. pushed instead for a "national unity government." In Clinton's telling, this was something she triumphantly pressured regime head Roberto Micheletti into accepting. The question is why this was the goal, instead of the restoration of democracy. Seen from another angle, Clinton's State Department collaborated with an illegal government that had seized power through force. When Shannon made the administration's true intentions public on November 3, by telling CNN en Español that Zelaya's return to the presidency prior to the elections was not necessary, the coup regime had all the leverage and Zelaya and his elected government suddenly had none. The November 2009 elections, held under a coup government, were widely seen as illegitimate, **and the**

OAS, the European Union, and the Carter Center refused to send observers. Following the elections, Honduras continued to be excluded from the OAS for almost two years. **Most significantly, though, the actions of Clinton and her State Department precipitated a new low point in U.S.-Latin American relations. In a clear sign of rejection of U.S. regional influence, all the countries in the Western Hemisphere formed a new group,** the

Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) — all of them, that is, except for the U.S. and Canada, which were excluded. **If Clinton's State Department was concerned by the extent of this foreign diplomacy failure in what Washington used to refer to as its**

"backyard," their emails and diplomatic cables do not hint at it. Rather, senior officials appeared to revel at having gotten one over on Brazil and other governments that wanted to see Honduras' democratic government restored. Just after the November 2009 election results were announced, Shannon emailed Clinton triumphantly, noting, "The turnout [...] and the clear rejection of [Zelaya's] Liberal Party shows our approach was the right one, and puts Brazil and others who would not recognize the election in an impossible position."

When Bloc collapsed only had 6-103 dissenters. Now have unprecedented coordination and pose a threat. Only a lack of dissenters kept Cuba from collapsing when Soviet Bloc tanked their economy. S-Quo levels of dissent could prompt Civ War.

Pumar 1999 [Enrique S. Pumar is the Director of the Global Migration and Refugee Studies Program at The Catholic University of America, "THE INTERNAL OPPOSITION AND CIVIL SOCIETY: AN ASSESSMENT," *Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy*, <http://www.ascecuba.org/c/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/v09-pumar.pdf>>]

"THE RISE OF INTERNAL OPPOSITION: FIRST VS. SECOND OPPONENTS **In Communist societies, the political arena is normally disguised until opponents of the regime find an opening** to articulate their demands in the public space. **In Cuba, this opportunity evolved gradually during the late 1980s and finally materialized in the early 1990s** when the opposition was emboldened by the fiscal crisis of the state and an unfolding legitimization crisis. Data collected by Juan Carlos Espinosa supports this assertion. **In 1987, 6 dissident and opposition groups were active in the public space.** This number grew to 103 in 1992, 330 in 1996, and 380 by 1998.8"

"But perhaps what differentiates the more recent dissident movement from the early opposition is that these opponents continue to multiply in numbers and have also strengthened their organizational and articulation capacities. During the first decade after Ricardo Bofill and a handful of associates organized the Comité Cubano Pro Derechos Humanos (CCPDH) in 1976, many of the dissident groups worked semi-independently from each other and their plight was the respects for human rights and the release of political prisoners. Starting around 1990, the character of the opposition changes. Not only does it proliferate substantially as previous stated, but it also becomes bolder in articulating numerous social, environmental, religious, and economic issues. For many observers this period marks the explosion of pluralism because of the wide scope and depth of opposition politics. Finally, **since the mid 1990s to the present, the internal opposition has widened its scope** to include independent labor unions, journalists, religious groups, and professional associations. **More importantly, these organizations are collaborating and supporting each other to a degree never witnessed before.** Umbrella associations such as the Asociación Nacional de Economistas Independientes de Cuba, Centro de Formación Cívica y Religiosa, Concilio Cubano, and the Grupo Cubano de Trabajo de la Disidencia Interna are a few examples of the proliferation of groups witnessed during the late 1990s. During this period autonomous publications such as the magazines Palabra Nueva and Vitral and path breaking manifestos such as La Patria es de Todos were also published"

"CONCLUSION This paper has attempted to assess the state of the internal opposition to measure the strength of civil society in Cuba. Political sociologists believe that the strength of civil associations is the backbone of pluralism. The more leverage the opposition brings to the negotiating table during the transition process, the more concessions it can bargain away from the regime. Events in the Southern Cone illustrate this axiom well. As Alfred Stepan, among others, suggests, the opposition's capacity to survive under an authoritarian regime is a measure of relative strength. **In Cuba, internal dissident groups have not only endured but multiplied as well. Whether the regime admits it or not, dissident groups are formidable opponents.** I am not saying the opposition should be complaisant. Dissents still have much to do to solidify their presence and prepare for the transition"

US Latin America Democracy promotion is imperialism and causes interventions

Gilbert 2008 [Steven Gilbert at Eastern Michigan University, "The U.S. Policy of Democracy Promotion in Latin America", *Eastern Michigan University*, <<http://commons.emich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1147&context=honors>>] //CJC

The U.S. policy of democracy promotion in Latin America has consisted of promoting governments that are favorable to U.S. political and economic interests rather than democracy itself. While the U.S. claims to have a tradition of "promoting democracy" in Latin America, justification for U.S. intervention has been questionable and inconsistent. U.S. support for Latin American regimes has coincided with favorable economic policies rather than with the strength of democracy within a country. Historically, the protection of resources for extraction has been one of the main goals of U.S. policy in Latin America. U.S. A historical overview of U.S. relations in Latin America shows that the promotion of democracy is secondary to economic and social factors. **Relations between the U.S. and Latin America show that the U.S. has used democracy promotion as cover for U.S. imperialism in Latin America.** During the Cold War, the U.S. supported anticommunist regimes that were often undemocratic because they were capable of protecting U.S. interests. Since the mid-1980s, we have seen a wave of democratization in Latin America and an embrace of market democracy. U.S. relations in Latin America since the end of the Cold War reveal that the U.S. is merely changing its means of establishing U.S. friendly governments by promoting low-intensity democracy. This low-intensity democracy is characteristic polyarchy, in which elites who adhere to the neoliberal model control the government. **When democratic governments within Latin America have veered too far from this outline for democracy and have threatened U.S. interests, the U.S. has intervened to undermine and attempt to overthrow these governments.**

Plan won't capture the Cuban market – Cuba will stay with its existing partners

Margulies, 8 – JD, New York University (Michael Margulies, "STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATES-CUBA RELATIONS" 8 *Asper Rev. Int'l Bus. & Trade L.* 147, lexis) https://works.bepress.com/michael_margulies/1/

While Cuba has been outspoken about the mutual benefits of enhanced trade relations with the United States, n163 it might not be willing to sacrifice the relationships developed with trade partners that have stepped up since the dissolution of the Soviet presence in Cuba. In particular, trade relations with Venezuela, Bolivia and China, because of their similar political ideals, n164 will likely flourish in years to come, making it increasingly difficult for the United States to occupy any share of the market those countries currently possess. Additionally, countries that are willing to enter into trade agreements with Cuba on the basis of credit, as well as those prepared to defer pre-existing loan payments, will [*176] have a greater opportunity to play an increased role in Cuban foreign trade. n165 Though Cuba does not have any outstanding loans with the United States, the "payment of cash in advance" requirement of TSRA n166 and the subsequent OFAC clarifications of this terminology n167

render the United States a less attractive trade partner than countries offering transactions on the basis of credit. Even if the U.S. Congress can pass legislation easing these restrictions, Cuba's poor credit rating n168 might discourage U.S. corporations and banking institutions from entering into such agreements.

Cuba says no to greater US trade – it's counter-revolutionary

Margulies, 8 – JD, New York University (Michael, "STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATES-CUBA RELATIONS" 8 Asper Rev. Int'l Bus. & Trade L. 147, lexis)

Should all the requisite factors fall into place on the U.S. side in order to ease or lift the existing trade restrictions against the export of agricultural commodities - or even allow other forms of trade - there is no guarantee that Cuba will seize the opportunity to enter into such an enhanced relationship with the United States. As evidenced by its initial rejection of the U.S. offer to export agricultural goods in 2001, immediately following the adoption of TSRA, n155 Cuba may be less willing [*174] to accept such an offer than an economic analysis would indicate. For Cuba, U.S. commodities - whether agricultural or of another nature - may be significantly cheaper than those offered by other trade partners, as a result of the proximity between the two countries and the related transportation costs. n156 The Cuban government, however, whether under the leadership of Fidel or Raul, has very strong ideals and convictions when it comes to relations with the United States. These may impede the expansion of any such trade.

It is well known that one of the central tenets of the Cuban Revolution and the Castro regime is a strong policy against "neo-liberal globalization," the United States and capitalist imperialism. n157 These convictions may lead Cuba to balk at the opportunity to take advantage of some forms of trade with the United States. Such selectivity has been present even under TSRA-authorized trade with Alimport. Cuba has claimed that the reduction in purchases by Alimport in 2005 came not as a result of tightened restrictions by the Bush administration and subsequent difficulties working out contracts with U.S. agricultural entities, but rather as a result of "efforts by the government of the Republic of Cuba to increase the motivation of United States-based companies, organization; state and local governmental representatives; and Members of the United States Congress to be more visible in their lobbying efforts for changes in United States policy, law and regulations." n158

Cuba economy will grow 2% despite Venezuela oil cutoff

CBR 1/10/2017 [Cuba Business Report, "Cuba Economic Performance 2016 to 2017", *Cuba Business Report*, <<http://www.cubabusinessreport.com/cuban-economic-performance-2016-to-2017/>>] //CJC

Official estimates of Cuban economic performance showed a decline of 0.9% in 2016. This drop occurs after average annual growth rates of nearly 3 per cent were seen from 2011 to 2015. The 0.9% GDP of last year was announced at the year-end session of the National Assembly by Economy and Planning Minister Ricardo Cabrisas. The decline is largely a response to the economic woes of Venezuela and shrinking commodity prices.

The problems stemming from the economic disaster in Venezuela include a reduction in the shipments of subsidized crude oil from 115,000 barrels per day (BPD) in 2008 to a mere 40,000 BPD over the last few months.

The Minister also said there was a decline in the number of contracts for medical services delivered by Cuban staff to Venezuela and that some payments have not been made. **Cuba's medical internationalism** program is a large contributor to the Cuban economy.

The Cuban economy is predicted to recover somewhat in 2017 and grow by just two percent.

Anocracy causes civil war

Regan 2009 [Patrick Regan, professor of political science, "Changing Lanes or Stuck in the Middle: Why are anocracies more prone to civil wars?", *Binghamton University*, <
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwi9heOchP3RAhWI0FQKHdGpCcssQFggdMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww3.nd.edu%2F~pregan3%2FPRQFinalDraft.2.23.09.doc&usg=AFQjCNF6BEYBeCDiD8AfxCy3de4Gu6zrA&sig2=Ag4FE_aqE2EluJb4V59COA&bvm=bv.146094739,d.cGw>] //CJC

Past research on regime type and civil war points to **anocratic regimes as having a high probability of civil war onset**. The specific characteristics of anocratic regimes that lead to their predisposition for civil war have been left unexplained. In this paper we examine how the transitional characteristics of anocracy explain the enhanced risk of civil war onset. Our results point towards three important conclusions. First, **anocratic regimes are most likely to experience civil war in the first few years of their duration**. Second, **transitions into anocracy from democracy leave states at a higher risk of civil war**. Third, **the probability of civil war onset increases with the magnitude of a transition into anocracy**.

Research into the causes of civil war has identified anocratic governance and/or the existence of a political transition as particularly high-risk regime characteristics. Many – possibly the modal category of studies – demonstrate a curvilinear relationship between regime characteristics and the likelihood of civil war onset, with **highly autocratic and highly democratic states being considerably less vulnerable than anocracies** (eg. Reynal-Querol, 2002; Sambanis, 2004; Urdal, 2005; Regan and Norton, 2005). In short, **there seems to be something about the vulnerability of states with political regimes in the middle of the autocratic-democratic continuum that makes them more prone to the outbreak of civil war**.

[...]

Anocracy, moreover, is not a regime-type as we might generally think of as a democratic one. The term is used to denote a mix of institutional characteristics that often constrain or facilitate democratic processes. As such most scholars identify a range of institutional constraints that describe adequately a democratic or autocratic regime, respectively, and relegate combinations that fall into neither ideal type to a catch-all anocratic category. This range of institutional characteristics is necessarily broader than either of its polar corollaries. We adopt the anocratic convention in part because it has been convention, but also because it is in these ranges of political institutional arrangements that empirical results suggest a link to civil war. Gates et al (2006) support this categorization of regimes with empirical evidence suggesting that regimes break along lines of institutional consistency. Although not conceptually identical, their category of institutionally inconsistent regimes is conceptually convergent with what we and others label anocracies.
[...]

The institutional characteristics of transitioning into an anocratic regime affect two aspects of the instability process. First, weak institutions limit the ability of the state to provide social welfare payments; second, those same weak institutions present at least a modicum of opportunity for the citizenry to make demands on the state and rebel. The interaction of these two processes can be unstable. Within the broad category of anocracy we are likely to observe these two characteristics working along a continuum.

No Cuba democracy

Azel 2013 [Jose Azel, senior scholar at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, "The Illusion of Cuban Reform: Castro Strikes Out", *World Affairs*, <<http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/illusion-cuban-reform-castro-strikes-out>>] //CJC

When contemplating change in Cuba, one must be mindful that **for the past half-century Cuba's history and political culture has been shaped and dominated by the Castro brothers and their ideas. Raúl Castro's inner circle is not made up of closet democrats waiting for an opportune moment to put into practice their long-suppressed Jeffersonian ideals. Their governing philosophy is inseparable from the totalitarian ideology that subordinates citizens to the state, and the state to an unelected Communist elite. The incentive for democratic reform is further hindered because this elite profits personally from a symbiotic relationship in which authoritarianism engenders a corrupt oligarchy and that oligarchy profits from the continuation of corrupt authoritarianism.**

Lifting embargo kills Latin rels — Obama proves

Azel 2015 [Jose Azel senior scholar at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, "The New Cuba Policy: Fallacies and Implications", *World Affairs*, <<http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/new-cuba-policy-fallacies-and-implications>>] //CJC

Moreover, **the president's new measures will enrich primarily the Cuban military, which controls most economic activity**, and thus will bolster the regime. Any resulting improvement in US-Cuba relations will not diminish Castro's close alliance with Iran, Russia, or Venezuela. It will not prevent Cuban personnel from advising and training Venezuela's security apparatus or from handling the issuance of Venezuelan passports and other identity documents, which is also an opportunity to provide false documents to Iranian and Cuban agents to travel throughout the world posing as Venezuelan citizens. **The president's new policy has legitimized a totalitarian-military regime in the eyes of the world, and particularly in the eyes of Latin**

America. By opening the door to an oppressive regime that violates human rights with abandon, the president has reversed America's longstanding support for democratic governance in the region. Would-be dictators and their sycophants now know that suppressing civil liberties is not particularly troubling to the United States—and certainly not detrimental to good diplomatic and commercial relations. Contrary to the argument that the new policy will help improve relations with Latin America, Obama's implicit concessions to, and approval of, a military dictatorship further weaken American influence in the region and elsewhere, encouraging others to take positions inimical to US interests, as Cuba has done for decades.

Latin American countries don't care about the embargo and are like Hillary — they publicly oppose it but privately are scared of a lift

Suchlicki 2000 (JAIME SUCHLICKI is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of History and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. He was the founding Executive Director of the North-South Center. For the past decade he was also the editor of the prestigious Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. He is currently the Latin American Editor for Transaction Publishers and the author of *Cuba: From Columbus to Castro* (1997), now in its fourth edition, and editor with Irving L. Horowitz of *Cuban Communism* (1999). He is also the author of *Mexico: From Montezuma to NAFTA* (1998). He is a highly regarded consultant to both the private and public sector on Cuba and Latin American affairs. The U.S. Embargo of Cuba Jaime Suchlicki University of Miami June 2000 <http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf>, nkj) Note: The first line of the card is saying an aff argument and then refuting it. //CJC

Cuba is not an important issue in U.S.-Latin American relations. The U.S.-Latin American agenda includes as priority items trade, investment, transfer of technology, migration, drugs, environment, and intellectual property rights. Cuba is not a priority item on this agenda. While publicly many Latin American countries oppose the embargo, privately they are extremely concerned that Cuba will divert investments from their countries to the island, and particularly that tourism will flock to Cuba, to the detriment of the Caribbean economies.

No tourism democracy

Azel 2015 [Jose Azel senior scholar at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, "The New Cuba Policy: Fallacies and Implications", *World Affairs*, <<http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/new-cuba-policy-fallacies-and-implications>>] //CJC

Finally, the proposition of US tourism seems intuitively reasonable: American tourists will act as ambassadors for democracy by sharing their values and expectations with the Cubans they meet and interact with. **Yet even when this is the case, it does not follow with any certainty that such ambassadorship can bring about the empowerment of the citizenry in a totalitarian regime.** Cuba has not exactly been a hermit kingdom. **For decades, 2 million tourists a year from Canada, Europe, and Latin America have traveled and enjoyed conversations and contact with the natives without changing the Cuban regime in any way. The more empirically valid argument is that expenditures by tourists will add to the longevity of the regime, since the monies flow into enterprises controlled by the Cuban military. Tourist dollars come with no strings attached: they are unconditional, allowing the regime to fill its cash registers without making the slightest economic or political reforms in return.** Advocates of tourism as a spur to democratic governance counter that Cuba

is different from Vietnam or China, where mass tourism has not materially liberalized government control, and suggest that it is not the total number of visitors that counts, but the advent of mass American tourism itself. **Yet they never say why American tourists will produce more pressure for democracy than, say, Canadians.** And if there is a long cultural and historical exchange between Cuba and the US, isn't the one with Spanish-speaking tourists from Latin America and Spain more profound? It is not as if there will be a harmonic convergence between the increasing numbers of American tourists who will visit the island and Cuban citizens. **Most tourist resorts are in isolated areas, controlled by the security apparatus, and off-limits to the average Cuban.** Most Americans will relate through a language barrier, and it is not clear that they consider their vacation time as an opportunity to subvert the Cuban regime rather than relax with mojitos on the pristine beaches. A majority of the visitors will be cruise ship tourists, disembarking for a few hours to purchase rum and cigars before heading back to the ship and on to the next port of call.

No Diaz Canel Takeover

Azel 2013 [Jose Azel, senior scholar at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, "The Illusion of Cuban Reform: Castro Strikes Out", *World Affairs*, <<http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/illusion-cuban-reform-castro-strikes-out>>] //CJC

Cuba's first vice president of the Council of State, the eighty-two-year-old José Ramón Machado Ventura, was expected to be Raúl Castro's pro forma successor. In February 2013, however, he was replaced in that post by **Miguel Díaz-Canel**, a factotum-like party apparatchik in his early fifties. The international media jumped on the appointment and concluded that Cuba's Gorbachev had arrived on the scene. But **while Díaz-Canel is in line to succeed Raúl in the Council of State, this is not equivalent to being number two in the regime. General Raúl Castro leads Cuba not because he is president of the Council of State, but because he is first secretary of the Communist Party, head of the armed forces, and Fidel's brother. Article 5 of the Cuban Constitution makes it clear that the Communist Party is "the superior leading force of the society and the State." It is the eighty-two-year-old Machado who remains second secretary of the fifteen-member Politburo of the Communist Party—and thus, at least for now, Raúl Castro's heir apparent.** Under Cuba's governing succession protocol, the military-dominated Politburo is the cabal that will recommend, when the time comes, the country's next leader. The succession plot thickens when we consider that the president of the Council of State is also the commander in chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. **When Raúl Castro leaves office, it is difficult to envision old comandantes like Ramiro Valdés and three-star generals of the Politburo offering their allegiance and subordinating themselves to a youthful civilian bureaucrat like Díaz-Canel.** Civilian control of Cuba's armed forces is not part of Revolutionary Cuba's genetic makeup.

Multi-Lateralism is Impossible and fails due to different national interests

Richard N. **Haas** November/December **2014**, [President of the Council on Foreign Relations, The Unraveling: How to respond to a Disordered World, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2014-10-20/unraveling>] MJS

As for global governance, international accords are often hard to come by for many reasons. The sheer number of states makes consensus difficult or impossible. So, too, do divergent national interests. As a result, attempts to construct new global arrangements to foster trade and frustrate climate change have foundered. Sometimes countries just disagree on what is to be done and what they are prepared to sacrifice to achieve a goal, or they are reluctant to support an initiative for fear of setting a precedent that could be used against them later. There is thus decidedly less of an “international community” than the frequent use of the phrase would suggest.

US Econ growing

Gillespie Oct 2016 [Patrick Gillespie at CNN Money, “U.S. economy posts best growth in 2 years”, *CNN Money*, <http://money.cnn.com/2016/10/28/news/economy/us-economic-growth-gdp-third-quarter/>] //CJC

America finally got some good economic growth. **The U.S. economy expanded at a 2.9% annual rate from July through September compared with the same time a year ago -- the fastest economic growth in two years.** It was the last reading on economic growth before the election, and it came as welcome news: Growth was sluggish in the first half of the year, averaging just above 1%. "This shows that the U.S. is roughly on track. It's a natural bounce back following a pretty underwhelming year so far," says Luke Bartholomew, fixed income investment manager at Aberdeen Asset Management. While the economy gained momentum in the third quarter, growth this year comes in at 1.7% -- still slow compared with historical standards.

Cubans have tons of guns — Fidel didn't take them

Sherman 2013 [Vince Sherman, writer at Return to the Source, “Castro Didn't “Take The Guns”, Alex Jones: Guns & Socialism”, *Return to the Source*, <https://return2source.wordpress.com/2013/01/11/castro-didnt-take-the-guns-alex-jones-guns-socialism/>] //CJC

Let's start with Cuba. **If Fidel Castro's goal was to confiscate all private firearms in Cuba, one has to conclude from the data that he's done a poor job.** According to GunPolicy.org, **there are an estimated 545,000 privately owned guns held by civilians in Cuba, meaning that approximately 4.8 people per 100 own guns.** It's not as high as the staggering 88.8 guns per person in the US – a grossly inflated statistic that doesn't account for at least 48% of all gun owners having more than four guns – but **it patently disproves the assertion by Alex Jones, the Drudge Report, and the right-wing fanatics that "Fidel Castro took the guns."** Of course, there are regulations for firearm ownership in Cuba, but even this reflects the very different meaning of 'the right to bear arms' in a socialist country. Chapter 1, Article 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cuba enshrines this right: "When no other recourse is possible, all citizens have the right to struggle through all means, including armed struggle, against anyone who tries to overthrow the political, social and economic order established in this Constitution." At first glance, this horrifies the gun fanatics, who argue that one only has the right to bear arms in Cuba if they are doing so in defense of the existing government. Indeed, that is exactly the case. Arms for hunting and personal protection in some cases are allowed, again according to GunPolicy.org, **but the chief function of the right to bear arms in a socialist country is to defend the class power of the workers.** The Bay of Pigs invaders captured and detained by an armed Cuban citizen. The lunacy of the anti-communist gun argument is accentuated further though by a look at Cuban history. After taking power on January 1, 1959, Castro and the July 26th Movement set to work expropriating the property held by oligarchs, corporations, wealthy land owners, and bankers in Cuba. This angered the US and those elements loyal to the Batista government, who sought to restore capitalism to Cuba through an invasion. **Castro**, well-aware at the foreign plots to bring down the Cuban revolution, **"universally armed all of its workers,** including women, for the defense of their country," according to the Cuba History Archive.

Burning sugarcane produces 10 times the pollution of fossil fuels

Nova 12 (Joanne Nova, a science presenter, writer, and speaker; author of The Skeptic's Handbook, "Sugar cane ethanol biofuel produces 10 times the pollution of gasoline and diesel", JoNova, a blog that focuses on the science, funding and politics related to anthropogenic global warming, 7/22/12, <http://joannenova.com.au/2012/07/sugar-cane-ethanol-biofuel-produces-10-times-the-pollution-of-gasoline-and-diesel> //CJC

Indur Goklany calculated that biofuels policies killed nearly 200,000 people in 2010 alone. That was before this study showed things may be worse than we suspected.¶ **Brazil is the largest sugar cane ethanol producer in the world,** but people are burning four times the area of sugar cane plantations than previously realized, and it's producing far more pollution than they thought. **For every unit of energy generated, the ethanol-biofuel use produces a lot less CO2 (plant fertilizer) but more volatile organic compounds (VOC's), more carbon monoxide, more nitrous oxides, as well as more sulphur dioxides.** (See Graph b below).¶ **Compared to gasoline and diesel, over its whole life cycle, every unit of energy produced with sugar cane produces 10 times as much volatile organic compounds** (VOC's), carbon monoxide, and nitrous oxides. The amount PM10's and PM2.5's produced with ethanol fuels is even higher. Most of the pollution comes from burning fields of sugar cane (see graph a). Hence the people suffering the most from ethanol production will be villagers and rural farmers living near areas of sugar cane production. While there have been efforts to encourage farmers to produce cane without burning fields, over half of sugar-cane crop loads continue to be burned. Presumably there is a cost to producing sugar cane without burning. Perhaps sugar-cane production is viable and competitive without burning but this study does not discuss the reasons farmers prefer to burn fields.¶ If you care about pollution, and want less of it, and you care about the health of people in developing countries then clearly **we should** encourage gasoline and diesel use, and **discourage** production of ethanol that involves **burning sugar cane-fields.**¶ Likewise, to promote growth in the Amazon (by increasing CO2 levels), we ought to be burning fossil fuels and not fields of cane.¶ If global policies devalue concentrated energy underground and prize diffuse photosynthetic sources of energy above ground, will we protect and retain dirty rocks deep below the surface at the expense of biodiversity and health of plants and people? It seems so.

Their own solvency advocate concedes it won't solve

Specht 4/24/13 (Jonathan, UC Davis professor, "Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol's Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States",
<http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf>) //CJC

It must be stressed that sugarcane-based ethanol, from Cuba or anywhere else, is not the solution to the energy and climate change problems faced by the United States, as replacing just 10% of global gasoline usage with sugarcane-based ethanol would require a tenfold increase in global sugarcane production.^[1] To address the problems of both peak oil and climate change, the United States must do much more to reduce its fossil fuel consumption. It should primarily do this by using the strategies highlighted in the introduction to this Article: higher fuel efficiency standards, electric cars (powered with electricity from renewable energy sources, not coal), more public transportation, more walkable neighborhoods, and shorter commutes. To the extent to which there will inevitably still be high demand for liquid fuels for automobiles, however, ethanol from Cuban-grown sugarcane can, and should, be part of the solution to both problems.

Sugar ethanol industry development is super slow

Specht 13

[Jonathan-J.D. Wash. U St. Louis, Legal Advisor, "Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol's Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States," Environmental Law & Policy Journal, Univ. of California Davis, Vol. 36:2,
<http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf>] //CJC

Like all new capitalist industries to emerge in the post-Castro era, whatever ethanol industry arises will have to deal with the painful transition from socialism to capitalism. The Cuban sugarcane ethanol industry will face similar challenges to other private sector industries that arise in the post-Fidel era. One of these challenges will be simply a lack of people with skills necessary for any industry. According to Edward Gonzalez and Kevin McCarthy of the RAND Corporation, "As a result of 40-plus years of communism, the labor force lacks the kinds of trained managers, accountants, auditors, bankers, insurers, etc., that a robust market economy requires."ⁿ⁵³ While these challenges will not be unique to Cuba's ethanol industry, they will put the country at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis existing ethanol exporters such as Brazil. This will be especially true if there is a significant lag time between the expiration of the ethanol tariff barriers at the end of 2011 and the eventual removal of the United [*181] States trade embargo against Cuba.[¶] Additionally, because Cuba's ethanol industry is currently almost non-existent, it will need a great deal of foreign expertise and investment to get started. However, such investments are unlikely to be made unless Cuba makes fundamental changes in its business climate. In the words of Gonzalez and McCarthy, "Capital investment, which Cuba's economy desperately needs and which is most likely to be supplied by foreign investors, will be difficult to attract without enforceable contracts, access to neutral adjudication of disputes, and a degree of predictability that has heretofore been lacking."ⁿ⁵⁴ Any post-Castro government will likely begin to make such changes to increase the appeal of the island nation to foreign investment. However, implementing these changes will take time and trial and error, which will slow the creation of a sugarcane-based ethanol industry.

Plan Doesn't Solve: Changes in US Policy Are Not Enough To Create a Cuban Ethanol Industry

Specht 4/24 [Jonathan, "Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol's Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States" UC Davis Online@<http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf> SM] //CJC

The ideal domestic policy scenario for the creation of a robust Cuban sugarcane ethanol industry would be a situation in which: **the U.S. trade embargo on Cuba is ended; U.S. tariff barriers are removed (in the case of sugar) or not revived (in the case of ethanol)**; and the RFS requiring that a certain percentage of U.S. fuel come from ethanol remain in place. **Of course, changes in United States policy alone, even those that ensure a steady source of demand for Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol, would not be enough to create an ethanol industry from scratch.** Cuba will need to foster the industry as a key goal of the post-Castro era and shape its domestic policies to encourage the growth of the industry.

No FDI

Frank '8

Havana-based Reuters correspondent Marc Frank is a former writer for the People's Daily World – Reuters – Feb 22, 2008 – <http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/22/cuba-castro-ethanol-idUSN2261316320080222> //CJC

Some experts **believe Cuba could become the world's third ethanol producer** after the United States and Brazil, **but that would require huge investments**, not just to improve its cane harvests, but also **to finance** the research and **construction of distilleries.** **The government, however, has been reluctant to allow foreign companies to administer farms, a precondition for any business wanting to invest in agriculture in Cuba.**

No, Cuban's don't like their govt — 47% approve 48% don't, and they're skewed because of fear of retribution — means disapproval is probably higher

Clement 2015 [Scott Clement at the Washington Post, "Do Cubans like the Castros?", *Washington Post*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/04/09/do-cubans-like-the-castros/?utm_term=.b53ee02c552e>] //CJC

Polls measure President Obama's **approval rating** every single day, but **such ratings are far less common in authoritarian nations due to restrictions on research or the press.** Cuba is a polling black hole, where our search found **only a single poll in the past decade testing Raul**

Castro's popularity, and this was conducted by an anti-Castro group. Filling that void, a new survey by television networks Univision and Fusion and conducted without government authorization asked residents of Cuba to rate both Castro brothers on a scale from "very positive" to "very negative."

Cubans gave Raul a split rating of 47 percent positive and 48 percent negative, while Fidel fared slightly worse with a 44-50 positive negative margin. The poll finds Raul Castro's popularity ranges across a number of demographic groups. He is most popular among the oldest Cuban residents, with 55 percent of those age 65 and older rating him positively. The current president also fares relatively well among those employed by the government, Catholics and people living in the western region, which encompasses Havana. He is less popular among younger Cubans - 43 percent are positive - as well as among those who identify their religion as Santería (34 percent) and people living in the central region of the country (37 percent). Castro also receives particularly negative ratings from private sector workers - 55 percent negative. Fidel's image ranges in similar ways across demographic groups, with higher ratings from government employees and those in the Havana region. He is particularly disliked among those whose religion is Santería - 69 percent negative. **When surveys ask about**

leaders in countries with major restrictions on free speech, there is always a concern that respondents may give answers that they think are politically safe. For instance, if they are worried about their individual answers being given to the government, **they may refrain from offering negative opinions of political leaders for fear of retribution.**

Uniqueness

Normalized US-Cuban ties coming. Happens by 2018 under Diaz-Canel — means all your offense is non-unique and any risk of the DA is enough to negate

Gott '13

Richard Gott is a writer and historian. He worked for many years at the Guardian as a leader-writer, foreign correspondent and as the features editor. He is the author of Cuba: A New History, published by Yale University Press – Guardian – Feb 25th – <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/feb/25/cuba-us-ties-castro-raul> //CJC

The mills of God grind slowly, yet they grind exceeding small. So it is with the history of Cuba, which has long moved forward at a barely observable speed. **The announcement by Raúl Castro**, aged 81, **that he will retire in 2018** (after two terms in office), **and that his likely successor** as eventual president **will be** Miguel **Diaz-Canel** Bermúdez (now appointed vice-president), aged 52, **suddenly catapults the** half-century-old **revolutionary process** into new and unfamiliar waters.

By 2018, Fidel Castro, aged 86, long described as an ageing revolutionary, **will likely be dead**; so too will most likely be Cuba's revolutionary ally in Venezuela, Hugo Chávez. Barack Obama will also have left the scene, the last of nearly a dozen US presidents that the Cuban revolution has outlived. Cuba will then move forward at its customary glacial pace without any Castros at the helm and without any members of the revolutionary generation of 1959 that will by then have guided the country for nearly 60 years (the retiring vice-president, the revolutionary veteran José Ramón Ventura Machado, was born in 1930 and is 30 years older than his replacement). Four questions immediately pose themselves. What is the nature and character of the new leader? What will be his impact on the internal Cuban scene? What will be the future of the all-important economic relationship with Venezuela, which provides cheap oil in exchange for Cuban developmental aid (in terms of doctors, security advisers and sports instructors)? And how will a new Cuban leadership affect relations with the United States which has maintained an economic blockade of the island for the past half century? For supporters of the Cuban revolution, there are reasons to give optimistic answers to all four questions. Diaz-Canel may have an unfortunate physical resemblance to a Soviet-style Bulgarian apparatchik of yesteryear but he has proved to be a competent administrator and a genial party chief in two provinces, Villa Clara and Holguín. Plucked from relative obscurity to be the youngest ever member of the politburo, he has been minister of higher education and has recently taken on important foreign roles. With a background as a university professor and an enthusiastic cyclist, he has also served in the armed forces, a significant and necessary detail in the biography of a future leader. As a protégé of Raúl Castro, Diaz-Canel has been a supporter of the current programme to introduce market forces into some aspects of the economy and there is no reason to suppose that this would not continue. The list of reforms is impressive: the introduction of co-operatives outside the agricultural area; the creation of private farms and businesses; the sale of private houses and cars; and the availability of visas for foreign travel. For many people these reforms have not gone far enough, but the new mood of optimism in Cuba is palpable. Diaz-Canel has also been a strong advocate of the existing close relationship with Venezuela which will continue for the next six years under the likely Venezuelan presidency of Nicolas Maduro, the chosen successor of Chávez. So no change there either. An important feature of this relationship, aside from its economic benefits, is that Cuba is now respected and welcomed throughout the continent, not just with Venezuela's close ideological allies like Bolivia and Ecuador, but also with Brazil and Argentina. In this context it is now the US that is the odd man out. Indeed **the most intriguing question now concerns Cuba's future relationship with the US**. Many people have expressed the hope that Obama, with no re-election problem to worry about, might feel emboldened to make conciliatory noises towards the existing Castro government. Most people both in Cuba and in the US have begun to forget what the quarrel was all about. **The road to a new friendship remains a possibility, yet one of the stumbling blocks has been the** continued **existence of a Castro in power**. Under the terms of the Helms-Burton Act, imposed by the US Congress in 1996, the US cannot contemplate recognising a Cuban government in which one of the Castro brothers has a continuing role. By 2018, this will no longer be relevant. **There seems little doubt that under a future President Diaz-Canel, Cuba would be able to forge a new and beneficial relationship with the US.**

Trump broke Cuban Embargo, dislikes its anti-business sentiment. Prioritizes Business over Politics

Report: Trump violated Cuba trade embargo. Eliza Collins, USA Today. Sept 29 2016\ZA
<http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2016/09/29/report-trump-violated-cuba-trade-embargo/91262876/>

Newsweek is out with a new charge against Donald Trump. The magazine is reporting that *Trump violated the United States' embargo with Cuba. In 1998 a company controlled by Trump spent at least \$68,000 to reimburse consultants sent to Cuba to explore hotel opportunities on behalf of the company,* according to Newsweek. *The trip came while Fidel Castro was in power and the U.S. had an embargo on any exports to Cuba.* The magazine said *the trip took place just months before Trump's short-lived run for president in 1999.* He had a campaign kick-off event in Miami with a group of Cuban-Americans. During the announcement Trump vowed to never spend money in Cuba until Castro was no longer in power — he never disclosed that he had already spent money through a complicated process. “As you know—and the people in this room know better than anyone—putting money and investing money in Cuba right now doesn't go to the people of Cuba,” Trump said according to Newsweek. “It goes to Fidel Castro. He's a murderer, he's a killer, he's a bad guy in every respect, and, frankly, the embargo must stand if for no other reason than, if it does stand, he will come down.” Newsweek said it received no response to the allegations from the Trump campaign or his company. Later Thursday Hillary Clinton's campaign released a statement based on the report. “Trump's business with Cuba appears to have broken the law, flouted U.S. foreign policy, and is in complete contradiction to Trump's own repeated, public statements that he had been offered opportunities to invest in Cuba but passed them up. This latest report shows once again that Trump will always put his own business interest ahead of the national interest - and has no trouble lying about it,” senior policy adviser Jake Sullivan said in the statement.

US businesses lobbying Trump for Cuba. Lobbyists Sympathetic to Trumps focus on the Economy and Jobs.

U.S. businesses to pressure Trump to keep ties to Cuba. Alan Gomez, Nov 20 2016. USA Today\ZA

<http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/11/20/cuba-donald-trump-barack-obama-diplomatic-opening/93956270/>

A powerful coalition of U.S. companies is preparing to appeal to President-elect Donald Trump's business instincts and drop his vow to reverse one of President Obama's signature achievements: renewed relations with Cuba. Candidate Trump pledged to close the recently reopened U.S. Embassy in Havana, cut the economic bonds established over the past two years and roll back regulations that made travel to the long-estranged island easier for U.S. citizens. Now, *dozens of major American companies that have started or expanded operations in Cuba under Obama's policy will try to persuade Trump to ignore the political side of his brain and listen to the business side.* That will be the ultimate test for Obama's Cuba strategy of *creating so many business opportunities that his successor would face the full weight of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and a long list of businesses pushing to maintain the new links to the communist government that controls the country.*

Cuban Government Needs Embargo

Washington Post, John M. Carey, April 6 2016, “Don't Expect the Cuban Government to Be Grateful when the Embargo Lifts” [Social Sciences and Government Professor at Dartmouth]
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/06> MRS

Since February 1962, the U.S. embargo has been a political asset for Cuba, and the Castro regime is loathe to see it disappear.

The Castro government has conceded little in exchange for the many U.S. overtures toward normalization in the past year. Political prisoners remain in Cuban jails. The Internet remains expensive, slow and hard to access. And as reported here in the Monkey Cage, there's a "second embargo" — the wall created by Cuba's own taxes and regulations, which deter potential foreign investors as well as Cuba's private sector.

For the past five decades, the Castro regime has said Cuba opposes the embargo and wants it removed. **But having the United States as an enemy has long been one of the Castro regime's main assets, a way to frame the regime's message and policies.**

Cuban laws prohibit commercial advertising, but billboards decrying the U.S. policy still line the highways. [...]

The Cuban regime has been determined to maintain the United States as an adversary.

Human Rights Promotion

Lowry 2016 [Rich, "President Obama's Che Moment," *National Review*. Accessed at: <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/433068/president-obamas-cuba-visit-ignores-continued-human-rights-abuses>.] //DNP

President Barack Obama inadvertently found the perfect photo-op for his Cuba visit at a wreath-laying ceremony at the Jose Martí Memorial in Havana. A news photo at Revolution Square caught Obama standing together with American and Cuban officials, with an enormous mural of the iconic revolutionary Che Guevara looming over his shoulder on the adjacent Ministry of the Interior building. Che is, of course, ubiquitous on dorm-room walls and T-shirts in the United States, and a hero of the Cuban revolution. He also was a cold-blooded killer who set up the Cuban gulag and presided over summary executions of political prisoners (trials were, per Che, "an archaic bourgeois detail"). No doubt, he would have been astonished at the Yanqui president coming to Revolution Square to pay his respects — and exceedingly pleased. President Obama's trip is self-consciously historic. As the president's introducer at an event at the U.S. Embassy put it, Obama often said, "Yes, we can," and now we can say, "Yes, we did." But did what? The trip ensures that the first visit to Cuba by an American president in almost 90 years will be part of Obama's legacy, and it seeks to make his opening to Cuba, announced in December 2014, irreversible. If that means extending credibility and a financial lifeline to a Castro regime that has no intention of reforming, so be it. **The regime made it clear that it**

wouldn't bother with maintaining a pretense of relaxing its grip, with the arrest of protesters at a march of the dissident group Ladies in White while President Obama was en route to the country. A reporter with a government news outlet told the New York Times that he and colleagues had been warned not even to discuss Obama's visit with friends. At a press conference with President Raúl Castro on Monday, Obama spoke in euphemistic terms **of our "two different systems," eliding the fact that one system is open, democratic, and prosperous, while the other is closed, dictatorial, and economically ruinous.** Castro railed against alleged human-rights abuses in the United States — Obama obligingly said he welcomed the dialogue — and El Presidente denied holding any political prisoners when reporters dared ask about it. There is no sign of greater openness in Cuba **since President Obama forged his break with long-standing U.S. policy. Political arrests have accelerated. There were more than 8,000 in 2015, four times as many as in 2010.** The **exodus of desperate Cubans to the United States has picked up.** And the country still ranks below Zimbabwe and Iran on Internet connectivity. But Obama's opening has produced a financial windfall for the regime. The **Cuban military occupies the commanding heights of the economy and controls the tourism business, which has been thriving with the influx of American tourists.** Starwood Hotels and Resorts just got special permission from the U.S. Treasury to operate three hotels in Havana, in a boost, not for the free market, but for the Cuban government. If Cuba were a repressive, small-minded military dictatorship of the right, Obama's visit and accommodationist attitude wouldn't be considered so broad-minded. But a patina of revolutionary romance, embodied by that image of Che looking down on President Obama, still hangs over Cuba. It makes its human-rights abuses, theft, and lies an afterthought, or even excusable, for the American Left. After the Cuban missile crisis, Che said that in the event of a U.S. attack, "if the rockets had remained, we would have used them all and directed them against the very heart of the United States, including New York, in our defense against aggression." It would have been beyond his imagining that so many decades later, with the revolutionary regime cash-strapped and decrepit, the imperialist Goliath would come bearing gifts and asking for nothing substantial in return, except a line in President Obama's Wikipedia entry.

Taylor 2016 [Guy, "Cuba's Communists dig in despite Obama's Outreach," *The Washington Times*. Accessed at: <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/apr/20/cubas-communists-dig-in-despite-obamas-outreach/>.] //DNP

Critics of President Obama's diplomatic outreach to Cuba are claiming vindication this week as the island nation's **Communist Party hard-liners** — cheered on by an 89-year-old Fidel Castro — **moved to cement their grip on power after Mr. Castro's brother Raul steps down in two years.**

"The administration can downplay this all it wants, but by every indicator, in terms of progress, this was a sign of failure," said Ana Quintana, a Latin America and Western Hemisphere policy analyst with The Heritage Foundation. **"All of these moves that the administration has made over the past two years — from opening an embassy in Havana to prematurely taking the Cubans off the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list — have only served to embolden the Cuban government."**

Many Cubans expressed dismay at the news that Raul Castro, 84, would stay in the critical post of Communist Party first secretary after stepping down as president in 2018 and that Jose Ramon Machado Ventura, who fought alongside the Castro brothers in the 1959 revolution and is considered an old-line enforcer of party orthodoxy, will retain his post as the party's second-in-command.

[...]

What's worse, critics say, is that the **Castro government's treatment of human rights and democracy activists has grown only more harsh as the nation has begun restoring relations with Washington.** One of the fiercest crackdowns came as Mr. Obama and his family traveled to Cuba last month — the first visit in 90 years by a U.S. leader.

Ms. Quintana claimed Wednesday that **Cuban authorities arrested 498 activists during the three days that Mr. Obama was on the island.**

The Communist Party, she argued, **"no longer has an impetus to change because the U.S. has lost its leverage of Cuba by making concessions and pursuing a policy of appeasement over the past two years."**

Lifting the embargo destroys Cuban democracy and US human rights credibility

Menges, 8 - Editor in Chief of the Americas Report, Menges Hemispheric Security Project Center for Security Policy (Nancy, CQ Congressional Testimony, 3/5, lexis)
//CJC

Contrary to critics' claims, lifting of the embargo and the travel ban without meaningful changes in Cuba will have several negative repercussions. First, it will send a poor message about U.S. toleration both of Cuba's patterns of unsavory behavior and its totalitarian system. Second, a cessation of the

embargo will strengthen state enterprises since most Cuban businesses are run by the state and since the Cuban government retains a partnership interest in all foreign investment. Third, it will lead to greater domestic repression and control because the leadership fears the "subversive" effects of U.S. influence upon the Cuban people. Thus, a transition to democracy on the island will be delayed. Finally, the regime in Havana will gain access to financial benefits from international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank that could help it resolve its debt and solvency concerns.[3]

The embargo should only be lifted when Cuba changes its current system and develops a democratic society. U.S. policy towards Cuba is not anachronistic but is rather aimed at the legitimate goal of a free Cuba; the lifting of the embargo now will be an important psychological victory for Castro and would be interpreted as a defeat for U.S. policy. There is also no indication that negotiation and incentives can influence Cuba, which has ignored such "carrot and stick" approaches in the past. Without major internal reforms in Cuba, the Castro government - not the Cuban people - will be the main beneficiary of the lifting of the embargo, since it will use this newly acquired wealth to strengthen its hold on the Cuban people, to rebuild its military apparatus, and to engage again in supporting anti-American terrorist and violent groups in Latin America and elsewhere. The U.S. has followed a regional policy that fosters human rights, liberal economic policies, and democratically elected civilian governments. U.S.-Cuba policy should be no different. To lift the embargo now is to provide Castro with a gift he does not deserve.

Cuban democracy is emerging organically now --- lifting the embargo would empower the regime.

Ron Radosh, 3/18/2013. PJ Media columnist and Adjunct Fellow at the Hudson Institute. "The Time to Help Cuba's Brave Dissidents Is Now: Why the Embargo Must Not be Lifted," PJ Media, <http://pjmedia.com/ronradosh/2013/03/18/the-time-to-help-cubas-brave-dissidents-is-now-why-the-embargo-must-not-be-lifted/?singlepage=true>. //CJC

The presence this week in the United States of dissident Cuban blogger Yoani Sanchez, the most well-known of Cuba's brave dissident community, has again brought to the forefront the reality of the situation facing the Cuban people in the Castro brothers' prison state.

Last week, Sanchez spoke at both Columbia University and New York University, where she [recalled](#) how different things were a decade ago during what Cubans refer to as the "Black Spring," when independent journalists were given a summary trial and large jail sentences. It was the arrest of these opponents of the regime that led to the Ladies in White, the wives and mothers of prisoners who regularly marched in silence in front of government buildings each week.

Ten years ago, Sanchez pointed out, there was no access to the internet for anyone in Cuba, it barely existed, and there were no flash drives to record information and no social networking sites to spread the word about the state's repression. Now, bloggers like Sanchez — who gains access to tourist hotels, posing as a Westerner so she can use their internet facilities — have managed to get past the regime's ban on use of the internet and to freely reveal to the world the reality of life in Cuba.

"Many independent journalists and peaceful activists who began their work precariously have now resorted to blogs, for example, as a format to circulate information about programs and initiatives to collect signatures," Sánchez said. She and others have done just that, getting signatures on petitions to demand the release in particular of one well-known Cuban journalist. In addition, Sanchez is circulating a petition known as "the Citizens' Demand" to pressure the Cuban regime to ratify the UN political rights agreements signed in 2008. The signers are calling for a legal and political framework for a full debate of all ideas relevant to the internal crisis facing the Cuban people on the island.

In effect, this demand for democracy is nothing less than a call for creation of a political democracy that would, if implemented, lead to the collapse of the edifice of the Communist one-party state.

As Sanchez put it: “It is important to have initiatives for transforming the law and demand concrete public spaces within the country.” Since a totalitarian state does not allow for such space and prohibits a real civil society from emerging, the actions of the dissidents are a mechanism for forcing such change from below. They are fighting what her fellow blogger Orlando Luis Pardo Lazo called a “culture of fear over the civil society” that the secret police seek to enforce.

For liberals and leftists in the United States, the main demand they always raise is to “lift the embargo.” According to the argument they regularly make, the embargo has to be lifted for the following reasons: 1) it is not effective; 2) it gives the regime the excuse to argue to the Cuban people that the poverty they suffer is the result of not being able to trade with the United States and other nations honoring the embargo; 3) lifting the embargo would hence deprive Fidel and Raul Castro from their main propaganda argument, revealing that the reasons for a collapsed economy are the regime’s own policies; and 4) trade and travel from the United States would expose Cubans to Americans and others who live in freedom, help curb anti-Americanism, and eventually lead to slow reform of the system.

What these liberals and leftists leave out is that this demand — lifting the embargo — is also the number one desire of the Cuban Communists.

In making it the key demand, these well-meaning (at least some of them) liberals echo precisely the propaganda of the Cuban government, thereby doing the Castro brothers’ work for them here in the United States. And, as we know, many of those who call for this actually believe that the Cuban government is on the side of the people, and favor the Cuban Revolution which they see as a positive role model for the region. They have always believed, since the 1960s of their youth, that socialism in Cuba has pointed the way forward to development and liberty based on the kind of socialist society they wish could exist in the United States.

Another brave group of Cuban opponents of the regime has actually taped a television interview filmed illegally in Havana. “Young Cuban democracy leader Antonio Rodiles,” an American support group called [Capitol Hill Cubans](#) has reported, “has just released the latest episode of his civil society project Estado de Sats (filmed within Cuba), where he discusses the importance U.S. sanctions policy with two of Cuba’s most renowned opposition activists and former political prisoners, Guillermo Fariñas and Jose Daniel Ferrer.”

The argument they present is aimed directly at those on the left in the United States, some of whom think they are helping democracy in Cuba by calling for an end to the embargo. In strong and clear language, the two dissidents say the following:

If at this time, the [economic] need of the Cuban government is satisfied through financial credits and the lifting of the embargo, repression would increase, it would allow for a continuation of the Castro’s society, totalitarianism would strengthen its hold and philosophically, it would just be immoral ... If you did an opinion poll among Cuban opposition activists, the majority would be in favor of not lifting the embargo.

Next, they nail the claim that travel without restrictions by citizens of our country to Cuba would help spread freedom. The men respond:

In a cost-benefit analysis, travel to Cuba by Americans **would be of greatest benefit to the Castro regime**, while the Cuban people would be the least to benefit. With all of the controls and the totalitarian system of the government, it would be perfectly able to control such travel.

We know this, as I [reported](#) a few months ago, about how a group of Americans taking the usual state-controlled Potemkin village tour came back raving about how wonderful and free Cuba is, and how Cuban socialism works.

Finally, the two former prisoners made this point about lifting the embargo:

To lift the embargo at this time would be very prejudicial to us. The government prioritizes all of the institutions that guarantee its hold on power. The regime's political police and its jailers receive a much higher salary and privileges than a doctor or engineer, or than any other worker that benefits society. We've all seen municipalities with no fuel for an ambulance, yet with 10, 15, 20, 50 cars full of fuel ready to go repress peaceful human rights activists.

Indeed, just this past week, more evidence came out substantiating how the secret police killed Cuba's leading political opponent Oswaldo Paya, and sought to blame it on a car crash for which he and those with him were responsible. Last week, [the Washington Post](#) in a tough editorial made the point:

Mr. Payá, who pioneered the Varela Project, a petition drive in 2002 seeking the guarantee of political freedom in Cuba, was killed in a car wreck July 22, along with a youth activist, Harold Cepero. The driver of the vehicle, Ángel Carromero, a Spaniard, was convicted and imprisoned on charges of vehicular homicide; in December, he was released to Spain. He told us in an interview published on the opposite page last week that the car carrying Mr. Payá was rammed from behind by a vehicle with government license plates. His recollections suggest that Mr. Payá died not from reckless driving but from a purposeful attempt to silence him — forever.

This is the kind of treatment effective opponents of the regime get from Cuba's secret police, measures taken upon orders of Raul Castro, whom useful idiots like Danny Glover and Sean Penn regularly visit. They fawn at his feet and those of his ailing brother, Fidel Castro.

This week, Sanchez and her colleague come to testify before Congress. They will speak as well at a public forum today, Tuesday, at the Cato Institute. You can watch on a live stream at 12:30 p.m. on the organization's [website](#).

The Cuban people have suffered long enough at the hands of a regime that came into power promising freedom and democracy, and instead inflicted on the Cuban people a totalitarian government modeled on that of the old Soviet Union. **Cuba is finally on the verge of change, and it is time the people of our country give whatever support we can to those within Cuba bravely working for the creation of a real democracy in Cuba, and an end to the decades of rule by the Castro brothers.**

Cuba's Economy

Cuba emboldened threatens US interests in Latin America and spreads socialism

Brooks '9 Senior fellow for National Security Affairs in the Davis Institute at The Heritage Foundation. (Peter – Heritage foundation “Keep the Embargo, O” April 16, 2009
<http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/04/keep-the-embargo-o>)/CJC

In another outreach to roguish regimes, the Obama administration on Monday announced the easing of some restrictions on Cuba. Team Bam hopes that a new face in the White House will heal old wounds. Fat chance. Sure, it's fine to allow separated families to see each other more than once every three years -- even though Cubanos aren't allowed to visit America. And permitting gifts to Cuban relatives could ease unnecessary poverty -- even though the regime will siphon off an estimated 20 percent of the money sent there. **In the end, though, it's still Fidel Castro and his brother Raul who'll decide**

whether there'll be a thaw in ties with the United States -- or not. And in usual Castro-style, Fidel himself stood defiant in response to the White House proclamation, barely recognizing the US policy shift. Instead, and predictably, **Fidel demanded an end to el bloqueo (the blockade) -- without any promises of change for the people who labor under the regime's hard-line policies.**

So much for the theory that if we're nice to them, they'll be nice to us. Many are concerned that the lack of love from Havana will lead Washington to make even more unilateral concessions to create an opening with Fidel and the gang. Of course, the big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with -- without any concessions on Cuba's part, of course.

Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white flag to -- Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further

lionizing the dictator and **encouraging the Latin American Left**. Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers -- **allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad**. **The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people**. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already. The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association. Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in. **We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America**, the Caribbean -- or *beyond*. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also *look to partner* with a revitalized Cuba.) With an influx of resources, **the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism** in the Western Hemisphere. The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time. Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn't free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers. **The US embargo remains a matter of principle -- and an appropriate response to Cuba's brutal repression of its people**. **Giving in to evil only begets more of it**. Haven't we learned that yet? Until we see progress in loosening the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should *hold firm* onto the leverage the embargo provides

Turn—lifting the embargo makes the situation worse for a laundry list of reasons

Suchlicki 2000 [Jaime, "The US Embargo of Cuba," *University of Miami*. Accessed at: <http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf>.] //DNP

Introduction **Opponents of U.S. policy toward Cuba claim that if the embargo and the travel ban are lifted, the Cuban people would benefit economically; American companies will penetrate and influence the Cuban market; the Communist system would begin to crumble and a transition to a democratic society would be accelerated**. These expectations are based on several incorrect assumptions. First, **that Castro and the Cuban leadership are naïve and inexperienced and, therefore, would allow tourists and investments from the U.S. to subvert the revolution and influence internal developments** in the island. Second, that **Cuba would open up and allow U.S. investments in all sectors of the economy, instead of selecting which companies could trade and invest**. Third, that **Castro is so interested in close relations with the U.S. that he is willing to risk** what has been upper-most in his mind for 40 years – **total control of power and a legacy of opposition to "Yankee imperialism," – in exchange for economic improvements for his people**. During the Fifth Communist Party Congress in 1997, Castro emphasized "We will do what is necessary without renouncing our principles. We do not like capitalism and we will not abandon our Socialist system." Castro also reiterated his long-standing anti-American posture,

accusing the U.S. of waging economic war against his government and calling for “military preparedness against imperialist hostility.” A change in U.S. policy toward Cuba may have different and unintended results. **The lifting of the embargo and the travel ban without meaningful changes in Cuba will: Guarantee the continuation of the current totalitarian structures. Strengthen state enterprises, since money will flow into businesses owned by the Cuban government.** Most businesses are owned in Cuba by the state and, in all foreign investments, the Cuban government retains a partnership interest. **Lead to greater repression and control since Castro and the leadership will fear that U.S. influence will subvert the revolution and weaken the Communist party’s hold on the Cuban people. Delay instead of accelerate a transition to democracy on the island. Allow Castro to borrow from international organizations** such as the IMF, the World Bank, etc. Since Cuba owes billions of dollars to the former Soviet Union, to the Club of Paris, and to others, and has refused in the past to acknowledge or pay these debts, new loans will be wasted by Castro’s inefficient and wasteful system, and will be uncollectible. The reason Castro has been unable to pay back loans is not because of the U.S. embargo, but because his economic system stifles productivity and he continues to spend on the military, on adventures abroad, and on supporting a bankrupt welfare system on the island. **Perpetuate the rather extensive control that the military holds over the economy and foster the further development of “Mafia type” groups that manage and profit from important sectors of the economy, particularly tourism, biotechnology, and agriculture. Negate the basic tenets of U.S. policy in Latin America which emphasize democracy, human rights, and market economies.** Send the wrong message to the enemies of the U.S.: that a foreign leader can seize U.S. properties without compensation; allow the use of his territory for the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed at the U.S.; espouse terrorism and anti-U.S. causes throughout the world; and eventually the U.S. will “forget and forgive,” and reward him with tourism, investments, and economic aid.

“If we lift the Embargo, U.S.-Latin American relations will improve. Cuba is not an important issue in U.S.-Latin American relations. The U.S.-Latin American agenda includes as priority items trade, investment, transfer of technology, migration, drugs, environment, and intellectual property rights. Cuba is not a priority item on this agenda. **While publicly many Latin American countries oppose the embargo, privately they are extremely concerned that Cuba will divert investments from their countries to the island, and particularly that tourism will flock to Cuba, to the detriment of the Caribbean economies.**”

Democratization

Cuban Government Controls Profits from Trade — deters investors

Suchlicki 2013 [Jaime, “What if... the US Ended the Cuba Travel Ban and the Embargo,” *The Development Research Center*. Accessed at: <https://devresearchcenter.org/2013/04/12/what-if-the-u-s-ended-the-cuba-travel-ban-and-the-embargo/>.] //DNP

In Cuba, foreign investors cannot partner with private Cuban citizens. They can only invest in the island through minority joint ventures with the government and its state enterprises. The dominant enterprise in the Cuban economy is the Grupo GAESA, controlled by the Cuban military. Most investments are done through or with GAESA. Therefore, American companies willing to invest in Cuba will have to partner mostly with the Cuban military. Cuba ranks 176 out of 177 countries in the world in terms of economic freedom. Outshined only by North Korea. It ranks as one of the most unattractive investments next to Iran, Zimbabwe, Libya, Mali, etc. Foreign investors cannot hire, fire, or pay workers directly. They must go through the Cuban government employment agency which selects the workers. Investors pay the government in dollars or euros and the government pays the workers a meager 10% in Cuban pesos. Corruption is pervasive, undermining equity and respect for the rule of law. Cuba does not have an independent/transparent legal system. All judges are appointed by the State and all lawyers are licensed by the State. In the last few years, European investors have had over \$1 billion arbitrarily frozen by the government and several investments have been confiscated. Cuba's Law 77 allows the State to expropriate foreign-invested assets for reason of "public utility" or "social interest." In the last year, the CEOs of three companies with extensive dealings with the Cuban government were arrested without charges.

Lifting embargo fails — no economic stimulus or FDI

Perales 2010 [Jose, "The United States and Cuba: implications of an Economic Relationship," *Woodrow Wilson Center for Latin American Program*. Accessed at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_Cuba_Implications.pdf.] //DNP

However, there are important pitfalls associated with deeper economic relations. In a April 29, 2010, hearing on H.R. 4645, the Travel Restriction Reform and Export Enhancement Act (designed to remove obstacles to legal sales of U.S. agricultural commodities to Cuba—by eliminating the cash-in-advance provision required for all such sales to Cuba—and to end travel restrictions on all Americans to Cuba), Representative Kevin Brady (R-TX), the Republican ranking member on the House Ways and Means Committee, outlined some of these drawbacks. Cuba's economic climate is intolerant of U.S. firms: there exists no accord on U.S. individual or corporate property claims. Indeed, in spite of the Obama administration's move to allow U.S. telecommunication firms to apply for licenses to conduct business in Cuba, few such companies have rushed in. This is in no small part due to the important challenges associated with policy unpredictability under the current Cuban regime, not to mention significant questions arising from issues of human rights and labor relations. In spite of these considerations, at the time of this publication, H.R. 4645 had been approved in the House Agriculture Committee and awaited further consideration on the Foreign Affairs and Financial Services committees before reaching the House floor. Whether or not one agrees with the U.S. embargo against Cuba, what must be kept in mind is the fact that the embargo is there for reasons of human rights, argued Christopher Sabatini, policy director at the Council of the Americas, and that has been how the embargo been defended. And in this we can't lose sight of the fact that Cuba's record on human rights is abysmal. The regime currently has detained over 200 political prisoners, many of whom have been arrested for the vague charge of "dangerousness." Cuba violates freedom of association, strictly limits freedom of expression, and systematically violates the core covenants of the International Labour Organization (ILO). When the debate strays from this central issue of rights, Sabatini stated, we lose sight of the real issues facing Cuba and Cuban citizens today. For this reason, any and all changes to the U.S. embargo must first and foremost be geared toward strengthening the hand of the island's independent sectors. According to Sabatini, there is broad scope in the United States for the executive to make regulatory changes that can give U.S. businesses and institutional actors greater scope to begin developing closer relations inside Cuba. This is important because any change to the status quo in bilateral economic relations will start with the executive's authority over the embargo's regulations. Indeed, a quick perusal of past efforts at dismantling U.S. embargoes—in particular, against Vietnam—reveals that terminating an embargo has never been the result of a straight up-or-down congressional vote. Instead, this has been

the result of slight, incremental regulatory changes that have served to allow independent actors to develop their own contacts with counterparts on the island and empower people.

These made the incentives for change easier to recognize, built an active, vested coalition supporting broader change, and made dismantling more palatable to political audiences. Sabatini noted that the ability to affect significant change on the embargo falls within the scope of executive regulatory authority, particularly in areas such as telecommunications and some elements of travel—particularly in licensing for cultural and educational exchanges and even some elements of marketing trips. In this sense the Obama administration took a first step on April 13, 2009, when President Obama announced an increased allowance for U.S. telecommunications companies to establish licensing agreements to allow roaming coverage on the island and establish a fiberoptic cable to Cuba, with the stated purpose of helping Cubans communicate with the rest of the world. However, according to Sabatini, it turned out that despite the fanfare, the regulations that came out of the **U.S. bureaucracy five months later did little realistically to allow U.S. companies to establish the necessary and sufficient links to allow broad communication between Cubans and the rest of the world.**

For instance, in his announcement, President Obama called for the establishment of a fiberoptic cable linking Cuba to the outside world. However, regulations prohibiting U.S. equipment transfers or sales to the island for commercial purposes persist. Similarly, the regulations continued to prevent the sale of handsets on the island for commercial purposes and blocks infrastructure investments such as cell phone towers, routers, and switchers. All of these sorts of now-prohibited equipment is essential if there is to be any meaningful broadband access to the tools of communication. Sabatini contended that other stated goals of the Obama administration have suffered a similar fate, yet he also claimed this does not mean all is lost. In his view President Obama just needs to take the next step: with the stroke of the executive pen he can introduce regulatory modifications that can allow the federal bureaucracy to meet his stated goals regarding Cuba. Regardless of the U.S. government's actions, a post-embargo, post-Castro Cuba does not necessarily imply a business bonanza for U.S. companies, added Professor José Azel of the University of Miami's Institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies. Conventional wisdom holds that U.S. companies will rush in to invest in the island if and when the legal and political circumstances allow them. However, **given Cuba's difficult economic situation, the international community needs to significantly lower its expectations regarding U.S. foreign direct investment in Cuba.**

Azel predicted that U.S. exports to Cuba will surge following a (hopefully) peaceful regime transition on the island; however, **exports will not lead to the technological transfers, expertise, and capital requirements that the country will desperately need to grow its economy.**

The United States will obviously want to invest in a post-Castro Cuba; but it is companies, not countries, that make investments. To support his view, Azel explained the three principal reasons that companies engage in foreign direct investment. First, companies are resource seeking; they invest to secure country-specific resources available only within that market. Oil, nickel, and tourism are examples of such resources in Cuba. These have and will continue to attract a certain level of foreign direct investment, argued Azel, regardless of who is in power or the country's market friendliness. Second, **companies are efficiency seeking**; they invest to make efficiency gains.

Companies engage in foreign direct investment for this reason because they are **looking to take advantage of lower labor costs or of a privileged distribution location.** However, **Cuba lacks an ideal labor force in comparison to that of its neighbors.** After more than half a century under a totalitarian regime and a centrally planned command economy, **Cuba's labor force has not been able to develop the kind of efficiencies needed to attract foreign direct investment.**

Finally, **companies are market seeking**; they invest to establish a foothold in a new market that is deemed strategic or dense. However, while the island nation has more than eleven million citizens, **its impoverishment means that its market has few effective consumers.** A far more rational strategy to supply a market exhibiting these conditions would be to manufacture finished goods elsewhere and export them to Cuba. Azel contended that, while **a rational cost-benefit analysis could discourage U.S. companies from investing in Cuba,**

Cuban American entrepreneurs may not engage in purely rational thinking on the topic, as they are also guided in part by emotional motivations, such as familial and cultural ties to their homeland. Cuban Americans investing in Cuba can also more easily overcome the innate disadvantages of being a foreigner that inevitably arise in foreign markets. For these reasons, Azel believes that Havana's best bet in attracting foreign direct investment is to encourage the Cuban American community to act as the island's "first movers." Small- and medium-sized Cuban American entrepreneurs could set up small businesses in the island, but also middle- and senior-level Cuban American executives in multinational corporations could act as champions of the island's foreign investment.

No Regime Change — No Trickle Down

Lopez 2000 [Juan, "Sanctions on Cuba Are Good, But Not Enough," *Orbis* Vol 44 (2000).]

//DNP

The engagement thesis also claims that economic development tends to promote democracy, an old hypothesis dating from the 1950s work of Seymour Martin Lipset.⁽ⁿ¹⁹⁾ But **the empirical evidence of the past fifty years suggests that this hypothesis is also false**. Countries under dictatorial regimes are not more likely to experience a transition to democracy as they reach higher levels of economic development.⁽ⁿ²⁰⁾ Nevertheless, the idea that development generates democracy continues to be presented as if it were true and is one of the key arguments used by USA Engage to justify its opposition to the U.S. embargo. Samuel Huntington has also argued that economic development produces democracy by creating new sources of wealth and power outside state control. However, if one considers the intervening mechanism between development and democracy in Huntington's reasoning, one finds that, whatever its validity elsewhere, it does not hold up in the Cuban case. **If increased wealth simply accrues to the state, as in Cuba, then (as Huntington himself acknowledges) the additional revenue merely increases the power of the state and makes no contribution to democratization.**

Regime Crackdown Checks Back Democracy

Amnesty International 2012 ["Routine Repression," *Amnesty International*.] //DNP

Cuba does not tolerate any criticism of the state outside the official mechanisms established under government control. Laws on "public disorder", "contempt", "disrespect", "dangerousness" and "aggression", are used to prosecute government opponents. **No political or human rights organizations are allowed to obtain legal status. Trade unions and bar associations independent from those affiliated to the Cuban Communist Party are not permitted to operate legally and their members are subject to repressive measures.** Any **challenge to official policy invariably results in retaliatory action involving the violation of human rights.** To justify their arsenal of repressive laws and practices, **Cuban officials continue to claim that political opponents act under the sponsorship or the influence of the United States government, and that their activities are a threat against national security, Cuba's integrity and the revolution.**

Regimes grow stronger with trade — Empirics prove

Jorge 2000 [Antonio, "The US Embargo and the Failure of the Cuban Economy," *Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies Occasional Papers*. Accessed at:

<http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=iccaspapers.>]

//DNP

It follows, from all of the above, that **a lifting of the embargo at this time would only serve the purpose of facilitating to Castro desperately needed resources, mainly in the form of credit lines extended by international organizations** such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank, and also by private banking and other financial institutions. This financial influx would serve to strengthen his 40-year stranglehold on the Cuban people. Furthermore, to those who believe that **greater contacts between the United States and Cuba would further the cause of democratization,** it should be pointed out that **such hopes definitely have not been validated by the experience of Marxist societies from the inception of the New Economic Policy in the Soviet Union, which followed the stage of War Communism, up to the last efforts at reforming socialism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s.** In these countries, **trade, foreign investment, and loans led hermetic lives of their own, oblivious to and unaffected by the**

rest of society. There is no historical precedent for drawing hope from the Cuban experience. As a matter of fact, it could be realistically argued that the opposite has happened. As the Cuban regime succeeds in solidifying itself, as a result of the legitimacy conferred upon it by other nations and by an augmented flow of resources, its repressive proclivities have increased in parallel fashion. Trade and investment with totalitarian states have not weakened or eroded those states; rather, the contrary has always been the case. Castro's regime is certainly no exception to the rule and, in fact, categorically confirms it. Only pressure has led Castro temporarily to implement some timid reforms that he subsequently has either partly rescinded or revoked altogether. Cuba has established for all to see a system of apartheid — which is openly and vigorously enforced — between foreigners and Cuban nationals.

Economic engagement strengthens regime. Embargo is prereq to change.

Lopez 2000 [Juan, "Sanctions on Cuba Are Good, But Not Enough," *Orbis* Vol 44 (2000).]

//DNP

The debate over the effectiveness of the U.S. embargo on Cuba has paid little attention to the scholarly literature on economic sanctions and transitions to democracy. One consequence is that critics of the embargo base their arguments on hypotheses that are empirically wrong or that misconstrue scholarly findings. Supporters of the embargo, in turn, do a poor job of exposing the flaws in the anti-embargo arguments. But in fact, the hypotheses used by engagement advocates to criticize the U.S. embargo are untenable. There is strong historical evidence that economic development does not lead to democracy. Foreign investors in Cuba are more likely to become supporters of the dictatorship rather than agents of political change. Foreign capitalists at the time of the transition to democracy will face legal and political problems that will likely entail considerable financial losses and impair their ability to continue to do business in Cuba. And the desire of some American firms to establish businesses in Cuba now, seeking to get a hold on the market in preparation for the post-transition period, is shortsighted and apparently based on misunderstandings of the economic and political factors involved. Given the nature of the Cuban dictatorship, neither engagement nor the embargo by itself will move the Castro government toward political liberalization. But unilateral economic sanctions can be effective by reaffirming a commitment to international norms of democracy and justice and by weakening the Castro government and promoting a change of regime. The U.S. sanctions impose serious economic costs on the Castro dictatorship, and the deterioration of the Cuban economy in the 1990s can be clearly linked both to the marked development of independent groups that challenge the government and to the increase in overt opposition on the part of the general population. Moreover, there is reason to believe that Cuba's economic problems have generated serious discontent within the Communist Party's own cadres, including military officers.

Cuban Economic Crisis makes it vulnerable to change

Lopez 2000 [Juan, "Sanctions on Cuba Are Good, But Not Enough," *Orbis* Vol 44 (2000).]
//DNP

A corresponding observation exists in the literature on transitions to democracy, which indicates that **dictatorships tend to fall when faced with crises, including economic ones.**(n33) **In a cross-national statistical study involving 139 countries from 1950 to 1990,** the authors **found that dictatorships are more likely to survive when their economies grow and more likely to be destabilized when they face economic distress.**(n34) Another study found that **in a data set of twenty-seven dictatorships, twenty-one experienced economic decline prior to transitions to democracy. All communist dictatorships in the set** (Poland, Nicaragua, Romania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia) **experienced economic deterioration or stagnant, low rates of growth in the years before the demise of the dictatorships.**(n35) A widespread observation among scholars of Eastern European politics is that a key factor underlying the pressures leading to the fall of communism in Eastern Europe was economic deterioration. **A declining standard of living decreased people's tolerance for the regimes.** As their situations grew worse, the **populations became more aware of the failure of their own regimes to provide an acceptable level of prosperity.**(n36) The connection between deterioration of economic performance and transitions to democracy has also been observed in Latin America, where decreases in standards of living preceded the wave of democratization during the 1980S.(n37) **Poor economic performance contributes to the demise of dictatorships by provoking latent or active opposition to the regime among citizens and groups within civil society who blame the government for their poverty. It also reduces the benefits enjoyed by active supporters of the regime and its coalition allies.**(n38) Even in cases where economic crises are not the main source of factional conflicts within the ruling elite, deterioration of economic performance tends to widen cleavages among the rulers.(n39)

The regime is strong can't solve without removing the regime, who will massively profit by lifting the embargo—turns the case

Mitchell Bustillo, May 9, '13, "Time to Strengthen the Cuban Embargo," International Policy Digest, ACC. 6-15-2013,
<http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2013/05/09/time-to-strengthen-the-cuban-embargo/>,
//CJC

These remittances are sent by Americans to help their Cuban families, not support the Cuban government. **It is also a common belief that the Cuban embargo is a leading cause of poverty among the Cuban citizens and that lifting the embargo would go a long way toward improving the Cuban standard of living. However, no amount of money can increase the living standards there as long as their current regime stands. "After all, the authorities were already skimming 20 percent of the remittances from Cuban-Americans and 90 percent of the salary paid to Cubans by non-American foreign investors," states Alvaro Vargas Llosa,** Senior Fellow of The Center on Global Prosperity at The Independent Institute.

However unfortunate it may be, Cuba, in its current state, is a nation consisting only of a wealthy and powerful few and an impoverished and oppressed proletariat, who possess little to no means to escape or even improve their fate. **Lifting the trade embargo will not increase the**

general prosperity of the Cuban people, but it will increase the prosperity of the government. Ergo, the poverty and dire situation of the Cuban people cannot be blamed on the United States or the embargo.

Healthcare Adv

Focus on Prevention

Garrett 2010 [Laurie Garrett, "Castrocare in Crisis: Will Lifting the Embargo Make Things Worse?," *Foreign Affairs* (2010).] //DNP

The **two keys to Cuba's medical and public health achievements are training provided by the state and a community-based approach that requires physicians to live in the neighborhoods they serve and be on call 24 hours a day**. In the wake of the 1959 Cuban Revolution, more than one-third of Cuba's doctors fled, mostly to the United States, leaving the country with just 6,300 physicians and a doctor-patient ratio of 9.2 per 10,000, according to the Cuban Ministry of Public Health. In response, Fidel Castro declared public health and doctor training to be paramount tasks for the new socialist state. By the early 1980s, **Cuba led the socialist world**, including its patron, the Soviet Union, **in all health indicators**. Between 1959 and 1989, **Cuba's doctor-patient ratio more than tripled**, soaring to 33 per 10,000, and health-care expenditures rose by 162 percent. **Cuba today has the highest doctor-patient ratio in the entire world**, with 59 physicians per 10,000 people, **more than twice the ratio of the United States**. **Cuba is the world's only poor country that can** rightly **say that basic health is no longer an existential problem** for its people. Its achievement in this respect is unparalleled. Cuba now boasts more than 73,000 practicing doctors (half of whom work in primary care), 107,761 nurses, and a total health-care workforce of 566,365, according to government figures. About 12 per cent of Cuba's adult population is employed by the state in the healthcare sector. Because of economic exigencies that have limited Cuba's access to advanced technology for diagnosing and curing ailments, **the Cuban health system has focused successfully on prevention**. Between 1959 and 2000, **Cuba reduced its infant mortality by 90 percent**, and the number of mothers who died from pregnancy-related complications dropped from 125 per 100,000 live births to 55 per 100,000.

Prevention and Education

Drain 2010 [Paul, "Fifty Years of US Embargo: Cuba's Health Outcomes and Lessons," *Science Magazine*. Accessed at: <http://globalhealth.washington.edu/sites/default/files/50%20yrs%20US%20Embargo%20Cuba%20Health%20Outcomes.pdf>.] //DNP

However, impacts of sanctions on Cuba's financial systems, medical supplies, and aggregate health measures appear to be attenuated by their successes in other aspects of health care. **Despite the embargo, Cuba has produced better health outcomes than most Latin American countries**, and they **are comparable to those of most developed countries**. Cuba has the **highest average life expectancy** (78.6 years) and **density of physicians per capita** (59 physicians per 10,000 people), and **the lowest infant** (5.0/1000 live births) **and child** (7.0/1000 live births) **mortality rates among 33 Latin American and Caribbean countries** (11, 26).¶ In 2006, the **Cuban government spent about \$355 per capita on health, 7.1% of total Gross Domestic Product** (GDP) (11, 26). The annual cost of health care for an American was \$6714, 15.3% of total U.S. GDP. Cuba also spent less on health than most European countries. But low health care costs alone may not fully explain Cuba's successes (27), which may relate **more to their emphasis on disease prevention and primary health care, which have been cultivated during the U.S. trade embargo**.¶ Cuba has one of the most proactive

primary health care systems in the world. **By educating their population about disease prevention and health promotion, the Cubans rely less on medical supplies to maintain a healthy population. The converse is the United States, which relies heavily on medical supplies and technologies to maintain a healthy population, but at a very high cost.**

Turn: Lifting Embargo causes medical tourism, raises costs, private healthcare invasion

Garrett 2010 [Laurie Garrett, "Castrocare in Crisis: Will Lifting the Embargo Make Things Worse?," *Foreign Affairs* (2010).] //DNP

Cuba's economic situation has been dire since 1989, when the country lost its Soviet benefactors and its economy experienced a 35 percent contraction. Today, Cuba's major industries—tourism, nickel mining, tobacco and rum production, and health care—are fragile. Cubans blame the long-standing U.S. trade embargo for some of these strains and are wildly optimistic about the transformations that will come once the embargo is lifted. Overlooked in these dreamy discussions of lifestyle improvements, however, is that Cuba's health-care industry will likely be radically affected by any serious easing in trade and travel restrictions between the United States and Cuba. If policymakers on both sides of the Florida Straits do not take great care, the tiny Caribbean nation could swiftly be robbed of its greatest triumph. First, **its public health network could be devastated by an exodus of thousands of well-trained Cuban physicians and nurses.** Second, **for-profit U.S. companies could transform the remaining health-care system into a prime destination for medical tourism from abroad.** The very strategies that the Cuban government has employed to develop its system into a major success story have rendered it ripe for the plucking by the U.S. medical industry and by foreigners eager for affordable, elective surgeries in a sunny climate. In short, although the U.S. embargo strains Cuba's health-care system and its overall economy, it may be the better of two bad options.

[...]

According to Steven Ullmann of the University of Miami's Cuba Transition Project, **if Washington lifts its embargo, Cuba can expect a mass exodus of health-care workers and then the creation of a domestic health system with two tiers, one private and one public.** The system's lower, **public tier would be at risk of complete collapse** Ullmann therefore suggests "fostering this [public] system through partnerships and enhanced compensation of personnel." He also argues that officials in both government should "limit out-migration of scientific brainpower from the country." Properly handled, the transition could leave Cuba with a mixed health-care economy — part public, part locally owned and private, and part outsourced and private — that could compensate Cuban physicians, nurses, and other health-care workers enough to keep them in the country and working at least part time in the public sector.

Non-unique, happening in squo

[Rebekah Sager, "**U.S. quietly lifts medical embargo on Cuba**, opening floodgates for new drugs," Fox News, 21 October 2016, <http://www.foxnews.com/health/2016/10/20/obama-administration-lifts-medical-embargo-with-cuba-opening-floodgates-new.html>] //ES

While much of the country has been excited about a recent rule change allowing Americans to buy as much Cuban rum and cigars as they want, the medical community has been trumpeting the easing of the Cuban embargo for a different reason.

Last week, the Obama administration quietly **lifted obstacles to medical research out of Cuba that may have far-reaching impacts for hundreds of thousands of Americans with cancer and other life-threatening diseases.**

On Oct. 14, the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a **lift in a medical embargo allowing U.S. medical research centers to collaborate with Cubans in commercial as well as non-commercial research.** **The lift will also allow Cuban-developed pharmaceuticals to enter the normal FDA authorization process and be sold in the U.S. once it is granted approval.** Health and Human Services Secretary Sylvia M. Burwell announced on Wednesday that she will travel to Cuba with National Institute of Health Director Dr. Francis Collins to visit various medical sites focused on healthcare and research. **"The Cubans have developed really novel cancer drugs and other drugs that U.S. patients have not had access to. Now we can research these in a pilot or phase one."** Dr. Thomas Schwaab, chief of strategy, business development and outreach at Roswell Park Cancer Institute in Buffalo, New York, told Fox News Latino.

Zhang 2016 [Sarah Zhang, "Cuba's Innovative Cancer Vaccine Is Finally Coming to America," *The Atlantic*, November 7, 2016.
<https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/11/cubas-lung-cancer-vaccine/505778/>] //WGC

"Last week, in a historic first, a box of water made it from Havana to Buffalo, New York. It was roundabout journey, since you can't just FedEx a box from Cuba to the U.S. (The embargo, no commercial cargo flights, etc.) The box flew first to Toronto. Customs brokers then escorted it across the U.S.-Canada border to its final destination at Roswell Park Cancer Institute. Why such a production for a box of water? **It was the test run for a promising lung-cancer vaccine called CIMAvax, which was developed in Cuba and soon will begin clinical trials in the U.S.** But no one in America has ever run a clinical trial with Cuban drugs, and no one was even sure, logistically, how to ship fragile cargo between the two countries. (Again, **the embargo, no commercial cargo flights.**) **So the researchers devised a roundabout route** and tested it with this box of water. "We actually wanted them to ship a box of beer," joked Kelvin Lee, an immunologist at Roswell who helped forge the Cuban collaboration, "but it turned out to be too complicated."*

This shipment came, of course, at a time of thawing relations between U.S. and Cuba. The embargo is still in place—only Congress can vote to lift it—but the Obama administration has been issuing executive actions easing restrictions on trade and travel to the country. **Last month, the administration made it easier to carry out joint U.S.-Cuban medical research, and the Food and Drug Administration promptly followed by approving clinical trials for the Cuban lung-cancer vaccine at Roswell.**

CIMAvax is so interesting, scientifically speaking, because it belongs to a new class of cancer treatments called immunotherapy. Rather than using a scalpel, radiation, or chemicals to take

cancerous cells out directly, immunotherapy stimulates the patient's own immune system to fight cancer. A few immunotherapies are already on the market, and pharmaceutical companies are racing to develop the next. For the past two decades, Cuba, a country with a tiny biomedical research budget, has been quietly sitting on CIMAvax. And this vaccine could be just the first of several Cuban drugs, currently locked behind the embargo, to make to the U.S.

The collaboration between Roswell and Cuba's Center for Molecular Immunology, which developed the vaccine, actually began in 2011, years before the Obama administration started easing restrictions on Cuba. Gisela Gonzalez, one of the Cuban researchers working on CIMAvax, was visiting family in Pittsburgh when she cold-called one of Lee's colleagues at Roswell.** She wanted to give a talk about the research they were doing in Cuba.

"We were not thinking about Cuba at all," says Lee. "Our image of Cuba was from back in the I Love Lucy days. We didn't consider they had really advanced cancer treatments." But Cuba manages to punch far above its weight in medicine. Although the country lacks access to advanced medical equipment due to the embargo, life expectancy in Cuba is even a bit higher than in the U.S. Its strength is a robust primary-care system that focuses on disease prevention. That's how CIMAvax came along, too. In the 1980s, Cuba developed a vaccine to prevent meningitis, a bacterial infection of the membranes around the brain. The vaccine uses pieces of protein from meningitis bacteria, which signal "hey, I'm foreign" and switch the immune system into attack mode. One particular protein, they found, was especially good at activating the immune response.

So when researchers at the Center for Molecular Immunology turned their attention to lung cancer—then the number-two killer in Cuba—they didn't start from scratch. They took that unusually powerful meningitis protein and fused it to part of another protein called epidermal growth factor, or EGF. EGF is important for controlling cancer because, as its name implies, EGF makes cells grow, and cancer is essentially cells growing out of control. When injected, this fused hybrid protein kicks a patient's immune system into high gear (thanks to the meningitis) and targets cancer cells (thanks to the EGF). That's how CIMAvax is supposed to work. It's called a vaccine because like other vaccines, it stimulates the immune system, but it is actually used to treat rather than prevent lung cancer.

Lee recalls learning all this for the first time at Gonzalez's talk. "I'm just sitting in the audience and going, 'That's really amazing,'" he says. CIMAvax had been approved in a handful of Latin American countries by then, and a handful of desperate American patients have since traveled abroad to get CIMAvax. The vaccine doesn't necessarily kill cancer cells, but it slows their growth enough to prolong patients' lives by several months in trials. And its side effects are mild, especially compared to how chemotherapy can ravage the body.

So the Roswell and Center for Molecular Immunology started working together. It wasn't your typical collaboration though. Calling Cuba is expensive (something like a dollar a minute), and the country only has slow dial-up internet. And then there was all the complications from the embargo, which made moving materials or money between the countries pretty much

impossible. “This has been a very challenging atmosphere for them to collaborate in,” says Gail Reed, the founder of MEDICC, a nonprofit that promotes U.S.-Cuban partnerships in medicine. “It’s really to their credit that they have been pursuing it.”

As the Obama administration looked into restoring relations with Cuba, politicians, law firms, and nonprofits interested in Cuba started paying attention to CIMAvax. MEDICC was one of those nonprofits, and it wrote a white paper detailing policy changes that would make collaborations like the one over CIMAvax less challenging. The executive actions on medical research last month largely reflect those recommendations. And Lee himself has since made about a dozen trips to Havana.

Roswell is now recruiting patients to its clinical trial for CIMAvax in New York. This trial will be a rigorous test for how well the vaccine works. **“There have been trials done outside of U.S., and when we test in U.S., they sometimes don’t give us the same results, because the way we conduct clinical trials is very strict.”** says Erminia Massarelli, an oncologist specializing in lung, head and, throat cancer at City of Hope cancer treatment center. “We will have to see if this vaccine is truly successful. **We hope so because we’re hoping for better treatment.”**

Regardless of how well CIMAvax itself works, it will blaze a path for medical collaborations with Cuba. Behind CIMAvax, Roswell has prepared paperwork for clinical trials on a second cancer immunotherapy candidate from Cuba, and it’s interested in several more. Cuba also has developed other cost-effective treatments that are currently unavailable in the U.S., such as injections for diabetes-related foot ulcers and the meningitis vaccine that predated CIMAvax. “This first trial really is the stone that we’re throwing in the pond to see what happens,” says Lee.

The collaboration has brought about all sorts of changes already, from explicitly allowing the FDA’s policy to approve Cuban pharmaceuticals, to changes as mundane as getting Cuba’s regulatory agency to follow the same drug application formats as the U.S. and other countries. Altogether, they could signal Cuba’s slow reentry in the global community. And FedEx has announced plans for commercial cargo service between the U.S. and Cuba next year. **Eventually, shipping a box of medicine from Havana to Buffalo may be no harder than shipping a box anywhere else in the world.”**

Food Scarcity


Cuba is not hungry

International Food Policy Research Institute 2016 [“Cuba”, *IFPRI*. Accessed at: <http://ghi.ifpri.org/countries/CUB/>.] //DNP

The 2016 GHI Score for Cuba is **<5**.

LEVEL **Low**

Global hunger index evolution



Detailed score for 2016

	Proportion of undernourished in population (%)	Prevalence of wasting in children under five years (%)	Prevalence of stunting in children under five years (%)	Under five mortality rate (%)
Country data (in %)	0.8	2.1	4.9	0.6

Cuba already buys food from US, more relations mean less food

Vinik 2015 [Danny, "Cuba to US: We don't want your food," *Politico*. Accessed at: <http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/10/cuba-to-us-we-dont-want-your-food-000263>.] //DNP

As President Obama's Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker journeys to Havana tomorrow to promote the idea of a warmer U.S. trade relationship with Cuba, she's shadowed by an awkward fact: The existing trade between the two nations is vanishing, and nobody is quite sure why. Strange as it might sound for a country under a 53-year embargo, **Cuba does buy a significant quantity of American goods every year, thanks to a little-known exception that allows American companies to sell food and medical supplies there. But as the two countries grow diplomatically closer, that business relationship has dropped off sharply. Agricultural exports to Cuba slid from \$710 million to \$291 million between 2007 and in 2014. In the first seven months of this year, they've fallen** to \$122 million, a **41 percent** drop. In July, the only agricultural product that Cuba imported from the United States was poultry, according to the U.S. Cuba Trade and Economic Council. As Pritzker arrives on Tuesday for two days of high-level talks with senior Cuban officials, the drop-off is a stark reminder of how much **control the Cuban government can exert over the relationship—and the limits of the White House's ability to promote U.S. interests.**

"What the Obama administration does is only 50 percent of the equation. This is also about what the Cuban government wants," said John Kavulich, the president of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council. "And right now the Cuban government is showing a less than enthusiastic focus on what the president's done." In part the numbers are going down because of pure economics: falling commodity prices push down the value of all trade. Many experts also point to the fact that Cuba can buy agricultural products in a global market. The U.S. has some major competitive advantages—high-quality products and a coastline less than 100 miles from Cuban soil—but American producers still have international competition. And a U.S. law forbids domestic producers from selling agricultural goods on credit to Cuba, putting U.S. producers

at a disadvantage. But many experts say economics is only part of the reason for the decline in exports. They also point a finger at politics. All U.S. agricultural goods must be sold to one state-owned company, Alimport, and many Cuba observers generally believe the Castro regime uses it as a political lever. During much of the 2000s, Alimport purchased U.S. agricultural products from dozens of states with the hope of garnering support from the states' respective lawmakers to repeal the embargo. "Alimport can certainly make decisions on imports that aren't purely economic," said Michael Gershberg, the special counsel at Fried Frank who focuses on trade issues. "If they receive orders from the government to make decision based on political reasons, that can certainly have an effect [on purchases]." When the strategy failed, the Cuban government moved in the opposite direction: Instead of buying from many different states, it decided to dramatically cut back on all U.S. agricultural products. "They tried the carrot. That didn't work," said Parr Rosson, the head of the department of agricultural economics at Texas A&M University. "This may be the stick." As diplomatic relations improved over the past year, the "stick" approach remains. In 2007, U.S. producers sold \$109 million worth of corn and \$67 million worth of soybeans to Alimport. Through July of this year, they've sold less than \$5 million worth of corn and less than \$7 million worth of soybeans. In fact, total U.S. food sales to Cuba fell to less than \$4 million in July, one of the lowest numbers since the law allowing such U.S. agricultural exports took effect in 2001. Just a few years ago, WestStar Food, a Texas agricultural company specializing in pinto beans, was selling 5,000 tons of beans to Cuba each year, worth around \$3.2 million at today's prices. Then those sales disappeared. "We haven't exported anything there for almost four years now," WestStar's president, Patrick Wallesen, said. "For the most part, the way I see it, they pretty much quit buying everything except chicken and grains." At the diplomatic level, all the formal moves have been toward openness: Secretary of State John Kerry reopened the U.S. embassy in Havana in August; a month later the Commerce and Treasury departments relaxed a rule to allow U.S. companies to establish warehouses, storefronts and offices in Cuba. The government also loosened its telecom restrictions, allowing U.S. telecom and Internet providers to do business on the island. It's possible that those moves will open new business channels—but it's also possible the farm sales are a sign Cuba isn't biting. "The U.S. can do what it can do," said David Salmonsens, the senior director for congressional relations at the American Farm Bureau Federation. "Fully having normal trade relations will help. But the focus at the same time is on what does Cuba want to do." Despite the Obama administration's desire to renew diplomatic relations with the Cuban government, increased trade still requires cooperation on the part of the Cubans. Pritzker's visit to Havana this week is intended to push Cuba towards a more open business climate. But if President Raul Castro intends to restrict purchases of U.S. agricultural products as leverage to pressure American politicians into repealing the embargo entirely—a job that falls to Congress—the White House is stuck. As for Patrick Wallesen, he's not confident that the Cuban government will be interested in his company's beans anytime soon. But he's hopeful that someday, that will change. "If they would allow me to lease a warehouse and import product into Cuba," he said, "I would be there tomorrow."

Tourists divert food resources, increase shortages and prices

Ahmed 2016 [Azam, "Cuba's Surge in Tourism Keeps Food of Resident's Plates," *The New York Times*. Accessed at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/08/world/americas/cuba-fidel-castro-food-tourism.html>.] //DNP

HAVANA — For Lisset Felipe, privation is a standard facet of Cuban life, a struggle shared by nearly all, whether they're enduring blackouts or hunting for toilet paper. But this year has been different, in an even more fundamental way, she said. She has not bought a single onion this year, nor a green pepper, both staples of the Cuban diet. Garlic, she said, is a rarity, while avocado, a treat she enjoyed once in a while, is all but absent from her table. "It's a disaster," said Ms. Felipe, 42, who sells air-conditioners for the government. "We never lived luxuriously, but the comfort we once had doesn't exist anymore." The changes in Cuba in recent years have often hinted at a new era of possibilities: a slowly opening economy, warming relations with the United States after decades of isolation, a flood of tourists meant to lift the fortunes of Cubans long marooned on the outskirts of modern prosperity. But the record arrival of nearly 3.5 million visitors to Cuba last year has caused a surging demand for food, causing ripple effects that are upsetting the very promise of Fidel Castro's Cuba. Tourists are quite literally eating Cuba's lunch. Thanks in part to the United States embargo, but also to poor planning by the island's government, goods that Cubans have long relied on are going to well-heeled tourists and the hundreds of private restaurants that cater to them, leading to soaring prices and empty shelves. Without supplies to match the increased appetite, some foods have become so expensive that even basic staples are becoming

unaffordable for regular Cubans. “The private tourism industry is in direct competition for good

supplies with the general population,” said Richard Feinberg, a professor at the University of California, San Diego, and specialist on the Cuban economy. “There are a lot of unanticipated consequences and distortions.” There has long been a divide between Cubans and tourists, with beach resorts and Havana hotels effectively reserved for outsiders willing to shell out money for a more comfortable version of Cuba. But with the country pinning its hopes on tourism, welcoming a surge of new travelers to feed the anemic economy, a more basic inequality has emerged amid the nation’s experiment with capitalism. Rising prices for staples like onions and peppers, or for modest luxuries like pineapples and limes, have left many unable to afford them. Beer and soda can be hard to find, often snapped up in bulk by restaurants. It is a startling evolution in Cuba, where a shared future has been a pillar of the revolution’s promise. While the influx of new money from tourists and other visitors has been a boon for the island’s growing private sector, most Cubans still work within the state-run economy and struggle to make ends meet. President Raúl Castro has acknowledged the surge in agricultural prices and moved to cap them. In a speech in April, he said the government would look into the causes of the soaring costs and crack down on middlemen for price gouging, with limits on what people could charge for certain fruits and vegetables. “We cannot sit with our hands crossed before the unscrupulous manner of middlemen who only think of earning more,” he told party members, according to local news reports. But the **government price ceilings seem to**

have done little to provide good, affordable produce for Cubans. Instead, they have simply moved goods to the commercial market, where farmers and vendors can fetch higher prices, or to the black

market. Havana offers stark examples of this growing chasm. At two state-run markets, where the government sets prices, the shelves this past week were monuments to starch — sweet potatoes, yucca, rice, beans and bananas, plus a few malformed watermelons with pallid flesh. As for tomatoes, green peppers, onions, cucumbers, garlic or lettuce — to say nothing of avocados, pineapples or cilantro — there were only promises. “Try back Saturday for tomatoes,” one vendor offered. It was more of question than a suggestion. But at a nearby co-op market, where vendors have more freedom to set their prices, the fruits and vegetables missing from the state-run stalls were elegantly stacked in abundance. Rarities like grapes, celery, ginger and an array of spices competed for shoppers’ attentions. **The market has become the**

playground of the private restaurants that have sprung up to serve visitors. They **employ cadres of buyers to scour the city each day for fruits, vegetables and nonperishable goods, bearing budgets that overwhelm those of the average household.** “Almost all of our buyers are paladares,” said one vendor, Ruben Martínez, using

the Cuban name for private restaurants, which include about 1,700 establishments across the country. “They are the ones who can afford to pay more for the quality.” By Cuban standards, the prices were astronomic. Several Cuban residents said simply buying a pound of onions and a pound of tomatoes at the prices charged that day would consume 10 percent or so of a standard government salary of about \$25 a month. “I don’t even bother going to those places,” said Yainelys Rodríguez, 39, sitting in a park in Havana while her daughter climbed a slide. “We eat rice and beans and a boiled egg most days, maybe a little pork.” Mrs. Rodríguez’s family is on the lower end of the income ladder, so she supplements earnings with the odd cleaning job she can find. With that, she cares for her two children and an infirm mother. Trying to buy tomatoes, she said, “is an insult.” Another mother, Leticia Álvarez Cañada, described what it was like to prepare decent meals for her family with prices so high. “We have to be magicians,” she said. The struggle is somewhat easier now that she is in the private sector and no longer working for the government, she said. She quit her job as a nurse to start a small business selling fried pork skin and other snacks from a cart. Now she earns about 10 times more every month. “The prices have just gone crazy in the last few years,” said Mrs. Cañada, 41. **There’s just no equilibrium between the prices and the salaries.** While many Cubans have long been hardened to the reality of going without, never more than during what they call the “Special Period” after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new dynamic that has emerged in recent months threatens the nation’s future, experts warn. “The government has consistently failed to invest properly in the agriculture sector,” said Juan Alejandro Triana, an economist at the University of Havana. “We don’t just have to feed 11 million people anymore. We have to feed more than 14 million.” “In the next five years, if we don’t do something about it, food will become a national security issue here,” he added. The government gives Cubans ration books to help provide staples like rice, beans and sugar, but they do not cover items like fresh produce.

Tractors and trucks are limited and routinely break down, often causing the produce to spoil en route. **Inefficiency, red tape and corruption at the local level also stymie productivity,** while a lack of fertilizer reduces yield (though it keeps produce organic, by default). Economists also argue that setting price ceilings can discourage farmers and sellers. If prices are set so low they cannot turn a profit, they argue, why bother working? Most will try to redirect their goods to the private or black market. “From the point of view of the farmer, what would you do?” asked Dr. Feinberg, the California professor. “When the differentials are that great, it requires a really selfless or foolish person to play by the rules.” Paladares sometimes go directly to farms to buy goods, and even provide farmers seeds for specialty products that do not ordinarily grow in Cuba, like arugula, cherry tomatoes and zucchini. Most acknowledge that they distort the market in some ways, and this year the government stopped issuing licenses for new restaurants in Havana. But some restaurant owners argue that it is the government’s responsibility to create better supply. “It’s true, the prices keep going up and up,” said Laura Fernandez, a manager at El Cocinero, a former peanut-oil factory converted into a high-priced restaurant. “But that’s not just the fault of the private sector. There is generally a lot of chaos and disorder in the market.” On the outskirts of Havana, Miguel Salcines has cultivated a beautiful farm. Rows of tidy crops stretch toward the edge of his modest 25 acres, where he employs about 130 people. Though he grows standard products on behalf of the government, there is no product he is more excited about than his new zucchini. A farmer for nearly 50 years, he had never grown the crop

before, but planted a batch two months ago. Now, the vegetables are coming into shape, the spots of bright orange flowers visible amid the green plumage. He knows this crop is not for the regular market, or for the government. It is like the arugula he grows. It is for the tourist market and, by extension, the future. "We are talking about an elite market," he said. "The Cuban markets are a market of necessity."

U.S. embargo strengthened Cuban agricultural industry – checking starvation

Kinser, 08 – B.S., Science, Technology & International Affairs @ Georgetown University; masters in urban planning at University of Michigan; (Corinne Kisner, December 2008, *Climate Institute* "Green Roofs for Urban Food Security and Environmental Sustainability" <http://www.climate.org/topics/international-action/urban-agriculture/havana.htm>)//JES

Following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990, Cuba lost the market for its sugar and the favorable terms of trade for oil. The country was plunged into an economic crisis called the "periodo especial" (special period) characterized by an intense lack of food, fuel, fertilizer, chemicals, spare parts and other industrial and agricultural inputs. During the special period, average caloric, protein and vitamin intake dropped by 30%. Average caloric intake dropped from 2908 to 1863 in five years, and the average Cuban lost 20 pounds during that time. By necessity, Cubans made use of the available resources and created urban gardens to prevent starvation. **The U.S. embargo plunged Cuba into intense economic hardship but gave the government the opportunity to enact agricultural policies** counter to the existing neoliberal model, **protecting Cuban farmers against competition from the extremely subsidized agricultural industry in the U.S. and E.U.** Cuba shifted from export-oriented, chemical-intensive monoculture to organic agriculture and food production for the domestic market. With over three quarters of the country's population living in cities, **urban agriculture played a central role in achieving food security** and took many forms, depending on local circumstances. By 2003, farmers had converted over 300,000 backyard patios to gardens and hope to reach half a million in the future. Organopónicos are a unique feature of Havana's urban agriculture. These raised bed containers are filled with nutrient-rich compost and installed on previously paved or infertile lots, in order to achieve intense vegetable production in urban settings of poor soil or asphalt. On a larger scale, state farms became cooperative agricultural production units (UBPCs) in 1993 to increase efficiency and provide incentives for productivity. By 1997, UBPCs comprised 42% of the agriculture sector. The break-up of state farms made individuals or small teams responsible for production, rewarding efficiency and tying their incomes to the output. Additionally, urban agriculture provides employment and income: in 2003, 22% of all new jobs in the Cuban economy were in this sector. **By 2002 Cuba had met the goal of providing every settlement of over fifteen houses with its own food production capacity, either through organopónicos, community gardens or individual plots.** There are environmental and social benefits in addition to economic ones. Intercropping improved the soil fertility, resulted in diversified diets and strengthened food security. Between 1994 and 1999, production of vegetables quadrupled, production of root crops and plantains tripled, potato production increased by 75% and cereals by 86%. (Meanwhile sugar dropped from 70% of export revenue in 1992 to 39% in 1998.) A lack of fuel and tractors forced farmers to use oxen labor, resulting in stark reductions in greenhouse gas-producing petroleum products. **In 2003 the Ministry of Agriculture used "less than 50% of the diesel fuel it used in 1989, less than 10% of chemical fertilizers and less than 7% of synthetic insecticides."** Furthermore, "the Havana City Government passed a law prohibiting the use of chemical pesticides in agriculture within the city limits. Thus, the crops are grown almost entirely using active organic methods." Socially, urban gardens boost cooperative involvement and dedication to the community. Gardeners often make food donations to the neighborhood, and especially to schools and daycare centers. In terms of the country's health, urban agriculture has been tremendously successful. By 2000, **food availability in Cuba again reached 2,600 calories daily per capita, proving that a country can achieve**

food security for its population through organic means, and providing an example for other third world countries.

Allowing US to import food to Cuba destroys Cuban urban agriculture

Crawford, 3 - Associate Professor, Georgia State University College of Law, member of the faculty of Thomas Jefferson School of Law, San Diego, California (Colin, "Necessity Makes the Frog Jump: Land-Use Planning and Urban Agriculture in Cuba," Summer 2013, Tulane Environmental Law Journal, LexisNexis)//HAL

On September 26, 2002, the largest-ever U.S. trade show in Cuba was held in a Havana suburb. Its purpose was to showcase U.S. food and agriculture. The sponsors included a dazzling list of U.S. agri-industrial superstars - from the makers of highly processed foods like Spam, M & M chocolate candies, and Sara Lee cakes, to the products of [*780] agribusiness giants like Archer Daniels Midland, Cargill, ConAgra, and Tyson Foods. The next day, The New York Times plastered a picture on its front page of Cuban President Fidel Castro at the show, gingerly fingering a plate containing a hamburger and french fries, a chocolate milk shake nearby. One could hardly imagine a more vivid illustration of the **challenges Cuban agriculture will face when the U.S. embargo is lifted**. Specifically, **United States and other foreign agribusiness giants, eager to enter the Cuban market, anxiously await the time they can press everything from processed foods to genetically modified seeds and chemical fertilizers on the Cuban market**. Despite Cuban claims that they will resist this onslaught just as they have resisted the attempts to meddle with their internal politics since the Revolution, the expansion of agricultural markets could well prove an unstoppable juggernaut. **In a country where food purchases can require as much as two-thirds of an average Cuban's salary, the lure of comparatively cheap agricultural inputs and even cheaper food could easily lead to social unrest** if not permitted by the government. n225 In short, the pressure to accept cheaper U.S. and other foreign agricultural products, could well prove to be the necessity that next prods the Cuban frog to jump.

Food ethics invite moral regression to the point of absurdity endangering all of humanity

Hardin, 74 – received a B.S. in [zoology](#) from the [University of Chicago](#) in 1936 and a PhD in [microbiology](#) from [Stanford University](#) in 1941. Moving to the [University of California, Santa Barbara](#) in 1946, he served there as Professor of [Human Ecology](#) from 1963 (Garret Hardin, 1974, "[Lifeboat Ethics: the Case Against Helping the Poor](#)" pgs. 86-76)//JES

Clearly, **the concept of pure justice produces an infinite regression to absurdity**. Centuries ago, wise men invented statutes of limitations to justify the rejection of such pure justice, in the **interest of preventing continual disorder**. The law zealously defends property rights, but only relatively recent property rights. Drawing a line after an arbitrary time has elapsed may be unjust, but the alternatives are worse. We are all the descendants of thieves, and the world's resources are inequitably distributed. But we must begin the journey to tomorrow from the point where we are today. We cannot remake the past. **We cannot safely divide the wealth equitably among all peoples so long as people reproduce at different rates. To do so would guarantee that our grandchildren and everyone else's grandchildren, would have only a ruined world to inhabit.** To be generous with one's own possessions is quite different from being generous with those of posterity. We should call this point to the attention of those who from a commendable love of justice and equality, would institute a system of the commons,

either in the form of a world food bank, or of unrestricted immigration. We must convince them if we wish to save at least some parts of the world from environmental ruin.

TOURISM

‘Increases’ in tourism really just displace non-US tourists

Romeu, 2008. [“Vacation Over: Implications for the Caribbean of Opening U.S.-Cuba Tourism.” Rafael Romeu. International Monetary Fund.
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08162.pdf> GST]

The results presented suggest an increase of Caribbean tourism arrivals of roughly 10 percent, and a shift toward U.S. tourism. U.S. consumers would experience an increase in purchasing power as the dead weight loss of the current policy were to be eliminated. **For Caribbean competitors, a hypothetical opening of Cuba to U.S. tourists would imply hedging toward alternative tourist sources, as U.S. visitor losses would occur on impact. The results suggest that binding capacity constraints in Cuba would likely displace current tourists as new U.S. arrivals with immensely lower travel costs would compete for limited hotel rooms.** Capturing this short-term dislocation is important for offsetting potential U.S. tourist losses. The results also suggest that permanent declines in travel costs for U.S. tourists alongside their importance in this market would increase their long-term presence in the region. **As U.S. tourists would be able to spend less on getting to their destination, they would be able to outbid other visitors for greater tourism quality and quantities.**

Lifting embargo doesn’t solve, tourists can go there whether or not embargo is lifted

PR

Young, 2016 [“Cashing in on Cuba: Why the U.S. tourism industry isn’t waiting for Congress to lift the embargo” by Angelo Young, Salon News. Writer and editor for Salon News. AUG 29, 2016]

In the past seven years, two-way travel restrictions have been lifted, diplomatic ties have been restored, prisoners have been swapped and more U.S. business delegations have been exploring the streets of Havana. And U.S. companies eager to do business in and with this long off-limits market have been leading calls to end the 56-year-old trade embargo.

Now after **the Obama administration used its executive powers to lift some trade restrictions** in September and renewed calls to lift the embargo, companies in the tourism

sector have decided the time to try to gain a foothold in Cuba is now. **They're working around the embargo**, which Congress has failed to rescind.

Although there are still only 12 approved reasons for U.S. citizens to travel to Cuba, they can now be defined broadly enough to accommodate almost any type of tourism, according Samuel Engel, vice president for the Aviation group of ICF International, a global advisory firm. "You'd have to be pretty uncreative not to find a way to put yourself into one of the 12 categories in order to fly to Cuba from the U.S.," Engel told Salon. What, for example, constitutes "educational activities," or "support for the Cuban people," two of the authorized reasons to visit Cuba?

In other words, the gaps in the embargo's fine print are big enough to sail a cruise ship through. Indeed, earlier this year, Carnival became the first U.S. leisure travel company since the 1950s to offer cruise packages to Cuba by carefully categorizing the tour as a cultural exchange program.

Tourism kills biodiversity

Sato, 2016. "Cuba's Tourism, the Embargo, and the Environment." June 7, 2016. By Erika Sato, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs
<http://www.coha.org/cubas-tourism-the-embargo-and-the-environment/> GST

A Rich and Fragile Natural Heritage

Cuba is extremely rich in biodiversity. In addition to its forests and terrestrial wildlife, there are two specific threatened ecosystems worth discussing. **The coral reefs** are very important to tourism and **could face much higher traffic in the next few years** due to its increase. **This increase could easily lead to the ecosystem's destruction from the sheer number of people touching and stepping on the various delicate parts of the reef.**[4] However, another lesser-known and equally important ecosystem is Cuba's mangroves. **Unsustainable tourism industry development has already destroyed around 10,000 acres of mangroves, ecosystems that are extremely rare and valuable for their role in coastal protection from pollution and soil salinization.**[5]

[...]

Particularly concerning for Cuba is the way that U.S. tourism corporations have been gathering at the sidelines ready to pounce on the nation. For example, executive director of Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Frank Del Rio, told The New York Times last July, "I just can't stop thinking about it, [...] Cuba and the cruise industry are just a match made in heaven, waiting to happen." [25] **This enthusiasm worries many environmental experts**, who believe that the sheer amount of money Cuba will be suddenly exposed to (once business restrictions from the United States are terminated) will result in new challenges to their environmental laws that have not been faced before. **"The tourism impact has really been minimal in Cuba, but that's going to change. When you go from 2 million tourists a year to 4 to 6 to 8, everything will change."** declares University of Miami's marine conservationist Fernando Bretos.[26]

Tourism Leads to Sex Trafficking and Raul Doesn't Care

Cribb, 2013. ["How Cuba became the newest hotbed for tourists craving sex with minors." The Miami Herald. Robert Cribb, Jennifer Quinn, Julian Sher, Juan O. Tamayo. March 16, 2013. <http://www.miamiherald.com/latest-news/article1948284.html>] GW

Foreign tourists, especially Canadians and Spaniards, are travelling to Cuba in surprising numbers for sex — and not just with adult prostitutes. They are finding underage girls and boys, a joint investigation by The Toronto Star and El Nuevo Herald has found.

Havana's conspicuous scenes of street-level prostitution are the outward face of a hidden prostitution trade in minors, some as young as four, some with families complicit in their exploitation, the newspapers found.

Cuba holds unique allure for Western sex tourists. It is closer and cheaper than other sex destinations, such as Thailand. And HIV rates are lower than in other Caribbean sex tourism hotspots, such as the Dominican Republic or Haiti.

While the size of the island's underage sex market remains a mystery — the communist government denies it is a problem and fosters the image of an island free of the social ills that plague other nations — it clearly goes on. **A confidential Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) report in 2011 showed Cuba was one of the main destinations in the Americas for Canadian sex predators,** along with the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Brazil and Mexico. More than one million Canadian tourists visited Cuba last year. **Cuba's government "made no known efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex," noted the 2012 version of the U.S. State Department's annual report on global Trafficking in Persons (TIP). The 2003 version noted that some officials of Cuban state enterprises such as restaurants and hotels "turn a blind eye to this [child] exploitation because such activity helps to win hard currency."** A dispatch by U.S. diplomats in Havana in 2009 noted that **"some Cuban children are reportedly pushed into prostitution by their families, exchanging sex for money, food or gifts,"** but gave no overall numbers.

Pimps, cabbies and tourist hotel staffers can procure discreet meetings with underage prostitutes, according to the RCMP report.

[...]

The State Department's TIP report has classified Cuba as a "Tier 3" country — the worst of its rankings — when it comes to combating sex trafficking every year since 2003.

Cuban laws "do not appear to penalize prostitution of children between the ages of 16 and 18" and prostitution for those 18 and older is legal though pimping is outlawed, the 2012 edition noted.

[...]

One State Department dispatch on underage prostitution in Cuba from 2009, also made public by Wikileaks, lists the following "Recommendations for Cuba."

"Acknowledge that child sex trafficking ... is a problem; provide greater legal protections and assistance for victims; develop procedures to identify possible trafficking victims among

vulnerable populations; increase anti-trafficking training for law enforcement; and, take greater steps to prevent the trafficking of children in prostitution.”

That advice has clearly fallen on deaf ears, and Raúl Castro, who succeeded ailing brother Fidel in 2008, continues to officially say nothing about the sex predators among the more than two million tourists who visit the island each year.

Cuba is a tourist destination for pedophiles

Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 2016[“2016 Trafficking in Person’s Report.” U.S. Department of State. Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. 2016. <https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2016/258752.htm>] GW

Cuba is a source and destination country for adults and children subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor. Child sex trafficking and child sex tourism occur within Cuba. Cuban authorities report people from ages 13 to 20 are most vulnerable to human trafficking in the country. Traffickers also subject Cuban citizens to sex trafficking and forced labor in South America and the Caribbean. The government indirectly acknowledged the presence of foreign national trafficking victims in Cuba. The government is the primary employer in the Cuban economy, including in foreign medical missions that employ more than 84,000 workers and constitute a significant source of Cuban government revenue. Some participants in foreign medical missions and other sources allege Cuban officials force or coerce participation in the program; however, the Cuban government and some participants say the program is voluntary and well paid compared to jobs within Cuba. The government uses some high school students in rural areas to harvest crops and does not pay them for their work but claims this work is not coerced.

The Government of Cuba does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so. Despite these measures, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing anti-trafficking efforts compared to the previous reporting period; therefore Cuba is placed on Tier 2 Watch List for the second consecutive year.

Cuban Aggression empirically increases when discussion of lifting embargo

Tymins 14 [Austin S. Tymins is a staffwriter for the Harvard Political Review, primarily interested in domestic economic policy and international trade, “Reexamining the Cuban Embargo”, *Harvard Political Review*, <http://harvardpolitics.com/world/reexamining-cuban-embargo/>] //BS

On a related note, **the Cuban government may not actually have a vested interest in ending the embargo** like it claims, **as doing so could affect the government’s stranglehold on power.** As Vasquez pointed out, **“Every time the United States has talked about liberalizing some aspects of the embargo, Cuba does something provocative to make that political move by the United States impossible. It looks like Cuba in fact has not been interested in ending the embargo.”** **In 1977, President Carter tried to begin diplomatic relations with Cuba and Castro responded with the Mariel Boatlift that sent 125,000 Cubans to American soil, many of whom were criminals and the mentally ill. In 2009, President Obama relaxed U.S. travel policy to the island and the Cuban government**

responded by arresting foreign aid worker Alan Gross and sentencing him to 15 years in a Cuban prison for supposedly aiding dissidents in distributing communications technology.

When the Cuban government acts in these ways, **it becomes impossible for the United States to relax the embargo policy.** In this way, Fidel Castro has successfully used the American embargo as a political tool to maintain political control over his country. The embargo is blamed for economic woes when in reality the communist model is likely responsible. Removing the embargo would show clearly to Cubans that poor economic performance is due primarily to mismanaged central planning. Instead, U.S. policy is used as a scapegoat to cover up the poor economic situation.

Cuban collapse turns literally everything — terrorism, democracy collapse, instability, econ collapse, drug trade, US intervention, and anti-Americanism — seriously this card ends the round

Gorrell, 5 - Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted for the USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT (Tim, "CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?" <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074> //CJC

Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba's problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable.

However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. **When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility** if the U.S. maintains the "wait and see" approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, **thousands will flee the island.** During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.²⁶ Many were criminals; this time the number could be **several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis.**

Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, **the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia.** The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba's actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.²⁷ While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. **If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.**

In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this

action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.

Cuba regime collapse causes a shit ton of bad shit and probably turns everything — refugees, econ, corruption, drugs, and no democracy or positive capitalist outcomes

NAÍM, 1 – editor of Foreign Policy (MOISÉS, “When Countries go Crazy”, MARCH 1, 2001, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2001/03/01/when_countries_go_crazy)//CJC

Some countries can drive other countries crazy. When people have this effect on one another, it is because of imbalances in the brain's neurotransmitters. With countries, it often happens because of the disproportionate influence of special interests. Cuba, for example, has long driven the United States crazy. Just think of the Bay of Pigs invasion or the outsourcing of Castro's assassination to the Mafia. For more recent examples of irrational behavior, think of the Helms-Burton Law or Elián. The problem is that Cuba not only drives the United States crazy but also seems to induce some acute form of learning disability among U.S. politicians. Cuba makes them forget -- or unlearn -- everything

the world has painfully discovered about the transition from communism. This knowledge can be distilled into five simple maxims: Lesson one: Failure is more common than success in the transition to a democratic market economy. Lesson two: The less internationally integrated, more centralized, and more personalized a former communist regime was, the more traumatic and unsuccessful its transition will be. Lesson three: Dismantling a communist state is far easier and faster than building a functional replacement for it. Lesson four: The brutal, criminal ways of a powerful Communist party with a tight grip on public institutions are usually supplanted by the brutal, criminal ways of powerful private business conglomerates with a tight grip on public institutions. Lesson five: Introducing a market economy without a strong and effective state capable of regulating it gives resourceful entrepreneurs more incentive to emulate Al Capone than Bill Gates. It is therefore safe to assume that if the Castro regime suddenly implodes, Cuba will end up looking more like Albania than the Bahamas. But that is not the assumption on which U.S. politicians base their efforts to hasten Castro's demise. Although a lot of money, political capital, and thought have been expended trying to overthrow the Cuban government, ideas about what to do the morning after are scarce and often unrealistic. They usually hinge on the expectation that in the post-Castro era democracy will emerge and Cuban-American exiles will lead other investors in transforming Cuba into a capitalist hub. More likely is that instead of a massive flow of foreign investment into Cuba, the United States will get a massive inflow of refugees escaping the chaos of a post-Castro regime. Frictions between Cuban-Cubans and Miami-Cubans will make politics nasty and unstable. New investments and privatizations will be mired in the legal mess produced by the 5,911 claims to property in Cuba (valued at more than \$17 billion) that have been filed with the United States Claims Commission by former property owners. (That amounts to nearly seven years' worth of Cuban exports.) The Cuban public sector is inextricably intertwined with the Communist Party, so the demise of the party will paralyze the government, at least for a while. And the cost of any resulting humanitarian crisis will mainly be borne by U.S. taxpayers, who will likely pay much more than the \$2 billion spent containing the influx of Haitian refugees in 1994.

But can't the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund support Cuba's transition with money, experts, and projects? Sure, except that the United States forbids them from spending even a dollar to prepare themselves and Cuba for the coming transition. The result is that these institutions are not ready to help Cuba. Again, the United States forgets a useful lesson from another continent: The day after Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin shook hands at the White House in 1993, the World Bank -- which had been instructed to prepare for the event -- was immediately ready to lend and invest in projects under the control of the Palestinian Authority, even though the authority was not and still is not a member of the bank. Allowing such an initiative in Cuba's case would cost U.S. taxpayers nothing and would help plan for the challenges ahead. Also, training Cuban professionals to run a modern market economy is bound to be a better investment for the United States than blocking academic exchanges with the island. The rational, self-interested approach for the United States that also avoids much future human pain in Cuba is to concentrate all efforts on ensuring as smooth a transition as possible. This view, of course, is not shared by all. U.S. Senator Jesse Helms recently said that "the opponents of the Cuban embargo are about to run into a brick wall on the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue.

President Bush is a committed supporter of the embargo." The failure of the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba to achieve its stated objectives over the last 40 years is dismissed by Senator Helms and some Cuban-Americans who argue that the embargo has never been vigorously implemented. Perhaps, as Senator Helms predicts, things are about to change and the aging Cuban dictator will finally fall. **If Cuba collapses and becomes a failed state 90 miles away from U.S. shores, the epicenter of the Caribbean drug trade, the source of a massive flood of refugees to the United States, a corruption haven, and a black hole for substantial sums of U.S. aid,** President Bush will have no one to blame but himself. Or, more precisely, the powerful interest groups that blinded him to the lessons of experience.

Lifting embargo empowers Castro, causes HR violations and prevents political transition

López, 2012 (Juan J. Lopez, Ph.D. Director of Research @ Research Office (College of Arts & Sciences) at Florida International University) Implication of the US Economic embargo for a Political Transition in Cuba. Endowment for Cuban American Studies of the Cuban American National Foundation, 1998.
(<http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume7/pdfs/Lopez.pdf>) MJS

An alternative to maintaining the embargo is to lift it. It is an illusion to believe that ending the embargo will lead to greater respect for human rights in Cuba or encourage a negotiated political transition under the Castro regime. The failure of normal international relations between Cuba and countries in Latin America and Western Europe to achieve political liberalization or respect for human rights supports this conclusion. The foremost goal of the ruling elite is to perpetuate itself in power. **The strategy of the dictatorship apparently is to obtain enough foreign exchange from its international transactions to muddle through while refusing to allow political liberalization.** The Castro government is not willing to pay the price of respect for human rights for better international economic relations. **Lifting the embargo would not mean that the Castro government would allow significant market-oriented economic reforms nor that there would be a dramatic improvement in economic performance.** The Cuban government has refused to move beyond quite limited market reforms while engaging in economic relations with countries other than the United States. **Yet lifting the embargo would help the Castro regime to survive.** Besides handing a political victory to the Cuban government, the end of the embargo would increase the financial resources available to the regime with which to ease the pressures it confronts arising from Cuba's economic situation. The end of the **embargo would make a political transition less likely.** The likelihood that Fidel would die of natural causes while in office would be greater. The current regime could last for an additional decade. Under the best outcome in this scenario, after Fidel dies a different type of regime could emerge in which a negotiated transition becomes possible. But the emergence of such a regime is not assured after the death of Fidel. It is possible that his younger brother, Raúl, the second in command in Cuba, could be able to maintain the current regime. In any event, anyone willing to bet on helping the Castro regime survive for the sake of a possible negotiated transition at some point in the distant future must not lose sight of the fact that people in Cuba have been living in hell for a long time.

Lifting Cuban Sanctions is Unlikely to Democratize Cuba

Dawn Brancati and Javier Corrales, 2016,

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https://www.researchgate.net/publication/299565509_Cuba_Embargo PR

First, the embargo has been unilateral. The embargo has been rejected by almost all nations, including close U.S. allies like Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom. The embargo has also been porous. Despite the embargo, commerce with the U.S. has expanded, and goods are commonly shipped to and from the U.S. through other countries.

Second, Cuba itself has never been interested in opening its doors to U.S. businesses, despite what Cuban officials claim. During the Cold War, Cuba was comfortable trading with the Soviet bloc — it was, after all, subsidized trade. Since then, Cuba has profited from the embargo. The government doesn't have to make concessions to U.S. businesses, and more important, the embargo gives Cuba leverage when dealing with other foreign investors: The government can offer other nations a business environment free of U.S. businesses.

But lifting the embargo will do little to end what some have described as Cuba's "second embargo" — onerous Cuban regulations blocking initiative and entrepreneurship.

Cuba's government allows citizens to work for themselves in only 201 professions, most with low skills. Labor continues to be shackled with restrictions: for instance, workers don't get to decide whom they can work for, and if they are lucky enough (or communist enough) to be allowed to work for a foreign firm, they cannot get paid in foreign currency.

Cuba's second embargo also applies to foreign direct investment (FDI). Joint ventures in Cuba, despite enjoying monopolistic environments, still confront onerous regulations: high taxes, opaque and arbitrary rule enforcement, no control over labor contracts, no protection of property rights. Consequently, FDI to Cuba "has fallen short" of its potential.

Cuba's second embargo is especially strict when it comes to [information](#). While Cubans can own smartphones and computers, and buy Internet access, information in Cuba remains significantly "bootstrapped." Access is too expensive (1 Cuban convertible peso per megabyte, in a country where the average salary is 25-30 pesos per month). Choice is too limited (Facebook is allowed but Skype, YouTube, and WhatsApp are not). Cuban online surveillance is not that sophisticated, but it is strong enough to deter most Cubans from using their devices for political ends. Just because more U.S. firms deliver more Internet does not mean that Cubans will engage in more political online surfing.

Lifting the embargo is unlikely to spark massive protests like those seen in the Middle East and North Africa five years ago. **It won't change the economy much, and it won't necessarily change the most important factors blocking protest in Cuba: state repression, social vigilantism, and exit.**

No research shows that [trade softens repressive regimes](#), unless treaties stipulate that ongoing trade depends on human rights practices and unless trade is rescinded when governments do not meet promised human rights standards.

There's another reason the Cuban regime survives: its citizens collaborate in keeping the government alive. Every street in Cuba has a Committee for the Defense of the Revolution. Cubans still spy on each other because the incentives are attractive. Either the government rewards volunteers for reporting anything suspicious, or volunteers can bribe neighbors who are caught doing something illicit. Either way, vigilantism and repression win.

Finally, there is the exit option. [Leaving Cuba](#) is neither easy nor inexpensive, but it is not impossible. Those who are truly discontent spend more energy figuring out how to leave the island than how to overthrow the system.

Lifting the embargo is also unlikely to change the position of the military. Research on the Arab Spring shows that when the [military](#) sides with protesters, regimes can change. But in Cuba, the military remains [fully aligned with the government](#). That's partly because [the military is perhaps the only sector that has been exempted from Cuba's second embargo](#). The military can engage in a number of economic activities, including deals with foreigners. [As the most important winner from the status quo, the military is therefore its most ardent defender.](#)

Democratization, if it comes, will probably come from domestic demands and potentially from protests from below – but not from the U.S. lifting its embargo. The embargo has had little effect on either hardening or softening the Cuban regime. Lifting it will have just as little influence.

In the past, free trade HAS increased inequality.

Public Citizen [Public Citizen, *A nonprofit organization that does not participate in partisan political activities or endorse any candidates for elected office. We accept no government or corporate money,* “Studies Reveal Consensus: Trade Flows during “Free Trade” Era Have Exacerbated U.S. Income Inequality,” <http://www.citizen.org/documents/trade-and-income-inequality.pdf>] // AUN

“In the early 1990s, as U.S. income inequality soared amid the enactment of U.S. “free trade” deals, a spate of economic studies put the theory to the test, aiming to determine the relative contribution of trade flows to the rise in U.S. income inequality. The result was an academic consensus that **trade flows had, in fact, contributed to rising U.S. income inequality.** The only debate was the extent of trade’s role, with most studies estimating that **between 10 and 40 percent of the rise in inequality during the 1980s and early 1990s** stemmed from trade flows, as indicated in the table below.”

Free Trade Increases Income Inequality. (free trade → people buying cheaper stuff elsewhere → workers get paid less so they can compete)

Meyerson, 2015 [Harold Meyerson, *an American journalist and opinion columnist. In 2009 The Atlantic Monthly named him one of “the most influential commentators in the nation”* [citation](#), “A trade deal at what cost?” May 20, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/at-what-cost-trade/2015/05/20/e9c9531c-ff1a-11e4-805c-c3f407e5a9e9_story.html] // AUN

“Future Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson [wrote in 1955](#) that, under free trade, “**national product would go up, but the relative and absolute share of labor might go down.**” More pointedly still, another Nobel laureate, Bertil Ohlin, showed that as a result of trade, **a nation’s workers could see their wages decline even if none of them lost their jobs.**

Samuelson and Ohlin have been proved right. **Increased trade with lower-wage nations over the past 30 years has resulted in both massive offshoring of manufacturing and wage decline for most U.S. workers.** As economists David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson [have demonstrated](#), **Chinese import competition has lowered wages not just for displaced manufacturing workers in this country but also, on average, for all workers in their midst.”**

Open borders increases tourism by 2 million

Mattingly, 2016. From the Winter 2015/16 Issue "Latin America On Life Support?" By Amanda Mattingly. The World Policy Institute. <http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/winter2015/changing-face-cuba> GST

Nevertheless, to the Cuban people, the importance of the new thaw between the United States and Cuba and the tantalizing possibility of an end to el bloqueo should not be underestimated. Cubans working for the state, private business owners, former diplomats, professors, street vendors, economists, urban planners, historians, B&B owners, artists, and musicians all now express their hopes for the future of Cuba. There is a palpable excitement in Cuba that cannot be denied. A taxi driver in Havana sums it up, saying that everyone in Cuba is excited for Americans to come to Cuba and wants to know when there will be more arriving because, as he says, “Everyone knows the Americans are the most generous.” **Cuban architect Pedro Vázquez is as optimistic about the expected surge in tourism to 2 million more a year once American citizens are able to travel freely as he is for the prospect of increased capital flowing into Cuba.** He enthusiastically notes all of the planned restoration and development projects along the Bay of Havana that are ready and eagerly awaiting funding by American investors. The sous chefs at the paladar, or privately owned restaurant, called Ivan Chef Justo, demonstrate their elation by waving wildly from the kitchen and calling in English, “Come back soon! We love Americans! Tell your friends!”

Oil drilling

Obama just removed oil restrictions on Cuba

Guzzo 2017 [Paul Guzzo at the Tampa Bay Times, “U.S. signs agreements [opening gulf to Cuba drilling](#), partnering on cleanups,” *Tampa Bay Times*, 1/20/17, <<http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/us-signs-agreements-opening-gulf-to-cuba-drilling-partnering-on-cleanups/2310268>>] //CJC

In its final days in the White House, the Obama administration made it easier for the Cuban government to drill for oil in gulf waters just beyond the country's maritime border with the United States. It's the result of a treaty signed Wednesday that defines who controls a 7,700-square-mile area that begins just over 200 miles off the coast of Tampa Bay and Florida, long known as the Eastern Gap. It is thought to be rich with oil but had no clear owner because it fell just beyond the maritime boundaries of the United States, Cuba and Mexico. The provisions of the treaty had been agreed upon under the Carter administration but were never formalized. Cuba gets around 10 percent of the Eastern Gap. Past oil explorations in Cuban waters have come up dry, but the government has said it intends to look again. Cuba has invited drillers to lease around the gap area but had no takers — probably, analysts have said, because of uncertainty over who owns the gap.

Drilling won't happen in the squo – wells aren't commercially viable – multiple wells prove.

Sullivan 2013

Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, Congressional Research Service, Cuba: U.S. Policy and Issues for the 113th Congress June 12, 2013 //CJC

Cuba has had seven offshore deepwater oil projects involving nine foreign companies in 22 exploration blocs. (See Figure 7 for a map of Cuba's offshore oil blocks.) The Spanish oil company Repsol, in a consortium with Norway's Statoil and India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, began offshore exploratory drilling in late January 2012, using an oil rig known as the Scarabeo-9 (owned by an Italian oil services provider, Saipem, a subsidiary of the Italian oil company ENI). On May 18, 2012, however, Repsol announced that its exploratory well came up dry, and the company subsequently announced in late May that it would likely leave Cuba. Subsequently, in late May 2012, the Scarabeo-9 oil rig was used by the Malaysian company Petronas in cooperation with the Russian company Gazprom to explore for oil in a block off the coast of western Cuba. On August 6, 2012, however, Cuba announced that the well was found not to be commercially viable because of its compact geological formation. In early September 2012, the Venezuelan oil company, PdVSA, announced that it had started exploring for oil off the coast of western Cuba, but on November 2, 2012, Cuba announced that the well was not commercially viable. In addition to these projects, Cuba has three additional offshore projects with foreign oil companies—PetroVietnam, Sonangol (Angola), and ONGC (India). **As a result of the three unsuccessful wells, the Scarabeo-9 oil rig left Cuba on November 14, 2012, reportedly headed to West Africa.** Some oil experts maintain that **it could be years before companies decide to return to drill again in Cuba's offshore deepwaters.**¹¹⁴ **Most observers maintain that the failure to discover oil in the three wells drilled by the Scarabeo-9 oil rig in 2012 is a significant setback for the Cuban government's efforts to develop its deepwater offshore hydrocarbon resources.**¹¹⁵

Status quo solves – inspection ensures compliance with U.S. standards

Geman, 12 (Ben, "Interior: Cuba-bound drilling rig 'generally' meets US standards", 1/9, <http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/203161-interior-cuba-bound-drilling-rig-generally-meets-us-standards>) //CJC

The deepwater drilling rig that Spanish oil giant Repsol will use for planned oil exploration off Cuba's coast *is getting a clean bill of health* from U.S. officials. The United States has no regulatory authority over the drilling, but an Interior Department and Coast Guard team was invited to inspect the Scarabeo 9 rig by Repsol, a check-up that comes as planned drilling off Cuba's coast draws criticism from several U.S. lawmakers. "The review compared the vessel with applicable international safety and security standards as well as U.S.

standards for drilling units operating in the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf. U.S. personnel found the vessel to *generally comply with* existing international and U.S. standards by which Repsol has pledged to abide," the U.S. agencies said in a joint statement Monday upon completion of the review. The U.S. team reviewed drilling equipment, safety systems such as firefighting equipment and the unit's blowout preventer and other aspects of the rig. A number of U.S. lawmakers critical of the Cuban government have criticized Repsol's planned project, noting it will bring revenues to the Cuban regime and that a spill could threaten nearby U.S. shores. More on that here, here and here. "The review is consistent with U.S. efforts to *minimize the possibility* of a major oil spill, which would hurt U.S. economic and environmental interests," Interior and the Coast Guard said of the inspection, which occurred off the coast of Trinidad and Tobago.

Turn: Drilling fractures ocean floor – leads to massive and permanent oil leak

Pravica 12—Professor of Physics and Astronomy @ [University of Nevada](http://www.unlv.edu/), Las Vegas [Michael Pravica, "Letters: Science, not profit, must lead deep water drilling," *USA Today*, Updated 4/24/2012 8:43 PM , pg. <http://tinyurl.com/9g8x28g> King TS) //CJC
There are a few critical points not mentioned in the USA TODAY editorial on the BP oil spill that should have been addressed ("[Editorial: 2 years after BP spill, lower risks](#)"). First of all, deep water drilling represents a "brave new world" of oil exploration and novel technology as humans probe depths of water, oil and rock that sustain thousands of atmospheres of pressure. **At these levels, the technology used to drill and extract oil can easily fail** as we approach the yield strengths of many of the confining materials subjected to extreme conditions. There is also a **high chance of significant fracture of the ocean/sea floor in drilling and hole erosion from gushing, hot and high pressure oil (along with particulates and other mineral-rich fluids) that could make repair nearly impossible and could permanently poison our waters.**

Spilled oil disperses – bacteria break down droplets

Ross, 10 (Selena, "BP Experts: Everything You Know About the Oil Spill is Wrong," AOL NEWS, 8-1-10, www.aolnews.com/gulf-oil-spill/article/gulf-oil-spill-cleanup-bp-consultants-discuss-what-they-see-as-misconceptions/19572133?icid=main|main|dl1|link5|http%3A%2F%2Fwww.aolnews.com%2Fgulf-oil-spill%2Farticle%2Fgulf-oil-spill-cleanup-bp-consultants-d) //CJC

There is no mass of Deepwater oil where we can't see it, and there are no traveling plumes of heavy oil miles away from the well head, the three experts say. "That would never happen, and all the monitoring that's been going on has been showing very low -- and decreasing -- concentrations of oil," Lewis says. **When oil is dispersed into tiny droplets, the droplets separate from each other and are diluted in the open ocean**, he explains. **They do not get weighed down and cannot rejoin each other under water. Bacteria break them down into carbon dioxide and water in a predictable way, and when they can't be found, it's because they are no longer there.** Lewis points to a huge eco-monitoring project started by the British government after the big Sea Empress spill was dispersed in 1996, Lewis says. "There were no effects the next year," he says. **If the oil is dispersed at sea, you can go back a year later and you can't find it.**

Chinese influence in the region key to the global economy and regime stability – preventing US influence key

Ellis 11

[R. Evan, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University. Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, 1st quarter 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf] //CJC

Access to Latin American Markets. Latin American markets are becoming increasingly valuable for Chinese companies because they allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export base at a time when economic growth is slowing in traditional markets such as the United States and Europe. The region has also proven an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated, higher value added products in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances, computers and telecommunication equipment, and aircraft. In expanding access for its products through free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets in Latin American countries with existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the PRC has often had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically well-connected established interests in those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key groups of businesspeople and government officials in those nations have played a key role in the political will to overcome the resistance. In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of the few people in the country who could call President Chávez on the telephone and get an instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese company.

Protection of Chinese Investments in and Trade Flows from the Region. At times, China has applied more explicit pressures to induce Latin America to keep its markets open to Chinese goods. It has specifically protested measures by the Argentine and Mexican governments that it has seen as protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as informal retaliation, China began enforcing a longstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost \$2 billion in lost soy exports and other damages for Argentina.¹⁴ China has also used its economic weight to help secure major projects on preferential terms. In the course of negotiating a \$1.7 billion loan deal for the Coco Coda Sinclair Hydroelectric plant in Ecuador, the ability of the Chinese bidder SinoHidro to self-finance 85 percent of the projects through Chinese banks helped it to work around the traditional Ecuadorian requirement that the project have a local partner. Later, the Ecuadorian government publicly and bitterly broke off negotiations with the Chinese, only to return to the bargaining table 2 months later after failing to find satisfactory alternatives. In Venezuela, the Chávez government agreed, for example, to accept half of the \$20 billion loaned to it by the PRC in Chinese currency, and to use part of that currency to buy 229,000 consumer appliances from the Chinese manufacturer Haier for resale to the Venezuelan people. In another deal, the PRC loaned Venezuela \$300 million to start a regional airline, but as part of the deal, required Venezuela to purchase the planes from a Chinese company.¹⁵ Protection of Chinese Nationals. As with the United States and other Western countries, as China becomes more involved in business and other operations in Latin America, an increasing number of its nationals will be vulnerable to hazards common to the region, such as kidnapping, crime, protests, and related problems. The heightened presence of Chinese petroleum companies in the northern jungle region of Ecuador, for example, has been associated with a series of problems, including the takeover of an oilfield operated by the Andes petroleum consortium in Tarapoa in November 2006, and protests in Orellana related to a labor dispute with the Chinese company Petroriental in 2007 that resulted in the death of more than 35 police officers and forced the declaration of a national state of emergency. In 2004, ethnic Chinese shopkeepers in Valencia and Maracay, Venezuela, became the focus of violent protests associated with the Venezuelan recall referendum. As such incidents increase, the PRC will need to rely increasingly on a combination of goodwill and fear to deter action against its personnel, as well as its influence with governments of the region, to resolve such problems when they occur. The rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country's sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests. In Latin America, China's attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used "against" Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.

Chinese growth prevents global economic collapse, war over Taiwan and CCP collapse

Lewis 8. [Dan, Research Director – Economic Research Council, "The Nightmare of a Chinese Economic Collapse," World Finance, 5/13, <http://www.worldfinance.com/news/home/finalbell/article117.html>] //CJC

In 2001, Gordon Chang authored a global bestseller "The Coming Collapse of China." To suggest that the world's largest nation of 1.3 billion people is on the brink of collapse is understandably for many, a deeply unnerving theme. And many seasoned "China Hands" rejected Chang's thesis outright. In a very real sense, they were of course right. China's expansion has continued over the last six years without a hitch. After notching up a staggering 10.7 percent growth last year, it is now the 4th largest economy in the world with a nominal GDP of \$2.68trn. Yet there are two Chinas that concern us here; the 800 million who live in the cities, coastal and southern regions and the 500 million who live in the countryside and are mainly engaged in agriculture. The latter – which

we in the West hear very little about – are still very poor and much less happy. Their poverty and misery do not necessarily spell an impending cataclysm – after all, that is how they have always been. But it does illustrate the inequity of Chinese monetary policy. For many years, the Chinese yen has been held at an artificially low value to boost manufacturing exports. This has clearly worked for one side of the economy, but not for the purchasing power of consumers and the rural poor, some of who are getting even poorer. The central reason for this has been the inability of Chinese monetary policy to adequately support both Chinas.

Meanwhile, rural unrest in China is on the rise – fuelled not only by an accelerating income gap with the coastal cities, but by an oft-reported appropriation of their land for little or no compensation by the state.

According to Professor David B. Smith, one of the City's most accurate and respected economists in recent years, potentially far more serious though is the impact that Chinese monetary policy could have on many Western nations such as the UK. Quite simply, China's undervalued currency has enabled Western governments to maintain artificially strong currencies, reduce inflation and keep interest rates lower than they might otherwise be. We should therefore be very worried about how vulnerable Western economic growth is to an upward revaluation of the Chinese yuan. Should that revaluation happen to appease China's rural poor, at a stroke, the dollar, sterling and the euro would quickly depreciate, rates in those currencies would have to rise substantially and the yield on government bonds would follow suit. This would add greatly to the debt servicing cost of budget deficits in the USA, the UK and much of euro land. A reduction in demand for imported Chinese goods

would quickly entail a decline in China's economic growth rate. That is alarming. It has been calculated that **to keep China's society stable** – ie to manage the **transition** from a rural to an urban society **without devastating unemployment** - **the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent**. **Anything less** than that **and unemployment will rise** and the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. **This is when** real **discontent with communist party rule becomes** vocal and **hard to ignore**. It doesn't end there. **That will** at best **bring a global recession**. The crucial point is that communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions – so far. But **when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress** and the implosion of central power, **history suggests** that **they don't become successful democracies** overnight. Far from it. There's a very real chance that **China might go the way of Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union** – **chaos, civil unrest and internecine war**. In the very worst case scenario, **a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan** – **whom America is pledged to defend**.

Chinese relations with Latin American are neither a threat nor zero-sum – multiple warrants

Jiang 11 (Jiang Shixue is a professor at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Vice President of Chinese Association of Latin American Studies. "The U.S. Factor in Sino-Latin American Relations", China & US Focus, November 3, 2011,

<http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-u-s-worry-factor-in-sino-latin-american-relations/>) //CJC

The U.S. concerns are unnecessary and unfounded. First, both China and Latin America have been opening to the outside world. In the age of globalization, both should cooperate to promote South-South collaboration. As a matter of fact, further cooperation between China and Latin America will benefit regional peace and development in the Asia-Pacific and Latin America. This outcome would certainly be welcomed by the United States. Second, it is well-known that Latin America has been implementing reforms and opening to the outside world for almost two decades. It endeavors to attract more foreign investment and liberalize the market to stimulate growth. As a result, China is only one of the economic partners Latin America has been trying to cooperate with. Third, China's relations with Latin America are for economic purposes, not for political outcomes to be used against the U.S. China well understands that Latin America is the backyard of the United States, so there is no need for it to challenge American influence. Fourth, China's cooperation with Latin America in military and security fields is not targeting any third party and it is hardly a secret issue. China's first policy paper on Latin America, published in November 2008, openly set aside one section to deal with the issue. It said: "The Chinese side will actively carry out military exchanges and defense dialogue and cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries. Mutual visits by defense and military officials of the two sides, as well as

personnel exchanges, will be enhanced.” Moreover, China’s military relations with Latin America are undertaken according to the following principles: 1) to gain better understanding of the Latin American military; 2) to improve professional expertise by learning from each other; 3) never target any third party; and 4) never harm regional and hemispheric stability. These principles are not counter to U.S. national interest and dominance in the western hemisphere. Finally, China does not wish to be used as a “card” against the United States. It has no enthusiasm for getting entangled in the problems of U.S.-Latin American relations. It is encouraging to see that in the U.S. there are other voices commenting about Sino-Latin American relations. For instance, Manuel Rocha, former U.S. ambassador to Bolivia, also said, “Were it not for China, Latin America would probably be showing a much more lackluster [economic] performance.” In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, in June 2008, Daniel P. Erikson, then a senior researcher at the Inter-American Dialogue, pointed out that “while China’s expansion into Latin America may imply a potential loss for some U.S. business sectors, it is important to note that trade is not a zero sum game. To the extent that China’s involvement is sparking economic growth in Latin America, it may contribute to economic stability and well-being in a manner that suits the U.S. desire to see a prosperous and healthy neighborhood.” Erikson added, “China’s engagement in Latin America is not yet a major concern for the United States, and there are few signs of any real frictions between the two countries on that score.” So, President Monroe does not need to roll over in his grave

Latin America is distancing from China

Ferchen 12 [Matt, China Brief, China-Latin American Relations: The End of the Honeymoon?, 1/16/12, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/01/16/china-latin-american-relations/925n>] //CJC

But at the same time, anxieties about expanding economic ties with China are rising in some countries and economic sectors in Latin America. *Even in countries that have benefited the most* from expanding commodity ties to China, through a combination of exports to China and an inflow of Chinese investment, there are worries. Such anxieties are often based on historical patterns of export dependency and the trauma of commodity boom-and-bust cycles that have afflicted the region for well over a century. Countries like Brazil that have fought to move away from commodity-based export growth worry about “de-industrialization” and over-reliance on demand from a single market like China. Moreover, rising Chinese foreign investment in the region’s mineral and agricultural resources have raised concerns about “Dutch disease” and its negative impact on Latin American manufacturing exports. (Dutch disease refers to the tendency for a commodity boom to result in currency inflation, which subsequently makes non-commodity exports less competitive). The surge in investment from China has also brought to the fore local sensitivities about foreign ownership of agricultural land. After a nearly decade-long period of increasingly close economic ties between China and Latin America, the relationship now stands at a turning point. The honeymoon period based on the initial Latin American euphoria over expanded trade and investment with China is giving way to anxieties. Even the relatively small number of South American countries that have benefited the most from commodities ties with China have long expressed a desire to move beyond a narrow Chinese focus on natural resource trade and investment. Initial hopes for a broadening of the relationship, including increased exports of Latin American manufactured goods to the huge Chinese market, have largely been disappointed.

US influence in Latin America’s resilient and the thesis of the DA is wrong

Duddy & Mora 5-1-13 [Patrick – US Ambassador to Venezuela until 2010 and Senior Lecturer at Duke. And Frank – Director of Latin American Center at Florida Intl University and former Assistant Secretary of Defense – Western Hemisphere (09-13). “Latin America: Is U.S. influence waning?” 5/1/13 <http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/01/3375160/latin-america-is-us-influence.html#storylink=cpy>] //CJC

As Moises Naim notes in his recent book, *The End of Power*, there has been an important change in power distribution in the world away from states toward an expanding and increasingly mobile set of

actors that are dramatically shaping the nature and scope of global relationships. In Latin America, many of the most substantive and dynamic forms of engagement are occurring **ina web of cross-national relationships involving small and large companies, people-to-people contact through student exchanges and social media, travel and migration.**¶ Trade and investment remain the most enduring and measurable dimensions of U.S. relations with the region. It is certainly the case that our economic interests alone would justify more U.S. attention to the region. **Many observers who worry about declining U.S. influence in this area point to** the rise of trade with **China** and the presence of European companies and investors.¶ While it is true that other countries are important to the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, it is also still true that the **United States is by far the largest and most important economic partner of the region and trade is growing** even with those countries with which we do not have free trade agreements.¶ An area of immense importance to regional economies that we often overlook is the exponential growth in travel, tourism and migration. It is commonplace to note the enormous presence of foreign students in the United States but in 2011, according to the Institute of International Education, after Europe, Latin America was the second most popular destination for U.S. university students. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. tourists travel every year to Latin America and the Caribbean helping to support thousands of jobs.¶ From 2006-2011 U.S. non-government organizations, such as churches, think tanks and universities increased the number of partnerships with their regional cohorts by a factor of four. Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean from the United States totaled \$64 billion in 2012. Particularly for the smaller economies of Central America and the Caribbean these flows can sometimes constitute more than 10 percent of gross domestic product.¶ Finally, **one** should not underestimate the resiliency of U.S. soft power in the region. **The power of national reputation, popular culture, values and institutions continues to contribute to U.S. influence in ways that are difficult to measure and impossible to quantify.** Example: Despite 14 years of strident anti-American rhetoric during the Chávez government, tens of thousands of Venezuelans apply for U.S. nonimmigrant visas every year, including many thousands of Chávez loyalists.¶ Does this mean we can feel comfortable relegating U.S. relations with the hemisphere to the second or third tier of our international concerns? Certainly not. **We have real and proliferating interests in the region.** As the president and his team head to Mexico and Costa Rica, it is important to recognize the importance of our ties to the region.¶ **We have many individual national partners in the Americas. We don't need a new template for relations with the hemisphere as a whole or another grand U.S.-Latin America strategy. A greater commitment to work more intensely with the individual countries on the issues most relevant to them would be appropriate.** **The United States still has the economic and cultural heft in the region to play a fundamental role and to advance its own interests.**

No resource wars – too expensive and market checks

Victor '8

David G., Adjunct Senior Fellow for Science and Technology, Council on Foreign Relations; Director, Program on Energy and Sustainable Development @ Stanford "Smoke and Mirror" <http://www.nationalinterest.org/PrinterFriendly.aspx?id=16530> //CJC

MY ARGUMENT is that classic **resource wars**—hot conflicts driven by a struggle to grab resources—**are increasingly rare. Even where resources play a role, they are rarely the root cause of bloodshed.** Rather, the root cause usually lies in various failures of governance. That argument—in both its classic form and in its more nuanced incarnation—is hardly a straw man, as Thomas Homer-Dixon asserts. Setting aside hyperbole, the punditry increasingly points to resources as a cause of war. And so do social scientists and policy analysts, even with their more nuanced views. I've triggered this debate because conventional wisdom puts too much emphasis on resources as a cause of conflict. Getting the story right has big implications for social scientists trying to unravel cause-and-effect and often even larger implications for public policy. Michael Klare is right to underscore Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, the only classic resource conflict in recent memory. That episode highlights two of the reasons why classic resource wars are becoming rare—**they're expensive and rarely work.** (And even in Kuwait's case, many other forces also spurred the invasion. Notably, Iraq felt insecure with its only access to the sea a

narrow strip of land sandwiched between Kuwait on one side and its archenemy Iran on the other.) In the end, **on the order of \$100 billion** (plus his country and then his head) **in his quest for Kuwait's 1.5 million barrels** per day of combined oil and gas output. By contrast, Exxon paid \$80 billion to get Mobil's 1.7 million barrels per day of oil and gas production—a merger that has held and flourished. **As the bulging sovereign wealth funds are discovering, it is easier to get resources through the stock exchange than the gun barrel.**

US-China war is impossible – deterrence checks even if they overtake us

Glaser 11 - Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Director of the Elliott School's Institute for Security and Conflict Studies (Charles, "Will China's Rise Lead to War?" Foreign Affairs, April 2011)
//CJC

What does all this imply about the rise of China? At the broadest level, the news is good. Current international conditions should enable both the United States and China to protect their vital interests without posing large threats to each other. Nuclear weapons make it relatively easy for major powers to maintain highly effective deterrent forces. Even if Chinese power were to greatly exceed U.S. power somewhere down the road, the United States would still be able to maintain nuclear forces that could survive any Chinese attack and threaten massive damage in retaliation. Large-scale conventional attacks by China against the U.S. homeland, meanwhile, are virtually impossible because the United States and China are separated by the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean, across which it would be difficult to attack. No foreseeable increase in China's power would be large enough to overcome these twin advantages of defense for the United States. The same defensive advantages, moreover, apply to China as well. Although China is currently much weaker than the United States militarily, it will soon be able to build a nuclear force that meets its requirements for deterrence. And China should not find the United States' massive conventional capabilities especially threatening, because the bulk of U.S. forces, logistics, and support lie across the Pacific. The overall effect of these conditions is to greatly moderate the security dilemma. Both the United States and China will be able to maintain high levels of security now and through any potential rise of China to superpower status. This should help Washington and Beijing avoid truly strained geopolitical relations, which should in turn help ensure that the security dilemma stays moderate, thereby facilitating cooperation. The United States, for example, will have the option to forego responding to China's modernization of its nuclear force. This restraint will help reassure China that the United States does not want to threaten its security—and thus help head off a downward political spiral fueled by nuclear competition.

Low-level conflicts won't escalate to accidental war –MAD and diplomacy still checks

Keck 13 - Former Deputy Editor of E-International Relations (Zachary, The Diplomat, "Why China and the U.S. (Probably) Won't Go to War," <http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/why-china-and-the-us-probably-wont-go-to-war/>)//CJC

These can and should be supplemented with clear and open communication channels, which can be especially useful when unexpected crises arise, like an exchange of fire between low-level naval officers in the increasingly crowded waters in the region. While this possibility is real and frightening, it's hard to imagine a plausible scenario where it leads to a nuclear exchange

between China and the United States. After all, at each stage of the crisis leaders know that if it is not properly contained, a nuclear war could ensue, and the complete destruction of a leader's country is a more frightening possibility than losing credibility among hawkish elements of society. In any case, measured means of retaliation would be available to the party wronged, and behind-the-scenes diplomacy could help facilitate the process of finding mutually acceptable retaliatory measures.

Cuban economy is remarkably resilient – embargo, loss of Soviet aid proves

Third World Planet, 13 ("The Cuban Economy," " <http://www.thirdworldplanet.com/cuban-economy.php>)//CJC

The Cuban economy has been remarkably resilient over the years surviving a great many difficulties. For many years the country relied on trade with the Soviet Union but when that came to end they had to find different ways to keep their economy going. **Despite an embargo by the United States, Cuba has managed to keep its economy afloat.** They are one of the few communist countries remaining in the world and it seems unlikely that that is going to change anytime soon

No more drilling in Cuba for 15-20 years – expert says

Reuters, 12 ("Drilling rig leaves Cuba, taking oil hopes with it", Nov 14, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/14/cuba-oil-rig-idUSL1E8MEHET20121114>) //CJC

HAVANA, Nov 14 (Reuters) - The Scarabeo 9, a Chinese-built offshore drilling rig that Cuba hoped would open a new era of oil production, **sailed away** from the island on Wednesday, **taking with it** the communist country's near-term dreams of energy independence. The massive, multi-colored rig, owned by Italian oil services company Saipem, could be seen from Havana heading east through the blue waters of the Florida Straits en route, industry sources said, to West Africa. It may be years before Cuba sees another rig like it. The Scarabeo 9, designed to operate in water up 12,000 feet deep (3,650 meters), **was used to drill three wells**, all in more than a mile (1.6 km) of water off Cuba's north and west coasts - and **all unsuccessful**. Cuba had hoped to tap into deepwater offshore fields it says may hold 20 billion barrels of oil and end its dependence on socialist ally Venezuela, which ships the Caribbean island 115,000 barrels of petroleum a day in an oil-for-services deal. A consortium led by Spanish oil giant Repsol, which contracted the Scarabeo 9 from Saipem, hit the first dry hole last spring. That was followed by unsuccessful wells by Malaysia's Petronas in partnership with Russia's Gazprom Neft, and by Venezuela's state-owned PDVSA. Little is known about the PDVSA well, but Repsol and Petronas **both encountered very hard rock that slowed drilling and, in Petronas' case, made it impossible to produce hydrocarbons** that were found. The Malaysian firm is continuing to do three-dimensional seismic work searching for reservoirs of oil, but Repsol is leaving the island after 12 years. Using a different rig, it drilled Cuba's first offshore well in 2004, where it said it found oil, but the find was not "commercial." **NO IMMINENT DRILLING PLANS** Other companies including Angola's Sonangol, India's ONGC and Petrovietnam hold offshore exploration leases in Cuba, but none are known to have any imminent drilling plans. Jorge Pinon, a Cuba oil expert at the University of Texas in Austin, said it could be a decade or more before anyone takes another chance on Cuba's deepwater fields. "This deal is done. It's going to take a long time before the next one," he said. **"You could even be looking at 15 to 20 years** if you put it all together.

Turn: Loss of drilling prospects causes Cuba to accelerate economic opening

Krauss and Cave, 12 – Clifford, National Business Correspondent, and Damien, Foreign Correspondent (“Cuba’s Prospects for an Oil-Fueled Economic Jolt Falter With Departure of Rig”, New York Times, November 9, 2012, “Cuba’s Prospects for an Oil-Fueled Economic Jolt Falter With Departure of Rig”)//CJC

Cuba’s hopes of reviving its economy with an oil boom have produced little more than three dry holes, persuading foreign oil companies to remove the one deepwater rig able to work in Cuban waters so it could be used for more lucrative prospects elsewhere. The rig, which was built in China to get around the United States trade embargo, is expected to depart in the next few weeks. With no other rigs available for deepwater exploration, that means Cuba must now postpone what had become an abiding dream: a windfall that would save Cuba’s economy and lead to a uniquely Cuban utopia where the island’s socialist system was paid for by oil sales to its capitalist neighbors. “The Cuban oil dream is over and done with, at least for the next five years,” said Jorge Piñón, a former BP and Amoco executive who fled Cuba as a child but continues to brief foreign oil companies on Cuban oil prospects. “The companies have better prospects by going to Brazil, Angola and the U.S. Gulf.” The lack of a quick find comes at a difficult time for Cuba. The effects of Hurricane Sandy, which destroyed more than 100,000 homes in eastern Cuba, are weighing down an economy that remains moribund despite two years of efforts by the Cuban government to cut state payrolls and cautiously encourage free enterprise on a small scale. Cuba had hoped to become energy independent, after relying first on Russia and now on Venezuela for most of its oil. But **with its drilling prospects dimming, experts say, Cuban officials may be pushed to accelerate the process of economic opening.** At the very least, it may embolden members of the bureaucracy looking for broader or faster changes in the economy. “This could represent a crucial setback for the Cuban regime,” said Blake Clayton, an energy fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. In the meantime, the government has mostly tried to put a positive spin on the disappointing drilling results and the decision of the rig operator to lease in other waters. Granma, the Communist Party newspaper, reported last week that while Venezuela’s state oil firm had plugged its hole because “it did not offer possibilities of commercial exploitation,” the drilling had obtained valuable geological information. The Venezuelan firm was the last of three foreign oil companies to use the rig, after the Spanish company Repsol and the Malaysian company Petronas. The government said more exploration could be expected

No Taiwan war- China doesn’t want to invade, and deterrence checks escalation

Keck 13 (12/24, Zachary, formerly Managing Editor of The Diplomat where he authored The Pacific Realist blog, Previously, he worked as Deputy Editor of e-International Relations and has interned at the Center for a New American Security and in the U.S. Congress, where he worked on defense issues, Why China Won’t Attack Taiwan, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/why-china-wont-attack-taiwan/>) //CJC

Even assuming China’s military capabilities are great enough to prevent the U.S. from intervening, there are two forces that would likely be sufficient to deter China from invading Taiwan. The first and least important is the dramatic impact this would have on how countries in the region and around the world would view such a move. Globally, China seizing Taiwan would result in it being permanently viewed as a malicious nation. Regionally, China’s invasion of Taiwan would diminish any lingering debate over how Beijing will use its growing power. Every regional power would see its own fate in Taiwan. Although Beijing would try to reassure countries by claiming that Taiwan was part of China already, and thus the operation was a domestic stability one, this narrative would be convincing to none of China’s neighbors. Consequently, Beijing would face an environment in which each state was

dedicated to cooperating with others to balance against Chinese power. But **the more important deterrent for China would be the uncertainty of success.** To be sure, China's military capabilities are growing to the point where it will soon be assured of its ability to quickly defeat Taiwan's military forces. A little longer down the road it will also likely be confident that it can prevent the U.S. from intervening in the conflict. However, as recent U.S. military conflicts have adequately demonstrated, **being able to defeat another nation's armed forces and being able to pacify the country are two different things altogether.** It is in this latter aim that China's strategy is likely to falter. Taiwanese are **adamantly opposed to being incorporated** into a non-Democratic China. These feelings would only harden in the aftermath of the invasion. Thus, even if it quickly defeated Taiwan's formal military forces, **the PLA would continue to have to contend with the remnants of resistance for years** to come. Such a scenario would be deeply unsettling for leaders in Beijing as **this defiance would likely inspire similar resistance among various groups on the mainland**, starting first and foremost with ethnic minorities in the western China. Should the PLA resort to harsh oppression to squash resistance in Taiwan, this would deeply unsettle **even Han Chinese on the mainland.** In fact, the clear parallels with how Imperial Japan sought to pacify Taiwan and China would be lost on no one in China and elsewhere. The entire situation would be *a nightmare for Chinese leaders*. Consequently, they are *nearly certain* to avoid provoking it by invading Taiwan. The only real scenario in which they would invade Taiwan is if the island nation formally declared independence. But if Taiwanese leaders have avoided doing so to date, they are unlikely to think the idea is very wise as China goes stronger. Thus, the status-quo in the Taiwanese strait is unlikely to be changed by military force. Instead, Beijing is likely to continue drawing Taiwan closer economically, and seeking to disrupt the U.S.-Taiwanese bilateral relationship. The hope would be that leaders in Taipei will ultimately conclude that they cannot resist being absorbed into China, something China itself can facilitate this by offering favorable terms.

Increasing U.S. oil independence forces Saudi to flood the market and sink oil prices

UT, 2/15 ("Without Oil. Without Allies: USA and the New American Dream of Independent Energy", 2/15/13, Urban Times Magazine, urbantimes.co/magazine/2013/02/usa-oil-saudi-arabia-independent-domestic-energy-supply/ //CJC

At the end of the day, **the United States of America is overcoming Saudi Arabia** for a simple reason. **The cuts on Saudi production are part of a well-planned economic strategy.** The more oil you pump, the more oil you have on the market. **The more oil on the market, the lower the price of the oil.** The Saudi government knows that injecting the market with more than the necessary amount of oil would reduce revenues. To top it all, American oil production is expected to overcome the Saudi's 2020. However, Saudi Arabia will regain its position by 2027. US is living the dream, for now. **The perspective of giving up the dependence on Saudi oil is appealing.** The Keystone pipeline will open job positions for thousands of American workers which is good news as 7.9% of the working population remain unemployed. **But the achievement of energy independence sounds like a fluffy fairy tale without the "living happily ever after".** Saudi oil production is determined by **Saudi government policy. Saudis could potentially produce more oil than they do now,** but for whatever reasons they choose not to do so. "I believe we need an all-of-the-above strategy. That means producing more biofuels. More fuel-efficient cars. More solar power. More wind power," Barack Obama stated, in Cushing, last year. The question we should ask is whether an energy independent country – whose economy is based on domestic fossil fuels – is actually motivated to move towards a green economy model? So far, small countryside town such as Hardisty and Cushing are getting bigger, richer and prouder, among crop fields. The Keystone is the symbol of this new era. But, if the forecasts are correct, **this new American dream won't last long.** **If green energy merely remains an electoral pledge and Saudi re-opens the taps while the US is unable to remain energy independent, the backlash could be far worse than any price fluctuation or discounted stock of F-15.** Without green energy, without oil, without allies.

Lower oil prices kill renewable investment—causes global warming.

Haug, Harvard Graduate, 11

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Developing and commercializing clean energy is one of the basic strategies to combat climate change. It involves the near total decarbonization of the power sector, the use of renewables and low-carbon fuels for heating and cooling, and last, but not least, the increasing substitution of oil in the transport sector. Hybrid, battery electric, and fuel-cell cars fuelled by clean power or hydrogen, together with

sustainable biofuels and natural gas/CNG, are considered the most likely technologies that will reduce oil demand. Such fundamental transformation of the energy sector evolves over time through co-evolution of technologies, markets, institutions, and societal values. Despite the absence of a global price or tax for carbon, governments of the major economies worldwide are putting in place the building blocks for a transition to a low-carbon economy. The present emphasis is on support for RD&D and market diffusion for a wide range of technologies in different stages of technological maturity and provision of associated infrastructure. Policies, institutional support, industrial capacities, and renewable resource base vary widely among countries. We know that 10–20 years are needed to introduce the diversity of technologies and policy approaches that should be helpful during this formative stage of the transition to address different public concerns in different countries and search for best solutions in both a country-specific and a global context.

Which energy mix of clean energy will evolve is highly uncertain. However, the broad based RD&D and infrastructure investments and commercial scaling up of clean technologies should narrow choices and reduce costs of substitutes for oil within the next 10–15 years and choices for new low-carbon vehicles in 20 years. In this evolving process of technology selections and industrial and policy engagement, the role of emerging economies as major investors in clean technology and cost-competitive producers will become crucial.

What are the chances that the transformative dynamic towards clean energy is derailed again? A span of 10–20 years is a long time to introduce competitive choices for clean electricity, sustainable biofuels, clean hydrogen, alternative power trains, and the necessary infrastructure. Unforeseen and unforeseeable events will happen over such an extensive time span. Chernobyl changed the growth of nuclear power, decisively, Fukushima is jolting the nuclear renaissance, and a meteorite hit may invalidate the climate change threat for a century or more. However, the probability that a clean energy transition will unfold is very high. First, RD&D and niche market support has unleashed a wave of scientific interest and technological creativity to explore clean-fuel and end-use alternatives in all scientifically advanced countries. The assumption that competitive backstop technologies for oil will be ready to be scaled up within the 10–20-year period is not only plausible but very likely. Second, the institutional and policy support in favour of clean energy, while highly fragmented and imperfect, is creating vibrant industries with increasing competitive pressure for all technologies, and sustainability as an overarching core value. In brief, the trend to slowing oil demand growth appears irreversible in the absence of a ‘black swan event’.

Can international oil influence the trend through price or quantity strategies, now, before the decline is imminent? Experience shows that, indeed, consistently **cheap oil will slow both substitution and the development of alternatives.**

Theoretically, **the world's low-cost oil producers have the capacity to increase output and flood the market for an extended period of time at low prices,** as Sinn with his Green Paradox postulates. **Such a major oil price drop could be passed on to the consumers.** But governments and societies committed to clean energy could also take such an opportunity to internalize the cost of carbon and energy security, keep consumer petroleum product prices relatively stable, and incentivize the clean energy transition without large fiscal outlays. Low-cost producers would gain market share, but would not slow the substitution process. As a corollary, a quantitative strategy to limit crude oil output is likely to increase the expectation of scarcity and oil prices. **Renewed oil price hikes would strengthen the commitment of governments to develop alternatives to oil and consumers' willingness to pay for alternatives and help accelerate market readiness and market opportunities of backstop technologies for oil.**

LNG Impacts

No impact—LNG not explosive

Lloyd's List 2008 (One of the world's oldest continuously-running journals, having provided weekly shipping news as early as 1734, "LNG is not an explosive issue", Lexis)//CJC

INTEMPERATE language has been employed in attacking the liquefied natural gas industry ever since its inception almost 50 years ago. But in the roll call of vilification, a recent article in the Los Angeles Times takes some beating. Referring to the potential of a piracy incident, a "specialist in maritime energy security" quoted by the newspaper warns that "an LNG tanker going up is like 50 Hiroshimas". It is this kind of ill-informed sensationalism that has fuelled an overly fearful attitude to the industry, particularly in the US, where the consequences of a terrorist attack on an LNG carrier or terminal have been hotly debated. The Los Angeles Times report actually concerned the seizure of the Sirius Star, a sufficiently serious incident in its own right, one would think. But the article's specialist went on to speculate: "If it was an LNG tanker seized, we're looking at something potentially catastrophic." The seizure of any gas carrier or oil tanker is an event of some gravity. But as the Center for Liquefied Natural Gas points out, LNG is not explosive or flammable in its liquid state. "Although a large amount of energy is stored in LNG, as in any hydrocarbon, it cannot be released rapidly enough to cause the over-pressures associated with an explosion," the Center says. Thus, the "atomic bomb" allusions refer to the total energy an LNG carrier contains, not the rate at which the energy would be released in an incident. The fact that the Center for Liquefied Natural Gas is an industry trade association should not detract from its arguments, which have been corroborated by numerous studies. The Los Angeles Times report serves only to feed the misconceptions that have surrounded the supposed dangers represented by LNG carriers. It cannot be stated often enough that LNG shipping has an impeccable safety record, with eight accidents in almost 50 years, none of which led to loss of life or a breach of a vessel's cargo containment system.

Ship design checks—prevention measures.

Tony Muncer 2005 (Managing Director, UAE Lloyd's Register EMEA, "Balance debate key to eradicating sensationalist untruths," Lloyd's List, Lexis) //CJC

Many who denounce LNG base their calculations on the total volume of LNG in a ship. It is unrealistic to imagine, however, that the entire cargo of any ship can be released instantaneously. To mount such an attack would require the equivalent of a full-scale military operation like that carried out against the USS Cole. It is more likely that the LNG would be released over time, based on the size of the breach in the inner hull. Similarly, the 'against' lobbies often quote the 9 m hole blown into the side of the Limburg to demonstrate that large holes can easily be created in the side of a ship. What they fail to understand is that this was the size of the hole in the outer hull; it is the size of the hole in the inner hull which dictates the outflow rate and, in the case of the Limburg, this was only 1 m - enough to lose containment but not enough to allow instant out-pouring of the cargo. This slow release has a significant mitigating effect on the potential consequences of a spill. It is for this reason that the idea that LNG carriers are potential atom bombs is erroneous. There is a lot of energy in LNG, as in any hydrocarbon. However, the 'atomic bomb' statement refers to the total energy an LNG carrier contains, not the rate at which the energy would be released in an incident. For example, a lump of coal contains lots of energy, but when it is burned, its energy does not all come out instantly like a bomb. Instead, the coal burns over a period of time releasing its energy as it goes. Similarly, LNG carriers contain large quantities of energy, but the energy can only be released slowly in the event of a spill or a fire.

No impact—LNG explosion is extremely unlikely even if there is a spill

San Diego Union-Tribune '4
(February 7, 2004, p.Lexis) //CJC

The industry notes that liquefied natural gas is explosive only within a narrow range of concentrations in the air, 5 percent to 15 percent).

Within that range, however, the fuel is combustible, so an uncontrolled release of LNG could trigger an explosion or fire. If liquefied gas spills but doesn't immediately ignite, the evaporating gas will form a vapor cloud that could drift away from the spill site. If the cloud encounters an ignition source, it can catch fire or, less likely, explode.

LNG explosion does not cause extinction – not equivalent to 55 Hiroshima bombs

Kalelkar, 06 - Dr. G. A. Melhem, President and CEO at ioMosaic), Dr. A. S. Kalelkar, Principal Consultant at ioMosaic, Dr. S. Saraf, partner at ioMosaic, and Henry Ozog, general partner at ioMosaic ("Managing LNG Risks: Separating the Facts from the Myths," August, ioMosaic Corporation, a leading provider of safety and risk management consulting services.

<http://archives1.iomosaic.com/whitepapers/Managing%20LNG%20Risks.pdf> //CJC

Myth No. 1 An LNG tanker holds thirty three million gallons of LNG, or twenty billion gallons of natural gas, the energy equivalent of fifty five Hiroshima bombs.

Fact :The estimation of hazard based on energy content is very misleading and erroneous. Using the same flawed reasoning relating LNG energy content to hazard potential, one can conclude that:

- 3 hours of sun shine over 10 square feet equals 3.2 lbs of TNT explosive
- A 24 gal automobile gasoline tank equals 1,225 lbs of TNT explosive
- 1,000 lbs of wood equals 3,530 lbs of TNT explosive
- 1,000 lbs of coal equals 4,470 lbs of TNT explosive

Hazard potential depends on both the amount of energy and the rate at which it is released.

Energy release during LNG burning is relatively slow. Explosion energy is released "lightning-like" causing the formation of a shock wave that travels outwards and can cause severe damage to people and property.

Terrorism Impacts

Risk of nuclear terror is exaggerated – no incentives due to long time frame, resource requirements, and it's contradictory to their cause.

Weiss 15 - Leonard Weiss, visiting scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). He is also a national advisory board member of the Center for Arms control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, 11/27/2015("On Fear and Nuclear Terrorism," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 71, Issue 2, 2015,] //CJC

While fear of **nuclear** weapons is rational, its extension to **terrorism has been a vehicle for fear-mongering that is unjustified by available data**. Some writers have recognized this lack of data on the subject,² and their works have started a lively debate, with pushback by proponents of the more conventional alarmist view (see Mowatt-Larssen, 2010). This debate on nuclear terrorism tends to distract from events that raise the risk of nuclear war, the consequences of which would far exceed the results of terrorist attacks. And the historical record shows that the war risk is real.

Despite the development and deployment of command-and-control systems in all nations with nuclear weapons (some more sophisticated than others), the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated that miscalculation, misinterpretation, and misinformation could lead to a "close call" regarding nuclear war, and that the possibility of a war being launched under conditions of confrontation cannot be dismissed. Accordingly, most analysts believe that reducing the motivation of non-weapon states to acquire nuclear weapons and increasing the motivation of weapon states to reduce and eliminate their nuclear arsenals is a worthwhile ongoing goal.

Achieving this goal has been helped by a number of cases in which countries have halted nuclear weapon programs or activities, or dismantled weapons in their possession.³ In these cases, the calculus dictated that security would be enhanced by giving up nuclear weapons, thus reducing the likelihood of becoming a target of another country's nukes or motivating a rival to acquire such weapons.

If the fear of nuclear war has thus had some positive effects, the fear of nuclear terrorism has had mainly negative effects on the lives of millions of people around the world, including in the United States, and even affects negatively the prospects for a more peaceful world. Although there has been much commentary on the interest that Osama bin Laden, when he was alive, reportedly expressed in obtaining nuclear weapons (see Mowatt-Larssen, 2010), and some terrorists no doubt desire to obtain such weapons, evidence of any terrorist group working seriously toward the theft of nuclear weapons or the acquisition of such weapons by other means is virtually nonexistent. This may be due to a combination of reasons. Terrorists understand that *it is not hard to terrorize a population without committing mass murder*. In 2002, a single sniper in the Washington, DC area, operating within his own automobile and with one accomplice, killed 10 people and changed the behavior of virtually the entire populace of the city over a period of three weeks by instilling fear of being a randomly chosen shooting victim when out shopping.

Terrorists who believe the commission of violence helps their cause have access to many explosive materials and conventional weapons to ply their "trade." If public sympathy is important to their cause, an apparent plan or commission of mass murder is not going to help them, and indeed *will make their enemies even more implacable*, reducing the prospects of achieving their goals. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists is not like the acquisition of conventional weapons; it *requires significant time, planning, resources, and expertise, with no guarantees that an acquired device would work*. It requires putting aside at least some aspects of a group's more immediate activities and goals for an attempted operation that no terrorist group has previously accomplished. While absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence (as then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld kept reminding us during the search for Saddam's nonexistent nuclear weapons), it is reasonable to conclude that the fear of nuclear terrorism has swamped realistic consideration of the threat. As Brian Jenkins, a longtime observer of terrorist groups, wrote in 2008:

They can't steal a weapon – dozens of safeguards and international collaboration account for loose nukes and irrational states

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Stealing nukes. Nothing is better protected in a nuclear weapon state than the weapons themselves, which have multiple layers of safeguards that, in the United States, include intelligence and surveillance, electronic locks (including so-called "permissive action links" that prevent detonation unless a code is entered into the lock), gated and locked

storage facilities, armed guards, and teams of elite responders if an attempt at theft were to occur. We know that most weapon states have such protections, and there is no reason to believe that such protections are missing in the remaining states, since no weapon state would want to put itself at risk of an unintended nuclear detonation of its own weapons by a malevolent agent. Thus, the likelihood of an unauthorized agent secretly planning a theft, without being discovered, and getting access to weapons with the intent and physical ability to carry them off in the face of such layers of protection is extremely low—but it isn't impossible, especially in the case where the thief is an insider.

The insider threat helped give credibility to the stories, circulating about 20 years ago, that there were “loose nukes” in the USSR, based on some statements by a Soviet general who claimed the regime could not account for more than 40 “suitcase nukes” that had been built. The Russian government denied the claim, and at this point there is no evidence that any nukes were ever loose. Now, it is unclear if any such weapon would even work after 20 years of corrosion of both the nuclear and non-nuclear materials in the device and the radioactive decay of certain isotopes.

Because of the large number of terrorist groups operating in its geographic vicinity, Pakistan is frequently suggested as a possible candidate for scenarios in which a terrorist group either seizes a weapon via collaboration with insiders sympathetic to its cause, or in which terrorists “inherit” nuclear weapons by taking over the arsenal of a failed nuclear state that has devolved into chaos. Attacks by a terrorist group on a Pakistani military base, at Kamra, which is believed to house nuclear weapons in some form, have been referenced in connection with such security concerns (Nelson and Hussain, 2012). However, the Kamra base contained US fighter planes, including F-16s, used to bomb Taliban bases in tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, so the planes, not nuclear weapons, were the likely target of the terrorists, and in any case the mission was a failure. Moreover, Pakistan is not about to collapse, and the Pakistanis are known to have received major international assistance in technologies for protecting their weapons from unauthorized use, store them in somewhat disassembled fashion at multiple locations, and have a sophisticated nuclear security structure in place (see Gregory, 2013; Khan, 2012). However, the weapons are assembled at times of high tension in the region, and, to keep a degree of uncertainty in their location, they are moved from place to place, making them more vulnerable to seizure at such times (Goldberg and Ambinder, 2011). (It should be noted that US nuclear weapons were subject to such risks during various times when the weapons traveled US highways in disguised trucks and accompanying vehicles, but such travel and the possibility of terrorist seizure was never mentioned publicly.) Such scenarios of seizure in Pakistan would require a major security breakdown within the army leading to a takeover of weapons by a nihilistic terrorist group with little warning, while army loyalists along with India and other interested parties (like the United States) stand by and do not intervene. This is not a particularly realistic scenario, but it's also not a reason to conclude that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is of no concern. It is, not only because of an internal threat, but especially because it raises the possibility of nuclear war with India. For this and other reasons, intelligence agencies in multiple countries spend considerable resources tracking the Pakistani nuclear situation to reduce the likelihood of surprises. But any consideration of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal does bring home (once again) the folly of US policy in the 1980s, when stopping the Pakistani nuclear program was put on a back burner in order to prosecute the Cold War against the Soviets in Afghanistan (which ultimately led to the establishment of Al Qaeda). Some of the loudest voices expressing concern about nuclear terrorism belong to former senior government officials who supported US assistance to the mujahideen and the accompanying diminution of US opposition to Pakistan's nuclear activities.

States won't give terrorists nukes – there are no guarantees terrorists will cooperate and only results in the state becoming a nuclear target.

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for Arms control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, 11/27/2015("On Fear and Nuclear Terrorism," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 71, Issue 2, 2015,] //CJC

Acquiring nukes as a gift. Following the shock of 9/11, government officials and the media imagined many scenarios in which terrorists obtain nuclear weapons; one of those scenarios involves a weapon state using a terrorist group for delivery of a nuclear weapon. There are at least two reasons why this scenario is unlikely: First, once a weapon state loses control of a weapon, *it cannot be sure the weapon will be used* by the terrorist group *as intended*. Second, the state cannot be sure that the transfer of the *weapon has been undetected either before or after the fact of its detonation* (see Lieber and Press, 2013). The use of the weapon by a terrorist group will ultimately result in the transferring nation becoming a nuclear target just as if it had itself detonated the device. This is a powerful deterrent to such a transfer, making the transfer a low-probability event.

It is impossible for terrorists to build a nuke – hundreds of challenges

Weiss 15 - Leonard Weiss, visiting scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). He is also a national advisory board member of the Center for Arms control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, 11/27/2015("On Fear and Nuclear Terrorism," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 71, Issue 2, 2015] //CJC

Manufacturing a nuclear weapon. To accomplish this, a terrorist group would have to obtain an appropriate amount of one of the two most popular materials for nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium separated from fuel used in a production reactor or a power reactor. Weapon-grade plutonium is found in weapon manufacturing facilities in nuclear weapon states and is very highly protected until it is inserted in a weapon. Reactor-grade plutonium, although still capable of being weaponized, is less protected, and in that sense is a more attractive target for a terrorist, especially since it has been produced and stored in prodigious quantities in a number of nuclear weapon states and non-weapon states, particularly Japan.

But terrorist use of plutonium for a nuclear explosive device would require the construction of an implosion weapon, requiring the fashioning of an appropriate explosive lens of TNT, a notoriously difficult technical problem. And if a high nuclear yield (much greater than 1 kiloton) is desired, the use of reactor-grade plutonium would require a still more sophisticated design. Moreover, if the plutonium is only available through chemical separation from some (presumably stolen) spent fuel rods, additional technical complications present themselves. There is at least one study showing that a small team of people with the appropriate technical skills and equipment could, in principle, build a plutonium-based nuclear explosive device (Mark et al., 1986). But even if one discounts the high probability that the plan would be discovered at some stage (missing plutonium or spent fuel rods would put the authorities and intelligence operations under high alert), translating this into a real-world situation suggests an extremely low probability of technical success. More likely, according to one well-known weapon designer,⁴ would be the death of the person or persons in the attempt to build the device.

There is the possibility of an insider threat; in one example, a team of people working at a reactor or reprocessing site could conspire to steal some material and try to hide the diversion as MUF (materials unaccounted for) within the nuclear safeguards system. But this scenario would require intimate knowledge of the materials accounting system on which safeguards in that state are based and adds another layer of complexity to an operation with low probability of success.

The situation is different in the case of using highly enriched uranium, which presents fewer technical challenges. Here an implosion design is not necessary, and a "gun type" design is the more likely approach. Fear of this scenario has sometimes been promoted in the literature via the quotation of a famous statement by nuclear physicist Luis Alvarez that dropping a subcritical amount of HEU onto another subcritical amount from a distance of five feet could result in a nuclear yield. The probability of such a yield (and its size) would depend on the geometry of the HEU components and the amount of material. More likely than a substantial nuclear explosion from such a scenario would be a criticality accident that would release an intense burst of radiation, killing persons in the immediate vicinity, or (even less likely) a low-yield nuclear "fizzle" that could be quite damaging locally (like a large TNT explosion) but also carry a psychological effect because of its nuclear dimension.

In any case, since the critical mass of a bare metal perfect sphere of pure U-235 is approximately 56 kilograms, **stealing that much highly enriched material** (and getting away without detection, an armed fight, or a criticality accident) **is a major problem for any thief** and one significantly greater than the stealing of small amounts of HEU and lower-enriched material that has been reported from time to time over the past two decades, mostly from former Soviet sites that have since had their security greatly strengthened. Moreover, fashioning the material into a form more useful or convenient for explosive purposes could likely mean a need for still more material than suggested above, plus a means for machining it, as would be the case for HEU fuel assemblies from a research reactor. In a recent paper, physics professor B. C. Reed discusses the feasibility of terrorists building a low-yield, gun-type fission weapon, but admittedly avoids the issue of whether the terrorists would likely have the technical ability to carry feasibility to realization and whether the terrorists are likely to be successful in stealing the needed material and hiding their project as it proceeds (Reed, 2014). But this is the crux of the nuclear terrorism issue. There is no argument about feasibility, which has been accepted for decades, even for plutonium-based weapons, ever since Ted Taylor first raised it in the early 1970s and a Senate subcommittee held hearings in the late 1970s on a weapon design created by a Harvard dropout from information he obtained from the public section of the Los Alamos National Laboratory library (Fialka, 1978). Likewise, no one can deny the terrible consequences of a nuclear explosion. The question is the level of risk, and what steps are acceptable in a democracy for reducing it.

Although the attention in the literature given to nuclear terrorism scenarios involving HEU would suggest major attempts to obtain such material by terrorist groups, **there is only one known case of a major theft** of HEU. It involves a US government contractor processing HEU for the US Navy in Apollo, Pennsylvania in the 1970s **at a time when security and materials accounting were extremely lax. The theft was almost surely carried out by agents of the Israeli government** with the probable involvement of a person or persons working for the contractor, **not a sub-national terrorist group** intent on making its own weapons (Gilinsky and Mattson, 2010). The circumstances under which this theft occurred were unique, and there was significant information about the contractor's relationship to Israel that should have rung alarm bells and would do so today. Although it involved a government and not a sub-national group, the theft underscores the importance of security and accounting of nuclear materials, especially because the technical requirements for making an HEU weapon are less daunting than for a plutonium weapon, and the probability of success by a terrorist group, though low, is certainly greater than zero. Over the past two decades, there has been a significant effort to increase protection of such materials, particularly in recent years through the efforts of nongovernmental organizations like the International Panel on Fissile Materials⁶ and advocates like Matthew Bunn working within the Obama administration (Bunn and Newman, 2008), though the administration has apparently not seen the need to make the materials as secure as the weapons themselves.

ISIS and Al-Qaeda don't pose a threat – their tactics are not new and won't be catastrophic

Ward 15 - Alex Ward, Assistant Director of the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council where he works on U.S. defense policy, strategy and military affairs., 5/29/15("How Much Does ISIS Really Threaten America?," published by How Much

does ISIS really Threaten America, Available online at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-much-does-isis-really-threaten-america-12993?page=2> //CJC

While some concern is warranted, **there is no need for alarm** on the scale we are currently witnessing. The ISIS threat is overhyped, giving the group more power than it deserves while distracting from bigger threats. More to the point, **there is no new phase of terrorism, just the same phase**—but with a different ability to promote use of usual tactics.

Indeed, the threats facing the American homeland today, mostly of the “lone wolf” variety, are threats the United States has faced for years. What is needed now is a new way of dealing with an old problem.

In an era of increased connectivity, the ability of terrorists to contact lone-wolf candidates is greater than ever—and American leaders are worried. Terrorist organizations, like ISIS, have used the means of this hyper-connected era, especially social media, to great effect. A Brookings Institution study showed that ISIS has a “sophisticated and innovative methodology” that makes use of the “at least 46,000 ISIS-supporting Twitter accounts.” This social media strategy—and the appeal of ISIS’ cause—has attracted lone wolves to carry out strikes in the West, with the brutal attack in Paris so far being the most significant. The United States is worried sick about a potential terrorist-inspired lone wolf operation on its own soil and is scrambling to tighten security at military bases and malls alike.

In addition, ISIS’ mastery of social media and messaging inspired a cadre of foreign fighters and people sympathetic to its mission. Many fighters have gone to the battlefields in Iraq, Syria, and beyond in hopes of establishing an Islamic state. Nicholas Rasmussen, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, called the rate of foreign fighters traveling to the area “unprecedented.”

The worry for Western governments is that these fighters will obtain advanced asymmetric warfare training and use them to great effect back in their home states. The thirty to forty Americans who have traveled to the Middle East—a dozen or so who may have joined ISIS—worry U.S. law enforcement because, upon their return, they pose a threat to homeland security.

These trends are certainly concerning, but they do not equate to a “new phase” of terrorism for the U.S. homeland. The reasons why are straightforward.

For one, **ISIS’ main focus is** consolidating gains and **grabbing new territory** in Syria and Iraq.

What it has been able to do there certainly constitutes a new phase in the way terrorists operate, but **does not** radically **change the danger calculus** on American land. Indeed, **ISIS is not** yet fully **focused on bringing chaos to the West**. Yes, it wants to eventually destroy Western targets, but that is currently a lesser concern for ISIS.

And, the **lone wolf attacks** the group does inspire will **continue to be smaller and less catastrophic** than has been seen in America’ recent past. Further, **al-Qaeda**—the bigger threat to the United States—**is not at the capacity level at which it once** was due to the United States. **Its ability to pull off a spectacular attack like 9/11 is substantially reduced**, although not impossible. So while the United States should still be vigilant for a large-scale attack, the country can breathe a little easier.

It is also important to note that **what is happening now** with ISIS and many other anti-Western terrorist groups **is not** necessarily **a new phenomenon**. While ISIS certainly has an amazing ability to inspire action via social media, **the appeal of fighting for an ideological cause has been around since time immemorial**. The Iraq and Afghanistan Wars in the 2000s, the **Afghanistan War** in the late 1970s and early 1980s, **and even the Spanish Civil War** of the 1930s **are** just some **examples of when foreigners came running** in order to help a cause for which they believed they should die. As for lone wolf or smaller-scale attacks in the United States, **the country has dealt with these kinds of issues for a long time**. Even today the United States experiences “one attack, on average, every thirty-four days.” In essence, the fear from returning foreign fighters should not scare us any more than current domestic terrorists do because they are already here and acting. To claim that ISIS is currently more dangerous to American targets seems off, although a lack of a coherent policy to stem the group could change that calculus.

Al Qaeda does not pose a threat – lack of funds and leadership – drones have empirically been successful in reducing the number of attacks.

Lee 15 - Kangil Lee, research analyst at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, 2015("DOES AL QAEDA CENTRAL STILL MATTER?," published by Revista UNISCI, Available online at <https://www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-72478/UNISCIDP37-2LEE.pdf>] //CJC

However, scholars who argue the demise of Al Qaeda Central seem to prefer a much simpler approach that measures al Qaeda's operational capability by a couple of simple factors. There are two main pieces of evidence used to support the argument that Al Qaeda has been defeated. Firstly, the death of bin Laden and the demise of Al Qaeda's core group of members, especially members of the Shura council. Secondly, the absence of terrorism in the West that Al Qaeda Central is involved in. These are central pieces of evidence that points towards al Qaeda's demise, which suggest Al Qaeda Central is incapable of carrying out any attacks.

For example, in 2012, Peter Bergen argued Al Qaeda is defeated because CIA drone policy in Afghanistan (Al Qaeda Central's stronghold for long time), successfully *eliminated 28 Al Qaeda key members* especially those on the Shura council revealed by Jamal al fadl, a former Al Qaeda member. Bergen said *as a result, Al Qaeda only has one senior leader left*, al Zawahiri, *who lacks charisma*, and who took over the group after the death of Osama bin Laden.³⁶ According to Bergen, Al Qaeda Central has never launched a successful terrorist attack in the West since 9/11 except for the 7/7 London bombing that killed 52 commuters. Even so-called affiliates and lone wolves inspired by Al Qaeda have only killed 17 people in the United States since 9/11.

Sageman backs up this assertion, and in 2011 added to Bergen's claim, arguing a *comprehensive survey of global neo-jihadi terrorism in the West highlights that there were 60 plots over the past 20 years, perpetrated by 46 different networks. Of these only 14 successfully inflicted any casualties, and only two were perpetrated by al-Qaeda* proper in the past 20 years. Over the past five years, global neo-jihadi and al-Qaeda terrorism in the West has been in decline and the vast majority of the plots were perpetrated by independent home-grown groups, inspired by al-Qaeda but not linked to it or its allies.³⁷ Many terrorist attempts launched by like-minded terrorist groups or individuals have not been traced back to Afghanistan. Moreover, he says, there is no evidence Al Qaeda Central was involved in any terrorist plots since 9/11. *Al Qaeda Central currently does not run a training centre for terrorists, and the group is not capable of funding terrorist attacks* anymore due to the loss of its financial resources. There has been no global neo-jihadi terrorist casualty in the West in the past four years and none in the U.S. in the past eight years.

According to Javier Jordán, terrorism expert and the author of The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign against Al Qaeda Central: A Case Study, US drone policy managed to oppress the group's operational capability. Jordán claims that there were 136 terrorist incidents from 2001 to 2012, and Al Qaeda Central was involved in only 33 cases out of 136, 5 in the United States and 28 in Europe. From 2001 to 2006, Al Qaeda Central was quite active in plotting terrorist attacks, as 20 incidents were conducted during the first half of that period. Whereas, Al Qaeda Central's activity came to a lull especially after 2007, the year US drone activity was stepped up in Afghanistan. Even 13 cases of attacks between 2007 and 2012, did not cause any casualty or damage to Western society. Jordán concludes the complexity and lethality of Al Qaeda Central's terrorist actions on American and European soil have fallen dramatically.³⁸ Jordán evaluates *Al Qaeda endured immense structural damage from the CIA drone campaign*. As a result, *Al Qaeda lost control over affiliates in strategic and operational positions*, and switched into a significantly

decentralized organization that has tried to recover its influence to affiliates but due to difficulties in communicating with affiliates, their efforts have largely failed. Now Al Qaeda Central has no or very little capability to plot and launch terrorist attacks, probably none outside of Afghanistan and Pakistan.³⁹

After the US drone policy commenced, approximately 60 key members of Al Qaeda were killed by drones. It is unclear exactly how many Al Qaeda members died in this campaign, although Jordán and Sageman presumed around 60. As matter of fact, even bin Laden was concerned about the loss of experienced members and his anxiety is well expressed in one of his documents seized from the Abbottabad raid. It is important to have the leadership in a faraway location to gain expertise in all areas. When this experienced leadership dies, this would lead to the rise of lower leaders who are not as experienced as the former leaders and this would lead to the repeat of mistakes.⁴⁰

Although the effect of the targeted killing policy has never been proved, the killing of key members in the organization seems to have caused some level of disconnection between groups. As per bin Laden's recommendation to avoid wiretapping or signal intercepting by CIA, Al Qaeda members prefer hand-written letters to communicate with each other. This is safe but it takes time to communicate especially with affiliates outside of Afghanistan. Indeed, along with beginning of drone program, al Qaeda's terrorism operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan have significantly decreased since 2008. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) shows that only one terrorist attack occurred in Pakistan after 2008, conducted by Al Qaeda Central.⁴¹ Nevertheless, we have no idea what has brought on the decrease in the number of terrorism incidents.

Latin American Relations

US Latin American Rels terminally non-unique. All advantages must postdate 2015 Summit of Americas and/or our 2016.

Shawn Lansing, December 2016. CUBA EMBARGO MYOPIA MISSES THE STRATEGIC POINT.

<https://warontherocks.com/2016/12/cuba-embargo-myopia-misses-the-strategic-point/>

This sticking point in U.S.-Latin America relations seemed to reach a resolution in December 2014, when Cuba and the United States resumed diplomatic relations and opened talks aimed at lifting the trade embargo. Matt Ferchen, a resident scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, believes "the Cuba deal changes everything in terms of how the United States can set a positive agenda in the region." Rapprochement quickly reshaped U.S. image and influence in Latin America, with many of the region's influential leaders hailing the thawing of relations as "positive." **When Presidents Barack Obama and Raul Castro shook hands at the April 2015 Summit of the Americas in Panama, discussions moved on from the embargo to larger substantive issues challenging the region such as trade, partnerships, and human rights.**

Relations improving – Cuban domestic reforms

Padgett 7-3 (Tim Padgett, WLRN-Miami Herald News' Americas correspondent covering Latin America and the Caribbean, "Why This Summer Offers Hope For Better U.S.-Cuba Relations" <<http://wlrn.org/post/why-summer-offers-hope-better-us-cuba-relations>> 7-3-13) //CJC

And yet, despite all that recent cold-war commotion, could this finally be the summer of love on the Florida Straits? Last month the Obama Administration and the Castro dictatorship started talks on re-establishing direct mail service; this month they'll discuss immigration guidelines. Diplomats on both sides report a more cooperative groove.¶ New Diplomacy¶ So what happened that's suddenly making it possible for the two governments to start some substantive diplomatic outreach for the first time in years?¶ First, Castro finished crunching the numbers on Cuba's threadbare economy, and the results scared him more than one of Yoani Sánchez's dissident blog posts. To wit, the island's finances are held up by little more than European tourists and oil charity from socialist Venezuela. He's adopted limited capitalist reforms as the remedy, and to make them work he has to loosen the repressive screws a turn or two.¶ That finally includes letting Cubans travel freely abroad, which gives them better opportunities to bring back investment capital. As a result, says Carlos Saladrigas, a Cuban-American business leader in Miami and chairman of the Washington-based Cuba Study Group, "The timing is right" for some U.S.-Cuban rapprochement.¶ "Cuba is clearly in a transitional mode," says Saladrigas. "They need to change to reinsert themselves in the global order, they need to become more normal in their relations with other nations."

US Drug policy block US-Latin American relations

Shifter '12

(Michael is an Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and writes for the Council's journal Foreign Affairs. He serves as the President of Inter-American Dialogue. "Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America," April, IAD Policy Report, <http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf>) //CJC

In the spirit of "shared responsibility," often invoked by senior US policy officials, it is critical that the US government respond to increasing calls from Latin American leaders for a serious review of drug policy. As the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy made clear, current measures addressing the drug problem are not working and alternatives need to be considered. That commission, led by three highly regarded former Latin American presidents—Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil, Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico, and César Gaviria of Colombia—rightly emphasized that drug problems and their contributions to criminal violence and widespread corruption threaten the rule of law in a number of countries. The commission's recommendations—including the decriminalization of marijuana, greater emphasis on drugs as a public health problem, and increased support for harm reduction—should be taken seriously and should serve as a starting point for an honest US-Latin American dialogue on the drug question. More serious attention and resources directed at reducing consumption in the United States are essential. Since the commission's report in 2009, even some sitting Latin American presidents, including Mexico's Felipe Calderón, Colombia's Juan Manuel Santos, and Guatemala's Otto Pérez Molina, have called for collective pursuit of new drug policy options, including consideration of legalization. Although there is debate about the merits of alternative policies—and political obstacles in the region and, particularly, in the United States, remain strong—a serious discussion is urgently needed about how to be more effective in dealing with the drug problem. This sense of urgency is underscored by the alarming crime statistics reported in the region. According to the United Nations, Latin America has the highest rate of homicides per capita of any region in the world. Although the causes are many, the narcotics trade is a key contributor.

Duddy and Mora 2013 – U.S. ambassador to Venezuela from 2007 until 2010 and is senior lecturer at Duke University; director of the Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International University [Patrick and Frank, "Latin America: Is U.S. influence waning?",

<http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/01/3375160/latin-america-is-us-influence.html>] //CJC

Is U.S. influence in Latin America on the wane? It depends how you look at it. As President Obama travels to Mexico and Costa Rica, it's likely the pundits will once again underscore what some perceive to be the eroding influence of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Some will point to the decline in foreign aid or the absence of an overarching policy with an inspiring moniker like "Alliance for Progress" or "Enterprise Area of the Americas" as evidence that the United States is failing to embrace the opportunities of a region that is more important to this country than ever. The reality is a lot more complicated. **Forty-two percent of all U.S. exports flow to the Western Hemisphere.** In many ways, **U.S. engagement in the Americas is more pervasive than ever, even if more diffused.** That is in part because the peoples of the Western Hemisphere are not waiting for governments to choreograph their interactions. A more-nuanced assessment inevitably will highlight the complex, multidimensional ties between the United States and the rest of the hemisphere. In fact, it may be that we need to change the way we think and talk about the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. We also need to resist the temptation to embrace overly reductive yardsticks for judging our standing in the hemisphere. As Moises Naim notes in his recent book, *The End of Power*, there has been an important change in power distribution in the world away from states toward an expanding and increasingly mobile set of actors that are dramatically shaping the nature and scope of global relationships. In Latin America, many of the most substantive and dynamic forms of engagement are occurring in a web of cross-national relationships involving small and large companies, people-to-people contact through student exchanges and social media, travel and migration. Trade and investment remain the most enduring and measurable dimensions of U.S. relations with the region. It is certainly the case that our economic interests alone would justify more U.S. attention to the region. **Many observers who worry about declining U.S. influence in this area point to the rise of trade with China and the presence of European companies and investors. While it is true that other countries are important to the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, it is also still true that the United States is by far the largest and most important economic partner of the region and trade is growing even with those countries with which we do not have free trade agreements.** An area of immense importance to regional economies that we often overlook is the exponential growth in travel, tourism and migration. It is commonplace to note the enormous presence of foreign students in the United States but in 2011, according to the Institute of International Education, after Europe, Latin America was the second most popular destination for U.S. university students. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. tourists travel every year to Latin America and the Caribbean helping to support thousands of jobs. From 2006-2011 U.S. non-government organizations, such as churches, think tanks and universities increased the number of partnerships with their regional cohorts by a factor of four. Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean from the United States totaled \$64 billion in 2012. Particularly for the smaller economies of Central America and the Caribbean these flows can sometimes constitute more than 10 percent of gross domestic product.

Trump's hardline stance is alienating Latin America

Ryan Dube, Reed Johnson, 11-28-2016 [staff writers, "Donald Trump's Line on Cuba Unsettles Latin America," WSJ, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trumps-line-on-cuba-unsettles-latin-america-1480372939>] MJS 1-21-2017

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump's threats to reverse the Obama administration's historic re-engagement with Cuba could drive a new wedge between Washington and Latin America. a region already suspicious of the next American leader over his rhetoric on immigration and trade. Mr. Trump on Monday said he would roll back the U.S.'s improved relations with Cuba forged by President Barack Obama unless Cuba's Communist government

offers “a better deal,” following statements from his aides that he wants to pressure Havana for more democratic reform.

Any undoing of the detente between Washington and Havana would be viewed as a big step back in the region, not only by leftist allies of Cuba like Venezuela and Bolivia but also by conservative governments in Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Colombia. It would also likely complicate regional cooperation on a range of issues, from immigration to security and anti-drug efforts. “It would be a grave error by Mr. Trump,” said former Ecuadorean Foreign Relations Minister Jose Ayala-Lasso. “It wouldn’t only be a measure that would affect relations between Cuba and the United States, but I think **all of Latin America that promoted a normalization of these relations would feel rejected and offended.**”

The U.S. trade embargo on Cuba has complicated Washington’s relations with the hemisphere for decades. Like Arabic-speaking countries in the Middle East, Latin America is largely tied together through language and culture, compelling countries to often try to show solidarity with one another. **A history of U.S. interference in the region has also long engendered a shared resentment.**

Free Trade Good

Globalization empirically bad in weak/unstable countries as shown in Africa (also has all the warrants)

Ibrahim, 13 [Alhaji Ahmadu Ibrahim, Professor of Sociology at Yobe State University, ‘The Impact of Globalization on Africa’,

http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_3_No_15_August_2013/11.pdf] PP

The negative impacts of globalization on Africa:

1. Tendon (1998) states that the cold war which was born out of the process for globalization has had significant consequences for Africa. During its height in the 1960’s and 1970’s, the cold war witnessed the emergence of authoritarian regimes in the form of one-party or military regimes. This was largely a result of the support of the two blocks to keep African countries in their respective camps. This has in turn, substantially reduced Africa’s international negotiating power and its ability to maneuver in the international system. In sum then, the cold war and its demise has worked against democracy and economic development in Africa.
2. Specific impact of globalization on Africa were identified according to Oyejide (1998) in the political sphere, the most important consequence is **the erosion of sovereignty, especially on economic and financial matters**, as a result of the imposition of models, strategies and policies of development on African countries by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization.

3. **More important is the fact that globalization for most part does not facilitate the establishment of the economic conditions necessary for genuine democracy and good governance to take solid roots and thrives.**
4. Economically, globalization has, on the whole, reinforced the economic marginalization of African economies and their dependence on a few primary goods for which demand and prices are externally determined. This has, in turn accentuated poverty and economic inequality as well as the ability of the vast number of Africans to participate meaningfully in the social and political life of their countries.
5. As a result of the cultural domination from outside that goes with globalization, African countries are rapidly losing their cultural identity and therefore their ability to interact with other cultures on an equal and autonomous basis, borrowing from other cultures only those aspects that meet its requirements and needs.
6. The scientific and technological forces unleashed by globalization have facilitated the extinction of the indigenous development of technology and distorting patterns of production in Africa.
7. Globalization on the whole impacts negatively on the development and consolidation of democratic governance. One form of this is the reduction of the capacity of governments to determine and control events in their countries, and thus their accountability and responsiveness to their people, given the fact that the context, institutions and processes by which these decisions are taken are far from democratic.
8. Globalization introduces anti-developmentalism by declaring the state irrelevant or marginal to the developmental effort. Development strategies and policies that focus on stabilization and privatization, rather than growth, **development and poverty eradication, are pushed by external donors, leading to greater poverty and inequality and undermining the ability of the people to participate effectively in the political and social processes in their countries**. Welfare and other programs intended to meet the basic needs of the majority of the population are transferred from governments to non-governmental organizations that begin to replace governments making them to lose the little authority and legitimacy they have.
9. By imposing economic specialization based on the needs and interests of external forces and transforming the economies of African countries into series of enslaved economies linked to the outside but with very little linkages among them, **Democracy, with its emphasis on tolerance and compromise, can hardly thrive in such an environment** (Rodrik 1994).
10. Further, Mule (2000) views that the economic specialization imposed on African countries makes rapid and sustainable growth and development impossible, conflicts over the distribution of the limited gains realized from globalization becomes more acute and politicized. Vulnerable groups, such as women, the youth, and rural inhabitants, fare very badly in this contest and are discriminated against. This further erodes the national ethos of solidarity and reciprocity that are essential to successful democracies.

11. Globalization, by **insisting** on African countries **opening their economies to foreign goods and entrepreneurs, limits the ability of African governments to take proactive and conscious measures to facilitate the emergence of an indigenous entrepreneurial class.** (Mowlana 1998).
12. **Globalization has encouraged illicit trade in drugs, prostitution, pornography, human smuggling, dumping of dangerous waste and depletion of the environment by unscrupulous entrepreneurs.**
13. Globalization has freed labour across boundaries and **facilitated brain drain.** It facilitated “brain drain” in developing countries, thus reducing further their human capacity.

The current world, where resources and benefits are concentrated in the hands of very few, is not a comfortable world for anybody. And to sustain it is to breed future insecurity as the mass of the poor strives to get a share of the riches concentrated in the hands of the few. It is clear that **globalization benefits those who have the capacity to harness it but can be very detrimental to those whom it finds not prepared.** Most African States are not prepared, especially in terms of having the requisite capacity.

Free Trade Increases Income Inequality. (free trade → people buying cheaper stuff elsewhere → workers get paid less so they can compete)

Meyerson, 2015 [Harold Meyerson, *an American journalist and opinion columnist. In 2009 The Atlantic Monthly named him one of “the most influential commentators in the nation”* ^{citation}, “A trade deal at what cost?” May 20, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/at-what-cost-trade/2015/05/20/e9c9531c-ff1a-11e4-805c-c3f407e5a9e9_story.html] // AUN

“Future Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson [wrote in 1955](#) that, under free trade, “**national product would go up, but the relative and absolute share of labor might go down.**” More pointedly still, another Nobel laureate, Bertil Ohlin, showed that as a result of trade, **a nation’s workers could see their wages decline even if none of them lost their jobs.**

Samuelson and Ohlin have been proved right. **Increased trade with lower-wage nations over the past 30 years has resulted in both massive offshoring of manufacturing and wage decline for most U.S. workers.** As economists David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson [have demonstrated](#), **Chinese import competition has lowered wages not just for displaced manufacturing workers in this country but also, on average, for all workers in their midst.”**

Too much too fast is bad—causes escalating instability and a backlash against liberalization

Perez 10 David A. Perez, J.D. Yale Law School, working with Koh, former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department, *America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department*, Spring, 2010, *Harvard Latino Law Review*, 13 *Harv. Latino L. Rev.* 187 //CJC

Policy-makers in Washington must realize that Cubans will not wake up the day after Fidel Castro dies and experience broad-based attitudinal changes. Therefore, while economic reform is sure to preface political reform, the Cuban government will have to move slowly on the former so as not to alienate the population, which would truncate the latter. At first, a successor regime may think that choosing between Castroism and economic liberalization is a Faustian choice: economic doldrums with continuity versus economic revitalization with instability. Indeed, continuing Castroism embraces the history and normative values attached to the Revolution, but would forestall any economic recovery. On the other hand, liberalizing the economy by adopting market reforms would promote economic growth, but could also alienate large segments of the population still enamored by Castro's revolutionary zeal. For example, one possible market reform would be to lay off the excess workforce that has cluttered the state-controlled enterprises and rendered them inefficient and virtually useless. Embracing deep cuts in the public employment might be efficient, but it certainly will not be popular. For decades Cubans have enjoyed job security, universal education, and universal healthcare. If market reforms are interpreted as a wholesale rejection of the normative and ideological underpinnings that have dominated Cuban discourse for the last fifty years, they will no doubt alienate influential ideologues in the Communist Party, the military, the Ministry of the Interior, and many others in the general population.

When a state takes control of the economy, it also takes responsibility for it when it performs poorly. A strong state could surely implement these reforms and survive the ensuing backlash; but to do so would require deft political maneuvering, and a careful patience to not try to change everything all at once. A poorly managed state-led economic opening can quickly become unmanageable, and create instability. Given these concerns, a slow and methodical economic transition, rather than an overnight toppling of the [*210] state-sector, would be a far more pragmatic approach for the Cuban government. China and Vietnam have both introduced market reforms that dwarf any that the Cuban regime has introduced so far. Given that China has been on the path of liberalization for over thirty years yet the state still controls wide swaths of the economy, one might expect Cuba's economic transformation to also move lethargically—especially at first. The stronger the parallel with Asia becomes, the more methodical Cuba's opening will be. Expectations that assume a quick economic turnaround should be correspondingly adjusted. Thus, the United States should recognize that the Cuban government has little choice but to move at a relatively glacial speed, and instead work assiduously to make the economic transition as smooth as possible. To that end, it is absolutely crucial that our policies not be used as a way to settle political grudges. For example, if America moves to regain the properties taken by the Cuban government fifty years ago as a way to "encourage" market reforms, the entire effort will be short-circuited before it takes off the ground.

Diaz-Canel helping advance reforms in squo- will continue

Chazan 13 - former news producer and editor (Jackie, examiner.com, "Cuba soon to have a president not named Castro", Feb 26, 2013, <http://www.examiner.com/article/cuba-soon-to-have-a-president-not-named-castro>) //CJC

This is a major change in Cuba, not just generational," said Arturo Lopez-Levy, an analyst at the University of Denver who used to work for the Cuban interior ministry on intelligence issues and U.S. relations. "The promotion of Diaz-Canel should be seen as part of an institutional change in the way the Cuban elite is promoted." ¶ Diaz-Canel's experience will help Castro advance reforms designed to make the economy more efficient and bring in more foreign currency, without loosening the Communist Party's political control. ¶ He was brought to Havana in 2009 to become minister of higher education and then a vice president of the Council of Ministers. He is seen within the Communist Party as incorruptible, a staunch communist, and a nationalist loyal to the Castros' revolutionary vision. ¶ He has a reputation as an effective manager and for negotiating the fine line between Raul Castro's reform agenda and the sometimes more dogmatic doctrine of provincial party members resistant to change.

Soft Power

Trump diplomacy fails

Babbin Dec 5 2016 [Jed Babbin is a writer for the Spectator, "Trump-Style Diplomacy", *The Spectator*, <<https://spectator.org/trump-style-diplomacy/>>] //CJC

Trump has been contacting other nations' leaders since before he was elected. He diplomatic style is reminiscent of what Winston Churchill said of John Foster Dulles: "He is the only bull who brings his own china shop with him." That's not necessarily bad, because American diplomacy has for eight long years been a disaster that shunned our allies, embraced our enemies, and reduced us from a superpower to a France-like also-ran. Trump's international relations are styled just as his campaign was. He seems to be breaking every taboo and, for the most part, getting it right. But what he's getting wrong may come back to bite him. In August, Mexican President Peña Nieto invited both Trump and Clinton to visit. Only Trump went. Both Trump and Peña Nieto had mild reactions to the meeting, which apparently was cordial. The border wall was mentioned, but apparently there was no agreement who'd pay for it. Since the election, Trump has had about fifty conversations with other nations' leaders, some of which are controversial. He called Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and told him he was a "terrific guy." In that conversation Trump offered to help solve any problems the Pakistanis have. That's an awful idea. Pakistan, since its founding, has been at war with India over the disputed province of Kashmir. Its foreign policy consists of enmity with India over Kashmir and sponsorship of Sunni Islamic terrorism. Pakistan was the nation that gave Osama bin Laden sanctuary for about a decade, hiding him from American forces seeking to capture or kill him. India is the world's most populous democracy and should be our natural ally, but we've been pushing it away since the Bill Clinton era. We've been cozy with Pakistan over India since 9/11 because they enabled American forces to land and travel over their territory to reach landlocked Afghanistan. There's no explanation from the Pakistanis for why bin Laden was given sanctuary. Pakistan is a state sponsor of terrorism. Terrorist networks based in Pakistan have conducted horrific attacks in India such as the 2008 Lakshar-e-Taiba attack in Mumbai that killed at least 164 people. Trying to solve Pakistan's problems will almost certainly create more problems for us. The most controversial of Trump's diplomatic conversations wasn't that one. Though he spoke earlier with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Trump accepted a call last week from the recently elected president of Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen. The two reportedly exchanged congratulations, and little else was said. The last time an American leader spoke to a Taiwanese leader was in 1979, when Jimmy Carter threw democratic Taiwan over the side in favor of declaring a "one China" policy that recognized Communist China as the only legitimate nation by that name. Predictably, not only are the Chicoms in a carefully-staged uproar that Trump would even speak with Ing-Wen, our media morons are as well. CNN has written reports on the call that don't even mention Ing-Wen's name for fear of angering the Chicoms. Trump was right to take the call. No nation has any right to limit who an American president or president-elect speaks to. As one of my Navy evil-genius friends pointed out in an email, Trump may have blown up a Chinese plan to create a crisis over Taiwan in Trump's first days in office. We'll never know if that was true, but Trump should continue, whenever he feels the need, to speak to those national leaders regardless of what our enemies and adversaries (or State Department bureaucrats) think. Trump is and will continue to be his own chief diplomat. He probably needs a score keeper more than a secretary of state. Congress and the diplomatic community will want a secretary of state to keep Trump on a tight leash. Good luck with that. No one is even going to be able to control his Twitter feed. For better and for worse, our next president will be himself wherever

he goes and the ambassadors he chooses will be expected to faithfully deliver his messages, no matter how undiplomatic or politically incorrect they may be.

Soft power fails – it takes too long and signals weakness, allowing conflicts to escalate.

Rubin 14 (Jennifer Rubin, Columnist and blogger for The Washington Post on domestic and foreign policy, “The evolution of Obama’s quarter-baked war plan,” The Washington Post, October 23 2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2014/10/23/the-evolution-of-obamas-quarter-baked-war-plan/>, *fc)

The results are entirely predictable. Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry repeatedly ruled out force or at least effective force (“boots on the ground”) while promising that conflicts can be resolved at the bargaining table. Obama did it with Syria, and Kerry insists diplomacy hasn’t failed, to the amazement of critics such as Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.). He did it with Russia (which remains ensconced in Ukraine). He is doing it with Iran. **Absent force or the threat of force, these negotiations prove to be fruitless.** And they have led us to a ridiculous war plan.

The results could hardly be a surprise, given recent history. Waiting around for soft power or multilateral bodies to work led to mass civilian deaths in Kosovo and Rwanda in the 1990s. It is not just that Obama repudiated his own liberal advisers’ idea that we have a “responsibility to protect” (R2P) those facing aggression and mass murder; it is that we have turned it on its head. The administration now asserts that it would be irresponsible to protect others. It is monstrously immoral, demanding that we must stand idly by while innocents are harmed and threats to our security build — and that others must, too. **You don’t have to believe that Obama wants dictators, mass murderers and terrorists to win to see that his policies make it more tempting for them to try and more likely that they will prevail.**

Eventually, Obama must succumb (e.g. against Libya, the Islamic State) to international realities and use some force. But if he can’t avoid force altogether, he will do the next best thing — use such limited, distant force that he can claim his ban on hard power is more or less intact. He insisted on an airpower-only strategy in Libya, then subcontracted even that to NATO and now cannot be bothered to see that the country is once again a haven for jihadists. And Yemen, which he cited as a success in his minimalist use of force doctrine? The Post editorial board recently explained, “Now Yemen appears in danger of disintegrating, as sectarian insurgents backed by Iran capture large parts of the country’s north, even while al-Qaeda forces surge in the south. Once again a narrowly focused U.S. engagement has helped make the breakdown possible.”

That brings us back to the war against the Islamic State. No boots on the ground was the first and predictable edict (although about 1,500 booted members of the U.S. military are currently in Iraq). The lack of success brought a win-some-lose-some attitude toward Kobane. But realizing that a major defeat and civilian massacre would send a deadly signal to Iraq, the Kurds and the Free Syrian Army and humiliate the United States, Obama stepped up bombing and now strives, still by air only, to prevent Kobane’s fall. And now a war premised on getting the help of locals on the ground in Syria risks failure because we won’t put our own troops in there to help.

After six years, **the notion that soft power can be divorced from hard lies in rubble.** The idea that if we really must resort to force to defend our interests we should use the least force (and the least effective force) has proved disastrous. Now it may lead to our inability to defeat a vicious foe.

US has most soft power in world

Mount 2016 [Ian Mount at Fortune, “The U.S. Jumps to the Top of the World’s ‘Soft Power’ Index”, Fortune, <<http://fortune.com/2016/06/14/world-soft-power-index/>>] //CJC

But President Obama's work over the last eight years to reposition the U.S. as more diplomatic and less belligerent seems to be paying some dividends, at least according to a survey released today by the London PR firm Portland in partnership with Facebook.

In the Soft Power 30 report, an annual ranking of countries on their ability to achieve objectives through attraction and persuasion instead of coercion, **the U.S. leapfrogged the U.K. and Germany to claim the top spot**, while Canada, under its popular and photogenic new Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, jumped France to claim fourth place.

Based on a theory of global political power developed by Joseph Nye, a Harvard political science professor, the survey uses both polling and digital data to rank countries on more than 75 metrics gathered under the three pillars of soft power: political values, culture, and foreign policy.

Sanctions are soft power

Brookes 2006 [Peter Brookes at the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy, "Iran: Our Military Options", *Heritage Foundation*, <<http://www.heritage.org/homeland-security/commentary/iran-our-military-options>>] //CJC

A reporter last month asked Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz, the Israel Defense Force's chief of staff, how far Israel is willing to go to stop Iran's nuclear (weapons) program; the general answered: "2,000 kilometers" - the flying distance from Israel to Iran's key nuclear sites. Keeping the military option on the table for dealing with the Mullahs of Mayhem's atomic intransigence makes good policy sense. **Diplomacy and "soft power" options such as economic sanctions are always more effective when backed up by the credible threat of force.** Unfortunately, flattening Iran's nuclear infrastructure isn't easy or risk-free - and could have serious consequences for American interests. The key challenge: the program is underground - literally and figuratively.

Squo solves

Haven 4/10/13 (Paul Haven, 4/10/13, AP, "Under the radar, Cuba and US often work together," <http://news.yahoo.com/under-radar-cuba-us-often-together-182659594.html>) //CJC

HAVANA (AP) — Cuba and the United States may be longtime enemies with a bucket overflowing with grievances, but the fast return of a Florida couple who fled U.S. authorities with their two kidnapped children in tow shows the Cold War enemies are capable of remarkable cooperation on many issues.¶ Indeed, diplomats and observers on both sides of the Florida Straits say **American and Cuban law enforcement officers, scientists, disaster relief workers, Coast Guard officials and other experts work together on a daily basis**, and invariably express professional admiration for each other.¶ "I don't think the story has been told, but there is a real warmth in just the sort of day-to-day relations between U.S. and Cuban government officials," said Dan Whittle, who frequently brings scientific groups to the island in his role as Cuba program director for the Environmental Defense Fund.¶ "Nearly every time I talk to American officials they say they were impressed by their Cuban counterparts. There

really is a high level of mutual respect."¶ **Almost none of these technical-level interactions make the headlines, but examples are endless.**¶ Just last week, Cuba's top environmental official Ulises Fernandez and several island oil experts attended a conference in New York of the International Association of Drilling Contractors after the State Department expedited their visas.¶

Cooperation now—Obama's lifting restrictions

Ordonez 12 (Franco Ordonez, 5/21/12, McClatchy newspapers, "Scientists work to bridge political gap between Cuba, U.S." <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/05/21/149603/scientists-work-to-bridge-political.html#.Ue93UI2Thsk>) //CJC

VINALES, Cuba — **Cuban and American scientists have joined forces** in an effort to protect baby sea turtles and endangered sharks. They're studying Caribbean weather patterns that fuel the hurricanes that have devastated the Southeastern United States.¶ **In the process, they're chipping away at a half-century of government feuding, helping to bring the nations together for talks on vital matters, such as what to do in case of an oil spill.**¶ The two countries are so geographically close, and the environmental concerns so similar, that scientists say it's crucial to combine forces.¶ "If we're going to have any hope of protecting our environment in the future, from climate change to our shared resources in the Gulf of Mexico, we have to collaborate," said Dan Whittle, the Cuba program director at the Environmental Defense Fund.¶ **Under the Obama administration, cooperation between scientific organizations has increased, scientists say.** Visas are being granted more regularly to Cuban scientists and it's easier for Americans to get the U.S. government licenses needed to do research on the island.¶ Peter Agre, a Nobel laureate in chemistry and the head of the Johns Hopkins Malaria Research Institute, led **18 U.S. scientists associated with the American Association for the Advancement of Science on a trip to Cuba in December to meet with counterparts about potential cooperation in marine and atmospheric sciences, and sustainable fisheries.**¶ For some American scientists, going to Cuba is like tasting a piece of forbidden fruit. The scientific landscape has been largely untouched for decades.¶ **The U.S. trade embargo,** which has been in place for 50 years, has in many ways been a gift to Cuba's forests, fish populations and coral reefs. It **helped insulate Cuba's ecosystem from the type of tourist development that's wracked other nations.**¶ Sea turtles that feed in Florida journey back each year to nest in Cuba. Many grunts and snapper fish that live off the North Carolina coast also spawn in Cuba. The oceanic whitetip shark has almost disappeared from U.S. waters, but preliminary studies show the predators in abundance around the island.¶ **Cuban scientists see the collaboration with Americans as an honest exchange of work, as opposed to a plea for funding or resources.**¶ They complain that they don't get enough credit for their science, and they boast that Cuba represents 2 percent of the Latin American population but has 11 percent of the scientists in the region. There are thousands of Cuban doctors and health professionals on medical missions abroad.¶ The country includes more than 84 protected areas, making up almost 14 percent of the island. In Western Cuba at the 37,500-acre Vinales National Park, environmentalists study ways to protect the vast mountains that are home to an array of native plants and animals, including the renowned "painted snails." Legend has it that the sun painted their vibrant orange and yellow swirled shells.¶ "Of maximum importance is the need to protect and conserve the environment," said Yamira Valdez, a Cuban environmental specialist at the park. ¶ **Our countries can share experiences,** criteria. They can see what works here. And we can apply their experience to the work we do."¶ **Scientists and scholars have helped break through political barriers before.** An environmental agreement reached with the Soviet Union in the 1970s is often credited with easing Cold War tensions.¶ "So later when things began to loosen up and relations warmed, there was a network of people who knew each other quite well who had actually had dinners together and been to each other's homes," said William Reilly, the head of the Environmental Protection Agency under President George H.W. Bush. "That is enormously constructive."¶ The researchers understand that anything involving Cuba is going to be controversial. A decision to grant President Raul Castro's daughter a visa to attend an academic conference in San Francisco this week sparked a wave of criticism from Cuban-American groups, calling her an enemy of democracy. But the researchers say their work is focused on science, not politics. Their cooperation will serve as a foundation for future dialogue, they say.¶ "The political relationship at some point, in five years, 50 years, 500 years, whatever it is, will change," said Vaughan Turekian, an atmospheric geochemist and chief international officer at the American Association for the Advancement of Science.¶ In a rare move last year, the Environmental Defense Fund received State

Department approval to bring a senior official from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to Cuba to meet with officials about rebuilding fish stocks for species of fish that populate the region.¶ Oil is a key area of cooperative interest.¶ Scientists have helped facilitate talks

between the nations as the specter of an oil spill has raised concerns in both of them.¶ Cuban oceanographers reached out to their U.S. counterparts after the 2010 BP spill to help them gain reassurances that the U.S. government would step in should the gushing petroleum come near Cuban shores.¶

¶ "The ocean doesn't have borders. It's more about the currents. It's more how nature works and which are the vulnerable species," said Roberto Perez, a scientist at the Antonio Nunez Jimenez Foundation of Man and Nature in Havana. "Fortunately, it didn't come to our waters, but the idea really opened up the window of opportunity for the governments to talk."¶ Those conversations have increased as Cuba prepares to drill for oil just 70 miles from the Florida Keys.¶ Last year, the U.S. Treasury Department granted a group of environmentalists and drilling experts, led by the Environmental Defense Fund, permission to travel to Cuban to meet with top officials at the Ministry of Basic Industry, which regulates the energy sector, as well as the state-run petroleum company. The group included Reilly, the co-chair of a bipartisan commission that investigated the 2010 BP spill. He said his goal was to share the commission's findings with Cuban officials, who had no experience regulating offshore oil and gas, in hopes that they wouldn't make the same mistakes that led to the BP disaster.¶ When he returned to the United States, Reilly briefed the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement and other administration agencies, whose officials, Reilly said, were very interested to learn that the Cubans were reading the Interior Department's regulatory reports and planned to adhere to American standards.¶ "That was not known," he said.¶ U.S. officials also have engaged with the International Maritime Organization, which has sent technical teams to Cuba to evaluate its oil drilling procedures, and Cuban and U.S. officials met in the Bahamas in December along with officials from Mexico and Jamaica to discuss disaster plans. A similar meeting was held in Trinidad and administration officials say more will come.¶ "In fact, we're all comfortable all the entities that would need licenses to respond appropriately either have them or are in the process of getting them at this point," said a senior administration official, who requested anonymity in order to speak freely.¶ Reilly notes that his delegation spent several days speaking directly with top Cuban officials and was able to gather

specific details about Cuban plans that may not have been discussed at other multinational meetings.¶ On the oil and gas issues, we've been moderately successful in getting the two governments to start talking with each other," said the Environmental Defense Fund's Whittle, who helped lead the trip and had several meetings with administration officials.

Zero evidence supports a Cuban bioweapons program

Smith, 7 - was a U.S. diplomat and specialist in Cuban affairs for roughly 25 years, leaving the Foreign Service in 1982, when he was Chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, because of his disagreements over Cuba policy. He has been an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University since 1984 and a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, DC since 1992 (Wayne, "Take Cuba Off The Terrorist List" The National Interest, 8/6, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/inside-track-take-cuba-off-the-terrorist-list-1733 //CJC>

Bogus Charges That Cuba is a Biological Warfare Threat

Back in 2004, Bolton said that the Bush administration was "concerned that Cuba is developing a limited biological weapons effort . . . and believes Cuba remains a terrorist and biological warfare threat to the United States."

Bolton's charges caused a stir. Over the past three years, however, they have widely come to be seen as politically motivated and groundless. Certainly neither he nor anyone else has been able to put forward any evidence to support the charges. The Department of State no longer even makes them.

Further, the Center for Defense Information (CDI) sent several delegations to Cuba to investigate and in one case was accompanied by CIP. They were allowed to go anywhere they wished and see anything requested. Their conclusions were perhaps best summed up by retired General Charles Wilhelm, the former commander of SOUTHCOM, who accompanied one of the delegations. "While Cuba certainly has the capability to develop and produce chemical and biological weapons, nothing we saw or heard led us to the conclusion that they were proceeding on this path."

Wilhelm's conclusions were practically echoed by a National Intelligence Estimate conducted in the summer of 2004 and reported in The New York Times on September 18, 2004. It said that

"the Intelligence Community continues to believe that Cuba has the technical capability [emphasis added] to pursue some aspects of an offensive biological weapons program." It made no claim, however, that Cuba was pursuing such a program. In sum, unless accompanied by new evidence, any charges that Cuba poses a biological warfare threat to the United States must be seen as baseless.

The bioweapons charge was based on pre-Iraq WMD intel

Smith, et al 2004- *senior fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, D.C., and an adjunct professor at the Johns Hopkins University, Muse **member of the American Society of International Law and the American branch of the International Law Association, Baker ***senior researcher in the Washington, D.C. office of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)
(Wayne S., Robert , Glenn, "Cuba Should Not Be on the Terrorist List", International Policy Report, November 2004,http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList_.pdf, google scholar)//KW

In March of 2004, Under Secretary of State John Bolton accused Cuba of moving ahead with a developmental effort Conference panelists Glenn Baker, Cynthia McClintock and Jonathan Tucker..2 to produce biological weapons. Cuba heatedly denies the charge and has invited anyone who wishes to come and see for themselves. Various U.S. delegations to Cuba led by CDI have seen no evidence at all to suggest that Cuba is in fact developing biological weapons. The charge that it is doing so appears to be a politically motivated statement by Mr. Bolton based on fragmentary intelligence that is ambiguous at best.

The central question we should ask here is how can U.S. interests possibly be served by putting forward these spurious allegations against Cuba, by insisting that it is a terrorist state when it obviously is not, and by rebuffing its offers to cooperate in the struggle against terrorism? Does this not undermine our own credibility and cast doubt on our seriousness of purpose? Conference organizers invited Under Secretary of State John Bolton and representatives of the State Department to participate in the conference so as to have the opportunity to defend their positions. They declined to do so.

Remittance restrictions are gone

Lovitt 2015 [Rob Lovitt at NPR News, "American Remittances Speed Change in the Cuban Economy", *NPR News*, <<http://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/american-remittances-speed-change-cuban-economy-n397796>>] //CJC

Roughly one-third of Cubans receive money from abroad," said Jorge Duany, director of the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University in Miami. "When you send \$100 or \$200 a month to Cuba — where the average salary is around \$24 a month — that makes a substantial difference in people's standard of living." Such funds, known as remittances, have been playing an increasing role in the Cuban economy since September 2009, when restrictions on the amount of money Cuban-Americans could send to family members in

Cuba were eliminated. Then, in January, the limits for Americans without a family connection were raised from \$500 to \$2,000 per quarter, or \$8,000 per year.

Trade with other countries

Seaman 10 (David Seaman, Prof., Social Science, U. Osnabruck, Germany, "U.S. Democracy Promotion: The Case of Cuba,

<http://www.blissfieldschools.us/downloads/justin_pooley/casebook_2_inherency_2013_20130611_075447_1.pdf> 2010) //CJC

While the U.S. embargo creates an extremely difficult economic situation in Cuba, the island is able to find relief from much of the economic pressure in several ways. Firstly, the lack of international support for the embargo has made it possible for Cuba to continuously find substitute trading partners and adapt to new and changing circumstances, helping fill the void created by the end of the massive Soviet subsidies and aid. Cuba enjoys trade with several Western capitalist states, foremost Canada, Spain, and the Netherlands, Cuba's three largest Western trading partners. Most recently, the country has developed close trade relations with Venezuela and China, which together now make up more than 50% off all trade for Cuba.

The economy is growing in all sectors

HT 7-7 (Havana Times, "Cuban Gov. Presents "Favorable" Stats" <<http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=95985>> 7-7-13) //CJC

The economy showed an overall a "favorable performance", said Yzquierdo. Almost all sectors recorded growth, "including trade, transport, communications and manufacturing," he noted.

Yzquierdo said the Cuban trade balance was positive at the end of the first quarter and pointed to a similar trend for year-end. At the same time, he spoke of a "slowdown" in the global economic situation. Cuba recently reduced its forecasts for annual growth in 2013 from the 3.6 percent initially estimated to somewhere between 2.5 and 3.0 percent. He emphasized that the evolution of gross domestic product (GDP) has been influenced by the crisis in the international arena. In the first semester, the island's economy grew 2.3 percent, according Yzquierdo, despite "external stress", the "internal weaknesses" and the effects of Hurricane "Sandy", which swept across the east of Cuba in October 2012. "Sandy" affected 11 provinces and caused losses of almost 7 billion dollars, according to the minister. The inaugural session of the eighth legislature of the National Assembly of People's Power closes on, Sunday. Raul Castro is expected to pronounce in a speech to the parliament. In a Communist Party Central Committee meeting last week, Castro came down hard on what he called "indiscipline and illegalities" in the State apparatus. He will most likely refer to the fight against corruption, one of the banner efforts of his administration.

Meneghini 16 [Alexandre, reporter for Reuters, "Cuba signs deal with Google for faster internet access", Dec 13 2016, *Al Jazeera*, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/cuba-signs-deal-google-faster-internet-access-161213060258481.html>] //BS

Google and the Cuban government have signed a deal allowing the internet giant to provide faster access to its data by installing servers on the island that will store much of the company's most popular content.

Storing Google data in Cuba eliminates the long distances that signals must travel from the island through Venezuela to the nearest Google server. **Washington has no direct data link to the communist island.**

US has had virtually no economic ties with Cuba for more than five decades owing to Washington-imposed trade sanctions.

But hopes of better relations have been revived since 2015, when US President Barack Obama re-established diplomatic ties between the two countries.

Eric Schmidt, chairman of Google's parent company Alphabet Inc, signed the deal with Mayra Arevich Marin, president of state telecommunications monopoly ETECSA, on Monday.

The deal removes one of the many obstacles to a normal internet in Cuba, which suffers from some of the world's most limited and expensive access.

But the move is not expected to help a significant number of Cubans to have internet access, at least in the short term.

Home connections remain illegal for most Cubans and the government charges the equivalent of a month's average salary for 10 hours of access to public wi-fi spots with speeds frequently too slow to download files or watch streaming video.

The agreement does not affect Cuba's antiquated communications infrastructure or broaden public access to the internet, but it could make Google websites such as YouTube or Gmail up to 10 times faster for users inside Cuba. Content hosted by other companies will not be affected.

Neither Google chairman Schmidt nor Cuban officials spoke to the press after the signing ceremony in Havana.

In a blog post, Marian Croak, Google's vice president for access strategy and emerging markets, and Brett Perlmutter, head of strategy and operations for Google Cuba and the lead negotiator of the deal, said: "Cubans who already have access to the internet and want to use our services can expect to see an improvement in terms of quality of service and reduced latency for cached content."

ABCC 14 [ABCC is a non-profit dedicated to curing brain cancer, "FDA Approves Scorpion Venom-based Tumor Paint for Brain Tumor Clinical Trial", *Accellerate Brain Cancer Cure*, <http://abc2.org/press-blog/2014/09/fda-approves-scorpion-venom-based-tumor-paint-brain-tumor-clinical-trial>] //BS

Olson and his team went to work and discovered a chlorotoxin found the venom of the deathstalker scorpion could attach itself to cancerous cells in rats.

"So when it binds to the cancer cell, it flips inside the cancer cell and makes them light up so the surgeon can see them in real time while they are operating," said Olson.

Olson and his team created a synthetic version for tumor paint based on the DNA structure of the chlorotoxin in the venom.

The patient comes to the doctor and has an injection of tumor paint just prior to surgery. Olson says as soon as the surgeon opens up the cavity "they can see what is cancer what is not cancer." Cancer tissue reflects green under a laser light. So far Tumor Paint has only been tested on lab rats and dogs that developed cancer.

Raul Started Making Changes in 2008

Aho, 2014. ["Cuba Under Raúl Castro: Assessing the Reforms." Americas Quarterly. Matthew Aho. Winter, 2014. <http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/cuba-under-ra%C3%BAI-castro-assessing-reforms-carmelo-mesa-lago-and-jorge-p%C3%A9rez-l%C3%B3pez>.] GW

When Cuban President Raúl Castro first assumed power in 2006 after his bombastic brother, Fidel, fell ill, few knew what to expect. Some believed his custodianship of the presidency would be short-lived and that the island's longtime Líder Máximo would surely come roaring back. Others simply assumed Raúl would follow in his brother's footsteps, shepherding Cuban Communism on its already decades-long march into economic and political oblivion.

No one predicted that the unassuming former military commander Raúl would, as president, not only consolidate political power and begin nudging Cuba in a new direction, but **undertake fundamental reforms that are now transforming the island's socialist system into a mixed-market economy.** Yet even today's most jaded skeptics and the government's harshest critics can no longer deny the **sweeping changes that have taken place on the island since 2008.**