

Cinco Ranch RT Jan '20 Block File

Goals - don't look stupid at UH, and make this expensive ass trip to georgia worth it

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AFF on Literally any Crisis:

<https://intpolicydigest.org/2019/10/17/maduro-is-isolating-venezuela-from-economic-prosperity/>

NEG On liberalization:

1. VA finds that a) he's doing it for the election so there are alt causes and b) he'll just revert back after the election, so no impact
2. Fuentes of Moody Analytics finds that the only risk of solvency is if sanctions are removed so they get access back, a pre-req.

<https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2019/12/30/2019-gave-us-a-new-kind-of-country/-at/> cause to liberalizaation

The shrinking of the chavista state is one of the main reasons behind this kind of economic liberalization we have seen in the last months of the year. It's not that Maduro suddenly discovered the lure of the market economy, but that he's simply unable to enforce the control measures of his Marxist education. Chavismo was able to turn a bug into a feature — for their own purposes, of course. A shift from the all-controlling revolutionary Leviathan to an absent state that sees mass migration as favorable (less protestors and less Clap boxes), and the resignation of droves of oil workers as a blessing.

Aff only risk of solvency

Juan Pablo Fuentes, xx-xx-2018, "In No Good Hands: The Venezuela Crisis and Consequences for South America" Moody's Analytics,

<https://www.moodyanalytics.com/-/media/web-assets/microsites/2018/economic-model/2018-06-15-venezuela-crisis.pdf>

The odds of a Maduro exit are less than even, but they are not slim. Few governments have outlasted the social tensions kindled by hyperinflation, and the likelihood of widespread social unrest will only increase in coming months as a shortage of hard currency keeps store shelves empty. Should mounting discontent lead to a popular uprising, Maduro's grip on power could slip. Even if the Maduro regime were to liberalize price and currency controls, the economy would not improve unless an agreement is reached with international creditors and the country regains access to international financial markets. This would require the lifting of U.S. financial sanctions, an outcome increasingly unlikely as long as Maduro remains. A worsening of Venezuela's crisis would deal a small but significant setback to growth prospects in Colombia, Peru and Chile, and force governments to contend with a continent-wide refugee crisis. Although governments have thus far limited the scope of humanitarian aid, a larger exodus would likely force governments to bear the resettlement costs for Venezuelan refugees, adding strain to public finances.

NEG On Inflation stuff/ East coast school paragra args

1. Also inflation decreasing doesn't mean anything if you can't buy anything from Int. Markets.
2. Inflation decrease wasn't that significant, hasn't seen any change.
3. No real impact, people were going to leave regardless because of the crisis.
4. Military is what matters. The extent to which their impact triggers is very small because if he liberalizes completely then he loses all ability to fund his generals, losing all power.
 - a. This also applies to their second contention
5. WP: all reforms currently are bandaids, Maduro hasn't actually reformed key sectors that caused the recession in the first place.
6. Their Paragra ev is really bad, says the trend of privatization has been existing since 2013, obviously sanctions aren't unique to causing privatization.
7. Their Kaknov evidence contradicts entire case, won't privatize because Maduro loses power, thus he's never going to fully engage.
8. Privatization bad; it's unclear on whether this stuff is better for the people.
9. Zero future diversification ability without access to international market.

NEG On Default to US:

1/ contradiction, why is russia/china not investing but US will?

2/ we don't invest enough to cause default, 2008 was trillions in subprime mortgages, max investment is 10-20 billion

3/ if it did get that bad we'd bail em out through the IMF like we did we several other countries

4/ US banks are super diversified, they have investment portfolios across the entire world, can always recoup investments, they have to prove that losses in Venezuela are significant enough to cause the ripple effect that it has

5/ incentive has completely crashed since 2017 as the economy tanked, have to prove that the same incentive exists for US banks because they investment before on the chance of a return in their economy

The way you know I'm right is because if trump has removed all those regulations there should have been a flood of investment into Venezuela, but there wasn't, there was only one.

6/ also no scope on this; only give one example of a bank, need to warrant more

AFF On Aid/Medicine:

1. The crisis predates sanctions. [NYT 16'](#) writes that a medicine shortage has existed for years, before sanctions even came in place. If anything after sanctions are removed mismanagement will just continue the trend.
2. Wasn't going to the people.
3. Alt causes on NGO's failing. [Reuters '19](#) writes that Maduro raids NGO's and prevents them from doing their operations, and are constantly ruining their ability to do stuff. Overall [Freedom House](#) says Maduro is always trying to make life hard for NGOs. The comparative is no difference.
 - a. Even w out sanctions they can't do anything because Maduro would stop them.
 - b. Turn because if we win 3rd contention then we solve back for forcing him to let them do their job.
4. It's not a zero sum. [Reuters 19'](#) reports that Venezuela just decided to turn to Russia to get aid, and is now actually investing in creating their own medicine creation sector.
 - a. We'd say this is offense for us because even if we remove sanctions seeing a private sector capable of creating drugs would reduce corruption in comparison to a state run distribution of medicine.

[Strake] Their Nebehay ev is from Maduro, this is exactly what we're talking abt, no guarentee it goes to the people

AFF On Epidemic:

1. Guardian ev is talking about a medicine crisis causing disease epidemic.
 - a. Says its bc healthcare people all fled the economy, its NU.
 - b. If we hadn't put sanctions in place, then illegal mining wouldn't have happened
 - c. Literally says that these epidemics were increasing exponentially in the decade before
 - i. Maduro literally didnt' care abt the people, but now allowing aid to come in
 1. [UNICEF](#): already benefited hundreds of thousands of people getting them access to clean water and medical kits

2. If there's actually an epidemics, international groups would have helped, ebola was in less developed countries yet we still managed it internationally to prevent a regional outbreak

AFF CLAP sanctioned:

1. OT 19': CLAP being reformed rn, only risk of offense because CLAP wasn't going to the people anyways.
 - a. Without sanctions only going to people who were already getting food, aka Maduro supporters.
 - b. We have the risk of offense, now being reformed so CLAP goes everywhere.
 - c. CLAP brings more revenue in the administration, helps him stay in power, that turns regime change etc.
 - d. CLAP boxes super bad, give diarrhea to kids, biggest cause of infant mortality.
 - i. We also have the only risk here w privatization to help make it better.

NEG On Inflation:

1. Decreasing from millions to thousands literally means nothing, still impossible to buy food
2. No real impact

NEG On Privatization:

1. [The Nation](#) writes that before the crisis Venezuela was significantly privatized, with it accounting for nearly 70% of economic activity. This means that reverting back to complete privatization isn't going to be a magical boon for the economy, the crisis shouldn't have happened if that was true.
2. The corruption continues into the private sector. The [NAC 19'](#) writes that people were withholding correct economic activities in order to influence private sector actors, for example withholding food before elections. This means that the corruption will just follow them into the private sector.
3. Economic activity will crash with privatization. [Carnegie Endowment](#) writes that in the past when Venezuela privatized companies cut millions of jobs and stole assets, crashing the middle income. This is why [the Daily Beast](#) confirms that these new reforms will actually increase poverty and inequality.
4. The reforms he's doing now are straight up just a bandaid. In fact the [WP 20'](#) looks at these current reforms and concludes that Maduro has shown no indication of pursuing long term reform the economy, but rather just some quick mitigation effects.
5. Their Paragra ev is really bad, says the trend of privatization has been existing since 2013, obviously sanctions aren't unique to causing privatization.

6. WPR 19': Even if privatization is focused on it won't be successful for a few reasons
 - a. People are very desperate and are stealing a ton of equipment causing massive losses and discouraging investment
 - b. VA's human capital resources are drenched, all either left or are too old, and it's too expensive and risky to bring expats over
 - c. The oil venezuela develops is too expensive compared to the light shale oil we're drilling in texas and emits too much that no int. Company wants to be seen investing in it
- 7.

Cant import, pre-req

Can't quantify dec in purchasing power, we tell 300k

<https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/14687> - privatization won't work to develop everything else

AFF On Dollarization:

1. Turn. Sanctions the reason why he's reforming to dollarize in the squo, wasn't happening before, [Argus Media](#) says its happening right now. Without sanctions though he'll bring back focus on Bolivars.
 - a. o/w prob, control unique happening rn

AFF On Debt Restructuring:

1. Restructuring just delays payments, problems still exist in the long term, they don't necessarily increase short term. Also doesn't prove that it works in the long term, just kicking the can down the road. Will get to a point where no one will want to restructure, impact is NU.
2. Does this even increase ability to get more debt investment? Venezuela was shut off from investing before sanctions anyways.
3. Have to prove debt restructuring leads to recovery, no guarantee the money saved is used properly to recover the economy. In a world with no sanctions he wasn't willing to do the proper spending, but in a world with pressure we can reduce the spending.
4. Venezuela wasn't even trying to restructure debt. [The WSJ](#) analyzes the reforms Maduro was planning on finds that he was just trying to make it seem like he was reforming just to blame it on sanctions. The dude literally appointed a Drug Mob boss to lead the efforts.
5. No one wanted to restructure Venezuelan debt anyways. [AQ](#) writes that even before sanctions the capital markets had already decided not to invest because its too risky.

Relatedly, Venezuela was already shut out of capital markets months before the August 2017 sanctions. Three months earlier, in May 2017, the country raised almost \$900 million in cash by promising to pay \$2.8 billion in five years with the sale of the infamous hunger bonds. The implicit interest cost of the financing was 47%. Previously, in November 2016, it had attempted to place a greatly over-collateralized bond at a 22% yield to maturity but was unable to sell the whole issue.

So, many months before the sanctions, capital markets had decided that it was too risky to lend money at anything other than an eye-gouging rate. The lack of market access had nothing to do with the financial sanctions, and the negotiations with bondholders (which were being run by a “drug kingpin”) were almost certainly going nowhere. Markets did not believe that Maduro was willing or able to reverse Venezuela’s decline.

AFF On Worsening Humanitarian Crisis:

O/w LT: future crises because underlying economic reasons why crisis started still exist

O/w ST: They’re just mitigating, our links solve short term

NEG On Regime Change:

1. Nothing has happened, if anything he’s strengthened his control because of the opposition.
2. [FA](#): Even if you remove Maduro its just gonna be someone else who takes his place, no real change.
- 3.

NEG On Trump Invasion:

1. Has to get congress approval., LA
2. Thinkprogress: Humanitarian
3. [Sanctions](#) also get the foot in the door, normalizes more action, historically true
4. Won’t do it, its just a threat

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/juan-guaidos-first-year-office>

On the other hand, Luis Almagro, secretary general of the OAS, encouraged the use of international agreements that aim to protect both the lives of Venezuelans and regional security. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) commitment and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, known as the Rio Treaty or TIAR for its initials in Spanish, are two instruments at the

disposal of Guaidó and the international community. For example, given the rapidly escalating political and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, and the repression and physical harm that the Venezuelan people have been subjected to in recent years, the relevance of R2P has become a crucial part of the discussion surrounding the international community's response to the crisis. Also, member countries of the Rio Treaty agreed in September 2019 to sanction and extradite Venezuelan government officials who participate in drug trafficking, terrorist activities, organized crime, and human rights violations.

<https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2019/03/07/us-envoy-dismisses-military-action-in-venezuela-during-prank-call/>

NEG On Citgo:

1. Guaido controls citgo, doesn't want to give it up. Same warrant for Maduro, [nyt](#) concludes Russia won't ever get citgo
2. Venezuela will have paid off its debt by the end of the year, so no control transfer.
3. Even if transferred, it's a US company, would split up the company
 - a. Government
 - b. Private investors

<https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Of-Course-Not-Venezuela-Slams-Russian-Takeover-Rumors.html> - Ven wouldn't hand over pdvsa

AFF On Water:

1. [The Conversation](#) writes that because of mismanagement Venezuela has been in a Water Crisis for decades, concluding that the failure represents Maduro's inability to lead. Sanctions aren't unique because Venezuela has plenty of water. This is why the [CSIS](#) completed a comprehensive analysis of Venezuela's water crisis, and finds 7 alternative reasons why the crisis exists, none of them sanctions.
2. Their economy was gonna crash regardless
3. Water ain't going to the ppl that need it, our c3 solves, squo proves
 - a. <https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Restoration-of-Drinking-Water-in-Venezuela-Done-Progressively-20190312-0017.html>

- b. Signed deal with unicef to inc. water
- 4. [all their numbers come from same indicted article]
- 5. Even their internal warrant is better solved in Neg world.
 - a. By creating a more sustainable economy to keep funding water infrastructure
 - b. Privatizing the industry to make it more efficient, away from State-control which is the stronger reason as to why the system is failing
 - i. Reform happening in squo
 - 1. <https://smartwatermagazine.com/news/tecnoconverting/venezuela-invests-water-infrastructure-caracas-improve-water-quality>

a/t the nytimes uniqueness

- 1. It literally says the decline has been there for 20 years
<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/19/world/americas/venezuela-water.html>

Aid assets still have to be proven to go to the people

NEG On Forcing Reform

- 1. Uniqueness flows aff. [OT 19'](#): Maduro was trying to reform social programs like CLAP but then sanctions came in place and preventing any chance of reform from materializing. That's why the [New York Times '20](#) writes that Venezuela devolves into a full scale humanitarian crisis with no real change being seen.
 - a. This gives us the only risk of offense, because even if sanctions magically pressure Maduro if the sanctions prevent the programs from operating then they have zero chance of offense.
 - 2. Maduro obviously isn't scared of him being removed from power, two warrants.
 - a. [The New Yorker 19'](#): He can just rig elections which is what he did last time, the Public's "support" doesn't mean anything; o/w, should have seen change with guaido support
 - b. [NYT 19'](#): Maduro has international allies keeping him afloat, allowing him to satisfy his generals too. He's not losing their support.
 - i. Both of these are independent reasons why he won't change anything; he doesn't need to.
-
- 1. Still ain't fixing stuff his approvals continue to drop yet he doesn't care
 - a. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/10/venezuela-maduro-chavez-guaido-pr-tests>
 - 2. Literally a facade, rural area getting murdered while some shops in the city look like they're getting better

- a. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/13/world/americas/Venezuela-collapse-Maduro.html>
3. CLAP reform not because of sanctions; [OT](#)

NEG Chinese Oil

1. They aint buyin any more; [reuters](#)

NEG Indian Oil

1. [Livemint 19'](#): US stepping in to offer India cheaper and fast oil as a result of Iranian oil drying up, would do the same for India
2. [Univision 19'](#): India not importing Venezuelan oil anymore.
3. [NYT 19'](#): Modi promised infrastructure spending five years ago still hasn't followed through; no guarantee the money is used for infrastructure.
4. [The Print 19'](#): Modi sucks at building infrastructure, most projects have delays and cost overruns.
5. [The Bulletin 19'](#): India planning massive shift towards green energy and electric cars to avoid high-oil import costs, this would reverse this. This is key as the [Guardian in 19'](#) writes that keeping India's emissions to a low is critical for climate change as they have the most potential to expand pollution amounts. The National Research Council writes that for every 1 degree celsius crop yields could decrease by 15%, endangering billions of lives.

t's unclear if chinese or indian growth is good, it's unclear if the infrastructure they develop is clearly good

c. it's unclear how much venezuelan oil actually helped with that rather than 'low oil prices in general'

d. sanctions also probably didn't actually do anything - venezuela has been able to circumvent them because they still can sell to china and russia

which is the most important respond

response*

like it's us sanctions and the eu joined in

but china still buys venezuelan oil

russia helps venezuela circumvent sanctions

the most effective sanctions are the ones that do things like freeze specific assets etc

and/or arguments about their optical arguments (e.g. intervention tradeoff)

also again

think about your argument

it takes like 8 steps

to get to some kind of an impact

how much of an impact are you really accessing

and then even then when you end at that impact
which is some version of chinese/indian economic growth
it's still unclear that this is clearly good
oil-driven economic growth in particular does not seem particularly 'clearly good'
cheaper oil also helps china militarize, it helps china save money to dump into their facial
recognition software
cheaper oil helps china make more money to then turn back and invest in these things
if i'm responding to your argument, i'm making like one response at four different points in your link
chain which can all be construed as terminal
and then turning your impact like seven different ways
or maybe i dont even respond on the link level
i very firmly don't think this argument is any good

NEG 4% econ growth

1. The number was invented by a conspiracy theorist in hiding in Canada who won an award from NATO for being a key role in spreading pro-Russia propaganda.

NEG Potomac / Peterson arg

1. Their Belfare ev is from 1998, we've had sanctions on so many countries that are essentially full scale. For example, their own Wall Street Journal ev, which they completely miscite in case, gives 4 other examples.
 - a. We've had sanctions on NK since 1995 and their nuclear program has continued to escalate.
 - b. We've had a full embargo on Cuba for a long time and seen no democratic progress.
 - i. These examples are terminal defense, because they trigger the Peterson evidence regardless of what Venezuela does.
2. There's really no reason why Venezuela is so unique. They completely miscut the Salama evidence about how unique Venezuela is, call for it, it's pretty bad. We say that every country makes their own decision calculus depending on their situation. For example, if sanctions worked on Iran and forced a nuclear deal then other countries know that there are examples going the other way. No country is dumb enough to look at one other country and base their decision calculus off of that.
3. If they want to say Venezuela is the shining most important example then they have to win that progress is being seen in Venezuela. We should have seen progress by the Maduro government to reform. We obviously haven't.
 - a. Their Warden ev about needing multiple years to bring reform is good for us. It says it took sanctions on Haiti around three years in order to work. We've had sanctions on

Venezuela since 2014. We should have seen a sliver of change, we haven't. This means that sanctions on VA aren't working, which

- i. Means that sanctions aren't effective, and thus other countries will think they don't have to reform and can just hold out.
 - ii. Trigger peterson even if the sanctions are still on because other countries will perceive they can suffer through sanctions and stay in power.
4. Their Rogers, Elizabeth, and Warden evidences are all from the same source, they're just trying to act like they are three different sources, probably because they're trying to hide the fact that the evidence is from 1997.
- a. [The Business Insider](#) does the comparative in 2014 writing that Modern states are much more nationalistic and as such are willing to suffer through sanctions instead of giving in. That's why the [TRT in 2018](#) finds that only a fifth of sanctions in the 21st century have been followed by even a bit of progress.

AFF Potomac Oil Links

- find something general about how you can't blame oil revenue decreases on sanctions
- assuming Maduro funnels money to people and employs them, probably won't
- still have to win internal link that maduro uses oil money to fund social programs/water correctly
- last time oil prices surged was in 2011 under chavez, completely different, Maduro not giving to people
- mismanagement the real reason all the crisis happened
 - also links into giving people directly back their money and social programs
- control link into conversation ev; same reason why he printed money, printed bc oil company crashed, started printing before sanctions, control uniqueness because he's decreasing inflation in squo

AFF Assorted Texas school First Links

1. Don't prove Private Investment is good
2. Still won't come in, Maduro is going to mismanage it
3. Also assuming that FI coming in to a company can be used independently of the government

wAFF Petrocaribe

1. Call for NPR ev, gives like four turns
 - a. Corruption
 - b. Climate change
 - c. Debt; allows countries to borrow oil free for 25 years, but leaders just used the money freed up on dumb stuff thus saddeling countries with hella debt, wasted money
 - d. If VA goes under they may demand hella debt right away, destroy econ

- e. Outdated tech; prevented countries from developing long term infrastructure that's much more efficient
 - i. [WOL 19'](#): does the comparative between benefits and costs, including economic, social and environmental costs outweigh, inhibit development and drain public finances, decreasing social development, money doesn't go to people
- 2. The Miami Herald even they cite in case literally concedes it's not because of US sanctions, but because the PDVSA is so mismanaged
 - a. It also concedes that all the countries that are part of it also agreed to sanctions on Venezuela and literally support the United States, so they still wouldn't accept it regardless
 - b. Also concedes that Petrocaribe was on a decline before sanctions and that Cuba really was the only country getting shipments when sanctions came in place

AFF On Oil Revenue:

- 1. Mismanagement root cause, solve back for
 - a. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/rropier/2019/01/29/charting-the-decline-of-venezuelas-oil-industry/#2d2136874ecd>
- 2. [Resilience '19'](#): VA oil that they sell will be hell a unprofitable in a couple years so it doesn't matter if we have sanctions or not
 - a. Offense for us, give incentive to diversify
- 3.

AFF On Guyana

- 1. Their only piece of evidence indicating that Maduro would do this is the Stratfor evidence. The Stratfor evidence derives this claim from an UNVERIFIED UNCONFIRMED source Legit some random person claimed it.
- 2. Alt causes for Maduro to consider invasion. [NI](#) writes that he would have considered doing it bc of the economy crashing from socialism regardless.
- 3. [DJ 19'](#) (probably postdates their evidence): US moving troops to Guyana, so if he invades he's guaranteed full invasion, would never do so because def loses regime.
- 4. T: [WO 19'](#): finds that sanctions have actually hindered the ability of Venezuela to interfere with Guyana's oil operations, control internal link, we take out capability

Our Contention Two is Protecting Guyana

Before sanctions, Venezuela was on the path to recovery.

Benjamin of the Political Review explains that while rising oil prices in 2018 should have helped Venezuela's economy stabilize, sanctioned prevented it from doing so.

Furthermore, Fuentes of the New York Time explains that even if Maduro attempts to liberalize prices and currency controls, unless sanctions are lifted and Venezuela is able to obtain international investment, sustained growth is impossible. This is why Andres of Miami Herald finds from last week that growth within Venezuela is projected to fall another 10% in 2020.

Put simply, as long as sanctions remain, Venezuela's economy will inevitably collapse. For this reason, Rendon of the CSIS confirms that Maduro is desperate to acquire leverage to eliminate sanctions.

For Maduro, it is try of die. Thus, Maduro will invade Guyana, a nearby latin american country, to obtain a bargaining chip against the US.

Stratfor confirms that because Guyana's oil fields are mostly owned by US oil companies, acquiring Guyana would give Venezuela a bargaining chip against Trump that could be exchanged for the lifting of sanctions.

Fortunately, there is still time.

Butler of the Financial Time confirms that Guyana's oil fields will go official online in 2020, making that the prime time for an invasion.

Absent lifting of sanctions, an invasion will occur, which would quickly regional.

Delgado of the Wall Street Journal continues that any small scale incursion into Guyana would force Brazil and other regional actors to intervene.

Delgado continues that as sanctions pose an increasing existential risk, the benefits from intervening would far outweigh the potential backlash from failure.

_ confirms that is it try or die

This would lead to chaos, as Gibson 19 explains that with the 3 countries having a combined population of 251 million, continuing that this war would make the carnage and refugee crisis from Iraq, Syria, and Libya seem like a watershed in history.

NEG China Trade Deal

1. Reuters gives like twenty alt causes, for example later down it says that China is mainly not giving because of Maduro's just complete failure and inability to manage the economy, the part they

cite is their public statement, but later down in private chinese officials say its because of how mismanaged it is

- a. It also says that China has basically built its own energy sector and doesn't need VA oil anymore
 - b. This means even without sanctions they won't invest
 - i. The way you know im right is their atlantic council evidence says China has stopped loaning to VA since 2013 bc of his mismanagement, this trend started way before sanctions
2. Their impact comes from the Newsweek ev, the problem is that Newsweek is from before this partial deal was announced, and is referring to a full stop in the trade war
- a. This is key as [NPR](#) writes two things:
 - i. This isn't a magical huge deal, its a super small deal and most steep af tariffs are still gonna remain in place
 - ii. A bunch of the parts aren't enforceable and China has a history of breaking deals on these things so it probably won't be effective
3. Their Atlantic Council ev works against them for two reasons:
- a. It's assuming the deal hadn't been signed yet, it has
 - b. The only brightline it establishes is China supporting the Maduro regime, yet China continues to release statements supporting the government publically, even with sanctions on, is NU
4. So many alt causes to disrupt the deal; uighers, trump being dumb, south china sea, etc.

AFF on Maduro Lashout

1. Breshaw evi is really bad its their link into Maduro getting out of power through a coup
 - a. Their evidence is literally from a year ago and it said A COUP WAS SUPER IMMINENT their should have been coup but instead Maduro has been reforming the economy and government and literally there was a failed coup in April of last year. We would contend the reason the coup probably failed was because he was improving the situation in Venezuela
2. Our third contention solves back for this; we keep Maduro in power by forcing him to adapt and reach out to the people, through things like social programs. That's why the opposition's approval ratings are dropping, Maduro is reacting to sanctions and fixing his approach.
 - a. This is why their Schemidt card is from 2017 and
 - i. Nothing has happened
 - ii. And doesn't take into account his shift towards appealing the people
 1. This also gives defense on the contention that Maduro wouldn't engage in diversified actions but rather try to help the people
3. On the subpoint A about Columbia, they say Maduro would invade at all costs, but the part they cite is referring to Maduro skipping bond payments, not even talking about invasion of any sort. Maduro being willing to skip bond payments is completely different than invading a country and guaranteeing the end of his regime.'

- a. This proves the logic true that Maduro obviously wouldn't invade if it means he loses his entire regime and any semblance of power
 - b. They also cite a different part about Ellis saying that Maduro may try to divert, but that's from Colombia, of course they're worried.
- 4. On their subpoint A second link; [Insight Crime](#) finds that Venezuela has harbored FARC groups on its borders for decades, it isn't new to sanctions.
- 5. Their impact evidence from WP is also bad
 - a. It gives all causes as to why VA and rebel groups are getting closer together; VA wants to get more leverage over Colombia and rebel groups need more areas to train, neither of which are affected by sanctions
 - b. This also contradicts the rest of their case, because in the article it says no VA leader would ever want war because the VA military is so bad, meaning that this further warrants that Maduro would never invade CO or Guyana.
- 6. Their Subpoint B is also really bad. Our responses at the top about a coup and Maduro regaining power because of his reforms responds here too. No need to lash out.
- 7. Their Schmidt ev from the link level is damning. It says that Maduro in 2015 tried issuing a decree to claim sovereignty over Guyana, because of how oppressed his citizens were, even before the big sanctions on oil.
 - a. This proves that A Maduro would have done this stuff regardless because of his own mistakes
 - b. These are mostly empty threats that he won't follow through on, should have seen at least some kind of military move
 - c. Their Schmidt evidence also says that Venezuela doesn't even have the capacity to invade, and that imagining them invading is entirely theoretical. Terminal defense
 - i. The way all these warrants are proven true is that this ev came out at the beginning of last year, should have seen something, literally the entire article is based off an unconfirmed source saying that VA was going to invade.
- 8. T: [WO 19'](#): finds that sanctions have actually hindered the ability of Venezuela to interfere with Guyana's oil operations, control internal link, we take out capability

NEG On Preventing Colombian Invasion

- 1. Destroying Venezuela through sanctions has increased the chance of war for two reasons:
 - a. Invited more Colombia terror groups to enter Venezuela, with WP 19' finding that VA-FARC coop ballooning this year
 - b. Making Venezuela appear much weaker and prime for Colombia to make threats to invade
 - c. Making the crisis worse increases refugee crisis increases resentment making it more likely to invade
 - i. For this reason the WP writes that now the chance of conflict between the two countries is much higher than years prior, o/w on uniqueness
- 2. Their evidence about Colombian popular support rising

- a. Doesn't say anything near that
- b. Is from a source funded by Maduro

NEG On Price Controls:

- 1. Reuters looks at the recent price controls reforms and says a couple things
 - a. Only rich ppl can afford stuff
 - b. Economy still crashing
 - c. Rest of the country left out

NEG On Dollarization:

- 1. Hella ton more dollars in aff world when Venezuela can sell oil and businesses can do direct business
- 2. Reforms literally incompetent rn, [WSJ](#): only dollars going to rich who were doing fine regardless, and the poor went further into poverty in squo
- 3. Absent sanctions dollars in economy, Forbes: 54% of VA econ on dollars
 - a. o/w case bc only rich ppl get in
- 4. Venezuela limited by dollarization bc they can't print their own; Ozy 19', harder to finance the deficit and create an effective budget
 - a. o/w, pre-reqs all social programs, need to avoid dollarization to see social programs
- 5. Our contentions so much more direct to people, they have to go through more hoops
- 6.

NEG On SMH Regime Change

- 1. Change of face, will just be another person
- 2. Maduro strengthening power rn

- 1. Maduro getting stronger
- 2. Tankers; getting around sanctions
- 3. Mil leaders sticking behind Maduro despite guaranteed no harm if they turned over the opposition, will stick with him no matter what
 - a.

Insight Crimes 20'; Maduro has actually reinforced his position by using illegal gold mines to generate revenue and help bribe key allies.

- a. Is more recent than all their evidence

- b. Proves that his control over power is more than his revenue sources, opposition just incompetent

People should have been fleeing already if they know he's going to run out of money, especially when the US is offering rewards to people for deserting now, proves they'll stick by him no matter what

Foreign Affairs 19';

- a. Cuba has so much influence that the government would be super failed regardless with continuing socialism, the system won't change, just the person
- b. No real reforms because they all have to start from scratch and remove literally every criminal that are embedded, too hard
- c. All expected to happen instantly because people want change right away, will fail and another dictator will come in place

NEG On Diversification

<https://www.history.com/news/venezuela-chavez-maduro-crisis>

-tried to diversify, didn't work

-cut off from international markets, despite a small increase in exports, economy still was crashing, reason being cut off from proper transcating mechnaism and can't switch exports etc.

FP from case

That's what began to happen in 2017. Last year, Venezuela's export revenues rose from \$28 to \$32 billion, buoyed by the recovery in world oil prices. Under normal conditions, a rise in a country's exports would leave it with more resources to pay for its imports. But in the Venezuelan case, imports fell by 31 percent during the same year. The reason is that the country lost access to international financial markets. Unable to roll over its debt, it was forced to build up huge external surpluses to continue servicing that debt in a desperate attempt to avoid a default. Meanwhile, creditors threatened to seize the Venezuelan government's remaining revenue sources if the country defaulted, including refineries located abroad and payments for oil shipments.

NEG On Potomac's New Neg

1. Ev doesn't say colombia would invade; NPR ev just says they're concerned abt the refugee crisis, dude is literally stupid, also isn't refering to war w VA, referring to civil war so its about VA inside, NOT TALKING ABT WAR W VENEZUELA (MISCUT COMPLETELY) (CNTRL F PLAN B TALKING ABT CIVIL WAR TALKING ABT ARMED CONFLICT)
2. They say it happened in 1990s, clearly there are other factors so NU
3. NYT ev indicates that VA did these in 90s
4. WP ev doesn't say sanctions
 - a. Works against them, tensions worsening rn
 - b. Cozying up to them, WP ev says more than a decade its served as a safe space for Farc, makes sense VA wants more allies
5. Don't prove sanctions lead to Guadio
 - a. Wont' let US in, everyone hates them
 - b. Change of face not change of policy, same approach
6. Appetite for intervention super low rn
7. Can't just get Brazil to intervene
 - a. Even if they do that doesn't mean it'll cause them to allow US to just walk in and take over oil sectors
8. Make fun of the arg fr like wtf is this