

We affirm, and our sole contention is that UNCLOS imposes an end to US pollution.

**Beckman of the National University of Singapore** writes that UNCLOS is the strongest environmental treaty in existence.

Indeed, **Groves of the Heritage Foundation** explains that parties to UNCLOS must adopt anti-pollution regulations and ban any activity that could harm the oceans. **Murray of the NCPA** provides an example, writing that if the U.S. joined, it would be forced to shut down all of its coal-fired power plants.

The U.S. would have no choice but to adhere to UNCLOS' stringent standards for two reasons.

*First, international lawsuits.*

The President of UNCLOS' tribunal explains that it takes an expansive view of UNCLOS' environmental standards because it wants to shape international law.

[SCFR](#) adds that UNCLOS "tribunals... are...likely to be stacked against" America, making defending against environmental lawsuits difficult regardless of their merit. But even so, [Brower of Yale](#) writes that the US' win rate as the defendant of lawsuits in the ICJ, which can be used as a proxy for UNCLOS, is only 19%.

For instance, **Chu of MIT News** writes that carbon emissions are causing sea levels to rise. As is, [Groves](#) explains that Bangladesh, Egypt, and Nigeria have legitimate claims to sue America, and a coalition of island nations have tried to but cannot due to our nonaccession.

Moreover, [Burns of Johns Hopkins](#) writes that rising sea levels are moving shorelines inward, profoundly impacting all coastal states' economies and giving almost any coastal state the right to sue.

Countries would uniquely want to sue the U.S. for three reasons.

First, the Constitution has provisions that UNCLOS must be enforced as domestic law that [Enabulele of the University of Benin](#) says are internationally unique.

Second, [Strauss of the Environmental Law Institute](#) explains that the U.S.' failure to ratify other environmental initiatives makes it easier to prove malintent.

Third, Doelle of Dalhousie University writes that a lawsuit stands the highest chance of success against the world's greatest emitter per capita, which is important in the establishment of a favorable precedent for claimants.

Because their penalties are seen as so severe and the rulings are unappealable, [Bandow of CATO](#) explains that just the threat of being sued leaves the U.S. no choice but to pass environmental policies.

### ***Second, executive action.***

According to a **2018 poll conducted by Stanford University**, 68 percent of Americans want the government to pass better environmental regulations.

However, climate policy will never pass in Congress. **Boven of the New York Times** explains in 2018 that Republicans in Congress consistently block it because they view it as a Democratic issue.

Acceding to UNCLOS would allow the next president of the US to bypass this gridlock and implement environmental reform. **Ku of Hofstra University** explains that, “The President can directly...alter...regulation[s] to comply with international [treaty obligations],” or “...sue a US states to force compliance.

If states or others tried to resist the president’s unilateral changes, they’d fail: Quigley of Ohio State University writes in 2012 that the courts have historically ruled in favor of the federal government in lawsuits with states over treaty obligations.

Ultimately, **Kogan of Seton Hall University** writes that UNCLOS could provide a future President with legal and political justification to strengthen environmental regulations beyond normal executive power.

**The impact** is reducing US air pollution.

**Chu** finds that air pollution kills 200,000 people in the U.S. every year. **Ansari of CNN** writes that even miniscule increases in air pollution increase overall mortality by 3%.

But if the U.S. doesn’t accede, corporations will continue to recklessly pollute. [Roberts of Vox](#) writes that Republican politicians direct government subsidies to fossil fuel plants to keep them running long after they become unprofitable, and thus [Geiger of Asme](#) writes that the share of fossil fuels will actually *increase* through 2040. The only way to switch away is by banning pollution.

Because changing climate patterns destroy the lives of farmers reliant on agriculture as a means of sustenance, global warming is imminently detrimental for the third world. For every degree average world temperatures increase, [Gustin of Inside Climate News](#) writes that annual crop yields will be reduced by 7.4 percent, and [Burke of Stanford](#) corroborates each will cost the developing world 60 trillion dollars.

Thus, [Berrens of GWC](#) writes that once global temperatures rise above two degrees, billions will be forced into starvation. That's bad because [Gillis of the New York Times](#) and [Eliperin of the Washington Post](#) write that as is, US emissions will account for more than two degrees of global warming over the next century.

Thus, we affirm.

We affirm, and **Contention One is Catalyzi**

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*First, existing deep-sea drilling* on the Gulf of Mexico and Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. This drilling will continue as it is incredibly profitable-- [US DOI](#) reports this year that companies bid a total for \$140 million just for the rights to drill in the US ECS.

*Second, developments in deep-sea mining.* [Wagner of HufPo](#) explains that the the US ECS contains the second most rare earth minerals in the world, trailing only China's highly guarded reserves. Because new advances are making it more feasible and American companies like Odyssey and Ocean Minerals are already finding REMs, **MIT** predicts that deep sea mining will be widespread by 2035.

The only difference is that under UNCLOS Article 82, most of our taxes are redistributed to landlocked developing countries in the form of royalties.

[USGS](#) reports that the resources in the US ECS are worth 1.7 trillion dollars, and thus [Groves](#) explains that US royalties will quickly amount to hundreds of billions if not trillions of dollars

This aid is beneficial for the developing world for two reasons:

**First,** [Tavares of Economic Letters](#) quantifies that a 1% increase in aid decreases corruption by 2% because it offers countries an incentive to crack down on corrupt practices to receive aid over rivals.

**Second,** because it provides much-needed capital for local businesses and increases consumption, [Sachs of UChicago](#) writes that a 10% increase in aid increases GDP growth by 3.5%

For these reasons, [Goldin of the World Bank](#) quantifies that for every additional billion dollars of aid given, three hundred thousand people are permanently lifted out of poverty.

**Our Second Contention is that UNCLOS imposes an end to US pollution.**

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However, [Boven of NYT](#) explains that Congressional Republicans consistently block climate legislation because they view it as Democratic.

[Ku of Hofstra](#) writes that acceding to UNCLOS would allow the next US president to bypass this gridlock and implement reform, as doing so would allow the president to

directly...alter...regulation[s] to comply with international [treaty obligations] and sue states to enforce compliance.

Thus [Kogan of Seton Hall](#) writes that UNCLOS allows for environmental regulations to be strengthened beyond normal executive power.

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## Frontlines & Removed Cards

### A/T Corruption Turns

1. Their evidence does not concern *royalty* aid, which is more subject to reallocation than normal aid because its allocation changes with every meeting of the ISA, thus increasing the incentive to use it to fight corruption.
2. Our side of the link outweighs theirs-- [Naim of the Atlantic](#) writes that the single best way to sustainably and reliably fight corruption on a wide scale is to offer countries strong incentives to weed out local corruption, and Tavares' quantification that a 1% increase in aid decreases corruption by 2% indicts the methodologies of contrary studies as being reverse causal.

### Corruption Impacts

This corruption is detrimental. [The World Bank](#) explains that it is the single largest barrier to growth in the third world because it costs Africa 150 billion dollars a year, and [Gupta of the IMF](#) quantifies that poverty increases by 2.3% for every 10% increase in third world corruption.

### Aid Good Metastudy

[Mekasha of United Nations University](#) confirms in 2018 that aid empirically relieves poverty in a metastudy analyzing more than 140 studies on the topic.

### Executive Action → Groups Will Sue for Overreach Frontline

If states or nonprofit groups tried to challenge the president's authority, they'd likely fail: **Quigley of Ohio State University** writes that the courts have historically ruled in favor of the federal government in lawsuits with states over treaty obligations