Septober Blockfile ‘19

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1. Non-UQ. Even without the BRI, as neighbors, Pakistan's economic incentive to make Afghanistan stable still exists as the world bank shows that Afghanistan is Pakistan's #4 trade partner, and as their economic situation worsens, Pakistan is likely to stabilize Afghanistan w/ or w/out the BRI.
2. (if interdependency is the reason why BRI solves) Non-UQ. The countries are already very interconnected with Afghanistan being Pakistan's #4 trade partner and Pakistan being Afghanistan #1 trade partner according to the world bank. They already have huge levels of interdependence.
3. Defense. The squo is solving. Gul of VOA News '19 tells us that Pakistan has capitulated to Afghan led peace talks to strengthen political and economic integration between the two countries.
4. Non-UQ. Even if Pakistan wanted to continue financing the Taliban, they're losing the ability to do so, as Chaudry '19 explains that Pakistan's economy has reached the point of collapse.
5. Uniqueness Overwhelms. Even if you don't buy our other responses, uniqueness overwhelms the link. The ICG evidence explains that the decision to support the Taliban stems from Pakistan military high command, which overrules the civil government's trade goals. This doesn't change with the BRI, meaning the support for the Taliban won't change.
6. Defense. Their link is reliant on CPEC. Aamir '19 gives 4 reasons that CPEC is going away even if the BRI survives:
    a. CPEC was started by Pakistan's previous administration, and its continuance only serves to weaken Khan's government.
    b. Pakistan needs an IMF loan, and to get this loan they will have to make the details of CPEC public, which will draw domestic criticism and further cancelation of projects.
    c. Recent criticism both internationally, within China, and within Pakistan has caused both parties to sour on CPEC, creating a stumbling block for the rest of the BRI, encouraging China to cut its losses in Pakistan and focus elsewhere.
    d. China promised loans but has not handed over the capital for CPEC projects, leaving Pakistan to finance projects on their own. Problematically, Pakistan is facing an economic crisis that is stopping their ability to continue funding CPEC.

7. https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13468-chinas-peacemaking-between-pakistan-and-afghanistan.html

A2 Biomass

1. Turn. Ewing '19 of the Hill writes that the coal plants China is building will double coal-fire capacity and risk putting any chance of escaping climate change out of reach. This empirically denies that biomass creates more emissions because the industrialization created from coal creates much larger effects than the small scale use of climate change. This also outweighs any deaths caused by biomass because climate change affects people on a much larger scale and has much more dangerous implications for the global economy and survival of humanity as a whole.
2. The places where biomass is burned are in homes. If developing nations are getting their first access to large amounts of power, it most likely will go to powering industry rather than homes, leaving people still burning biomass.

A2 China Recession

1. DA. The Belt and Road is destructive for the declining Chinese economy as Huang of the American Enterprise Institute '19 explains that loans for the Belt and Road crowd out loans to the private sector, as state banks choose to invest in the Initiative over it's private sector. Because of this, Wu '19 of the South China Morning Post explains that the decline in private sector investment has reduced China economic growth by 2%.
2. Link in to our case/Delink. Joske '18 of War on the Rocks explains that the BRI is all about power projection, and would be dropped in the case of a recession. This concedes the link into our case that not affirming ends the BRI.

Overcapacity

1. Defense. Hedrick '18 of Forbes explains that Chinese investment firms are mostly state owned, and the debts they take out are to Chinese banks. They literally just owe debt to themselves, meaning it won't cause a recession insofar as China won't cripple its own economy.
2. Defense. China gains hegemony through protecting their economic interests. Thus, <u>Xu '18 of the Hoover Institute</u> explains that China has been able to avoid economic collapse through decades of financial crisis that would have toppled similar economies- because they implement anti-crisis reforms that include a closed capital account, implementing prudent external financial policies. This means that no matter what the Chinese economy will never go into deep recession.
3. Defense. <u>Barman '19 of Yahoo Finance</u> explains that Chinese companies are looking to crank up the overall output of steel to keep up with a perceived growth in domestic demand from increased Chinese interest into infrastructure investment efforts as a method to combating economic slowdowns. Overproduction won't be an issue for the Chinese economy to begin with because there's going to be sufficient domestic demand to take up the steel.
4. Defense. The European Commission '19 explains that the European Union is already investing billions of Euros into sweeping infrastructure projects in and around Europe and the Mediterranean that are projected to significantly decrease travel times and congestion on land routes, making trade and communication significantly easier. This has two implications:
    a. The BRI won't be built using Chinese steel overcapacity, projects will just continue to use EU steel and overcapacity remains.
    b. It won't create an export market for steel insofar as Europe already has plenty of steel that they're using right now.
5. Defense. Even assuming that the steel companies get projects in the EU using Chinese steel, the time before they see a return is long, but the upfront cost to supply the steel and finance the projects is high. If their loan default is as imminent as my opponents make it out to be, it likely won't be in time to save the Chinese economy.
6. Defense. Make them prove the brink. Even if in their world some steel companies are saved, insofar as the project contracts aren't going to be doled out equally, many companies will still

fail. At that point, the Chinese economy is still going to have the recession they talk about because they don't meet their own brightline.

Partnering w/ EU Improves Investment

1. Defense. The reason investment from China is so unprofitable isn't due to a lack of investment experience, it's because the BRI isn't profit oriented. Greer '18 of Foreign Policy explains that local administrators use BRI projects as a tool to gain clout within the Chinese government rather than basing them on sound economic viability. The projects are fundamentally unviable which the EU doesn't solve.
2. Non-uq. Lo '19 of SCMP writes that a bunch of Western countries like Belgium, Canada, and France have agreed to help consult on investments with China. Thus, Jia '17 of Baker McKenzie writes that local and foreign partners have already helped China manage risks.

A2 Sand

1. Diaz 18 explains that there is a new alternative to mining sand,called Finite, which uses abundant desert sand instead of river bank sand. It is becoming economically competitive against concrete and when used will save millions of people who are hurt by mining of river sand.

https://www.fastcompany.com/90165549/the-next-great-building-material-it-could-be-sand-from-deserts

abundant desert sand makes Finite economically competitive against concrete but, more importantly, it may help save millions of delicate water-based ecosystems around the world.

A2 China Heg Good

1. In a lot of the regions in the world it's already bipolar. For example, in Asia where a majority of BRI investment is going into, the 2 biggest actors in the region are the US and China. If There aren't any other major actors involved make them show what type of unique heg impact they would get.
2. Rivera '17 of the SCMP explains that China has already become the bedrock of the UN's functioning, as it has begun to fill the vacuum that the US left in the international arena, with the UN recognizing China at the helm of many of its most prominent multilateral issues.
3. Hutchinson in '16 argues that a multipolar world is a lot better than a bipolar due to the fact that it deters large scale aggression as any unjustified act of aggression would bring in the response of other major powers.
    a. This is even more crucial as China is military aggressive in places around the world, like in the South China Sea and future areas such as the arctic. {Contextualize some conflict scenario

A2 Chinese 5G Development

1. Impact Turn. Chanda '19 of Times of India explains three reasons why the 5G internet China proliferates in the affirmative world is bad.
    a. Sustainability. Within BRI agreements, China includes a clause that requires BRI partners to only use Chinese 5G suppliers. This prevents nations from developing their own 5G infrastructure and makes developing nations' entire internet infrastructure reliant to the whims of China.
    b. Censorship. China censors the internet it provides to BRI partners, removing websites and discourse that goes against state narratives.
    c. Surveillance. China uses the internet to harness data on member nations and track citizens, with the goal of improving their geopolitical aims.
2. Turn. IEEE writes Increasing IoT increases the mining of rare earth minerals (REMS) to create things like fiber optic cables. This causes them to get REMs from hydrothermal vents which Oregon state university furthers releases enough methane to create a doomsday climactic event.

A2 Diversionary War

1. Delink. Erin Baggott of the ISAC in 2014 corroborates that based on a 61 year study of over 30,000 US diplomatic actions, diversion usually takes on the form of verbal diversion rather than actual conflict initiation – cheap talk allows presidents to garner a public opinion boost without paying the costs of war.
2. Delink. Davis of the Journal of Conflict Resolution tells us that conomic growth is not needed for peace. Historically, in times of economic downturn, nations have continued to cooperate to resolve disputes.

A2 Deforestation

1. Howeden ‘12 of Common Dreams: Deforestation is inevitable since any expansion of economic activity, like agriculture, logging, and ranching, will cause deforestation, which is important since countries, especially developing ones, have an increasing economic imperative.
2. (If they run EU impact). AIDDATA ‘19: Chinese infrastructure projects empirically reduce deforestation in countries with strong forest protection rules.
3. (If they run EU impact). Losos ‘19 of the Brookings Institute: In economically developed and already deforested regions, there’s barely any natural forest, so the BRI has little impact on Europe. If anything, more infrastructure and roads can attract more tree plantation around them.
4. Kaczan ‘17 of the World Bank: In India’s less forested areas, road construction between 2000 to 2014 had a causal relationship with a 1.2 percent increase in coverage.
5. The EU has its own infrastructure plan called the Juncker Plan, meaning that infrastructure would still be built and leave places deforested. This means that they don’t prove how much more deforestation will occur with the BRI.

A2 EU FDI

1. Defense. The recent decrease in Chinese FDI inherently proves that investment has the potential to be high without the BRI, thus, lack of participation is not at the center of the issue.
2. Defense. Hanemann ‘19 of the Mercator Institute explains that even with Eastern European nations in the BRI, almost all Chinese FDI goes to Western Europe regardless, meaning Chinese FDI doesn’t hinge on BRI participation.
3. Defense. Greer ‘18 of Foreign Policy explains that only 12% of Chinese FDI go to BRI nations. There are two implications:
    a. The EU already has access to 88% of Chinese FDI in the status quo, China can already invest in the region.
    b. There is no relation between increasing BRI projects and increasing FDI, so the EU joining won’t bring more FDI to the region.

A2 EU FDI Low RN

1. Defense. Ernst and Young ‘19 writes that the reason FDI is low in the squo is because investors do not have confidence in the EU because of brexit and it’s political and economic consequences.
2. Defense. Reuters ‘19 explains that the EU as a whole is implementing more protectionist policies in order to fend off unwanted Chinese investments in sensitive technologies and critical infrastructure. He furthers that the EUs newly implemented FDI screening process comes as a

direct block to China as it aims to give EU countries a tool to intervene in cases of foreign direct investment in strategic assets if carried out by state-controlled or state-financed enterprises.

   a. FDI is low because the EU wants it to be low so they can prevent what Pierce '16 of Harvard explains would be a 15-50% increase in prices because of monopolization and what Forbes '10 tells us would be a 7.9% reduction in labor demand due to decreased competition in the EU.

Reuters '19- EU doesn't want Chinese FDI

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-china-fdi/chinese-fdi-in-europe-drops-investment-screening-will-cut-it-more-survey-idUSKCN1QN1T6

Germany last year lowered the threshold for screening and even blocking purchases of stakes in German firms by non-Europeans, in a move to fend off unwanted Chinese investments in sensitive technologies and critical infrastructure. Berlin is also mulling the creation of a state investment fund that could take stakes in key domestic companies to prevent foreign takeovers. The European Union will start screening foreign direct investment into the 28-nation bloc from April to safeguard Europe's security, public order and strategic interests. The screening aims to give EU countries a tool to intervene in cases of foreign direct investment in strategic assets, in particular if carried out by state-controlled or state-financed enterprises.

A2 EU Splintering/Collapse

1. De-link: McNamara 2019 of the Washington Post explains that the EU is becoming more unified.
2. De-link. Harlan 2019 of the Washington Post explains that EU parties support the EU now after seeing Brexit; they just want internal reform.

A2 EU Stimulus

1. Ross '19 of Investopedia explains that infrastructure has very little correlation with economic gains because it often misallocates spending and uses capital ineffectively. Prefer our evidence to theirs because he also continues that the studies that conclude infrastructure's effectiveness are reverse causal, examining economies already in recovery.
2. China pulls out during recession.

A2 FDI Good

1. Delink. <u>Greer '18</u> of Foreign Policy explains that because BRI projects are mostly rebranding of existing projects, FDI flows into BRI nations from China are low, with only 12% of Chinese FDI outflows going to BRI nations. Two implications:
    a. Solvency should already exist, as countries, if investment was profitable, would be getting FDI right now.
    b. They only access a minor increase in FDI because BRI nations don't get noticeably more FDI, limiting their offense to meagre 12% of Chinese FDI.
2. Turn. FDI shuts down local businesses. Karen Baker of the Economic Policy Institute explains that the inflow of FDI causes prices to fall and discourages local entrepreneurs or business owners from entering the market. Baker concludes that a 10% increase in FDI inflow results in a 7% increase in failing domestic firms.
    a. Domestic firms outweigh FDI because FDI just ships growth and economic returns back to China, whereas domestic firms create jobs, activity, and economic activity in the developing nation and actually decreases poverty.
3. DA. FDI destroys economic stability. When countries depend on foreign capital, when that capital fluctuates or is withdrawn, the country's economy will suffer harmful repercussions, which shows that FDI also increases economic volatility, which is also not a good thing. Economic volatility almost always hurts the poorest members of society. This independently turns the argument against my opponents in a multitude of ways.
4. DA. <u>Meunier 2018 of Oxford University Press</u> corroborates that 97% of Chinese FDI is mergers and acquisitions. This has 2 negative implications:
    a. First, <u>Pierce of Harvard Business Review 2016</u> states that M&A's increase prices 15-50% because of monopolization.
    b. Second, <u>Forbes 2010</u> tells us that mergers and acquisitions reduce labor demand 7.9% in Europe due to less competition.

A2 Green Tech

1. Defense. F.S. ‘18 explains that China's coal will remain the core energy export because China needs to get rid of the overcapacity they have in coal and expand the industry because it will hurt their economy if they don’t.
2. Defense. Saha ‘19 tells us even if their case is true, and China exports some greentech, that projects backed by Chinese development banks will produce more coal-fired power globally than total Chinese clean energy generation and on net increase emissions.
3. Defense. Parnell ‘19 explains that China recently ended their program to support greentech projects as they find coal to be more cost-competitive. This has two implications:
    a. It means that as the BRI goes forward, China will continue to export coal rather than greentech, meaning they don’t get access to their impacts.
    b. It also means that all of their evidence from before 2019 about exporting greentech doesn’t take into account China’s policy change, delinking their case.
4. Turn. Saha ‘19 explains that nearly all of China’s non-fossil fuel projects are not wind and solar but hydroelectric dams. Problematically, Weiss ‘16 explains that hydroelectric dams being clean energy is a misnomer as they account for 1.3% of all manmade greenhouse gas emissions. He furthers that 80% of those emission are methane, which has 34 times the warming power of carbon dioxide.
    a. This means that even if they win a link into green technology, the GT they’re building only exacerbates the symptoms of CC.

Fitch Solutions- 18’- coal remains core power export

https://www.fitchsolutions.com/corporates/utilities-power/belt-and-road-coal-power-exports-remain-key-focus-31-07-2018?fSWebArticleValidation=true&mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiWWpSaE1UWTRabU5tWm1VMiIsInQiOiJWaUdUak4wUzhQUVpCNDlseEZxM2ZcL1lUdlwvRHVLOERmR0VcL2RcL1dKZFlcL2t1QTZpRXdiempSV0wwTXNtbnc1WTRGa2JSZThMNDNlcmtpYTRwU0ZtTFdLYktLQzY2YWFNZ09yYkxBZHlNbTlCMU5ENmsydk9VQ3JVT2U4U2xSUnVoIn0%3D

China's footprint in the global power sector will grow substantially under the Belt and Road Initiative, as recipient countries will aim to attract Chinese investment to boost electrification levels while China seeks to export domestic power sector overcapacity. **Coal will remain the core power technology export**, which will lead to greater international scrutiny into China's carbon emissions reductions efforts

Saha ‘19- Coal plants in greater capacity than any chinese clean energy generation

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-belt-and-road-plan-destroying-world-74166

This surge in coal-fired generation will come with a drastic emissions increase. Chinese development finance flows between 2013 and 2018, by conservative estimates, will contribute to annual emissions equivalent to that of the Netherlands. Overall, projects backed by Chinese development banks will produce more coal-fired power globally than clean energy generation, setting the path ahead in the wrong direction. If it were not for government support, then Chinese coal power suppliers almost certainly would not be as successful and global emissions would be fewer.

Saha '19- most gt - hydroelectric dams

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-belt-and-road-plan-destroying-world-74166

Beijing did not finance fossil fuel projects in more than half of the thirty-eight countries, but China's non-fossil fuel projects constitute one-off investments over the six-year period. Moreover, nearly all those non-fossil fuel projects are not wind and solar but hydroelectric dams, which carry their own environmental damage. China's hydroelectric projects portend ruin for millions of farmers and fishermen.

Weiss '16- huge source of methane (80%)

https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2016/nov/06/hydropower-hydroelectricity-methane-clean-climate-change-study

In July, UN Secretary Ban Ki-Moon highlighted the role of hydropower in boosting the use of renewable energy globally, when he visited a nonprofit institute in China that helps emerging nations develop and build hydropower plants. Many countries consider hydroelectricity a clean source of power because it doesn't involve burning dirty fossil fuels. But that's far from true. Hydropower is a significant source of greenhouse gas emissions: a new study shows that the world's hydroelectric dams are responsible for as much methane emissions as Canada.

The study from Washington State University finds that methane, which is at least 34 times more potent than another greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, makes up 80% of the emissions from water storage reservoirs created by dams. What's more, none of these emissions are currently included in global greenhouse gas inventories. These are already revealing a worrisome future in which rising global temperatures will likely cause environmental changes such as rising sea levels and stronger hurricanes, which could uproot communities and intensify competition for food and other resources.

Weiss '16- 1.3% of all green house gas emissions

Using data from the 267 reservoirs, the authors estimate total emissions from all reservoirs worldwide and conclude that those water storage facilities account for 1.3% of all manmade greenhouse gas emissions.

A2 Health Silk Road

1. Turn. McLaughlin of the Pulitzer Center explains that China supplies fake pills to Africa when they do the Health Silk Road. This reverses progress that Africa is making right now as it undermines healthcare systems progressing domestically. Moreover, Political Insights '18 explains that China produces substandard vaccines, sometimes literally injecting water into patients instead of actual vaccines.
2. Defense. China gains hegemony through protecting their economic interests. Thus, Xu '18 of the Hoover Institute explains that China has been able to avoid economic collapse through decades of financial crisis that would have toppled similar economies- because they implement anti-crisis

reforms that include a closed capital account, implementing prudent external financial policies. This means that in the face of their current economic slowdown, the Chinese will stop the Health Silk Road as it doesn't turn a profit.

3. Defense. Political Insights '18 explains that the issue with healthcare in Africa isn't access to hospitals, its stigmatization and institutionalized discrimination towards those seeking treatment.
4. Defense. Chen '18 of the Lancet explains that China doesn't have enough healthcare professionals with experience working in the developing world, making Chinese health aid unhelpful.
5. Turn. Qu '18 of the NCBI explains that China and it's doctors overprescribe antibiotics when they aren't needed. Problematically, the overuse of antibiotics creates antibiotic resistant diseases, and Coates '18 of the NCBI explains that antibiotic resistant viruses have the potential to kill 300 million people and cause a $100 trillion loss by 2050, not only undoing the positive impacts of their case but reversing them, causing a net harm.
6. DA. Chen '19 of PLOS explains that growing commercial trade and more frequent personal exchange following the implementation of the BRI will amplify infectious disease transmission or inadvertently introduce emerging infectious diseases, leading to an increased burden for local medical systems. Moreover, infectious diseases resulting from poverty disproportionately affect poor and marginalised communities. Outweigh two ways:
    a. Short-circuit - The increased medical systems don't matter because they get bogged down by the massive increase in diseases that they're exposed to via trade.
    b. The marginal decrease in existing diseases with the Health Silk Road is outweighed when you expose vulnerable, poor, marginalized communities to brand new diseases they have no resistance, vaccines, or treatments for.

A2 Houses

1. Defense. Houses cost 2000 times the income of those who need them
2. Defense. Chinese economic slowdown, even w/ EU funding, means that BRI will focus on trade routes over unprofitable things like houses
3. Defense. Public housing isn't free, insofar as the people they're talking about live on like a dollar a day, it doesn't matter if it gets even significantly cheaper.
4. This is just fake, call for their evidence I promise on my life this shit is not real.

A2 Infrastructure

1. Defense. The United Nations '18 explains that in order for any benefits to arise from infrastructure, it must be coupled with economic reform. For example, if your economy remains agrarian your advanced highways and roads don't help. The UN furthers that current infrastructure projects in the developing world on average would require a doubling in funding and a commitment to increased social spending to manifest any impact.
2. Delink**.** Friedman '18 of Health Affairs finds that Chinese BRI infrastructure fails, as China uses its own human resources and businesses. Consequently, without a well-trained domestic workforce, infrastructure cannot be maintained, repaired, upgraded, or operated, rendering the infrastructure nearly useless.
3. DA. Kleven '19 of the Geopolitical Monitor explains that right now, developed countries have appropriately made renewable investments for sustainable growth, but developing nations could change this trend. Zhang '17 of the Science Journal writes that the initial construction of infrastructure, like roads or bridges, through the BRI will require substantial fossil fuel consumption. Problematically, Jun '19 of the World Economic Forum writes that the BRI is the largest source of new infrastructure within the next few decades. However, Jun finalizes that 70% of global emissions come from building infrastructure. Unfortunately, The World Bank quantifies that transport infrastructure and trade would increase global emissions by .3%. Thus, Klein '14 in her book *This Changes Everything* writes that the construction of electricity grids and transportation even if implemented with renewables will not compensate for the short-term increase in emissions that pushes the world past the climate change brink. Zadek '19 of Brookings writes that the BRI will push the world past the 2 degree brink. The impact is also scalar, as Dell '12 of Harvard University concludes that every 1 degree increase in temperature decreases income by 8 percent. Because of this, Wallace-Wells '19 in his book The Uninhabitable Earth writes that an increase of half of a degree would kill 150 million people. This outweighs infrastructure for two reasons
    a. Pre req. If climate change occurs it kills all benefits of infrastructure because natural disasters destroy them and any economic development done from infrastructure is reversed by wage decline and food shortages.
    b. Scope and magnitude. Climate change effects essentially every person in the world and often kills with natural disasters and resource and food scarcity while infrastructure benefits only a few nations and doesn't save lives.

(Friedman, Eric & Gostin, Lawrence O. & Filani, Oyebanji & Chenguang, Wang., 4-3-2018, "China's Grand Idea For The 21st Century: Will The New Silk Road Transform Global Health Assistance?," Health Affairs, https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180327.739726/full/)

Investment should flow more to local laborers and industries, particularly in Africa and other low- and middle-income countries. But China is using its own human resources and businesses. Without a well-trained domestic workforce, infrastructure cannot be maintained, as future repairs and upgrades are required; ports and information technology also cannot be successfully operated. Would local economies prosper if Chinese companies bring profits home instead of investing in host countries' businesses and people? Will China allow or facilitate the transfer of technological knowledge to the host country? Who will control a nation's rich natural resources? For example, Afghanistan, along the "belt," possesses rare earth mineral deposits worth $1 trillion. African resources such as timber, diamonds, and ivory could be exploited. Modern infrastructure is vital for development, but loans could saddle lower-income countries with long-term debts, as interest payments displace domestic health spending.

A2 Free Trade Agreements

1. Defense. Hillman '19 of CSIS writes that a BRI-wide trade agreement is highly unlikely because of the immense amount of countries with varying regulations in the initiative and, for this reason, China is not even trying to create a free trade agreement.
2. Defense. Herrero '16 of the Bruegel Institute that the EU could never join a BRI free trade agreement because EU countries are not allowed to strike free trade agreements with China. This is why the current EU countries in the initiative are not part of any trade agreement.

A2 Trade Infrastructure

1. Defense. Hart '18 of CADTM explains that pressure from overcapacity and need for political influence is forcing China to create useless infrastructure. Hart continues that these projects are economically pointless and do not generate returns. Hillman '18 of CSIS corroborates this, writing that BRI corridors aren't actually coming to fruition because provincial officials, rather than sticking to China's grand vision, are building useless infrastructure projects, creating duplication and waste rather than integrating countries into global markets. Thus Greer 18' finds that 270 projects have failed.
2. Turn. As a result of poor project management and inefficiencies endemic to Chinese construction, the USCNPM '17 explains that over 50% of BRI infrastructure is net loss-making, thus, its expansion means more economic harms on a wider scale.
3. Turn. Crabtree of the Financial Times reports in 2019 that China "traps" its BRI partners financially through the use of predatory loan practices, often times leading to a monopolization of that country's trading infrastructure. (means that they can't even gain full benefits of the infra to begin with) In fact, Taj in 2019 confirms that because they were trapped in debt, Sri Lanka was forced to sign a 99 year lease with China allowing them to operate its strategic Hambantota port.
4. DA. Dumping. Christian '16 of the AALEP explains that China dumps cheap goods into the markets of its trade partners. This undercuts domestic businesses, as China can always go cheaper due to government subsidization. Unfortunately, this dooms the developing world as rather than employing local workers and increasing domestic economic growth, the jobs are created back in China and the profits are shipped halfway across the world. The Economic Times concludes that as a result of China's ability to undercut local suppliers, market share for domestic suppliers has decreased.

    a. This outweighs their case because developing nations, rather than gaining the ability to develop, are robbed of domestic industry, stunting their local growth. Prefer local growth to cheaper products because in the long term, the only way to create sustainable growth is for domestic business to grow and develop, cheap Chinese goods only delay the problem.
5. DA. Resource extraction. When China creates trade infrastructure it ensures the economies of developing nations are based around commodity exports to China. Fruman '17 of World Bank explains that this dooms developing nations because it leaves them susceptible to commodity booms. Furthermore, as long as developing nations are entirely based around exporting to China, their industrialization and development is prevented.
    a. This outweighs their case because in the long term, the entire industrialization of the developing world is prevented, so they never become developed economies and implement social services or have economic mobility.

A2 Juncker Plan

1. Delink - the Juncker Plan has been successful and doesn't need China. According to The European commission, the program exceeded original €408.4 billion investment target, is set to create 1.4 million jobs, increase EU GDP by 1.3% by 2020, and greatly benefit around 952,000 small and medium-sized enterprises.
1. Turn - funding for the Juncker Plan could be better spent on other projects. Insofar as the Junker plan already has sufficient funding, there is no reason to diverting BRI spending from possibly projects in the developing world.
2. They literally never prove that China would invest into the Juncker Plan. They have no incentive to invest in a project that is already thriving.
3. (If you don't read collapse) Non Unique - According to Vocal Europe 201, the BRI and Juncker Plan work together harmoniously. One example of this cooperation is the launch of new cargo train line services which have opened trade routes between Hamburg on the one hand and Harbin and Shandong Province on the other. This win-win cooperation for the EU and China is successful in a world without the EU being part of the BRI, they never give you a unique reason why funding is necessary for this cooperation.
4. DL: China is losing money in the squo. **Pei** writes China is going through an economic slowdown, triggering capital flight. A fall in chinese exports, dwindling tax revenues, and slowing economic growth means it can't invest.

A2 Middle Income Trap

1. NU. The problems plaguing countries in the middle-income trap are a lack of production and innovation stifling economic growth and income growth. **Deutch '19** writes that Chinese innovation is increasing at an incredibly rapid rate, more rapidly than that of the US, fueled by heavy investment into the R&D sector and through increasing investment in high-technology firms. The implication is that China will never fall into the middle-income trap.
2. NU. **The Economist 18** finds that China is shifting economy from heavy industry to services, which now account for more than half of GDP, up from a third two decades ago. This has three implications:
    a. China's economy is already in the process of restructuring to a more service based economy, their link is already happening independent of the BRI.
    b. China's shift to a more service-based industry will increase incomes correspondingly, lifting them out of the middle-income trap.
    c. Even if incomes aren't immediately rising, China's productivity will increase in the long-term as it continues the transition, meaning that the root cause of a middle-income trap will be solved back for.
3. Defense. Even if China can't fully shift to new high-value industries, this won't be solved by the BRI. <u>Baashir '19 of Georgetown University</u> writes that foreign investors won't move their manufacturing firms out of China. This is because, although the push for higher wages in China should push manufacturing out, automation has made it so wages are no longer a factor in deciding where to keep manufacturing plants. Thus, he concludes that only 6% of manufacturing firms will actually move out of China.

General Trade

1. Defense. <u>Elmer '19 of the South China Morning Post</u> writes that the EU's impending recession will lower demand for Chinese exports, meaning that China won't be able to sell high-value goods to a slumping EU economy.

Keegan Elmer (). xx-xx-xxxx. "How would a recession in the EU affect China's economy?." South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3003362/chinas-fragile-trade-economy-could-be-risk-eu-outlook-goes. Accessed 9-13-2019. //TP

A recession in Europe would hit demand for Chinese exports and could lead to a further narrowing of China's trade balance, analysts have said. Existing concerns that Europe was on the verge of a recession were stoked on Friday by new data which shows the bloc's manufacturing sector is struggling. The euro zone purchasing managers index (PMI) showed that manufacturing contracted in March, at a rate not seen in nearly six years. **Along with the already weak performances of major European economies and uncertainties over the impact of Brexit and the US-China trade war, the data added to concerns that Europe is headed for a downturn later this year or early in 2020. "**Europe has moved into the same phenomenon as Japan or maybe even worse. Population has peaked but it also has pretty poor productivity," said Francis Scotland, director of global macro research at Brandywine Global Investment Management. "I see it already entering into some sort of technical recession." A recession is when gross domestic product (GDP) shrinks for two successive quarters. **Should the EU dip into recession, it would be bad news for China's trade economy.** China is the EU's biggest source of imports and its second-biggest export market. China and Europe trade on average over €1 billion (US$1.13 billion) a day, according to EU figures.

High-Speed Railway

1.

Free Trade Agreements

1. FTA responses in blockfile

Mergers and Aquisitions

1. Reuters '19 explains that the EU as a whole is implementing more protectionist policies in order to fend off unwanted Chinese investments in sensitive technologies and critical infrastructure. Wuttke '17 of the University of Durham furthers that China, even if operating under the BRI, would only be able to bypass EU's protectionist policies if they provided equal market access to european companies in China. However, Wu '16 of SCMP explains that China is becoming more aggressive in its own protectionist policies with foreign companies in response to concerns over the local business climate.
2. Deutch '19 of IST writes that Chinese firms are already gaining tech assets by investing in US tech enterprises.

Reuters '19- EU doesn't want Chinese FDI

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-china-fdi/chinese-fdi-in-europe-drops-investment-screening-will-cut-it-more-survey-idUSKCN1QN1T6

Germany last year lowered the threshold for screening and even blocking purchases of stakes in German firms by non-Europeans, in a move to fend off unwanted Chinese investments in sensitive technologies and critical infrastructure. Berlin is also mulling the creation of a state investment fund that could take stakes in key domestic companies to prevent foreign takeovers. The European Union will start screening foreign direct investment into the 28-nation bloc from April to safeguard Europe's security, public order and strategic interests. The screening aims to give EU countries a tool to intervene in cases of foreign direct investment in strategic assets, in particular if carried out by state-controlled or state-financed enterprises.

Jorg Wuttke. "The Dark Side of China's Economic Rise." European Union Chamber of Commerce in China. http://sci-hub.tw/10.1111/1758-5899.12439
//TP

Due to the amount of state support that has been offered by the central and local governments, CM2025 may be putting China's international trade partners on alert regarding areas where additional overcapacity can be expected to emerge by 2025. As has been seen in the past with steel and aluminium, this runs the risk of creating tensions with China's international trade partners at a time when support for economic globalisation and free trade faces rising opposition in some quarters. The government-driven approach to pursuing international acquisitions that align with industrial policy priorities may unfortunately also lead to political tensions that could complicate the ability of private Chinese companies to complete normal merger and acquisition transactions. China holds concerns that the priority sectors outlined in China's CM2025 amount to a 'shopping list' of companies and technologies that China has not been able to develop domestically. **As 70 per cent of the Chinese investment that flowed into Europe in 2015 came from SOEs, it is likely no coincidence that many of these investments have been in industries like advanced machinery, robotics, semiconductors and clean technology – all priorities for China under CM2025. It is therefore an increasingly serious concern that reciprocal market access has yet to be extended to European business in China.** In contrast to Chinese companies who face few, if any, limitations in investing in European industries like construction, financial services, healthcare, insurance, logistics, media and telecommunications, European companies in China continue to either be fully barred from participation or limited to holding a minority position. The new Market Access Negative List on domestic and international investment that was released in March 2016, indicates that minimal progress has been made in opening up the market to more competition. While it is too soon to draw a definitive conclusion, nor do the draft revisions that were announced for the Foreign Investment Catalogue in December 2017 include many significant changes. As a result, while the complementarities of pairing Europe's technology, knowhow and capital with China's supply chain, market and capital are attractive, in many industries European companies' only options for accessing the Chinese market are to license their technology, take on a Chinese investor or be fully acquired. As China's largest trading partner, the EU represents about 15 per cent of the country's trade. Since it is also a leading destination for its outbound investment, China needs the EU as much as the EU needs China. **The question of whether China will be willing to offer reciprocity** therefore **has serious ramifications, both for European business today and for how in the longer term Chinese investments will be perceived internationally. If it i**s ultimately **unwilling to offer reciprocal access to its own market, China cannot assume that it will indefinitely continue to enjoy open and unhindered access to the EU market. The liberal approach to mergers and acquisitions will only work if all parties move toward equal access and the removal of barriers, otherwise it is politically untenable.**

Wu '19- China internally protected

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1940397/china-making-life-difficult-foreign-companies

That's the concern of some foreign firms – a group once relied upon by China to attract capital and technology to bolster its growth. "Challenging", "hesitant" and "doubtful" are the kind of words European and American companies in China are using to describe their environment. **Concerns over the business climate are mounting, and range from rising protectionism and slow progress in market access to forced technology transfers and tightening internet censorship.** All these come at the time when **China – with rising economic influence and seeking a bigger voice in the global political and economic issues – is steering growth towards a heavier reliance on internal consumption rather than exports.**

A2 Nuclear Power

1. The World Nuclear Association '16 explains that to have any impact on the environment 1,000 nuclear power plants would need to be built. But even then, the study furthers that even 1000 reactors would only decrease co2 emissions 6%.
2. Lazard Asset Management '16 explains that building this many nuclear reactors would cost 8.2 trillion dollars and solar and wind are 80% less expensive for the same amount of power.

A2 OPIC / build act

1. Defense. Roberts ‘19 of the Daily Signal explains that OPIC only lends money to middle and upper class countries. At that point, they have no meaningful benefits stemming from their case.
2. DA. Development aid via OPIC creates dependency. Swanson ‘15 of the Washington Post explains that foreign aid corrupts the governments in developing nations because traditionally, governments are reliant on their people to sustain their power via taxes, but foreign aid removes this accountability. Young ‘15 furthers that OPIC’s political insurance condones bad government behavior and corruption. Swanson concludes that as a result, nations receiving foreign aid often have lower growth rates. Prefer local growth to foreign aid for two reasons.
    a. OPIC just provides a funding bandaid for nations by handing them a blank check. Always prefer growth to a blank check because growth creates long term economic development that helps these countries actually industrialize whereas foreign aid just enriches government officials.
    b. Aid will eventually go away at some point, like when the US has a recession for example, but local growth will always stay within the country.
3. Call for ev its probably bad

A2 Overcapacity

1. Response 1 (Non-unique): China has already built infrastructure all across the world for 6 years and its overcapacity problem still exists: there is no reason why a few more railroads in a certain part of the world makes a difference.
2. De-link: Fulco 2016 explains that BRI can't solve for China's overcapacity since BRI markets are not large enough to absorb it.
3. Turn: Even if you grant them that the EU would solve for overcapacity, you can TURN the argument because Yanyi of the EU Observer '16 explains that a decrease in overcapacity by 30% leads to the unemployment of 3 million workers.
4. **Spiegel Online '19** finds that at the Silk Road summit this year, Beijing agreed to decrease excess capacity in the steel industry.
5. Non-unique: The **National Interest** this week finds that Chinese companies are already defaulting on their debt, with a higher amount of defaults than 2018 creating a new record.
    a. The key implication is that the wave of loan defaults that trigger a chinese recession are already happening in the status quo, it is too late for the BRI projects to reverse the trend.
6. Non-unique, Li '19 reports that China has already taken measures to solve overproduction by incentivizing mergers and debt restructuring plans, which will reduce the steel industry's capacity by 150 million tonnes by 2020.
7. DL: **Hedrick-Wong 18** writes debt induced recession is literally fake. All of the debt is state owned. Last time there was a problem china just straight up got rid of all the debt so the firms didn't close

A2 Pirates

1. Defense. The ISDP ‘16 explains that piracy is already the lowest it's been in decades, and they never tell you how much more the continuation of BRI decreases piracy.
2. Defense. The ISDP ‘16 furthers that in the status quo, the BRI goes through areas still active with pirates, meaning the presence of the BRI doesn’t solve piracy otherwise there wouldn't still be piracy along the Maritime Silk Road.
3. Defense. Zhihao is really important for three reasons.
    a. It explains that China has been escorting ships and decreasing piracy since 2008, before the BRI, conceding that BRI is not the link to fighting piracy.
    b. It also explains that China launches these anti-piracy from ports within mainland China to whichever destination they go to.
    c. The ships being escorted are often foreign owned or owned by the UN, which China still has an incentive to escort for national reputation.
4. Defense. Pike ‘14 of Global Security explains that piracy has actually been decreasing since before the BRI, as a result of other factors, including an increase in private security firms for naval vessels and other efforts made by the international community. This means that even if China stops policing piracy, other actors will step in.

A2 Power Grids

1. EnDisplace developing nations energy suppliers.
2. ergy price spike.
3. China running grids bad.
4. Takes a long time.
5. Nigeria decentralize
6. China can’t afford
7. (Assuming no funding uniqueness). Defense. They never read a warrant or evidence as to why Western Europe is needed for these power grids to work. The Science Daily evidence only says that you need countries with excess to supply underdeveloped nations, but this could be China, Eastern Europe, or any other country in the BRI that makes more energy than they need.
8. (No funding Link) Hornby ‘18 of the Financial Times explains that China is already constructing and linking grids in EU countries in the Belt and Road, meaning that they obviously don't need western europe.
9. The study the Science Daily cites explains that tapping as little as 3.7% of the solar energy potential in the current BRI region could supply enough power to satisfy the entire BRI’s energy demands through 2030. Because you need such a small amount of power, there is no reason for the EU because supply exists.
10. Non-uq. The World Bank ’18 writes that the world bank has invested in billions of dollars across 35 countries to build energy infrastructure.
11. Wolfram ‘18 explains that these grids are unreliable. She continues that in some cases, grids function properly as low as 20% of the time. The implication is that industry becomes incredibly hard to establish because you need constant power for things like hospitals and factories.

A2 Leverage/Reform

1. Defense. Affirming now delinks their whole case. Affirming means the EU joins now, meaning they can't withhold financing as leverage, completely eradicating any possibility for reform.
2. Defense. Leonard '19 of ECFR explains that China's hegemonic expansion threatens the EU's ability to operate economic independence. This means the EU has very little leverage over China because the EU relies on appeasing China for their economic independence.
3. Defense. Hunnicut '19 of Reuters explains that the EU is currently facing an economic slowdown, diminishing the financial leverage the EU has over China.
4. Defense. Brattberg '18 of the Carnegie Endowment explains that instead of the EU flipping China, most likely China would flip the EU on issues because of their massive economy. This is evident EU nations that are in the BRI, who routinely vote with China.

A2 Protectionism Bad

1. Turn. Amadeo of The Balance 2019 tells us that protectionism is actually good because it creates jobs and makes countries more competitive.
2. Non. Uq. Kobo '19 of TRTW explains that the EU has been increasing protectionist policies in the status quo in response to both US and Chinese competetion. Meunir '19 of the Washington Post corroborates that the EU has introuced a new and more stringent screening process for foreign direct investment as a response to skepticism over chinese investment.
   a. (probably give no unique tipping point for when protectionist policies trigger recession) recession triggered in either world- presume neg lmao

Kimberly **Amadeo**, **Balance**, 7-10-**2019**, 9-8-2019 ["Why Protectionism Feels So Good but Is So Wrong"] // aj https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-trade-protectionism-3305896

If a country is trying to grow strong in a new industry, tariffs will protect it from foreign competitors. That gives the new industry's companies time to develop their own competitive advantages.

Protectionism also temporarily creates jobs for domestic workers. The protection of tariffs, quotas, or subsidies allows domestic companies to hire locally. This benefit ends once other countries retaliate by erecting their own protectionism.

A2 Aff creates recession

1. Recession is impossible to predict because of the complexity of the economic process. The economy is comprised of literally thousands of unpredictable variables that all control it. This complexity is why every expert around – including Alan Greenspan and Joseph Stiglitz – fail to predict the great recession. If experts can't predict recessions reliably, surely my opponents can't.

2. **Even if you think we can predict what will cause a recession, recession is inevitable by 2020.**

Roubini and Rosa 2018 (Nouriel Roubini, a professor at NYU's Stern School of Business and CEO of Roubini Macro Associates, was Senior Economist for International Affairs in the White House's Council of Economic Advisers during the Clinton Administration, Brunello Rosa is co-founder and CEO at Rosa & Roubini Associates, and a research associate at the Systemic Risk Centre at the London School of Economics, "The Makings of a 2020 Recession and Financial Crisis" Project Syndicate, September 13th 2018, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/financial-crisis-in-2020-worse-than-2008-by-nouriel-roubini-and-brunello-rosa-2018-09. DOA: November 29th 2018)

As we mark the decennial of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, there are still ongoing debates about the causes and consequences of the financial crisis, and whether the lessons needed to prepare for the next one have been absorbed. But looking ahead, the more relevant question is what actually will trigger the next global recession and crisis, and when. The current global expansion will likely continue into next year, given that **the US is running large fiscal deficits, China is pursuing loose fiscal and credit policies**, and Europe remains on a recovery path. But **by 2020, the conditions will be ripe for a financial crisis, followed by a global recession**. There are 10 reasons for this. First, the fiscal-stimulus policies that are currently pushing the annual US growth rate above its 2% potential are unsustainable. **By 2020, the stimulus will run out**, and a modest fiscal drag will pull growth from 3% to slightly below 2%.

Non-u. Rowley 2019 states that

Anthony **Rowley**, **South China Morning Post**, June **2019**, 9-8-2019 ["Brace for a global recession unlike any other"] // aj https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3013604/brace-global-recession-unlike-any-other-amid-world-polarised-us-and

Global economic recession is no longer a threat but an inevitability. The question economists should be asking is not whether or when a recession will strike but rather what can be done once it does. Normal policy tools such as monetary easing and/or fiscal stimulus may be no more effective than pushing on the proverbial piece of string.

This time, it will be different — as optimists like to say when trying to convince themselves that crises cannot happen again; though not for the reasons they think. The 2019 recession will be different from the Great Recession a decade ago, and indeed, from any slump since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

The comparison with 1930 — when the US introduced its Smoot-Hawley tariffs and plunged the world into depression in the wake of the 1929 US stock market crash — is obvious, except, this time, world trade growth is already crumbling. Global trade growth is at its slowest in 10 years, according to the World Bank.

Trade crises tend to cut deeper into the heart of global economic activity than any of the post-war financial or debt crises did. The onset may be slower and less dramatic but the adverse effects last longer.

It is easy to forget that what caused global economic growth to stagnate for seven or eight years after the 2008 financial crisis was the secondary shock to trade. World trade only began to pick up again in 2016, to then have US President Donald Trump clobber it with tariffs.

A2 Saudi Arabia

1. Defense. Wald '19 of Forbes explains that Saudi Arabia actually has more oil than previously thought, giving them a healthy surplus. This removes the need for Saudi Arabia to invade surrounding neighbors for oil because they have it domestically.
2. Link Turn. Even though Saudi Arabia has plenty of oil, Wald '19 of Forbes explains that the perception that reserves are low serves to increase oil prices and thus improve the Saudi economy, facilitating the transition to their Vision 2030 plan.
3. The IMF '19 explains that Vision 2030 reforms are currently boosting the Saudi economy, with real non-oil growth expected to further strengthen to 2.9 percent in 2019 and real gdp growth rebounded to 2.2 percent after contracting in 2017.

IMF '19- Vision 2030 is working rn

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/05/15/mcs051519-saudi-arabia-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2019-article-iv-mission

Economic outcomes improved in 2018. Real GDP growth rebounded to 2.2 percent after contracting in 2017. Real oil GDP increased by 2.8 percent (3.1 percent decline in 2017), while non-oil GDP growth rose to 2.1 percent (1.3 percent in 2017). Government spending increased, but the exit of expatriate workers and dependents appears to have held back growth. CPI inflation rose with the introduction of the value-added tax (VAT) and increase in energy prices in January 2018 but has eased since as housing rents have fallen. Consumer prices declined by 2.1 percent (y/y) in March 2019. **Real non-oil growth is expected to further strengthen to 2.9 percent in 2019.** Recent monthly indicators have been positive and the increase in oil prices since the turn of the year is boosting confidence. At this time, it is difficult to assess future developments in the oil market given uncertainties about production in some key exporting countries. On the assumption that Saudi Arabia produces at its agreed level under the current OPEC+ agreement in 2019H2, real oil GDP growth is projected at 0.7 percent in 2019 and overall real GDP growth at 1.9 percent.[1] If Saudi Arabia increases oil production, then oil GDP growth would be higher (as would export and fiscal revenues). Over the medium-term, **the team expects a strengthening in non-oil growth to around 3-3¼ percent as the ongoing reforms yield dividends and overall real GDP growth to settle around 2½ percent.**

A2 SCS

1. The BRI has existed since 2013, the impacts of diverted trade haven't materialized yet, make them give you the timeframe.
2. Turn. Tata '13 of the Diplomat explains that the BRI gets rid of Chinese dependence on the West by creating new energy supply lines, meaning that Affirming just gives China more leeway to aggress in the SCS.
3. Non-uq. Stashwick '19 of Foreign Policy explains that Chinese aggression in the SCS is little more than geopolitical posturing, and that China realizes militarizing the islands would be more trouble than it's worth. This is because the islands are ineffective in wartime because they're too isolated from the mainland and too expensive to maintain.
4. Non-uq. Stashwick '19 furthers that China would never go to war in the South China Sea because any conflict would be an embarrassment to the party and would undermine their legitimacy.
5. Defense. Smith '18 of Foreign Affairs writes that Europe is too divided to stand up to China, because EU smaller states want to trade with China and therefore won't risk angering them through economic leveraging.
    a. For example, The Cipher Brief '19 writes that in 2017, Greece and Hungary vetoed joint EU statements criticizing Chinese aggression in the South China Sea because they feared economic repercussions from the Chinese.

Vietnam

1. Defense. Beckhusen '18 of the National Interest explains that Vietnam is increasing its deterrence capability right now by arming their submarines with missiles. This means that they have the capability to deter China from instigating conflict.
2. Defense. Fawthrop '18 the Diplomat explains that in 2018 China deployed missiles on an island Vietnam claimed. This should have triggered their impact already as per French, who explains that China claiming a single island would trigger the war.

A2 Taiwan

1. Non-UQ. Yuwen '18 of the SCMP explains that China is going to take back Taiwan by force in 2020 regardless of affirming or negating. There are two warrants:
    a. An increase in calls from the Chinese people for a violent reunification of Taiwan by force.
    b. 2020 is the first of China's "two centenary" milestones, and Taiwan represents a historic achievement for Xi in China's return to prosperity.
2. Taiwan is already planned to be back as a part of China by 2050, so the BRI offers no uniqueness for this

3. Taiwanese political party about to reunify anyways
4.

A2 Solar Power Good

1. Impact mitigation. Lomborg of Huffington Post in 2016 explains that solar panels are not that efficient. Lomborg explains that even in 2040, even if everyone does everything they've promised at the Paris climate summit, the world will get just 2.4% of its energy from solar and wind.
    a. This card says that the world will get only 2.4% of its energy from solar AND WIND. That means that the Solar Power that the aff claims that the BRI solves for will be even less beneficial. Their impacts are really small.
2. De-link. China will always prefer coal because Lomborg '16 explains that solar is not cheaper now and will not be cheaper in the long term.

A2 Trade Increase

1.

A2 Neg

A2 Auth Regimes

Tech Link

1. The countries who would use the 5g for authoritarian purposes are probably already cracking down in every possible, 5g would just provide them another avenue to achieve this goal.
    a. This means their impact is very marginal because they don't prove why they wouldn't just crack down without the internet and 5g.
    b. They have to prove there is a dramatic unique increase in oppression because 5g could just be used to substitute in current methods of oppression.
    c. 5g is literally faster internet... How much more oppression?
2. Authoritarian governments will always purchase technology like 5g to oppress their people. The comparative is that if China invests in a developing country now the people have the technology too.
3. Desjardins 15 explains that US companies like Facebook and Google are taking the lead to combat the lack of internet access in the developing world right now. For example, Google is working to deliver internet access by laying down infrastructure to connect 12000 rural Indian Neighborhoods.
    a. These companies already have the profit incentive to eventually spread internet to the developing world there is no unique reason to have BRI.
4. Because the Internet spreads new ideas about society and political structure, more access actually spreads democracy. Pirannejad in 2017 finds in a study analyzing 122 countries from 2000-2014 that internet expansion has a significant effect on democracy promotion.
5. With the BRI, there is an expansion in connectivity with the global market for these countries. This is crucial as Griswold finds in 2006 that more globalized economies are significantly more likely to reinforce political freedoms. This is because trade and globalization means that citizens of countries that are at a high risk of plunging into authoritarianism become less dependent on the authorities for their livelihood, decreasing the chance that authoritarianism a) is fostered and b) is maintained.
    a. Griswold gives the historical precedent writing that Countries such as Taiwan, South Korea, and numerous other Latin American countries have achieved political reform.
6. With the spread of the internet comes higher economic growth, the Borgen Project '16 finds that getting access to the rest of the world could life 500 million people out of poverty.
    a. This is outweighs on timeframe as authoritarian governments almost never have an extremely long life cycle there are a lot of things that can topple them and cause them to reform, whereas the people who are in poverty in these countries are stuck in intergenerational poverty we need to affirm now.

b. It turns their case, as Geddes of UCLA finds that strong evidence indicates that countries that are more developed are more likely to be democratic.

Desjardins 15

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/free-internet-cheaper-android-editable-pdf-here-is-googles-3-way-plan-to-target-every-indian/articleshow/65578045.cms?from=mdr

Highlighting the importance of booming Indian internet market, global giant Google has announced three goals that will drive its services in India. Google made the announcement during Google for India Event today. The three goals are -- "Making internet work for more Indians; Making Google's products relevant to Indians; and Taking the best of India to the rest of the world". The goals are part of Google's plan to target every Indian. Here are some of the key points from Google's three goals plan. 1. Making the internet work for more Indians**: * Moving from keyboard to smartphone internet: After internet at railways stations across India, Google will now provide high-quality internet access to secluded areas. Google Station will collaborate with Andhra Pradesh to cover over 12,000 villages covering 1 crore population.**

Pirannejad in 2017

https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02681102.2017.1289889?scroll=top&needAccess=true

In the age of information revolution, **information and communication technologies are** penetrating all levels of society and are also i**nfluencing the political aspect of each country** **by providing** some facilities **such as the Internet** and web technologies. Democracy, as a universal value and a political system, is also well known and has an important role in the sublimation of the human societies. This study attempts to examine the effect of Internet extension on democracy promotion by **using a panel consisting of 122 countries covering the period from the year 2000 to 2014.** In order to estimate the effect, and also to deal with the endogeneity and autocorrelation problems, the dynamic panel data models are employed in the study. The **results** of estimation models i**ndicate that Internet extension has a significantly positive effect on democracy promotion** during the period. In the end, some ideas for further research are presented.

The connection between trade, development, and political reform is not just a throwaway line. In theory and in practice, economic and political freedoms reinforce one another. Political philosophers from Aristotle to Samuel Huntington have noted that economic development and an expanding middle class can provide more fertile ground for democracy. **Trade and globalization can spur political reform by expanding the freedom of people to exercise greater control over their daily lives.** In less developed countries, the expansion of markets means they no longer need to bribe or beg government officials for permission to import a television set or spare parts for their tractor. Controls on foreign exchange no longer limit their freedom to travel abroad. They can more easily acquire tools of communication such as mobile phones, Internet access, satellite TV, and fax machines. **As workers and producers, people in more open countries are less dependent on the authorities for their livelihoods. For example, in a more open, market-driven economy, the government can no longer deprive independent newspapers of newsprint if they should displease the ruling authorities**. In a more open economy and society, the "CNN effect" of global media and consumer attention exposes and discourages the abuse of workers. Multinational companies have even greater incentives to offer competitive benefits and wages in more globalized developing countries than in those that are closed. Economic freedom and rising incomes, in turn, help to nurture a more educated and politically aware middle class. A rising business class and wealthier civil society create leaders and centers of influence outside government. People who are economically free over time want and expect to exercise their political and civil rights as well. In contrast, a government that can seal its citizens off from the rest of the world can more easily control them and deprive them of the resources and information they could use to challenge its authority.

In the past two decades, a number of economies have followed the path of economic and trade reform leading to political reform. South Korea and Taiwan as recently as the 1980s were governed by authoritarian regimes that did not permit much open dissent. Today, after years of expanding trade and rising incomes, both are multiparty democracies with full political and civil liberties. Other countries that have most aggressively followed those twin tracks of reform include Chile, Ghana, Hungary, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Portugal, and Tanzania.

UCLA

https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.115

This essay synthesizes the results of the large number of studies of late–20thcentury democratization published during the last 20 years. Strong evidence supports the claims that democracy is more likely in more developed countries and that regime transitions of all kinds are more likely during economic downturns. Very few of the other arguments advanced in the transitions literature, however, appear to be generally true. **This study proposes a theoretical model, rooted in characteristics of different types of authoritarian regimes, to explain many of the differences in democratization experience across cases in different regions. Evidence drawn from a data set that includes 163 authoritarian regimes offers preliminary support for the model proposed**

Borgen Project '15

https://borgenproject.org/internet-access-reducing-global-poverty/

In a speech to the United Nations in September 2015, Mark Zuckerberg stated, "When communities are connected, we can lift them out of poverty." During his talk, the Facebook CEO and founder asserted that increased Internet access can aid in reducing global poverty. According to the World Bank's 2016 World Development Report, 60 percent of the world's population do not have access to the Internet. In the United States alone, 60 million people do not have Internet access at home. However, for the rest of the world's population, technological advancement has provided enormous levels of wealth and development. **A recent report by Price Waterhouse Cooper's consulting and strategy firm, Strategy&, states that giving internet to the world could bring extraordinary results. If the 4.1 billion people without Internet were given access, 500 million people could be brought out of poverty. For those in poverty, the Internet provides a multitude of opportunities, including jobs, access to global current affairs and education.**

Shielding:

- Greece is already condemning

A2 Arctic Drilling

1. No link. Minter 18 of Bloomberg explains that China lacks any proper ownership of land near arctic to claim.
2. No solvency. Bershidsky '18 of The Dispatch corroborates that Russia is already winning in the Arctic. They are invested in opening and reopening military bases along its Arctic Coast.
    a. Insofar as China has no actual claims in the Arctic, they cannot stop Russia.

A2 Bubbles (infra)

1. 4
2. Turn. Landry '18 of Foreign Policy explains that current BRI investments are conducted in markets where China has little expertise, and therefore investments are unprofitable and failing right now. However, if the EU joins it gives opportunities for synergies within the BRI and western investors to create safe, correctly valued investments.

A2 BRI Unprofitable

1. No link. Kharas '19 of the Brookings Institution explains that China banks specifically choose projects that are profitable for them. They do not lose money.

A2 Coal

1. China can always export coal through other institutions like the AIIB which is why Chinese coal exports have always been high.
2. China will never export coal
    a. Chinese coal is unprofitable. Ambrogi '18 finds that two fifths of Chinese coal plants are losing money with up to 95% losing money by 2040.
    b. Green Tech will expand. Merchant '18 writes that by 2030, green tech will be cheaper than coal. That's important as Cuff '18 explicates that developing nations are abandoning coal and shifting to green tech. This gives China an incentive to get into green tech now, make them dependent on Chinese tech, so China controls all their energy demand for 100s of years instead of 20 years with coal lock in
3. Even if China does export coal, there are 2 reasons why coal is good
    a. First is that there are alt exporters. Japan and South Korea have exported more coal than China in the past and have the incentive to continue. Bengali '19 explains that due to the initial investment into coal technology, Japan and South Korea are looking to recoup this money by expanding coal into other countries. This would be devastating as Hart '19 finds that Chinese coal is cleaner and has more strict regulations than the alternatives.
    b. At worse, Coal is a better link into energy poverty. Amhad '16 writes that there 1.1 billion people who lack access to energy. More importantly, energy-poor developing economies need coal as a cheap and readily available resource to provide electricity for their growing populations. That outweighs their case as giving energy allows countries to shift their economies away from climate sensitive sectors like agriculture, allowing those in developing countries to adapt to climate change
4. Yellen '19 finds that the only incentive China has to export coal is to save state owned enterprises from losing 2.3 million jobs. That's why Shearer '19 finds all private investment in China is towards renewables and all the coal investment is public. That means 2 things:
    a. If they concede that the BRI is completely collapsing in terms of state funding, this argument is terminal defense because it's all EU and private funding that will all go to renewables(lilly canada ev).
    b. Or its a turn because in the neg world, all funding comes from the state but in an aff world, you increase reliance on the EU/private funding that would all be green projects that would otherwise be coal and make them green.

5. At worse, Coal is a better link into energy poverty. Amhad '16 writes that there 1.1 billion people who lack access to energy. More importantly, energy-poor developing economies need coal as a cheap and readily available resource to provide electricity for their growing populations. That outweighs their case as giving energy allows countries to shift their economies away from climate sensitive sectors like agriculture, allowing those in developing countries to adapt to climate change

6. Because the EU and China are working through the Juncker plan to cofinance the BRI, and the Juncker Plan is primarily funded by the European Investment Bank, Fossil Fuel Energy will not be funded according to **Rutter 19,** which explains that the EIB plans to end funding fossil fuesl by the end of 2020

Rutter 19 [Calum Rutter, August 2, 2019, Public Finance International, "EIB Plans to End Funding Fossil Fuels by 2021", https://www.publicfinanceinternational.org/news/2019/08/eib-plans-end-funding-fossil-fuels-2021//LM]

"But under the draft policy, the bank would stop its support for oil and gas production, infrastructure primarily dedicated to natural gas and power generation and heat based on fossil fuels.

Alex Doukas, lead analyst with campaign group Oil Change International, said: **"The European Investment Bank's proposal to end financing for fossil fuels by the end of 2020 is a massive step forward on climate leadership.**

"With this move, the world's largest multilateral lender is now poised to leave oil, gas, and coal in the past.""

A2 Climate Change

Warants:

China Switch Back to Fossil Fuels

1. Domestic pressure
2. Green actor/leader for greentech
3. Domestic regulations

Infrastructure

1. Turn. The alternative to building infrastructure is using airplanes and other high pollution modes of transportation. Because railroads are extremely emission efficient the long term benefits of infrastructure outweighs the initials harms of building the infrastructure.

Lock In

1. Non-UQ. Ren '19 of VoxEU explains that local bureaucrats in China always approve new coal production for short term economic gain so they get re-elected and promoted,
2. Hilton 18' writes that . As soon as 2021 it will be cheaper to build new onshore wind farms than to operate existing coal plants, and installing new solar PV will be cheaper than running coal plants by 2025.
3. Turn, Nichols 19' reports that China promised greener and more sustainable projects during the Belt and Road Summit in late April. Since then, Min 19' finds that China has promoted clean energy through the BRI. For example, In Argentina, Chinese banks provided 85% of the financing for the 500 megawatt Cauchari solar power plant, the largest in Latin America. Indeed BakerMckenzie reports that AIIB banks have promised to focus their investments on projects that deliver 'green' outcomes.

Deforestation

Two reasons their impact disproves the link:

1. Europe wouldn't allow deforestation to happen for 3 reasons
    a. There would not be deforestation in Europe. Europa 18 writes that "The area of protected forests in Europe increased by around half a million hectares annually between 2000 and 2010. Furthermore, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature says that, "The European Commission launched its consultation on 'Deforestation and forest degradation – stepping up EU action' in January 2019.

    b. Nations in the EU are already pushing to stop deforestation. Neslon 18 the UK, France, and Germany have called on the European commission to launch tough new action to halt deforestation. They say that the EU should show “a leadership role, mobilising its political and market leverage” to put an end to the deforestation. Nelson continues that strong EU laws could reduce the ecological footprint of commodities such as soy, palm oil and beef, which drive deforestation in the Amazon. Given that the EU is already internally pushing to put a halt to deforestionion the additional leverage they would gian over China by becoming a part of the BRI will prevent China and the BRI from mass deforestation

c. After the second BRI meeting in April, China is trying to switch to a cleaner, greener BRI. Xia writes that at the second Belt and Road Forum, China officially launched the International Coalition for Green Development on the Belt and Road to facilitate the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development through a green construction of the BRI. Meaning China is now going to be under more international pressure to follow through on this commitment and move away from projects that greatly harm the environment.

2. China wouldn’t let it happen. For example, **Liviy 19** writes that The Bank of China cancelled a dam project in Indonesia that threatened deforestation - signifying a movement China has taken recently to address the global destruction in forests. The warrant is simple - projects that destroy forests and harm biodiversity would always get huge backlash and reduce China’s profits. This is why she concludes that China is taking real steps towards ensuring that the belt and road initiative will have a positive impact on our planet

Impacts:

A2 Brink

1. Defense. There are two reasons even global carbon neutral reform won't save us from the brink.
    a. The Climate Action Organization ‘18 explains that in the current state of reforms, we are 97% likely to blow past the brink of climate change which is why Temple of MIT explains that to meet the PCA’s threshold we have to create technology to pull carbon out of the atmosphere.
    b. Mann ‘18 explains that the worst effects of climate change aren't felt until centuries later. Because of this, Hausfather ‘19 of Yale finds that even if we avoid the Paris Climate Accords 2 degree increase goal we will still pass the brink. She continues that old greenhouse gases will cause the earth's temperature to rise 5 degrees no matter what measures are taken.

A2 Scalar

1. Adaptation to climate change from economic advancement will always be a priority. This is because Mann ‘18 explains that the worst effects of climate change aren't felt until centuries later. This means that their contribution to climate change doesn't matter, because Temple of

MIT explains that we will inevitably blow past the 2 degree brink unless we use carbon capture technology, something that is not feasible. The implication is that were screwed in the next few years so we must adapt. If we don't, it is likely that we don't live to see the effects of stopping climate change now. The way you adapt is to give people jobs and pull people out of poverty through power grids because the Bailey evidence says that getting economies out of poverty and energy poverty makes industry less climate reliant, for example, economies become less agriculture based and more manufacturing oriented, which is less affected by the climate.

A2 Chinese Heg Expansion

A2 Chinese Overreach

1. Alt-Cause/Turns. The Chinese economy is collapsing for two other reasons that they don't solve but we do.
    a. Stewart '19 of Reaction explains that China has too much capacity in the construction and infrastructure sectors, and now those industries need new opportunities. Expanding infrastructure projects to the EU allows construction overcapacity to be solved for.
    b. China has overinvested in things like steel mining, but the trade increase from the BRI expanding to the EU solves.
2. Non-UQ. DW explains that China increased funding for the BRI in April, meaning that overreach will happen regardless.
3. Defense. Wharton '19 explains that although each individual project may seem to be a no return investment at first, the connectivity of the BRI as a whole increases the aggregate profit the BRI, making each project then profitable.
4. We solve their case. Hutchinson '19 explains that China will never give up the BRI because it's key to China's geopolitical and economic strategy, even when facing an economic slowdown. Thus, Ciurtin '17 explains that the best partner to help China fund the BRI is the EU. Casarini explains that the EU has already talked about co-financing the BRI with funds from the EU. This means that by affirming, you allow the EU to help China finance the BRI, alleviating the financial burden.
5. Turn. Landry

A2 Debt Trap

1. Cross apply the top of our case, because when the EU finances the BRI, they then gain financial leverage over China, as China is then faced with either conceding the reforms and the BRI surviving, or facing the failure of their entire foreign policy abroad. Buresch '18 of the Project 2049 Institute explains that the EU seeks to create reform to stop China implementing debt traps. This means comparatively, our world is the only way in which developing nations escape debt traps and sustainably develop.
2. Moak '19 of the Asia Times writes that most of the debt in these countries comes from outside institutions; for exampl
3. Defense. Khanna '19 of Politico writes that the BRI reduces countries exposure to Chinese debt because it connects developing nations to global trade networks which gives them higher sovereign credit ratings and investment grade statuses, pushing other investors to invest in their debt.
4. Defense. Because of recent backlash, China has altered their geopolitical strategy. Instead of seizing ports, *Zhou of the South China Morning Post* writes that Beijing, in almost all cases, has forgiven loans of debt ridden countries. They don't link into their impact.
5. Defense. China gains hegemony through protecting their economic interests. Thus, Xu '18 of the Hoover Institute explains that China has been able to avoid economic collapse through decades of financial crisis that would have toppled similar economies- because they implement anti-crisis reforms that include a closed capital account, implementing prudent external financial policies. This fiscal conservatism means that China will only invest in projects that prove high fiscal return. Crucially, debt traps are loss making, providing no tangible fiscal return. Right now, with China's economic slowdown, they simply cannot afford to continue investing in loss making debt-traps.

6. China is inclined to renegotiate or write off debts incurred by other countries for its belt and road infrastructure projects and only rarely seizes assets, a study by a New York consultancy has found.
7. The Rhodium Group's research looked at 40 cases of external debt renegotiation between 2007 and this year and found there was only one confirmed case of asset seizure – in Sri Lanka.

The conclusions, based on the studies of Chinese debt renegotiations with 24 countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, challenge claims that the Belt and Road Initiative will leave countries with debts they cannot repay and force them to hand over assets or natural resources to Beijing.
The report concluded that Beijing had renegotiated about US$50 billion of loans and in most cases, debts had either been written off or payment was deferred.

A2 Dutch Disease

1. Defense-CBC '13 writes that Dutch Disease gets rid of low paying jobs and replaces them with higher paying jobs in other sectors of the economy.
2. CBC '13 explains that in developed countries dutch disease has no effect on the economy

A2 Dumping

1. <u>Rose '18</u> of Reuters explains that France is strictly against Chinese steel dumping.
    a. The implication here is that because France is one of the major players in the BRI they will not allow for Chinese steel to be vented en masse.

A2 EU Recession

1. Smart ‘17 of Harvard explains that the Eurozone is incredibly resilient to a recession. He finds that because the Eurozone is cooperative and the monetary system is stable, Europe can just move money around to lessen economic shocks, for example, in 2008 Europe was incredibly resilient to the global shock of the great recession.
2. Anev ‘16 explains that having suffered the worst financial and economic crisis of the last 80 years, Europe took decisive action to improve its public finances, push through deep reforms, and establish new institutions to manage and prevent crises better. The changes are structural, long-lasting and make Europe stronger. The crisis-hit countries implemented radical reforms, improving their public finances, reducing deficits, and cutting labour costs to make themselves more competitive. The euro area outperformed the US, Japan and the UK in fiscal terms, with many becoming growth leaders.

A2 Funding

1. Defense. Dowdell '19 of SCMP explains that while the number of projects in the initiative will ebb and flow based on China's economic strength, China will never let the BRI die and will continue it because it is part of China's grand strategy to give China a spot as a world power again. Thus, Hutchinson '19 of CBR writes that the BRI is just recalibrating and growing again after a slump in Chinese growth because Xi Jingping thinks it is key to his political legitimacy. Thus, DW '19 concludes that China is reinvigorating the BRI after a slump last year and invested an additional 64 billion dollars in loans in April 2019.
2. Defense. Even if the BRI is running out of funding from China, they still lose this argument because the initiative is already getting funding from EU countries and more. Lo '19 of SCMP writes that Australia, Belgium, France, Canada, Japan, Singapore, Spain, and the Netherlands have already started giving funding to the initiative. Indeed, Zhou '19 of the SIPRI writes that the EU and China have already started working on projects and joint investments within the BRI.
3. Nonunique; **Leng '19 of the SCMP** finds that BRI loans from Chinese banks are at a record high, approving double the projects approved during the same period in the last year. Clearly, the funding gap is not posing an issue for China.
4. Dialog Chino '19 finds that the BRI recently expanded to Latin America, which shows the program is still expanding. Uniq controls the link. They don't need EU.

A2 Indian Encirclement

A2 Indian Ocean Warrant

A2 Econ Warrant

1. Kantha ‘17 of the South China Morning Post explains that India accepted China's belt and road initiative, with China realizing that appeasing India is a good foreign policy idea, and India realizing that the belt and road initiative can be good for their economy.
2. **Kantha ‘17 of the SCMP** continues that India has built their own infrastructure project, the India’s Act East Strategy, which means that India’s method of trying to grow their own influence is through their own infrastructure project, not the military.
3. Kantha ‘17 of the SCMP continues that China has continued participation in the Indian economy as India has tried to expand their market. This means that the incentive for war doesn’t exist since both countries have an economic incentive for not going to conflict. This is why CNN finds that even as the two countries almost went to war over the Doklam standoff, they used an informal summit in April of 2018 to diffuse tensions and put relations on a positive track.

A2 IndoPak

CPEC UQ

1. Aamir '19 gives three reasons CPEC is going away regardless.
    a. The project began under the previous administration's rule, thus, continuing it looks bad politically for the new administration.
    b. Pakistan is currently in an economic downturn and is looking to the IMF for loans. Unfortunately for CPEC, the IMF says that they would only bail out Pakistan if they were transparent about the terms of CPEC loans. Aamir concludes that exposing the details of CPEC would cause massive backlash against the project within Pakistan.
    c. Both Pakistan and China are souring on CPEC right now and there isn't much will to continue it.

Pakistan Trigger

1. Link Turn. We decrease the chance of Pakistan initiating conflict in the region in three ways.
    a. Small '18 of War on the Rocks explains that China wants to shift Pakistan's foreign policy to be more restrained in Indian relations because they want CPEC to be economically viable, and tensions decrease economic returns.
    b. Fair '17 of Foreign Policy explains that by increasing economic interwovenness with Pakistan, China gains the leverage necessary to decrease Pakistan's use of terror and nuclear proliferation, decreasing the likelihood of conflict.
    c. Chang '18 of AICGS explains that if the EU were to help fund CPEC it could leverage its political neutrality and diplomatic activism in conflict mitigation to mediate tensions in the Indo-Pacific region.
2. Aamir '19 explains that Pakistan has turned almost completely to Saudi Arabia in order to keep its economy functioning. Pakistan's dependence on Saudi Arabia means that:
    a. they have a much greater incentive not to sanction attacks against India, whose economy is largely intertwined with that of Saudi Arabia.
    b. There is greater joint pressure coming from China and Saudia Arabia to ensure that both India and Pakistan de-escalate tensions.

A2 Juncker Plan

A2 NATO Breakup

1. Walt '10 of foreign policy explains that even if Nato doesn't dissolve it will become irrelevant. He explains that Europe's economic woes are forcing key NATO members (and especially the U.K.) to adopt draconian cuts in defense spending. NATO's European members already devote a much smaller percentage of GDP to defense than the United States does, and they are notoriously bad at translating even that modest amount into effective military power. The latest round of defense cuts means that Europe will be even less able to make a meaningful contribution to out-of-area missions.
2. Link Turn. Carpenter '18 of the CATO institute explains that the U.S. and NATO continue to antagonize Russia. In addition to the increase of U.S. troops in Norway, major NATO war games are scheduled for October. Western leaders have continued to apply Soviet containment tactics to a modern Russia, but NATO leaders insist that they are not aggressing. Carpenter concludes that continuing aggressive actions while denying hostile intent could lead to miscalculation and a catastrophic confrontation. The funding that does exist leads to miscalc
3. **Delink: Trump is Alone in Criticisms of NATO – Probability that US Leaves is Near 0 (no support within administration,public, or congress)**
    a. **Kupchan 19 (**March 20, 2019, Charles Kupchan, Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University, NATO is Thriving in Spite of Trump, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-03-20/nato-thriving-spite-trump, DOA 7/17/2019) ZK But **even if Trump has the authority to scuttle the alliance, he is very unlikely to do so. There is virtually no support—in his own administration, among the American public, or in Congress— for taking a wrecking ball to NATO.** Even as Trump cycles through foreign policy advisers of various ideological persuasions, they are all competent enough to understand the abiding strategic value of NATO. **The electorate similarly knows better than Trump.** A 2018 Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey indicates **that 75 percent of Americans believe the United States should either maintain or increase the nation's commitment to NATO—exactly the same as in 2016, before Trump took office.**
4. **Mitigation: This Isn't New – US Has Been Pivoting Away from Europe for Years, NATO is Responding and Becoming More Self-Reliant**
    a. W: US started decreasing NATO support in obama administration, trump's only hastened it. But NATO is dealing with it well (e.g. baltic missions) and integrating with other nations and are well suited to cover all necessary capabilities.
    b. **Ling 18** (July 12, 2018, Justin Ling, of Maclean's, NATO Will Endure, With or Without the United States, https://www.macleans.ca/opinion/nato-will-be-fine-with-or-without-the-united-states/, DOA 7/17/2019) ZK But here's the thing, though: **Despite the Trump-inspired focus on U.S. participation in NATO, the organization has been preparing for U.S. withdrawal from Europe for years.** After all, it was **when Barack Obama was presiden**t that **NATO first adopted its 2 per cent spending goal**. That's because in 2015, Washington closed down 15 of its permanent military bases in Europe. In 2016, Obama arrived in Parliament to tell Prime Minister Justin Trudeau that NATO will be better off once everyone, including Canada, "contributes its full share to our common security." It was a not-so-subtle prod to get Canada to step up and shoulder some of America's burden on the continent. And Ottawa appeared to hear the message. Gen. Jonathan Vance, the chief of defence staff, told me this spring that while he's not fond of spending 2 per cent for the sake of hitting 2 per cent, Trump had little bearing on Canada's upped investment. "My view: We were going there, no matter who was in the White House," he said. Some have pointed to Obama's statements as vindication for Trump's slapdash position, but it is not. Obama's position was a recognition of reality: it makes little sense for America to station itself in Europe forever, and someone will eventually need to fill the gap. Trump's position, one that is becoming increasingly familiar, is that America is getting ripped off by its allies as part of some conspiracy to defraud the United States and, as such, a preposterous policy solution is required. Trump's quixotic campaign against his own military alliance also happens to fit perfectly into the Russian narratives around NATO. When I

was in Latvia earlier this year, I had the chance to stop by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence which, among other things, studies Russian narratives and propaganda targeting NATO. Researchers there say they've identified consistent narratives emerging from Russian state media, and one of the main ones is that NATO is obsolete, or can't adequately protect itself. Trump seems all too happy to play up that exact notion. **But** this is where we are. **While Obama may have begun the process of decreasing NATO's over-reliance on America, Trump has hastened it.** And now **NATO needs to deal with that reality,** and start figuring out a new European order where America can't always be relied upon. Any number of things may come next, after all: a drawdown of U.S. troop levels in Europe, more base closures, or a wholesale repudiation of Article V, which compels members to defend each other in case of an attack. It's all on the table—including America's withdrawal from NATO itself. **The good news is that they seem to be forging that new path,** and the Baltic missions are prime examples. What my trip to Latvia in February showed is that **NATO nations are learning how to integrate tightly with** a host of **other nations at a very micro level—even without the U.S.—meaning that load-bearing is increasingly possible**. It seems unlikely that any one European nation, each facing their own particular issues and domestic pressures, will step up and fill the void left by a retreating American power, **but collectively, NATO may be well-suited to cover all the necessary capabilities.**

5. Turn: Trump's Bellicose Rhetoric Strengthening NATO

a. **Kupchan 19 (March 20, 2019, Charles Kupchan, Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University, NATO is Thriving in Spite of Trump, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-03-20/nato-thriving-spite-trump, DOA 7/17/2019) ZK**

i. These **worries are unwarranted: NATO** at 70 **is** actually **in remarkably good shape.** Yes, European allies have been laggards on defense spending, and some members—Hungary, Poland, and Turkey in particular—have tarnished democratic credentials. But **NATO has demonstrated an impressive ability to adapt to the changing geopolitical environmen**t since the Cold War's end, ensuring that the United States and Europe remain each other's go-to partners. The alliance opened its doors to the new democracies that emerged from the former Soviet bloc, helping to anchor security and democracy in a wider Europe. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2014, members have taken important steps to strengthen deterrence against the Kremlin's adventurism. NATO has struck partnerships across the globe and carried out ambitious missions well beyond the territory of member states—most notably in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Libya. All the while, **the alliance has retooled to address new hazards such as cyberthreats, terrorism, hybrid warfare, and migration.** Precisely because NATO has been so nimble and effective, it enjoys strong political support on both sides of the Atlantic, leaving Trump virtually alone as a vociferous critic. **Moreover**—and paradoxically—**Trump's withering attacks on the alliance are actually strengthening NATO. Defenders of the alliance are coming out of the woodwork,** especially **in the U.S. Congress**. Trump's regular haranguing of allies for insufficient defense spending is paying off: **Europeans are finally investing more in their militaries, making it only more likely that the United States will cleave to Europe as its partner of choice. And** Trump's skepticism toward NATO expansion could help resolve continuing controversy over enlargement, guiding allies to the sensible conclusion that it is time for the alliance to begin closing its open door.

6. NATO Members can easily afford their own defense w/out US

a. **Chapman 19 (Jan 16, 2019, Steve Chapman, Editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, So Trump Wants to Leave NATO? That's Not Such a Bad Idea, https://www.chicagotribune.com/columns/steve-chapman/ct-perspec-chapman-nato-trump-putin-defense-0117-20190116-story.html, DOA 7/17/19) ZK**

i. **Trump has often griped that our allies expect us to carry too much of the load. That complaint has a distinguished pedigree. In 2011, Robert Gates, who was defense secretary under George W. Bush and Barack Obama, castigated allies "who enjoy the benefits of NATO** membership **but don't** want to **share the risks and the costs." Eight years later, not much has changed. The U.S. spends 3.6 percent of its GDP on defense.** According to NATO, **just five European countries spend as much as 2 percent,** and Germany spends just 1.2 percent**. If our allies were obliged to provide for their own defense without us, they could easily afford to do so.**

7.

1). NATO is Bad — Conventional U.S. forces cause miscalculation and confrontation with Russia

Carpenter, senior fellow in defense and foreign-policy studies at the Cato Institute, 6/15/**2018** (Ted Galen, Is NATO Pushing Russia Towards Retaliation? https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/nato-pushing-russia-towards-retaliation)

The United **S**tates **and** its **NATO** allies **continue to find ways to antagonize Russia.** The latest provocation is a request from Norway to more than double the number of U.S. troops stationed on its territory and deploy them even closer to the border with Russia. Granted, the numbers involved are not large. There are currently 330 American military personnel in the country on a "rotational" basis. Oslo's new request would increase the number to seven hundred. If the Norwegian government gets its way, the new troops would be stationed in the far north, barely 260 miles from Russia, in contrast to the existing unit in central Norway, several hundred miles from Russian territory. The rotational aspect theoretically complies with Norway's pledge to Moscow in 1949 when it joined NATO that Oslo would not allow U.S. bases on its territory. Indeed, Foreign Minister Ine Marie Eriksen Soriede reiterated that assurance in connection with the new troop request, contending that there would be "no American bases on Norwegian soil." Making their official status rotational supposedly means that the troops are there only on a temporary basis. It is a cynical dodge that fools no one—least of all Vladimir Putin and his colleagues in the Kremlin. Norwegian officials also insisted that the new deployment was not directed against Russia. That assurance has even less credibility than the rotational rationale. Oslo's request came just days after nine nations along NATO's eastern flank, including Poland, the Baltic republics, and Romania called for a larger Alliance (meaning largely U.S.) military presence in their region. **In addition to the** move to **increase** the number **of U.S. troops in Norway**, **major NATO** military exercises (**war games**), code-named Trident Juncture 18, **are scheduled for October**. The focus of those exercises will be central and northern Norway, and they will involve thirty-five thousand troops, seventy ships, and 130 aircraft. Nevertheless, Soriede insisted that she couldn't see "any serious reason why Russia should react" to Oslo's proposal for an enhanced U.S. military presence. She should perhaps receive credit for being able to make such a statement with a straight face. But such transparent dishonesty is a longstanding feature of NATO's behavior toward Moscow. Even during the Cold War, Western officials routinely insisted that the Alliance was not directed against the Soviet Union. In their more candid moments, though, they conceded the obvious—that NATO was a military mechanism to contain Soviet power. Granted, it was not the sole purpose. Lord Hastings Ismay, NATO's first secretary general, stated that NATO was created to "keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down." The first objective, though, seemed to be the most important. **Containment of the Soviet Union made sense** to keep democratic Europe out of Moscow's geopolitical orbit, and NATO was an important component of that strategy. **But Western leaders continued to apply that model to a noncommunist Russia once the Cold War ended**. Indeed, **they intensified the containment rationale by** adding new members throughout Eastern Europe and **expanding the Alliance to Russia's border**. Those actions were taken despite verbal assurances from Secretary of State James Baker and West German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher at the time of German reunification that NATO would not expand beyond Germany's eastern border. Throughout the Alliance's inexorable move eastward, Western officials and pundits insisted that NATO enlargement was not directed against Russia. Indeed, some members of the Western foreign-policy community argued that the move would benefit Russia by erasing Cold War dividing lines and increasing Eastern Europe's political and economic stability. One wonders whether Westerners thought that the Russians were gullible enough to believe such absurd arguments, or the proponents actually believed their own propaganda. **NATO leaders continue to insist that the Alliance has no offensive intent against Russia** or that the Alliance seeks to undermine Moscow's interests. **But NATO's behavior belies such assurances**. **The interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo that weakened** and eventually truncated **Serbia**, **a longstanding Russian ally**, **was** certainly **not** a **friendly** act. **Stationing** Alliance (most notably **U.S.**) **forces** and weapons systems **in NATO's easternmost members**, (a process that has accelerated markedly since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014) likewise **is provocative**. Yet Western leaders and publics act as through Russia has no legitimate reason to react negatively to such moves, as Soriede stated explicitly regarding the proposed increase in the U.S. troop presence in her country. NATO has conducted several large-scale military exercises in Poland and other member states, as well as naval maneuvers in the Black Sea near Russia's important naval base at Sevastopol. Again, the Russians apparently are wrong to regard such actions as provocative and threatening. U.S. and NATO leaders need to adopt a much more realistic attitude. Any nation would regard NATO's behavior as decidedly unfriendly, and even menacing, if conducted on its frontiers. **Continuing such actions while cynically denying their hostile intent could easily lead to miscalculation and a catastrophic confrontation**. As a first step toward mending ties with Moscow, the Trump administration should summarily reject Norway's unnecessary request for more U.S. troops.

Even if it doesn't dissolve, NATO will become irrelevant

Walt 10 (Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. September 24, 2010, "Is NATO irrelevant?", http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/24/is_nato_irrelevant)

Nonetheless, I share William Pfaff's view that **NATO doesn't have much of a future**. First, **Europe's economic woes are forcing key NATO members** (and especially the U.K.) **to adopt draconian cuts in defense spending. NATO's European members already devote a much smaller percentage of GDP to defense than the United States does, and they are notoriously bad at translating even that modest amount into effective military power. The latest round of defense cuts means that Europe will be even less able to make a meaningful contribution to out-of-area missions** in the future, and those are the only serious military missions NATO is likely to have. Second, the ill-fated Afghan adventure will have divisive long-term effects on alliance solidarity. If the United States and its ISAF allies do not win a clear and decisive victory (a prospect that seems increasingly remote), there will be a lot of bitter finger-pointing afterwards. U.S. leaders will complain about the restrictions and conditions that some NATO allies (e.g., Germany) placed on their participation, while European publics will wonder why they let the United States get them bogged down there for over a decade. It won't really matter who is really responsible for the failure; the key point is that **NATO is unlikely to take on another mission** like this one **anytime soon (if ever).** And given that Europe itself is supposedly stable, reliably democratic, and further pacified by the EU, what other serious missions is NATO supposed to perform? The third potential schism is Turkey, which has been a full NATO member since 1950. I'm not as concerned about Turkey's recent foreign policy initiatives as some people are, but there's little doubt that Ankara's diplomatic path is diverging on a number of key issues. The United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany have been steadily ratcheting up pressure on Iran, while Turkey has moved closer to Tehran both diplomatically and economically. Turkey is increasingly at odds with Washington on Israel-Palestine issues, which is bound to have negative repercussions in the U.S. Congress. Rising Islamophobia in both the United States and Europe could easily reinforce these frictions. And given that Turkey has NATO's largest military forces (after the United States) and that NATO operates largely by consensus, **a major rift could have paralyzing effects on the alliance as a whole.** Put all this together, and **NATO's future as a meaningful force in world affairs doesn't look too bright**. Of course, the usual response to such gloomy prognostications is to point out that NATO has experienced crises throughout its history (Suez, anyone?), and to remind people that it has always managed to weather them in the past. True enough, but most of these rifts occurred within the context of the Cold War, when there was an obvious reason for leaders in Europe and America to keep disputes within bounds. Of course, **given NATO's status as a symbol of transatlantic solidarity, no American president or European leader will want to preside over its demise.** Plus, you've got all those bureaucrats in Brussels and Atlantophiles in Europe and America who regard NATO as their life's work. For all these reasons, I don't expect NATO to lose members or dissolve. I'll even be somewhat surprised if foreign policy elites even admit that it has serious problems. Instead, **NATO is simply going to be increasingly irrelevant.** As I wrote more than a decade ago: . . .the Atlantic Alliance is beginning to resemble Oscar Wilde's Dorian Gray, appearing youthful and robust as it grows older -- but becoming ever more infirm. The Washington Treaty may remain in force, the various ministerial meetings may continue to issue earnest and upbeat communiques, and the Brussels bureaucracy may keep NATO's web page up and running-all these superficial routines will go on, provided the alliance isn't asked to actually do anything else. The danger is that NATO will be dead before anyone notices, and we will only discover the corpse the moment we want it to rise and respond." Looking back, I'd say I underestimated NATO's ability to rise from its sickbed. Specifically, it did manage to stagger through the Kosovo War in 1999 and even invoked Article V guarantees for the first time after 9/11. NATO members have sent mostly token forces to Afghanistan (though the United States, as usual, has done most of the heavy lifting). But even that rather modest effort has been exhausting, and isn't likely to be repeated. A continent that is shrinking, aging, and that faces no serious threat of foreign invasion isn't going to be an enthusiastic partner for future adventures in nation-building, and it certainly isn't likely to participate in any future U.S. effort to build a balancing coalition against a rising China. The bad news, in short, is that one of the cornerstones of the global security architecture is likely to erode in the years ahead. The good news, however, is that it won't matter very much if it does.

US Backlash

1. Mallin ‘18 of ABC News explains that the Senate overwhelmingly supports NATO, and Trump leaving would ruin him politically, meaning it wouldn’t be worth it to Trump.
2. Trump already criticizes NATO and has made it abundantly clear he doesn’t support it, the impacts of weak US commitment should’ve already manifested.

China Fractures

1. Sawhney ‘18 explains that since half of the EU is in the BRI and the other half isn’t, their fracturing within NATO is already occurring. The only way to actually solve back for that is for the entire EU to join and unite.
2. McLaughlin ‘18 of the Irish Times explains that China needs the EU for economic strength, making it against their interest to undermine EU unity and create conditions for a war.

5G Infrastructure

1. Defense. Stolton ‘19 of Euractiv writes that when Italy signed on to the Belt and Road Initiative they opted out of 5G investment in the agreement with China to ease concerns from the US. This means that EU countries are most likely not going to accept 5G investment so the US isn’t angered.

2. Defense. Rahn ‘19 (march 24) of DW explains how the benefits of 5G in developing nations greatly outweigh the potential harms. He furthers that, if developing nations see a perceived risk, there is always a more reliable US option.

3. Turn. 5G is a good thing. Harrison ‘19 of the National Interest explains that the potential commercial implications of 5G are sweeping, including revolutionized medicine and networked sensors in constant communication. Indeed, by the year 2035 5G-supported technology may generate as much as $12.3 trillion in economic value and help to create 22 million new jobs.

4. Defense. China literally cannot conceive this. Chen ‘19 of Deloitte concludes that the Digital Silk Road would cost an additional 200 billion dollars. Given that it would cost 3 trillion dollars to keep the BRI running, which China cannot provide, then they definitely can’t make this additional to that amount.

A2 Populism

1. Defense. The BBC '19 explains that Italy had a populist government way before they joined the BRI. This proves that populists in the EU obviously don't dislike the BRI as their populist government signed the MOU.
2. Defense. Carothers '18 of the CEIP explains that China gets a free pass from European populists, who view China favorably as an ally. Bloomberg '19 explains that China has been reaching out to right wing and populist parties in Europe, who have historically been marginalized in political discourse, leading populist groups to respond positively to China's presence.
3. Defense. Suet Yi '17 of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace writes that the Belt and Road Initiative is an unfamiliar, or even unknown, topic among the general public in the EU, meaning that neither populists nor voters care about it, so they won't be emboldened.
4. Their argument is really unclear. They need to explain how many populists get elected because of the Belt and Road, and how many populists need to get elected to enact their impacts. This means that we outweigh on probability because there is always doubt on the link.
5. Smith '19 of NBC warrants that the negative effects of brexit serve as a warning to populists across the EU, causing them to change their push from leaving to EU to using reforms to transform the bloc from within. He furthers that in April, 61 percent of respondents from across the 27 states other than the United Kingdom said their country's membership was a good thing, compared to just 53 percent who said so in October 2016.

Smith '19- brexit the vaccine to anti- eu propaganda

https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/brexit-referendum/brexit-effect-europe-s-populists-back-away-calls-leave-union-n1029176

Most euroskeptic parties— including those that have since assumed power — have rowed back on their demand for referendums, presenting themselves instead as reformers hoping to transform the bloc from within.

The change in tack comes at a time when the union is more popular than it's been since a brief interlude between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty that furthered European integration, according to a European Commission survey. In April, 61 percent of respondents from across the 27 states other than the United Kingdom said their country's membership was a good thing, compared to just 53 percent who said so in October 2016.

European Council President Donald Tusk is in "no doubt" that Britain's bungled attempt to leave has played a vital role in strengthening support for the union across the continent.

"Brexit has been a vaccine against anti-E.U. propaganda and fake news," he said as he celebrated May's election results, which delivered a pro-E.U. majority in the European Parliament.

A2 Reform

1. Defense. Peel ‘19 of Financial Times writes that the EU has divided over BRI, meaning that they can’t coalesce around reforming the initiative.

A2 Refugees

1.

A2 Russia Arctic

A2 War

- Attack the incentive structure behind Russia war (econ, geopolitics)

A2 Arctic Drilling

1. Defense. Kireeva ‘19 explains that here are 3 reasons why Russia will never Drill in the Arctic
    a. A Global Shift. By 2023 oil prices will stagnate, because of this major oil countries are shifting investment away from oil and into green tech. This means that because of the high costs of drilling it the arctic it will be unprofitable. Russia is smart enough to not put unprofitable oil on it's books.
    b. Russian Laws. In Russia only state owned companies can drill in the arctic. Problematically,, the biggest state owned companies are not positioned to drill in the arctic because they are busy elsewhere.
    c. Equipment. Because of the weather in the region, rigs can only drill once per year making it very expensive and inefficient to drill in the arctic.
2. Defense. Dodwell ‘19 of the South China Morning Post explains that in response to the Polar Silk Road, the US has deployed forces in the arctic and rebuilt it's fleet of icebreakers assuming that even economic projects are threats to national security. This has two implications, either:
    a. If the US is in the region China won't be willing to continue its relations with Russia in threat of starting conflict.
    b. The US will wreck arctic ice and release methane with ships and military activities or just drill altogether while in the region.
3. Releasing the methane in the arctic is inevitable. Hausfather ‘19 of Yale explains that greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are locked in from centuries ago. She continues that this means that even if we reach the 2 degree goal of the PCA the temperature of the arctic will still rise by 5 degrees by 2050. The implication is that the ice melts and methane is released with drilling or not.

4. Russia will never drill deep in the arctic. Gramer '17 of Foreign Policy explains that companies took losses drilling in the arctic when oil was $100 per barrel, the problem is oil is around $60 per barrel. The implication is that Russia, especially during what Inoz '19 of Moscow Times describes as a time of looming recession, cannot undertake unprofitable ventures.
5. Russia is already drilling in it's nearby arctic coast. Allen '17 of the CFR explains that Russia gets 75% of its oil from it's arctic coast, if it were to worsen the climate as much as they say it would have already happened. There's no reason why drilling deep in the arctic is worse than close to coasts.

A2: Icebreakers/Shipping

1. Pai '19 of the Marine Link explains that the volume of goods being transported in the Arctic are up 25% due to recent increases in Arctic infrastructure. This has two implications:
    a. Since shipping is increasing, it means that most of the ice has already melted.
    b. Infrastructure can and is being built outside of the BRI, meaning their impacts are non-unique.
2.

Pai, Laxman, Marine Link, February 3, 2019, "Huge Increase in Arctic shipping"
https://www.marinelink.com/news/huge-increase-arctic-shipping-462458

Data from Russia's ports and Northern Sea Route show that the volume of goods being shipped out into the Arctic waterway are up by 25 percent 2018. According to information from the Russian Transport Ministry, **a total of 92.7 million tons was handled by regional seaports, of which almost 70 percent was oil products and liquified natural gas.** The biggest increases came in Sabetta, which sits on the icy Yamal Peninsula in the Kara Sea, according to Bellona. With Novatek's $27 billion Yamal LNG project now in commercial production, Sabetta has seen a 130 percent increase in the volume of cargo it handles – up to 17.4 tons for 2018 Ports in Murmansk alone handled some 60 million tons of cargo in 2018 – an 18.1 percent boost over volumes from the year before. Archangelsk ports saw their volumes grow by 15 percent. **Other key seaports in the Russian north are also experiencing significant growth. The goods turnover in regional port is reflected in the growing Russian shipping through Arctic waters, said a report in Arctic Today. In 2018, the volumes of goods shipped on the Northern Sea Route amounted to more than 18 million tons.**

A2 SCS

1. (if they read bohman) Their evidence literally concludes that western powers, such as the EU, should join the BRI to moderate China's hardline stance and increase transparency, decreasing the military aspect of the BRI.
2. The BRI has existed since 2013, the impacts of diverted trade haven't materialized yet, make them give you the timeframe.
3. Turn. Affirming makes China closer with the West via increased cooperation with the EU. Crucially, Focus Taiwan '19 explains that the EU has reiterated strong support for Taiwan, thus, closer ties means China is equally unable to go to war with Taiwan as their dependency on the EU increases.

Vietnam

1. Defense. Beckhusen '18 of the National Interest explains that Vietnam is increasing its deterrence capability right now by arming their submarines with missiles. This means that they have the capability to deter China from instigating conflict.
2. Defense. Fawthrop '18 the Diplomat explains that in 2018 China deployed missiles on an island Vietnam claimed. This should have triggered their impact already as per French, who explains that China claiming a single island would trigger the war.

A2 SOEs Crowdout

Link BRI Promotes SOEs

1. Turn. Jia '17 of Baker McKenzie writes that state-owned companies were only for the first stage of the BRI and now privately owned firms are taking a larger share of BRI projects as they look to find new markets. Indeed, Deloitte '18 writes that the BRI was originally based on energy and infrastructure has, but because it has broadened to trade and manufacturing the initiative is shifting to being financed by private firms. Yu '19 of the Telegraph explains that 90% of Belt and Road projects employ private firms to carry out projects. If anything, the BRI helps the Chinese economy by expanding the private sector.
2. Defense. Xie '18 of SCMP explains that China has recognized that private sector crowdout is creating drag in the economy, so they are taking steps to revitalize investment in the private sector. In fact, Lee '19 of the SCMP writes that the Chinese government is getting rid of the capital preferences it gives to state owned enterprises.
3. Defense. Guluzade '19 of the World Economic Forum writes that China is currently releasing ownership of state owned enterprise and only keeping ownership of industries that are traditionally state owned like defense and energy.
4. Turn. While some state owned enterprises are inefficient, Lee '19 of the SCMP writes that as a whole state owned enterprises revenues and profits are at historic highs. This is because state firms have enacted cost cutting and efficiency measures to improve economic growth. In fact, Guluzade '19 of the World Economic Forum writes that China has begun introducing mixed ownership with state enterprises, forcing firms to focus on generating equity returns and, thus, making them more efficient.

A2 Spreads Recession

1. Even if interconnectedness makes a recession worse, the benefits of globalization outweigh. The Lumen institute explains that interconnectedness incentivizes business to expand to new countries and create jobs and sectors within the developing world. This shift from a developing to developed country outweighs worse recessions for two reasons

a. Time frame. Recessions last a few years while the decades between recessions gain the benefits to globalization.
b. The comparative is interconnectedness causes recessions to send citizens of countries into poverty every few years, but without globalization people are in poverty constantly.

A2 Trade War Worsens

China Pulls Out of Negotiations

1. Carter '19 of the SCMP explains that the EU is already China's number one trade partner, meaning China's confidence should have already surged and negotiations already rejected.

A2 Uighur Crackdown

Xinjiang Hub

1. Alt. Cause. **Liu 19 of Jacobin** explains that China began interning Uighurs because they wanted natural resources from the XUAR, so even if repression happened because of the BRI and CPEC it was inevitable because China needed to crackdown for resources.
2. Alt. Cause. **Kirby 18 of Vox** writes that thousands of Han Chinese migrated into Xinjiang, angering Uighur muslims into protesting and rioting. China intervened on the side of the Han, and thus started cracking down.
3. Defense. Even if the BRI collapses, the trade routes through Xinjiang still exist meaning that there is always a continued incentive to crack down. But you turn this argument, because if the BRI collapses and China faces economic downturn from this, they will most likely use the Uighurs as a scapegoat and increase crackdown in a form of diversionary wars to divert attention from a failing economy.

Pakistan cooperation

1. Defense. Dhume '19 of AEI explains that Pakistan's cooperation with China on Uighur muslims is not isolated to CPEC, but rather to the decades long alliance with China. Even if CPEC collapses, relations remain and so does cooperation.
2. Defense. The reason that Pakistan is cooperating with China is because they are economically dependent on them. This doesn't go away in a world without the BRI, because CPEC routes still exist and Pakistan has a faltering economy so they will always bend to China's will for economic support.

CPEC going away (only if you don't rely on CPEC yourself)

8. Defense. Their link is reliant on CPEC. Aamir '19 gives 4 reasons that CPEC is going away even if the BRI survives:
    a. CPEC was started by Pakistan's previous administration, and its continuance only serves to weaken Khan's government.
    b. Pakistan needs an IMF loan, and to get this loan they will have to make the details of CPEC public, which will draw domestic criticism and further cancelation of projects.
    c. Recent criticism both internationally, within China, and within Pakistan has caused both parties to sour on CPEC, creating a stumbling block for the rest of the BRI, encouraging China to cut its losses in Pakistan and focus elsewhere.
    d. China promised loans but has not handed over the capital for CPEC projects, leaving Pakistan to finance projects on their own. Problematically, Pakistan is facing an economic crisis that is stopping their ability to continue funding CPEC.

A2 US Tariffs

1. Non-unique. Brinkley '19 of Forbes explains that Trump is already about to put tariffs on the EU because the WTO is about to permit tariffs on the EU for illegal subsidization.
2. They don't have a clear warrant (probably just "trigger happy" card), as to why Trump would impose tariffs, if it was true that trump would impose auto tariffs then
    a. He should have imposed them on Italy or any other EU countries that have signed MOU's on the BRI
    b. Kumar '19 reports that in April China and the EU agreed to stronger trade relations, to work together on the WTO, etc. Trump should've imposed tariffs then if the warrant is just EU-China cooperation.
3. Defense. **Amaro of CNBC 19**' there is a "low probability" of this. This is because the EU would be in a much better position to retaliate than China and is prepared to do so in a highly targeted fashion ahead of the U.S. presidential elections in 2020,"
    a. When Trump tariffed the EU last year, the EU retaliated immediately, putting duties on denim, peanut butter and other American goods made by industries that support Trump's campaign. Incidentally, Trump has yet to implement more tariffs.
4. In fact, relations are trending upwards as the 28 European countries finally adopted a common position to negotiate trade with the U.S.
5. Turn. If the European Union were to join BRI, the United States would be alarmed and attempt to compete more intensely with the new-BRI. Looking to historical precedence, **Gerry Brown '18** finds every time countries have joined the BRI, instead of retaliating with tariffs, the US engages in competitive loaning. In practice this increases their aid to that country in an attempt to keep their loyalty.
    a. Or read - In response to an increase in BRI activity, **the SCMP in 2018** writes that Trump pushed through a bipartisan bill that allocates 60 billion for a separate loan distribution program, that competes with Chinese BRI loans.

    Gerry Brown
    https://www.counterpunch.org/2018/10/02/is-china-led-belt-and-road-initiative-afraid-of-competition/
    SCMP
    https://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2157381/us-competes-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-new-asian-investment

Soon '19 cnbc-

China will win the trade war with the U.S., and eventually wean itself off its reliance on American technology, a strategist told CNBC on Monday."China will never trust the United States again, and it will achieve its technology independence within seven years," David Roche, Independent Strategy's president and global strategist, told CNBC's "Squawk Box."China has traditionally been reliant on U.S. suppliers for key tech components such as chips and software, as well as modems and jet engines, but recent developments in the two countries' protracted trade war have strained those ties and affected businesses from both sides.

A2 US-China Tensions

A2 Yuan Overtake Dollar

1. Defense. Constable ‘18 of Forbes explains that the yuan currency literally doesn’t exist in enough liquidity to be the global reserve currency.
2. Defense. The reason the dollar is the global reserve currency is because countries can rely on it to remain stable in times of economic crisis. The yuan cannot fill the same void because China continually devalues their currency to make their exports competitive.
3. Defense. Coogan ‘17 of Sounding Line explains that trade flows have nothing to do with the reserve currency. China’s closed capital account and difficulty of monetary conversion means that countries can’t rely on the yuan in times of crisis. As a result, the Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, and British pound are all ahead of the yuan as reserve currencies.
4. Uniqueness overwhelms the link: **Richter 18** writes RMB is literally 1.39% of foreign reserves whereas the US is about 40%, despite efforts to increase its usage.
5. DL: If China is out of money and EU banks are funding the BRI, loans literally wont be done in yuans anymore.
6. Link Turn: **Smith 18** writes the majority of BRI projects aren’t funded by the yuan, they’re funded by the dollar, which is why **Smith** concludes the renminbi hasn’t made significant headway in recent years. This strengthens the strength of the dollar if anything.
7. Impact Turn: **Al Jazeera 18** writes as the dollar rises, it costs developing countries more to repay their debts. This exacerbates the impact of high debt in these countries. **Shabir 15** furthers a 1 percent increase in debt servicing is likely to compel the government to cut down its overall spending by 0.89 percent, its development spending by 4.1 percent, and its spending on the social sector by 0.25 percent
8. Impact Turn: **La Monica of CNN 18** explains the majority of US companies suffer financial consequences as a result of a stronger dollar, as it’s difficult to make sufficient profit conducting international trade if one currency has such a stronghold over the other by making products from other countries cheaper and US goods more expensive on international markets
9. Impact defense: Unseating the dollar is impossible. **Constable 2018** explains that it’s nearly impossible to unseat the world’s reserve currency; the last time it happened, it took the Great Depression and two world wars to do it. The reason why you can’t unseat the dollar is because the global economy relies on its use: it controls the debt market, the interest rate derivative market, and the foreign exchange market. This institutional reliance on the dollar means no other currencies can replace it.

EU joining causes legitimize BRI to increase investment in Yuan bonds

With the second highest gross domestic product at purchasing power parity,[29] China poses a significant challenge to U.S. economic primacy especially with the expectation that U.S. national debt could explode to 717% of GDP by 2080 according to Congressional Budget office. Moreover, this debt is financed largely by China

Cnnmoney, 18, (), "The dollar is really strong. That could hurt the economy", Hartford Business Journal, 11-6-2018, https://www.hartfordbusiness.com/article/the-dollar-is-really-strong-that-could-hurt-the-economy, DOA-7-18-2019 (MO)
Continued dollar strength could wind up leading to more volatility in the stock market. The stronger dollar is a problem for many large American companies, because it reduces the value of their international sales and profits. Hasbro (HAS), Harley-Davidson (HOG), Huggies maker Kimberly-Clark (KMB) and Gillette owner Procter & Gamble (PG) have all warned that the dollar is hurting their results. So have industrial companies 3M (MMM) and Caterpillar (CAT) and Big Pharma giant Pfizer (PFE). The stronger dollar can also cause trouble for large American firms at home, because it helps make products from overseas cheaper. On the flip side, **US goods are now more expensive in international markets because of the stronger dollar. That's a particular worry for giant tech hardware companies like Apple** (AAPL). "These big tech companies are global businesses that rely on international markets. If interest rates are rising and the dollar is following suit, that reduces the purchasing power of their foreign customers," said Jonathan Curtis, portfolio manager with the Franklin Technology fund. JJ Kinahan, chief market strategist for TD Ameritrade, conceded that a stronger dollar is a problem. But he thinks the benefits of less expensive imports for American consumers and retailers may offset the profit hit that multinational companies have to take. A healthier US consumer could keep the economy afloat.

Paul R. La Monica, Cnn Business, 18, (), "Why the strong dollar is so bad for business", CNN, 11-6-2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/29/investing/strong-dollar-earnings-stocks/index.html, DOA-7-18-2019 (MO)
It can also hurt large US firms at home because American consumers have more purchasing power and may buy goods from overseas. Several blue chip consumer companies, including Hasbro, Harley-Davidson, Huggies maker Kimberly-Clark and Gillette owner Procter & Gamble have warned that the dollar is hurting their results. So have industrial companies 3M and Caterpillar (CAT). **Mightier dollar equals punier profits.** Hasbro (HAS) said last week that the combination of a stronger dollar against currencies in Europe, Latin America and Asia led to a more than $30 million hit to its sales in its most recent quarter. Harley-Davidson (HOG) said the stronger dollar led to a more than 1% hit to its sales. That's on top of the negative impact from aluminum and steel prices as well as retaliatory tariffs slapped on the motorcycle maker by Europe and China.

Colby Smith, 18, (), "The Belt and Road's dollar problem", Financial Times, 12-18-2018, https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/12/18/1545130791000/The-Belt-and-Road-s-dollar-problem/, DOA-7-18-2019 (MO)
When China first unveiled its plans to connect more than 65 countries along a modern Silk Road in 2013, the project was met with great fanfare. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as it was later renamed, was initially hailed as "the most ambitious economic and diplomatic program since the founding of the People's Republic". Beyond the pledge that it would help to turn China into a high-income economic powerhouse, Chinese officials also touted the BRI as a vehicle for transforming the country's currency into a global one. ***Five years on, the renminbi hasn't made much headway as an internationally-***

recognised unit of account, medium of exchange or store of value — the three functions a global currency must fulfil. In fact***, the majority of BRI projects are not even funded this way. Like most global transactions, the dollar dominates, putting a natural cap on just how revolutionary the BRI can be.*** **I**n recent years, Chinese officials have made a concerted effort to promote the renminbi's international use. Since 2009, China has signed more than 30 bilateral currency swap agreements with a wide range of countries from Argentina to Nigeria. This year, Chinese regulators have loosened rules for foreign commercial banks to conduct business on the mainland. And as recently as last week, they also extended more licenses to Western banks to underwrite renminbi-denominated bond sales by foreign companies.

Wolf Richter, 18, (), "Here's why efforts to reduce the dollar's dominance won't work anytime soon", Business Insider, 7-2-2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-dollar-heres-why-it-will-remain-dominant-around-the-world-2018-7, DOA-7-18-2019 (MO)
Over the decades, there have been major efforts to undermine the dollar's hegemony as a global reserve currency, which it has maintained since World War II. The creation of the euro was the most successful such effort. The plan was that the euro would eventually reach "parity" with the dollar on the hegemony scale. Before the euro, global exchange reserves included the individual currencies of today's Eurozone members, particularly the Deutsche mark. After the euro came about, it replaced all those. And its share edged up for a while until the euro debt crisis spooked central banks and derailed those dreams. ***And now there are efforts underway to elevate the Chinese renminbi to a global reserve currency.*** This became official on October 1, 2016, when the IMF added it to its currency basket, the Special Drawing Rights. ***But watching grass grow is breathtakingly exciting compared to watching the RMB gain status as a reserve currency***. The RMB is the thin red sliver in the pie chart below with a share of just 1.39% of allocated foreign exchange reserves. Minuscule as it is, it is the highest share ever, up from 1.2% in Q4 2017. In other words, ***its inclusion in the SDR basket hasn't exactly performed miracles as central banks seem to remain leery of it and have not yet displayed any kind of eagerness to hold RMB-denominated assets.***

Shabbir and Yasin 2015 (Sadia Shabbir* and Hafiz M. Yasin ,"Implications of Public External Debt for Social Spending: A Case Study of Selected Asian Developing Countries," The Lahore Journal of Economics, Summer 2015, http://www.lahoreschoolofeconomics.edu.pk/EconomicsJournal/Journals/Volume%2020/Issue%201/03%20Shabbir%20and%20Yasin%20ED%20ttc%20FIGURES%20NEED%20WORK.pdf DOA: 07/12/2019)

The results confirm a negative relationship between the dependent (social sector spending) and explanatory variables (size of debt servicing). As the literature shows, **an increase in debt servicing shifts resources away from the social sectors, especially education and health. The coefficient is significant at 5 percent and the results indicate that a 1 percent increase in debt servicing will decrease social sector spending by 0.25 percent**. **The results are consistent with Fosu (2010), who finds that debt servicing has a negative impact on social spending in sub-Saharan Africa**. Based on the analysis above, the results obtained using GMM indicate that both the debt burden and debt servicing have a negative impact on overall government spending, development spending, and social spending (on education and health). **A 1 percent increase in debt servicing is likely to compel the government to cut down its overall spending**

by 0.89 percent, its development spending by 4.1 percent, and its spending on the social sector by 0.25 percent. The results also suggest that GMM is best suited to analyzing the impact of debt servicing on public spending for panel data. All the results discussed above confirm the findings of previous studies carried out for other developing countries. Our analysis confirms the general view in the literature that the debt-servicing liability has a negative impact on social sector spending, in this case, education and health**. The higher the stock of external debt, the higher will be the debt-servicing liability.** The case of external debt liability is, however, different from domestic public debt. External debt is serviced in terms of foreign exchange, which in turn has to be earned from exports or remittances. Further, the government has to cut down spending to release sufficient resources to this end. However, the (negative) distributional impact of this burden is heavy on the social sectors. **Debt servicing reduces social sector spending in two ways: there Public External Debt and Social Spending in Selected Asian Countries 93 is a direct negative impact (-0.25, Table 4), and further through an indirect effect that takes place via the impact on development expenditures (- 4.1*0.73, Table 3 & Table 4).**

Unseating a reserve currency is impossible

Constable 18 *(Simon Constable, I'm a fellow at the Johns Hopkins Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health and the Study of Business Enterprise, 5-23-2018, "Why China's Yuan Is No Imminent Threat To The Dollar," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/simonconstable/2018/05/23/no-china-isnt-going-to-unseat-the-might-dollar-anytime-soon/ DOA 1/14/19) MDS*

That inertia in the habits of business means that it takes an awful lot to unseat the doiminant reserve currency. "It would take a seismic-sized shock to unseat the U.S. dollar," *says Robert Wright, professor of political economy at Augustana University in Sioux Falls Sout Dakota, and also an economic historian.* ***We don't have a lot of history of currency regimes changing.*** *But there is some evidence from when the British pound sterling got unseated by the U.S. dollar. Even during the late 19th century, the U.S. economy was clearly rivaling that of the United Kingdom (not including its colonies and possessions.)* ***However, size wasn;t enough. It took until 1944 for the U.S. dollar to unseat the pound, and it did indeed involve some cataclysmic shocks.*** *To begin with, there was* ***WWI of 1914-1918 in which Britain lost up to 100,000 men a month.*** *Not only was a huge portion of a generation of men killed, but there was a* ***vast financial cost to the country also.*** *Following that, in the 1920s, an attempt was made by Britain to peg its currency back to gold at the same rate it had been before the war. The result was massive industrial action.* ***Then came the Great Depression and after that WWII*** *with all the associated destruction and death. In short,* ***there was a lot of economic and geopolitical upheaval necessary in order to unseat the pound from its role of King of currencies.*** *I have written similar commentary in the past, but somehow some people just aren't getting the message. The dollar will be with us for long time yet.*

Warrant

Constable 18 *(Simon Constable, I'm a fellow at the Johns Hopkins Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health and the Study of Business Enterprise, 5-23-2018, "Why China's Yuan Is No Imminent Threat To The Dollar," Forbes,* ***https://www.forbes.com/sites/simonconstable/2018/05/23/no-china-isnt-going-to-unseat-the-might-dollar-anytime-soon/ DOA 1/14/19) MDS***

The reserve currency is part of an ecosystem of financial systems. The dollar is the paper money that we all know. But ***there is also the bond market, the commodity market, and the foreign-exchange markets. All of these markets work together to the benefit of anyone using dollars as opposed to any other currency.*** *Imagine you are an oil trader. You buy your oil in dollars (because all commodities are priced in dollars) load it onto a tanker that you purchased with dollars, and then you financed both the ship and the cargo with a loan denominated in dollars. Finally, when you deliver the oil to the customer you get paid in dollars. Of course, the first response would be to say that* ***if you can do that with dollars then surely you can do that with another currency, such as the yuan. Theoretically yes. But in practicality, no you can't. "There is simply not enough liquidity in all the other currencies combined to switch away from the dollar,"*** *says*

Jeff Christian, veteran financial markets expert and founder of New York-based commodities consulting firm CPM Group. Consider these financial markets statistics. **The debt market is dominated by** *securities denominated in* **dollars***. More than half (51%) of the liabilities are in dollars with 28% in euros. The remainder of the total comprises all other currencies combined, according to data from the Bank of International Settlements.* **The Chinese yuan doesn't get an individual mention. The market for interest rate derivatives is dominated by the dollar.** *Around 70% of the transaction volume is in dollars, with all other currencies combined making up the remainder, according to BIS data.* **The foreign exchange market is dominated by the dollar** *with almost half of all transactions (44%) by volume involving the dollar, according to the latest (2016) triennial survey from the BIS. The data shows 88% but the total of all currencies comes to 200%.* **The dollar's dominance in all these subsector markets means there is more liquidity and hence more efficiency in each of the markets. That efficiency means there is little financial reason to look elsewhere for loans or derivatives.** *If nothing else, the mantra of business has long been, "if it ain't broke don't fix it." Chief financial officers know that the dollar market is the biggest and most efficient, so that is what they use. Self-fulling maybe, but that is a fact of life. There's little reason for them to change.*

Cards

Aff Cards

Afghanistan

Chaudhry '19 – Pakistan economy about to collapse

Kamran Chaudhry. "PAKISTAN Pakistan's economy on the brink of collapse."Asian News. 2019. http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Pakistan's-economy-on-the-brink-of-collapse-46810.html. //SH

Pakistan's economy has "reached the point of collapse. For the first time in four decades of research, I am deeply worried," said Dr Kaiser Bengali, Dean of the Faculty of Management Science at the Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Institute of Science and Technology, in Karachi. The federal government is expected to present a new budget for the fiscal year 2019-20 on 24 May. However, "India might cause the collapse our economy as the US did with the USSR," Bengali warns. **"The alarm bells are ringing.** We have no choice but to beg. I fear starvation, poverty and unemployment." Bengali, a former advisor for Planning and Development to the Chief Minister of Sindh province, spoke yesterday at a hotel in Lahore at the launching of his research titled *State of the Economy 1990-2015; Economy on a Roller Coaster – And Stuck in the Mud!* The report, which evaluates Pakistan's economy over a quarter of a century, examined three sectors: major crops, minor crops and large-scale manufacturing. **"Average GDP growth of 4 per cent cannot be expected to raise the per capita income sufficiently to reduce poverty,"** the study states. **"Agriculture, the core of economy, has performed worse. Major crops sectors have grown at less than3 per cent and minor crops sector at less than 2 per cent. Large scale manufacturing has grown at just about 5 per cent." The picture is very serious,** the economist told *AsiaNews*: "sales are declining, purchase power has ended. The most affected will be youth. An average family can no longer afford a house" and has "to share it with another."

Afghanistan number 4 trading partner with Pakistan
https://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/PAK

Pakistan number 1 trading partner with Afghanistan
https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/AFG

Gul '19- peace talks for economic integration
https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/pakistan-afghanistan-vow-improve-strained-ties

ISLAMABAD - Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has begun a two-day official visit to Pakistan to pursue what aides say would be the normalization of the relationship between the two uneasy neighboring countries. The Afghan leader held delegation-level talks with Prime Minister Imran Khan shortly after arriving in Islamabad as the head of a large delegation comprising cabinet ministers, advisors and Afghan business community leaders. Khan's office said in a post-meeting statement the two leaders "agreed to open a new chapter of friendship and cooperation ...based on mutual trust and harmony for the benefit of the two peoples and countries and for advancing the cause of peace, stability and prosperity in the region." The discussions between the two delegations focused on strengthening mutual cooperation in a number of areas, including political, trade, economy, security, as well as peace and reconciliation efforts in Afghanistan, the statement noted.

Mehmoud '19- pak wants peace talks to be afghan led

https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Afghanistan-Pakistan-seek-to-stabilize-relations-594124

The talks between Khan and Ghani were part of a two-day official visit. Ghani was accompanied by cabinet ministers, top advisers, senior officials and prominent businesspeople. Also present were Afghani National Security Adviser Hamdullah Mohib, National Directorate of Security head Masoom Stanakzai and Acting Interior Minister Masud Andrabi. Khan "reaffirmed Pakistan's commitment to supporting the Afghan peace process as a shared responsibility," the statement continued. "He underlined that an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process was the only viable option to end the decades-long conflict in Afghanistan. In this regard, Pakistan supported a result-oriented intra-Afghan dialogue."

Biomass

Ewing, Jackson. "China's Foreign Energy Investments Can Swing Coal and Climate Future." *TheHill*, 5 Apr. 2019, thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/437564-chinas-foreign-energy-investments-can-swing-coal-and-climate. //TP

Coal plants are being planned or constructed in 14 countries with no current coal power to speak of, and in 19 countries where new coal plants would more than double coal-fired capacity. These plants could bring more than 860 gigawatts of new capacity online in the next 15 years, and risk putting global climate targets truly out of reach.

China Recession

Lo '19 – countries have already joined into funding the BRI in the status quo even though they haven't joined the BRI

Lo, Kinling. "From New Faces to New Funds, What has Changed in the Belt and Road Forum?" South China Morning Post. 25 Apr. 2019. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3007512/new-faces-new-funds-what-has-changed-belt-and-road-show //RJ

When the belt and road strategy was launched its primary sources of funds were the *China-led* Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the state-owned Silk Road Fund and the policy lenders China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China. But *as the value of its projects has grown into the hundreds of billions of US dollars and concerns about debt levels have also soared, Beijing has increasingly looked to new ways to finance its global ambitions*. Among the latest ideas is "third-party market cooperation" under which, as the name suggests, investments are shared by more than one nation. Despite the general lack of support for the belt and road scheme shown by the US and India, *since adopting the third-party cooperation approach China has signed deals with many of their traditional allies, including Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Japan, Singapore, Spain and the Netherlands. While these nations have not signed up for the belt and road scheme itself, they have agreed to co-fund infrastructure, technology and finance projects in third-party countries that have.* T**he advantage of this approach for Beijing is that it not only helps to mitigate the financial risk** but also creates a link between member and non-member countries under the belt and road umbrella.

Hedrick '18 - chinese debt is from China to China

Yuwa **Hedrick-Wong**. "The Myths About China's Economic Slowdown." Forbes. **18**. https://www.forbes.com/sites/yuwahedrickwong/2018/08/15/the-myths-about-chinas-economic-slowdown/#bcc82045d550. //SH

What is overlooked is the fact that virtually **all China's debt is domestic, and most of it is owed by state-owned enterprises to state-owned banks.** In other words, most debts are owed by one part of the government to another. Coupled with China's massive foreign reserves, **this makes a debt crisis like that of Greece impossible. China dealt with a worse debt situation in the 1990s by removing the banks' non-performing loans and recapitalizing the banks. In the worst case scenario, the government could do so again;** and today its fiscal power is stronger than in the 1990s.

Chinese firms are partnering with firms to manage risks currently

Stanley Jia, 2017,"Belt and Road: Opportunity and Risk," Baker McKenzie, https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/insight/publications/2017/10/belt-road/baker_mckenzie_belt_road_report_2017.pdf?la=en, accessed 7-31-2019 //TP

Foreign companies will also find opportunities to participate in BRI. For a start, **helping Chinese firms to manage their risks in the BRI region will be critical**, especially for the smaller SOEs and privately-owned firms that are unable to rely on strong government to government relationships to smooth over any issues. Moreover, **many Chinese firms are already partnering with reputable local and foreign partners to help win deals and manage risks.** Global players must similarly recognise that they do not need to start operating in all the BRI's 60+ markets, especially smaller, less stable countries, to participate in the initiative. More important are the BRI region's 10 major markets that account for 66% of the region's GDP, including India, Russia, Indonesia, Korea and Turkey. Most foreign companies are already active in these markets, meaning there is little change in strategy.

Wu- crowd out lowers growth by 2%

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2185905/china-puts-its-economy-risk-spurning-market-oriented-reforms-it?fbclid=IwAR0L5k0sEJzjcxIc4NLKJTm5RSqnWCjo-SAPj3Opkux84dOvqfHRNXmzy1Y

Lardy estimated that the deteriorating productivity of state-owned enterprises and the decrease in private investment reduced China's growth by an estimated 1.6 to 2.0 percentage points annually. "More than two-fifths of state firms persistently lose money," he noted in the book, adding that China's official data understates the losses of poorly performing state firms and non-performing loans, while overstating the profits of the successful state firms.

Huang- BRI crowds out private sector

https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/3011546/its-belt-and-road-projects-china-risks-falling-biggest-debt

Belt and Road Initiative will probably further strengthen China's state sector, thereby increasing one of the long-term threats to its economy. According to a study by the American Enterprise Institute, private firms accounted for only 28 percent of belt and road investments in the first half of 2018, down by 12 percentage points from the corresponding period of 2017. T**he belt and road project's massive scale, coupled with the lack of profitability of China's state sector, means that projects under the scheme may need substantial support from Chinese banks. Belt and road investments would then inevitably compete for funds — and increasingly precious foreign-exchange resources — with China's domestic private sector**, which already faces a high tax burden and the strains of the trade war with the US.2

Stephen Joske. "China's Coming Financial Crisis and the National Security Connection." War on the Rocks. 2018. https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/chinas-coming-financial-crisis-and-the-national-security-connection/. //SH

China's Belt and Road Initiative has never had a real economic base. It is all about power projection (such as the Gwadar port) **and would quickly be dropped by Beijing as a post-crisis China becomes focused on domestic political and economic stability.**

Greer '18 - geopolitical not economic due to political groups in China

Tanner Greer. "One Belt, One Road, One Big Mistake." Foreign Policy. 18. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/06/bri-china-belt-road-initiative-blunder/. //SH

Investment decisions often seem to be driven by geopolitical needs instead of sound financial sense. In South and Southeast Asia expensive port development is an excellent case study. **A 2016 CSIS report judged that none of the Indian Ocean port projects funded through the BRI have much hope of financial**

success. They were likely prioritized for their geopolitical utility. Projects less clearly connected to China's security needs have more difficulty getting off the ground: the research firm RWR Advisory Group notes that 270 BRI infrastructure projects in the region (or 32 percent of the total value of the whole) have been put on hold because of problems with practicality or financial viability. There is a vast gap between what the Chinese have declared they will spend and what they have actually spent.

This has not happened: one analysis of 173 BRI projects concluded that with the exception of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) "there appears to be no significant relationship between corridor participation and project activity... [suggesting that] **interest groups within and outside China are skewing President Xi's signature foreign policy vision."** This skew is an inevitable result of China's internal political system. BRI projects are not centrally directed. Instead, **lower state bodies like provincial and regional governments have been tasked with developing their own BRI projects. The officials in charge** of these projects **have no incentive to approve financially sound investments: by the time any given project materializes, they will have been transferred elsewhere. BRI projects are shaped first and foremost by the political incentives their planners face in China: There is no better way to signal one's loyalty to Xi than by laboring for his favored foreign-policy initiative.** From this perspective, the most important criteria for a project is how easily the BRI label can be slapped on to it.

EU Commission. "European Commission." 2019. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1872_en.htm?fbclid=IwAR0Y8R1_VyDvgkRGTmL8tD9ZMZa-_ibxlwJQaRqoSJcAyoVEdxYsYDq_L1U. //SH

[EU] Commission adopts €4 billion investment package for infrastructure projects across 10 Member States

The investment package involves Bulgaria, Czechia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Poland, Portugal and Romania. The projects cover a wide range of areas: health, transport, research, environment and energy. **With national co-financing, the total investment in these projects amounts to €8 billion.**

€33 million of EU funds will finance the construction of a 182-km cross-border gas interconnector between Komotini, Greece, and Stara Zagora, Bulgaria. The pipeline is a European Project of Common Interest, contributing to the objectives of the Energy Union. The two countries' gas systems will be linked for the first time, diversifying energy sources in the region and increasing energy security. With more competition on the gas market, consumers will enjoy lower prices. **Smoother road and rail connections on the Trans-European Transport Network in Czechia**

First, €76 million is financing upgrades on the rail corridor between Prague and Pilsen. Works include new or reconstructed tracks between Rokycany and Pilsen, shortening travel time by half on this section and reinforcing the attractiveness of Pilsen as a regional economic centre. Then, almost **€75 million is invested in a road from Nebory to Bystřice,** as part of a major link between the Czech D48 motorway and the Slovak D3 motorway.

China Heg Good

Steve **Inskeep**, 4-29-**2019**, "Why Is China Placing A Global Bet On Coal?," **NPR**.org, // AJ
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/29/716347646/why-is-china-placing-a-global-bet-on-coal

But **<u>facing overwhelming pollution levels, China has restrained the growth of its coal industry — at home.</u>** For many years, four huge electric power plants burned coal within the capital city, Beijing, contributing to the city's choking smog. But within the past four years, all four stopped burning coal. A visit by NPR on Saturday to one of the plants, the Huaneng Beijing thermal power station, showed that it now burns natural gas — still a contributor to climate change but overall considered cleaner.

<u>Yet China's overseas ventures include hundreds of electric power plants that burn coal, which is a significant emitter of carbon scientifically linked to climate change.</u> Edward Cunningham, a specialist on China and its energy markets at Harvard University, tells NPR that

In fact, **<u>China is building or planning more than 300 coal plants in places as widely spread as Turkey, Vietnam, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Egypt and the Philippines.</u>** Days before the forum with its "clean and green" theme, the latest Chinese-built coal plant opened in Pakistan. The plants are significant investments at a time when most nations of the world, including China, have committed to fighting climate change. "When you put money down and put steel into the ground for a coal-fired power plant," says Cunningham, "it's a 40- or 50-year commitment." In one sense, China's push for coal is not surprising: China knows how to build coal plants. It is the world's largest coal consumer, drawing more than 70 percent of its electricity from coal, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

Rivera '17 scmp- china bedrock of the un's functioning

Donald Trump's "America First" maxim leaves a vacuum on the global stage that China appears willing to fill, and the UN can serve China well in seizing that global leadership role. Just three days before Trump's inauguration, President Xi Jinping (习近平) sent an unequivocal message to a world distressed by the incoming US president's isolationist hyperbole. "We should adhere to multilateralism to uphold the authority and efficacy of multilateral institutions," Xi told the <u>World Economic Forum</u>. The following day, at the UN in Geneva, Xi urged the world to unite on issues ranging from the environment to terrorism, nuclear disarmament and development cooperation – signalling the UN as the natural venue to channel China's global ambitions. Secretary General António Guterres also emphasised China's crucial role in helping the UN deliver the Paris Agreement on climate change (now threatened by Trump) and halving global extreme poverty, a key goal largely achieved due to China's efforts at home. Beijing's enthusiasm for multilateralism comes as a relief to the UN, <u>faced with a bullish US</u> in the diplomatic arena, and potential draconian cuts to US contributions to UN funds. China's diplomatic objectives have usually been more focused on narrow geopolitical interests, as seen in its <u>rejection of last summer's Hague tribunal ruling</u> against some of its territorial claims in the South China Sea. Yet, it has recently become a bedrock of the UN's functioning. China is now the third-largest contributor to the UN's regular budget and the second-largest contributor to the peacekeeping budget, according to Washington's Centre for Strategic and International Studies.

<u>Hutchinson in '16</u>

https://www.tbwns.com/2016/08/22/bears-lair-multipolar-world-may-safest-best/

<u>With a multi-polar world, a power that engages in more than minor unjustified aggression risks bringing on itself the wrath of the other major powers. While any power is comparable in strength to any other single power, it is unable to face down a combination of powers, and hence deterrence is</u>

<u>achieved</u>. It appears that Vladimir Putin understands this; he is the enemy of Europe and the U.S. in Ukraine, where he is undertaking only "salami-slice" aggression, but the friend of Europe and the U.S. in Syria. There are two main dangers. First, a weak or naïve President could tempt Putin to an over-aggressive foray, for example into the Baltic states. Second, an over-aggressive President could turn Putin into a permanent enemy, perhaps pushing him to ally with China in an anti-American coalition and recreate a bipolar world. As Palmerston said in 1848, each power should have "no eternal allies, and no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." Long-term alliances like the Triple Entente of 1907 should thus be regarded as illegitimate, since they run the risk of turning a stable multi-polar world into a highly unstable and belligerent bipolar one.

Chinese 5G Development

Nayan **Chanda.** "Coming: Digital BRI – How China's growing 5G clout could soon enable it to play Big Brother to the world." Times of India Blog. **2019**. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/coming-digital-bri-how-chinas-growing-5g-clout-could-soon-enable-it-to-play-big-brother-to-the-world/. //SH

While the US keeps issuing warnings about the espionage risks of using Chinese 5G network equipment and the security threat posed by Huawei devices, China's telecom infrastructure projects keep growing. Despite the lamentations of a Cassandra-like Washington, Huawei and ZTE are acquiring access to larger markets making an end run around their Western rivals. Less visible than ports and railways of BRI, China's expanding control over the world's digital communications networks would give Beijing unparalleled influence. Its growing clout in surveillance tech, combined with its lead in developing superfast 5G, promises to make China a global tech challenger to the US. This significant development comes despite repeated American warnings that it might reconsider sharing sensitive intelligence with allies that allow Huawei to build 5G networks in their countries. Even the UK, which as a member of the "Five Eyes" intelligence sharing group (US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) once supported a tough stand against Huawei, has now decided to allow the firm to build parts of its 5G network. **<u>Major BRI partners don't even have an option: they are required to use only Chinese 5G suppliers</u>**, which hold 36% of all 5G patents worldwide.

Ever since the Digital Silk Road was launched in 2017, China has begun building up an "information expressway" of fibre optic cable links to Myanmar, Nepal and Kyrgyzstan. It plans to connect Africa to China by laying cables across the ocean from Pakistan which is being linked to China through its China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. China has offered help to countries as far away as Cuba, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey to advance cloud computing, big data, Internet of Things, and artificial intelligence (AI). China's advance as a digital connector and leading provider of 5G technology – which would form the backbone of autonomous vehicles, facial recognition technology, and AI – to an ever-growing number of developing countries raises the possibility that Chinese-style surveillance states will proliferate. **<u>Its ongoing efforts to harness AI to master big data and its ability to harvest vast amounts of such data from connected countries would give Beijing greater political influence</u>** than by merely constructing trade and transportation hubs.

<u>The export of surveillance technology would also add to the appeal of China's authoritarian political model and its iron-fisted internet governance style. Zambia, which entrusted China with building its internet infrastructure from ground up, has already parted from its former tradition of free press and censored dissidence.</u> Recent revelations by Human Rights Watch about how a Chinese mobile phone app has been developed to exercise "Big Brother" like control over the entire population of Xinjiang offered a real-life demonstration of China's digital prowess. **<u>China's advanced</u>**

facial recognition technology has also been deployed to track, monitor and apprehend suspected dissidents. Similarly, a New York Times investigation uncovered a surveillance system manufactured by Huawei and a **state-backed Chinese company being used in Ecuador to track individuals through their mobile phones. According to NYT, similar Chinese-systems are already being used in Venezuela, Bolivia, Angola and a dozen other countries. For years now, China's Great Firewall has demonstrated its ruthless efficiency in cutting off its internet from the outside world making irritating international news services and social media platforms disappear from China's web.** Though China loftily describes its Digital Silk Road as a "community of common destiny in cyberspace", its growing control over the cyberspace – its own and that of its partners – **would in fact allow Beijing to bend that common destiny towards the interests of its one-party rule.**

Use of Rare Earth Metals/Heavy Metals, Damaging to Mine (Hegg – IEEE)
Robin Hegg (IEEE). Issue 3. Published 2016. http://spark.ieee.org/2016-issue-3/the-internet-of-everything/.
While the IoT offers an amazing opportunity to increase energy efficiency and monitor the environment, the quick development of new semiconductor-rich devices also poses a large environmental challenge. **These devices often contain heavy metals and rare-earth metals that are very damaging to mine.** They are difficult to recycle properly and these rare-earth metals are infrequently recovered for reuse. S

Rem mining on hydrothermal vents
Alessandra Potenza, 17, (), "Deep-sea mining for rare metals threatens rare species", Verge, 10-3-2017, https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/3/16398518/deep-sea-mining-hydrothermal-vents-japan-precious-metals-rare-species, DOA-7-24-2019
As such, countries and mineral extraction companies all over the world have been gearing up for years to tap into these underwater treasure troves, which hold many of the rare elements key to power our smartphones and computers. The deposit mined by Japan is believed to contain an amount of zinc equivalent to the country's annual consumption, according to The Japan Times. (Japan consumed 470,121 metric tons of refined zinc in 2014, according to the US Geological Survey.) The ore also includes gold, copper, and lead.

Hydrothermal vents → "doomsday climatic event"
"Hydrothermal Vents methane seeps enormous." Phys. 2016/
https://phys.org/news/2016-05-hydrothermal-vents-methane-seeps-enormous.html
However, even as researchers learn more about their role in sustaining a healthy Earth, these habitats are being threatened by a wide range of human activities, including deep-sea mining, bottom trawling and energy harvesting, scientists say in a report published in Frontiers in Marine Science. Researchers from Oregon State University first discovered these strange, isolated worlds on the ocean bottom 40 years ago. These habitats surprised the scientific world with reports of hot oozing gases, sulfide chimneys, bizarre tube worms and giant crabs and mussels - life forms that were later found to eat methane and toxic sulfide. "It was immediately apparent that these hydrothermal vents were incredibly cool," said Andrew Thurber, an assistant professor in the OSU College of Earth, Ocean and Atmospheric Sciences, and co-author on the new report. "Since then we've learned that these vents and seeps are much more than just some weird fauna, unique biology and strange little ecosystems. Rather than being an anomaly, they are prevalent around the world, both in the deep ocean and shallower areas. They provide an estimated 13 percent of the energy entering the deep sea, make a wide range of marine life possible, and are major players in global climate." As fountains of marine life, the vents pour out gases and minerals, including sulfide, methane, hydrogen and iron - one of the limiting nutrients

in the growth of plankton in large areas of the ocean. In an even more important role, **the life forms in these vents and seeps consume 90 percent of the released methane and keep it from entering the atmosphere, where as a greenhouse gas it's 25 times more potent than carbon dioxide**. "We had no idea at first how important this ecological process was to [global climate]," Thurber said. "Through methane consumption, these [life forms] are literally saving the planet. **There is more methane on the ocean floor than there are other forms of fossil fuels left in the oceans, and if it were all released it would be a doomsday climatic event**." In reviewing the status of these marine geological structures and the life that lives around them, a group of researchers from 14 international universities and organizations have outlined what's been learned in the past four decades and what forces threaten these ecosystems today. The synthesis was supported by the J.M. Kaplan fund.

Deforestation

Deforestation inevitable

Howden, 5-14-12, Daniel, Common Dreams, "Deforestation: The Hidden Cause of Global Warming," http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/05/14/1175,

Indonesia became the third-largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world last week. Following close behind is Brazil. **Neither nation has heavy industry on a comparable scale with the EU, India or Russia and yet they comfortably outstrip all other countries**, except the United States and China. **What both countries do have in common is tropical forest that is being cut and burned with staggering swiftness**. Smoke stacks visible from space climb into the sky above both countries, while satellite images capture similar destruction from the Congo basin, across the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic and the Republic of Congo. According to the latest audited figures from 2003, two billion tons of CO_2 enters the atmosphere every year from deforestation. That destruction amounts to 50 million acres - or an area the size of England, Wales and Scotland felled annually. The remaining standing forest is calculated to contain 1,000 billion tons of carbon, or double what is already in the atmosphere. As the GCP's report concludes: "If we lose forests, we lose the fight against climate change." **Standing forest was not included in the original Kyoto protocols and stands outside the carbon markets** that the report from the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) pointed to this month as the best hope for halting catastrophic warming. The landmark Stern Report last year, and the influential McKinsey Report in January agreed that forests offer the "single largest opportunity for cost-effective and immediate reductions of carbon emissions". International demand has driven intensive agriculture, logging and ranching that has proved an inexorable force for deforestation; ***conservation has been no match for commerce***. The leading rainforest scientists are now calling for the immediate inclusion of standing forests in internationally regulated carbon markets that could provide cash incentives to halt this disastrous process. Forestry experts and policy makers have been meeting in Bonn, Germany, this week to try to put deforestation on top of the agenda for the UN climate summit in Bali, Indonesia, this year. Papua New Guinea, among the world's poorest nations, last year declared it would have ***no choice*** but to continue deforestation **unless it was given financial incentives to do otherwise.**

In less forested areas, BRI won't have a bad impact

Losos, Elizabeth. "The deforestation risks of China's Belt and Road Initiative." The Brookings Institute. 1/28/19//SSK

A cursory evaluation of the distribution of forest cover change within these corridors has provided a preliminary indication of areas most vulnerable to one of the most consequential environmental risks: deforestation. Because satellite data of forest cover are not that difficult to obtain, forest cover loss (deforestation) is commonly used as a proxy for a range of environmental impacts on biodiversity, carbon storage, water provision, and other eco-services. Map 1, created by our colleague Andrew Jacobson, shows the forest cover in the BRI's geographic realm.There are six main economic corridors of the belt component of the BRI (Map 2). Putting Maps 1 and 2 together indicates that deforestation risks are especially high in Southeast Asia. Looking more closely would reveal vulnerable areas along the other corridors as well. To assess deforestation risks along the BRI economic corridors, there are at least three landscape settings, which should be distinguished by their levels of prior development and prior forest loss: Landscape Setting 1: High deforestation and high prior economic development**. In the most economically developed and often deforested regions, little natural forest remains to be cleared. Hence, minimal forest impact is expected from BRI transport projects within these areas. It is even possible that lowered transport costs could lead to rural transformations that results in reforestation, such as through tree plantations.**

Roads increase trees empiric

Kaczan, David. "Can roads contribute to forest transitions?" The World Bank Group. 4/17/17//SSK

Consideration of institutional heterogeneity is not currently part of this analysis, although this omission should not threaten identification. Over the last 30 years, India's forest policies have featured devolution of state power through joint forest management, state-driven reforestation programs, and restitution of forest rights, among other large-scale initiatives (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2016; Kumar and Kerr, 2012; Mather, 2007). Road impacts are almost certainly modified by the legacy of differential implementation of these programs across regions. In addition, new roads likely facilitate policy implementation. Roads may allow for better enforcement of state property rights, or improved state support for local enforcement of community rights, through improved access for forest officers (Ghate et al., 2009). Alternatively, increased access could lead to conflict over previously isolated resources. The institutional setting, such as the tenure regime under which different forests are managed, is also likely to modify the road-forest relationship. Open-access forests face increasing pressure under higher forest products prices. Commonly-held forests face similar pressures but not necessarily the same outcome: improved collective action that conserves forest may be incentivized under these conditions (Agrawal and Yadama, 1997). Private property rights, meanwhile, should allow landowners to capitalize on increasing forest products prices, encouraging the protection of existing forests or the establishment of new plantations (Robinson et al., 2013). Some of these institutional considerations will be the focus of future analysis. **These empirics first suggest that** at least part of **the rise in India's tree cover, and thus India's forest transition, can be attributed to the construction of new roads in rural settings. I estimate a positive causal impact for India overall, on the order of 0.6 to 1.2 percent relative to baseline tree cover, above underlying trends across the study period (2000-14).** While previous studies provided indirect or theoretical support for the possibility of positive road impacts (Deng et al., 2011; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2003), this is the first direct evidence of such to my knowledge. While small in absolute terms, these estimates of positive tree cover outcomes from new roads apply to a relatively short period. Should trends continue the impact of the program would compound over time. I note, however, that countervailing general equilibrium effects could mitigate the long-term impact24 . Regardless of the specific magnitude, this positive average treatment effect runs contrary to the conventional wisdom that new roads drive deforestation. This is not to say that the previous understanding, based on substantial empirical evidence and well-developed theory, is erroneous, or that concern regarding the environmental impact of road construction (e.g. Caro et al., 2014; Laurance et al., 2014b) is unfounded. Nor does it mean that the net provision of environmental services must be positive from expanded tree cover, even in this study location25 . Instead, the results simply demonstrate that particular settings, which have not been the subject of much prior scholarship, can give rise to positive road impacts, raising the possibility that improved spatial targeting of roads can not only avoid environmental costs but also deliver environmental benefits. I present evidence regarding the nature of settings in which this occurs in my heterogeneity analysis. The fact that I observe negative road impacts in frontier-like settings helps reconcile my results with the broader deforestation literature, which has focused on frontier-like settings (primarily in central and South America). However, in India, where forest cover is rising overall, negative road impacts on frontier settings are outweighed by positive road impacts in other settings.

Decreases deforestation in places with strong protection rules

"INFRASTRUCTURE." AIDDATA. 2019//SSK

https://www.aiddata.org/infrastructure

AidData and its research collaborators have undertaken a series of geospatial impact evaluations (GIEs) to provide decision-makers with new insights regarding infrastructure projects and their effects on deforestation and biodiversity. One of these studies discovered that World Bank projects subjected to the organization's most stringent environmental safeguards do not damage local ecosystems. When mitigable environmental risks are identified at the project preparation stage, the study finds that World Bank projects can even reduce deforestation in nearby areas. Another GIE measured the forest cover impacts of Chinese-funded infrastructure projects in Cambodia and Tanzania, finding that **while these investments accelerate deforestation in areas with weak forest protection rules, they actually slow deforestation in areas with strong forest protection rules.**

Diversionary War

No empirical backing for diversionary wars - study of over 30,000 diplomatic actions over 60 years

Baggott, Erin. "Diversionary Cheap Talk." ISAC. March 2014//SK

This study tests the diversionary aggression hypothesis that domestic discontent breeds aggression abroad in US foreign policy between 1945 and 2006. **It is based on a new, day-level event dataset of over 30,000 US diplomatic actions between 1945 and 2006, drawn from a new corpus of all 1.3 million New York Times articles on interstate affairs, 1851-2011**. I theorize and confirm that a coalitionary diversion effect exists, with Democratic administrations responding to economic pain faced by labor interests. Republicans do not divert, in keeping with recent findings on differential partisan responsiveness to constituent opinion. **Diversion takes the form of increased verbal but not material conflict. Verbal conflict boosts presidential job approval ratings, whereas material conflict does not. I conclude that diversionary cheap talk allows presidents to garner the public opinion boost from rally around the flag effects without paying the cost of war**. These findings advance the literature on the domestic and institutional explanations for foreign policy.

Econ decline doesn't cause wars

Davis, Christina. "Cooperation in Hard Times." Journal of Conflict Resolution. June 2016//SK

Coordination, since all these instruments of trade protection fall within the letter of the law. Future research should explore trade policy at the micro level to identify which pathway is the most important for coordination. Research at a more macro-historical scope could compare how countries respond to crises under fundamentally different institutional contexts. In sum, the determinants of protection include economic downturns not only at home but also abroad. **Rather than reinforcing pressure for protection, pervasive crisis in the global economy is shown to generate countervailing pressure for restraint in response to domestic crisis. In some cases, hard times bring more, not less, international Cooperation**. Acknowledgment We would like to thank Raymond Hicks and Jason Weinreb for valuable research assistance and Kosuke Imai for advice on

EU FDI

Hanemann, Thilo. "Chinese FDI in Europe: 2018 trends and impact of new screening policies." Mercator Institute for China Studies. 19. https://www.merics.org/en/papers-on-china/chinese-fdi-in-europe-2018. //SH

The "Big Three" EU economies received the lion's share of investment. The United Kingdom (UK) (EUR 4.2 billion), Germany (EUR 2.1 billion) and France (EUR 1.6 billion) continue to receive the most attention, but their share in total Chinese FDI declined from 71 percent in 2017 to 45 percent in 2018. Two newcomers made it to the top five list (Sweden and Luxembourg), propping up the relative shares of Northern Europe and Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (Benelux) in total investment.

Ernst and Young '19

https://www.ey.com/en_gl/news/2019/06/prolonged-geopolitical-and-economic-uncertainty-see-foreign-direct-investment-into-europe-drop-for-the-first-time-in-six-years //NT

Foreign direct investment (FDI) projects into Europe dropped 4% (to 6,356 projects) over the year according to the EY European Attractiveness survey. Despite the decline in FDI into Europe for the first time in six years, the level of investment remains the second-highest since EY began compiling this data in 2000. However, investor sentiment is gloomy, with only 37% of surveyed businesses foreseeing an improvement in Europe's attractiveness in the next three years, down from 50% last year.

The technology sector, however, is bucking this downward trend, as the number of FDI projects surge to a record high of 1,227 in 2018 (up 5% year-on-year). Growth was mainly driven by US businesses, which accounted for 37% of the digital FDI projects in Europe last year. FDI was also strong in Europe's traditional industrial sectors: the combined number of FDI projects in the transport, machinery and chemicals industries increased 4% to 1,729 projects in 2018.Andy Baldwin, EY EMEIA Area Managing Partner and EY Global Managing Partner – Client Service-elect, says:"While the size and diversity of Europe's market continues to make it attractive among global investors, **we are now seeing the impact of Brexit and other political and economic uncertainty as inv5ates**. **The UK's historical competitive advantage in FDI has been eroded over the last three years largely due to Brexit, which means that thousands of new jobs have not been created.** While competitive advantages remain, such as a flexible labor market and the rule of law, the persistent uncertainty experienced over the last three years is turning investors elsewhere as they are no longer willing to take a 'wait-and-see approach' on Brexit negotiations.

Greer '18 – Only 8% Chinese FDI goes to developing BRI nations, rest goes elsewhere

Tanner Greer. "One Belt, One Road, One Big Mistake." Foreign Policy. 18. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/06/bri-china-belt-road-initiative-blunder/. //SH

This reality helps explain the coolness with which private investors have treated the initiative. Despite stringent capital controls on non-BRI investment, only 12 percent of Chinese foreign direct investment has been directed to the countries participatinFg in the Belt and Road Initiative (and one third of that goes to the developed economies of South Korea, Israel, and Singapore). Government calls for participation from international partners and private investment have been ignored: large state-owned enterprises and government policy provide more than 95 percent of BRI funding. BRI is not a brand investors trust.

EU Splintering/Collapse

EU is becoming more unified

Kathleen McNamara, Washington Post, "Despite the Brexit chaos, Europe did not collapse like dominoes - The Washington Post", April 12, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/12/despite-brexit-chaos-europe-did-not-collapse-like-dominoes/?utm_term=.d191e8d2cd95

Michel Barnier, the European Commission's chief Brexit negotiator, has proved an effective advocate for the E.U. while the European Council, a heterogeneous group of the EU27 national leaders from all over the political spectrum led by Polish President Donald Tusk, has acted together throughout the process. Moreover, **recent polls across the other 27 E.U. members show steadily growing support for the E.U. Populist parties no longer talk about exiting but rather reforming the E.U. from within. They seek not to renationalize politics but reorganize in a Pan-European political movement.**

Even far-right EU parties support EU now after seeing Brexit; just want internal reform

Chico **Harlan, Washington Post**, March 29, **2019** ["Frexit? Italeave? After watching Brexit, other European countries say: No, thanks.", https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/frexit-italeave-after-watching-brexit-other-european-countries-say-no-thanks/2019/03/29/7b6e059a-4be0-11e9-8cfc-2c5d0999c21e_story.html 7-22-2019] klw

But the 2016 Brexit vote has spawned no copycats. Nor did it lead to the crack-up of the European Union. **Even the most ardent Brussels-bashing politicians have concluded it's better to stick with the bloc than endure a messy, years-long divorce.** On Friday, the day Britain was supposed to leave the E.U. and "take back control," the British Parliament was still fighting over how and whether to leave. Lawmakers rejected, for the third time, the withdrawal deal negotiated between Prime Minister Theresa May and E.U. leaders. The pound fell on fears that Britain will abruptly crash out of the bloc on April 12, with massive disruptions to trade and travel. **Even if Britain manages an orderly departure, forecasts predict that Brexit could dampen economic growth for years**. And the political and social divisions between "leavers" and "remainers" may persist. **Watching all this, the continent's influential euroskeptic parties — from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean — have quietly recast their message. They've dropped calls to leave the E.U. and are instead advocating for the less drastic approach of changing the bloc from within.** The European political scene has scarcely a party remaining advocating for a Brexit-style departure. "There has been a shift, definitely a shift," Stephen K. Bannon, a former White House chief strategist who consults with nationalist parties in Europe, said in an interview. "The agony of Britain in the last two years has clearly been a subtext for, let's try to make this thing work" within Europe. The shift doesn't mean the E.U. has averted turmoil, nor that Europe's political insurgents are happy with the status quo. Europe's class of populists and nationalists — a mix of ruling parties and clamorous outside voices on both the left and right — remain buoyed by discontent over low economic growth, migration and perceived imperiousness of E.U. elites. Those populists want to decentralize power within the European Union and are hoping to use European parliamentary elections in May to expand their influence and carry out their ideas. But **even as Europeans find reason to grumble about the bloc, voters don't seem to have the appetite for an irrevocable split, and in fact some have grown fonder of the European Union. The E.U.'s approval rating increased sharply in 2017, as Britain began to debate the terms of its exit**. A new Pew Research Center survey of 10 European nations shows that **62 percent of people hold a favorable view of the E.U.** A separate poll from last year showed that 67 percent of Europeans believed their country benefited from E.U. membership — the highest figure in 35 years. "**You had the Brexit referendum. Also the Trump election,**" said Stefan Lehne, a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels. "I**t created a lot of fear and uncertainty, and the response [from Europeans] was, we want the known over the unknown.**" From Hungary to Sweden, Germany to Italy, euroskeptic politicians are now trying to figure out just how much of a mandate they might have to upend Europe's norms. It's not as clear a calculus as it had been. The reasons to stick with Europe go beyond a distaste for Brexit redux. A significant number of **Europeans, even those who support euroskeptic parties, appreciate the freedom of movement allowed by E.U. rules and the ability to live in other countries**. **They also like the outsized influence of the unified bloc,** which makes it easier for countries to contend with China and the United States. For now, som**e parties have simply dropped exit-the-E.U. plans from their platforms.** Others have made concessions or adapted after political setbacks. In Austria, the Freedom Party abandoned calls for a euro referendum before joining another party in a coalition government. In France, nationalist leader Marine Le Pen called in her 2017 campaign for a referendum on eurozone membership and badly lost an election to Emmanuel Macron. Now, she speaks instead of a "Europe of nations" that works better for its members.

EU Stimulus

Ross '19 - no correlation infra to econ gains, studies reverse causal

Sean Ross. "Can Infrastructure Spending Really Stimulate the Economy?." Investopedia. 19. https://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/080816/can-infrastructure-spending-really-stimulate-economy.asp. //SH

Economics, as a science, struggles to produce convincing empirical results. It is difficult to find solid, demonstrable evidence about how effective changes in infrastructure spending have been. In a 2014 working paper for the International Monetary Fund (IMF), **economist Andrew M. Warner found little evidence that global infrastructure projects produced economic gains. Even when projects received credit for growth, Warner found that the economy was already improving at a similar rate by the time construction began.**

Green Tech

Fitch Solutions, July 2018, "Belt And Road: Coal Power Exports To Remain Key Focus," Fitch Solutions, https://www.fitchsolutions.com/corporates/utilities-power/belt-and-road-coal-power-exports-remain-key-focus-31-07-2018?fSWebArticleValidation=true&mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiWWpSaE1UWTRabU5tWm1VMiIsInQiOiJWaUdUak4wUzhQUVpCNDlseEZxM2ZcL1lUdlwvRHVLOERmR0VcL2RcL1dKZFlcL2t1QTZpRXdiempSV0wwTXNtbnc1WTRGa2JSZThMNDNlcmtpYTRwU0ZtTFdLYktLQzY2YWFNZ09yYkxBZHlNbTlCMU5ENmsydk9VQ3JVT2U4U2xSUnVoIn0%3D, accessed 9-6-2019 //TP

China's footprint in the global power sector will grow substantially under the Belt and Road Initiative, as recipient countries will aim to attract Chinese investment to boost electrification levels while China seeks to export domestic power sector overcapacity. Coal will remain the core power technology export, which will lead to greater international scrutiny into China's carbon emissions reductions efforts. Coal and hydropower projects dominate the BRI power project pipeline, **making up 80GW** and 48GW of the total respectively. **The two technologies have a relatively low levelised cost of electricity, which makes them attractive to recipient countries, while China also sits on substantial expertise in delivering projects.** The average size of coal projects is 955MW, while hydropower projects average a size of 780MW, in many cases making these projects big-ticket prestige projects in the countries where they are being developed. For example, the 7,100MW Bunji hydropower project in Pakistan, the 6,000MW Muyitsone dam in Myanmar and the 4,320MW Duyen Hai coal-fired power generation complex in Vietnam all go under the BRI, and will boost power generation in these markets substantially if implemented. **Coal-fired power will remain a key component of the BRI over the coming**

decade, as China seeks to export overcapacity as domestic expansion stagnates, while markets such as Indonesia, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Pakistan all look to China to finance and develop cheap coal plants (see 'Coal Power To Stagnate As Alternatives Surge', March 20). While this will lead to greater scrutiny of Chinese carbon emission reduction aspirations, we believe the exports of coal technology to be a key bridging strategy to provide growth opportunities for companies active in China's coal power sector that face the closure of excess coal generation capacity and further sector consolidation (see 'Quick View: Coal Power Consolidation Under Way, More To Follow', August 9 2017).

Parnell '19 - China end support for greentech in 2018

John **Parnell**. "China: No Wind Or Solar If It Can't Beat Coal On Price." Forbes. 2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnparnell/2019/01/10/china-no-wind-or-solar-if-it-aint-as-cheap-as-coal/#bdf02df3e2f6. //SH

Beijing pulled the plug on support for large solar projects, which had been receiving a per kWh payment, in late May. That news came immediately after the country's largest solar industry event and caught everyone by surprise.

FDI Good

(Karen Baker – Economic Policy Institute)

Karen Baker (Economic Policy Institute). DOES FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT CROWD OUT DOMESTIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP. Accessed 2/15/2017. Published 5/12/2013. http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/618.pdf.

The results in table 3 support the hypothesis that international competition hinders the formation of domestic entrepreneurs. The negative and significant coefficients of IMPGROWTH and FORENTRY clearly suggest that **import competition and the inflow of FDI have a negative effect on the entry of domestic entrepreneurs. Strong import competition causes prices to fall on product markets and discourages domestic entrepreneurs to enter the shrinking the domestic market.** The immediate negative effect of import competition on domestic entry is -0.091 (-0.099*0.921) while the total effect through the partial adjustment process is -0.131 (-0.099*0.921/0.695). The negative effect of foreign entry is significantly larger, suggesting that **the inflow of FDI impedes the entry of domestic entrepreneurs because of stronger competition on the product market as well as skimming off the (best) workers on the labor market.** The immediate effect of foreign entry is -0.214 (= -0,237*0,921), while the total response of domestic entry on foreign entry is -0.702 (= -0,237*0,921/0,305). As the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities, **an extra FDI inflow of 10% would then cause**, ceteris paribus, **the entry rate of domestic firms to fall with 7% in the long run**. The insignificant coefficient of FOREXIT suggests that new domestic firms do not easily replace foreign firms leaving Belgium.

The results for the domestic exit-equation also support the crowding out effect of domestic firms by foreign firms and to a lesser extent by import competition. The positive coefficient of FORENTRY demonstrates that **the inflow of FDI forces domestic entrepreneurs to exit, because of lower prices on product markets and/or higher wages on the labor market** (encouraging domestic entrepreneurs to become wage workers). The positive albeit insignificant coefficient of FOREXIT in this equation may reflect that the exit of foreign firms directly results in the exit of domestic supplying/buying firms, however further evidence is necessary in order to validate this explanation.

TURN: 97% of Chinese FDI is M&A

Sophie **Meunier.** "BEWARE OF CHINESE BEARING GIFTS: Why China's Direct Investment Poses Political Challenges in Europe and the United States" **Oxford** University Press. **2018.** Accessed: 7/8/19.
https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/smeunier/files/meunier_beware_of_chinese_bearing_gifts_100517.pdf

Finally, the nature of the investment deals initially made by Chinese companies increased the public spotlight. In general, greenfield investment is seen as more innocuous and less politically problematic than mergers and acquisitions. **Yet the vast majority of Chinese investment in Europe and the U.S. , at least in the early years, were takeovers. In 2016, acquisitions drove 97% of the value of FDI activity in Europe** and the U.S.10 These are more likely to touch off opposition, no matter what the origin of the investment is.

THIS HAS TWO IMPLICATIONS

1. M&A's increase prices 15-50% because monopolization

Bruce A. Blonigenjustin R. **Pierce Harvard** Business Review "Mergers May Be Profitable, but Are They Good for the Economy?" 11-15-**2016** 7-8-2019
https://hbr.org/2016/11/mergers-may-be-profitable-but-are-they-good-for-the-economy?

On average, we find that mergers do not have a discernible effect on productivity and efficiency. Specifically, we do not find evidence for plant-level productivity changes, nor do we find evidence for the consolidation of administrative activities that is often cited as a way in which mergers yield lower costs through economies of scale. We also don't find evidence that merged firms are more likely to close down less-efficient plants. **By contrast, we find substantial average increases in the amount that firms mark up prices over cost following a merger, ranging from 15% to over 50%, depending on the control group we use.**

2. **M&A's reduce labor demand 7.9% in Europe because less competition**

Oxford Analytica Forbes "Mergers And Unemployment" 02-08-**2010** 7-8-2019
https://www.forbes.com/2010/02/07/mergers-acquisitions-layoffs-jobs-business-oxford.html

Numbers reveal different effects of M&A on employment in different countries. According to a study economists Klaus Guglerand and Burcin Yurtoglu published in 2004 in the International Journal of Industrial Organization: --in the United States there was no systematic evidence of employment losses in M&A; **--in continental Europe, M&A diminished labor demand by 7.9%; and** --in the United Kingdom, M&A have an even more serious effect, provoking a 12.4% reduction in labor demand. Europe's large employment losses vis-a-vis the United States can be explained in terms of more rigid employment protection laws. However, the fact that employees in the United Kingdom run a higher risk of being dismissed after a merger than their continental European counterparts is, in part, explainable in terms of its less rigid labor market. These studies typically concentrate on short-term losses. They cannot fully account for longer-term impacts, and it is impossible to know what would have happened to employment in firms taken over had they not been bought.

Health Silk Road

Chinese aid sends fake Drugs in Africa

Kathleen E. McLaughlin, 2012, "China's Aid in Africa: Good Intentions Mix with Bad Drugs," Pulitzer Center, https://pulitzercenter.org/projects/chinas-aid-africa-good-intentions-mix-bad-drugs

While China's health programs, **hospitals and medical teams often do provide access to life-saving drugs, vaccines and medical care in Africa and Southeast Asia, problems in the supply chain are already affecting global health in negative ways. Fake drugs threaten** China's image in Africa and, more importantly, **the health of African people who have been making incremental gains thanks to global aid programs.** The issue has been touched on primarily in academic reports, but there has been little serious investigative reporting about how China's health aid is influencing Africa. Focussing on fake malaria pills, Kathleen McLaughlin traveled to Tanzania and Uganda, two of the countries worst-plagued by the parasite, given their borders on Great Lake Victoria – the world's second-largest lake and home to some of the world's deadliest mosquitoes. **The fake pills are, quite simply, everywhere.** Nearly everyone has a story about fake medications, mostly malaria pills. Because **government hospitals are overloaded and corruption makes drugs go missing from official supplies, thousands of people turn to the local pharmacy and buy potentially life-saving drugs when they get the hallmark malarial fever. But in many cases – up to one third of the time – those drugs are fake.** The parasite lives on and, when the drugs contain half-strength of partial active ingredients, the parasite can potentially become resistant to real treatment. The scientists studying this problem do not shy away from calling it a crisis. The question now is whether governments, NGOs and medical teams can amass the will to fight it. It will take serious collaboration and a commitment from the countries where these drugs are made. The proof is limited at this stage, but most signs point to China. While India's government has rejected the accusations that it is the source, **China has remained largely silent on whether its factories are sending fake pills to Africa. Turning the tide and changing China's image there will take more than just words.**

Xiaoyuan **Qu**. "Consumption of antibiotics in Chinese public general tertiary hospitals (2011-2014): Trends, pattern changes and regional differences." PubMed Central (PMC). 2018. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5933762/. //SH

China has a high rate of antibiotic use. The Chinese Ministry of Health (MOH) established the Center for Antibacterial Surveillance (CAS) to monitor the use of antibacterial agents in hospitals in 2005. The purpose of this study was to identify trends, pattern changes and regional differences in antibiotic consumption in 151 public general tertiary hospitals across China from 2011–2014.

Jessica **Coates**. "Antibiotic-induced population fluctuations and stochastic clearance of bacteria." PubMed Central (PMC). 2018. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5847335/. //SH

The frequent failure of antibiotic treatments is a serious public health threat. A recent study projects treatment failures caused by antibiotic resistance will lead to 300 million deaths and a healthcare burden of $100 trillion by 2050 (O'Neill, 2016). This epidemic is further exacerbated by our inability to reliably eradicate antibiotic-susceptible bacteria. For example, **antibiotic treatments of infections caused by antibiotic-susceptible bacteria never achieve a success rate of 100%**, often failing to eradicate them unexpectedly (Doern and Brecher, 2011; Weidner et al., 1999; Gopal et al., 1976; Ficnar et al., 1997; Forrest et al., 1993). To design effective treatments and avoid antibiotic failure, there is a strong need to better understand the dynamics of bacterial populations exposed to antibiotics.

Chinese Health Policies bad; not beneficial to export to world

Political Insights, 8-2-2018, "One Belt, One Road, One Health," https://politicalinsights.org/2018/08/02/one-belt-one-road-one-health/

Despite the moderate progress made in preventing and controlling AIDS, HIV is not the only communicable threat to China and Chinese global health diplomacy. **Chinese efforts to rebrand the country's public and global health reputation suffered a series of hits in July 2018. After the European Medicines Agency confirmed that valsartan-containing drugs by Zhejiang Huahai Pharmaceuticals were tainted with impurity,** it triggered a series of international recalls. **An investigation into Changchun Changsheng Life Sciences Limited found evidence that the company had illegally produced rabies vaccines for human use.** Furthermore, **reports revealed that the diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis vaccine produced by Changchun Changsheng and subsidized by the government had been of substandard quality.** Beyond pharmaceutical companies' fraudulent actions, t**he public sector also proved to be lacking in regulatory implementation after a UPI report revealed that Chinese disease control centers had begun using syringes filled with water instead of vaccines to meet the public vaccination needs.** With vaccine and drug products usually undergoing the toughest standards, tests and regulations, the events of the past few weeks demonstrate **China's inability to provide not only health care quality but basic do-no-harm guarantee**. **Chinese authorities' failure on public health level puts a question mark behind Xi Jinping's pledges of action in the context of BRI and poses a challenge for the WHO and the international community in finding an approach to effectively utilize all provided resources while assuring the quality of the provided aid.**

China no solvency for root cause

Political Insights, 8-2-2018, "One Belt, One Road, One Health," https://politicalinsights.org/2018/08/02/one-belt-one-road-one-health/

Adopting a deductive approach and starting with the challenges within the country, China now has a 95% population coverage of basic health insurance and has achieved a 40-fold increase of its total health expenditure (5.6%) over the past two decades. However, looking forward, a particularly relevant aspect to be considered are the societal and cultural dynamics among the Chinese population. **Despite the implementation of three five-year action plans for HIV/AIDS prevention and control, the virus and the circumstances around acquiring an HIV infection remain a significant public health problem.** Furthermore, as the mindset regarding premarital sexual intercourse is evolving among the younger generation, HIV incidence especially in the population group aged 15-24 years increases. **HIV diagnoses in this age cohort have doubled between 2008 and 2015 and the upsurge can be partially ascribed to the lack of sexual health education.** Even with HIV testing being made more accessible, the risks of the increasing number of young people getting infected exceed the potential economic losses due to employment inactivity and health care costs. **Stigmatization and institutionalized discrimination remain at the heart of problem in preventing and controlling HIV spread.**

Chen '19 - BRI increase spread of diseases and hurts poor.

Jin Chen. "Combating infectious disease epidemics through China's Belt and Road Initiative." PLOS. 2019.

https://journals.plos.org/plosntds/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0007107&type=printable. //SH

The world is currently witnessing increasingly complex epidemics as well as natural disasters with a rising impact on both human health and the economy [1]. Growing commercial trade and more frequent personal exchange following the implementation of the BRI may amplify infectious disease transmission or inadvertently introduce emerging infectious diseases, leading to an increased burden for local medical systems. Moreover, infectious diseases resulting from poverty disproportionately affect poor and marginalised communities, which remains a more serious hurdle to achieving the SDGs and UHC [9, 10]. This is the reason why the initiative has made the need to combat infectious diseases a priority for social and economic development. The implementation of the BRI is expected to facilitate progress in eliminating infectious diseases such as the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), tuberculosis (TB), malaria, and 17 neglected tropical diseases (NTDs), which make up SDG 3.3. It has also gained the support of WHO, which has proposed a strategic cooperation with the BRI [5, 6, 11]. Taking the opportunities provided by this initiative, action for combating the diseases will be conducted through the sharing of information and experience and cooperative disease control programmes, including interventions and research innovation [5]. It will also mediate resources including the building of medical infrastructures, funding support, training of staff, and delivery of emergency healthcare [1, 10, 12]. The initiative provides guidance for stronger health collaboration, which should hopefully break the vicious cycle of poverty and infectious disease [13].

Infrastructure

UN '18- must reform econ with infrastructure for success

https://unctad.org/en/pages/PressRelease.aspx?OriginalVersionID=471

The report states that **bankability**, ironically, **will not close the financing gaps for economic infrastructure investment whose total annual financing needs**, according to recent estimates, range between $4.6 trillion and $7.9 trillion at the global level and sectoral level, and require increased public spending. As important, the b**ankability approach avoids the key question of how infrastructure can become a force of productivity-enhancing structural transformation and deliver much needed economic and social change in most of the developing world**. In fact, the report states, **most developing countries must double current investment levels in infrastructure projects** of less than 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to around 6 per cent, **if there is to be any transformational impact**. In Latin America and the Caribbean, infrastructure investment needs have been estimated at 6.2 percent against actual spending of 3.2 percent of the region's GDP in 2015. In Africa, projected needs are estimated to be around 5.9 per cent of the region's GDP in 2016–2040, as against the current figure of 4.3 per cent. In Asia, both current and projected investment needs in 2016–2030 are estimated at around 5 percent of GDP. The report calls for a clearer, **bottom-up approach to infrastructure investment that places it at the centre of national developmental strategies. This requires a mixture of political ambition, policy experimentation and planning discipline.** However, the report states, bold endeavours with calculated risk-taking and a future outlook are hardly met by projects that aim to generate revenues over their life cycles to ensure only returns on investment

Free Trade Agreements

Hillman '19// China's focused on bilateral deals no multilateral agreements, a BRI wide trade agreement is impossible because different regulations among countries

"China's Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later." *China's Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later | Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 18 July 2019, www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-five-years-later-0. Accessed 23 July 2019. //TP

Trade agreements could provide that upgrade, and they have been placed under the BRI banner as well. Chinese officials have described a network of free trade agreements that would support the BRI, but to date, China appears primarily focused on bilateral trade deals.13 **Given the diverse list of countries participating in the BRI, a BRI-wide trade agreement is highly unlikely. While lowering barriers between China and individual markets, additional bilateral deals could further complicate a web of rules that firms struggle to navigate, as could the 130 transportation agreements that China says it has concluded with BRI participants.14 Neither of these efforts has the trade-promoting potential of a high-standard regional agreement or a truly multilateral effort.**

Herrero '16// EU members wouldn't be allowed to join BRI FTA

Alicia Garcia Herrero. China's Belt and Road initiative: can Europe expect trade gains?. 2016. https://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/WP-05-2016.pdf //TP

Figure 7 shows the five biggest winners from the establishment of a free trade agreement within the Belt and Road area, and compares their trade gains with those obtained from reduced transportation costs. The biggest winners are Middle Eastern and central and east Asian countries, with trade increases of more than 15 percent. This compares favourably with the trade gains of 3 percent stemming from a reduction in transportation costs that were estimated for this group of economies. EU countries, whose trade gains were the largest under the reduced transportation cost scenario, would now experience weak losses. **The result is intuitive, because the EU countries would be outside the Belt and Road free trade agreement, so EU trade would be expected to be substituted to some extent by enhanced trade within the Belt and Road region. This is true even for EU countries formally included in the Belt and Road initiative, such as Hungary and Poland. This is because EU members cannot strike separate trade agreements with China, so they could not take part in a potential Belt and Road free trade agreement (Table 1).**

Trade Infrastructure

USCNPM '17 – Most of China infrastructure is net lossmaking, only 28% genuinely economically productive, costs outweigh

US-China Perception Monitor. "China's Addiction to Unproductive Infrastructure." 17. https://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2017/07/07/chinas-addiction-unproductive-infrastructure/. //SH

But are China's infrastructure and other fixed asset investments actually productive drivers of economic growth? Researchers at the University of Oxford find that *in over half of China's infrastructure investments, the costs of the projects have been greater than the benefits generated. Only 28% of the infrastructure projects were "genuinely economically productive." Economists* at the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China's top economic regulatory agency, *have also observed high waste and inefficiency in China's fixed asset investments.*

Hart '18- trade infra isn't economically viable http://www.cadtm.org/A-critical-look-at-China-s-One-Belt-One-Road-initiative

While BRI investments might temporarily help sustain key Chinese industries suffering from overcapacity, absorb surplus capital, and boost enterprise profit margins, they are unlikely to serve as a permanent fix for China's growing economic challenges; they will only push off the day of reckoning. **One reason for this negative view is that in the rush to generate projects, many are not financially viable**. Andreea Brinza, writing in *Foreign Policy*, illustrates this problem with an examination of European railway projects: If one image has come to define the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China's ambitious, amorphous project of overseas investment, it's the railway. Every few months or so, the media praises a new line that will supposedly connect a Chinese city with a European capital. Today it's Budapest. Yesterday it was London. They are the newest additions to China's iron network of transcontinental railway routes spanning Eurasia. **But the vast majority of these routes are economically pointless, unlikely to operate at a profit, and driven far more by political need than market demand**

Hillman '18// BRI isn't actually creating corridors it's just a bunch of random projects

"China's Belt and Road Is Full Of Holes." *China's Belt and Road Is Full Of Holes | Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 18 July 2019, www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-belt-and-road-full-holes. Accessed 23 July 2019. //TP

Yet the results suggest that project activity on the ground is not adhering to China's grand vision. For five of the six corridors, there appears to be no significant relationship between corridor participation and project activity, as summarized in Figure 4 below. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is an outlier in at least two respects. First, CPEC is the only corridor that is significantly correlated with higher levels of project activity. **A more compelling explanation is that interest groups within and outside China are skewing President Xi's signature foreign policy vision. Within China, interest groups at the regional, local, and firm level are incentivized to repackage their existing work as supporting the BRI and pursue new activities under the same banner. China's 32 provinces and regions are jockeying not only for economic gains but also the political spoils that come with advancing President Xi's initiative.** By signaling that the BRI is likely to remain a focal point for years to come, **adding the BRI to the Chinese Party Constitution last year made it more likely that "legitimate" activities and rent-seeking will continue under the BRI banner. This competition has led to duplication and waste instead of promoting market efficiencies.** From 2011 to 2016, for example, China's provincial governments collectively spent over $300 million subsidizing China-Europe block trains. Provincial governments were so eager to announce new train services that they were undercutting each other with subsidies. Each new service was named after its local champion, creating a long list of services and confusion among prospective customers. In 2016, the China Railway Company stepped in and announced that all China-Europe trains would be referred to as "China Railway Express." The BRI's political economy within China drives its opportunistic expansion beyond China. **Without specific criteria for what qualifies as a BRI project, the initiative has grown to encompass an endless list of unrelated activities.** Chinese officials have not only allowed this expansion but actively participate in it. In official statements, the BRI has expanded since it was announced to include the Arctic, cyberspace, and even outer space. As the list of functions and geographies grows, more interest groups enter the battle for BRI spoils. Without more rigorous oversight by Chinese officials, there is no reason to expect this competition to converge upon the BRI's six economic corridors. If anything, the opposite is true. In a larger arena, geographic priorities will be more difficult to pursue.

James **Crabtree**, 4-25-2019, "China needs to make BRI more transparent and predictable," Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/3c5d6d14-66ac-11e9-b809-6f0d2f5705f6

Even so, three interlinked problems remain at the heart of Mr Xi's pet project, all of which must be addressed if BRI is to move beyond the pitfalls that have damaged its reputation. *The first and most obvious is debt. Critics allege that China "traps" its BRI partners financially, often pointing to a debt-for-equity deal that handed China control of a port in Sri Lanka.* These claims are exaggerated — few other projects have ended up this way. *Yet poorer nations from Laos to Tajikistan are still signing up to vastly expensive Chinese schemes that offer poor value for money while straining their public finances*. The second problem is transparency. Despite its grand scale there is still no reliable list of BRI projects, no disclosure of the lending standards China follows, nor even the amount China has invested. Beijing claims more than $1tn; independent estimates suggest perhaps a few hundred billion. Either way, it will be hard for China to convince doubters on debts until it is open about the criteria it uses in deciding who to lend to and why.

Christian, 2-16-2016, "THE CHINESE DUMPING REALITY," No Publication, http://www.aalep.eu/chinese-dumping-reality

Dumping from China is wiping out European jobs. **European industry has already lost millions of manufacturing jobs to China. For instance, when China joined the WTO in 2001, millions of EU workers were employed in the textile sector. Now, China has an estimated 65 percent of the world's total textile production and European production has been decimated.** Overall, China now makes and sells more manufactured goods than any other country, particularly steel. Driven by massive excess capacity more than twice the size of total EU steel demand, China has been dumping unprecedented volumes of steel into Europe. **The EU steel sector has lost at least 85,000 jobs since 2008, over 20% of its workforce.** Import volumes of steel from China into the EU have doubled in the past two years, with prices collapsing by about 40%. **Steel is the backbone of many of Europe's manufacturing and construction industries, providing direct and indirect employment to millions more European citizens.** The list of vulnerable industries include steel , ceramics , glass , aluminium, bicycles and parts , solar panels and many others besides. These industries are at high risk due to the potential for large import surges in sectors where China has, or is developing, substantial excess production capacity. **The country has demonstrated past willingness to engage in subsidies and the massive dumping of excess domestic production at prices below cost.**

Economic Times. "US-China trade spat could lead to dumping of Chinese goods in emerging markets: India Ratings." 2019. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/trade/exports/insights/us-china-trade-spat-could-lead-to-dumping-of-chinese-goods-in-emerging-markets-india-ratings/articleshow/69370835.cms. //

Hence, **imports by other Asian EMs from China grew 20.70% in 2018 versus 12.75% in 2010. This has been catalysed by the Chinese manufacturers' ability to undercut domestic manufacturers in these markets, resulting in lower market share for the domestic players in the EMs**, India Ratings observed.

Cecile **Fruman**, World Bank Blogs 3-1-**2017** ["Economic diversification: A priority for action, now more than ever available online at: https://blogs.worldbank.org/psd/economic-diversification-priority-action-now-more-ever accessed - 7-21-2019]cdm

While the sluggish global economy is creating economic problems for traditional exports, other economic trends offer new routes and opportunities for poor countries to diversify. The trend toward the spatial splitting up of production across wide geographic areas, and the emergence and growth of regional and global value chains, offer new ways for developing countries to export tasks, services and other activities. Value chains offer developing countries a path out of the trap of having to specialize in whole industries, with all of the cost and risk that such a strategy entails. New technologies that have led to steep declines in transport and communications costs have created enormous opportunities for developing countries to export services such as back-office processing. Expansion into these fields not only broadens the base of production, it also diversifies the structure of employment and, especially for women, increases opportunities to find productive work. This is growth that can transform households and countries and boost participation in education — which, in turn, enhances long-term productivity and poverty reduction. E-trade is widening the range of mechanisms by which small producers in developing countries can grow through exporting. Finally, growth in developing countries over the last decade has created the means to reduce dependence on the North American and European markets. During commodity booms, many resource-dependent countries find it difficult to design and implement public investments and policy reforms that provide a framework for diversification. High commodity prices often lead to overly appreciated exchange rates that undermine the competitiveness of potential new export activities. Such problems are exacerbated when government fails to attend to distortions in markets for products, services or the factors of production (labor, capital, raw materials and the market for management or entrepreneurial resources). Rent-seeking — for example, by firms seeking government subsidies or other favorable treatment — and a lack of transparency can lead to instability and internal conflict as public and private stakeholders vie for a share of the revenue generated by resource extraction. Governments need to change their regulatory emphasis away from rigid tools governing investment in extractives toward a more flexible approach that encourages investment in a wider range of activities. (For more on this, see the recent blog post by our colleague Akhtar Mahmood: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2017/01/25/unlearning-to-learn-the-path-to-diversification/).

Juncker Plan

Bri will die quietly

Minxin Pei, 19, (Claremont Mckenna College), "Will China let Belt and Road die quietly?", Nikkei Asian Review, 2-15-2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Will-China-let-Belt-and-Road-die-quietly, DOA-7-10-2019 (MO)

But the world has changed in the last five years. ***China's economic slowdown has triggered a capital flight, draining more than $1 trillion from its foreign exchange reserves.*** If we factor in the trade war's impact on Chinese balance of payments in the future, China will unlikely generate sufficient foreign exchange surpluses to finance BRI on the same scale. The tariffs imposed by the U.S. and the uncertainty about U.S.-China commercial relations will significantly reduce Chinese exports to the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, other developed markets. Since China's trade surplus with the U.S. accounts for nearly all its overall current account surplus, **a substantial fall in Chinese exports to the U.S. will result in a current-account deficit for China if it cannot offset the shortfall with increased exports to other markets (an impossible feat)**. China's deteriorating balance of payments will force Beijing to use it foreign exchange reserves mainly to defend its currency, the yuan, and maintain investors' confidence in China's macroeconomic stability. As a result, Beijing will have to review its external commitments carefully. ***Grandiose projects conceived and launched when it was flush with foreign exchange will be reassessed. Some will have to be curtailed or even abandoned altogether***. But the trouble for BRI does not just stem from the near-certainty of China's declining foreign exchange earnings in coming years. On the domestic front, ***Beijing faces a perfect storm of rising pension costs, slowing economic growth and dwindling tax revenues***. The grim fiscal outlook was conveyed with unusual bluntness by the Chinese Minister of Finance at the annual finance conference at the end of December last year. Minister Liu Kun warned, "***All levels of the government must lead by tightening their belts and do their utmost to reduce administrative expenses.***" Shortly after the meeting, Shanghai, the richest city in China, ordered a 5% cut for most departments in 2019. ***This bout of austerity fever was precipitated by declining fiscal revenue growth and Beijing's decision to cut taxes to stimulate faltering growth.***

European Commission - Press release Juncker Plan exceeds original €315 billion investment target Brussels, 18 July 2018 europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4469_en.pdf

The Juncker Plan has proven to be a success. We surpassed the original €315 billion investment target and the **European Fund for Strategic Investments is set to create 1.4 million jobs and increase EU GDP by 1.3% by 2020**. We have financed projects which without the EFSI would not have been possible, and all without creating new debt: two thirds of the investment comes from the private sector. From financing job-training for refugees in Finland to renewable energy in Greece to farming in Bulgaria - we will continue to use the EU budget for what it does best: to catalyse growth."

Country And, 7-17-2017, "Investment Plan results," **European Commission** - European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/jobs-growth-and-investment/investment-plan-europe-juncker-plan/investment-plan-results_en

- **Juncker Plan expected to trigger €408.4 billion in investments**
- **around 952,000 SMEs set to benefit**

Editorial, 1-29**-2016**, "China and Juncker's Investment Plan," **Vocal Europe**, https://www.vocaleurope.eu/china-and-junckers-investment-plan/

In theory, **Juncker's Investment Plan and the 'One Belt-One Road' project will work together in a harmonious way.** There are several examples outlining the logic of **win-win cooperation for the EU and China**. A recent one is **the launch of new cargo train line services which have opened trade routes between Hamburg on the one hand and Harbin and Shandong Province on the other.** Russia, South Korea, Japan and European countries such as Germany, Poland, France and Spain will benefit from the new projects. Previous cooperation schemes are equally encouraging. The operation of China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) in the port of Piraeus since 2009 benefits economically not only Greece and China but also other countries including the US.

Middle Income Trap

The Economist 18 (The Economist, "After a good run of growth, China's economy braces for bumps - Life after digging", April 17, 2018, https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/04/17/after-a-good-run-of-growth-chinas-economy-braces-for-bumps) //

The improvement in China's fortunes can be traced to three factors. First, the government has started to tackle several ingrained problems. After a long period of overproduction of steel and coal, a campaign to close unused capacity restrained output and pushed up prices. To reduce the property overhang, local governments bought millions of unsold homes from developers and gave them to poorer citizens. Financial regulators have taken aim at banks' murky off-balance-sheet loans, and at heavily indebted borrowers such as property developers. Wang Tao of UBS, a Swiss bank, notes that these efforts have given investors more confidence. Chinese shares listed in Hong Kong have risen in value by a third over the past two years. The government has also helped arrange behind-the-scenes rescues of troubled firms. One was in Wuhan. The big local steel company, bleeding cash, merged with its much stronger counterpart in Shanghai in 2016. The combined entity is profitable. A second factor is that China's economy is maturing. Growth is bound to slow as China gets richer, but structural changes are also making growth more stable. Thanks in part to a falling working-age population, which peaked in 2011, incomes are growing faster than the overall economy. This, in turn, is rebalancing the economy. Excessive reliance on investment is giving way to consumption. And heavy industry is yielding to services, which now account for more than half of GDP, up from a third two decades ago.

Deutch 19 (John Deutch, Issues in Science and Technology, "Is Innovation China's Next Great Leap Forward? | Issues in Science and Technology", Summer 2019, https://issues.org/is-innovation-chinas-next-great-leap-forward/) //TP

Innovation refers to the process of implementing new or improved technology and management practices that offer products and services with desirable performance at affordable cost. Innovation encompasses the entire pathway from early-stage idea creation through technology development and demonstration, and finally to late-stage production and deployment.

Innovation aims at increasing consumer satisfaction, economic productivity, growth, exports, and jobs. A number of significant indicators suggest that China's innovative capability is increasing more rapidly than that of the United States, portending a weakening of the United States' relative global competitive position: China's total research and development (R&D) expenditures are growing faster than those of the United States, but China is at a lower absolute level. Many attribute China's technical advances to illicit transfer of technology, theft of intellectual property (IP), and requiring transfer of technology from foreign firms operating in China, in violation of World Trade Organization rules **China has adopted aggressive technology targets in key areas such as robotics, artificial intelligence, and digital learning, with the announced goal of surpassing US capabilities. China is increasing its investment in small and large high-technology US enterprises without allowing US firms similar investment opportunity in China. China's intelligence agencies are expanding efforts to collect information from Chinese students doing research on US university campuses in areas relevant to China's key technology.**

David Fickling, 1-13-2019, "Xi's Leading China Toward Stagnation," Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-01-13/xi-s-leading-china-s-economy-into-the-middle-income-trap, accessed 9-7-2019 //TP

To be sure, Beijing's economic planners seem well aware of the risk. The Made in China 2025 program that has raised hackles in the West looks like nothing so much as an attempt to build a group of high-value export industries that can help the country hurdle its way out of the trap — one of the key characteristics of economies that have achieved the feat, according to a 2017 study for the Asian Development Bank. I**t's not enough just to have a lot of exports, according to a 2012 paper by associates of the bank: The products involved need to be diverse, sophisticated and of a type to encourage a virtuous circle of technological development.** That's where Xi is pushing the country in the wrong direction. **Building that sort of export sector is unpredictable, and works best when there's a wide array of private businesses with myriad different approaches.** But as Bloomberg Opinion contributor Richard McGregor wrote in November, China's president has persistently downplayed the benefits of the private sector and favored sclerotic state-owned national champions instead. **That's the wrong part of the economy to be favoring, given China's need for export-led growth.** I**n 2013, state-owned enterprises accounted for only 11 percent of overseas shipments, with private domestic companies on 39 percent and 47 percent coming from local affiliates of foreign companies.** The investments are also failing on their own terms. While public fixed-asset spending at the end of 2017 was up 88 percent from five years earlier, profits from state-owned enterprises increased only 17 percent. That divergence is particularly worrying, since a plateau in productivity growth is another key factor keeping countries trapped in middle-income status.

Nuclear Power

World Nuclear Association 16'/ Lazard 16'

https://www.fairewinds.org/demystify/nuclear-powers-carbon-dioxide-co2-smoke-screen

Let's fast forward to 2050. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) estimates that even if the 2015 Paris CO2 accords (COP 21) are implemented and 1,000 new nukes are constructed, global CO2 emissions will still increase to a ***minimum*** of 64 GT[19]. While this increase appears counterintuitive given the Paris agreement, it is on target because pent up energy demands from large populations in India, China, Southeast Asia, and Africa who want to achieve the standard of living in western developed countries[20]Can new nukes really help cut CO2 by 2050? Unfortunately, what is past is prologue. To do so, **the World Nuclear Association claims 1,000 new nukes will be needed by 2050 to combat CO2 buildup and climate change[21].** The MIT estimate also assumes 1,000 nukes must be in operation by 2050. **Using the nuclear trade association's own calculations shows that these new nukes will offset only** 3.9 GT of CO2 in 2050. Do the math again! 3.9 GT out of 64 GT is only **6.1% of the total CO2 released to the atmosphere in 2050, hardly enough for the salvation of the polar bears!**If those 1,000 nuclear power plants were cheap and could be built quickly, investing in nukes might still make sense. **However, Lazard Financial Advisory and Asset Management**[22], with no dog in the fight, **has developed a rubric that estimates that the construction cost of those new nukes will be $8,200,000,000,000.** Yes, that's $8.2 TRILLION to reduce CO2 by only 6%![23] Surely **that huge amount of money can be better spent on less expensive alternatives to get more bang for the buck! Lazard also estimates that solar or wind would be 80% less expensive[24] for the equivalent amount of peak electric output.**

Saad Baashir. Belt and Road Advisory. January 28, 2019. "Automation is the biggest challenge to the Belt and Road Initiative - Wake Up Call". https://beltandroad.ventures/beltandroadblog/what-is-the-biggest-challenge-to-of-belt-and-road-automation //TP

The flying geese phenomenon has been the most successful developmental strategy since World War Two. It's then no surprise that *many developing countries today are keen to engage with China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the hope that BRI can help them finance the infrastructure necessary to attract FDI and develop their manufacturing capacity. Many of these countries are taking big loans, and making big bets on infrastructure, on the assumption that it will ultimately pay for itself by catalyzing the development of export-oriented manufacturing.* This strategy is based on an assumption that what has happened over the last 70 years is replicable today. Through promoting and engaging with BRI; developing countries and China are implicitly indicating that they believe the model is repeatable. The arguments raised in favor of this assumption are focused on recent success stories in Vietnam, Bangladesh and Ethiopia, all of whom have captured some industry transfer from China. But using these early examples ignore the fact that *the decision to relocate production is fundamentally different versus previous episodes of industry transfer.* When manufacturing moved from Japan to Korea to Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and eventually mainland China, wages were the key factor. However, *today, while still important, wages are not as deterministic for the location of production, given the advance of automation and artificial intelligence technologies that are revolutionizing manufacturing. There are a growing number of examples that suggest manufacturing is becoming less dependent on low cost labor.*

Adidas recently decided to produce trainers in Germany for the first time in two decades, as the country offers highly-efficient automated factories. Foxconn made 60,000 people redundant in its Zhengzhou factory and replaced them with automated processes. These examples are also being supported by more comprehensive academic research; ***a survey undertaken by researchers at China's Peking University found that of over 600 manufacturing firms in China, only 6% of them preferred to relocate operations abroad in response to rising wages at home*. *Research by McKinsey shows that 87% of manufacturing production activities are automatable.*** Of course that number is an average, and the likelihood of automation is different across sectors. Those with the lowest probabilities of being automated, for example leather shoe production, still stand a good chance of being transferred to countries with lower wage costs. However, a general standpoint, it is becoming increasingly clear that manufacturing is becoming less dependent on labor. But it remains unclear as to what the potential ramifications are for BRI. *With automation advances, foreign investors in manufacturing have less incentives to move their production abroad. But, many countries are still investing in infrastructure and are engaging with BRI on the proviso that they can* be beneficiaries of the flying geese phenomenon and *attract manufacturing investors through a combination of good infrastructure and low wages.* Therein lies a paradox and perhaps the biggest risk facing BRI that no one is talking about. *If foreign investors in the manufacturing space choose not to continue moving production operations – or do not move them to the extent they have done in previous waves of industry transfer - then BRI is unlikely to be able to stimulate the development of export-oriented manufacturing. This scenario plays to concerns around debt that have come with the BRI. If industry transfer does not follow the infrastructure build-up because automation keeps manufacturing in China, BRI could instead lead to levels of debt that many countries will struggle to pay off.* This would begin to look badly on China if the same fate happens across the board for countries receiving China's financing and contractors. While there are some sub-sectors within manufacturing that will of course be harder to automate and some countries that will still present attractive investment offers above and beyond their low wages, we believe these trends in manufacturing are worthy of concern. The flying geese phenomenon is not dead, but it might slowly be dying. *When we view that in the context of millions of manufacturing jobs that the developing countries are betting big on, but may never get, the size of the risk becomes clear.* Ultimately it is in the interest of both China and the recipients of BRI infrastructure investments to fully understand the risks associated with the changing nature of the flying geese phenomenon. For China, these trends put BRI at risk. For recipients, it puts their economic development strategy at risk. *Unless more is done to understand these trends by companies and governments alike, we risk sleepwalking into – what could potentially become – a source of macroeconomic instability.*

OPIC

James M. **Roberts**, 5-22-20**19**, "Will BUILD Act Hike Lending in Poor Countries, Counter China? Jury's Out", Daily Signal, https://www.dailysignal.com/2019/05/22/will-the-build-act-improve-lending-in-poor-countries-and-counter-china-the-jurys-still-out/ // JJ

During debate over the BUILD Act (Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act)—a bill that would rename and double the size of the Overseas Private Investment Corp.—proponents asserted that it was needed to counter China's aggressive "One Belt, One Road" debt-trap diplomacy initiative that finances infrastructure projects in developing countries. The question is, will BUILD, passed by Congress last year, counter China? Judging by the Overseas Private Investment Corp.'s recent lending decisions, so far, the answer to that question appears to be "no." Why? First, because ***the majority of the Overseas Private Investment Corp.'s loan portfolio, as of the end of 2018, is still in upper-middle and high-income countries (excluding regional loans).*** Meanwhile, almost all of the countries that are identified in a March 2018 studyby the Center for Global Development as most heavily indebted to China's One Belt, One Road program are low- and lower-middle-income countries (according to the World Bank's 2019 rankings). Second, although the Overseas Private Investment Corp. did reduce its lending to high-income countries in calendar year 2018, it continued lending to its traditionally favored sectors (especially financial services and renewable energy)—sectors that are not targeted by Chinese lending.

Swanson 15 Ana Swanson, 10-13-2015, "Why trying to help poor countries might actually hurt them," Washington Post https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/10/13/why-trying-to-help-poor-countries-might-actually-hurt-them/ //DF

It might seem odd that having more money would not help a poor country. Yet economists have long observed that countries that have an abundance of wealth from natural resources, like oil or diamonds, tend to be more unequal, less developed and more impoverished, as the chart below shows. Countries at the left-hand side of the chart have fewer fuels, ores and metals and higher growth, while those at the right-hand side have more natural resource wealth, yet slower growth. Economists postulate that this "natural resource curse" happens for a variety of reasons, but one is that such wealth can strengthen and corrupt a government. Like revenue from oil or diamonds, wealth from foreign aid can be a corrupting influence on weak governments, "turning what should be beneficial political institutions into toxic ones," Deaton writes in his book "The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality." This wealth can make governments more despotic, and it can also increase the risk of civil war, since there is less power sharing, as well as a lucrative prize worth fighting for. Deaton and his supporters offer dozens of examples of humanitarian aid being used to support despotic regimes and compounding misery, including in Zaire, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Somalia, Biafra, and the Khmer Rouge on the border of Cambodia and Thailand. Citing Africa researcher Alex de Waal, Deaton writes that "aid can only reach the victims of war by paying off the warlords, and sometimes extending the war."

Swanson 15 Ana Swanson, 10-13-2015, "Why trying to help poor countries might actually hurt them," Washington Post https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/10/13/why-trying-to-help-poor-countries-might-actually-hurt-them/ //DF

Why was this happening? The answer wasn't immediately clear, but Deaton and other economists argued that it had to do with how foreign money changed the relationship between a government and its people. Think of it this way: In order to have the funding to run a country, a government needs to collect taxes from its people. Since the people ultimately hold the purse strings, they have a certain amount of control over their government. If leaders don't deliver the basic services they promise, the people have the power to cut them off. Deaton argued that foreign aid can weaken this relationship, leaving a government less accountable to its people, the congress or parliament, and the courts. "My critique of aid has been more to do with countries where they get an enormous amount of aid relative to everything else that goes on in that country," Deaton said in an interview with Wonkblog. "For instance, most governments depend on their people for taxes in order to run themselves and provide services to their people. Governments that get all their money from aid don't have that at all, and I think of that as very corrosive."

Swanson 15 Ana Swanson, 10-13-2015, "Why trying to help poor countries might actually hurt them," Washington Post https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/10/13/why-trying-to-help-poor-countries-might-actually-hurt-them/ //DF

The effect wasn't limited to Africa. Many economists were noticing that an influx of foreign aid did not seem to produce economic growth in countries around the world. Rather, lots of foreign aid flowing into a country tended to be correlated with lower economic growth, as this chart from a paper by Arvind Subramanian and Raghuram Rajan shows. The countries that receive less aid, those on the left-hand side of the chart, tend to have higher growth -- while those that receive more aid, on the right-hand side, have lower growth. Why was this happening? The answer wasn't immediately clear, but Deaton and other economists argued that it had to do with how foreign money changed the relationship between a government and its people.

Young '15 Ryan Young, 09-24-2015, "The Case Against Overseas Private Investment Corporation" CPI
https://cei.org/sites/default/files/Ryan%20Young%20-%20The%20Case%20Against%20OPIC.pdf

One of OPIC's financial products is political risk insurance. Its policies are an Econ 101 textbook case of moral hazard. In some countries, political risk involves threats of terrorism or war. **But in many of the countries where OPIC does business, political risk means corrupt or predatory governments prone to nationalizing private assets. By offering political risk insurance, OPIC enables this bad government behavior. Predatory behavior and political instability create obvious disincentives to invest in such countries, but subsidized political risk insurance greatly reduces those beneficial disincentives.** As a result, predatory or unstable governments continue to receive foreign investment, while their people remain poor. Meanwhile, American taxpayers bear the risk, to the tune of up to $250 million per project.18 In addition to being suspect from an economic development and human rights perspective, OPIC's expropriation insurance is problematic as a foreign policy tool. Many predatory governments are not exactly allies of the U.S. government, so OPIC's expropriation 4 insurance may actually incentivize them to nationalize OPIC-financed projects. In effect, the U.S. government is paying its enemies to thumb their nose at it. A more effective way to increase foreign investment in developing countries is for their governments to enact sound economic policies and respect property rights. How to encourage them to do so is well beyond this paper's scope. But OPIC's attempt to treat a symptom may actually make the root disease even worse, by reducing incentives for reform.

Overcapacity

BRI can't solve for Overcap

Matthew **Fulco**, **China-focused leadership and business analysis**, June 14 **2016**, Accessed 07/23/19, AJ
http://knowledge.ckgsb.edu.cn/2016/06/14/chinese-economy/solving-the-prickly-issue-of-overcapacity-in-china/

But according to David Dollar, a senior fellow in Foreign Policy, Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution in Washington, **OBOR markets are not large enough to absorb China's excess capacity** in sufficient amounts. "In steel alone, **China would need $60 billion per year of extra demand to absorb excess capacity**… The economies of Central Asia are not that large," he wrote in a July 2015 paper.

Decrease in Overcap leads to job loss

Yang **Yanyi**, **EUobserver**, Feb **2016**, 7-23-2019 ["[Stakeholder] The right approach to addressing overcapacity problems, from a Chinese perspective"] // AJ https://euobserver.com/stakeholders/132288

Nobody should be under any illusion: overcapacity, including excessive capacity of the global steel sector, is one of the many challenges we are all faced with. Not only has the European steel industry sector been hard hit, iron and steel industries in China and many other emerging economies are bearing the brunt, suffering badly from excessive production and flagging demand. According to some estimates, **a reduction of overcapacity by 30% in those industries with the most excess capacity** – iron and steel, coal, cement, ship building, aluminium and flat glass – **is expected to affect the employment of three million workers.** Not to mention that China is also confronted with many other daunting tasks: lifting the remaining 70 million people out of poverty, advancing industrialisation to transform China into a post-industrial society, rebalancing the economy from investment and net exports to consumption and innovation.

Pirates

ISDP '16 - Piracy low now, but BRI doesn't solve

Isdp. "The Belt and Road Initiative." Institute for Security and Development Policy. http://isdp.eu/publication/belt-road-initiative/. //SH

The Maritime Silk Road faces its own security concerns. **Whilst piracy is presently at its lowest levels since 1995, the Maritime Silk Road ventures through zones that are still considered to be the most active piracy hotspots.** The effects of piracy are numerous. In addition to posing risks to human lives, piracy exerts a financial cost by increasing insurance premiums and results in a higher costs of goods for consumers. This is antithetical to the goals of the Maritime Silk Road.

Zhihao '16 - China doing anti-piracy before BRI (13 years ago)

Zhang Zhihao. "Peacekeeping, anti-piracy operations aren't muscle flexing, experts say." China Daily. 16. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201812/14/WS5c12e6c1a310eff303290ec1.html. //SH

Dec 26 marks the 10th anniversary of the PLA Navy's first escort mission in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia. Over the past 10 years, China has sent more than 100 ships and 26,000 personnel to the region, said Senior Colonel Liang Fang, a PLA National Defense University professor.

Zhihao '16 - Escort missions start from Chinese ports

Zhang Zhihao. "Peacekeeping, anti-piracy operations aren't muscle flexing, experts say." China Daily. 16. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201812/14/WS5c12e6c1a310eff303290ec1.html. //SH

On Sunday, **the PLA Navy dispatched a naval escort task force from the port city of Zhanjiang, Guangdong province**, to the Gulf of Aden and waters off the Horn of Africa, according to Xinhua News Agency.

Zhihao '16 - China still has incentive to keep escort missions for int'l heg

Zhang Zhihao. "Peacekeeping, anti-piracy operations aren't muscle flexing, experts say." China Daily. 16. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201812/14/WS5c12e6c1a310eff303290ec1.html. //SH

The PLA Navy has helped escort around 6,600 vessels, half of which were foreign owned or carrying cargo for the United Nations World Food Programme, Liang said. In 2017, only 4 percent of global pirate attacks occurred in the area where Chinese naval escorts were present-a significant decrease compared to the 48 percent seen in 2009, she added.

Pike '14 - Piracy dec due to private security comps and int'l efforts

John Pike. "Pirates." Global Security. 2014. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/pirates.htm. //SH

Private security companies offering armed protection teams has evolved from a niche market to a multibillion dollar norm in the region. Floating armouries and training bases in certain countries have allowed these companies to circumvent local regulations on prohibiting arms within territorial waters. Although liability and the inherently non-transparent nature of the sector often bring it into question, **it is nonetheless a fact that no ship with armed security teams on board has ever been hijacked.**

The number of pirate attacks worldwide fell in the first half of 2013. However, maritime officials warned that the waters off West Africa were growing more dangerous. International Maritime Bureau Director Pottengal Mukundan highlighted the findings of the latest piracy report. "We have had 138 incidents compared to 177 incidents for the same period in 2012. This is largely because of the reduction in the attacks off the Horn of Africa, which accounted previously for around 50 percent of the worldwide attacks," he said. **The reduction is due to a number of reasons, including the international effort that's been underway off the Horn of Africa. That's dealt a major blow to Somali pirates.**

Power Grids

Wolfram '18- grids are unreliable https://energyathaas.wordpress.com/2017/05/30/the-developing-world-is-connecting-to-the-power-grid-but-reliability-lags/

The graph on the right represents the share of those city dwellers who report that their **electricity connections works "all the time" or "most of the time." It's less than 20 percent in Lagos, Nigeria, home to nearly 20 million people.5**

Hornby '18

https://www.ft.com/content/bdc31f94-68aa-11e8-b6eb-4acfcfb08c11

Chinese companies have announced investments of $102bn in building or acquiring power transmission infrastructure across 83 projects in Latin America, Africa, **Europe** and beyond over the past five years, according to RWR. Adding in loans from Chinese institutions for overseas power grid investments brings the total to $123bn.

Chen '19 - BRI energy potential now meets all energy demand (don't need west eu for power grids)

Shi Chen. "The Potential of Photovoltaics to Power the Belt and Road Initiative." Joule. June 27, 2019. https://www.cell.com/joule/pdfExtended/S2542-4351(19)30275-2 //SH

Results suggest that **the electricity potential for the BRI region reaches** 448.9 PWh annually, **41.3 times the regional demand for electricity** in 2016. **Tapping 3.7% of the potential** through deploying 7.8 TW capacity **could satisfy the regional electricity demand projected for 2030.**

[regional refers to the region of the whole BRI]

World Bank 18'
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/04/18/access-energy-sustainable-development-goal-7

The World Bank has a long track record of helping developing countries expand access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy. It is doing so through supporting grid investments and helping to develop off-grid markets, for example**, through programs such as Lighting Global.** Since 2010, the Bank **has provided more than $5 billion for energy access in over 35 countries** through some 70 projects.

With innovative solutions and modern technologies available, now is the time to be hopeful about achieving universal access. Plummeting costs for renewable energy and storage technologies, along with increasing efficiency of end use equipment and appliances, offer tremendous opportunity to deliver more service with a lower energy investment.Additionally, new technology-enabled business models, such as pay-as-you-go solar, offer great opportunities for private sector-driven off-grid electrification, as long as countries can create the right investment environment. [for example] **In Bangladesh, the World Bank helped deploy 1.4 million solar home systems. More than 18.5 million people in rural areas now have reliable access to solar-powered electricity.**

Reform

Brattberg '18 - China is flipping EU countries on subjects

https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/19/europe-s-emerging-approach-to-china-s-beltand-road-initiative-pub-77536

Some of these **activities have provided China with a political foothold enabling it to influence EU policies**. For example, in June 2017, **Greece blocked an EU statement**

at the UN Human Rights Council criticizing its human rights record, the first time the union failed to make a joint statement at the UN's top human rights body. In March 2017, **Hungary refused to sign a joint letter denouncing the reported torture of detained lawyers in China, breaking EU consensus**. And in July 2016, **Hungary and Greece sought to block any direct reference to China in an EU statement about the ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague that struck down its legal claims in the South China Sea.**

Leonard '19 - EU threatened by Chinese heg expansion

Leonard, Elina. "Redefining Europe's economic sovereignty." . 2019. ECFR. https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/redefining_europes_economic_sovereignty#. //SH

But perhaps the EU has been lucky so far. Perhaps **the EU's apparent economic independence in the global context was always the result of a lack of geopolitical interference**. **Perhaps it could only flourish under the benevolent aegis of a real superpower.** Perhaps, in other words, **it only existed because no serious power was willing to challenge it** and because the US was willing to protect it.

In this context, **the EU was able to conduct an international economic policy that was reasonably insulated from geopolitical concerns**. Its construction – with most international economic powers given to EU-level bodies and most security and foreign policy instruments left at the member-state level – reflected this assumption. **This separation between the economic and the geopolitical spheres was always fragile. It now looks outdated.** The US and China have fundamentally different relationships with Europe, but have in common that they do not separate economics from geopolitics.[1]**The competition between [the EU and China] has become simultaneously an economic competition and a security competition.**

Hunnicut '19 - EU Slowdown

Trevor Hunnicutt. "Europe's slowdown is worse than investors imagined: El-Erian." Reuters. 19. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-investment-elerian/europes-slowdown-is-worse-than-investors-imagined-el-erian-idUSKCN1QL28L. //SH

The European economy is cooling more than many investors believe, Mohamed El-Erian, chief economic adviser for Allianz SE, said on Monday, warning that **the slowdown poses the biggest risk to the market**. In addition, El-Erian, in an interview with Reuters, said that the European Central Bank has only limited tools at its disposal to respond to economic weakness while European governments are not prepared to respond with spending. "People are underestimating how quickly Europe is slowing," El-Erian said. **The International Monetary Fund revised down its forecast for euro zone growth to 1.6 percent in January from 1.9 percent three months prior, but El-Erian thinks even the lowered outlook is overly optimistic**. El-Erian, the former chief executive of Pimco, the bond investment giant owned by Allianz, expects **the euro zone will struggle to deliver even 1 percent growth in gross domestic product this year.**

Saudi Arabia

Wald, Ellen. 1-9-**2019.** "Why It Matters How Much Oil Saudi Arabia Has." **Forbes**. https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenrwald/2019/01/09/why-it-matters-how-much-oil-saudi-arabia-has/#44f5dbf35137. //SH

The most interesting part of all of this is that when the world thinks Saudi Arabia has less oil, that oil is actually more valuable. When Simmons' claims were en vogue, the price of oil skyrocketed. **Saudi Arabia was arguing it has plenty of oil, but the belief that it did not, pushed up oil prices and made Saudi Arabia even richer. Now, Saudi Arabia is demonstrating that is has more oil than people expected,** but that only serves to make its oil a little less valuable for now.

SCS

Intel Brief, 9-11-2019. Cipher Brief, "The EU's Problematic Approach to China's Belt and Road Initiative" 9-11-2019. https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/the-eus-problematic-approach-to-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative.

China's increasing involvement in key infrastructure projects on the European continent has spurred concerns about the political strings that are inevitably attached –and potential implications for European security. **There is growing concern that infrastructure loans under the BRI umbrella are incurring soaring debts for Western Balkan states that are seeking EU membership, including Serbia and Montenegro. If EU states default on their BRI loans, it becomes a question of whether the EU will bear the responsibility to mitigate broader economic fallout**. As the recent example of Pakistan's financial crisis demonstrates, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) explicitly stated that a bail-out would not be an option if Islamabad continued to accept unsustainable loans from China. **EU member states' warming relationships with China have also created political divisions: in 2017, Greece vetoed a joint EU statement criticizing China based on human rights and a year prior, Greece and Hungary refused to sign a joint EU statement criticizing China's growing** aggression in the South China Sea. In addition, the U.S. has warned European allies and countries against accepting the Huawei 5G network due to the consequences for security and intelligence sharing.

Tata '13// the BRI takes away US's ability to sever Beijing's energy lifeline, China deterrence falls

Samir Tata, The Diplomat, 3-11-2013, "Deconstructing China's Energy Security Strategy," Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/deconstructing-chinas-energy-security-strategy/

The United States should not underestimate China's ability to achieve energy security within the next two decades. ***China's Silk Road strategy, which completely bypasses the global maritime commons, is Beijing's non-military***

solution to U.S. global naval dominance. *Once the new overland pipelines for black gold are fully operational,* ***the U****nited* ***S****tates* ***no longer will have the ability to sever Beijing's energy lifeline.*** And **China may no longer be deterred from resorting to military action in support of its proclaimed core interests to force Taiwan reunification, seize the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands from Japan, and enforce its nine-dash maritime boundary in the South China Sea.**

Steven Stashwick, 6-18-2019. Foreign Policy, "China's South China Sea Militarization Has Peaked" 6-18-2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/19/chinas-south-china-sea-militarization-has-peaked/

Despite the islands' scale, China's maximalist regional claims, and its aggressive coercion of regional rivals, ***tension between China's political and military incentives suggest it has little more to gain from expanding its buildup in the Spratly Islands and it could even have quite a bit to lose. Additional overt militarization doesn't help China exert control over the South China Sea in peacetime and may not be decisive in wartime.*** It also encourages a greater and more public U.S. military presence, undermining the islands' political symbolism. **It** also **reduces China's room for diplomacy and de-escalation in a crisis, increasing the potential for a**n uncertain and **potentially embarrassing clash that would risk further undermining the party's legitimacy.**

Taiwan

Yuwen, Deng, 1-3-2018. "Is China planning to take Taiwan by force in 2020?." 9-5-2019. https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2126541/china-planning-take-taiwan-force-2020. //SH

Nonetheless, the points raised so far only signal that Beijing has a timetable in mind to unify Taiwan with China, but they do not explain why **the PLA could move to take Taiwan by force in 2020.**

A combination of factors could point to a military confrontation.

They include Trump's labelling of China as a strategic rival in his administration's national security strategy; Beijing's worry about the pro-independence movement in Taiwan and its belief that it now has the ability to resolve the Taiwan problem once and for all; a misjudgment by Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen; and Xi's sense of his own legacy.

First of all, why would Beijing opt for unification by force, rather than through the peaceful negotiation it has always championed? There are four reasons.

First, after extending economic help to the island for years, Beijing has still failed to win the hearts and minds of its people. Instead, cross-strait relations have deteriorated.

Second, as one generation of Taiwanese replaces another, the "Chinese" identity among the people will only grow weaker.

Third, the influence of Taiwan's political parties is waning. Even if the Kuomintang wins back power, it would not be in a position to lead cross-strait unification.

Fourth, more and more Chinese are calling for unification by force.

Thus, though on the surface Beijing has continued to call for a peaceful reunification, it has in fact ditched the idea.

Though on the surface Beijing has continued to call for a peaceful reunification, it has in fact ditched the idea.

As Beijing believes it has to use force to reunite with Taiwan, the next step would be to find a good time to do so. The year 2020 offers such an opportunity.

That's the year when China would be approaching the first of its "two centenary" goals – the establishment of a *xiaokang*, or **moderately prosperous, society by 2021**, the 100th year of the founding of the Communist Party.

This would act as a driving force for China to take back Taiwan by force. If China becomes a well-off nation with Taiwan in its fold, it would mean a historic achievement for Xi.

Solar Power Good

Solar panels are inefficient.

Bjorn **Lomborg**, **Huffington Post**, 1-27-**2016**, 7-19-2019 ["Funding Wind and Solar Energy Is Inefficient"] // AJ
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/are-wind-and-solar-energy_b_9087586?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAAx0BeKYrU0SdDshvaujhpx3PVEJT0_Fo7oiAiUboRDB9Kwy5eZE7O77heqRCpm3uGZSH3fWrKIXSR4UgG2pOeTp-izo1mcLuNpT30yCZfHO-b3H3_8lWORqpXyaydapw2bQ5CfyRSrA3-XOSDqLjlHzSWuOo4TkTuS0pPsezy2c

Truth is, wind and **solar** PV **will be trivial contributions to global energy for the next quarter century.** The International Energy Agency estimates that **today just about 0.5 per cent of global energy comes from solar and wind** (see graphic below). **Even in 2040, even if everyone does everything they've promised at the Paris climate summit, the world will get just 2.4% of its energy from solar and wind.**

Solar is not cheaper now and will not be cheaper in the long term.

Bjorn **Lomborg**, **Huffington Post**, 1-27-**2016**, 7-19-2019 ["Funding Wind and Solar Energy Is Inefficient"] // AJ
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/are-wind-and-solar-energy_b_9087586?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAAx0BeKYrU0SdDshvaujhpx3PVEJT0_Fo7oiAiUboRDB9Kwy5eZE7O77heqRCpm3uGZSH3fWrKIXSR4UgG2pOeTp-izo1mcLuNpT30yCZfHO-b3H3_8lWORqpXyaydapw2bQ5CfyRSrA3-XOSDqLjlHzSWuOo4TkTuS0pPsezy2c

Still, **it will cost a fortune. This year the world will spend about $106 billion on subsidies for solar and wind, and even by 2040 it will not be cheaper than fossil fuels - we will still have to pay $84 billion in subsidies annually. The International Energy Agency estimate that even by 2040, renewables will on average be more expensive both in the developed and developing world than any other energy source, like oil, gas, nuclear, coal and hydro.** Instead of spending billions of dollars to prop up today's inefficient wind and solar energy, we should be investing more in green research and development to innovate the price of green energy down below fossil fuels. Bill Gates managed to get almost all developed countries to agree to double their green R&D investments from $10 billion to $20 billion, and that is a great start. But we need to push that investment further to $100 billion per year.

Neg Cards

Auth Regimes

<u>Turn Joining the BRI will increase democratization empirically through trade with the EU</u>

Julianna **Pontet, University of Szeged, 2015** ["", https://www.etsg.org/ETSG2016/Papers/151.pdf 7-20-2019] klw

"The purpose of this study was to investigate whether international trade can promote democratization process in developing countries. To answer the question, the trade relations between ACP-states and the European Union were analysed between 1995 and 2014. In current paper we applied a gravity equation method involving 9 different variables into our model. As the results indicate, <u>there is significant relationship between democracy and trade</u> and the other variables, but these relationships are really weak, the explanatory power of regression is only 20 percent. Furthermore, based on our result, we can highlight some concluding remarks: first, the larger and more open a country is, the higher the democratization is; second, a bit surprisingly, landlocked and small island developing countries are more democratized than countries which do not belong to this group, and oil exporting countries are less democratized. Finally, from our point of view, one of the most important statements is that <u>ACP-exports to the EU result in higher democratization in ACP-states.</u> "

Arctic Drilling

Minter '18 of Bloomberg

Adam Minter, Bloomberg, "Don't Fear China's Arctic Takeover", january 30th, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-01-30/don-t-fear-china-s-arctic-takeover

Last week, China said it plans to build a "Polar Silk Road" that will open shipping lanes across the largely pristine region at the top of the world. **It's an ambitious idea for a country that lacks an Arctic border, and it has raised concerns around the world about China's ultimate intentions and its capacity for environmental stewardship.** Although these are reasonable worries, they're almost certainly overblown.

Bershidsky '18 of The Dispatch

Leonid Bershidsky, The Dispatch, "Russia's winning the race to control the Arctic", May 30th, 2019, https://www.the-dispatch.com/opinion/20190530/bershidsky-russias-winning-race-to-control-arctic

The Northern Sea Route tracks Russia's Arctic coastline from the Barents Sea in the west to the Bering Strait in the east. It cuts cargo delivery times between Europe and Asia by 10 to 15 days compared to shipping via the Suez Canal. The Russian insistence that all Arctic traffic requires Moscow's permission long has been an irritant to the U.S. **Russia, meanwhile, has invested in opening and reopening military bases along its Arctic coast.** The bases cover almost the entire coastline and are, if required, ready to protect or disrupt any traffic along the North Sea Route. In a classic case of a great power competition — Who's got more hardware? — the U.S. faces an "icebreaker gap" compared with Russia.

BRI Unprofitable

BRI is profitable because Chinese Banks specifically choose projects for upside

Kharas 19 (April 2019, "China's Belt and Road: The New Geopolitics of Global Infrastructure Development", Brookings Institution) https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/FP_20190419_bri_interview.pdf) //NPT

We also should not mistake BRI for an aid program. Sometimes people try to compare BRI with the Marshall Plan, or something like that. From a Chinese point of view, **BRI is a way of making money**, **principally** for their **[Chinese] banks**. China has one of the largest financial systems in the world. Chinese banks in aggregate have maybe $35 trillion worth of assets. They've got almost no foreign assets. So, how are you going to get a better balanced portfolio? One way is to go abroad and try to have dollar-denominated assets.

I think there was a big push to see how they could make money, not just with the stimulus domestically, which I think all Chinese leaders knew had some limits, but then supplementing it by generating aggregate demand abroad. How are you going to do that? Most of these developing countries don't have the money to pay upfront, so China has to provide a package with financing. But that finance is not concessional, it's not cheap. One major critique of the BRI from recipient countries is that, in the negotiations, the Chinese have put almost all of the risk onto the recipient country, meaning that Beijing is getting decent rates of return, minimal levels of risk, and is using political power in order to drive down the risk of non-repayment. I think **we have to see these as money-making investments for the Chinese.**

Especially after the financial crisis, China also sensed an opportunity to take advantage of what was seen as disarray in the West to pursue some strategic objectives. This can be seen, to a certain degree, by the **countries** that **were chosen for this type of investment.** It starts with the hinterland, it starts with Southeast Asia, it starts with Pakistan and access to the sea. It obviously goes into Central Asia. There were a few other pieces of it in Africa, and increasingly in a couple of commodity-producing places in Latin America, where they're trying to secure either oil or essential foods or minerals. So, when people view the BRI as if it were traditional aid, they misrepresent the original purpose and motive. There's never been much of a secret about China's intentions. It's just not the way in which Western aid agencies typically operate.

Bubbles

Landry '18//Chinese investors under the BRI don't understand the markets they are investing in AND this experience gap results in risky investments that A. tradeoff with investments that could develop China and B. could have broader effects on the Chinese economy AND Western firms uniquely have experience investing in these countries

Landry, David. "The Belt and Road Bubble is Starting to Burst." Foreign Policy. June 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/27/the-belt-and-road-bubble-is-starting-to-burst/ //RJ

Through the Go Out policy and the Belt and Road Initiative, China's firms have been economically and politically incentivized to invest in countries where they have little to no experience. Chinese President Xi Jinping's trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative has backed the Go Out policy's economic incentives with a healthy dose of political pressure, reflecting China's desire to have its economic rise matched by political clout. **Chinese firms lack the experience of their Western counterparts when investing abroad;** some Western investments date back to colonial times. **Because of their late entry into new markets, Chinese firms may also be more likely to invest in lemons — projects deemed too unprofitable or risky by other investors. Chinese firms have also been taking on projects that are far outside their field of competence**. The Sicomines deal is a case in point, resulting in two Chinese construction giants now sharing a controlling stake in a copper mine. **The possibility has been raised that Chinese firms may be in a haste to invest in large projects, regardless of risk, because they aim to become too big to fail, with the expectation that they will be bailed out even if they throw money down the drain.** They may also be seeking to transfer assets abroad to shield them from the state's prying hands should their political fortunes turn. **Regardless of Chinese firms' motives for undertaking such risky projects abroad, failed investments are now fixtures of China's foreign investment portfolio. Furthermore, many of these projects are on the books of the Chinese policy banks that finance them. These banks expect all their loans to be repaid — and are unlikely to forgive them.** However, they will likely be forced to renegotiate or even reschedule many loans down the line. **The new rules the Chinese government has recently imposed on policy banks suggest that Beijing believes their lending poses a risk to the broader Chinese economy.** Meanwhile, risky ventures such as Sicomines carry a huge opportunity cost. While Go Out has funneled billions of dollars out of the Chinese economy, vast swaths of China remain underdeveloped. It's true that much of the Chinese market is saturated. But investments in Tibet and Xinjiang would likely yield better returns than those in Congo and South Sudan. As a bonus, they would also contribute to China's development and help ease some of its domestic tensions.

Coal

Japan and South Korea have incentive to keep exporting

Shashank Bengali, Los Angeles Times, "China, Japan and South Korea, while vowing to go green at home, promote coal abroad", May 13, 2019, https://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-indonesia-south-korea-coal-energy-finance-20190513-story.html

Analysts say that as global markets shift toward renewable sources such as solar and wind power, whose prices are falling, governments in these countries are looking abroad to protect domestic companies that manufacture coal plants and supply equipment like steam turbines and boilers. "**The** Chinese, **Japanese and Koreans have a lot of coal-fired power equipment that will not have a great deal of international value in another three to five years**," said Melissa Brown, energy finance consultant at the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis. "**So they're looking to partner with countries that can move forward quickly to put new coal-fired power capacity in place**." **They have found willing buyers in countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam, South Africa and Bangladesh,** where governments for now appear more concerned with building their economies and expanding access to electricity than with the environmental impact of burning more coal.

Coal crucial to fighing energy poverty; OW bc Clim change inevitable, promotes resilience to CC; Effects of climate change much smaller

China supporting more renewables internationally right now

John **Mathews**, China's Belt and Road as a conduit for clean power projects**, Energy Post,** 10-3-**2018**, https://energypost.eu/china-belt-and-road-renewable-energy-investments/, 7-19-2019

China's Belt and Road is a conduit for polluting investments by Chinese policy banks around the world, argues Kelly Sims Gallagher (The Fletcher School, Tufts University) in a Beyondbrics comment in the Financial Times on 10 August 2018. But when examined, this argument is not persuasive. If we use the same China Global Energy Finance (CGEF) database that Gallagher uses, it is easy to demonstrate the opposite finding, namely that **China's investments globally in power generation over the past five years have been more green than black**. In this commentary we use the CGEF data (housed at Boston University, or BU) to demonstrate that **over the past five years, more than 50% of China's investments in power generation projects around the world have been directed towards those sourced from water, wind and sun**. Moreover, we demonstrate tha**t China's investments in clean and green energy projects around the world have increased as a proportion of total power generation investments from 20% to 55% – or a 35% increase in a decade, with the most**

recent results indicating that green investments globally outrank investments in black thermal power projects.

Shabbir **Ahmad, Conversation,** 6-13-**2016** ["Is coal the only way to deal with energy poverty in developing economies?", https://theconversation.com/is-coal-the-only-way-to-deal-with-energy-poverty-in-developing-economies-54163?fbclid=IwAR3MheIultTl3UuqX_TO8w9s4IWGBcwMjoFD7zgSeEOfzhHt0DaM5vAgKmo 7-21-2019] klw

The availability of efficient and reliable energy for industrial, agricultural and household use is critical for productivity growth and improvement in human wellbeing. B**ut many people across the planet live in a state of energy poverty.** The energy-poor are people living without electricity services and clean energy – for cooking, lighting, heating and other daily needs. According to the World Bank, **one-third of the world's economies have severe energy crises and about 1.1 billion people lack access to electricity**. A large population in developing economies, particularly in Africa, relies on traditional biomass sources of energy that themselves cause problems, such as severe deforestation and carbon pollution. What's more, many inhabitants of these countries face power outages of up to 20 hours a day. **An economical and sustainable energy source for deprived populations is clearly needed. Enter coal: Coal is a relatively cheap, abundant and well-established source of energy,** but it's also a major source of carbon pollution. Hence the controversy about whether burning coal can end energy poverty in the coming decades. In the past, coal has occupied a significant share in the energy mix of developing economies, but it has been under attack due to its emissions, which include sulphur dioxide, nitrous oxide and carbon dioxide. Amid calls for the use of efficient and clean technologies for electricity generation, the world's largest producer and consumer of coal has already embarked on dynamic pathways to achieve energy efficiency and sustainability and combat carbon emissions. China's initiatives for boosting the use of renewable energy sources, cutting the use of high-ash coal and resuming import tariffs on coal have reshaped the global energy mix landscape. Likewise, other developing countries including India are changing their energy mix by shifting their focus to renewables to reduce their reliance on coal-based energy. Although more than 50% of India's new electricity generation is expected to be met by renewables, the country still needs to rely on coal-based generation to meet expanding demand. The World Bank has already paused funding for new coal power generation except for exceptional cases, leaving a question mark over coal as a cure for global energy poverty. But the slowdown in world coal demand is partly due to China's structural shift away from construction and export-led manufacturing, which has significantly reduced coal prices. This has, in turn, slashed revenues of many exporting countries. And the collapse in prices is resulting in the closure of many mining businesses as companies are unable to recover production costs. Still, **energy-poor developing economies need coal as a cheap and readily available resource to provide electricity for their growing populations** unless they find a way to completely replace it with alternative renewable sources. According to global statistics, coal contributed to 39% of the world's energy mix in 2014. The World Coal Association claims that abou**t 1 billion people around the globe have received electricity from coal-powered energy generation.** And that the industry has created 7 million jobs worldwide.

Chinese Coal losing money

Stefano Ambrogi, Carbon Tracker, "40% of China's coal power stations are losing money", 11 October 2018, https://www.carbontracker.org/40-of-chinas-coal-power-stations-are-losing-money/ //AS

Two fifths of China's coal power stations are loss-making and owners could save nearly $390 billion by closing plants in line with the Paris Climate Agreement, finds Carbon Tracker in the first study to use satellite images to assess the everyday use and on-going profitability of fossil fuel power plants. The financial think tank has developed a revolutionary new method to help policymakers and investors understand climate risk in countries with big fossil fuel power industries but inadequate information about plant activity. The technique is all the more timely as the U.N. IPCC in a major report this week said holding global warming to 1.5˚C will require much deeper cuts in the use of fossil fuels, especially coal...**40% of China's coal power stations**

are already losing money, and this could rise to 95% by 2040 because of the cost of complying with air pollution regulations and a rising carbon price

Green Tech Cheaper than Coal

Emma Foehringer Merchant, Green Tech Media, "Renewables May Prove Cheaper Than 96% of Coal Plants Worldwide by 2030", November 29, 2018, https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/renewables-may-prove-cheaper-than-96-of-coal-plants-2030#gs.1cxpec //AS

The uphill battle confronting coal seems to be getting steeper. A new global analysis of 6,685 coal plants finds tha**t it is now cheaper to build new renewable generation than to run 35 percent of coal plants worldwide.** **By 2030**, that percentage increases dramatically, with **renewables beating out 96 percent of today's existing and planned coal-fired generation.** The 4 percent exception is in markets with extremely low fuel costs, where coal is cheap and plentiful, or with uncertain policies for renewables, like Russia.

Dev Countries going to Renewables

Madeleine Cuff, GreenBiz, "Will power: Developing countries are driving the renewables transition, says BNEF", November 30, 2019, https://www.greenbiz.com/article/will-power-developing-countries-are-driving-renewables-transition-says-bnef

President Donald Trump may not have gotten the message that coal is the pariah at the global energy party, but it is becoming increasingly clear that almost every other world leader — and energy industry investor — has. A new report out from Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) reveals **developing nations are abandoning coal to switch their focus to rolling out renewable technology instead,** a shift in market dynamic that puts non-OECD countries in the driving seat of the green energy transition for the first time. According to the latest Climatescope report (PDF), which every year takes stock of clean energy activities across the world's developing nations, most global clean energy activity is taking place in non-OECD countries.

Shearer '19: Most renewables outside of BRI AND private investment in BRI in renewables

Shearer, Christine, and Tim Buckley. *China at a Crossroads: Continued Support for Coal Power Erodes Country's Clean Energy Leadership*. 2019. http://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/China-at-a-Crossroads_January-2019.pdf Accessed 4 Sept. 2019.//CM

International energy funding from China has been increasing under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in which China is offering to develop infrastructure worth an estimated US$6 trillion across 68 economically-diverse countries in Asia, Europe, and Africa. Although BRI is technology-agnostic, **most Chinese finance under BRI to date has gone to fossil fuels**: of the US$51.2 billion spent on electric power generation and transmission from 2014-2017, 36% (US$18.2 billion) was spent on coal. In comparison, 11% (US$5.9 billion) was spent on solar and wind energy.6 **Most of China's foreign investment in renewables has been outside BRI countries**.7 **The Chinese government has identified coal plant construction and operation as a strategic investment for international development and state support for the country. It is a sector through which Chinese technology, equipment, and services can be exported, particularly as domestic deployments taper off**. Under this model, **financing is often contingent on business deals for Chinese companies**, allowing the

Chinese government to prop up its declining domestic coal industry by subsidising its development overseas. Notably, **while China's state-owned enterprises remain heavily concentrated in coal, private sources of BRI finance from China are far more active in renewables. This suggests market signals are increasingly directing investments to climate-friendly sectors,8 which the central government ignores by concentrating its state-owned entities on coal investments.** This funding for coal comes as financial institutions around the world are moving away from thermal coal. In 2013, the World Bank decided to limit its investments in coal-fired power plants, and with its exit from the increasingly controversial Kosovo coal power plant project as of October 2018, the Bank has no more coal plants in its portfolio of investments. The European Union (EU), United States (U.S.), and most multilateral development banks have progressively followed suit by restricting or ending their coal lending, including the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In 2015, export credit agencies (ECAs) within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) agreed to limit the types of coal-fired power plants that could be financed to those that meet carbon dioxide (CO_2) performance requirements, and many private financial institutions have decided to limit their coal funding. A survey of international coal financing by state-owned policy banks finds China is by far the largest supporter of future coal plants abroad with 44GW of capacity, followed by South Korea with 14GW and Japan with 10GW.9

Yellen '19: China building more coal as of 2019, needs to export coal

Yellen, David. "The Chinese Export We Should Be Targeting: Climate Change." *Atlantic Council*, 2019, www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/the-chinese-export-we-should-be-targeting-climate-change. Accessed 1 Sept. 2019. //CM

China has **cast itself as a leader in combatting climate change** on the global stage, particularly since the United States left the Paris Climate Accords, even as it is in the process of building or planning to build at least 300 coal plants around the world, from the Philippines to Egypt. It has been instrumental in making renewable energy economical by building cheap solar panels and exporting across the world, and **it has made extraordinary progress in cleaning its domestic emissions—largely through closing coal plants. But that domestic progress comes at a cost:** namely, **2.3 million coal miners' jobs are projected to be cut by 2020**. **Creating demand abroad allows the central government to protect those jobs**—both **by stimulating coal demand abroad and exporting its labor**—**while claiming environmental stewardship at home.** And despite ambitious domestic goals for coal use reduction, China's new coal mine approvals have risen 500 percent so far in 2019. China's coal export push has been particularly pronounced in some of the fastest growing energy demand centers: East Africa and in its own backyard, in Pakistan. Take Kenya, for example, which **recently contracted with a Chinese company to construct a coal plant** in Lamu, in the northeast of the country. More than **70 percent of the country's electricity generation comes from renewable sources**, and it has the largest geothermal resources on the continent—a renewable that does not suffer from intermittency. Last year, President Uhuru Kenyatta **announced plans for the country to reach 100 percent clean energy by 2020**. **Research suggests that tapping into the prodigious geothermal resources would be the best play for Kenya to electrify, and cheaper than coal**—the country also has no experience in coal power or mining. Coal is currently better for powering certain industrial plants, but the country primarily wants to electrify, not enhance heavy industry. In other words, **there are no apparent economic or security incentives to choosing coal over geothermal—certainly none that outweigh those incentives** for geothermal. **The plant will also be in an environmentally fragile region that is economically reliant on its fishing industry**; the strain of increased population and coal pollution—both air and water—**could drive thousands into poverty. Pressure from China is the driving force behind Kenyan coal development.**

Because Kenya has no legacy coal industry**, China does not just sell coal, it plans to build and operate the plant by sending Chinese coal workers abroad.** And Kenya has good reason to try to appease the Asian powerhouse: its debt to China has swelled to almost $10 billion and prompted speculation that China might seize Mombasa, Kenya's most important port, if the African nation does not pay up. After severe public backlash, a Kenyan court has temporarily halted the coal plant's construction pending a more thorough environmental assessment—but China's push for the project continues. China's most ambitious effort to date is in Pakistan, where it began constructing coal plants after Pakistan's blackouts in 2014-15. Before the projects began, Pakistan generated less than 1 percent of its power from coal. China has brought Pakistan's coal capacity from 190 megawatts (MW) to 15,300—threatening to quadruple the country's emissions by 2030. China is leveraging its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to push coal in developing countries, despite coal's unpopularity in those countries—less than a third of the population supports coal investment—especially compared to renewables, which are supported by more than 85 percent. China does invest in renewables as part of BRI, but that investment pales in comparison to coal—between 2014 and 2019, China built 12.6 gigawatts (GW) of renewable capacity internationally compared to 67.9 GW of coal.

Climate Change

Liviy, 3-11-**2019**, Bank of China to Reevaluate Dam Project That Threatens Endangered Orangutan with Extinction, Mighty Earth, http://www.mightyearth.org/bank-of-china-to-reevaluate-dam-project/, RJ

The Bank of China has announced it will re-evaluate its support for the Batang Toru dam project that threatens the Tapanuli orangutan. In response to this development, Mighty Earth CEO Glenn Hurowitz released the following statement:

"We are grateful that Bank of China is taking the responsible step to reevaluate this project given the threat it poses to the Tapanuli orangutan and the entire Batang Toru ecosystem.

"The Batang Toru dam would permanently disrupt the habitat of the Tapanuli orangutan and would contribute to the first extinction of a great ape – our closest cousins in the animal kingdom – in all our recorded history. We are therefore confident that this review will lead to the cancellation of the project. Mighty Earth is ready to participate in this re-evaluation process and help facilitate a positive outcome.

"We strongly support development in Indonesia, but that requires some attention to be paid to ensuring that infrastructure projects are located in the right place**. The Batang Toru dam is proposed for exactly the wrong place, with a higher density of Tapanuli orangutans than surrounding areas**. Given that fact, we are confident that upon review, the Bank of China will recognize that there are far superior development options, such as expanding the nearby Sarulla Geothermal Plant, which has more energy potential than the Batang Toru dam and doesn't put the ecosystem at risk. We have also supported responsible run of the river hydro development in Indonesia in the past, and are happy to work with all stakeholders to find better locations and additional financing for hydro infrastructure. **"More broadly, we appreciate the significant gestures that China has made in recent weeks to address the global destruction of forests. This announcement builds upon Chinese state-owned food company COFCO's emerging leadership in tackling agriculture-linked deforestation. Together, these actions suggest that China is starting to take real steps toward ensuring that overseas investments like its Belt and Road Initiative have a positive impact on our shared planet**. "Responsible Chinese international financing would be a huge boost for the environment and local peoples everywhere, and has the potential to dramatically change – for the better – the way that China is perceived around the world."

Nelson 18, 11-12-18, Aurthur Nelson, "EU states call for tough action on deforestation to meet 2020 UN goal" https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/nov/12/eu-states-call-for-tough-action-on-deforestation-to-meet-2020-un-goal-amsterdam-declaration (SJ)

The **UK, France and Germany have called on the European commission to launch tough new action to halt deforestation by the end of the year.** A long-delayed EU action plan should be brought forward "as soon as possible", says a letter to the commission sent by the Amsterdam Declaration group of countries, which also includes Italy, the Netherlands and Norway. To help meet a UN goal of halting deforestation by 2020, **the EU should show "a leadership role, mobilising its political and market leverage, and promoting broader international dialogue and cooperation",** the letter says. Actions should be taken to align "economic opportunities" with "responsible management of global supply chains", says the letter signed by Denmark's environment minister, Jakob Ellemann-Jensen.

Strong EU laws could reduce the ecological footprint of commodities such as soy, palm oil and beef, which drive deforestation in the Amazon, according to Greenpeace. Sébastien Risso, the group's EU forestry director, said: "Ignoring the problem and delaying action will only move us deeper into catastrophic climate change and a major global species extinction."

European Environment Agency, 11-15-16, "Forests" https://www.eea.europa.eu/soer-2015/europe/forests (SJ)

The development of human infrastructure, land-use change, excessive forest harvesting and forest fires in Europe has resulted in a landscape of fragmented forests. This reduces the capacity of forest-dependent species to move to other forested areas and their ability to survive and adapt to climate change. Forests play an important role in the conservation of biological diversity. **The area of protected forests in Europe increased by around half a million hectares annually between 2000 and 2010. Half of the protected forests are managed for conservation of biodiversity.** In Europe, protected forest areas account for more than 45% of the Natura 2000 protected areas, 31.3% of the national designated protected areas, and about 12% of the total forest area. Despite the efforts to halt loss of biodiversity, 80% of forest habitat assessments still have unfavourable conservation status.

IUCN 19, 2-11-19, "Improving European action on forest management" https://www.iucn.org/news/europe/201902/improving-european-action-forest-management (SJ)

The European Commission launched its consultation on 'Deforestation and forest degradation – stepping up EU action' in January. There are three weeks left to send in contributions. Forest area of the size of Portugal was lost globally between 1990 and 2008 because of EU consumption of commodities grown on deforested land, shows a Commission study. However, forests play an important role in providing a wide variety of ecosystem services. For example, one third of the world's cities obtain their drinking water from protected forested watersheds and 20% of European forests are dedicated to protect water and soils. In this context, Luc Bas, Director of the IUCN Regional Office, spoke during a high-level international conference at the European Parliament in Brussels, 'Forests at the heart of sustainable development'. At the event, all the different speakers highlighted the importance of forests and the wide variety of social, economic and environmental functions they harbour, and how they play a key role in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Underlining how forests sustain livelihoods both in urban and rural landscapes, but also how forests and their services are under thread. In addition to the global context of deforestation and forest degradation, also the huge potential for forest landscape restoration in Europe was highlighted. **Under the Bonn challenge many countries, including the US, have committed a pledge towards 350 million hectares of restoration by 2030.** In Europe, for now only Scotland has pledged a contribution. "We are looking forward to more pledges from EU Member States.

Restoration has multiple benefits, mitigation, adaptation, improved watersheds, soil retention etc. It is thus even more surprising that we are still awaiting European pledges since 2010" said Luc Bas, Director of the IUCN European Regional Office. **IUCN hopes that the consultation of the European Commission will lead to improvement of the actions of the European Union to halt deforestation and very much encourages members to contribute.**

Xia 19, 4-26-19, Li Xia, "Interview: BRI's green commitment significant to global development -- NPO leader" http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/26/c_138012531.htm (SJ)

BEIJING, April 26 (Xinhua) -- **China's commitment to make the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) a green cause advancing sustainable development is admirable and far-sighted**, said the deputy chief of a global research organization. **"Following through on this commitment will be good for China, for the partner countries, and for the rest of the world,"** Manish Bapna, executive vice president and managing director of World Resources Institute (WRI), said in a recent interview. **"We see signs that China is taking this commitment seriously."** On **Thursday, at a thematic forum of the second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF), China officially launched the International Coalition for Green Development on the Belt and Road to facilitate the implementat**ion of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development through a green construction of the Belt and Road. Under the coalition Chinese and foreign leading agencies will work closely together to conduct research and make policy recommendations on key issues as well as facilitate international dialogues. "In the near future, the establishment of this coalition could raise the visibility and importance of green infrastructure and facilitate deeper cooperation between BRI partners," said Bapna, whose nonprofit organization was invited to the forum.

Carbon unprofitable- will stop making them

https://www.carbontracker.org/40-of-chinas-coal-power-stations-are-losing-money/

According to a new report from Carbon Tracker, which used satellite data to estimate power plant activity, two-fifths of China's coal power stations are already loss-making and China could save nearly $390 billion by closing them down. By 2040, they estimate, 95 percent of China's coal plants will be loss-making, through a combination of a rising carbon price and clean air regulation. As soon as 2021, they say, it will be cheaper to build new onshore wind farms than to operate existing coal plants, and installing new solar PV will be cheaper than running coal plants by 2025

Climate Action Organization '18- 97% likely to blow past the brink

https://climateactiontracker.org/global/cat-thermometer/

The 'median' is based on the probability distribution generated by the climate model (MAGICC) when it takes into account uncertainties in our knowledge of climate sensitivity, the carbon cycle, and effect of greenhouse gases, aerosols, and other factors that are used to calculate the temperatures. The probability distribution enables us to provide more information for policy makers and stakeholders about the likelihood of goals being met, or specific temperatures being exceeded. **The emissions pledge pathway that includes (I) NDCs has over 90% probability of exceeding 2°C. The current policy pathways have a higher than 97% probability of exceeding 2°C.**

Temple of MIT- have to suck carbon out of air to avoid the brink https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610927/the-daunting-math-of-climate-change-means-well-need-carbon-capture/

At current rates of greenhouse-gas emissions, the world could lock in 1.5 ˚C of warming as soon as 2021, an analysis by the website Carbon Brief has found. **We're on track to blow the carbon budget for 2 ˚C by 2036**. Amid this daunting climate math, many **researchers argue that capturing carbon dioxide from power plants, factories, and the air will have to play a big part in any realistic efforts to limit the dangers of global warming.**

Mann '18- takes centuries to feel effects of CC

https://ideas.ted.com/the-worst-effects-of-climate-change-may-not-be-felt-for-centuries-so-how-should-we-think-about-it-now/

Researchers Rob DeConto and David Pollard went on to perform that analysis, which was published in *Nature* in March 2016. They said there was a chance that Antarctica could fall apart by 2100, and therefore the seas could rise higher and faster than the IPCC imagined possible. "For a geophysicist, what's going on is stunning," DeConto told me. "We used to believe these systems needed thousands of years to make these shifts. Instead it's happening so fast that it's terrifying. **Conceivably, you could start seeing truly bad effects in a hundred years."** And *this* is one of the great difficulties in thinking about climate change: what seems terrifyingly fast on the geological scale is unfathomably long on the human scale. **By "truly bad effects" DeConto meant flooded coasts, vanished islands, awful droughts and, maybe, storms of unprecedented power**. But even if these occur in the time he fears — even if they transpire in the geologically insignificant span of a century

Hausfather '19- passing even if we meet the Paris accord

Zeke Hausfather. "Is 3.5 C of Arctic warming 'locked in'? » Yale Climate Connections." Yale Climate Connections. 19. https://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2019/03/is-3-5-c-of-arctic-warming-locked-in/. //SH

Warmer temperatures in the Arctic resulted in a record low in the winter sea ice extent between 2015–2018 (Overland et al., 2018). Indeed, under a medium- or high-emission scenario, projected temperature changes for the Arctic will follow a winter warming trend at least double the rate for the northern hemisphere (AMAP 2017a). **This means that even if countries manage to cut GHG emissions to the targets outlined in the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change, winter temperatures in the Arctic will still be 3 to 5 C higher by 2050** and 5 to 9 C higher by 2080, relative to 1986–2005 levels. In fact, even if we stopped all emissions overnight, winter temperatures in the Arctic will still increase by 4 to 5 C compared to the late twentieth century. This increase is locked into the climate system by GHGs already emitted and ocean heat storage (AMAP 2017a)

Hilton 18'

According to a new report from Carbon Tracker, which used satellite data to estimate power plant activity, two-fifths of **China's coal power stations are already loss-making and China could save nearly $390 billion by closing them down. By 2040, they estimate, 95 percent of China's coal plants will be loss-making, through a combination of a rising carbon price and clean air regulation. As soon as 2021, they say, it will be cheaper to build new onshore wind farms than to operate existing coal plants, and installing new solar PV will be cheaper than running coal plants by 2025.**

Chinese Heg Expansion

Chinese Overreach

Stewart '19 - China need new markets for construction and infra

Ian Stewart. "The BRI shows China's emergence as a global economic power." Reaction. 2019. https://reaction.life/the-bri-shows-chinas-emergence-as-a-global-economic-power/. //SH

Slowing activity at home has reinforced the search for new sources of growth. China is grappling with too much unproductive capacity, the consequence of a multi-decade investment boom that is now drawing to an end. China's sizeable construction and infrastructure sectors needs new opportunities. And shifting some of China's vast foreign exchange reserves from US Treasury bonds into overseas infrastructure offers the benefits of diversification and, and potentially, higher returns.

Wharton University of Pennsylvania - 4-30-2019 ["China's Belt and Road Initiative: Why the Price Is Too High available online at: https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-why-the-price-is-too-high/ accessed - 7-15-2019]cdm

On their own, many of the BRI projects would not produce sufficient returns on investment, and that explains why private investors are not attracted to them, said Wharton management professor Minyuan Zhao. "China is hoping that by coordinating all these projects – by connecting all the railways, connecting the waterways with the railways — every single project will generate more return in the aggregate." In that context, China's state sponsorship of BRI makes sense, she added. "With state sponsorship, you create enough externality to make every single investment, which would otherwise be un-investible, a good project." She noted that many of the projects are in some of the "most challenging geographic areas and institutional environments," and the key is to generate "enough momentum for a coordinated effort."

Hutchinson '19//BRI stagnation is short-term it is key to China's foreign policy and creates positive political and economic returns

Despite downturn longterm China will still continue BRI alone

"Belt and Road in 2019: Recalibration or Retrenchment?" China Business Review, 24 May 2019, www.chinabusinessreview.com/belt-and-road-in-2019-recalibration-or-retrenchment/. //TP

China's economy is slowing; fourth quarter GDP in 2018 fell to a nearly three-decade low. Foreign companies are projected to have weaker growth due to softening in the China market and Chinese companies, too, may find themselves harder-pressed to pay their debts. On the domestic political front, recent BRI loans have triggered a "wave of grumbling in China" from citizens who feel those funds would be better spent at home in a country that still defines itself as a developing econom**y. With economic stressors continuing to grow, how will Xi's signature initiative to connect Eurasia hold up in the year ahead? One thing is certain: the Belt and Road is not going away.** When BRI was first announced, called One Belt One Road at the time, China's foreign currency reserves stood at some $4 trillion. In an effort to offload pressure on the yuan and provide contracts for Chinese companies, Beijing took an interest in spending some of those reserves overseas. Five years later, reserves have fallen to $3 trillion and hopes that BRI will help internationalize the renminbi now seem far-fetched. Chinese companies are often heavily saddled with debts that have led a record number into default. As noted in the Financial Times, "big Chinese state-owned enterprises that build, operate, and invest in many BRI projects are—on average—extremely highly leveraged." In addition, if the fanfare around competitive neutrality from high-level Chinese officials is to be believed, and as more resources are spent to prop up private enterprise, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) may see their access to capital curtailed in the long run. If the cash spigot for these government-backed companies begins to dry up, future BRI projects may fall victim to the drought. Large SOEs are not the only ones facing economic pressure, though. In recent months, factory activity in China has been steadily contracting, with export orders falling at rates not seen since the financial crisis. At the same time, Chinese companies are facing stress from US tariffs, according to the American Chamber of Commerce. These headwinds for the Chinese economy may begin to whittle away at broad domestic support**. Despite these stressors, the most likely course for the Belt and Road this year seems to be one of recalibration. Economic growth in China is not the only engine driving expenditures on the Belt and Road; the program's political support and significance to Xi Jinping and the CCP could be just as important, if not more so than its economic rationale.** Experts maintain that the link between domestic Chinese economic growth and expenditures along BRI is not necessarily strong. Matthew Goodman, a senior scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), does not think the basic constraint is "financial capability as produced by economic growth." **Even if China's economic slowdown, as it is, shrinks the BRI budget, the impact would not be as catastrophic as the steady stream of 'worst yet' numbers might suggest. Although consumer confidence and the manufacturing PMI may look bleak, the initiative still maintains some domestic support.** Jonathan Hillman, Director of the Reconnecting Asia Project at CSIS, points out that part of the reason BRI has not flopped is because many of its projects are undertaken domestically, for example, the upgrade to the airport in Urumqi, a major domestic BRI hub in China's far west Xinjiang Province. **Belt and Road projects also offer a pressure release valve for economic unrest, as workers from China's Rust Belt are sometimes able to find work on construction projects dotting the landscapes of participant countries. Goodman pointed out that China "still [has] a fairly significant pool of capital that they could deploy to this initiative if they wanted to," adding that "at some point, longer term, if they're only creating white elephants and things that are not generating a real return, that is going to pinch. But I don't think that's a constraint on the macro-level in the near term."** Xiaosong Wang, a professor of Economics at Renmin University of China agrees that "**because the central government's established policy remains unchanged, and the overall economics of supporting the Belt and Road Initiative are positive, then concrete measures will not undergo fundamental changes, and the pace of the Belt and Road Initiative will not stop."**

Ciurtin '17 – the BRI requires $3 trillion for the first stage, something that China can't do alone; without the EU, other actors can't feasibly join China in funding the initiative

Ciurtin, Horia. "A Pivot to Europe: China's Belt-And-Road Balancing Act." European Institute of Romania. Dec. 2017. http://ier.gov.ro/wp-content/uploads/publicatii/Final_Policy-Brief-5_Horia-Ciurtin-A-Pivot-to-Europe_web.pdf //TP

However impressive the sums might appear at a first glance, they fall short of the needed amount. The first stages of developing the Belt-and-Road require no less than $3 trillion (according to some accounts, even more). And *this is a task that China* – despite its constant growth and increasing economic power – *cannot accomplish alone.*36 *It really needs co-interested parties*. *And that is where the European Union* (with its unbearable economic force) *comes into the spotlight*: it is not supposed to be just a "passive" destination at the end of the road, but also a co-owner in this joint venture. *Without European cash – from public and private sources – it is highly improbable that other actors could feasibly join China in funding the initiative.* Russia, Iran, Turkey or Kazakhstan (or even Japan and India37) are in an entirely different economic league than what is needed for such a massive project. *For a path to Europe to emerge, Europe itself is needed along the way.* In reality, EU-based institutions already are the largest lenders in the region (see Figure 3 below). And Europe is highly interested in developing infrastructure and connectivity with its marginal areas.

The EU can co-finance the BRI by "joining forces"

Casarini 15 Nicola Casarini [Senior Fellow for East Asia at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and a nonresident Global Fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington], 10-2015, "Is Europe to Benefit from China's Belt and Road Initiative?," Paper prepared for the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) driv //DF

The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative – unveiled by President Xi Jinping in late 2013 – is China's major diplomatic outreach in decades. The project combines a land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and a sea-based 21st Century Maritime Silk Road which connects China to Europe through South East Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East, covering areas generating 55 percent of the world's GNP, 70 percent of the global population, and 75 percent of known energy reserves. The stated aim of this grandiose project is to boost connectivity and commerce between China and 65 countries traversed by the OBOR. China's total financial commitment to the project is expected to reach 1.4 trillion dollars. Beijing has already committed around 300 billion dollars for infrastructural loans and trade financing in the coming years, a sum which includes a 40 billion dollar contribution to the "Silk Road Fund" for infrastructural development and the 50 billion dollar initial capital (to be raised eventually to 100 billion dollars) allocated to the China-initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).1 Sitting at the end-point of the OBOR, Europe st34ands to benefit greatly from these funds. At the last EU-China Summit [in] on 29 June 2015, Jean-Claude Juncker, the European Commission President, called for the creation of synergies between his European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) and China's Belt and Road initiative.2 Premier Li Keqiang replied to Juncker by making a multibillion dollar investment commitment to the EFSI, though no precise amount has been unveiled so far.3 Totalling 315 billion euros, Juncker's plan aims at relaunching Europe's growth and job creation in sectors ranging from innovation to research, education, and transport infrastructure. The Belt and Road initiative, on the other hand, serves the purpose of reviving the Chinese economy, now at a historical juncture transitioning from export-oriented growth to a new model based on consumption and outward investment. Loans for infrastructure projects abroad are expected to contribute to upgrading the Chinese economy at a time of domestic overcapacity and to the restructuring of various sectors, including heavy industries involved in the building and maintenance of transportation and energy infrastructure. Trade financing would serve to maintain existing – as well as find new – markets for Chinese products. **Policymakers in Brussels and Beijing are currently identifying appropriate cooperation mechanisms between** Xi's **Belt and Road and Juncker's Fund. Ideas** presented so far **include** the establishment of a China-EU joint investment fund to support project shareholding, joint contracting and **co-financing.**4 Infrastructure projects in Southeast Europe and the Mediterranean are likely to become the first concrete examples of this enhanced Sino-European connectivity.

Greater Sino-European connectivity will inevitably entail some economic and political costs for Europe – and the same could be said for China. Yet, the One Belt, One Road remains, ultimately, a great opportunity for a continent that is still struggling to recover from the crisis. Beijing has faith in Europe's recovery, as demonstrated by the multibillion euro investment commitment from China to Juncker's newly created European Fund. **What is urgently needed in Europe is a comprehensive response to the Belt and Road initiative.** The focus should not be limited to economy and trade, but also include political and security issues. For instance, the OBOR plans to go through the same routes used by the refugees fleeing the Syrian conflict and other war-torn societies. Given the significant funds already committed to infrastructural projects in Southeast Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, the stability of these regions should be a matter of priority for China as well. **The OBOR should thus compel Brussels and Beijing to seek ways to join forces and contribute to bringing stability and prosperity to Europe**'s neighbourhood without relinquishing, however, those norms and practices that Europe has long fostered. Should the two succeed in creating effective mechanisms and ad hoc projects to address some of the root causes of the refugee crisis, this would help foster a positive image of China – and contribute to mitigating the costs of the Belt and Road initiative for some sectors of the European economy.

Landry '18 – Chinese investors under the BRI don't understand the markets they are investing in AND this experience gap results in risky investments that A. tradeoff with investments that could develop China and B. could have broader effects on the Chinese economy AND Western firms uniquely have experience investing in these countries

Landry, David. "The Belt and Road Bubble is Starting to Burst." Foreign Policy. June 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/27/the-belt-and-road-bubble-is-starting-to-burst/ //RJ

In a sense, the Sicomines resources-for-infrastructure agreement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been just another underperforming deal in a country with no shortage of them. But it is also more than that — namely, a window into the flaws at the heart of Chinese international economic policy, which is already costing its economy dearly. At the turn of the century, *the Chinese government started implementing its "Go Out" policy, which sought to incentivize* *domestic firms to look for business overseas*. Chinese firms would invest and seek contracts abroad, which would make them more competitive globally while alleviating some of the pressures of a domestic market that was starting to saturate. At the same time, the move would allow Chinese firms to secure new markets for their exports. *The policy was supported by cheap and easy credit from China's policy banks. Chinese firms responded to these incentives. Fueled by easy credit and the impetus to go out, many of them have been taking increasingly risky projects. Unsurprisingly, many of these projects have underperformed massively. And the impacts for Chinese banks, and through them the Chinese economy, are now becoming visible. Consider Congo's Sicomines agreement.* In 2007, the Congolese government signed an enormous resource-for-infrastructure deal originally valued at $9 billion with a consortium of Chinese companies. According to the fleshed-out version of the agreement, signed in 2008, more than 10 million metric tons of copper and some 600,000 metric tons of cobalt were ceded to the newly minted Sicomines, of which the major Chinese state-owned enterprises China Railway Engineering Corp. (CREC) and Sinohydro had majority ownership. In exchange, Sicomines would build $6 billion (later adjusted to $3 billion) worth of infrastructure and invest $3 billion in the mine itself. China's Export-Import Bank agreed to finance the whole thing, with the guarantee that the mine's output would serve to repay its loans down the line. *Ostensibly, the deal was good for China*. Through Sicomines, it would gain a new friend in Joseph Kabila. (Relevant here is that in 2007, unlike today, Kabila had just won Congo's first ever democratic election and was portrayed as a figure of hope for stability, democracy, and development.) The Chinese side of the agreement would also secure massive mineral reserves. Finally, China would offload some of its domestic overcapacity by carrying out $9 billion worth of investments halfway across the world. According to new research — based on dozens of interviews and an in-depth financial model of the agreement — the deal had a net value more than $10 billion to the Chinese consortium when it was signed. But the deal soured. *The Chinese consortium misjudged the market it was entering.* As can be expected from any venture in one of the world's least stable countries, also infamous for its infrastructure deficit, massive delays plagued the development of the mine. For example, after failing to secure electricity from the Congolese grid at the agreed-upon price, Sicomines had to import electricity from Zambia. It is now in the process of building a hydroelectric plant, without which the mine cannot produce at full capacity. Sicomines also got unlucky. In 2013, news broke out that the total estimated copper reserves in its concession had been adjusted down to 6.8 million metric tons — a 35 percent drop. Mirroring this drop, the consortium readjusted its copper production targets down by 37.5 percent. To make things worse, in the years following the signature of the deal, the price of minerals took a hit. Copper now costs under $7,000 per metric ton, down from about $9,000 when the deal was finalized in April 2008. As things stood in late 2016, Sicomines may result in a substantial net loss for the Chinese consortium. *The Sicomines case is not unusual. China's mammoth firms frequently make massive losses on foreign investment ventures.* A recent Foreign Policy piece points out that *individuals and firms have made up an increasingly large share of China's total foreign asset purchases in recent years*, from 12 percent in 2011 to nearly 40 percent in 2017, as the People's Bank of China's share of total foreign direct investment shrank. *It turns out that these new investors are poor asset judges. As their share of China's portfolio grew, its aggregate returns dwindled. In 2016, the total return on Chinese foreign investment was 0.4 percent, which is dramatically lower than the 4 percent earned by foreign reserves. Through* the Go Out policy and *the Belt and Road Initiative, China's firms have been economically and politically incentivized to invest in countries where they have little to no experience. Chinese President Xi Jinping's trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative has backed the Go Out policy's economic incentives with a healthy dose of political pressure, reflecting China's desire to have its economic rise matched by political clout. Chinese firms lack the experience of their Western counterparts when investing abroad; some Western investments date back to colonial times*. Because of their late entry into new markets, Chinese firms may also be more likely to invest in lemons — projects deemed too unprofitable or risky by other investors. *Chinese firms have also been taking on projects that are far outside their field of competence*. The Sicomines deal is a case in point, resulting in two Chinese construction giants now sharing a controlling stake in a copper mine. The possibility has been raised that Chinese firms may be in a haste to invest in large projects, regardless of risk, because they aim to become too big to fail, with the expectation that they will be bailed out even if they throw money down the drain. They may also be seeking to transfer assets abroad to shield them from the state's prying hands should their political fortunes turn. Regardless of Chinese firms' motives for undertaking such risky projects abroad, *failed investments are now* *fixtures of China's foreign investment portfolio*. Furthermore, *many of these projects are on the books of the Chinese policy banks that finance them. These banks [expect](#) all their loans to be repaid — and are unlikely to forgive them. However, they will* likely *be forced to renegotiate or even reschedule many loans down the line. The new [rules](#) the Chinese government has recently imposed on policy banks suggest that Beijing believes their lending poses a risk to the broader Chinese economy.* Meanwhile, *risky ventures such as Sicomines carry a huge opportunity cost. While Go Out has funneled billions of dollars out of the Chinese economy, vast swaths of China remain underdeveloped*. It's true that much of the Chinese market is saturated. But *investments in Tibet and Xinjiang would* likely *yield better returns than those in Congo and South Sudan*. As a bonus, *they would* also *contribute to China's development and help ease some of its domestic tensions.*

Van der Putten, Frans-Paul. "Europe and China's New Silk Roads." Real Instituto Elcano. Dec. 2016. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Europe_and_Chinas_New_Silk_Roads_0.pdf //RJ

While China's OBOR approach has been mainly targeting the CEE and Mediterranean countries, other parts of Europe have not been entirely neglected and the list of countries forming part of OBOR is evolving. Beyond regional clusters that play an important role for China's practical outreach, countries can be categorized very roughly by distinguishing three factors (see Figure 1 below): (1) whether a country hosts major concrete 'OBOR projects'; (2) whether China attaches great importance and attention to a country in terms of its OBOR outreach; and (3) whether a country is strongly receptive to China's OBOR initiative. Apart from the railway projects in Western European countries and China's interest in the United Kingdom's role in the internationalization of the RMB, **the Chinese government has shown an interest in cooperating with mainly Western European countries – such as the United Kingdom, France, Portugal and Spain – on OBOR projects in 'third countries' – that is, countries in Asia, Africa and even Latin America. China shows active willingness to cooperate with France in francophone Africa, with Spain in Spanish-speaking countries in Latin America, and with Portugal in Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa and Brazil.**

Debt Traps

Moak 19 4-15-19 "European nations should join BRI" Asia Times https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/04/opinion/european-nations-should-join-bri/

Sri Lanka, the country China critics like to use as an example of Chinese "debt trap" diplomacy, does not think so. According to two economists, Dushni Weerakoon and Sisira Jayasuriya, **Sri Lanka's repayment problems are not of China's making. Chinese loans account for only 10% of the country's total foreign debt. Most Chinese loans are concessional with reasonably good terms, a fixed interest rate of 2%,**

other fees of 0.5% and average maturity dates of between 15 and 20 years. Though such terms are not as generous as those of Japanese loans, they are not outlandish either, according to the Sir Lankan economists. Non-concessional loans make up the other 40% and they account for 20% of the total in that category. **The remaining 90% of Sri Lanka's debt is owed to international financial institutions in the forms of sovereign bonds and foreign-currency-dominated loans. In 2007, the loans totaled US$700 million, but mushroomed to $15.3 billion by 2018.** The proceeds were largely applied in paying off old loans because economic growth stagnated or even declined because of a civil war and lack of measures to spur growth, dis-enabling the economy economy from generating sufficient revenues to repay loans. As if that was not bad enough, **Western or Japanese-owned or controlled financial institutions imposed** the "Washington Consensus" **loan conditionality, requiring borrowers to adopt austerity measures or refrain from deficit financing during periods of economic slowdown or recessions**. According to Columbia University economist and Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, that conditionality was meant to have borrowers repay loans first before spending on stimulus programs. **Insufficient revenues forced Sri Lanka to cut back spending, reducing the size of the public service and other expenditures, sliding further down the growth slope and increasing indebtedness.** And on top of this, the weakening global economy caused Sri Lanka's exports to fall, exacerbating its current-account deficits.

Xu '18

https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/18104-xiang_xu.pdf

By reviewing existing debates on the connections between these three collapses and China during the same period, we explain why these collapses have not yet happened in China and assess their effects on China's political and economic system. First, we find that China was able to avoid a Soviet-style collapse through a higher degree of political consolidation, an economic structure that gives rise to market-oriented competitive enterprises, and a far more developed set of institutions. Second, China was able to avoid an AFC-style financial crisis by keeping a closed capital account, implementing prudent external financial policies, preventing yuan from depreciating, and through fiscal stimulus. Third, China was able to minimize the impact of the GFC through a 4-trillion-yuan stimulus plan, though this plan, we note, has created other problems in the GFC's aftermath.

Zhou of South China Morning Post 2019,

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3008326/why-chinas-belt-and-road-loans-may-not-be-debt-trap-other

The conclusions, based on the studies of Chinese debt renegotiations with 24 countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, challenge claims that the Belt and Road Initiative will leave countries with debts they cannot repay and force them to hand over assets or natural resources to Beijing. **The report concluded that Beijing had renegotiated about US$50 billion of loans and in most cases, debts had either been written off or payment was deferred.** One example it gave was **Cuba, which had US$2.8 billion in debts written off in 2010,** while last week Ethiopia announced that Beijing had forgiven interest owed on belt and road loans. The publication of the research on Monday followed the end of the second Belt and Road Forum in Beijing on Saturday, where Chinese President Xi Jinping attempted to allay growing international complaints that the plan was a "predatory debt trap" and promised to promote high financial and environmental standards under the initiative. **The study said debt forgiveness was usually driven by Beijing's desire to improve relations or relieve acute financial distress – and was often accompanied by extra loans to fund more infrastructure projects.** At last year's Forum on China-Africa Cooperation **Beijing wrote off US$7 million of Botswana's debt, while agreeing to lend an undisclosed sum to finance new infrastructure projects.**

Dutch Disease

CBC '13

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/dutch-disease-builds-healthier-economy-economist-says-1.1339490

In his report, Gordon writes the number of jobs paying $35 per hour or more was largely unchanged between 2002 and 2008. More than 60 per cent of the manufacturing jobs lost paid less than $19.05/hour — the median wage in 2002, the report said. **"The shift out of manufacturing was also accompanied by an increase in real wages, both in the economy as a whole and in the manufacturing sector.... The term 'Dutch disease' is a misnomer**; the Canadian manufacturing sector was arguably healthier in 2008 than it was in 2002," Gordon wrote in the report.

Dumping

Rose 18 (Michel Rose, reporter for Reuters. January 7th, 2018. *Reuters.* "China's new 'Silk Road' cannot be one-way, France's Macron says," https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-france/chinas-new-silk-road-cannot-be-one-way-frances-macron-says-idUSKBN1EX0FU. DOA: July 18, 2019.) ALP

British Finance Minister Philip Hammond said in December Britain, which is quitting the European Union, wanted closer cooperation with China over the Belt and Road scheme. *Macron*, 40, *has said Europe should not be "naive" in its trade relations, pushing in Brussels for more stringent anti-dumping rules against imports of cheap Chinese steel*. In June, he urged the European Commission to build a system for screening investments in strategic sectors from outside the bloc, which drew criticism from Beijing. In Xian, Macron said he hoped EU-Chinese relations could have a new start, based on "balanced rules", after acknowledging there had been mistrust and "legitimate questions" in China as well as fears amongst Europeans. Europe was now united and ready to cooperate with China after years of crisis-management and economic stagnation, Macron said.

EU Recession

Smart '17- eurozone resilient

https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/mrcbg/publications/awp/awp69

The reinforcement of euro area institutions following a sudden stop in global financial flows suggests a surprising resilience. Indeed, the euro as a store of value did not suffer directly from the [2008] crisis. And for all the gnashing of teeth, euro area governments were forced to double down on their commitments to one another under the skeptical watch of global financial markets. Even in the face of certain voter rebellion, they **opted for measures for integration rather than separation or dissolution**. For a project that is perennially on the verge of collapse, it is worth re-examining how these **leaders committed significant sums of taxpayer resources and agreed to an unprecedented sharing of sovereignty**. This paper argues that the **resilience comes from the deep financial integration of the currency union that created both stronger links of interdependence among its members as well as greater flexibility to absorb shocks**. On the one hand, the financial market turmoil made it painfully clear to European leaders that investors viewed Europe as more or less a single borrower notwithstanding a treaty that said otherwise. On the other hand, this integration, especially through the banking system, **provided mechanisms to reallocate resources throughout the currency union in order to absorb the asymmetric shocks through liquidity injections**, market purchases and the euro area payments system.

Funding

Jiayi Zhou, February 2017, "THE SILK ROAD ECONOMIC BELT: Considering security implications and EU–China cooperation prospects, "SIPRI, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/The-Silk-Road-Economic-Belt.pdf, accessed 8-31-2019 //TP

In September 2015, the European Commission signed a MOU on an EU–China Connectivity Platform, to 'enhance synergies' between the BRI and the EU's own Investment Plan for Europe (the 'Juncker Plan'*). **The platform is designed to pursue joint investment opportunities along the Silk Road. Prospective projects have so far been identified in the territories of the EU and China itself, although joint investment in third countries could eventually take place under this framework.***

Jonathan Hillman Axios, 3-21-2019 ["U.S. handwringing overplays importance of Belt and Road agreements" Jonathan Hillman is director of the Reconnecting Asia Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. available online at: https://www.axios.com/us-handwringing-overplays-importance-of-belt-and-road-agreements-ac70be38-b563-48e9-aedd-daded73b96c7.html accessed - 7-15-2019]cdm

Diluted value: Chinese state media claim that cooperation documents have been signed with over 150 countries and international organizations, but participation is no guarantee of investment. The longer the list of BRI cooperation documents grows, the less signing them means.

Delink - China is reinvigorating the BRI after a slump last year—64 billion dollars in infrastructure deals were signed in April

DW. "China's Xi hails $64 billion in new Belt and Road deals." DW. April 27 2019.//GG

https://www.dw.com/en/chinas-xi-hails-64-billion-in-new-belt-and-road-deals/a-48513084-0

Chinese President Xi Jinping said on Saturday that $64 billion (€57 billion) in infrastructure deals were signed at this week's Belt and Road Forum in Beijing. Xi, who did not elaborate on the agreements in his closing remarks, said the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) would "enjoy higher quality and brighter prospects" as "more and more friends and partners" joined the China-led project. BRI projects to build roads, bridges, pipelines and ports would focus on "open, clean and green development" and be based on market principles, he added. China's expensive gambit: **China has been trying to reinvigorate BRI after a slump in the number of new projects last year. The initiative, also known as the New Silk Road, aims to boost trade between China and the rest of Asia, Africa, Europe and South America**.t

Dodwell 19 David Dodwell [Chief Executive of Strategic Access Limited. A veteran Financial Times journalist and expert on international business, global trade and economic and political developments, particularly in Hong Kong and China, he founded the company in 2005], 2-2-2019, "China's Belt and Road is Here to Stay, Whether the US Likes it or Not," South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2184602/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-here-stay //DF

This is a bit rich coming from a country that has both directly and through the International Monetary Fund sat at the heart of debt crises in South America, across Asia in 1998, and more recently among the Western economies in 2008. That aside, **the idea that the Belt and Road Initiative is floundering is nonsense. It remains at the heart of Chinese foreign policy. It is not going away** for good reasons. First, the initiative is not a grab-bag of random big-infrastructure projects but a 100-year vision of how China sees its place in the world as it emerges from a century of poverty, turmoil and introversion to re-engage with the global economy. China's belt and road can't meet Asia's infrastructure needs alone Infrastructure building is seen not just as "good aid", but also as a critical precursor to boosting two-way trade. Research from the French credit insurance agency Euler Hermes predicts that belt and road projects will this year add US$117 billion to global trade – an additional US$56 billion in exports from China and an extra US$61 billion in imports. Infrastructure building is seen as a critical stabiliser in deeply unstable parts of the world that, from China's point of view, are too close for comfort. This is particularly true across the "stan" countries in Central Asia on China's western borders. **The number of projects counted as belt and road projects in any year will ebb and flow, but the strategy and philosophy behind the programme itself is unlikely to falter:** if the aid policies around the world of former colonial powers were built around food aid, **China's strategy is based on helping countries build their own infrastructure.** In 2016, Jin Liqun, head of the China-led Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), noted in the Financial Times: "The Chinese experience illustrates that infrastructure investment paves the way for broad-based economic social development, and poverty alleviation comes as a natural consequence of that." Can China learn anything from the US Marshall Plan? You'd be surprised Jin views the AIIB as "an opportunity for China to show it can work with other countries and to better international practice – not just Western practice – so people can be convinced China is a force for peace and prosperity in the world." He was talking not about the Belt and Road Initiative, which is run by the Chinese government and mainly employs mainland companies and banks, but about the AIIB, which has 70 shareholders and runs on lines similar to the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank (ADB). But their philosophies come from a common source. **The Belt and Road Initiative is here to stay for another good reason: the need for better infrastructure is gigantic, and largely unmet.** The ADB says the Asia-Pacific alone needs to spend US$26 trillion on infrastructure between now and 2030 – that includes not just roads, bridges, ports and power plants, but clean water systems and strong digital infrastructure too. Putting aside the politically motivated sniping from the US, the bad belt and road press speaks more to the formidable challenges of building "big infrastructure" in countries with fragile governments, ill-founded legal systems and next to no money. While I admire Chinese efforts to help countries improve their infrastructure, I wish China had been willing to listen more closely to the World Bank, the ADB and other development banks on the challenges of organising large-budget infrastructure projects in developing economies – **especially about the fact that the**

principle obstacle to infrastructure building is not a shortage of money, but identifying and structuring coherent and commercially viable projects. There is an unseemly eagerness in some quarters in the US to see the Belt and Road Initiative "fail". This is myopic and counterproductive. Asia's economies need all the improved infrastructure they can get. Rather than attack China, other rich economies should be complementing its efforts, and educating it away from some of the obvious mistakes it has so far made. As David Dollar, Ryan Hass, and Jeffrey A. Bader at the Brookings Institution recently wrote: "Washington has driven up negative perceptions of China's Belt and Road Initiative, but has yet to articulate an alternative for countries that are in need of infrastructure."

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coherent and commercially viable projects. There is an unseemly eagerness in some quarters in the US to see the Belt and Road Initiative "fail". This is myopic and counterproductive. Asia's economies need all the improved infrastructure they can get. Rather than attack China, other rich economies should be complementing its efforts, and educating it away from some of the obvious mistakes it has so far made. As David Dollar, Ryan Hass, and Jeffrey A. Bader at the Brookings Institution recently wrote: "Washington has driven up negative perceptions of China's Belt and Road Initiative, but has yet to articulate an alternative for countries that are in need of infrastructure."

Hutchinson '19//BRI stagnation is short-term it is key to China's foreign policy and creates positive political and economic returns

Despite downturn longterm China will still continue BRI alone
"Belt and Road in 2019: Recalibration or Retrenchment?" China Business Review, 24 May 2019, www.chinabusinessreview.com/belt-and-road-in-2019-recalibration-or-retrenchment/. //TP

China's economy is slowing; fourth quarter GDP in 2018 fell to a nearly three-decade low. Foreign companies are projected to have weaker growth due to softening in the China market and Chinese companies, too, may find themselves harder-pressed to pay their debts. On the domestic political front, recent BRI loans have triggered a "wave of grumbling in China" from citizens who feel those funds would be better spent at home in a country that still defines itself as a developing econom**y. With economic stressors continuing to grow, how will Xi's signature initiative to connect Eurasia hold up in the year ahead? One thing is certain: the Belt and Road is not going away.** When BRI was first announced, called One Belt One Road at the time, China's foreign currency reserves stood at some $4 trillion. In an effort to offload pressure on the yuan and provide contracts for Chinese companies, Beijing took an interest in spending some of those reserves overseas. Five years later, reserves have fallen to $3 trillion and hopes that BRI will help internationalize the renminbi now seem far-fetched. Chinese companies are often heavily saddled with debts that have led a record number into default. As noted in the Financial Times, "big Chinese state-owned enterprises that build, operate, and invest in many BRI projects are—on average—extremely highly leveraged." In addition, if the fanfare around competitive neutrality from high-level Chinese officials is to be believed, and as more resources are spent to prop up private enterprise, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) may see their access to capital curtailed in the long run. If the cash spigot for these government-backed companies begins to dry up, future BRI projects may fall victim to the drought. Large SOEs are not the only ones facing economic pressure, though. In recent months, factory activity in China has been steadily contracting, with export orders falling at rates not seen since the financial crisis. At the same time, Chinese companies are facing stress from US tariffs, according to the American Chamber of Commerce. These headwinds for the Chinese economy may begin to whittle away at broad domestic support**. Despite these stressors, the most likely course for the Belt and Road this year seems to be one of recalibration. Economic growth in China is not the only engine driving expenditures on the Belt and Road; the program's political support and significance to Xi Jinping and the CCP could be just as important, if not more so than its economic rationale.** Experts maintain that the link between domestic Chinese economic growth and expenditures along BRI is not necessarily strong. Matthew Goodman, a senior scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), does not think the basic constraint is "financial capability as produced by economic growth." **Even if China's economic slowdown, as it is, shrinks the BRI budget, the impact would not be**

as catastrophic as the steady stream of 'worst yet' numbers might suggest. Although consumer confidence and the manufacturing PMI may look bleak, the initiative still maintains some domestic support. Jonathan Hillman, Director of the Reconnecting Asia Project at CSIS, points out that part of the reason BRI has not flopped is because many of its projects are undertaken domestically, for example, the upgrade to the airport in Urumqi, a major domestic BRI hub in China's far west Xinjiang Province. **Belt and Road projects also offer a pressure release valve for economic unrest, as workers from China's Rust Belt are sometimes able to find work on construction projects dotting the landscapes of participant countries. Goodman pointed out that China "still [has] a fairly significant pool of capital that they could deploy to this initiative if they wanted to," adding that "at some point, longer term, if they're only creating white elephants and things that are not generating a real return, that is going to pinch. But I don't think that's a constraint on the macro-level in the near term."** Xiaosong Wang, a professor of Economics at Renmin University of China agrees that "**because the central government's established policy remains unchanged, and the overall economics of supporting the Belt and Road Initiative are positive, then concrete measures will not undergo fundamental changes, and the pace of the Belt and Road Initiative will not stop."**

Lo '19 – countries have already joined into funding the BRI in the status quo even though they haven't joined the BRI

Lo, Kinling. "From New Faces to New Funds, What has Changed in the Belt and Road Forum?" South China Morning Post. 25 Apr. 2019. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3007512/new-faces-new-funds-what-has-changed-belt-and-road-show //RJ

When the belt and road strategy was launched its primary sources of funds were the *China-led* Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the state-owned Silk Road Fund and the policy lenders China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China. But *as the value of its projects has grown into the hundreds of billions of US dollars and concerns about debt levels have also soared, Beijing has increasingly looked to new ways to finance its global ambitions*. Among the latest ideas is "third-party market cooperation" under which, as the name suggests, investments are shared by more than one nation. Despite the general lack of support for the belt and road scheme shown by the US and India, *since adopting the third-party cooperation approach China has signed deals with many of their traditional allies, including Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Japan, Singapore, Spain and the Netherlands. While these nations have not signed up for the belt and road scheme itself, they have agreed to co-fund infrastructure, technology and finance projects in third-party countries that have.* The advantage of this approach for Beijing is that it not only helps to mitigate the financial risk but also creates a link between member and non-member countries under the belt and road umbrella.

Indian Encirclement

Kantha '17- india doesn't care/ wants to co-op with BRI https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2094167/why-india-cool-towards-chinas-belt-and-road

There is an expectation in India that **China will take India's sensitivities into account while formulating its plans. Clearly, there is room for closer consultations between China and India on the objectives, contours and future directions of the Belt and Road.** However, **India has considered synergy-based cooperation on a case-by-case basis, where its interests for regional development converge with that of other countries, including China**. This pragmatic approach is formulated on India's stance that as the two largest emerging economies of the world and major powers in Asia, **there is bound to be common understanding on many global and regional issues between India and China. They have cooperated on international platforms with similar positions on climate change and global trade, for instance**.

Kantha '17- india doesn't care/ wants to co-op with BRI https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2094167/why-india-cool-towards-chinas-belt-and-road

Like China, India has its own agenda of connectivity and cooperation within Asia and beyond. For instance, India's "Act East" strategy is aimed at developing close economic synergies with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and East Asia. Two great nations and civilisations such as India and China need not endorse or sign on to each other's strategies. **A more pragmatic approach will be to explore synergies and look at projects they can work on together, without insisting on artificial labelling.** By 2030, the United States, China and India will be the three largest economies in the world. How India and China utilise each other's growth stories will be of great significance for both them and the global economy. China's participation in the Indian economy is growing as India's markets expand and new opportunities arise. The two countries must continue to jointly explore points of convergence in their respective connectivity and developmental agendas and utilise openings for collaboration.

Westcott, Ben. "Why China Doesn't Want a India-Pakistan Conflict." *CNN*, 2019, www.cnn.com/2019/02/28/asia/pakistan-india-china-crisis-intl/index.html. Accessed 18 July 2019.

In July 2017, for example, there was a heated month-long territorial standoff between Chinese and Indian troops in Doklam, near the borders of India, China and Bhutan. The two powers nearly came to blows over accusations the Chinese government was building a road inside the territory of close Indian ally Bhutan. Nearby, China also conducted live-fire drills with combat troops. But a warm, informal summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in April 2018 helped put relations back on a positive track. "The common interests of China and India far outweigh their differences," state-run newspaper China Daily said in an editorial at the time. The situation is much clearer for China across the border. Pakistan is a longtime friend and trading partner of Beijing, described by Chinese diplomats as enjoying an "all-weather friendship" with the country.

IndoPak

Aamir '19 - Pakistan cutting funding bcs China not paying

China-US Focus. "Why Is Pakistan Cutting Funding from Belt and Road Projects?." 2019. https://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/why-is-pakistan-cutting-funding-from-belt-and-road-projects. //SH

The third reason for funding cuts can be found in the financing model of CPEC. In April 2015, **when the CPEC agreement was signed, it was implied that China would finance all projects in the form of investments and loans.** Later, **Pakistan would repay the loans to China once the projects are fully functional.** Since then **China has financed some of the energy generation projects with loans, but Pakistan is using its own resources to finance the majority of the infrastructure projects under CPEC.** Due to the secrecy surrounding the CPEC agreements, there is no available documentation or stated policy as to why Pakistan, instead of China, is funding infrastructure projects. **Pakistan is running out of cash, literally, and it does not have resources to allocate for CPEC. Therefore,** presumably, **the Pakistan government felt it appropriate to cut down funds when China is not contributing its implied share.**

In the current budget, the federal government of Pakistan slashed the funding for CPEC projects by a staggering 60 percent. The government allocated only Rs83 billion ($505.42 million) for CPEC projects as compared to Rs198 billion ($1.20 billion) last year. This is a huge cut in funding and it will hamper the progress and timely completion of the CPEC projects. The impact of the funding cut is further compounded by the depreciation of Pakistani rupee. Pakistan's currency lost 30 percent value against U.S dollar in the last 12 months.

Aamir '18 - New gov. politically dislikes CPEC

Adnan Aamir. "Why is Pakistan backing away from China's influence?." South China Morning Post. 2018. https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2169365/why-pakistan-backing-away-chinese-funded. //SH

The new government has another reason to roll back CPEC: namely, this is not its baby. Rather, it was a project started under the old government, which got a lot of political mileage from it. Politically, it makes no sense for the current administration to actively pursue its predecessor's project.

Aamir '18 - CPEC lose domestic support for IMF loan

Adnan Aamir. "Why is Pakistan backing away from China's influence?." South China Morning Post. 2018. https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2169365/why-pakistan-backing-away-chinese-funded. //SH

Meanwhile, **Pakistan's foreign reserves are dwindling and it has asked the International Monetary Fund for help, after neither China nor Saudi Arabia gave it financial help.** Pakistan is hoping for up to US$15 billion in IMF loans, but faces another CPEC-related problem.

The IMF says it requires "absolute transparency" about Pakistan's Chinese loans before it bails the country out. Yet the financial details of CPEC were closely guarded secrets under the previous government. If the current government makes the details public, the programme is likely to come under more fire in Pakistan.

Aamir '19 - Neither China nor Pakistan like CPEC

China-US Focus. "Why Is Pakistan Cutting Funding from Belt and Road Projects?." 2019. https://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/why-is-pakistan-cutting-funding-from-belt-and-road-projects. //SH

Unlike the case from 2015 to 2018, **there is not much enthusiasm for CPEC in both the Pakistan and the Chinese governments.** That's the reason that a 60 percent funding cut to CPEC projects has gone unnoticed. **This is an indication that both China and Pakistan will further sour on CPEC, which will translate silently into further funding cuts. This means that CPEC is going to be a major stumbling block for the success of the BRI in the near future. This will definitely put heavy strains on Sino-Pak relations in the years to come.** Currently, there is no apparent realization of this reality but it can't be hidden from world view for very long.

CPEC could increase IndoPak security

"Buyer's Remorse: Pakistan's Elections and the Precarious Future of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor." *War on the Rocks*, 27 July 2018, warontherocks.com/2018/07/buyers-remorse-pakistans-elections-and-the-precarious-future-of-the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor/. //TP

CPEC was the golden thread that tied it all together. For those in China who favored a stronger Pakistan tilt, the corridor provided a neat riposte to the skeptics (and for all the flowery public language, there are plenty of Pakistan-skeptics in China). I**n private discussions, Chinese officials and analysts who favored deeper ties with Pakistan argued that closer relations would be essentially economic in nature, but would deal with many of China's security concerns too: helping to stabilize and de-radicalize the country and shifting Pakistan towards a more restrained foreign policy, a necessary precondition for the success of the economic project. Some of these arguments, they contended, could be sold to India too: New Delhi could be persuaded of the advantages of CPEC "weaning the populace from fundamentalism," as Chinese premier Li Keqiang supposedly told Narendra Modi. For economic policymakers in China, who have been among the most skeptical about Pakistan, supporters could point to the excellent financial terms that Islamabad was willing to accept.**

China is in the position to dampen Pakistani terrorism and nuclear proliferation

Fair, C. Christine. "Pakistan Can't Afford China's 'Friendship'." Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, 3 July 2017, foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/03/pakistan-cant-afford-chinas-friendship/. //TP

But the news may not be all bad. For China to get maximal returns on its extensive investments in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan it needs stability in both countries. In recent years, China has stepped up its role in trying to negotiate peace in Afghanistan by helping to mediate between Pakistan and Afghanistan. **As Pakistan's economy becomes evermore interwoven with China's, China may be in a position to dampen Pakistan's worrying affinity for terrorist groups and nuclear proliferation —particularly the latter, because China enabled Pakistan's nuclear program to begin with. If China took on the responsibility of managing Pakistan, Washington might be happy to wash its hands of the problem and let the civilians in Islamabad and the uniformed men in Rawalpindi stab someone else in the back for a change.**

Juncker Plan

NATO Breakup

Stolton, Samuel. "5G Not Part of Italy-China Agreement, Di Maio Says." *Euractiv.com*, EURACTIV.com, 22 Mar. 2019, www.euractiv.com/section/5g/news/5g-not-part-of-italy-china-agreement-di-maio-says/. Accessed 23 July 2019. //TP

The Belt and Road Initiative is China's landmark development plan involving infrastructure and investments stretching across more than 80 countries in Europe, Asia and Africa, making it the largest infrastructure project in history. As well as telecommunications networks, the memorandum states that China would contribute to investments "roads, railways, bridges, civil aviation, ports [and] energy." **However, Di Maio told Rai on Thursday that "5G is not in the memorandum of understanding," and added that Italy plans to use its golden rule powers to 5G in a bid to ease concerns from Washington that Chinese telecoms manufacturers are wheedling their way into the European market. The rules are a form of industrial veto, which would oblige companies to inform the government of any purchase of 5G technology from providers based outside of the EU.**

McLaughlin '18 - China won't undermine EU unity

Daniel Mclaughlin. "EU on guard as China builds infrastructure and influence." Irish Times. 18. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/eu-on-guard-as-china-builds-infrastructure-and-influence-1.3705904. //SH

“China really needs the EU for economic and geopolitical reasons and it’s not in its interests to undermine EU unity . . . but China doesn’t know a lot about the EU and its procedures, so sometimes situations like that with the Budapest-Belgrade railway can happen,” she explains.

1. (If Link is Trump): **Trump Cannot Unilaterally Pull the US out of NATO because this would ruin Trump politically**

Alexander Mallin, ABC News, "Lawmakers, experts doubt Trump could unilaterally pull US from NATO", July 12, 2018, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/lawmakers-experts-doubt-trump-unilaterally-pull-us-nato/story?id=56552444 //MB

"The United States would essentially have to legally inform itself and give a one year notice that it's going to withdraw," Damon said. "That's a legal provision. **The reality is President Trump would have a revolt on his hands – you have this U.S. Senate and even the next US Senate that would not accept that." In a move that underscores the extent of Senate support for NATO, earlier this week the body passed, 97-2, a nonbinding measure that urged negotiators over the annual defense policy bill to reaffirm the United States’ commitment to NATO and its obligations of mutual self-defense as enumerated in Article 5.** The Senate Foreign Relations Committee also unilaterally approved a separate provision, also nonbinding, expressing support for the strategic importance of NATO to the United States. “A strong NATO, especially given a level of aggression from Russia not seen since the Cold War, remains essential for maintaining the rules-based international order,” the committee chairman, Republican Bob Corker, said after his panel approved the resolution.

Populism

Wolf ‘17 -https://www.ft.com/content/5557f806-5a75-11e7-9bc8-8055f264aa8b

But **the financial crisis opened the door to a populist surge. To assess this, I have put together indicators of longer-term economic change and the crisis, for the G7 leading economies, plus Spain. The longer-term indicators include the loss of manufacturing jobs**, the globalisation of supply chains, immigration, **inequality, unemployment and labour force participation**. The indicators of post-crisis developments include unemployment, fiscal austerity, real incomes per head and private sector credit (see charts).

Suetyi ’17//Public doesn’t really know about BRI – backlash unlikely

Suetyi, Lai, and Lai Suetyi. “Understanding Europe’s Interest in China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017, carnegieendowment.org/2017/05/10/understanding-europe-s-interest-in-china-s-belt-and-road-initiative-pub-69920. Accessed 8 July 2019. //TP

It is also worth noting that **European interest in the BRI has largely been confined to EU elites**. According to a study by the European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC), **the Belt and Road remains an unfamiliar, or even unknown, topic among the general publics in most EU countries.** The ENTC study observed that **most EU countries have devoted limited media attention to the BRI, which tends to be deemed too distant from the lives of ordinary citizens**.

Thus far, the major targets of China's diplomatic efforts to promote the Belt and Road have been European government, business, and intellectual leaders.

Clarkson '19 Politico
https://www.politico.eu/article/populist-attitude-to-eu-matteo-salvini-far-right///nt

Salvini and his ideological allies may have used nationalist rhetoric to mobilize their base while they were in opposition, but they've also proven to be pragmatic, willing to cut deals with their ideological enemies at home or abroad if it benefits their voters.**In government, far-right populists are less likely to want to bring down the EU to their — and everybody else's — disadvantage than to try to work the EU system to their advantage, harnessing it to their agenda**.Take the way Salvini managed the showdown between the Italian government and the European Commission over Italy's next budget. Even as he was denouncing pressure from Brussels as anti-democratic interference, he was giving Italian Finance Minister Giovanni Tria space to work out a deal with the EU. The result: A budget that enables Salvini to deliver on his policy promises while forcing his uneasy coalition partner — the anti-establishment 5Star Movement — to largely walk back on its promises for a universal citizen's income.

European nationalist welcome Chinese investment – China has a get out of populist jail free card.

Thomas Carothers 2018 [CHINA IN THE WORLD PODCAST Host: Paul Haenle Guest: Thomas Carothers one of the most noted international experts on international democracy support, democratization, and U.S. foreign policy. He serves as vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he founded and currently directs the Democracy and Rule of Law Program, Episode 105: The Rise of Populism and Implications for China April 24, 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Episode_105_-_The_Rise_of_Populism_and_Implications_for_China.pdf, accessed 7-25-2019]cdm

Carothers: I think in the first sense, Paul, that the Chinese political establishment and also just, you know, well informed Chinese looking at Europe and looking at the world, first of all they see a bit of chaos and they see unfamiliarity and it's unsettling. "Who are these people? What do they want? Is this bad for us? Good for us?" You know, they're used to a Europe that's almost boring. Politically, it kind of goes from the center-right to the center-left and there's quite a bit of consensus. First, it's just an unsettling time for Chinese trying to think about how to deal with Europe. Second, they see fragmentation. They see some countries going down very unexpected and different directions, and others not. Macron and France seem to be moving right up the center alley of politics, yet then another country like Italy seems to be in a completely unstable and fragmented state. So they're again, used to dealing with Europe as a region, you know, China and Europe, but what if Europe is multiple Europes? What does that mean? That requires a more differentiated focus and some new thinking. Third, populists are often nationalistic, antiglobalization. China benefits from globalization. China's a major engine of globalization in the world. What does it mean for China to live in a world where the West, which is traditionally the driver of globalization, becomes often opposed to globalization? So these are all big questions for China. The good news for China so far is that populists in Europe have not focused their negative energies on China very much. Haenle: Right. Carothers: They've been focusing it on Brussels and the European Union, on established politicians. If anything, they sometimes point to China and to Russia and other powers outside the region, non-traditional powers, and say, "Look, we have other friends that we could call in and we can make a deal to build a new railroad with China. We don't need structural funds from Brussels." And so China has actually gotten kind of a free pass, I'd say, from populists in Europe so far.

Signing onto the BRI benefits economic nationalists by giving rich European countries new markets to export. Italy proves.

Miles Johnson, **Financial Times** 3-21-**2019** ["Why would Italy endorse China's Belt and Road Initiative? available online at: https://www.ft.com/content/f0af46b0-4b2d-11e9-8b7f-d49067e0f50d accessed - 7-25-2019]cdm

Signing a deal with China plays to both parties' brand of economic nationalism by helping promote so-called "made in Italy" products. China is recognised as one of the most important markets globally for industries such as fashion and luxury goods that Italy has historically excelled in, as well as products such as food. Ahead of his visit, Mr Xi cited China's love of Italian products as one of the key cultural connections between the two nations. "Made in Italy has become synonymous with high-quality products, Italian fashion and furniture completely match the tastes of Chinese consumers, young Chinese people like pizza and tiramisu," he said.

Herrero and Xu verify that Europe will be the biggest winner with trade increasing by more than six percent

ALICIA GARCIA **HERRERO AND** JIANWEI **XU 2016** China's Belt and Road initiative: can Europe expect trade gains? Alicia Garcia Herrero is a Senior Fellow at Bruegel. Jianwei Xu is a Visiting Fellow at Bruegel. WORKING PAPER | ISSUE 5 | 2016

Figure 6 shows the simulation results by region. The impact on trade by region is shown in panel A. The EU is the biggest winner from the Belt and Road initiative, with trade rising by more than 6 percent. Trade in the Asian region is also positively affected by the reduction in transportation costs, but only by half as much as the EU, with trade increasing by 3 percent. Conversely, the rest of the world suffers from a very slight reduction in trade (0.04 percent). The findings by region basically confirm our analysis at the country level. As a whole, our results point to the Silk Road being a win-win in terms of trade creation because the gains from EU and Asia clearly outweigh the loss felt by the rest of the world.

Nationalists across Europe are bought and paid for by Chinese diplomatic connections – nationalist parties have historically been marginalized in Europe, thus they've reacted positively to China reaching out to them over mainstream political groups.

Bloomberg, 4-3-**2019** ["China's Influence Digs Deep Into Europe's Political Landscape available online at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-03/china-s-influence-digs-deep-into-europe-s-political-landscape accessed - 7-25-2019]cdm

At a time when the world is growing more skeptical of China's economic attentions, Deva is one of an increasing number of European officials courted by Beijing as it seeks to push its political agenda. Bloomberg spoke with more than two dozen diplomats, government officials, lawmakers and business leaders in China and in Europe to shine a light on Beijing's links with sympathetic politicians and political parties across the European Union. What emerges is an extensive network of contacts of all political persuasions, all of whom are either predisposed to China or are open to Chinese arguments. The result is a band of China advocates throughout Europe whose positions range from urging closer economic and governmental cooperation with

Beijing to air-brushing over China's human rights record. Discussions with officials also showed: China's penetration of Europe's political landscape knows no geographical boundaries. It includes European heavyweights Germany and France, eastern states Romania and Hungary, as well as smaller strategic countries Belgium, Portugal, Greece and Austria. China isn't fussy about political orientation. Beijing has traditionally had links with mainstream parties and former communists in Europe; now it's building ties to right-wing populists such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD), anti-immigrant nationalists like Austria's Freedom Party and Italy's anti-establishment Five Star Movement. China has stepped up its outreach in recent months, coinciding with the campaign for EU-wide elections to the European Parliament in May. Beijing's efforts to reach out beyond the European mainstream are paying off as populism gains traction on the continent. Italy is the first Group of Seven country to join President Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative, and Hungary under Viktor Orban blocked the EU from signing a letter two years ago condemning the alleged torture of Chinese human rights lawyers.

Reform

EU multilateral leverage is impossible because European countries have been divided by the issue of the BRI.

Michael Peel, Financial Times 4-26-2019 ["China pledges open Belt and Road but west is split on project available online at: https://www.ft.com/content/b10359ce-669f-11e9-9adc-98bf1d35a056 accessed - 7-15-2019]cdm

The BRI has divided the EU between states that support a tougher stance against a "systemic rival" and others including Italy, Hungary and Greece, which want tighter political and investment ties with Beijing. More than half of the EU's 28 member states have now signed bilateral endorsements of the BRI.

Russia Arctic

Kireeva '19

https://bellona.org/news/arctic/2019-04-for-all-of-russias-talk-about-oil-drilling-in-the-arctic-most-arctic-oil-will-likely-go-untouched

But for a number of reasons — both economic and environmental — **those resources** [oil in arctic] **may go unrecovered**. According to many estimates, **global demand for oil could plateau as soon as four years from now, in 2023. Enormous government investment funds that were themselves built on oil are also pulling away from investments in the oil sector – a move that could spur a global capital shift away from fossil fuels as governments and institutional investors pour funds into renewable energy.**

The first of these is Russia's ill-conceived licensing process. According to Grigoriev, **only state owned companies get licenses to drill**. Private companies are left out of the process unless they are at least half owned by the Russian state.

Moreover, said Grigoriev, some **80 percent of the estimated hydrocarbon reserves under the Arctic shelf are accounted for by gas – and this points to a fundamental mismatch between Russia's two biggest hydrocarbon companies**. Rosneft, Russia's oil monopoly, which has some experience with shelf projects like the Prirazlomnaya, knows how to drill oil on the Arctic shelf— but there's not much to be had there. Meanwhile, Gazprom, Russia's gas monopoly, is so tied up by land-based projects that it has little experience with Arctic shelf project – as witness the failed Shtokman endeavor.

The biggest obstacle, he say, are weather conditions on the Arctic shelf, which really only allow for a rig to drill one test well per year. Russia meanwhile, only has two drilling rigs in service on the shelf.

Inoz '19- russian economic downturn

Vladislav Inozemtsev For Riddle. "The Looming Russian Recession." Moscow Times. 19. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/01/29/the-looming-russian-recession-op-ed-a64318. //SH

In conclusion, it's likely that the main consequence of 2019 for the Russian economy will be a new recession. It will meet this fate even if the global economy continues to grow and oil prices remain between $58-$65 a barrel. Thus "non-stop inertia" will become the main defining feature of the Russian economy, and it will continue to be so for quite a long time to come. After all, history shows us that in most authoritarian states, economic hardships alone are not enough to turf out well-entrenched regimes. Which is seemingly understood well today in the Kremlin.

Allen '17- Russia gets 75% oil from arctic https://www.cfr.org/interview/arctic-integral-us-national-security

Alaska is critical to national security of the United States for several reasons. It is where we have ground-based missile systems that can intercept potential missile launches from Asia. It has operating bases where aircraft can refuel. It is on the great circle route from the United States to Asia. If you look at the ability of U.S. forces in Alaska to deploy to the Pacific Rim, it becomes a very important forward operating base or stopover point. What is Russia doing in the region? The report notes that **Russia has the longest Arctic coastline, and that it derives 95 percent of its natural gas and 75 percent of its oil from its Arctic territories.-**

Gramer '17- not profitable to drill at 100 dollars per barrel https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/24/oil-companies-cool-on-arctic-drilling-trump-wants-it-anyway-energy-alaska-environment/

"Shale is more accessible and is going to come ahead of the Arctic," said Bud Coote of the Atlantic Council, formerly a CIA energy analyst. **When oil companies like Shell did venture to the waters**

off Alaska several years ago, oil went for more than $100 a barrel. That made all the extra costs involved in drilling at the edge of the earth a bit more bearable. "I think it has to be back up in that range" for companies to head north again, he told Foreign Policy. Yet crude has hovered around $50 a barrel since late 2014.

Dodwell '19- US responding to China in the arctic https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/3010818/arctic-next-geopolitical-hot-spot-us-wants-freeze-china-out

He said that **in response to Russia's "destabilising activities", the US would be hosting military exercises, strengthening its military presence, rebuilding its icebreaker fleet, expanding coastguard funding and creating a new senior military post for Arctic affairs**. In a paranoid and increasingly McCarthyite US, it seems threats to national security lurk on all sides, whether it is Chinese students and Confucius Institutes, Huawei or cargo ships beginning to be able to play the Northern Sea Route along Russia's 24,000km Arctic coast from Murmansk, close to Norway, to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky on the Kamchatka peninsula close to Japan. **In a world of "dual use" everything, there is no innocent or profit-seeking venture that cannot be seen as a national security threat.**

SCS

Focus Taiwan. "EU expresses support for Taiwan's system of governance." Focus Taiwan. 2019. http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201901040004.aspx. //SH

Brussels, Jan. 3 (CNA) **The European Union (EU) reiterated Thursday that it will continue to develop relations with Taiwan and support the shared values that underpin Taiwan's system of governance,** following a recent speech in which Chinese president Xi Jinping (習近平) said China retains the right to use force to achieve reunification with Taiwan.

"The EU has a strong stake in the security, peace and stability of Asia, including across the Taiwan Strait," an EU spokesperson said in an email response to CNA after seeking a comment on Xi's speech on cross-Taiwan relations Wednesday.

Robert Beckhusen. "South China Sea Showdown: How Vietnam Would Wage War Against China." National Interest. 2018. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/south-china-sea-showdown-how-vietnam-would-wage-war-against-25931 //SH

Vietnam is also arming its submarines with Russian-made Klub land-attack cruise missiles — because a key part of an asymmetric strategy is to strike an enemy's bases, such as airfields and ports, bypassing a one-on-one battle at sea. **And the point of all this hardware, along with the expanding Vietnamese maritime militia, is deterrence — to signal to China that pushing Vietnam around comes with risks. And** hopefully, **that process creates a deterrence, which makes war less likely.**

Tom Fawthrop, The Diplomat. "Vietnam Mass Protests Expose Hanoi's China Dilemma." Diplomat. 18. https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/vietnam-mass-protests-expose-hanois-china-dilemma/?fbclid=IwAR0Ir2NBuSOkmnRe_VRdO9e0UN_n77RHTLhsVTRGtQmjc_P71ikfF-OG4Dg. //SH

On another front, **Vietnam has condemned China's militarization of islands in the South China Sea, and claims sovereignty over several islands in the area that Hanoi defiantly insists should be called "Biển Đông (the East Sea)."**

Only a few days after the recent anti-Chinese protests, on June 14, **Vietnam's foreign ministry denouncedChina's recent redeployment of missiles on Woody (Phu Lam) Island, an island in the Paracel group claimed by Hanoi. The foreign ministry statement called the missile redeployment "a serious violation of its sovereignty."**

SOES Crowdout

Stanley Jia, 2017,"Belt and Road: Opportunity and Risk," Baker McKenzie, https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/insight/publications/2017/10/belt-road/baker_mckenzie_belt_road_report_2017.pdf?la=en, accessed 7-31-2019 //TP

Chinese SOEs are also only the first stage of BRI. Chinese private-owned firms (POEs) will increasingly account for a growing share of outbound activity. Many are already winning deals in BRI markets: Oppo is a Dongguan-based smartphone manufacturer with retail outlets across Asia; Country Garden is a Shunde-based real estate developer building large-scale projects in Southeast Asia; Tencent is a Shenzhenbased internet firm buying start-ups in India. **Entering the BRI region is certainly an attractive prospect for private Chinese firms. As growth slows in the China market, many firms are looking for new opportunities, while others are recognizing that their products and price points are ideally suited for BRI consumers. This particularly applies to Chinese manufacturers involved in the production of smartphones and household facilities. Furthermore, many Chinese companies are still looking to set up manufacturing facilities in the BRI region in response to rising costs in their own country.**

"To Kill a Zombie: China Steps up Efforts to Close Failed Companies." South China Morning Post, 7 Feb. 2019, www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2185186/china-steps-efforts-close-failed-zombie-companies-2020-faces. Accessed 26 July 2019. //TP

Plans to liquidate China's thousands of "zombie" companies are underway in several of its provinces, according to state media, as the government moves towards an aggressive target of eliminating such firms by 2020. In December, the Chinese government set a goal of closing zombie state-owned enterprises by the end of 2020. On February 1, the Economic Information Daily, a newspaper owned by the Xinhua News Agency, reported that various arms of the government, including regional authorities and the State-owned Assets Supervision and

Administration Commission (SASAC) – the body that oversees all state assets -- are moving forward with liquidation plans in regions including Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan and Shaanxi. **Closing unprofitable firms in industries with excess production capacity, such as the steel sector, would support prices and profits while easing tensions with trading partners.**

Lee

"Chinese State Firms Had Best Year in 2018 Even as Economy Slumped." *South China Morning Post*, 17 Jan. 2019, www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2182552/chinas-state-owned-companies-enjoy-record-profits-even-private?fbclid=IwAR1kszZHTnpJ4pClYPr9xBJKhSr-QJppmZw1fjazlNj5GTCxI19y97B1E64. Accessed 26 July 2019. //TP

Revenues and profits at China's state-owned enterprises hit historic highs last year, even as the country's private firms fought for their survival amid the slowest period for economic growth in a decade. Last year, firms owned by the central government booked revenues of 29.1 trillion yuan (about US$4.3 trillion), up 10.1 per cent from 2017, while net profits reached 1.2 trillion yuan, a rise of 15.7 per cent from the previous year, according to figures released by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) on Thursday. **State-owned firms were able to achieve record high revenues and profits because of relatively stable growth in the domestic economy and supporting measures enacted by the government**, according to Peng Huagaung, a spokesman for the state asset oversight agency. **State firms also benefited from cost cutting as well as better efficiency and risk management amid the slowdown in economic growth.**

Lee2

"Chinese State Firms Had Best Year in 2018 Even as Economy Slumped." *South China Morning Post*, 17 Jan. 2019, www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2182552/chinas-state-owned-companies-enjoy-record-profits-even-private?fbclid=IwAR1kszZHTnpJ4pClYPr9xBJKhSr-QJppmZw1fjazlNj5GTCxI19y97B1E64. Accessed 26 July 2019. //TP

State-owned firms were able to achieve record high revenues and profits because of relatively stable growth in the domestic economy and supporting measures enacted by the government, according to Peng Huagaung, a spokesman for the state asset oversight agency. State firms also benefited from cost cutting as well as better efficiency and risk management amid the slowdown in economic growth. **China's banks are more likely to provide funds to state firms than to private companies because of the perception that the debts of state-owned firms are implicitly guaranteed by the government. However, the advantages that state-owned firms have enjoyed in recent years may be trimmed back in the period ahead, as the government looks to address international trade frictions and to stabilise economic growth.**

Guluzade, Amir, and Ahmadoff & Co. "Explained, the Role of China's State-Owned Companies." *World Economic Forum*, www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/05/why-chinas-state-owned-companies-still-have-a-key-role-to-play/. Accessed 26 July 2019. //TP

Despite the above-mentioned factors, the **Chinese government is still keen on supporting SOEs** and is committed to making them bigger, stronger and more efficient. This is particularly relevant to certain strategic sectors where government oversight is essential - specifically **in defense, energy, telecom, aviation and railway systems**. **Conversely the state is encouraged to divest from other industries by decreasing its ownership. The State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) is making great strides in implementing the government's 'zhuada fangxiao' (grasp the big, release the small) policy, which has greatly reduced the number of SOEs through privatisation, asset sales, and mergers and acquisitions. The Commission, which was established in 2003, is currently concentrating on restructuring the remaining SOEs into modern profit-oriented corporations.** Practically all of the entities overseen by SASAC are structured as corporations and are legally separate from the government with their own boards of directors, effectively delegating more authority to the executives.

Guluzade, Amir, and Ahmadoff & Co. "Explained, the Role of China's State-Owned Companies." *World Economic Forum*, www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/05/why-chinas-state-owned-companies-still-have-a-key-role-to-play/. Accessed 26 July 2019. //TP

There is also substantial work being done to improve SOEs through reorganisation, restructuring and enhancing their internal governance standards. T**he government went as far as introducing mixed ownership in telecoms company China Unicom, by selling shares worth around $11 billion to 14 private investors. This was done as a step towards making China Unicom more accountable and more focused on generating returns on equity, while retaining state control.** T**hese efforts to make SOEs competitive** while holding absolute control over their final decision-making reasserts the Chinese government's commitment to consolidating state control while **simultaneously allowing the market to be the ultimate resource allocator**. In other words, the government wants to keep a close eye on market forces while reserving the 'intervention option' in critical situations.

"Embracing the BRI Ecosystem in 2018." *Deloitte Insights*, www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/economy/asia-pacific/china-belt-and-road-initiative.html. Accessed 26 July 2019. //TP

A common complaint is that BRI has mainly benefited China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs). That is largely true and, given the long investment horizon associated with infrastructure projects, will remain a feature of BRI.2 H**owever, changes are afoot. BRI's initial focus was on energy and infrastructure; it is now widening to trade, manufacturing, the Internet and tourism (figure 1). Multinational corporations (MNCs) with competitive advantages are winning BRI-related deals, and we predict more will do so in the near future.** In addition, geopolitical and financial risk considerations mean China will need to ensure more widespread participation in projects.3 If we were to draw an analogy, it would be this: BRI is a journey, one with opportunities and risks, and one that—four years in—is still closer to its start than its end. That means investors need to take a longer view of projects than they are accustomed to doing. And while we do not downplay the risks, we believe they are less severe than many assume.

Yu '19 - most projects are private firms https://www.telegraph.co.uk/china-watch/business/private-sector-belt-and-road-role/

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to realise more benefits in foreign and domestic markets, according to industry experts Nan Cunhui, chairman of Chint Group, China's leading industrial electrical equipment and new-energy enterprise, said **the BRI is bringing "huge" opportunities in foreign markets** "Currently, more than 10,000 Chinese companies are doing business in Africa. **Among them, 90 per cent are private ones,**" said Nan.

Xie '18- alt cause https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2178954/chinas-private-firms-shy-away-bank-borrowing-delaying

Lending to small private firms also suffers from a broad prejudice among loan officers, who favour lending to state firms due to the explicit government guarantee their borrowing carries. This bias is particularly acute at a time when private firms are at greater risk of credit defaults due to the slowdown in the economy. **Chinese financial regulators, including the central bank, are working around the clock to issue new measures and launch specialised funds to support private companies that are struggling to survive.** To boost lending to the private sector, the government has sought to scale back the deleveraging push at the margins while maintaining its general thrust, so that the current focus on stabilising the economy in the face of the US trade war does not result in a further large increase in debt.

Spreads Recession

Lumen Institute- globalization good

https://courses.lumenlearning.com/marketing-spring2016/chapter/reading-globalization-benefits-and-challenges/

Those in favor of globalization theorize that a wider array of products, services, technologies, medicines, and knowledge will become available, and that these developments will have the potential to reach significantly larger customer bases. **This means larger volumes of sales and exchange, larger growth rates in GDP, and more empowerment of individuals and political systems through the acquisition of additional resources and capital**. These benefits of globalization are viewed as utilitarian, providing the best possible benefits for the largest number of people. For global companies, often referred to as multinational corporations (MNCs), common benefits of expanding into developing markets include unsaturated demand for new products, lower labor costs, less expensive natural resources, and other inputs to products. Technological developments have made doing business internationally much more convenient than in the past. MNCs seek to benefit from globalism by selling goods in multiple countries, as well as sourcing production in areas that can produce goods more profitably. **In other words,**

organizations choose to operate internationally either because they can achieve higher levels of revenue or because they can achieve a lower cost structure within their operations. MNCs look for opportunities to realize economies of scale by mass-producing goods in markets that have substantially cheaper costs for labor or other inputs. Or they may look for economies of scope, through horizontal expansion into new geographic markets. If successful, both of these strategies lead to business growth, with stronger margins and/or larger revenues. **There is particularly strong opportunity for business growth in markets where strong economic growth is also projected. ITn these areas, incomes are rising. In many cases, local populations can now afford goods and services that were previously out-of-reach, including many good produced in industrialized countries. Global companies stand to capture stronger growth and profitability if they can make headway into these markets.**

Uighur Crackdown

Dhume '19 http://www.aei.org/publication/china-and-the-limits-of-pakistans-pan-islamism/

If the Uighurs of Xinjiang want help they shouldn't look to Pakistan next door. After seven decades, the unstoppable force of Pakistani pan-Islamism has met the immovable object of Islamabad's alliance with China. In this clash of ideologies, the Chinese communists have won

Liu '19 https://jacobinmag.com/2019/06/china-uyghur-persecution-concentration-camps

Economics also plays a large role in the persecution and repression of the Uyghur as well. Approximately ten million Uyghur are concentrated in Xinjiang province, also known as the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR). It spans some 640,000 square miles, representing about one-sixth of the total land area under the control of the People's Republic of China. **China has long been intent on exploiting Xinjiang's vast natural resources — increasing oil extraction and refining, along with coal and natural gas production, among other resources. The province has an estimated twenty-one billion tons of oil reserves; its coal resources represent 40 percent of China's total. Thus the repression of the Uyghur takes place simultaneously with the plundering of Xinjiang's natural resources.**

US Tariffs

Brinkley 19 John Brinkley, 7-24-2019, "Trump Is Poised To Bombard The E.U. With More Tariffs," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbrinkley/2019/07/24/trump-is-poised-to-bombard-the-e-u-with-more-tariffs/#61edacc75b93 //DF

If you like French and Italian wines, olives, olive oil, Scotch, Irish Whiskey, or European-made cheese, you'd better stock up now, because they may soon get a lot more expensive. President Trump is on the verge of punishing importers of these and myriad other **European imports**, and by extension American consumers of them, **with tariffs of 100%.** This is predicated on **an expected decision by a World Trade Organization arbitration panel that the United States is entitled to hit the European Union with punitive tariffs, because the E.U. has for years illegally subsidized Airbus**, the European commercial aircraft manufacturer. The U.S. argues that the subsidies have given Airbus an unfair advantage over the Boeing Co. (NYSE:BA). **A WTO ruling in America's favor would allow the Trump administration to impose tariffs on not just aircraft and associated parts and equipment, but on all manner of E.U. products.** The administration published a list of them on April 12 and another on July 5. The listed products represent about $7 billion in annual imports. WTO rules allow a member country to impose tariffs "equivalent to the value of the subsidy," said Steve Charnovitz, a trade law professor at George Washington University. In other words, if the arbitration panel finds that the EU has illegally subsidized Airbus to the tune of $7 billion, as the United States claims, the United States can impose tariffs on $7 billion in E.U. imports. The Trump administration originally estimated the damage to Boeing at $11 billion. "Typically, the U.S. asks for more than they get," Charnovitz said. The arbitration panel's decision will be final; it can't be appealed. Of course, if the tariff on French wine raises its price to more than you want to pay, there are plenty of good American wines you can buy instead. But American vintners will probably raise their prices, too. Why? Because they can. This is what happens when a domestic industry is protected from foreign competition. Olive oil is another matter. If you cook with it – and who doesn't? – you're going to get slammed. Only 5% of the olive oil consumed in the United States is made here. Most of the rest comes from Europe.

Kumar '19. "EU, China Agree to Deepen Trade Ties." Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/eu-china-agree-to-deepen-trade-ties. //SH

The European Union and China on April 9 agreed to strengthen their trade relationship, cooperate on WTO reform, widen market access, and not force businesses to hand over their intellectual property— the last a longstanding complaint of foreign investors in China. The announcement followed a meeting between European Council President Donald Tusk, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, and Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang in Brussels.

Yuan Overtake Dollar

Cards are in January blockfile/Nahas prepout