

**Mukerjee 13** of Princeton University finds that overall, analysts agree that permanent membership for India is only a matter of time.

## Our first contention is conflict intervention

**Muni** writes for the OGR that the “Responsibility to Protect”, or R2P, is supposed to be a new norm of international law to allow for legal military interventions in times of humanitarian crisis. Within the UN framework, R2P is expected to justify the use of force in the interest of humanity for the universal good, but its exercise is often an excuse for interventionist action in the management of global affairs to suit the interests of the powerful.

Fortunately, **Mukherjee** of UN University writes that the most urgent goal for India at the UN Security Council, or the UNSC, is to act as a voice of moderation in the face of the western powers’ increasing enthusiasm for humanitarian intervention. Indeed, **Ganguly** of Indiana University explains that India opposes excessive intervention by the West as they loathe the history of western colonial domination, and **Jaganathan** of the Center for International Politics finds that India principally opposes the intervention’s frequent disregard of state sovereignty.

Thus, India only accepts interventions in two circumstances.

First, **Ganguly** writes that India accepts the R2P principle as it should be, but they believe that armed intervention should be a later resort rather than the first, after diplomatic measures. Thus, **Krause 16** of the ORF writes that all of their peacekeeping efforts had the consent of the host-state and were done after non-military options exhausted.

Second, India looks to the efficacy of the intervention before they approved it. **Jaganathan** writes that India’s Sri Lanka intervention resulted in failure, rendering India much more risk averse on matters of intervention. Thus, **Ganguly** writes that India would support interventions where they saw both adequate capabilities and a proper reason.

Once India joins the UNSC, they would veto interventions that abused the R2P doctrine. While temporarily on the council, **Ganguly** writes that India abstaining from the Libya vote given US pressure and the prospect of needing US support for a permanent seat, demonstrates that they are willing to take very difficult measures to preserve their principles. **Ganguly** writes that India opposed the Libya intervention because they were worried that the resolution was based on too little information and would not result effectively. And they were right-- intervention in Libya led to a sixfold increase in conflict duration and a sevenfold increase in deaths.

Overall, **Haslett 14** of the UNC School of Law writes that if R2P abuses continue, the doctrine will not survive due to perpetuating the atmosphere of mistrust which obstructs R2P intervention in situations where action is sorely needed. **Murray 13** concludes that R2P CAN be a good idea, but is only bad policy.

## Our second contention is foreign aid

Joining the UNSC permanently is beneficial, as **De Mesquita 10** of the Journal of Conflict Resolution finds that those on the UNSC receive more aid inflows because they are in a position to provide the US with favors that the US is willing to pay for. **Kuziemko** of the Journal of Political Economy quantifies that a UNSC member enjoys a 59% increase in aid on average, or up to 53 million dollars in a two year term. Furthermore, **Collier** of the World Bank finds that aid allocation in India is very efficient due to better policies and population density, and 1 million dollars of aid would permanently lift 3,000 people out of poverty.

## Our third contention is relevance

**Ayres 17** writes that India is joining economic institutions like BRICs and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as they aren't a part of the Council. Problematically, **Manuel 16** in his book writes, the threat of a global, Chinese and Indian led security initiative threatens to fundamentally undermine the UN.

Manuel furthers:

Over the next decade the UNSC will either be restructured to reflect the shift in world power *or it will become obsolete*. Eventually we will have to agree to a solution that will give China, India, and other developing countries a bigger say at the expense of the West. It is preferable to have China and India inside even if we often disagree, rather than on the outside creating an alternative order. The new AIIB and BRICs development banks are warning shots: unless we reshape outdated postwar institutions, India and China will ignore or leave them. To build a positive vision for 2030, we need both of the world's largest countries engaged in international governance.

**Anderson** explains the critical role the UN plays in maintaining security arrangements. the Security Council serves as a "concert of the Great Powers" who can come together, when their interests do not greatly clash, to establish and maintain order in the world; and the Security

Council serves as a "talking shop of the Great Powers," the place for diplomacy and debate in a multipolar world of increasingly competitive powers.

This is why **Mack** of the HSC finds that the single most compelling explanation for a dramatic decline in the number of wars, genocides and human rights abuse over the past decade is found in the unprecedented upsurge of international activism, spearheaded by the UN.

1- india doesn't want to overturn the world order/they don't want to be a revisionist power

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2017-10-16/will-india-start-acting-global-power>

While deepening its ties with the West, New Delhi has also shown a determination to invest in alternative international organizations over the course of the past decade. **India does not seek to overturn the global order; rather, it merely wants such institutions as the UN Security Council, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the World Bank, the IMF, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and others to expand to accommodate it. But as reform of these organizations drags on, New Delhi has put some of its eggs in other baskets. Take the BRICS**, comprising **Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa**. In less than a decade, the group has become an important diplomatic forum and has accomplished more than most observers expected. At their 2012 summit, the **BRICS began discussions on the New Development Bank—which announced its first loans in 2016—an institution in which these five countries could have an equal voice, unlike their disproportionately low representation in the World Bank and the IMF**. And in 2014, they agreed to form the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, an alternative to IMF support in times of economic crisis. India also supported the Chinese-led creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and it is now the bank's second-biggest contributor of capital. In 2017, **India also joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and it maintains an active presence in other institutions far outside the United States' orbit, such as the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia**. **Although New Delhi's top priority remains a seat commensurate with its size and heft within the traditional global organizations still dominated by the West, India has shown that it is also willing to help build other arenas in order to have a greater voice**. India will likely continue to maintain this diverse array of relationships even as it strengthens its ties with the United States; regardless, granting New Delhi the place it deserves in major Western international forums would help, rather than hinder, U.S. interests. At a time when international coordination has become far more complex, the increase in new organizations creates “forum-shopping” opportunities, as the political scientist Daniel Drezner and others have argued. More forums and more options make it harder to get things done internationally—and also decrease Washington's influence.

- Now is better , squo trajectory is on brink of collapse
- ONLY ADDING INDIA can prevent success of alt forums

## Cards for intervention

**Responsibility to rebuild – intervention only taken halfway without long term commitment**

Murray, Robert. The National Interest. 2013.

<https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/r2p-more-harm-good-8970>

**Prior to 2001 and the advent of R2P, humanitarian interventions did occur, and so did missions aimed at halting violence within states or between them. The notion of protecting civilians did not originate with R2P, and arguably, previous forms of intervention, though sporadic, achieved many of the same purposes desired by R2P proponents. What has changed most markedly with R2P is the linkage between sovereignty and legitimacy, and humanitarian intervention. Under the provisions of the doctrine, and according to many of its advocates, it is not enough to end violence.** There is typically a **desired response that sees full-scale military intervention followed by regime change (hence the reference to a responsibility to rebuild)**. In some ways, this makes perfect sense, in that it is extremely difficult to end violence or human suffering without putting external forces in place to protect them and overthrow the regime responsible for using the tools of violence in the first place—once a war criminal, always a war criminal.

**Yet, since 2001, we have also witnessed a variety of intervention missions, some R2P-endorsed, others not, that have demonstrated the enormous risks and costs involved with long-term military deployments and nation building experiments.** These missions are vast departures from traditional military missions, in that the enemy is very difficult to find and identify, foreign forces are rarely welcomed with a red carpet (and if they are, it is a short-lived celebration), and insurgent forces are more familiar with the terrain and local intricacies than external forces could ever be. **Experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have been effective in scaring states away from wanting to embark on regime change and counterinsurgency missions, and the 2011 mission in Libya is a good example of what happens when interventionism is only taken half way without a long-term commitment.**

**R2p is good IDEA but bad policy**

Murray, Robert. The National Interest. 2013.

<https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/r2p-more-harm-good-8970>

None of this is to say that the R2P lobby is responsible for the debacles seen in recent military deployments, but rather, it is to say that **continually calling for intervention and regime change in the wake of these experiences panics states more than it mobilizes them. Invoking morality has never been a compelling argument for states to act consistently in the cause of human security, and in a practical sense, the thought of committing to intervention missions with no clear end game other than realizing human security is irrational.**

Ultimately, **R2P can be seen as a good idea but bad policy**. The situation in Syria is worthy of action not because of any false sense of responsibility, but because of international law that existed long before R2P came around. The Chemical Weapons Convention, conventions prohibiting genocide and war crimes, and historical experiences with peacekeeping missions all serve effectively enough as justification for action in Syria. **By continually attaching responsibility, regime change and long-term action, states are deterred from making decisions that might set a precedent interpreted as endorsing or enacting R2P in national foreign and defense policy.**

## Cards for forum shopping

Widespread consensus among analysts that permanent membership for India is only a matter of time.

Mukherjee, Rohan. 2013. Princeton University.

<https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.epw.in/journal/2013/29/special-articles/india-and-un-security-council.html>

Keeping this in mind, there are **three strategies that India can simultaneously follow to better secure its interests in the UN**. First, given that the P-5 are likely to block any efforts at expanding the permanent membership of the UNSC in the near future, **India might devote considerably greater resources than at present to wooing the middle and smaller powers in the UN to increase the clout of the general assembly relative to the council, a tactic already evident in India's participation in the L-69 group**. If this strategy is successful, the P-5 might prefer to defuse the threat of a stronger general assembly by incurring the cost of expanding the permanent membership of the UNSC. Second, the MEA would benefit from a wider public dialogue on what India's positions should be on key aspects of international issues today, including sovereignty, intervention and the use of force. The multi-author Nonalignment 2.0 report (Khilnani et al 2012) provides a valuable stepping stone, ideally to be followed by wider consultations, especially on multilateralism. Particularly on issues of sovereignty and intervention, **India would gain from a deeper understanding of its own constraints rather than hewing to the positions of western members of the P-5 on some occasions, and the eastern members on others**. **India's unique circumstances among the rising powers as a liberal democratic state with serious internal and regional security challenges merit a domestic dialogue on how best to engage with and respond to the growing international norm of contingent sovereignty**. Third, India should engage in coalition building with other rising powers that are similarly placed in the international system, such as Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey. Given the P-5 and general assembly's lack of enthusiasm for G-4 proposals, a wider coalition representing a larger swath of powers might prove more effective, at mid range between the G-4 and the L-69. From India's perspective, it would represent a shift from being "leader of the Third World trade union" (Mohan 2003) to key member of a rising power cartel, a formation better suited to India's evolving capabilities and interests than is the G-4. **Such a grouping could successfully lobby** for more frequent or even systematic middle-tier membership within the UNSC, between the P-5 and other members, with a view to translating this status into permanent membership over time. **There is widespread consensus among India's intellectual elites that permanent membership on the UNSC is only a matter of time**. *Moreover, few believe that India's performance in its most recent term will have any bearing on its future prospects as a permanent member, which will be determined by the trajectory of India's economic growth and military development*. By this reasoning, the P-5's obduracy dictates

that India invest in relationships elsewhere to bolster its international profile sufficiently that UNSC permanent membership becomes a logical corollary. In the words of a veteran observer of India's role in the world, "The Security Council will not be changed from inside, but from outside".<sup>13</sup> This is almost certainly true but India would still benefit greatly from investing more and more wisely in increasing its influence and footprint within the international system, keeping in mind that for now this is the order within which important matters of international peace and security will be determined in the near future.

Manuel, Anja. This Brave New World: India, China, and the United States (p. 282). Simon & Schuster. Kindle Edition.

China and India are rising into a world where the institutional order is fairly well developed. When the United States rose, by contrast, power wars were a normal occurrence, and countries only episodically committed to maintaining the global economy. So there is no direct historic parallel. However, Britain again went out of its way to establish some institutions that helped it cooperate with the United States, even if they disagreed on many issues. In the 1890s, for example, both countries together established an international court of arbitration to settle transnational commercial disputes. Similarly, we should seek to cooperate with both China and India whenever that is feasible without compromising our core values. The United States cannot expect China and India to accept, without change, the institutions we helped create after World War II, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the international trading system. China, and to a lesser extent India, have worldviews that differ substantially from those of the West. **This is another reason India must be a critical player in shaping China's rise: on issues such as sanctions on Iran or Syria, or aid to Afghanistan, it can act as a bridge between western and Chinese views. Some have argued that the West should change these institutions to make real room for new players like China and India. If it is a matter of giving others a more prominent seat at the table, we should do so.** This does not mean, however, that we should lower the standards related to transparency, labor relations, and the environment of these institutions. President Xi says he shares this moderate view. He emphasized in his 2015 visit to the United States that developing countries want a more equitable international system, but they do not want to unravel the entire order. **China does not intend to undermine the existing institutions, as some have warned, but it and India do want influence in the current system that matches their rising power.** To begin, we should join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to lend support and shape its progress. If managed correctly, **the AIIB is the first example of China trying to become a "responsible stakeholder" in the international system. It is voluntarily restraining its own economic clout. China could make massive infrastructure investments around the world on its own. Yet it has chosen to do much of it through the AIIB. The bank's new Chinese CEO is pushing for high transparency, environmental, and other standards, and wants to cooperate with the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and others. We should encourage initiatives like this as much as possible. The next U.S. president should also push hard to reform the World Bank and other institutions to make more room for developing countries like China and India. Over the next decade the UN Security Council will either be restructured to reflect the dramatic shift in world power or it will become**



**obsolete.** President Obama has wisely proposed India for a seat, which China quietly opposes. **Eventually we will have to agree to a solution that will give China, India, and other developing countries a bigger say at the expense of the United States and Europe. It is preferable to have China and India inside a larger tent even if we often disagree, rather than on the outside creating an alternative order. The new AIIB and BRICs development banks are warning shots: unless we reshape outdated postwar institutions, India and China will ignore or leave them. To build a positive vision for 2030, we need both of the world's largest countries engaged in international governance.**