# SV – TOC NEG Round 7

## Contention 1 is a Break in Foreign Policy

#### Harsh Pant indicates that India at a crossroads – he argues that:

Harsh V. Pant, 8-5-16, "Gradually burying non-alignment,", Mint – an Indian financial daily newspaper, https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/aGnhCRbhSnkSQQHGgO0PTK/Gradually-burying-nonalignment.html, Date Accessed 4-18-2019 // WS

Finding an effective grand strategy inevitably requires a balancing act. Non-alignment has been India’s answer to this challenge and an influential tenet of its foreign and security policy since its emergence from colonization. This approach has in the past enabled India to avoid many of the limitations and entanglements of formal alliances; but it has also left the country in the position of shaping policy in a reactive manner. India is now at a crossroads. China’s rise and assertiveness as a regional and global power and the simultaneous rise of middle powers in the region mean that this balancing act is increasing in both complexity and importance, simultaneously. China’s growth presents great opportunities for positive engagement, but territorial disputes and a forward policy in the region raise concerns for New Delhi, particularly in the Indian Ocean and with Pakistan. The region itself is riddled with rivalries; a desire to balance China may push states together, while other issues divide them. The same applies on the global level as well, as noted by the unpredictability in Sino-US relations. Indian policymakers have continued to place emphasis on strategic autonomy, a relic of non-alignment, as a means of mitigating the potential costs of a strategic partnership with the US. This balancing act is evident in relations with China: despite interest in cooperation with the US, India stands to benefit from an economic partnership with China and wishes to avoid antagonizing its more powerful neighbour by serving as the lynchpin of the US pivot to Asia, which the Chinese broadly perceive as a measure of containment. There is also lingering concern over US reliability, not only owing to its relationship with Pakistan but also because of its vulnerability to China during the financial crisis of 2008–09. Likewise, India has balanced its still strong defence relationship with Russia against its interests in cooperation with the US. New Delhi has sided with Russia, China and Iran in avoiding interference in Syria’s civil war and, despite voicing concern over the spread of the Islamic State network, has continued to promote a Syrian-led process of institution-building. Finally, there is a general concern in India that the country’s capabilities in the event of a conflict with Pakistan may be limited by over-reliance on the US, which continues to extend defence aid to Pakistan despite a drop after 2011.

#### Unfortunately, a seat on the UN Security Council forces India to break this foreign policy stance. Paras Ratna argues that:

Paras Ratna, 10-12-2015, "A Permanent Seat on the UNSC: A “Feather” on the Hat or the “Hat” Itself? – South Asian Voices," South Asian Voices, https://southasianvoices.org/a-permanent-seat-on-the-unsc-a-feather-on-the-hat-or-the-hat-itself/, Date Accessed 4-18-2019 // JM

Next is the jackpot question of veto power, which is one of the major reasons for these [persistent efforts](http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/29-Sep-2015/unsc-reforms-and-g-4-countries) made by G-4 countries, especially India, to gain a permanent UNSC seat. Given India’s policy of [non-alignment](http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20349/History+and+Evolution+of+NonAligned+Movement) in the past, veto power might complicate things further. A close look at voting patterns reveals that Russia and China are mostly on one side, while NATO partners are on the other. Given the [strategic partnership](http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2253135/Strategic-relations-suit-India.html) that India maintains with each of these countries, taking a stance would not only adversely affect India’s relationship with them, but would also give a severe blow to India’s non-alignment stance. Hence, strained relations with these nations could lead to a possibility of exposing India to increased international pressure on issues like the Kashmir dispute, human rights abuse in the north east, and climate change reform

#### This policy of non-alignment is the SINGULAR REASON there has not been a war in the area. Arzan Tarapore argues in 2018 that:

Arzan Tarapore, 6-18-2018, "Using Uncertainty as Leverage: India’s Security Competition with China," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/using-uncertainty-as-leverage-indias-security-competition-with-china/, Date Accessed 4-22-2019 // JM

India’s refusal to quickly escalate security competition with China or to bind itself too closely to the United States may seem like frustrating ambivalence. But it carries at least one key advantage. The uncertainty over India’s intentions — and specifically, the extent to which it cooperates with the United States — is India’s greatest leverage over China. More than any geographic, material, or ideational advantage New Delhi can muster in its asymmetric balance with Beijing, its potential but as-yet unrealized partnership with Washington [concerns Beijing the most](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-biggest-fear-us-indian-encirclement-12225). In this light, the ambiguities of Indian policy are a feature, not a bug. Uncertainty over India-U.S. relations has probably already moderated Chinese behavior — including Beijing’s willingness to [de-escalate the Doklam stand-off](https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/countering-chinese-coercion-the-case-of-doklam/), and to adopt a more solicitous tone in recent months. China’s strategy is focused on preventing and disrupting counter-balancing coalitions — hence its [stern opposition to the Quad](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/08/c_137024428.htm). A brash declaration of a “hard-balancing” U.S.-Indian compact would likely elicit much more aggressive Chinese actions on the Himalayan border and across South Asia, designed to stress and break that compact. Less nuanced Indian security competition, then, would probably accelerate the expansion of inimical Chinese influence in the region, and elevate the risk of open war. India’s distinct style of competition suggests its strategists may deserve more credit than [they are often given](https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/america-has-high-expectations-for-india-can-new-delhi-deliver/). It should not, however, be a convenient catch-all excuse for moments of Indian prevarication or loss of nerve. Even more, it should not absolve India of the need to continue building national power. India can and often should do more – especially in military modernization and reorganization. At some point the current Modi-Xi bonhomie will pass and the pendulum will swing again, perhaps with another militarized crisis on the border or a [contest of wills](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-maldives-politics/asian-giants-china-and-india-flex-muscles-over-tiny-maldives-idUSKCN1GJ12X) elsewhere in the region. At that point, New Delhi will be tested to ensure its careful escalation management does not devolve into submission to a stronger foe. India’s policies benefit from uncertainty, but the ultimate currencies of security competition — and the ultimate guarantors of a free and open Indo-Pacific — are military power and political resolve.

#### Mizokami concludes that the war the status quo has prevented is significant. He argues that:

Kyle Mizokami, 6-12-2018, "Why a War Between China and India Is Not Unthinkable (And Would Be a Total Horror Show)," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-war-between-china-india-not-unthinkable-would-be-total-26238, Date Accessed 4-20-2019 // WS

A hypothetical war between India and China would be one of the largest and most destructive conflicts in Asia. A war between the two powers would rock the Indo-Pacific region, cause thousands of casualties on both sides and take a significant toll on the global economy. Geography and demographics would play a unique role, limiting the war’s scope and ultimately the conditions of victory. India and China border one another in two locations, northern India/western China and eastern India/southern China, with [territorial disputes in both areas](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/india-china_conflicts.htm). China attacked both theaters in October 1962, starting a monthlong war that resulted in minor Chinese gains on the ground. While India could be reasonably confident of having an air force that deters war, at least in the near term, it has no way of stopping a Chinese ballistic-missile offensive. Chinese missile units, firing from Xinjiang and Tibet, could hit targets across the northern half of India with impunity. India has no ballistic-missile defenses and does not have the combined air- and space-based assets necessary to hunt down and destroy the missile launchers. India’s own ballistic missiles are dedicated to the nuclear mission and would be unavailable for conventional war.

## Contention 2: Backlash

#### Aamir Khan indicates that as:

Aamir Khan 2015 “UNSC’S EXPANSION: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGIONS AND THE WORLD”, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632266.pdf>, date accessed 4-2-19 //WS

Kashmir is the major dispute between Pakistan and India. Pakistan wants a just resolution of the Kashmir dispute in accordance with the spirit of UNSC resolutions—the UNSC resolution maintained the issue of Jammu and Kashmir be determined through plebiscite as per the wishes of the people of Kashmir. The U.N. HLP report also refers to the Kashmir dispute as one of the “oldest and unresolved disputes on the UNSC agenda.”216 To silence the popular demand of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, India has deployed a huge military contingent, which is involved in fthe worst kind of human right violations. According to Noorani, “Indian Security Forces have systematically, and with impunity, perpetrated outrageous violations of human rights in the [Kashmir] valley.”217 Today, Pakistan and India are nuclear power; even small conflict may conflagrate to nuclear exchange which will devastate the entire South Asian region. Without settlement of the Kashmir dispute, use of force cannot be ruled out. Noorani contends that, “It is reasonable to conclude that relations between India and Pakistan will never be normal until the Kashmir dispute is settled.”218 Without resolution of the Kashmir dispute, India does not qualify to be a member of the UNSC. India has refused to implement the resolutions of the UNSC over settlement of the Kashmir dispute. It would be unjust to award membership of the council to a country that has violated its resolution. As a permanent member of the UNSC, India can influence favorable decisions at the UNSC over Kashmir. Furthermore, India, due to its strong conventional military, can resort to the use of force on the pretext of pre-emption or hot pursuit to coerce Pakistan to change its stance on Kashmir in favor of India

#### Salil Shetty indicates in 2019 that:

Salil Shetty, 2-18-2019, "Throwing Stones From Inside a Glass House – India’s Human Rights Record Since 2014," Wire, https://thewire.in/rights/india-human-rights-record-since-2014, Date Accessed 4-12-2019 // JM

For nearly a whole month now, the government of India has been very concerned about the human rights situation in Pakistan. Pakistan’s record on human rights is deeply worrying without a doubt. The attacks on freedom of speech and journalists, the unlawful blasphemy law, the ill-treatment of Balochs, the inability of the government to protect civilians from Islamic extremist violence, the list is long. India is right to call out human rights abuses anywhere, particularly in our neighbourhood. On February 18, 2019, almost all major Indian news channels were running prime time live coverage of ex-solicitor general of India Harish Salve at the International Court of Justice challenging the death sentence of Kulbhushan Jadhav by a Pakistani military court on charges of espionage. It made me proud to see our government making a powerful case to uphold international human rights standards. But as Salve was admonishing Pakistan for its shoddy human rights record, 12 Kashmiri students were [assaulted in Dehradun](https://thewire.in/rights/trapped-kashmiri-students-dehradun-bajrang-dal-offensive) by Hindu extremist groups calling all Kashmiris as ‘traitors’. In the days and weeks that followed, Kashmiri civilians have been under attack on a regular basis in so many parts of India, including [most recently in Lucknow](https://thewire.in/rights/two-kashmiris-thrashed-in-lucknow-viral-video). I have never heard the words human rights and Geneva Convention being mentioned so regularly on mainstream Indian TV glibly as I have heard since Pulwama/Balakot. So many of our [hyper-nationalistic and bloodthirsty anchors](https://thewire.in/media/indian-tv-medias-blatant-endorsement-of-hyper-nationalism-is-shameful) and panelists turned into human rights defenders overnight. [But] Throwing stones from within a glasshouse is never a clever strategy. It is common knowledge in the international arena that India has a dismal track record in human rights. The last five years under the “Hindu nationalist” regime has seen an unprecedented increase in human rights violations. Officially reported atrocities on Dalits has increased eight fold in the last five years, compared to the preceding five years. The vast majority of the nearly 200,000 reported crimes are extreme in nature – murders, rapes and the like. Beef-related lynchings, which led to over 25 deaths in the last four years, shocked the world. The minister of state for home affairs [himself disclosed that in 2017](https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/communal-violence-killed-111-people-in-822-in-2017-ministry-of-home-affairs/story-VPYIxDHRpazNpm2DdC398O.html) alone there were 822 communal “incidents” resulting in 111 deaths. There has been an alarming number of attacks and even murders of journalists, the most visible one being the tragic killing of [Gauri Lankesh](https://thewire.in/rights/gauri-lankesh-murder-an-organised-crime-planned-by-sanatan-sanstha-chargesheet) in September 2017. The campaign to silence, buy or coopt the media, particularly electronic media, by the current regime has been quite comprehensive and successful. We can now almost count the independent journalists left in mainstream media. Any voice of dissent is immediately crushed or tarnished as anti-national. Arrests of human rights defenders has been relentless. [Lingraj Azad](https://thewire.in/rights/activist-jailed-for-joining-tribal-protest-armed-with-bows-and-arrows), the tribal leader from Nyamgiri in Orissa fighting against the corporate giant Vedanta, is the latest victim. Intimidation and harassment of independent non-profit organisations, particularly advocacy groups that speak truth to power, has led to shutting down of many important institutions. The ministry of home affairs and its agencies are used on a full time basis to go after organisations that are considered unhelpful to the regime’s agenda. [Fake encounters reached an all-time high](https://thewire.in/rights/uttar-pradesh-yogi-adityanath-fake-encounters-un) in the last few years, with the UP chief minister Yogi Adityanath alone breaking all records; within nine months of taking power, 1,038 encounters were carried out in Uttar Pradesh resulting in 32 deaths. What is appalling is the level of impunity that powerful leaders and corporates enjoy. In the most sensitive cases, witnesses regularly turn hostile or go mysteriously missing. All of this is on top of the on-going reality of a criminal justice system that has almost half a million people languishing in our prisons for years, sometimes decades, for petty crimes, stuck there because they cannot afford bail, despite a Supreme Court order to the contrary. Most of these people are poor Dalits, Muslims and backward castes as one would expect. Violations of women’s rights abound and even this is increasingly being justified in the name of religion, like the entry of women into Sabarimala temple. When India got its political independence in 1947, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar guided us to adopt a constitution that was a visionary social contract focussed on leaving no one behind. Hansa Mehta, an Indian feminist who was also prominent among the drafters of our constitution, played a defining role in the making women an equal stakeholder in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Hansa Mehta went on to become the vice president of the UN Human Rights Commission in1950. For decades, India was seen as being on the right side of history, supporting the struggle for justice in Palestine, South Africa and other post-colonial countries. Fast forward to the last five years and two successive UN human rights chiefs [have called out India’s human rights abuses](https://thewire.in/rights/un-decries-shameful-reprisals-on-rights-activists-in-38-countries-including-india) in the last two years. I don’t recall this happening in the history of independent India. When Prince Zeid bin Ra’ad Zeid [chided India for serious human rights violations](https://thewire.in/politics/seventy-years-indias-democracy-need-urgent-repair) in Kashmir in June 2018, the Indian establishment was livid and dismissed it as the baseless and illegitimate rant of an outgoing “Muslim” UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. But on March 6, 2019, High Commissioner Michelle Bachelet, the soft spoken ex-President of Chile, while presenting her annual report to the UN Human Rights Council, [warned India about the growing reports](https://scroll.in/latest/915652/indias-divisive-policies-may-undermine-success-of-economic-growth-says-un-human-rights-chief) she has been receiving of attacks on minorities, Dalits and adivasis. She also took the unusual step of expressing concern that this divisiveness was being fomented to meet political ends. I am left wondering what Hansa Mehta would have had to say on our country’s current human rights crisis to two of her fellow Gujaratis who have seemingly been running India for the last five years.

#### Despite India’s record, Lettinga argues in 2015 that:

Doutje Lettinga & Lars van Troost, March 2015, Shifting Power and Human Rights Diplomacy, page 39, https://www.amnesty.nl/content/uploads/2015/04/amn15\_01\_strategische\_verkenningen\_india\_digitaal\_def.pdf, Date Accessed 4-19-2019 // JM

Public discourse in India is overwhelmingly focused on internal affairs. Foreign causes unrelated to domestic politics do not move citizens and groups to demand that New Delhi take strong positions or action. This is changing as broader sections of Indian society engage with the external world: the number of Indian investors, corporations, business people, expatriate workers, tourists and students abroad is growing and the effects of this are reaching deeper into society. With the growing awareness and interest in world affairs, the likelihood that public discourse will take up foreign issues is higher. Given India’s self-image as a liberal democracy, we can expect civil society to acquire a stronger voice in India’s foreign policy positions, especially on human rights.

#### And there is precedent for this -- Xiao Jie argues in 2019 that:

Xiao Jie, 3-25-2019, "Why is Tibet a target for Western countries to pick on China?," No Publication, https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d414f776b544e33457a6333566d54/index.html, Date Accessed 4-12-2019 // JM

Under such circumstances, Western countries chose to weaponize "human rights" to undermine the international image and soft power of non-ally emerging countries by mobilizing international pressure or even inciting instability domestically. The "Tibet issue" was no more than a geopolitical tool to disrupt China's national security and obstruct its efforts to create a friendly international environment for its economic development.

#### The impact is that this criticism comes across as hypocritical which just bolsters the abusers case against India. Conflict becomes inevitable and escalates faster – Snyder argues that:

Jack Snyder, 2009, Expediency of the Angels, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/42896214.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A7a11b4ec8b2710484a35860ff3ea63ac, Date Accessed 4-21-2019 // WS

Efforts to improve human rights are often frustrated by two kinds of social dilemmas. First, spoilers (whose social position depends on the perpetuation of abuses) can stymie rights-reform movements in order to preserve their power. Second, abuses are sometimes so engrained in local social practices that a society can fall into a perverse-equilibrium trap (a situation where individual members of a community cannot abandon abusive practices unless everyone changes their behavior at the same time). Human-rights interventions fail when their tactics are not designed to outmaneuver these two very strong forces. A review of the classic tools of human-rights advocacy - naming and shaming, signing treaties that promise to end abuse, criminal trials for the tyrannical and even some grassroots activism - shows they have often failed. These strategies frequently don't work because of their one-size-fits-all philoso-phy. They fail to adapt to local factors that decisively influence human-rights outcomes, such as per capita income, the level of democ- racy, whether a country is at war, whether it inherited strong rule-of-law institutions as its colonial legacy and whether a Left or Right government is in power. Not acknowledging these specific on-site societal attributes dooms well-intentioned policy. For decades, naming and shaming has been the emblematic human-rights practice. Ominous faces of dictators would flash on television screens, Human Rights Watch would issue denunciations in attempts at ostracism and sometimes this would lead to dictators agreeing to sign toothless human-rights treaties. But, as political scientist Emilie Hafner- Burton has shown, regimes that are heav- ily targeted for naming and shaming tend to restrain themselves only from the most publicized cruelties - the ones that can be easily dug up by advocacy organizations and reported on the evening news. In the mean- time, these regimes increase other abuses to maintain the same overall level of repression. Without being precisely aimed to resonate in local debates, an indiscriminate shotgun blast of naming and shaming does little. But human-rights promoters need to consider more than military might. When spoilers' power depends on popular ideological support rather than just military muscle, human-rights activists need to avoid provok- ing a backlash that strengthens opposition to reforms. International interventions on behalf of human rights may sometimes actually bolster the abusers position, offering spoilers a pretext to mobilize resistance, usually along ethnic-nationalist or religious lines. In Iraq, for example, Sunni insurgents and Shia militias portrayed U.S. efforts to establish democracy and international standards for human rights as imperialist hypocrisy, helping both to rally their respective sectarian constituencies and to justify atrocities. Effective human-rights tactics must be careful to avoid providing spoilers with this kind of pretext to cloak their abuses in the garb of cultural self defense.

#### Lars-Erik Cederman concludes this month that:

Lars-Erik Cederman, March/April 2019, Blood for Soil: The Fatal Temptations of Ethnic Politics, Foreign Affairs, EBSCO, Date Accessed 4-26-2019 // JM

Ethnic nationalism is most likely to lead to civil war, but it can also trigger interstate war by encouraging leaders to make the sorts of domestic appeals that can increase tensions with foreign countries. That dynamic has been at play in the disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, India and Pakistan, and Greece and Turkey. Researchers have found some evidence that political inequality along ethnic lines makes things worse: when ethnonationalist leaders believe that their kin communities in neighboring countries are being treated badly, they are more inclined to come to their rescue with military force. What’s more, those ethnonationalist leaders are typically hostile to international organizations that favor minority rights, multiethnic governance, and compromise. In their eyes, calls for power sharing contradict their ethnic group’s rightful dominance. They view the protection of human rights and the rule of law, as well as humanitarian interventions, such as peacekeeping operations, as direct threats to their ethnonationalist agendas, and so they work to undermine them. Russia has explicitly sought to weaken international law and international institutions in order to create more room for its own project of occupation in Crimea. Israel has done the same thing in the service of its occupation of the West Bank. Trump, who has called for an *end* to U.S. sanctions on Russia and moved the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, has actively backed these ethnonationalist impulses, further encouraging the erosion of the postwar consensus that put a cap on ethnic conflict. If all of these are the risk factors for ethnic nationalism sliding into ethnic conflict, then where are they most prevalent today? Statistical analysis suggests that the ethnically diverse but still relatively peaceful countries most at risk of descending into violence are Ethiopia, Iran, Pakistan, and the Republic of the Congo. These are all developing countries with histories of conflict and where minorities face discrimination and exclusion from power.

#### Thomas Glardon concludes that:

Glardon 5 (Thomas L., Lt. Colonel for USAF, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil12.pdf) GAT

India and Pakistan suffer from internal unrest that inhibits internal stability and threatens civil war. Both states have multi-ethnic populations, many of which profess separatism and even contempt for their parent state.vi From Sikh unrest in the Punjabvii to the Assam, Nagaland, and Manipur independence movements viii to northern Maoist insurrections,ix India faces destabilizing conflict across its territories. Pakistan, too, faces internal unrest from separatists in such communities as the Sindh,x Pushtuns in western Pakistan, and radical Islamists in remote Waziristan.xi These internal conflicts threaten the internal stability of these states and, in the case of Pakistan, the stability of the regime. As well, the internal conflicts could potentially spill into other states in the region. For example, in the mid 1980s, India claimed Pakistan supported a Sikh Punjab uprising. This belief resulted in military operations along the border of Pakistan, drawing out the Pakistan forces in a face-off.xii Thus a civil conflict does not just threaten the stability of one state, but also that of all South Asia.