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## NEG Add-ons

### South Korean Sovereignty

**Link: Not deploying THAAD and not joining the US trilateral missile system would be politically toxic for SK (Hardy - The National Interest).**

James Hardy (The National Interest). "North Korea, Beware of Seoul's Mighty Missiles." July 2, 2014.

<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/north-korea-beware-seouls-mighty-missiles-10792?page=show>

For the United States, the South's new missile capabilities and the accompanying doctrine appear to be less than welcome. For starters, "Kill Chain" complicates potential conflict scenarios and could see the United States pulled into a shooting war with the North by a trigger-happy South Korean military—something the United States has already had to deal with, according to former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. After the North's November 2010 artillery attack on Yeonpyeong island, "South Korea's original plans for retaliation were, we thought, disproportionately aggressive, involving both aircraft and artillery," Gates wrote in his memoir. "We were worried the exchanges could escalate dangerously," he added. "Kill Chain" and KAMD also explain why South Korea **feels that it can refuse to join a trilateral ballistic missile defense system with the United States and Japan, something that is a major policy objective for Washington and politically toxic for Seoul.** "If we consider various conditions such as the necessity, its adaptability to the peninsular environment and its cost, there is no appropriate logic for South Korea to join the U.S. missile defense," Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin said in 2013, in comments that skirted the real issue – Tokyo's involvement in any BMD program. Kim was in his current position when public opposition stopped Seoul from signing a military intelligence sharing agreement with Tokyo at the last minute in June 2012; since then, bilateral relations have plumbed new depths.

## **Link: Not Deploying THAAD Represents a Lack of Resolve to the U.S. Alliance (Newsham - National Interest).**

Grant Newsham (The National Interest). "The Real Reason China Is Desperate to Stop THAAD." March 15, 2017.

<http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-real-reason-china-desperate-stop-thaad-19895>

**Chinese opposition to South Korea's deployment of the THAAD missile defense system is less about missiles than about an ongoing effort to weaken—and ideally demolish—the United States' network of formal and informal alliances in Asia that has underpinned the regional order for the last seventy**

**years.** The THAAD controversy that heated up in 2016 once deployment became likely displays a familiar Chinese modus operandi: First, pick a fight over an allegedly offensive act. Next, follow up with vitriol and veiled threats, and then inflict economic pressure—while making bland denials or declaring it the spontaneous reaction of the righteously offended Chinese people. This sequence played out to form in South Korea in recent months, highlighted by verbal assaults on South Korea and fierce pressure on Lotte Group's operations inside China. (Lotte provided the land for basing THAAD batteries in ROK.) Other strong-arm tactics include restricting Chinese tourism to South Korea and blocking online trade in South Korean goods. **In addition to domestic disruption caused by Chinese hectoring and economic sanctions, in South Korea and other targeted countries, opposition voices are energized, claiming the U.S. relationship isn't worth the economic or security "costs" of offending the PRC.** And even if the alliance with the United States remains intact, it is at least shaken and may face self-imposed constraints in the future over worries about Chinese reactions. All in all, a "win-win" for the PRC.

## **Link: Suspending THAAD deployment strained US-SK relations (Rich - New York Times).**

Motoko Rich (New York Times). "North Korea Fires More Missiles as Seoul Puts Off U.S. Defense System." June 7, 2017.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/world/asia/south-korea-thaad-missile-defense-us.html>

The missile defense system is contentious in South Korea and has drawn sharp criticism from China, which sees the system's radar as a threat. Beijing has taken retaliatory economic measures against Seoul, including curtailing the flow of Chinese tourists and punishing South Korean companies in China. During his campaign, Mr. Moon, who won the presidency last month, complained that the United States and the previous South Korean administration had rushed to deploy Thaad in order to present him with a fait accompli. His **decision to suspend the installation could strain relations with the White House, which has taken a hard line in confronting North Korea and its nuclear weapons program. It could also hurt American efforts to present a tough, unified position** with Japan and South Korea **against the North.** Mr. Moon, who has said he wants to resolve the nuclear crisis through dialogue, has also suggested that South Korea must "learn to say no" to Washington. He has already signaled a softening stance toward North Korea by encouraging aid groups to visit the country, although the North has rejected those offers since Seoul supported new United Nations sanctions. Analysts said that as people protested the Thaad installation and South Korean businesses pressured the government to improve relations with China, Mr. Moon might have decided that suspending the progress of the system was politically expedient.

## **Link: Suspending THAAD angered Trump and can end up eroding US-SK assurances (Snyder - National Interest).**

Scott A. Snyder (The National Interest). "Is the U.S.-South Korea Alliance in Trouble?" June 26, 2017.

<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-us-south-korea-alliance-trouble-21323>

While emphasizing a willingness to go along with the U.S.-led sanctions and pressure campaign, Moon has downplayed resumption of inter-Korean economic cooperation efforts such as the possible reopening of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. He has conditioned such efforts on evidence of North Korea's commitment to denuclearization. Moon expressed his outrage at North Korea's responsibility for the death of American college student Otto Warmbier and called Kim Jong-un "an unreasonable leader and a very dangerous person" in a June 20 interview with the Washington Post. Moon's pragmatic style thus far is a stark contrast to that of his populist political mentor Roh Moo-hyun. But **Moon's decision on THAAD has reportedly angered President Trump, despite his administration's assurances that the environmental review will not result in a reversal of South Korea's decision to accept the missile defense system.** Likewise, **Trump's longstanding personal perceptions of South Korean defense and trade free-riding could come to the surface at any time,** despite Moon's pledges to strengthen South Korea's defense and his country's substantial financial contributions to the construction of a new base for U.S. forces south of Seoul. The two countries are set to negotiate South Korea's future share of financial contributions in support of U.S. Forces in Korea later this year, and it is entirely reasonable to expect trade negotiators to review the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement as well. South Korea's greatest fear is that **bad**

**chemistry between Moon and Trump will erode the assurances on which South Korea's security is based. These worries are likely to persist, despite deep institutional ties within the alliance**, a deeply shared common purpose in countering growing peninsular and regional instability, and strong public support for the security alliance in both countries.

### **Link: THAAD essential to protect US troops stationed in SK (Griffiths - CNN).**

James Griffiths (CNN). "South Korea suspends THAAD deployment." June 8, 2017.

<http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/07/asia/south-korea-thaad-suspended/index.html>

Relations between Seoul and Beijing have soured significantly as a result of its deployment, affecting South Korean businesses and Koreans living in China. A spokesman for the Pentagon said the United States will work with the South Korean government "throughout this process." "The US trusts (South Korea's) stance that the THAAD deployment was an alliance decision and it will not be reversed," Navy Cmdr. Gary Ross said. Gen. Mark Milley, US Army chief of staff, told the Senate Subcommittee on Defense that the system **is essential to protect thousands of US troops in South Korea**, as well as South Korean citizens.

### **Link: By blocking measures to protect troops SK erodes US confidence and support for US troop commitments (Snyder - Forbes).**

Scott Snyder (Forbes). "South Korea's Decision To Halt THAAD Carries Hidden Risks." June 11, 2017.

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottsnnyder/2017/06/11/south-koreas-decision-to-halt-thaad-carries-hidden-risks/#5442ed3429ad>

North Korea's missile advances across the board are cause for concern--and cause for defensive countermeasures. The risks and vulnerabilities are out in the open: South Korea's indigenous missile defense efforts are developing too slowly to counter North Korean progress, and that could put U.S. Forces in Korea at risk. Moon's decision carries risks The Moon administration must find a way to enhance governmental transparency and accountability while upholding its credibility as a strong U.S. security partner. **If the perception becomes that the South Korean government is blocking measures necessary to protect American forces, that would rapidly erode American public support for U.S. troop commitments. It could potentially provide President Donald Trump with a pretext to pursue U.S. withdrawal of forces in Korea.** Moon's decision also carries another risk. For months, China put the economic pressure on South Korea for agreeing to the deployment in the first place. It could see the halt in implementation of the THAAD deployment as an acquiescence, and thereby invite even more pressure on Seoul on each occasion that China is dissatisfied with new South Korean defense measures toward North Korea. The way forward The THAAD debate has become overheated and politicized, generating risks of miscalculation and overreaction. A pause that defuses the political issues surrounding the THAAD deployment would be a good thing, but a pause as prelude to reversal could do great damage to the U.S.-ROK security alliance.

### **Solvency: Removing US troops solves for the threat (Bandow - The Hill).**

Doug Bandow (The Hill). Worried about war with North Korea? Withdraw from South Korea — seriously. Published 5/2/17.

<http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/foreign-policy/331578-worried-about-war-with-north-korea-withdraw-from-south>.

And even so, U.S. casualties likely would be very high, as American forces rushed in to stop a North Korean invasion backed by biological, chemical, and perhaps nuclear weapons. Overall casualty estimates start in the tens of thousands and race skyward. To trigger the war which the U.S. has spent 64 years attempting to prevent would be extraordinarily foolish. Especially since **there is a very easy way to remove the North Korean target** from American cities. **Withdraw U.S. troops from the Republic of Korea.**

Washington policymakers [are] horrified by the thought that Pyongyang might be able to target America ignore the fact that the U.S. was vulnerable to Soviet attack for most of the Cold War. Eventually China added a rudimentary capability to do so as well. Yet leaders as foul as Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong did not strike America. They didn't want to die or destroy their societies. Attacking the U.S. would have resulted in horrific retaliation. Mutual Assured Destruction is an ugly doctrine, but it worked for decades to keep the peace. Nevertheless, there seems to be a common presumption that 33-year-old North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is irrational, even crazy. He is evil, but that doesn't make him suicidal: he, like his father and grandfather, prefers his virgins in this world.

### **Frontline: SK doesn't need the US (Bandow - The Hill)**

Doug Bandow (The Hill). Worried about war with North Korea? Withdraw from South Korea — seriously. Published 5/2/17.

<http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/foreign-policy/331578-worried-about-war-with-north-korea-withdraw-from-south>.

Obviously, the idea of the U.S. stepping back militarily contradicts the bipartisan interventionist philosophy which dominates Capitol Hill. Yet American policymakers need to ask: At what cost? For what are they prepared to go to war? For what are they prepared to risk nuclear war?

**Defending South Korea, which possesses around 40 times the GDP and twice the population of the North, is a matter of choice. Yesterday entanglement risked involvement in a hideous conventional struggle. Now the cost is a possible nuclear strike on U.S. bases in Asia. Tomorrow it may be the incineration of Los Angeles, Seattle, or cities further inland.**

Is that danger really justified? There ain't no such thing as a free lunch, Nobel laureate economist Milton Friedman was fond of saying. That's true in foreign policy as well as economics. Jump into someone else's conflict and you are likely to get burnt. In this case the result could be getting nuked. Better for Washington to pull back rather than either start a war today or receive a nuclear strike tomorrow.

**Impact (Econ): China concerned about THAAD (Stratfor).**

(Stratfor). China Fears U.S. Missile System in South Korea. Published 3/27/15.

<https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/china-fears-us-missile-system-south-korea>

China's strong stance against THAAD is quixotic — the system is an area defense system, meaning it would defend against missiles falling only on South Korea. Beijing, however, has larger concerns. It sees the deployment of the system as the potential start of greater U.S. deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems on the Asian mainland. Ultimately, **China's rhetoric toward South Korea reflects Beijing's concern that enhanced U.S. anti-ballistic missile capabilities would weaken Chinese nuclear deterrence and thus shift the balance in the Pacific.**

**Impact (Econ): Chinese backlash through economic sanctions have detrimental affect on South Korea's economy (Herh - Business Korea).**

Michael Herh (Business Korea). "Deployment of THAAD System May Cost S. Korean Economy Up to \$15 Billion." March 9, 2017.

<http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/english/news/industry/17472-economic-loss-deployment-thaad-system-may-cost-s-korean-economy-15-billion>

There is concern that the damage caused by **China's growing economic retaliations over South Korea's deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system may impact not only some Korean companies but also the entire Korean economy.** According to a report on March 8 titled "The Diffusion and Effects of Anti-South Korean Sentiments in China" compiled on March by Jang Woo-ae, a researcher at the IBK Economic Research Institute, **South Korea's economic loss will reach US\$14.76 billion** (about 16.9 trillion won) in a worst-case scenario **with a decline of 10% in product exports to China, a 30% cut in tourists from China and a 20% reduction in value added in the South Korean contents industry.** In that case, **South Korea's GDP growth rate will fall by 1.07 percentage points.** Credit Suisse, a global investment bank, also predicted that if China's ban on Chinese tourists to South Korea lasts for a year, Korea's GDP growth may fall by 0.5 percentage points." This is based on the calculation that South Korea's total loss due to the tourism ban is close to US\$7.3 billion (about \$ 8.4 trillion), which is 0.53% of Korea's GDP. South Korea, attracts 3.5 million Chinese tourists a year via packages or Airtel programs which, offer airline tickets and accommodation, and they spend US\$2,080 per person in Korea on average. Korea's GDP will slid 0.25% on the assumption that Korea's consumer goods exports fall 20%, and Chinese tourists to South Korea drop by 20%, Ahn Ki-tae, a researcher at NH Investment & Securities also said in his worst case scenario on the previous day. The South Korean government is in a position to keep an eye on the current situation. "We are closely watching a series of situations that have been taking place in China lately," said deputy prime minister and minister of strategy and finance Yoo Il-ho said in the 4th meeting of the ministers related to economic affairs on March 8. "We will step up economic and diplomatic efforts to minimize damages to Korean companies and people in China."

**Impact (Econ): SK wants to develop stronger ties with China (Oh - Brookings).**

Kongdan Oh (Brookings Institute). U.S.- ROK: The Forgotten Alliance. Published 10/13/08.

<https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/u-s-rok-the-forgotten-alliance/>.

Any revision or transformation of the U.S.-ROK security alliance must take several factors into account. Most South Koreans today have no direct memory of the Korean War, and they find it hard to believe that the North Koreans would ever launch an invasion of the South. Many even believe that the Korean War was actually triggered by both sides, or by the United States. Consequently, North Korea is not considered to be a security threat—and certainly is no longer the "main enemy," as it used to be called. Instead, most South Koreans realize that some day they will be reunited with their northern brethren, and rather than prepare to fight them, they must help them rebuild their economy so that when the day of reunification arrives, the cost to South Koreans will be manageable. No longer viewing North Korea as an enemy calls into question the central role of the U.S.-ROK security alliance What does. concern many Koreans is the rise of China. Japan is still widely viewed

with suspicion for its former imperial designs on Asia, but China is seen as the country to deal with in the future. Rather than consider China as a competitor, most Koreans want[s], or at least hope, to work with China as trade partner, and perhaps in the future, even as an ally. To the extent that South Koreans believe that U.S. forces in Korea are stationed there to confront China's rising military capabilities, Korea and the United States[' interests] are at odds. South Korea's rising confidence, borne of political and economic progress, sometimes verges on nationalism, a sentiment that Koreans in both north and south are susceptible to. Most Koreans (like people in many other countries), are highly skeptical of U.S. foreign policy, especially the policy of preemptive defense. As noted earlier, South Koreans are particularly concerned that the American defense policy of "strategic flexibility" will drag them into conflicts they do not want to be a part of. This issue must be dealt with very seriously in future negotiations over the shape of the security alliance.

## China Backlash

**Link: Getting rid of THAAD incentives oil sanctions (Niksich - George Washington University).**

Larry Niksich (Professor at George Washington University/Japan Forward). "Forget Current Sanctions, Cut Off North Korea's Oil Supply." June 30, 2017. <https://japan-forward.com/forget-current-sanctions-cut-off-north-koreas-oil-supply/>

The dilemma for the United States, Japan, and South Korea is that, as North Korea succeeds in advancing its nuclear missile program,

**sanctions would have to inflict increasing amounts of pain on North Korea in order to compel Kim Jong-un to consider changing his present course. The current sanctions have not inflicted that kind of pain. However, there is a sanction that has not been attempted: a cutoff of foreign oil shipments to**

**North Korea.** An oil cutoff could inflict enough pain that the regime might consider offering concessions to the United States, Japan, South

Korea, and other affected countries. **A cutoff of oil imports would cause an acute energy crisis in North Korea**

**within six months. As gasoline supplies dwindled, the transportation system would become**

**paralyzed. Electricity generating plants fueled by oil would reduce output, even for Pyongyang.**

**Especially important, the military's supplies of oil, gasoline, and aviation fuel would dry up.** A Strategy To

Deal With China A strategy would begin by the United States introducing a resolution in the U.N. Security Council mandating that U.N. member states cease providing oil to North Korea and not assist other states that seek to provide oil to North Korea. **China supplies North**

**Korea with an estimated 90 percent of its oil. The U.S. proposed resolution would force the Chinese**

**Government to make a fundamental choice regarding sanctions on North Korea. Many experts**

**believe that China would veto a U.S. resolution. However, U.S. strategy could employ explanations**

**and incentives that would make a Chinese decision to veto more difficult:** Deal with China's reputed fear of a

North Korean collapse by asserting to the Chinese that North Korean leaders would make a rational decision to start making concessions rather than allow oil shortages to generate an internal crisis. Cease talking about "regime change." Offer the Chinese acceptance of China's

long-standing proposal to resume Six Party Talks. Tell the Chinese that if China schedules a six party meeting in Beijing, the United States will

attend. **Offer China a one year suspension of deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense**

**(THAAD) missile defense system in South Korea in order to give an oil cutoff an opportunity to**

**produce North Korean concessions in serious negotiations. In summary, offer China a justifiable**

**bargain to satisfy its opposition to the THAAD system** and its advocacy of renewed Six Party Talks. **The United**

**States would implement these incentives if China did not veto the resolution and allowed the United**

**States to verify that China had ended oil shipments to North Korea.** The United States also should publicize its

resolution and incentives offered to China. This publicity should include information on China's oil subsidies to North Korea. A main target of

this publicity should be the Chinese public, which has become increasingly critical of North Korea. This would produce a robust debate in China on the internet and within the Chinese Government, sparked by voices urging tougher measures against North Korea.

**Impact: China is a crucial trade partner (The Hankyoreh News).**

Cho Kye-wan and Lee Jeong-yeon (The Hankyoreh News). "China's economic retaliation for THAAD could cut S. Korean growth by 0.5%." March 9, 2017. [http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english\\_edition/e\\_international/785774.html](http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/785774.html)

In a report titled "The Spread of Anti-Korean Sentiment inside China and its Effects" that was released on Mar. 8, the IBK Economic Research Institute estimated that if continuing retaliation caused a 5% decrease in commodity exports to China, a 20% decrease in the number of Chinese tourists to South Korea and a 10% decrease in exports of South Korean cultural products, the South Korean economy would suffer losses of US\$7.69 billion (in terms of added value). Since this would represent a 0.59% reduction in South Korea's 2015 GDP (US\$1.38 trillion), it implies that THAAD could reduce the economic growth rate this year to 2.0% (from the Bank of Korea's projection of 2.5%). **"Since South Korea depended upon China for 26% of its exports last year, the THAAD retaliation could have a very big ripple effect. A contraction in the export, tourism and content markets could cause employment and investment to decrease as well, which could even lead to a reduction in consumption in the private sector,"** said Jang Woo-ae, an analyst at the IBK Economic Research Institute. **Since 72% of the South Korean companies doing business in China (3,582 altogether) are small and medium-sized companies that are targeting the Chinese domestic market, there are serious concerns that anti-Korean sentiment in China could cause their sales to plunge.** In a report released on the same day, analysts from NH Investment and Securities concluded that a 20% drop in exports of consumer goods to China and a simultaneous 20% decrease in Chinese tourists to South Korea would cause the economic growth rate to decrease by around 0.25 percentage points. "Around the time of the territorial conflict over the Senkaku Islands in 2012, damage was concentrated in Japan's consumer goods industry, as soaring anti-Japanese sentiment among Chinese consumers decreased Japanese automobile exports to China by 42% and nearly halved the number of Chinese tourists to Japan," said An Gi-tae, a NH Investment and Securities economist. **There are also some analysts who think that the scale of the damage could be even greater when the THAAD deployment is completed. "It's not likely that China will halt its retaliation just because the deployment is complete. When the deployment really gets underway, China could even regulate the exports of South Korean intermediate goods at the risk of hurting itself,"** said Kim Hyeong-ju, an analyst at the LG Economic Research Institute.

### **Impact: Chinese backlash through economic sanctions have detrimental affect on South Korea's economy (Herh - Business Korea).**

Michael Herh (Business Korea). "Deployment of THAAD System May Cost S. Korean Economy Up to \$15 Billion." March 9, 2017. <http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/english/news/industry/17472-economic-loss-deployment-thaad-system-may-cost-s-korean-economy-15-billion>

There is concern that the damage caused by **China's growing economic retaliations over South Korea's deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system may impact not only some Korean companies but also the entire Korean economy.** According to a report on March 8 titled "The Diffusion and Effects of Anti-South Korean Sentiments in China" compiled on March by Jang Woo-ae, a researcher at the IBK Economic Research Institute, **South Korea's economic loss will reach US\$14.76 billion** (about 16.9 trillion won) in a worst-case scenario **with a decline of 10% in product exports to China, a 30% cut in tourists from China and a 20% reduction in value added in the South Korean contents industry.** In that case, **South Korea's GDP growth rate will fall by 1.07 percentage points.** Credit Suisse, a global investment bank, also predicted that if China's ban on Chinese tourists to South Korea lasts for a year, Korea's GDP growth may fall by 0.5 percentage points. "This is based on the calculation that South Korea's total loss due to the tourism ban is close to US\$7.3 billion (about \$ 8.4 trillion), which is 0.53% of Korea's GDP. South Korea, attracts 3.5 million Chinese tourists a year via packages or Airtel programs which, offer airline tickets and accommodation, and they spend US\$2,080 per person in Korea on average. Korea's GDP will slid 0.25% on the assumption that Korea's consumer goods exports fall 20%, and Chinese tourists to South Korea drop by 20%, Ahn Ki-tae, a researcher at NH Investment & Securities also said in his worst case scenario on the previous day. The South Korean government is in a position to keep an eye on the current situation. "We are closely watching a series of situations that have been taking place in China lately," said deputy prime minister and minister of strategy and finance Yoo Il-ho said in the 4th meeting of the ministers related to economic affairs on March 8. "We will step up economic and diplomatic efforts to minimize damages to Korean companies and people in China."



# THAAD Deployment Damages Public Trust

**Link: South Koreans perceive the deployment of THAAD as an action take to avoid public scrutiny (Friedhoff - Real Clear World).**

Karl Friedhoff (Real Clear World/Real Clear Politics). "Will Trump Upend U.S.-South Korea Alliance?" June 28, 2017. [http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2017/06/28/trump\\_south\\_korea\\_summit\\_112414.html](http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2017/06/28/trump_south_korea_summit_112414.html)

To understand the mistakes Washington has made, consider THAAD's delivery to South Korea. **The South Korean public saw images in the green glow of night-vision as the systems were rolled off of airplanes literally under the cover of dark.** The terrible optics of this deployment coincided with a highly unpopular South Korean president being impeached for corruption. **This strengthened the narrative that this deployment was being conducted in secret, with the explicit goal of avoiding public scrutiny.** In this light, Moon's decision to delay the full deployment is astute. As a year-long environmental impact study takes place, two launchers will remain operable while four others wait to come on line. Full deployment will likely take place, but Moon has effectively bought time for broader public support to overwrite the anger of a vocal minority, thus smoothing over a potential trouble spot in the U.S.-South Korea alliance.

**Anti-American sentiment is spreading in South Korea; could jeopardize the US SK alliance**

Misun Hwang. "Anti-Americanism in South Korea" [Web.stanford.edu](http://web.stanford.edu). 25 Oct. 2004. Web. 11 Jul. 2017. <https://web.stanford.edu/class/e297a/Anti-Americanism%20in%20South%20Korea.pdf>

Together with human rights violations by the U.S. soldiers, [coupled with] the unjust Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) has instigated people to take a negative stance on the U.S. military presence in the Korean peninsula. The loss of people's faith in the U.S.'s role as a protector will inevitably lead to the weakening of ROK-U.S. alliance; however hard the Korean government may try to do otherwise, the voices of citizens, in the end, win the government over. Since the U.S. military occupation after World War II until 1967, the ROK had no sovereignty and had no voice even in the face of complete surrender of jurisdiction. During the first U.S. military occupation of South Korea, the two nations made a promise that ROK surrender all rights and allow "the U.S. Armed Forces' exclusive rights to the military bases and facilities under the condition that the U.S. Army withdraw in 1949" ("United States," 1). The promise was obviously broken. Although the ROK-U.S. SOFA Agreement was first established in 1967, it "is considered the most unequal law by international legal standards ("United States," 1). Not only did the agreement force the Korean government to dispatch troops in Vietnam, but it also demanded an enormous share of defense cost; "[t]he share of ROK in 1995 was \$30 million, which amounts to 78% of the stationing expenses, with an annual increase of 10%" ("United States," 1).

## Unified Olympic Team

**THAAD prevents unification of the Teams (Boone – Daily Zipper)**

Grant Boone (Reuters). South Koreans Hold Mass March to Denounce THAAD Weapons System. Published 6/27/17. <http://thedailyzipper.com/2017/06/27/south-koreans-hold-mass-march-to-denounce-thaad-weapons/>.

**THAAD has been described by the US military as "absolutely critical" to defending USA forces and the South Korean population from North Korea threats.** The president was speaking at the opening of the World Taekwondo Championships in the southern county of Muju. SEOUL (Reuters) - **A leading North Korean sports official believes it is too late to consider South Korean President Moon Jae-in's proposal to form a unified team for the 2018 Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, saying that political tension must be resolved first. The United States insists the system is necessary to guard against the growing ballistic missile threats from North Korea.**

**Unified olympic team leads to better relations (Merkel – University of Brighton)**

Udo Merkel (University of Brighon). The Politics of Sport Diplomacy and Reunification in Divided Korea. Published 2008.

<http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1012690208098254>.

policy shifts of the South Korean government but has been reinvigorated by the often emotional celebration of a common cultural heritage and national unity through the various sporting encounters between the two nations. In her recent PhD project focusing on narratives of gender and nation Oh (2007) confirms these findings. The women she interviewed also displayed great support and sympathy for North Korean athletes and teams. She refers to this phenomenon as 'pan-Korean identification, which could evoke and produce pan-Korean identities' (pp. 51-2). Oh clearly established that: the nation and nationhood by many women were inclusive of North Korea, which implied an ultimate dream of unification for their and their nation's future. This was articulated at various levels, one of which was through their support for North Korean delegates at the Athens Olympics and for its football team during the World Cup qualifying matches. (p. 199) **One of the most appealing values of sport to governments is its potential for nation-building and as a basis for recognition of claims to national distinctiveness and, in the Korean context, cross-border national unity.** What this case study of Korea also demonstrates is that in a certain sense, **the 'amateurism' of sport's most visible diplomats, athletes, coaches and administrators, has given sport diplomacy its enduring power. Sport diplomacy has become more important than ever before as part of foreign policy in which contacts between divided or 'hostile' nations can be started or renewed on an apparently informal basis.** Athletes and sport administrators appear to be non-threatening since they are assumed to be apolitical, that is, they are not assigned to a specific political agenda. The reality, however, is that **all forms of sport are deeply embedded in the social and political trajectories of states. Sport has been a valuable resource within the international system for over a century now.** It is not only states and governments but also other non-governmental organizations that draw on this versatile and multi-faceted resource. Sport has very frequently been an element of broad political strategies and on some occasions a useful foreign policy tool. **The elaborate trans-national diplomatic infrastructure of sport on the divided Korean peninsula and the symbiotic relationship between sport and foreign policy** outlined and analysed in this article **add weight to the Pluralist paradigm of International Relations theories.** It does not mean that that the cornerstones and focuses of the Marxist and Realist paradigms require rejection due to their very specific interests in the (global) accumulation of capital and national security, respectively. Rather the Korean case study provides plenty of evidence that these issues are equally important. However, what this article also confirms is the existence of a complex set of agencies that pursue similar interests without being thoroughly coordinated by a central actor. **Due to the high profile of sport in the 21st century, sport organizations** are in fact welcomed by many states, treated with a high degree of respect in recognition of their contributions to foreign policy initiatives and **have slowly become influential trans-national actors.**

### **Sports unification best way to solve strained relations (Wootae – KINC)**

Lee Wootae (Korea Institute for National Unification). Restoring Inter-Korean Relations by Promoting Sports Exchange. Published 5/30/17.

**Utilizing sports in restoring inter-Korea relations** - an area in which inter-Korean exchanges have been maintained for some time - **will be the most effective way considering the currently strained South-North Korean relations.** Fortunately, South Korea plans to host 2018 Pyongchang Winter Olympics next February. The ROK government should continue the latest momentum into the upcoming olympics, such as qualifying matches of women's hockey and soccer team with the North. The government should consider how to utilize Pyongchang Winter Olympics in overcoming an impasse of strained inter-Korean relations in consultation with the local governments, the organizing committee and IOC. Examples could be North Korean national team's participation in the Winter Olympics, passing mountain Baedu for Olympic Torch relay, and hosting some events in Masingnyeong ski resort in Northern part of the peninsula. If Pyongchang Olympics would bring about the expansion of **inter-Korean exchanges, restore mutual trust, and create a spill-over effect into other areas, it could improve currently-strained inter-Korean relations** and provide the necessity and rationale behind inter-Korean exchange and cooperation to the international community, ultimately garnering its full-support. on the Korean Peninsula. However, it requires dialogues and cooperation between the two Koreas. **Starting with politically less sensitive areas like social, culture and sports sectors, we can restore inter-Korean relations step by step.**

### **Unifications solves for the NK threat (Park – The Korea Herald)**

Robert Park (The Korea Herald). Unification of Koreas solution to North Korea's nuclear threat. Published 9/19/16.

<http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160919000474>.

China and Russia believe the X-band radars from the THAAD battery will be used to transfer their classified missile data to the US. On Sept. 5, President Park and President Xi met on the sidelines of the G20 conference in Hangzhou, China, during which President Park stated, "Once the nuclear and missile issues are resolved, it (THAAD) will no longer be needed," seemingly offering the rescinding of THAAD as a bargaining chip in exchange for China's forthright help in effectively stopping North Korea. President Park delivered an equivalent message to a Russian state-run news agency ahead of her summit meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Sept. 3 which, incidentally, appears for all practical purposes to have gone surprisingly well. Coordination between South Korea, the United States, China and Russia is plainly necessary to resolve the North Korean threat. To surmount the prevailing deadlock, South Korea and the United States should prioritize establishing a formal agreement with China and Russia that guarantees an independent, genuinely democratic and neutral reunified Korea, including the withdrawal of US troops from the Korean Peninsula in the event of unification. Both countries fear the consequences of their intractable neighbor's atomic weapons development, nuclear and missile tests and proliferation of diverse weapons of mass destruction. If the proposal for Korean unification, independence and neutrality is made transparently, unflinchingly and in earnest, both China and Russia would become far more likely to cooperate. The Republic of Korea has proven itself to be an agreeable neighbor and an exceedingly superior economic partner, and is thus vastly preferable for all parties to the penurious, intemperate, hazardous "Hell on Earth" the Pyongyang regime represents and is accountable for. In a 1973 essay entitled "Korea: The Preposterous Division," the late professor Gregory Henderson of Tufts University, who served in Seoul as vice consul at the outbreak of the Korean War, recommended "a four-power (including Japan) guarantee of the neutrality and independence of the Korean Peninsula," asserting Korea's "unity and independence ... guaranteed by the great powers, would be the solution to be sought for this most dangerous of the world's peninsulas." Henderson cautioned that **the unification and independence of Korea was essential for "stability in Northeast Asia" and the "broader cause of world peace."** Criticizing the 1945 division of Korea effectuated by the United States and the Soviet Union, Henderson wrote, **"There was no justification whatsoever for the ideological-political division that occurred at the 38th parallel."** Most crucially, a democratic and reunified Korea would be empowered to open the door for the estimated hundreds of thousands of North Korean refugees -- including tens of thousands of stateless and abandoned Korean children in China -- to at last be welcomed home without fear of persecution. The abolition of torture, slavery, forced starvation, extrajudicial killings and other internationally recognized crimes from the North would make the Korean nation and people better, stronger and safer as a whole. Nations that instituted Korea's unjust division in 1945, if unpretentious about peace, should contribute meaningfully to the financial cost of reunification. The cruelly imposed partition went against the universal will of the Korean people and resulted in innumerable separated families -- nearly all never reunited -- and both through the Korean War and North Korea's mass atrocity crimes, an estimated 6-8 million Koreans dead. The Korean people need not fear unification, but rather welcome, embrace and prepare for unity comprehended through the lens of a new paradigm signifying a veritable peace, mutual uplift and long-delayed justice.

## Anti-Missile Defense Systems Are Ineffective

**Link: THAAD targets missiles on their descent, making them virtually useless midway through flight (Newman - Wired).**

Lily Hay Newman (WIRED). "South Korea's THAAD Missile Defense Has Limits Against North Korea." 5-5-2017.

<https://www.wired.com/2017/05/south-koreas-new-missile-defense-tech-isnt-cure-north-korea/>

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems like the one now functioning in South Korea have a strong track record of missile interception in US tests. A THAAD has a range of a little under 125 miles, and can target missiles both inside and just outside the atmosphere. Strategists think of THAADs as an important layer in broader missile defense plans, since they address the in-between area that other specialized systems don't. The systems are mounted on armored trucks to be highly portable, and consist of a digital control system, radar, and reloadable launchers that fire interceptors. But **a single THAAD is far from a magic bullet, and the one now operating in South Korea still leaves that country, many US assets in the area, and US allies like Japan vulnerable to North Korean attack. That's partly because THAADs target medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles on their descents, meaning they're ineffective against missiles midway through their trajectory.** Mostly, though, one simply isn't enough. "The problem is that given the range of the interceptors with THAAD, you really need at least two and probably three or four THAAD batteries in South Korea in order to defend the whole country," says Bruce Bennett, a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation.

**Link: THAAD cannot intercept certain short range missiles coming from NK (VOA News).**

Brian Padden (VOA News). "For Some South Koreans, THAAD Deterrence Not Worth Risk." 7-13-2016.

<https://www.voanews.com/a/south-korea-announces-location-for-thaad/3416225.html>

THAAD uses road-mobile launchers and missiles equipped with precise infrared seeking technology to intercept incoming enemy missiles after reentry from high altitude, during their final, or terminal, phase of flight. This missile defense system in South Korea would be effective against a number of missiles in North Korea's arsenal, including short-range scuds and medium range Nodong and Musudan missiles. Critics point out that in Seoul and other areas near the inter-Korean border, **THAAD's effectiveness is limited against some short-range North Korean missiles and artillery that do not travel into the upper atmosphere.** But proponents say THAAD is part of a larger deterrence program needed to counter North Korea's advancing nuclear and missile capabilities. "People like to take a look at one particular weapon system, you know, very short range rockets or artillery and say, well, THAAD doesn't protect against that, so we don't really need this. But you have to look across the whole spectrum of threats," said Daniel Pinkston, a North Korea security analyst and lecturer in international relations at Troy University in Seoul. The South Korean military is also planning to increase its short-range Patriot missile defense system to protect vulnerable areas closer to the border.

**C - If North Korea were willing to attack South Korea they could attack Seoul, which sits only 35 miles from North Korea, and anti-missiles defense systems would be powerless (Lendon - CNN).**

Brad Lendon (CNN). "How would missile defense systems work against North Korea?" Tue March 7, 2017.

<http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/07/asia/north-korea-japan-us-ballistic-missile-defense/index.html>

The first piece of the controversial THAAD missile defense system arrived in South Korea Monday night, hours after North Korea test-fired four ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan, also known as the East Sea. The Patriot and Aegis systems are already deployed in the Pacific region. THAAD, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, can shoot down short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in the latter stages of their flight as they plunge toward their targets. But its presence in South Korea might be just as important for its sophisticated radar -- the AN/TPY-2 X-Band radar -- which could provide the first warning of any missile launched from North Korea. Why does that matter? The missiles that North Korea fired Monday were thought to be of longer range, designed for targets beyond South Korea. That would put THAAD interceptors out of range. But by being closer to North Korea, THAAD's radar could provide critical early tracking data to missile interception systems farther afield, such as those protecting Japan or US bases in Guam, according to data from the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency. Those other protection systems, including the Aegis and Patriot missile defense systems, are linked to THAAD by the US military's Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications system, known as C2BMC, according to contractor Lockheed Martin. The THAAD battery's radar in South Korea would have detected the launch of the North Korean missiles launched on Monday. Determining the missiles were not targeting South Korea, the THAAD battery would send radar tracking data to US Navy warships equipped with the Aegis missile defense system sailing between South Korea and Japan. The Aegis ships would combine data from THAAD's radar with information from their own AN/SPY-1 radar to track and fire interceptors at the enemy missiles midflight, US military documents show. If Aegis interceptors were unable to make the intercept, data from both the Aegis radar and the THAAD radar could be transmitted via the C2BMC system to Patriot missile batteries, which are stationed closer to the enemy's intended targets and would attempt to take out missiles as they are plunging toward those targets, according to the Missile Defense Agency. Could a North Korean missile still hit its target? The ballistic missile protection systems are not foolproof. Though Aegis is touted as being able to track more than 100 targets at one time, and has passed repeated tests, according to the US Navy, it has never taken out a ballistic missile in combat. THAAD has also never been used in combat. And the system could be overwhelmed if North Korea were to launch a series of missiles simultaneously, according to a report from the North Korea monitoring group 38 North. It's also not effective against submarine-launched ballistic missiles launched from south, east or west of lower South Korea, 38 North said. Patriot missile defenses have been tested in combat, taking out short-range ballistic missiles during the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, according to the Arms Control Association. **Which target is in the most danger? The South Korean capital of Seoul, but not necessarily from ballistic missiles. Seoul sits only about 35 miles from the border with North Korea. That means it could be struck by shorter range rockets and artillery, of which North Korea has thousands of units. Civilian casualties in Seoul and its northern suburbs from a North Korean artillery barrage could number in the thousands or more, experts have said.**

**Link: THAAD was never intended to be used on its own (Woolf - Public Radio International).**

Christopher Woolf (Public Radio International). "How good is the new missile defense system the US just deployed in South Korea?" 5-3-2017.

<https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-05-03/how-good-new-missile-defense-system-us-just-deployed-south-korea>

"The key to making this work," Axe adds, "is you've got to have very good sensors that can pinpoint and detect and track incoming missiles very accurately, and then your own missile needs to be able to travel very fast and very high and arrive at a very precise point, in order to actually physically strike that incoming rocket." The system has not been tested in battle, and analysts are aware that an enemy could try to counter it by sending a swarm of missiles. "That's always a problem with any air defense system, that you can simply overwhelm it," Axe says. North

Korea, and China for that matter, rely on masses of missiles. So **THAAD is good, but no panacea. "And it was never meant to be,"** **Axe explains. "THAAD is part of a layered missile defense system. Most countries that try to build missile defense systems, aim for defense in depth. So in addition to THAAD, you might have sea-based Aegis missiles, that fire from warships and can cover other areas and are much more mobile. And then you have shorter-range Patriot missiles. You can connect all of these weapons to the same sensor and command network so you can coordinate your defenses."** The THAAD deployment in South Korea has proven controversial in the region. There have been protests in South Korea by people who live near the deployment site, who are afraid of becoming targets. Anti-war protesters have also clashed with riot police. South Korea was also concerned by an off-the-cuff comment from President Donald Trump last week that Seoul should pay for the THAAD battery, with the figure of \$1 billion being floated. However, the South Korean government says other Trump administration officials have assured Seoul that the United States will foot the bill. Meanwhile, Beijing has expressed its concern, fearing the THAAD system also weakens China's own deterrent, and that it allows the US to spy deep into China.

**Link: THAAD has never actually been used in combat, and has only been successful in 1 trial (Starr - Foxtrot Alpha).**

Terrell Jermaine Starr (Foxtrot Alpha). "South Korea's New Missile Defense System Won't Keep It Safe." 3-30-2017..

<http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/south-koreas-new-missile-defense-system-wont-keep-it-sa-1793839226>

First, a primer on THAAD is necessary. The system is based on a simple enough concept: "What if you could knock out a missile with another missile?" Which sounds simple enough, until you consider that these missiles are moving at many thousands of miles an hour, and you just go ahead and try hitting a bullet with another bullet. Using massive, powerful radar systems like the trailer-based AN/TPY-2, the THAAD system is supposed to track short, medium, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, similar to the ones North Korea would be theorized to use in a nuclear shooting match. **In development since the 1990s, the**

**THAAD system has been hitting short range targets since 2005, and actually managed to shoot down a simulated medium-range ballistic missile in 2012. But it hasn't demonstrated a kill of an intermediate-range missile like North Korea's Musudan, which can chuck a warhead more than 2,000 miles away. And there's no telling how the system would perform if it had to deal with multiple missile salvos, featuring dozens of warheads, all at once, as 38north pointed out.** It has also evoked sharp backlash

from residents in Seongju County, North Gyeongsang Province where it is located; THAAD is located on a golf course, to be exact. Residents fear the missile defense system makes them a bullseye in the event of a North Korean attack and that THAAD is nothing more than a symbol of U.S. geopolitical interests that will leave South Koreans shouldering the bulk of any collateral damage.

**Link: THAAD could not stop North Korean warheads if haystacked among conventional warheads (Chang - Yonhap News).**

Chang (Yonhap News Agency). "THAAD not effective in countering N.K. nuclear attack haystacked in barrage of warheads: expert." 6/14/16

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2016/06/14/0401000000AEN20160614000300315.html>

The U.S. **THAAD** system is a powerful anti-missile tool, but **wouldn't be effective in defending against a North Korean nuclear attack coming as part of a barrage of conventional warheads**, a U.S. analyst said Monday. Garth McLennan, who has closely followed American foreign and security policy, made the point in an article contributed to the website 38 North, forecasting that THAAD's deployment to South Korea would lead to the North stepping up its production of ballistic missiles. South Korea already has formidable missile defense capabilities, including a large arsenal of Patriot-2 short-range missiles set to be upgraded to PAC-3s, but the addition of THAAD, which is designed to defend against short and intermediate-range missiles, would provide South Korea with a more layered defensive posture, he said. **"THAAD would not, however, serve as an effective tool in countering a North Korean nuclear strike if such an attack were haystacked among a barrage of conventional warheads," he said. "The THAAD system is a powerful anti-missile tool ... but in this case, it would not serve as a**

**bulletproof measure against a North Korean nuclear attack."** The nuclear warheads would be the proverbial needles in the haystack of conventional munitions. Currently, such a defensive system does not exist, he said. "If THAAD were deployed to the Korean peninsula, it would hardly be a stretch for Pyongyang to immediately and aggressively increase their production of ballistic missiles and their assorted delivery systems. THAAD, for all it can do, has limits that can be overcome by high volume missile stockpiles and SLBM capabilities," McLennan said. SLBM stands for submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Following the North's long-range missile test in February, Seoul and Washington launched official talks about placing a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery in the South to bolster defense against missile threats from the communist nation. Sources have said that the THAAD talks have moved forward to a point where the two sides are now looking into candidate sites for deployment, including not only existing U.S. military bases, but also mountainous areas away from cities.

McLennan said that South Korea's capability to counter a "saturation-based ballistic missile attack" from the North is limited, with the doctrine attached to missile interception calling for a two-to-one ratio for every missile fired, he said. "If Pyongyang were to launch a haystacked barrage, it would almost immediately tax Seoul's capacity to repel it. At the same time, nuclear-armed ballistic missiles would almost certainly confront the ROK with the problem of leakage in any attempt to intercept them," he said.

### **Link: THAAD Ineffective – couldn't protect Seoul from short range attack (Lendon - CNN).**

Brad Lendon (CNN). "How would missile defense systems work against North Korea?." 3-7-2017.

<http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/07/asia/north-korea-japan-us-ballistic-missile-defense/index.html>

If Aegis interceptors were unable to make the intercept, data from both the Aegis radar and the THAAD radar could be transmitted via the C2BMC system to Patriot missile batteries, which are stationed closer to the enemy's intended targets and would attempt to take out missiles as they are plunging toward those targets, according to the Missile Defense Agency. Could a North Korean missile still hit its target? The ballistic missile protection systems are not foolproof. Though Aegis is touted as being able to track more than 100 targets at one time, and has passed repeated tests, according to the US Navy, it has never taken out a ballistic missile in combat. THAAD has also never been used in combat. And the system could be overwhelmed if North Korea were to launch a series of missiles simultaneously, according to a report from the North Korea monitoring group 38 North. It's also not effective against submarine-launched ballistic missiles launched from south, east or west of lower South Korea, 38 North said. Patriot missile defenses have been tested in combat, taking out short-range ballistic missiles during the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, according to the Arms Control Association. **Which target is in the most danger? The South Korean capital of Seoul, but not necessarily from ballistic missiles. Seoul sits only about 35 miles from the border with North Korea. That means it could be struck by shorter range rockets and artillery, of which North Korea has thousands of units.** Civilian casualties in Seoul and its northern suburbs from a North Korean artillery barrage could number in the thousands or more, experts have said. The only protection to such an attack would be an early warning to get in shelters

## Militarism

### **NK's nuclear program is it's main deterrent to it's biggest threat: the US**

**Beauchamp 17** Zach Beauchamp, 9-8-2017, "The case for letting North Korea keep its nukes," Vox,

<https://www.vox.com/world/2017/9/8/16256880/north-korea-nuclear-weapons-test-containment> //DF

**The most fundamentally important fact about North Korea's nuclear program is that it is born out of fear**

— fear, specifically, **of the United States**. The Korean War began in 1950 when North Korea invaded the South and nearly conquered all of it. The only reason it didn't was intervention by a US led-coalition, which in turn nearly took the entire North, stopped only by a Chinese counterintervention. After the war ended in an armistice in 1953, the US pledged to defend South Korea against future attack and left thousands of US troops deployed there — a constant reminder to Pyongyang that the world's strongest military power was its enemy. Put

another way, **North Korea's entire foreign policy and national identity has evolved around the threat of war with America. As a result, they've always been trying to improve their military capabilities in order to deter the US from invading. "They're hyper-focused on our military and what we can do,"** explains Dave Kang,

the director of the Korean Studies Institute at the University of Southern California. **The nuclear program, which began in the 1950s, was designed to be the ultimate answer to this problem.**

The thinking among three generations of Kims was that **if North Korea had nuclear weapons, they could inflict unacceptable costs on the US if it were to invade the North.** Nuclear weapons, in other words, would be **the ultimate deterrent against regime change.** This explains why

**North Korea has invested so many resources, and been willing to accept crushing international sanctions, in order to develop a nuclear bomb and** intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) **that could hit the US**

mainland. "There's pretty broad agreement that Kim Jong Un wants a nuclear arsenal, including a nuclear-armed ICBM that could put cities and targets in the United States at risk, to deter an attack and to ensure survival and prevent regime change," says Kingston Reif, the director for

disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association. What this brief history suggests is that **North Korea's pursuit of nuclear missiles is fundamentally rational.** North Korea is not a suicidal state; **there is no evidence that it wants**

to blow up an American city and invite regime-ending retaliation. Its goal, according to every piece of evidence we have, is the opposite: to avoid war at all costs.

## R/T AFF

### R/T NK Threat

#### Uniqueness – R/T War Imminent

##### **1. Non-unique: no country wants war, or has an incentive to start one. Much more likely is a permanent state of “crisis”**

**Tonnesson 17** Stein Tonnesson, 8-12-2017, "Why a war with North Korea is unlikely," Al Jazeera, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/08/war-north-korea-170811130544750.html> //DF

No one wants war. It would spell the end of the Kim dynasty (Kim Il-sung 1912–94; Kim Jong-il 1941–2011; Kim Jong-un 1984- ), and could cause a tremendous disaster in South Korea, maybe also in Japan - if North Korea were able and willing to launch a nuclear attack on its former colonial master. Although not directly, the US would also be harmed in this scenario. If it decides to launch a military attack against North Korea, then this could cause an uproar in South Korea, causing the US to lose its Korean ally. Moreover, the White House and the Pentagon are no doubt aware that the North Korean regime is not a ripe fruit ready to fall, as it relies on a disciplined army and population. The power of the Kim dynasty is based on fear, faith and pride. People live in constant fear of the government. Yet many combine their fear with faith in the "great leader". North Koreans are immensely proud of their nation and its history. Together these three factors provide for a high level of discipline. Although North Korea's main weapons and command centres might be quickly destroyed through US precision-bombing, North Korea's command structure would most likely function in the opening phase of a war, thus allowing Kim to launch massive artillery and missile attacks against the South Korean capital Seoul, with its more than ten million inhabitants. Why is war still possible? The risk of war increases if Kim decides to launch new missile or nuclear tests and Trump then decides to send aircraft carriers, submarines and troops to the Korean peninsula in an attempt to force Kim to the negotiating table. Either side might then convince itself that the other is about to attack, and conclude that a pre-emptive strike is necessary. Both sides know how advantageous it will be to strike first. A permanent crisis is likely, since the US and North Korean objectives are incompatible. Kim doggedly pursues his aim to have the same capacity as Russia and China to strike the American continent. This would deter US attacks against his country. A succession of US presidents have seen this as totally unacceptable. Trump has said "it will not happen". The US has made it a precondition for negotiating with North Korea that it totally give up its nuclear weapons. This makes it all but impossible to reach a negotiated deal between the two sides. The North Korean nuclear crisis has already lasted for a long time. Trump is trying to overcome George W Bush and Barack Obama's "strategic patience" by forcing North Korea with Chinese help to give up its nuclear weapons. Kim, however, defies Chinese advice and Beijing does not want to provoke a total crisis with the country it helped to save in the Korean War. The most likely scenario is therefore permanent crisis. The current situation is particularly difficult for Kim Jong-un, since Russia and China have decided to join the US in applying sanctions. Their reasons, however, have much to do with a need to avoid too much US hostility against themselves. If the relationship between the US and Russia/China worsens, if the US becomes preoccupied with a crisis somewhere else, or if the internal political crisis in Washington prevents Trump from pursuing US foreign policy goals, then the pressure on North Korea will lessen.

## **That's why the probability is so low (Taylor – The Washington Post)**

Adam Taylor (Washington Post). North Korea has threatened a U.S. attack for years. Why aren't you scared?. Published 8/17/15.

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/08/17/north-korea-has-threatened-a-u-s-attack-for-years-why-arent-you-scared/?utm\\_term=.731ccfb8fa3f](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/08/17/north-korea-has-threatened-a-u-s-attack-for-years-why-arent-you-scared/?utm_term=.731ccfb8fa3f)

Even with these developments, most experts still argue that a North Korean nuclear strike remains extremely unlikely. **"There is a near zero chance of a premeditated North Korean nuclear attack,"** Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, told NK News earlier this year, though Kimball added that a miscalculation by either side could pose a serious risk. **Instead, North Korea seems to view its nuclear weapons as a deterrent and threats as a means of gaining political concessions.** Cathcart notes that if North Korea is able to move up on the U.S. foreign policy agenda, it may be able to achieve some progress with the Obama administration "as it moves into late second term mode, which is historically when US-DPRK relations have made strides." Some, including former South Korean president Kim Young-sam, suggest that part of the reason North Korea makes such awful threats is because they are well aware that there won't be a military response. "Looking back," Kim told the New York Times in 2009, "I think the North Koreans think they can say whatever they want because no matter what they do, the Americans will never attack them."

## **2. Any attack against the US or a US ally would be stupid (Lockie - Business Insider)**

Alex Lockie (Business Insider). "North Korea just showed it had a missile that can hit the US — here's what happens next." July 4, 2017.

<http://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-icbm-test-aftermath-us-response-2017-7>

But North Korea's independence day missile launch wasn't a message to China, South Korea, Japan, or anyone besides the US. **Kim Jong Un has told the US it's at risk of nuclear attack, so what changes now? The short answer is nothing. Nothing will happen.** The US has lived under threat of nuclear attack for over 50 years. **The US already lives with a nuclear-armed North Korea that can level Seoul, South Korea's capital and home to metro-area population of 25 million civilians. North Korea can already lay waste to the 28,000 US troops permanently stationed near the demilitarized zone.** Japan already lives with the knowledge that North Korea could most likely range Tokyo, home to a metro-area of almost 38 million, with a nuclear weapon. **Why should anything change when North Korea can reach Guam, Alaska, Los Angeles, or New York? North Korea doesn't attack Seoul, Tokyo, Guam, or any other place — because if they did, the US would absolutely destroy them. That's the same reason that Russia, despite deep differences on foreign policy and conflicts of interest with the US, never fired on the US, or any other country, even during the height of the Cold War. "We can deter them,"** retired Adm. Dennis Blair, the former head of US Pacific Command, said of North Korea at a National Committee for US-China Relations event. **"They may be developing 10 to 15 nuclear weapons. We have 2,000. They can do a lot of damage to the US, but there won't be any North Korea left in the event of a nuclear exchange. That's not a good regime survival strategy, and even Kim Jong Un would understand that."** Under Kim Jong Un, North Korea wrote the possession of nuclear weapons into their constitution as a guarantor of their security. Expect the US to push for sanctions, diplomatic talks, investments in missile defenses — the types of measures taken against other nuclear powers — but don't expect a nuclear exchange. Because for North Korea to use one of its nuclear weapons in anger would absolutely undermine its desire for security, and likely turn much of the Korean peninsula into a glowing nuclear wasteland.

## **There is historical precedent for this; MAD holds (Bandow – The Hill)**

Doug Bandow (The Hill). Worried about war with North Korea? Withdraw from South Korea — seriously. Published 5/2/17.

<http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/foreign-policy/331578-worried-about-war-with-north-korea-withdraw-from-south>

Washington policymakers horrified by the thought that Pyongyang might be able to target America ignore the fact that the U.S. was vulnerable to Soviet attack for most of the Cold War. Eventually China added a rudimentary capability to do so as well. **Yet leaders as foul as Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong did not strike America. They didn't want to die or destroy their societies. Attacking the U.S. would have resulted in horrific retaliation. Mutual Assured Destruction is an ugly doctrine, but it worked for decades to keep the peace. Nevertheless, there seems to be a common presumption that 33-year-old North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is irrational, even crazy. He is evil, but that doesn't make him suicidal: he, like his father and grandfather, prefers his virgins in this**



world. Kim appears to be young, impetuous, and reckless, but frankly not that much different from our old, impetuous, and reckless president. Contra the fear-mongering, **Kim is responding logically as head of a weak nation in a difficult geopolitical position threatened by the globe's superpower which routinely removes regimes it dislikes.**

## Uniqueness – R/T Wants War

### 1. NK would lose even to just SK, and they know this

**Farley 17** Robert Farley, 10-8-2017, "This Is How North Korea Would Start a War (And How Bad It Could Get)," National Interest,

<http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-north-korea-would-start-war-how-bad-it-could-get-22648?page=show> //DF

This is the best case for North Korea, but it is important to recall that **most analysts judge North Korea's military as insufficient to defeat the forces of the RoK.** The static defenses along the DMZ, combined with the mobility and sophistication of RoK forces, mean that **any offensive into South Korea is likely to bog down into a logistical disaster before it can capture Seoul.** At that point, attacks along the depth of the North Korean position, combined with a concerted assault on regime targets and the KPA's command and control network, will likely isolate advance forces and leave them ripe for destruction. **The North Korean air defense network is immense and robust, but not particularly sophisticated. Even the much-vaunted artillery along the border will likely see quick attrition at the hands of hyper-accurate counter-battery attacks** and other precision guided munitions. Once KPA forces are defeated in the field, there is little doubt that the ROK and the United States would take advantage of the opportunity to end the regime once and for all. **North Korean military officers know all of this, and surely appreciate the exceedingly low probability that an attack would see any kind of success,** either short or long-term. But we can hardly rule out that political circumstances might shift such that North Korea becomes desperate enough to launch an attack, or that it imagines itself as having "one last great opportunity." At the very least, preparation rarely hurts.

### 2. They know that they couldn't even afford a war

**Mason 17** Ra Mason, 8-11-2017, "North Korea knows it can't afford to go to war," Conversation,

<https://theconversation.com/north-korea-knows-it-cant-afford-to-go-to-war-82335> //DF

As North Korea expert Hazel Smith has pointed out, the Pyongyang government is far from a one-man band, or even a family affair. Rather, since its establishment in 1948, a number of leading players have both competed and cooperated to preserve the existing governance structure. So while there are few checks and balances on the abuse of power, the leadership's priorities remain the same: keep the country relatively stable, head off political risks, and avoid a financially ruinous military conflict. **The north is well aware that** even in the crude terms of oil and supplies, **it almost certainly lacks the funds to pay for any kind of sustained military campaign,** despite having one of the world's largest standing armies. It could in theory be bankrolled by China or Russia, but those countries no longer share the powerful ideological interests that drew them into the Korean War on Pyongyang's side. China in particular has been seeking to reduce tensions, not escalate them – not least for its own commercial reasons, which include the economic colonisation of North Korea's north-eastern ports and other parts of its industrial economy.

**That's why they talk about not wanting to strike**

Deutsche Welle ([www.Dw](http://www.dw.com/en/can-north-koreas-elites-oust-kim-jong-un/a-39091374), 17, 02,06.2017 Can North Korea's elites oust Kim Jong Un?, DW, <http://www.dw.com/en/can-north-koreas-elites-oust-kim-jong-un/a-39091374>, 9-26-2017, (NK)

A study by the RAND Corporation, a US government-funded think tank has proposed a radical new solution to the seemingly intractable problem of North Korea's worsening relationship with the international community. It suggested that incentives such as immunity from prosecution for human rights abuses might be used to encourage senior members of the regime to stage a coup against the country's leader

Kim Jong Un. The report, recently published by RAND's National Security Research Division, says that **North Korean propaganda has indoctrinated the regime's elites to believe that reunification with South Korea would be a disaster to them and result in loss of power, influence, wealth and prestige. In extreme cases, should the collapse of the regime in Pyongyang involve outbreaks of fighting, then it might even cost them their lives.** As a result, the most critical element of signaling external support for any such uprising against the latest member of the Kim dynasty to rule the nation will be promising coup plotters that they will be protected and even have a say in a post-Kim North Korea.

## Uniqueness – R/T Nukes

**TURN: Getting nukes pacifies, not intensifies, the conflict because it raises the cost of any conflict. Even an arms buildup won't do much to change that**

**Jong 16** Jong Kun Cho [associate professor in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea] and Jong-Yun Bae [associate professor in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea], 12-2016, "Security Implications of a Nuclear North Korea: Crisis Stability and Imperatives for Engagement," Institute of Korea Studies, [http://www.iks.or.kr/rankup\\_module/rankup\\_board/attach/vol47no4/14833219641857.pdf](http://www.iks.or.kr/rankup_module/rankup_board/attach/vol47no4/14833219641857.pdf) //DF

However, some deterrence literature also argues that nuclear weapons are in fact stabilizing. The catastrophic nature of nuclear weapon detonations actually bolsters the deterrence relationship between nuclear-armed states (Powell, 1990). Waltz asserts that "when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of major powers. This awareness discourages nuclear states from bold and aggressive action" (Waltz, 2012 : 4). Furthermore, from a weaker power's perspective, the possession of nuclear weapons compensates for conventional military inferiority and reduces the probability of the use of force by its powerful enemy (Waltz, 1995). To the weaker power, maintaining nuclear deterrence is a safer means to ensure the absence of major conventional war than taking the risk to disarm. This logic means that a rogue state such as North Korea may be very prudent with its nuclear use. **It follows that rather than taking additional risks exploiting nuclear threat, Pyongyang will be very cautious since its nuclear capability is its last resort when it comes to deterring US and ROK attack** (Park and Lee, 2008). If this argument is correct, then **a nuclear-armed North Korea is surprisingly stabilizing to the Korean Peninsula.** Thus, **nuclear weapons may work by creating a paradox whereby the risk of nuclear catastrophe stabilizes conflicts by lowering the propensity of nuclear-armed states to act impulsively, thereby maintaining peace** (defined as the absence of war). In this vein, **North Korea's nuclear weapons will buttress the existing security order** of crisis stability in the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia. North Korea's emergence as a nuclear-armed state will raise diplomatic tension and may justify increases in military expenditures by Seoul and Tokyo, a trend that may be accelerated by the Trump White House. However, this school of deterrence literature suggests that North Korea's nuclear weapons will not alter the security order in the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia — a region consisting of tight webs of mutually assured conventional and nuclear deterrence — but may instead reinforce the existing order.

## Uniqueness – R/T Kim Finger On Button

**Non-unique: his advisors call the shots**

**Guardian 14** North Korea Network Expert Panel, 5-27-2014, "Kim Jong-un: North Korea's supreme leader or state puppet?," Guardian,

[//DF">https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/27/kim-jong-un-north-korea-supreme-leader-or-state-puppet //DF](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/27/kim-jong-un-north-korea-supreme-leader-or-state-puppet)

Rather than regard Kim Jong-un as a puppet, we might look at him as a **youthful monarch surrounded by a retinue of close aides, advisors and gatekeepers that controls what briefing and policy papers he reads, who he talks to on the telephone and who is allowed access to him.** The retinue channels what he decides to communicate through written documents, public speeches and interactions with low-level officials. When we see Kim Jong-un visiting a construction site or inspecting a military unit, those events are reported through filtered and censored state media reporting which his subordinates approve (through a unit called the #5 Documentary Office). It is not that **Kim Jong-un** has strings manipulated by a coterie of septuagenarian party officials. Instead, he is a macro-manager and, as one might say of a western politician, he **is overprotected by his handlers.** **The DPRK's political culture consists of a series of key officials with policy portfolios and institutional empires in which they are given a flexible degree of latitude to operate.** At the top of the power structure sits the supreme leader who, as the decider, balances these institutions' divergent interests and objectives as these top officials press their agendas. The leader can also initiate policies and compel the compliance of the country's top officials and he also plays these powerful constituencies off against one another as they compete for his approval and attention (the late leader Kim Jong-il excelled at this).

## Uniqueness – R/T Internal Struggles

### 1. Delink: North Korea is functioning relatively well, have been in much worse positions (Lee - VOA News).

Jenny Lee (VOA News). "Analysis: Is North Korea's Collapse Imminent?" January 30, 2017.

<https://www.voanews.com/a/north-korea-analysis-is-collapse-imminent/3699107.html>

Following Thae's comments, a Wall Street Journal editorial suggested the Trump administration should "make regime change an explicit policy goal for North Korea." **Joseph DeTrani, former U.S. nuclear envoy and intelligence official, said that while Thae's claims are "significant commentary" based on the diplomat's knowledge base, there is virtually "no indication that the regime's collapse is imminent."** While saying that his views are based on limited information, **DeTrani said he sees "a functioning government" in the North: private markets are functioning and people have access to food.** Ken Gause, who monitors the Kim regime, is also skeptical of Thae's prediction of regime change. **Notwithstanding increasing international sanctions, he says, Pyongyang's economy is faring relatively well. Even with its chronic food shortage, the country is "not as in serious situation as it was in the 1990s when there was mass starvation."** Gause, director of the International Affairs Group at the Center for Naval Analyses in Arlington, Virginia added that due to an extensive surveillance network of informants that covers every North Korean citizen, it is highly unlikely that information that could lead to a popular uprising will circulate among ordinary citizens. "If this regime is going to collapse, it will come from destabilization at the top of the regime," Gause said. Some experts, however, give weight to Thae's description of Pyongyang's political state. Bruce Klingner, a senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center in Washington, believes the Kim regime is being undermined significantly by disillusionment among North Koreans. "Mr. Thae's comments show that there is growing disillusionment, that the hopes that people had for Kim Jong Un have not panned out, that he is no better than his father and his grandfather, not only the repression but the resistance to allowing outside information in and implementing necessary economic reform," the former intelligence official said.

### 2. Delink: NK has always been written off to fail, yet Kim's cult following allows him to maintain internal stability (Kelly - The National Interest).

Robert E. Kelly (The National Interest). "South Korea Needs to Realize That North Korea Isn't Going to Collapse." February 13, 2017.

<http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/south-korea-needs-realize-north-korea-isnt-going-collapse-19427?page=show>

**There is a strong sense that North Korea lives on borrowed time. As Victor Cha writes, it is the "impossible state." Its economy is weak. Its ostensible ideology is long since bankrupt. Its people are increasingly aware that their southern kinsmen live vastly healthier, wealthier and happier lives. The regime, for all its ferocity, is alienated from its own people whose uprising it fears.** Its capital approximates a feudal city-state estranged from its own impoverished piedmont. It is extremely dependent on China for licit trade, illicit trade and financial

services. Its conventional forces are technological dated. Hence the regular predictions, going back decades, that North Korea's fall is imminent. It seems like we only need to find the final magic bullet to finally put this zombie down. But of course, it does not collapse. **Even if it violates much of what we "know" in political science and economics, it has some source of strength—extreme nationalism, a genuine belief in the Kim cult, the regime's willingness to do anything to survive—that helps it through crises which would bring down similar nation states.** North Korea has survived the end of the Cold War; the cutoff of Soviet aid; the death of founder-turned-godhead Kim Il-sung; the famine of the late 1990s; the death of the founder's heir, Kim Jong-il; and ever-tightening United Nations sanctions. If the North has survived all this, then none of the various ideas out there for change—chasing North Korean money in Chinese banks, inward information flows, airstrikes on missile sites, more sanctions—are a likely to be a magic bullet. All are worth discussion, of course, but given what the regime has survived to date, we must admit that it will be with us for a long time. This will be a long, grinding stalemate—as it has been to date—in which the side that "hangs tough" will triumph. Seen in that light, the Obama administration's much-maligned "strategic patience" is not so bad after all. It recognizes that the democracies on the outside—particularly South Korea, Japan and the United States—can do little to proactively force change in North Korea. They can cut it off and harden themselves against its provocations and misbehavior, but it will be a long grind. Sanctions, missile defense, the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the crackdown on North Korea's diplomatic relationships (which frequently double as sanctions) are necessary to slowly choke off the country and push it back to a precarious, exclusive dependence on its Chinese patron. Just as the Soviet Union was slowly internationally isolated and eventually ground to a halt, so too can the democracies of this cold war can hunker down.

### **3. Delink: Literally every single NK coup attempt has failed, Kim Jung-Un is not threatened by elites (Ryall - DW) Also use this as an indict to the RAND evidence that people use bc it looks at the RAND evidence.**

Julian Ryall (Deutsche Welle). "Can North Korea's elites oust Kim Jong Un?" 2/6/17.

<http://www.dw.com/en/can-north-koreas-elites-oust-kim-jong-un/a-39091374>

As a result, the most critical element of signaling external support for any such uprising against the latest member of the Kim dynasty to rule the nation will be promising coup plotters that they will be protected and even have a say in a post-Kim North Korea. North Korean refugees find help in the South Analysts, however, point out that **previous coup attempts have failed in the North and that the regime keeps a very close eye on those with any degree of power, making the coordination of any uprising a very difficult proposition.** RAND has identified what it believes are the five conditions that would need to be satisfied for senior members of the present regime in Pyongyang to conclude that reunification of the Korean peninsula would be beneficial for them. **The primary condition would be ensuring their individual safety, followed by maintaining their positions, protecting their wealth, ensuring the safety and privileges of their family and the chance to do "something meaningful for their country."** To help convey that message to potential plotters, the report calls on South Korea to "establish more unification-friendly policies" and reduce concerns about reunification, as well as establishing a legal basis for extending amnesty to most North Korean elites after unification and promising to continue their roles in a new government in Pyongyang. Ubiquitous monitoring The study concludes that the "conditions for unification could develop at any time" and that South Korea needs to assemble funds to support the cost of unification and to underline that its plans are serious. US installs THAAD amid rising tensions Yet analysts believe that no inducement will be enough to convince a North Korean official who fears for his life - and that of his extended family - to betray the regime. They point to the case of Jang Song Thaek, Kim's uncle, who was summarily executed in 2013 despite serving as a mentor to the young dictator. **"There is no question that ousting the Kim dynasty by fracturing the elite is a strategy that has been considered and that outcome would be popular, but we cannot underestimate the monitoring carried out by the regime's instruments of repression and the punishments that are handed out to anyone who is disloyal,"** said Daniel Pinkston, a professor of international relations at the Seoul campus of Troy University. "And even if there is a person in the regime who is so committed to removing Kim that he would be willing to risk his life, then we have to remember that under the North Korean system, the family of anyone who is disloyal is also held accountable," he told DW. **The Kim dynasty has also, down the decades, been cunning in the ways in which it rewards those who are loyal, showering them with gifts that are beyond the wildest dreams of ordinary North Koreans,** such as new Mercedes cars and homes in shiny new apartment complexes, Pinkston added. **Yet another hurdle that must be overcome is what Pinkston terms "rebels' dilemma," or the perceived benefits of joining an uprising weighed against the possibility that promises of more power or wealth might very well be reneged on at a later date.** Despite the clear disincentives for any plotters, Toshimitsu Shigemura, a professor at Tokyo's Waseda University and an

authority on North Korea's ruling family, points out that **there have been attempted coups against the Kim family, most recently in 2013. An extremely tough task Personal security around Kim was dramatically stepped up in March 2013**, according to intelligence sources in South Korea, with armored vehicles deployed close to his personal residence in Pyongyang, troops armed with automatic rifles on the streets of the city and mobile phone signals jammed at public events that the North Korean leader attended, apparently out of concern that they could be used to detonate a bomb. Four months previously, there were reports of outbreaks of gunfire on the streets of the North Korean capital between factions within the military and heightened discontent in some quarters with the way in which Kim was managing the country. **"There have been at least three attempted coups since 1992 and another one is, of course, possible if a sense of distrust in Kim's leadership grew more broadly throughout the armed forces,"** Shigemura said. **"But it has become increasingly difficult to cooperate in a coup because all officials' phones are tapped and their movements are watched very closely. "Organizing an uprising on the scale that would be needed to overthrow Kim would be an extremely difficult task,"** he said.

#### **4. Any elite uprising would be near impossible because of how closely the Kim Regime monitors all with power. coups have failed before. (Ryall - Deutsche Welle 17)**

Deutsche Welle ([www.Dw](http://www.Dw), 17, 02,06.2017 Can North Korea's elites oust Kim Jong Un?, DW,

<http://www.dw.com/en/can-north-koreas-elites-oust-kim-jong-un/a-39091374>, 9-26-2017, (NK)

A study by the RAND Corporation, a US government-funded think tank has proposed a radical new solution to the seemingly intractable problem of North Korea's worsening relationship with the international community. It suggested that incentives such as immunity from prosecution for human rights abuses might be used to encourage senior members of the regime to stage a coup against the country's leader

Kim Jong Un. The report, recently published by RAND's National Security Research Division, says that **North Korean propaganda has indoctrinated the regime's elites to believe that reunification with South Korea would be a disaster to them and result in loss of power, influence, wealth and prestige. In extreme cases, should the collapse of the regime in Pyongyang involve outbreaks of fighting, then it might even cost them their lives.** As a result, the most critical element of signaling external support for any such uprising against the latest member of the Kim dynasty to rule the nation will be promising coup plotters that they will be protected and even have a say in a post-Kim North Korea. **Analysts, however, point out that previous coup attempts have failed in the North and that the regime keeps a very close eye on those with any degree of power, making the coordination of any uprising a very difficult proposition.** RAND has identified what it believes are the five conditions that would need to be satisfied for senior members of the present regime in Pyongyang to conclude that reunification of the Korean peninsula would be beneficial for them. The primary condition would be ensuring their individual safety, followed by maintaining their positions, protecting their wealth, ensuring the safety and privileges of their family and the chance to do "something meaningful for their country."

## Uniqueness – R/T 06' Missile

### **NK launched its first missile in response to “axis-of-evil”**

**Suh 17** Jae-Jung Suh [Professor of Politics and International Affairs, International Christian University and an expert on the international relations of the Korean Peninsula], 4-27-2017, "Missile Defense and the

Security Dilemma: &nbsp;THAAD, Japan's "Proactive Peace," and a Global Arms Race in Northeast Asia," Asia Pacific Journal, <http://apjif.org/2017/09/Suh.html> //DF

North Korea has thus far conducted five nuclear weapons tests and numerous missiles tests. While it is all but impossible to tell whether its weapons systems are functional or what their real capacities are, it is certain that it has been developing the capacity to strike U.S. military facilities and personnel in the region and the U.S. continent. It may even be suggested that Pyongyang under Kim Jong Un's leadership is engaged in a drive to acquire the capability. It is notable—and directly relevant to our discussion of the security dilemma—that it conducted its first nuclear test in 2006 when it was singled out as one of the countries in the "axis of evil" with an unveiled threat of a preemptive strike by the George W. Bush administration and that it conducted the four subsequent tests during the Obama administration that implicitly excluded North Korea from its no-first strike policy.<sup>4</sup> Pyongyang indeed justifies its nuclear weapons development in terms of security threats it alleges it has received from the United States.

## Link – R/T Increasing Tests

### 1. Non-unique: the pace of tests have been increasing since Kim took office

**The natural progression of North Korea's needs leads to more testing and provocations – it has nothing to do with BMDs or external threats (Lockie – Business Insider)**

Alex Lockie (Business Insider). Experts say North Korea doesn't want peace talks — it wants nuclear missiles and to bully the US. Published 9/27/17. <http://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-doesnt-want-peace-bully-the-us-2017-9>.

"I think they [North Korea] will first want to demonstrate their capacity to have an ICBM ... that could reach the United States" before negotiating, Suzanne DiMaggio, a director and senior fellow at the New America think tank who directs unofficial talks between the US and the North Koreans, told Axios. **To demonstrate this capacity, North Korea needs to test more. Pyongyang has learned all it can from laboratory tests, simulations, and lofting missiles halfway to space instead of around the globe. North Korea needs to keep firing missiles, probably over Japan, to demonstrate a credible ICBM in real world conditions. This need exists independently of Trump's threats.** "North Korea will complete its remaining tests before softening" its negotiating position, Tong Zhao, a leading North Korea expert with the Carnegie's Nuclear Policy Program in Beijing, told Business Insider. In short, experts say there's little that would bring North Korea to the table right now. Only after North Korea has satisfied itself with its nuclear and missile technologies will it talk with the US on anything close to acceptable terms.

### 2. De-link: NK is testing to improve technology, not because of missile defense

**Berlinger 17** Joshua Berlinger, Cnn, 9-17-2017, "North Korea's missile tests: What you need to know," CNN, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/29/asia/north-korea-missile-tests/index.html> //DF

Less than six years into his reign, Kim Jong Un has tested more missiles than his father and grandfather combined. During the first months following the inauguration of US President Donald Trump, Pyongyang conducted a similar number of launches as it did during the same period in 2016. However, North Korea did not conduct any tests during the two months from Trump's election to his inauguration. The political turmoil in South Korea, which led to the eventual impeachment of former President Park Geun-hye, may also have factored into North Korea's decision making, experts say. Pyongyang has tested an average of one missile per week in the three weeks following the election of President Moon Jae-in, Park's successor. **They need to conduct tests to perfect the technology**, analysts say. Some have speculated that the United States has tried to meddle with the program using cyber methods, which could halt progress. The tests also are thought to be timed for maximum political impact -- a May launch coincided with the One Belt One Road summit in Beijing, an important project for Chinese President Xi Jinping, and a February launch happened as Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was visiting US President Donald Trump. And the ICBM test came on July 4, Independence Day in the US. All of this applies equally to the North's nuclear test program, which has typically followed a similar pattern.

## Solvency – R/T THAAD Tests

### **No Solvency: tests aren't realistic. THAAD has never actually been used in combat, and has only been successful in 1 trial (Starr - Foxtrot Alpha).**

Terrell Jermaine Starr (Foxtrot Alpha). "South Korea's New Missile Defense System Won't Keep It Safe." 3-30-2017..

<http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/south-koreas-new-missile-defense-system-wont-keep-it-sa-1793839226>

First, a primer on THAAD is necessary. The system is based on a simple enough concept: "What if you could knock out a missile with another missile?" Which sounds simple enough, until you consider that these missiles are moving at many thousands of miles an hour, and you just go ahead and try hitting a bullet with another bullet. Using massive, powerful radar systems like the trailer-based AN/TPY-2, the THAAD system is supposed to track short, medium, and intermediate-range

ballistic missiles, similar to the ones North Korea would be theorized to use in a nuclear shooting match. **In development since the 1990s, the THAAD system has been hitting short range targets since 2005, and actually managed to shoot down a simulated medium-range ballistic missile in 2012. But it hasn't demonstrated a kill of an intermediate-range missile like North Korea's Musudan, which can chuck a warhead more than 2,000 miles away. And there's no telling how the system would perform if it had to deal with multiple missile salvos, featuring dozens of warheads, all at once, as 38north pointed out.**

It has also evoked sharp backlash from residents in Seongju County, North Gyeongsang Province where it is located; THAAD is located on a golf course, to be exact. Residents fear the missile defense system makes them a bullseye in the event of a North Korean attack and that THAAD is nothing more than a symbol of U.S. geopolitical interests that will leave South Koreans shouldering the bulk of any collateral damage.

## Solvency – R/T Early Warning

### **No solvency: SK is unprepared for an attack**

Rich 17 Motoko Rich, 7-5-2017, "In North Korea, 'Surgical Strike' Could Spin Into 'Worst Kind of Fighting'," New York Times,

[//DF](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/world/asia/north-korea-south-us-nuclear-war.html?mcubz=3&amp;_r=0)

**The South Korean government conducts emergency drills only five times a year, and they are fairly desultory** affairs that last about 20 minutes, with people hunkering in buildings or stopping in their cars on the roads after sirens go off.

**Many residents have no idea where their nearest shelter is. Few people keep stockpiles of food and water**, for example, and while the government has indicated it may buy about 1.8 million gas masks for use in the event of a chemical attack, that would not be nearly enough to protect the population. **"For the first 72 hours,"** said Nam Kyung-pil, governor of Gyeonggi Province, **"each individual will have to save their own lives or be prepared by themselves."**

## Solvency – R/T BMDs Solve

### **1. No solvency: THAAD could not stop North Korean warheads if haystacked among conventional warheads (Chang - Yonhap News).**

Chang (Yonhap News Agency). "THAAD not effective in countering N.K. nuclear attack haystacked in barrage of warheads: expert." 6/14/16

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2016/06/14/0401000000AEN20160614000300315.html>

The U.S. **THAAD** system is a powerful anti-missile tool, but **wouldn't be effective in defending against a North Korean nuclear attack coming as part of a barrage of conventional warheads**, a U.S. analyst said Monday. Garth McLennan, who has closely followed American foreign and security policy, made the point in an article contributed to the website 38 North, forecasting that THAAD's deployment to South Korea would lead to the North stepping up its production of ballistic missiles. South Korea already has

formidable missile defense capabilities, including a large arsenal of Patriot-2 short-range missiles set to be upgraded to PAC-3s, but the addition of THAAD, which is designed to defend against short and intermediate-range missiles, would provide South Korea with a more layered defensive posture, he said. **"THAAD would not, however, serve as an effective tool in countering a North Korean nuclear strike if such an attack were haystacked among a barrage of conventional warheads," he said. "The THAAD system is a powerful anti-missile tool ... but in this case, it would not serve as a bulletproof measure against a North Korean nuclear attack."** The nuclear warheads would be the proverbial needles in the haystack of conventional munitions. Currently, such a defensive system does not exist, he said. "If THAAD were deployed to the Korean peninsula, it would hardly be a stretch for Pyongyang to immediately and aggressively increase their production of ballistic missiles and their assorted delivery systems. THAAD, for all it can do, has limits that can be overcome by high volume missile stockpiles and SLBM capabilities," McLennan said. SLBM stands for submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Following the North's long-range missile test in February, Seoul and Washington launched official talks about placing a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery in the South to bolster defense against missile threats from the communist nation. Sources have said that the THAAD talks have moved forward to a point where the two sides are now looking into candidate sites for deployment, including not only existing U.S. military bases, but also mountainous areas away from cities. McLennan said that South Korea's capability to counter a "saturation-based ballistic missile attack" from the North is limited, with the doctrine attached to missile interception calling for a two-to-one ratio for every missile fired, he said. "If Pyongyang were to launch a haystacked barrage, it would almost immediately tax Seoul's capacity to repel it. At the same time, nuclear-armed ballistic missiles would almost certainly confront the ROK with the problem of leakage in any attempt to intercept them," he said.

## **2. No Solvency: Anti-Missile systems 1 - can't shoot down Scud missiles and 2 - can't identify genuine or fake warheads on Nodong missiles (Hyun - The Hankyoreh).**

Park Hyun (The Hankyoreh). "Study: THAAD's interception capability may not be reliable." June 25, 2015.

[http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english\\_edition/e\\_international/697535.html](http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/697535.html)

The US is considering placing a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system on the Korean Peninsula to block the North Korean missile threat - but a recent study suggests THAAD's ability to intercept North Korean ballistic missiles may be unreliable. **According to the study, North Korean Scud and Nodong missiles are difficult targets because of their irregular trajectories, while any missile that is struck would pose the serious danger of its warhead falling to earth and exploding. Theodore Postol, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and George Lewis, a visiting scholar at the Cornell University Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, reached this conclusion** on June 14 from an analysis on whether a THAAD system in South Korea could successfully intercept a North Korean Scud or Nodong missile. The Hankyoreh was the first media outlet to acquire the findings from Postol and Lewis, both leading experts with years of research into US missile defense systems. While US experts and news outlets have previously noted possible problems with the use of Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) to protect the mainland US, the question of THAAD interception capabilities has remained a mystery, with few raising questions about the systems' deployment and export to allies. The new findings now appear to hold important implications for a full-scale debate on THAAD's military efficacy. **The findings showed that both the North Korean Scud-B and Scud-C missiles, with ranges of around 300 and 600 km respectively, and the Nodong missile, with a range of around 1,000 km, would fall in the range of THAAD intercept ability. But they also concluded a THAAD unit would have difficulty accurately targeting the Scud-B and Scud-C missiles because of their irregular trajectory, which moves in a spinning or screw-shaped pattern rather than a straight line once it finishes its powered flight and reaches a target. In the case of a Nodong interception, the same irregular movement issues apply, along with the basic US missile defense problem of being unable to distinguish genuine warheads from decoys.** Noting that intercepting missile would have to be fired when the Nodong is at an altitude of over 105 km from its target, Postol and Lewis said the difference from a decoy would be difficult to identify at that height. While a decoy is lighter and would have a slower descent to earth, the thin air at that altitude would produce similar descent speeds, making the warhead and decoy difficult to tell apart.

## **3. NK will just plan around BMDs**

Brahma Chellaney, 3-20-2017, "Averting an accidental war on the Korean Peninsula," Japan Times,

<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/03/20/commentary/world-commentary/averting-accidental-war-korean-peninsula/#.WXAjhoiyuUl>

Let's be clear: THAAD cannot credibly protect South Korea from the North's tactical or short-range ballistic missiles. Designed for high-altitude intercepts, THAAD is geared mainly to interdict medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Given South Korea's relatively small land size,



an attack by the North may not necessitate the use of medium- or intermediate-range missiles. Metropolitan Seoul, which has almost as many residents as North Korea's total population of 25 million, is located just 40 km from the Demilitarized Zone dividing the two Koreas. North Korea has a virtual artillery choke-hold on Seoul that THAAD cannot neutralize. This is why the U.S. lacks a realistic option to militarily degrade the North's nuclear and missile capabilities without provoking Pyongyang to unleash its artillery power against Seoul or triggering an all-out war. The absence of credible techno-military options against North Korea is also underscored by the reported failure of the U.S. to undermine Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs through coordinated cyber and electronic strikes in recent years. In this light, THAAD's political symbolism is greater than its military utility. The system, in any case, has never been battle-tested. But **rather than enhance South Korea's security, including by reassuring its citizens, the THAAD deployment threatens to make South Koreans more insecure through an action-reaction cycle.** For example, **the Stalinist regime in Pyongyang may now plan, in a combat scenario, to fire many missiles simultaneously so as to defeat THAAD. Against this background, a new strategy is needed to stem the growing risk that a small mishap could escalate to a full-fledged war.** U.S. President Barack Obama employed sanctions with engagement to clinch a nuclear deal with Iran yet, throughout his eight-year tenure, pursued a completely different approach toward North Korea — sanctions without engagement.

#### **4. A multilayered system doesn't even work. The anti-missile systems don't have the ability to work together.**

Stefan Soesanto "US Missile Defense in the Age of Everything from BMDs to IAMD" *Pacific Forum*. 3 May 2016. Web. 14 Sept. 2017. <[https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/196735/issuesinsights\\_vol16no6.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/196735/issuesinsights_vol16no6.pdf)>

However, despite the success of deploying the US BMDS and proving that it is indeed possible to 'hit a missile with a missile,' the DoD got only half the equation right. First, not all missiles are ballistic in nature. Cruise missiles, air-to-surface missile (ex. Hellfire), air-to-air missiles (ex. AMRAAM), and precision-guide ammunition for instance are not covered by the BMDs. Second, ballistic missiles come with an inherent attacker advantage due to the low-cost of decoys, non-ballistic trajectories, multiple warhead deployments (MIRVs), and hypersonic engines. As such the BMD equation on costs, numbers, speed, range, accuracy, stealth, and lethality, are firmly on the attacker's side. Third, a BMDs tailored to the needs of the geographic combatant command requires theater allies and partners to not only procure missile defense systems but also exercise the political willingness to integrate with the US BMDS in an effort to streamline command-and-control, facilitate sensor data exchange, and settle upon defined rules of engagement. Fourth, the MDA and JFCC-IMD have failed to create an interoperable system by recycling and upgrading elements that were not designed to function together in the first place. Consequentially, componentization (ex. **using a PAC radar to aim and a THAAD launcher to shoot**) is not possible, because the various elements do not have a "standardized connection so everything can talk to everything else."<sup>140</sup> Fifth, the MDA and JFCC-IMD have also neglected the integrated part to facilitate US BMDS operationalization in concert with offensive kinetic capabilities. Meaning that "the same sensor that warns defensive systems of an incoming attack [ought] to also cue offensive systems to retaliate."

## Solvency – R/T GMD Solves

### **No solvency: GMD is super ineffective**

**Klimas 17** Jacqueline Klimas and Connor O'Brien, 7-5-2017, "U.S. missile shield not yet ready for North Korean nukes," POLITICO,

<http://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/05/north-korea-missile-defense-240246> //DF

**Tens of billions of dollars spent over three decades have still left the Pentagon with no reliable way to shoot down nuclear-tipped missiles approaching the U.S. homeland** — a vulnerability that has taken on sharp new urgency after North Korea's Independence Day test of its first ICBM. Instead, **the missile defense system designed to shield the United States from an intercontinental ballistic missile** — a diverse network of sensors, radars and interceptor missiles based in Alaska and California — **has failed three of its five tests, military leaders acknowledge. Even the two successful ones were heavily scripted.** "If the North Koreans fired everything they had at us, and we fired at all of the missiles, we'd probably get most of them," said Jeffrey Lewis, the director of the East Asia nonproliferation program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. "But is 'probably get most' a good day or a bad day?" The Pentagon's official stance on Wednesday was that the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, designed by Boeing and a slew of other defense contractors, can knock out a missile whizzing

through the atmosphere. But that view is in the minority. Most current and former military officials and other experts argue that the chances of protecting U.S. territory from a surprise or short-notice ICBM attack would be slim at best. As recently as last month, the outgoing Navy admiral in charge of all the Pentagon's missile defense programs told Congress he has "reliability concerns" with the system.

## Solvency – R/T BMDs Outpace

### Offense outpaces BMDs

**Soesanto 16** Stefan Soesanto, 4-2016, "US Missile Defense in the Age of Everything: From BMDS to IAMD: Challenges, Opportunities, and Recommendations for the Asia-Pacific Theater," Pacific Forum CSIS, Center for Strategic and International Studies //DF

While this concept of stability still resonates in US-Russia relations, superior US technology in the area of guided conventional munitions profoundly changed the art of modern warfare, and in effect replaced parity with US military dominance on the global stage in 1991.<sup>95</sup> In the end, military power became synonymous with precision, and its exercise helped significantly offset conventional numerical advantages on the battlefield (second offset strategy).<sup>96</sup> The third offset strategy (which the DoD is currently devising) will host a series of new technologies by leveraging "unmanned systems and automation, extended-range and low-observable air operations, undersea warfare, and complex system engineering and integration" to counter emerging threats asymmetrically and project military power in entirely different ways than today.<sup>97</sup> US Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work explains this new strategy by highlighting that "the US has never, on the matter of conventional deterrence, tried to match our conventional adversaries' tank for tank, ship for ship, airplane for airplane. It has always looked for technological offsets."<sup>98</sup> Missile defense in this context is seen as flawed, because it is symmetrically engaging a threat 'missile for missile' within an environment of finite fiscal resources. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) notes that "barring technological breakthroughs, the competition in [missile defense and defensive space control] is currently heavily offense-dominant, and thus, ramping up expenditures in a likely futile attempt to actively defend it is a cost-imposing strategy on the United States."<sup>99</sup>

### It's always cheaper for NK to increase their arsenal than to build BMDs

**Elleman 16** Michael Elleman, 3-10-2016, "THAAD: What It Can and Can't Do," 38 North //DF

However, the added defensive capability will have to be weighed against other considerations. Chinese objections to the deployment of THAAD (an assessment of whether those objections are rebased on a realistic assessment of the system is beyond the scope of this article) are clear.

The economics of missile defense must also be considered. It is considerably more expensive to deploy and operate THAAD to South Korea, than it will be for North Korea to grow the size of its arsenal or to quickly invest in additional missiles, missile launchers and trained crews in order to overwhelm the defenses.

Last, as this analysis shows, any system designed to destroy incoming missiles will have leakage. If those missiles are armed with nuclear weapons, that leakage could have catastrophic results.

## R/T Blackmail

### Uniqueness – R/T Blackmail

#### 1. Non-unique: this strategy runs counter to the regime's main goals

**Jackson 15** Van Jackson, The Diplomat, 5-28-2015, "What Is North Korea's Nuclear Strategy?," Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/what-is-north-koreas-nuclear-strategy/> //DF

Of course, North Korea's rhetoric would have us believe it already employs an asymmetric escalation strategy, but its credibility is hampered by capability limitations and its track record of dubious military posturing and threat making. The question facing the United States and South Korea is whether to believe them (a subject of my forthcoming book). There are several reasons to doubt North Korea on this point during peacetime, but believe it during periods of conflict. **First, a peacetime asymmetric escalation strategy would seem to subvert North Korea's widely acknowledged primary goal of regime survival.** North Korea should want the outside world to believe it's willing to go nuclear first because it might accrue some political benefit through coercion. Perhaps, for instance, the alliance will hesitate to retaliate against a North Korean provocation in peacetime for fear of a conventional conflict escalating to the nuclear level. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates suggests this type of thinking existed among some in the Obama administration in 2010 in his memoir. But **to actually adopt an asymmetric escalation posture in peacetime** — as opposed to bluffing that it has one — **would risk North Korea triggering regime change** (the eventuality it most seeks to avoid) simply for coercive gain. **Second, North Korea has a track record of over-hyping its military capabilities.** Not only are there suggestions that its May 2015 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test claim is a farce, but **it has also staged artificial missile capabilities in parades and on television to signal that it's capable of more than it actually is.** **Third, if North Korea were pursuing an asymmetric escalation posture, we should expect to see some evidence of it developing tactical nuclear weapons** — nuclear-armed artillery, landmines, short-range rockets, or "suitcase bombs." To date, **there is no evidence suggesting North Korea is moving in this direction.**

## **2. Non-unique: even if they did adopt this strategy, it doesn't threaten South Korea's interests because nuclear blackmail doesn't work**

Fisher 17 Max Fisher, 7-29-2017, "North Korea's Nuclear Arms Sustain Drive for 'Final Victory'," New York Times,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-missile.html?&moduleDetail=section-news-5&action=click&contentCollection=Asia%20Pacific&ion=Footer&module=MoreInSection&version=WhatsNext&contentID=WhatsNext&pgtype=article> //DF

Research on nuclear diplomacy offers two lessons: that **North Korea's strategy is likely to fail** and that the country is likely to try anyway. **Nuclear threats rarely succeed in extracting concessions from adversaries,** according to a book-length study by the political scientists Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann. **Nuclear threats are simply not believable; the consequences of using the weapons are seen as too great to be credible. As a result, nuclear states are less likely to successfully coerce an adversary than non-nuclear states,** which can more credibly threaten war. And because nuclear weapons heighten the risk to both sides, they tend to lock the status quo in place — the **opposite of North Korea's goal.** Mr. Kim, the research by Mr. Sechser and Mr. Fuhrmann suggests, has greatly enhanced his ability to deter the United States from invading. But **if he is hoping to force the United States into a major policy change, he is headed for disappointment.**

## **3. South Korea has a far greater conventional military which means North Korea knows they would lose (Robb – USA Today)**

Robert Robb (USA Today). Robb: North Korea has nukes, so South Korea and Japan need them too. Published 9/1/17.

<http://www.azcentral.com/story/opinion/op-ed/robertrobb/2017/09/01/north-korea-has-nukes-south-korea-japan-need-them/622019001/>.

Even before the recent developments, it made no sense for the United States to assume responsibility for protecting South Korea and Japan against North Korea. North Korea shouldn't be this big of a threat **South Korea has a population twice as big as North Korea and an economy 50 times larger.** Japan has five times as many people and an economy that is 125 times larger. **South Korea spends five times as much on its military as does North Korea.** Japan spends even more. GDP per capita in

South Korea is \$37,900. In Japan, it's \$38,900. In North Korea, it's just \$1,700. **South Korea** and Japan **have far greater capability of increasing their military prowess than North Korea, which is already more than maxed out.** North Korea can't win an arms race with either country. ROBB: North Korea is a threat, and we sleepwalked right into it In short, North Korea doesn't pose, or shouldn't pose, any conventional threat to South Korea or Japan. It only poses a threat because it has nuclear weapons and South Korea and Japan do not.

#### **4. China would intervene against North Korea in the event of a war (Stilwell – Business Insider)**

Blake Stilwell (Business Insider). Here's who would win in a war between North and South Korea.

Published 8/9/17.

<http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-who-would-win-in-a-war-between-north-and-south-korea-2016-4>.

The North is also hampered in terms of alliances. During the Korean War, the Korean Communists were pushed all the way to the Yalu River by Gen. Douglas MacArthur. It was only after the Chinese intervened with massive manpower and matériel that the Communists were able to form any kind of counterattack. Chinese intervention for the North is questionable at best, given its extensive overseas economic ties. In fact, **it might even be in China's best interest to invade North Korea itself, to give a buffer zone between China and a collapsed North Korean government, or worse, US troops right on the border.** South Korea maintains a tight alliance with the United States, which has 30,000 troops of its own stationed there, 3,800 in Japan, and 5,700 on Guam, along with significant air and naval forces in the region.

#### **5. Kim doesn't want to reunify. He's giving his elites propaganda that reunification would be a disaster (Ryall - Deutsche Welle 17)**

Deutsche Welle ([www.Dw](http://www.dw.com), 17, 02,06.2017 Can North Korea's elites oust Kim Jong Un?, DW,

<http://www.dw.com/en/can-north-koreas-elites-oust-kim-jong-un/a-39091374>, 9-26-2017, (NK)

A study by the RAND Corporation, a US government-funded think tank has proposed a radical new solution to the seemingly intractable problem of North Korea's worsening relationship with the international community. It suggested that incentives such as immunity from prosecution for human rights abuses might be used to encourage senior members of the regime to stage a coup against the country's leader Kim Jong Un. The report, recently published by RAND's National Security Research Division, says that **North Korean propaganda has indoctrinated the regime's elites to believe that reunification with South Korea would be a disaster to them and result in loss of power, influence, wealth and prestige. In extreme cases, should the collapse of the regime in Pyongyang involve outbreaks of fighting, then it might even cost them their lives.** As a result, the most critical element of signaling external support for any such uprising against the latest member of the Kim dynasty to rule the nation will be promising coup plotters that they will be protected and even have a say in a post-Kim North Korea. **Analysts, however, point out that previous coup attempts have failed in the North and that the regime keeps a very close eye on those with any degree of power, making the coordination of any uprising a very difficult proposition.** RAND has identified what it believes are the five conditions that would need to be satisfied for senior members of the present regime in Pyongyang to conclude that reunification of the Korean peninsula would be beneficial for them. The primary condition would be ensuring their individual safety, followed by maintaining their positions, protecting their wealth, ensuring the safety and privileges of their family and the chance to do "something meaningful for their country."

**6. They have survived for 64 years, they can do it without reunification.**

**7. Has nothing to gain from a war because it would destroy South Korea**

## Impact – R/T Economic Concessions

### **This doesn't make sense because nuclear weapons allow Kim to focus more on the economy**

**Mansourov 14** [Alexandre Y. Mansourov, Ph.D., Senior Associate of Nautilus Institute], 12-16-2014, "Kim Jong Un's Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know," Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability,

<https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/> //DF

**The principal purpose of the DPRK's nuclear weapons program is to ensure the favorable environment for regime survival and national development by deterring external threats against the country's sovereignty and leadership and by freeing internal resources for economic growth and individual consumption. The survival of the ruling Kim family is intimately linked to the nuclear weapons development program because nuclear arms help legitimize Kim Jong Un's hereditary rule, keep his foreign foes at bay, and allow the DPRK government to prop up the civilian economy with the additional resources previously spent on conventional military arms.**

On March 31, 2013, Kim Jong Un said, "Nuclear weapons guarantee peace, economic prosperity, and people's happy life." [4] According to the MOFA spokesman statement on 4 October 2014, "The DPRK's nuclear force serves a powerful treasured sword to protect the sovereignty of the country and the dignity of the nation and provides a sure guarantee for focusing efforts on preserving peace and security, building economy and improving the standard of the people's living." [5] Despite what many Western analysts believe, development of nuclear weapons does not take precedence over economic development in Kim Jong Un's North Korea. In a visible departure from the military-first policy, as envisioned and practiced by his father Kim Jong Il, the Workers' Party of Korea under Kim Jong Un's leadership adopted at the March 2013 Plenum of its Central Committee the so-called Pyongjin Line, i.e. the strategic course on parallel construction of economy and nuclear weapons (경제건설과 핵무력건설을 병진시킬데 대한 전략적로선). [6] Notwithstanding the Songun imperatives, both are regarded as parallel tracks of the overall national development strategy designed to fulfil the supreme interests of the Korean people and Juch'e revolution. According to the DPRK foreign ministry spokesman's statement on 4 October 2014, "The DPRK's line of simultaneously developing the two fronts serves as a banner for bolstering nuclear deterrence for self-defence to cope with the reckless nuclear threat and aggression by the U.S. and its followers and, on its basis, winning a decisive victory in building a thriving nation... The DPRK's line of simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and the building of nuclear force is the strategic line which should be permanently maintained to meet the supreme interests of the Korean revolution." [7] The North Korean government emphasizes the critical role of nuclear weapons in national security and defense strategies by putting them in the center of its campaign to prevent war and shape peace suitable to Pyongyang and in the foundation of its plans to wage war under the conditions favoring the North. In his speech on 31 March 2013, Kim Jong Un called for increasing the "pivotal role of nuclear weapons in war deterrent strategy and war-waging strategy." [8] According to the DPRK national security doctrine, as part of the overall war deterrent strategy (전쟁억제전략), "the nuclear deterrent enables peaceful development at home and allows North Korea to dictate international trends on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia."

### **In fact, their economy is currently growing. It doesn't make sense why they would want to endanger this success.**

**Kim 17** Christine Kim, 7-21-2017, "What sanctions? North Korea economy grows at fastest pace in 17 years," Asia Times,

<http://www.atimes.com/article/sanctions-north-korea-economy-grows-fastest-pace-17-years/> //DF

**North Korea's economy grew at its fastest pace in 17 years** in 2016, South Korea's central bank said on Friday, **despite** the isolated country facing **international sanctions** aimed at curbing its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Gross domestic product (GDP) in North Korea last year rose 3.9% from the previous year when the economy contracted due to a drought and low commodity prices, the Bank of Korea said. The expansion, driven by mining and energy, marked the biggest rise since a 6.1 percent gain in 1999. **North Korea, which**

counts China as its biggest trading partner, also boosted exports by 4.6%, the most since an 11.8% jump in 2013. Still, the isolated state's per capita gross national income in 2016 was just 1.5 million won (\$1,136), less than 5% of the comparable number in South Korea. North Korea does not publish economic data. The Bank of Korea has released GDP data on North Korea every year since 1991 based on information from government agencies including South Korea's Ministry of Unification and the National Intelligence Service. The estimate is widely used by international organizations and researchers. North Korea has been under U.N. sanctions since 2006 over its ballistic missile and nuclear programs and the Security Council has ratcheted up the measures in response to five nuclear tests and two long-range missile launches.

## Impact – R/T Aid Extractions

### **This has not been a successful strategy**

**Anderson 17** Nicholas D. Anderson [Department of Political Science, Yale University], 4-20-2017, "Explaining North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions: Power and Position on the Korean Peninsula," Australian Journal of International Affairs,

<https://campuspress.yale.edu/nickanderson/files/2017/04/Anderson-2017-Explaining-North-Koreas-Nuclear-Ambitions-website-1dcnbpz.pdf> //DF

Second, if the North's nuclear ambitions are driven by its desire to use this capability as an extortion tool for international aid (Eberstadt 2004; Lankov 2013, 146-149), we might expect there to be some relationship between its nuclear status and its receipt of international food aid. If its primary purpose is to extort international aid, we should expect it to either receive more aid after it acquired its nuclear program, or to abandon its nuclear efforts altogether if aid is not forthcoming. Putting this second hawk argument in hypothesis form: H5: North Korean nuclear acquisition will lead to an increase in international food aid. A return to Figure 4 (above), however, indicates that if this is the North's goal, it is not seeing much success. The basic trajectory of food aid to North Korea is a steady increase between 1995 and 2001, and then a steady decline from 2002 onward. This pattern is far more consistent with North Korean need, during the famine of the 1990s, than with its ability to use its nuclear sabre-rattling as an extortion tool. And of course, declining food aid seems to have done little to discourage North Korea in its nuclear ambitions more broadly.

## R/T US Preemptive Strike

### Link Turn

**BMDs increase the chance of a preemptive strike for two reasons:**

**1. BMDs are a main reason why the tensions are so high right now. Gollman says that if there's going to be a strike, it's going to happen now**

**2. BMDs make Trump overconfident and more willing to launch a preemptive strike**

Eric **Gomez**, 5-15-2017, "THAAD Won't Save Asia (or America) from North Korea," National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/thaad-wont-save-asia-or-america-north-korea-20665>

With these technical limitations in mind, THAAD's main purpose is to provide a protective umbrella for U.S. air force bases in South Korea, and the port of Busan, the primary port of entry for follow-on U.S. ground forces in the event of a long-term fight with North Korea. But although missile defense systems are usually viewed as solely defensive, the protection they provide also creates a perverse incentive for U.S. military planners to use force offensively. If U.S. planners believe essential military facilities are relatively safe from missile attack, they could be emboldened to launch first strikes against North Korea's nuclear forces. Currently, the United States, South Korea, and North Korea all face

strong incentives to go first in a conflict. The best way for the United States and South Korea to limit the damage of a North Korean attack is to destroy the North's nuclear weapons on the ground or kill Kim Jong Un before he can give the order. Unfortunately, **Before [missile defense] THAAD, a disarming blow was incredibly risky because of the damage that just a few surviving nuclear-armed missiles could do to U.S. forces in South Korea.** The risk and danger of a disarming strike are both still high, but **THAAD [missile defense] does reduce[s] them by providing a better shield against any weapons that may survive the first strike.** Ultimately, THAAD will do little to defuse the current tensions on the Korean peninsula. **The greater protection it provides to U.S. troops could make U.S. escalation less costly and therefore more attractive.** The Trump administration will have to find another way out of this crisis.

**Weigh the turns over their link. THAAD doesn't even drastically increase the ability to defend South Korea. The Internal Link Turns outweigh their case because affirming creates a negligible increase in defensive capability but a huge increase in the chance of a missile being launched.**

## Probability

**Lee 17** Chung Min Lee, 9-3-2017, "Facing North Korea, Washington and Seoul must avoid war with each other," Washington Post, [//DF](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017/09/03/facing-north-korea-washington-and-seoul-must-avoid-war-with-each-other/?utm_term=.1d5ba4ab4b49)

Before Sunday's test, news reports spoke of Trump's impending decision to withdraw from the U.S.-South Korea free-trade agreement (KORUS). Such a move is unjustified in the first place. But after Pyongyang's most threatening nuclear test so far, withdrawing from KORUS would send the worst possible signal to North Korea and China. If the White House proceeds to drop KORUS even after the test, it will severely damage one of America's staunchest and important allies in Asia by throwing the U.S.-South Korea alliance to the wolves. Trump and South Korean President Moon Jae-in ought to respond to the regime of Kim Jong Un jointly and without any ambiguity. **For Trump, the temptation to hint about a preventive strike against North Korea will surely grow. Some members of Congress may advocate for a such a blow to end North Korea's nuclear threat once and for all.** But a preventive strike is the worst possible option for South Korea. Any preventive strike on North Korean nuclear sites will result in North Korean attacks on U.S. bases in South Korea, as well as on civilian targets. Even if a small-yield nuclear weapon were dropped in Seoul, hundreds of thousands would die, and millions would suffer from radiation poisoning. South Korea as we know it — the world's 12th-largest economy, the sixth-largest trading power and Asia's most vibrant democracy — would cease to exist.

## De-link – China

**The US would never launch a preemptive strike because China has sworn to come to North Korea's aid (Le Miere – Newsweek)**

Jason Le Miere (Newsweek). CHINA WOULD JOIN FORCES WITH NORTH KOREA IF U.S. LAUNCHES PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE. Published 8/11/17. <http://www.newsweek.com/china-north-korea-preemptive-strike-649802>.

China will remain neutral if North Korea fires missiles at United States territory first, but should the U.S. launch a pre-emptive strike, as it has suggested it might, North Korea's chief ally would come to the North's aide. While not direct government policy, that verdict of how the country should react amid the unfolding nuclear threats from the U.S. and North Korea is contained in an editorial in the influential Communist Party-run Global Times newspaper Friday. **"China should also make clear that if North Korea launches missiles that threaten U.S. soil first and the U.S. retaliates, China will stay neutral,"** read the editorial. **"If the U.S. and South Korea carry out strikes and try to overthrow the North Korean regime and change the political pattern of the Korean Peninsula, China will prevent them from doing so."** Keep Up With This Story And More By Subscribing Now It went on: "China opposes both nuclear proliferation and war in the Korean Peninsula. It will not encourage any side to stir up military conflict, and will firmly resist any side which wants to change the status quo of the areas where China's interests are concerned." The piece stated that the government was "not able to persuade Washington or Pyongyang to back down at this time."

## Link Defense – R/T Trump

### **1. De-link: Despite the statements, we haven't actually undergone preparation for war**

**Vox 17** Jennifer Williams, 8-8-2017, "Calm down: we're (probably) not about to go to war with North Korea," Vox,

<https://www.vox.com/world/2017/8/8/16115238/war-north-korea-trump-missile-nuclear-weapon-threat> //DF

There is also no indication that the US has started taking the kinds of massive logistical preparations needed to launch a war against North Korea. Hell, we don't even have an ambassador to South Korea yet, as my colleague Zack Beauchamp has reported. Nor do we have an assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs in the State Department or an assistant secretary for Asian and Pacific security affairs at the Defense Department. As Beauchamp explains: This is a situation in which you want smart, levelheaded people in the top Korea-related posts in the US government. You want leading subject matter experts running Asia policy in the Departments of State and Defense, and someone who knows the South Korean government well serving as ambassador in Seoul. Yet in the Trump administration, those positions remain vacant. If we were really about to launch a massive, bloody war with North Korea that could potentially kill tens of thousands of innocent civilians in South Korea and elsewhere — one war game convened by the Atlantic magazine back in 2005 predicted that a North Korean attack on the South would kill 100,000 people in Seoul in the first few days alone, while others put the estimate even higher — one would expect to see a major mobilization happening across the political, military, and diplomatic arms of the US government. We're not seeing anything like that. What we do have is a belligerent statement from President Trump that he made while on vacation in New Jersey. So while anything is theoretically possible when it comes to Trump, it's more likely that this is yet another example of him making an extremely inflammatory statement without having actually thought through the policy implications of it, as we saw with his tweet announcing a new ban on transgender service members in the US military. That's bad enough when we're talking about a policy affecting the lives of thousands of trans American service members. It's even worse when we're talking about a war that could involve nuclear bombs. And although it's probably slightly easier for Trump to launch a military strike against a sovereign nation on the other side of the globe with little to no advance planning than it is to try to change a Defense Department policy with little to no advance planning, the fact that the people in charge of launching a war on North Korea don't seem to be doing anything of the sort is probably a fairly good indication that we're safe, at least for now.

### **2. There is historical precedent for this; every US President has threatened strikes and then backed down because the costs are too high**

**Fifield 17** Anna Fifield, 4-21-2017, "Twenty-five million reasons the U.S. hasn't struck North Korea," Washington Post

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/twenty-five-million-reasons-the-us-cant-strike-north-korea/2017/04/21/47df9fea-2513-11e7-928e-3624539060e8\\_story.html?utm\\_term=.55fbace433cc](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/twenty-five-million-reasons-the-us-cant-strike-north-korea/2017/04/21/47df9fea-2513-11e7-928e-3624539060e8_story.html?utm_term=.55fbace433cc) //DF

This prospect of extensive damage and casualties has restrained successive U.S. administrations, however provocative North Korea has been. "Every U.S. administration, as they have looked at this problem, has said that all options are available. But that's not really true," said Baker, who is at the Pacific Forum of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "We really don't have a military option." Vice President Pence, speaking in Seoul this week, said that all options are on the table for dealing with North Korea, echoing statements that Secretary of State Rex Tillerson made in Seoul last month. There was a similar discussion in 1994, when North Korea threatened to go nuclear, sparking talk



of surgical strikes. "People in Washington were saying, 'We have the capability to do this,' but those of us who were sitting in Seoul said, 'You can't do that.' " Baker said.

### **3. De-link: there is no public support for a pre-emptive strike; since any strike would most likely lead to a prolonged conflict, that would require some level of public support, but there is none**

**Clement 17** Scott Clement, 9-24-2017, "Poll: Far more trust generals than Trump on N. Korea, while two-thirds oppose preemptive strike," Washington Post,  
[https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/poll-far-more-trust-generals-than-trump-on-n-korea-while-two-thirds-oppose-preemptive-strike/2017/09/23/5cc4377c-9fbb-11e7-8ea1-ed975285475e\\_story.html?utm\\_term=.7270c5b745cd](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/poll-far-more-trust-generals-than-trump-on-n-korea-while-two-thirds-oppose-preemptive-strike/2017/09/23/5cc4377c-9fbb-11e7-8ea1-ed975285475e_story.html?utm_term=.7270c5b745cd) //DF

**Two-thirds of Americans oppose launching a preemptive military strike against North Korea,** with a majority trusting the U.S. military to handle the escalating nuclear crisis responsibly but not President Trump, a new Washington Post-ABC News poll finds. Roughly three-quarters of the public supports tougher economic sanctions on North Korea in an attempt to persuade it to give up its nuclear weapons, while just about one-third think the United States should offer the isolated country foreign aid or other incentives. The Post-ABC poll finds 37 percent of adults trust Trump either "a great deal" or "a good amount" to responsibly handle the situation with North Korea, while 42 percent trust the commander in chief "not at all." By comparison, 72 percent trust U.S. military leaders, including 43 percent saying they trust them "a great deal." A scant 8 percent of Americans surveyed think North Korean leader Kim Jong Un can act responsibly.

## Link Defense – R/T Surgical Strike

**Probability: this kind of attack is never going to happen because the costs are too high**

**Burns 17** Robert Burns, 7-7-2017, "Missile strike on North Korea an unlikely response to aggression," Military Times,  
<https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2017/07/07/missile-strike-on-north-korea-an-unlikely-response-to-aggression/> //DF

A pre-emptive military strike may be among the "pretty severe things" President Trump says he is considering for North Korea, but it's a step so fraught with risk that it ranks as among the unlikeliest options. Even a so-called surgical strike aimed at the North's partially hidden nuclear and missile force is unlikely to destroy the arsenal or stop its leader, Kim Jong Un, from swiftly retaliating with long-range artillery that could kill stunning numbers in South Korea within minutes. An all-out conflict could then ensue. And while Trump's Pentagon chief, Jim Mattis, says the U.S. would prevail, he believes it would be "a catastrophic war." In Poland on Thursday, Trump said the time has arrived to confront North Korea. "I don't like to talk about what I have planned, but I have some pretty severe things that we're thinking about," the president said. "That doesn't mean we're going to do them."

## R/T Troop Pullout

### Uniqueness

**1. Nonunique: Trump, not THAAD, damages US-SK alliance (Friedhoff - Real Clear World)**

Karl Friedhoff (Real Clear World/Real Clear Politics). "Will Trump Upend U.S.-South Korea Alliance?" June 28, 2017.  
[http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2017/06/28/trump\\_south\\_korea\\_summit\\_112414.html](http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2017/06/28/trump_south_korea_summit_112414.html)

The negotiations for the current SMA were handled with care, largely out of the public eye. That was for good reason. Opposition lawmakers said the agreement was humiliating, and in 2013, a poll conducted by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies found that 57 percent of the South Korean public thought South Korea was paying too much. **In a White House that sees foreign policy as transactional, a suboptimal summit will increase the likelihood that SMA talks turn from negotiation to perceived extortion. An impulsive tweet or a statement on the need for South Korea to dramatically increase its contribution will touch a raw nerve that recalls the days when the United States treated South Korea as a client state rather than the trusted partner it feels it now deserves to be. With an already high distrust of President Trump among the South Korean public, such an outcome would drive South Korean public opinion sharply against the United States. Gaps between the two countries will provide an opening that North Korea and China will seek to exploit. These perceptions will do longer-lasting damage to the U.S.-South Korea alliance than policy divergence on either North Korea or THAAD.**

Getting the summit right will likely mean ongoing disagreement about the best ways to approach North Korea and the urgency of THAAD deployment. Those disagreements can be managed within the alliance. Getting it wrong could mean a series of 140-character missives that derail a 70-year partnership for the foreseeable future.

## Link Defense – R/T Trump Troop Pullout

### Trump went back on his earlier comments and committed to remaining in SK

**Kim 16** Jack Kim and Ju-Min Park, 11-10-2016, "South Korea says Trump pledged commitment to its defense," Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-southkorea-idUSKBN135080> //DF

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump pledged his commitment to defending South Korea under an existing security alliance during a phone call with South Korean President Park Geun-hye on Thursday, her office said. Trump had said during the election campaign he would be willing to withdraw U.S. military stationed in South Korea unless Seoul paid a greater share of the cost of the U.S. deployment, but an adviser to the president-elect played down such comments on Thursday. There are about 28,500 U.S. troops based in South Korea helping to defend the country against nuclear-armed North Korea, which has remained in a technical state of war with the South since the 1950-53 Korean conflict. Park said the U.S.-South Korean alliance had grown in the past six decades and she hoped it would develop further. She asked Trump to join in the effort to help minimize the threat from North Korea, which has carried out repeated nuclear and missile tests in defiance of U.N. Security Council resolutions and sanctions.

## Link Defense – R/T Troop Pullout

### 1. Delink: Both public and government support for US-SK alliance will prevent the withdrawal of US military forces (Snyder - The National Interest).

Scott A. Snyder (The National Interest). "Is the U.S.-South Korea Alliance in Trouble?" June 26, 2017.

<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-us-south-korea-alliance-trouble-21323>

Moon served as Roh's chief-of-staff and his campaign borrowed directly from the Roh administration's playbook. Moon's decision to temporarily halt implementation of the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) U.S. missile defense system due to procedural concerns about transparency and domestic environmental standards have reminded Americans of the prickly challenges that beset alliance relations between Washington and Seoul a decade ago. But Moon Jae-in faces a dramatically different domestic and international situation as president compared to the one he experienced as chief-of-staff in the Roh Moo-hyun administration. **Domestically, Moon leads a government that holds a minority of seats in South Korea's National Assembly and South Korean public support for the U.S.-ROK alliance (as well as the deployment of the THAAD missile defense system) is high.** Moon's electoral mandate revolves primarily around the need to root out domestic corruption and address economic inequality; to do so, he must pursue a pragmatic and responsible foreign policy, the centerpiece of which will be the security alliance with the United States. Second, North Korea under Kim Jong-un is different from the North Korea that his father Kim Jong-il led a decade ago. Despite Moon's stated desire during the campaign to cultivate dialogue and renew economic relations with Pyongyang, North Korean missile tests—conducted only four days after Moon's election—served as a wake-up call. North Korea long ago abandoned denuclearization

negotiations and has rebuffed early Moon administration efforts to reopen non governmental exchanges. North Korea under Kim Jong-un has appointed military leaders focused on subversion to handle relations with South Korea and has shown little interest in dialogue.

## 2. The U.S. wouldn't do this; it goes against its core principles

Vu 16 Khang Vu, 8-16-2016, "Mutually Assured Benefit: Why America Must Stay in Korea," National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-america-gains-staying-south-korea-17375?page=2//DF>

Nonetheless, **such a unilateral act would be at odds with Washington's nonproliferation policy, and poses more difficulties for Washington** to persuade Pyongyang to give up its nuclear arsenal. As a result, the United States responded by deploying its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system in South Korea, to alleviate its ally's fear of being attacked by North Korean missiles and thereby impede South Korea's nuclear ambitions. **If Washington were to withdraw its troops or signal to reduce its presence, it would have to deal with a potentially more independent and nuclear-armed South Korea. America knows this well thanks to its experience of the Park Chung-hee–Jimmy Carter crisis in the late 1970s. This crisis started when the U.S. president attempted to pull out American armed forces without proper consultations with South Korea, and Seoul launched its nuclear program to make up for the loss of American protection.** South Korea's nuclear bid only ended after the United States reassured its military support and slowed down its troop withdrawal. This lesson should serve as a reminder that Washington will not be able to withdraw troops without negative repercussions.

## Impact Defense – R/T Pullout Bad

### Impact Mitigation: Troop withdrawal does not affect South Korea (Mize - U.S. Army War College).

Colonel Tommy R. Mize (U.S. Army War College). "U.S. Troops Stationed in South Korea, Anachronistic?" 2012. <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a562829.pdf>

on 27 July, 1953. On 1 October, 1953, the U.S. and South Korea entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). This treaty states that if either country is attacked by a third country, the U.S. and South Korea will act together to defend one another. 10 In support of this treaty, the U.S. has continued to station military forces in South Korea for the past 60 years. **The number of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea has steadily decreased as the capacity of the South Korean military to defend its country has increased. During the late 1950s and 1960s, U.S. troop levels in South Korea hovered around 60,000. 11 In 1971 the United States reduced the number of U.S. forces in South Korea by approximately 1/3 (withdrawing 20,000 of the 62,000 then stationed there). This reduction (made despite Seoul's protest) was the result of the „Nixon Doctrine“ calling for America's Asian allies to provide for more of their own defense. 12 Minor reductions in the number of U.S. forces stationed in South Korea continued during the Carter, George H. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush administrations. The last significant reduction took place when the 2nd Brigade Combat Team from the 2nd Infantry Division deployed from Korea to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom in August 2004. A year later, the BCT redeployed to the United States rather than return to South Korea. 13 Today there are approximately 28,500 United States service members stationed in South Korea serving alongside 650,000 South Korean military troops. 14 These troops provide a tripwire and serve as an “unequivocal symbol of the U.S. defense commitment” 15 to South Korea. Questioning the Continued Stationing of Troops in South Korea. The debate over whether or not it is in the best interests of the U.S. to station forces in South Korea has been going on for many years, even before the end of the Cold War. In addition to the aforementioned Nixon Doctrine released in 1971, soon after taking office in 1977, President Carter announced his desire to significantly reduce and ultimately eliminate the U.S. footprint in South Korea. Despite his stated intention, he did not do so because of increased concerns about the North Korean threat after the discovery of tunnels under the Demilitarized Zone. 16 The end of the Cold War caused the U.S. to again reexamine its commitment to forward deploy U.S. forces in South Korea. The administrations of George H. Bush and Bill Clinton desired to reduce U.S. forces in South Korea, but decided against doing so because of increased anxiety over North Korea's nuclear weapons program. 17 Most recently, President George W. Bush announced in August 2004 his plan to withdraw 70,000 military personnel from Germany and South Korea, stating “The world has changed a great deal and our posture must change with it.” 18 **The continued stationing of U.S. forces in South Korea after the conclusion of the Cold War has been called an anachronistic commitment by some. In addition to the demise of****

**the Soviet Union, it is argued that South Korea is no longer in a position where it requires U.S. forces to deter or defend itself from an attack by North Korea. While North Korea still maintains a large military, it is one equipped with weapon systems developed in the 1950s and 1960s. The ROK military, on the other hand, possesses modern weapon systems and is superior to the North Korean military in readiness, command and control systems, and training.** Furthermore, South Korea's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ranks 12 th in the world and is 40 times greater than that

## Impact Turn – Pullout Good

### **1. TURN: Removing US troops solves for the threat (Bandow - The Hill).**

Doug Bandow (The Hill). Worried about war with North Korea? Withdraw from South Korea — seriously. Published 5/2/17.

<http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/foreign-policy/331578-worried-about-war-with-north-korea-withdraw-from-south>.

And even so, U.S. casualties likely would be very high, as American forces rushed in to stop a North Korean invasion backed by biological, chemical, and perhaps nuclear weapons. Overall casualty estimates start in the tens of thousands and race skyward. To trigger the war which the U.S. has spent 64 years attempting to prevent would be extraordinarily foolish. Especially since **there is a very easy way to remove the North Korean target** from American cities. **Withdraw U.S. troops from the Republic of Korea.**

Washington policymakers [are] horrified by the thought that Pyongyang might be able to target America ignore the fact that the U.S. was vulnerable to Soviet attack for most of the Cold War. Eventually China added a rudimentary capability to do so as well. Yet leaders as foul as Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong did not strike America. They didn't want to die or destroy their societies. Attacking the U.S. would have resulted in horrific retaliation. Mutual Assured Destruction is an ugly doctrine, but it worked for decades to keep the peace. Nevertheless, there seems to be a common presumption that 33-year-old North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is irrational, even crazy. He is evil, but that doesn't make him suicidal: he, like his father and grandfather, prefers his virgins in this world.

### **2. TURN: The root cause of NK aggression is U.S. troops stationed in South Korea.**

Jonathan Kaiman (The LA Times). Here's what's driving North Korea's nuclear program — and it might be more than self-defense. Published 5/1/17. <http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-north-korea-missile-worship-2017-story.html>.

One longtime analyst of the secretive country's murky ideology says **it's become clear that North Korea's rulers have come to consider nuclear capability not just a means of defense, but the only way of achieving their most important goal: to rid South Korea of U.S. troops**, and reunite the Korean peninsula on their own terms. "North Korea is a radical nationalist state and it's committed to anything that anybody in North Korea's position would be — which is the reunification of the [Korean] race, and the reunification of the homeland," said B.R. Myers, a professor at Dongseo University in South Korea who has spent years studying North Korean propaganda and ideology. Tensions on the Korean peninsula are at their highest point in years. North Korea has conducted five nuclear tests since 2006, and could soon conduct its sixth. Its missile tests have become routine, including another attempted launch Friday. The U.S., in response to North Korean tests and threats, has diverted an aircraft carrier strike group to the Korean peninsula. North Korea, meanwhile, has responded with a massive artillery exercise and warnings of imminent nuclear war. Why is this happening? The North's strategic calculus hasn't changed in decades, Myers said. In 1994, President Clinton contemplated a preemptive strike on the North's nuclear weapons program — yet he balked in the face of the potential fallout: North Korea has a devastating array of artillery aimed at Seoul, which sits 35 miles south of the countries' heavily militarized border, and if a conflict were to erupt, hundreds of thousands of South Koreans could be killed within an hour. Now, Kim Jong Un, the country's current leader, has accelerated efforts to enable a strike not just on Seoul, but on the U.S. The only logical answer is that it's pursuing something greater than mere security — and there's only one logical conclusion as to what that is. — B.R. Myers, professor at Dongseo University in South Korea "Why is it doing the one thing that could cause the U.S. to strike North Korea, even at the risk of South Korean fatalities?" Myers said. "The only logical answer is that it's pursuing something greater than mere security — and there's only one logical conclusion as to what that is." **North Korea has been demanding the removal of U.S. troops from South Korea since the Korean War, which ended with an armistice in 1953.** In December 1955, Kim Il Sung, the country's founder-president and Kim Jong Un's grandfather, said in a speech that "peaceful unification" was the ideal option, and could come about when "we grow stronger" and the "forces of peace, democracy and socialism become more powerful." If that fails, "the problem of reunification might also be solved by war," he said.

### **3. Diplomacy: The only way the North Korea would negotiate is if there is no US presence in the region. Joshua Berlinger from CNN reports**

Joshua Berlinger "No reply yet from North Korea on offer of talks, South Korea says." *CNN*. 20 Jul. 2017. Web. 21 Jul. 2017.  
<<http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/20/asia/north-korea-talks-south-korea/index.html>>

But it's unclear exactly how the Moon administration plans to get North Korea to give up its nukes. **Pyongyang has long insisted that its nuclear weapons are here to stay, as North Korea believes its ability to use nukes against the United States is the key to preventing any American-led efforts at regime change.**

"Unless a fundamental end is put to the US hostile policy toward the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's official name) and the nuclear threat to it, the DPRK will never put the nuke and ballistic rocket on the negotiating table," state-run KCNA said in a commentary the day after the July 4 ICBM launch.

Greg Price (Newsweek). "U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN ASIA: TROOPS STATIONED IN JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA AND BEYOND." 4/26/17.  
<http://www.newsweek.com/us-military-japan-north-korea-asia-590278>

President Donald Trump could have avoided the curious questions after declaring an armada was heading to the Korean Peninsula by just not making the statement in the first place and pointing to more than a half-century of history instead. The reason? **The United States military, across all four service branches, has maintained a massive presence in Southeast Asia, and in particular Japan and South Korea**, in the decades that have followed World War II. Trump made global waves when he said in a recent interview that an armada, led by the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier, was on its way to deter North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and his regime's threats to not only continue testing nuclear and missile defense systems but also to obliterate the U.S. and its allies in the increasingly volatile region. The ship was actually heading in the opposite direction at the time of Trump's comments but is expected to reach the peninsula in the next few days, according to media reports. Yet, **one of the reasons Kim has routinely accused the U.S. and the South of attempting to overthrow his government has sat some 600 miles to the east of the peninsula. By the end of last year, a little more than 39,000 troops were stationed in Japan, with the Marine Corps representing roughly a third of that force at 13,724 personnel, according to the most recent data released by the Department of Defense. That's by far the largest force stationed overseas among the entire U.S. military, with Germany next up at more than 34,000 troops, followed by South Korea at nearly 23,500 troops. The force is spread out across a number of Japan's islands, with a heavy concentration on the island of Okinawa, and the U.S. Forces Headquarters at Yokota Air Base outside western Tokyo serves as the primary hub. Altogether, the headquarters has about 54,000 military personnel and also includes 25,000 Japanese workers.** As the graphic above shows, the U.S., since Japan has not been allowed to create a traditional military after its defeat in World War II, has set up naval and air bases to the north and south of Japan. **Altogether, the Army has two bases, the Marine Corps two (though Camp S D Butler is technically broken down and spread across Okinawa into a number of bases including the controversial Futenma), three for the Navy and three for the Air Force, with the 18th Wing and 35th Fighter Wing also based there. Along with that balanced bevy of troops, ships and aircraft, South Korea also has a heavy U.S. military presence. Four Army, one Navy and three other Air Force installations have long served as deterrents to the North in the years following the Korean War. The U.S also has installations in Singapore and Guam.**

#### **4. TURN: Withdrawal key to NK denuclearization (Pollack - Asia-Pacific Studies Group).**

Pollack (professor of Asian and Pacific Studies and chairman of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group at the Naval War College). "Kim Jong-il's Clenched Fist." October, 2009. [https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy\\_files/files/publication/twq09octoberpollack.pdf](https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/twq09octoberpollack.pdf)  
Pyongyang characterized the North's 2006 test and its accumulation of weaponized plutonium as a fundamental strategic turning point that diminished the importance the DPRK had previously attached to diplomatic relations with the United States.<sup>28</sup> According to senior North Korean diplomats, **"the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" would require the United States to disengage from its security commitments in Northeast Asia, remove its nuclear umbrella from South Korea, withdraw U.S. military forces from the peninsula, and develop a U.S.—DPRK "strategic**

**relationship” paralleling the U.S.—ROK alliance. North Korean officials also asserted that normalization, presumably entailing a peace agreement to supplant the armistice accords of July 1953, would have to precede denuclearization. Moreover, dismantlement and final verification would not be possible unless and until the United States again provided the light water reactors initially pledged under the now defunct Agreed Framework.**

## R/T Trilateral Cooperation

### Uniqueness

#### **1. Nonunique: South Korea, Japan ink intelligence-sharing pact on North Korea threat (Johnson - Japan Times).**

Jesse Johnson (Japan Times). “South Korea, Japan ink intelligence-sharing pact on North Korea threat.” November 23, 2016.

<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/11/23/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/south-korea-japan-ink-intelligence-sharing-pact-north-korea-threat/#.WV48vRPvY-Y>

**Japan and South Korea formally signed an agreement Wednesday to share military intelligence on North Korea amid Pyongyang’s ramped-up nuclear and missile programs** and a swirling influence-peddling scandal

threatening to oust South Korean President Park Geun-hye. The contentious pact, known as the **general security of military information agreement (GSOMIA)**, comes despite growing momentum that could see Park impeached. The final deal was also reached less than a month after talks resumed following a four-year suspension. South Korean Defense Minister Han Min-koo and Japan’s ambassador to the South, Yasumasa Nagamine, inked the agreement in Seoul, according to the South Korean Defense Ministry.

**“Cooperation between Japan and South Korea is becoming more important than ever in the security sphere as North Korea’s nuclear (development) and missiles pose a different level of threat from before,”** public broadcaster NHK quoted Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida as telling reporters in Miyagi Prefecture. **“Signing of the pact has a very important significance.”** **The South’s Defense Ministry called the agreement**

**“necessary,” considering Pyongyang’s nuclear saber-rattling and improvements in its atomic and missile programs.** The North has conducted two nuclear tests and more than 20 missile launches this year, including some that fell

within Japanese territorial waters. **“Since we can now utilize Japan’s intelligence capability to effectively deal with North Korea’s escalating nuclear and missile threats, it will enhance our security interests,”** **the**

**Ministry said in a statement.** In Beijing, Pyongyang’s main backer, the Foreign Ministry said the deal would only add to soaring tensions on the Korean Peninsula. “This will add a new unsafe, unstable element for Northeast Asia,” spokesman Geng Shuang told a daily news briefing. In a twist of fate, the deal was also signed on the sixth anniversary of North Korea’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in South Korea. The attack caused widespread damage and left four South Koreans dead. Having access to Japan’s advanced satellite photos of North Korea, as well as its intelligence on Pyongyang’s growing submarine-launched and ground-launched ballistic missile capabilities, are likely to provide a large boost to Seoul’s own defense abilities — including potentially preventing attacks similar to the one on Yeonpyeong Island. Bong Young-shik, of the Yonsei University Institute for North Korean Studies, said the agreement would play to both countries’ strengths. “Signing GSOMIA will help combine human sources — South Korea’s strength — and surveillance — Japan’s strength, as the only country that monitors North Korea 24 hours,” Bong said. Both Asian powers currently go through Washington when sharing defense intelligence under a deal inked in 2014. But once the new one-year pact, which is automatically renewed annually, enters into effect, the two U.S. allies will be able to directly share information. “If we can obtain military information on Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs both from the U.S. and Japan, it will greatly strengthen our ability to counter the North’s provocations,” the Yonhap news agency quoted a Defense Ministry official as saying Wednesday. **Japan and**

**South Korea are obliged to keep military information on Pyongyang secret under the pact, without disclosing anything to a third party, the official added.** Frosty ties between Seoul and Tokyo began thawing late last year,

when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Park announced a formal agreement to settle the dispute over so-called comfort women who were forced to provide sex at Japanese military brothels before and during World War II. But despite the warming ties, the intelligence-sharing pact had faced a number of obstacles, including a wary South Korean public that remains cool toward any military agreement with Tokyo. Japan

colonized the Korean Peninsula from 1910-45, and Seoul has accused it of attempting to whitewash this history and other past aggressions. South Korean opposition forces have also lashed out at the deal, calling it “a rush job” that failed to take into account public opinion, with three parties threatening to submit a joint motion to dismiss the defense minister. Critics in the opposition have described the pact as a distraction by the Park administration as scores of protesters have poured into the South Korean capital over the last month to demand that she step down for her alleged role in a corruption scandal. But Yonsei University’s Bong predicted the deal’s timing would work out well for Park and her administration. “(The) timing of signing GSOMIA is, paradoxically, good,” Bong said, noting that the other scandal enveloping Park had provided some cover for the controversial deal. “The opposition parties did not want to allow the Blue House to frame it as the administrative branch responsibly dealing with national security and urgent threats from North Korea vs. opposition parties that are mainly interested in pressuring President Park and riding on anti-Japanese sentiment.”

## **2. Nonunique: Japan and South Korea have good relations and cooperate and work together to fight North Korean aggression (Reuters)**

NA (Reuters). “South Korea, Japan agree intelligence-sharing on North Korea threat” November 23, 2016.

<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-japan-military-idUSKBN13I068>

**South Korea and Japan signed a military intelligence pact on Wednesday to share sensitive information on the threat posed by North Korea’s missile and nuclear activities, the South’s defense ministry said. The South Korean government went ahead with the deal despite opposition from some political parties and a large section of the public,** who remain bitter over Japan’s actions during its colonial rule of Korea from 1910 until the end of World War Two. The signing of the General Security of Military Information Agreement had originally been expected in 2012, but South Korea postponed it due to the domestic opposition. The case for the neighbors to pool intelligence has increased, however, as North Korea has been testing different types of missiles at a faster rate, and claims it has the capability to mount a nuclear warhead on a missile. “Cooperation between Japan and South Korea is becoming more important than ever in the security sphere as North Korea’s nuclear (development) and missiles pose a different level of threat from before,” public broadcaster NHK quoted Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida as telling reporters in Miyagi Prefecture, northeastern Japan. “Signing of the pact has a very important significance.” In Beijing, which is North Korea’s most important supporter despite Chinese anger at its missile and nuclear tests, the foreign ministry said the agreement would add to tensions on the Korean peninsula. “This will add a new unsafe, unstable element for northeast Asia,” ministry spokesman Geng Shuang told a daily news briefing. South Korea’s Defence Minister Han Min-ko and Japan’s ambassador to the South, Yasumasa Nagamine, inked the agreement in Seoul, according to the South Korean defense ministry. A survey by Gallup Korea on Friday showed that 59 percent of 1,007 respondents opposed the agreement between the two countries. Many of protesters demanding President Park Geun-hye to resign over a influence-peddling scandal also insisted Park withdraw the military information sharing agreement with Tokyo. A defense ministry official said South Korea now has deals with 33 countries, including the United States and Russia, on military intelligence sharing. (Reporting by Ju-min Park; Additional reporting by Ben Blanchard in Beijing and Tetsushi Kajimoto in Tokyo; Editing by Simon Cameron-Moore)

## **3. Nonunique: Japan-SK relations doesn’t affect their cooperation (Jee-eun - VOA News)**

Lee Jee-eun (VOA News). “South Korea-Japan Row Could Hurt Cooperation on North Korea.” January 18, 2017.

<https://www.voanews.com/a/south-korea-japan-row-could-hurt-cooperation-on-north-korea/3681880.html>

**“Regardless of how good or how bad the relationship between Japan and South Korea is over history-related issues, I think that there is a realization in both Tokyo and Seoul as well as Washington that there’s a need for coordination toward North Korea,” Snyder said. J. Berkshire Miller, international affairs fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations based in Tokyo, also expected the two countries to try to “quarantine trilateral security cooperation as a separate track” from the bilateral ties.** Auslin said the issue should be a priority of the incoming U.S. administration, suggesting the Trump administration “push and nudge” Japan and South Korea to put the wartime history issues behind them and establish better relations.

R/T – IL Trade

**Trump’s trade deals aren’t in SK’s interests, they’re in the US’**

**Jennings 17** Ralph Jennings, 7-8-2017, "After 6 Months In Office, Trump Finally Shows Signs Of An Asian Foreign Policy," Forbes, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphiennings/2017/07/17/they-say-trump-has-no-asia-policy-here-it-is/#2070d1707b01> //DF

**Trump made few friends in Asia by backing out of the [TPP]** 12-nation Trans Pacific Partnership trade deal in his first week in office. Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam had signed it and were looking forward to lower tariffs on exports to the United States. **Trump says he's open only to one-on-one trade deals, if they help U.S. workers and business.** The United States and Japan started talking about a deal in April, and two months later **Trump said his government would renegotiate a deal with South Korea in view of a \$17 billion trade surplus favoring Seoul.**

## R/T Increases leverage/Diplomacy

**1. It's not used as leverage. According to Daniel Russel, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs and among the most knowledgeable about US East Asian diplomacy, THAAD is not used as a bargaining chip.**

Guy Taylor. "THAAD missile shield to South Korea gives Donald Trump advantage over ." *The Washington Times*. 8 Mar 2017 Web. 16 Aug. 2017. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/8/thaad-missile-shield-to-south-korea-gives-donald-t/>

Washington insists that THAAD is defensive only. But Beijing argues that it contains "X-band" radar capable of reaching well beyond the Korean Peninsula and into China to target and spy on Chinese military assets. During negotiations toward the system's deployment in February, **Daniel Russel, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, rejected the notion that THAAD was being used as leverage in U.S.-Chinese talks on North Korea. "THAAD is not a diplomatic bargaining chip,"** Mr. Russel said at the time.

## Link Turn – R/T China

**1. Turn: THAAD makes China really angry because it doesn't like the US in its backyard. As a result, it becomes less likely to negotiate. This refusal to negotiate has already panned out:**

**Daniels 17** Jeff Daniels, 6-29-2017, "China talks with South Korea, Japan a no-go due to THAAD controversy," CNBC, <http://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/29/china-talks-with-south-korea-japan-a-no-go-due-to-thaad.html> //DF

**China has called off plans for** top-level talks **with South Korea and Japan**, according to reports. The trilateral summit was expected to take place in late July. Beijing notified Tokyo that that time won't work, although the controversy over the U.S.-supplied **THAAD** missile shield system **appears to be the main reason**, according to Japan's Asahi Shimbun. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had been expected to host the summit. **China has put economic pressure on Seoul to abandon the** Terminal High Altitude Area Defense **system**, designed to defeat nuclear-armed North Korean missiles. The Chinese are concerned THAAD's powerful radar gives the U.S. and South Korea the ability to peer deep inside China to monitor military activities. The last time the leaders of China, South Korea and Japan met for three-way talks was in 2012. There's a chance the meeting could be rescheduled for early 2018. **The talks would have marked an opportunity for** newly elected South Korean **President Moon Jae-in to** meet face to face with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and **begin repairing fractured ties with China, its largest trading partner.** Moon is currently in Washington for talks with President Donald Trump to discuss North Korea, THAAD and U.S.-South Korea trade issues.

**2. Turn: China doesn't respond to THAAD by curtailing, they respond with strength. That's why they've responded with incredibly strict sanctions, which Mody in 2017 has deemed:**

Seema Mody. "China Lashes out as South Korea Puts an American Anti-missile System in Place." CNBC. CNBC, 28 Apr. 2017. Web. 26 June 2017. <http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/17/thaad-anti-missile-system-makes-china-lash-out-at-south-korea.html>.

U.S. officials insist the system has nothing to do with China and point out that it is not an offensive weapon. "THAAD is a purely defensive system designed to counter short- and medium-range regional ballistic missiles. It will not undermine China's or Russia's strategic deterrent," said U.S. Navy Commander Gary Ross. Experts on the region, including former U.S. Ambassador Thomas Hubbard, and Richard Weitz, director of the Hudson Institute's Center for Political-Military Analysis, told CNBC that a warming trend between South Korea and China was put to an end



by the THAAD issue. China is South Korea's largest trading partner. "China has already engaged in **one of its most assertive influence campaigns in recent history to prevent the THAAD deployment**, encompassing **threatening leadership speeches, alarming media commentary, and** most recently **coercive economic pressure** that has included **government-sanctioned trade boycotts**," Weitz said.

### **In fact, Thaad is literally breaking relations**

**Mullany 17** Gerry Mullany and Chris Buckley, 3-7-2017, "China Warns of Arms Race After U.S. Deploys Missile Defense in South Korea," New York Times, [https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/world/asia/thaad-missile-defense-us-south-korea-china.html?\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/world/asia/thaad-missile-defense-us-south-korea-china.html?_r=0) //DF

For days, **the official Chinese news media has warned that deployment of Thaad could lead to a “defacto” break in relations with South Korea** and urged consumers to boycott South Korean products. The Chinese authorities recently forced the closing of 23 stores owned by Lotte, a South Korean conglomerate that agreed to turn over land that it owned for use in the Thaad deployment, and hundreds of Chinese protested at Lotte stores over the weekend, some holding banners that read, “Get out of China.”

## Impact – R/T Decreasing Tensions

### **1. Talks to decrease tensions always fail because Kim’s survival relies on him constantly provoking the south and the US. (Beauchamp – Vox)**

Zach Beauchamp (Vox). North Korea isn't crazy. It's insecure, poor, and extremely dangerous. Published 7/5/17.

<https://www.vox.com/world/2017/7/5/15922446/north-korea-nuclear-war-casualties>.

Nor is the North secure from military attack. While its army is extremely large personnel-wise, with about 1.2 million soldiers, it uses antiquated Cold War technology while its neighbors to the South are equipped with top-of-line modern gear. Moreover, the presence of 23,500 US troops in South Korea means any war between North and South Korea would draw in the world's only superpower, though with potentially enormous American casualties. **Facing the twin dangers of domestic instability and foreign attack, the North has devised a strategy for survival that depends** (somewhat counterintuitively) **on provoking the South and the United States. The North** will do something that it knows will infuriate its enemies, like testing an intercontinental ballistic missile or shelling a South Korean military base. This limit-pushing behavior is designed to show that **the North is willing to escalate aggressively in the event of any kind of action from Washington or Seoul that threatens the regime**, thus deterring them from making even the slightest move to undermine the Kim regime. It also sends a signal to the North Korean people that they're constantly under threat from foreign invasions, and that they need to support their government unconditionally to survive as a nation. **The problem is that this strategy is inherently unstable. There's always a risk that one of these manufactured crises spirals out of control, leading to a conflict that no one really wants. This is especially risky because the North Korean government is deeply insular: Washington doesn't have the kind of direct line of communication with the North that it had with the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, which was vital in preventing standoffs like the Cuban Missile Crisis from escalating.** Maybe the Trump administration responds too aggressively to a provocation, prompting North Korean retaliation. Maybe North Korea thinks it's about to be invaded by the South, leading it to mount a preemptive strike. Maybe South Korea misreads the North's signals and thinks it is about to launch a war, causing the South to do something wild like try to assassinate Kim Jong Un. That isn't totally hypothetical: Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies and a noted North Korean expert, thinks killing Kim is a real option that the South is considering if it thinks war is likely (mainly to head off a nuclear strike before it starts).

### **This explains why North Korea hasn't responded to South Korea's attempts to talk.**

**Kim 17** Kim Myong-Song, 8-2-2017, "N.Korea Silent on Seoul's Talks Proposals," Chosun Ilbo,

[http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html\\_dir/2017/08/02/2017080201430.html](http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/08/02/2017080201430.html) //DF

**North Korea never responded to Seoul's proposals for military talks** on July 21 and Red Cross talks on Aug. 1, **making it increasingly clear that it wants to freeze South Korea out of any negotiations on its nuclear and missile programs.** A Unification Ministry spokesman told reporters on Tuesday the North "hasn't made any response to the offers yet." "Seoul will continue to make multifaceted efforts to solve humanitarian issues" like the reunion of families separated by the Korean War "and to ease

military tensions along the border area," the spokesman added. "We're not going to be overly optimistic or pessimistic about any response or lack thereof." But some ministry officials are embarrassed that they are being so completely ignored. "We didn't think that the North would meekly accept to our offers, but we hoped that they would make a counterproposal or at least some kind of gesture," one said. Since the Moon administration came into office, Pyongyang has turned down 76 approaches from South Korean civic groups to visit the North. The regime also rejected a proposal from Hyundai Group, its long-term business partner in the South, to visit Mt. Kumgang and hold a memorial service for its late chairman Chung Mong-hun. Hyundai executives went to the resort for the memorial service almost every year. The regime also dismissed President Moon Jae-in's offer to field a unified team in the upcoming Pyeongchang Winter Olympics as "ridiculous."

## **2. Even if diplomacy is somewhat successful, there is no long-term impact. Negotiations have never historically worked**

**Daniels 17** Jeff Daniels, 7-30-2017, "As Trump fumes, experts warn that an answer to the North Korea crisis won't come through China," CNBC,

<https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/30/answer-to-north-korea-standoff-wont-come-through-china-experts-say.html> //DF

Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center, opposes any negotiations at this time. He said South Korea has tried more than 200 agreements, not all nuclear, and those too failed to moderate the secretive regime's behavior. Over a stretch of two decades, Klingner said there's been various multi-party talks with the North Koreans, which have largely gone nowhere. "We need to avoid a premature return to negotiations," said Klingner, a former chief of the CIA's Korea branch.

## Impact – R/T Denuclearization

### **There is no impact. Negotiations have never historically worked**

**Daniels 17** Jeff Daniels, 7-30-2017, "As Trump fumes, experts warn that an answer to the North Korea crisis won't come through China," CNBC,

<https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/30/answer-to-north-korea-standoff-wont-come-through-china-experts-say.html> //DF

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### **This is for two reasons**

#### **1. North Korea sees nukes as too important to give up (Klug - TIME)**

**AP 17** Associated Press, 7-5-2017, "Kim vows North Korea's nukes are not on negotiation table," ABC News,

<http://abcnews.go.com/amp/International/wireStory/kim-vows-north-koreas-nukes-negotiation-table-48444781>

SEOUL, SOUTH KOREA—North Korean leader Kim Jong-un vowed Wednesday his nation will "demonstrate its mettle to the US" and never put its weapons programs up for negotiations, a day after successfully testing its first intercontinental ballistic missile. The hard line suggests that North Korea will conduct more weapons tests until it perfects nuclear-armed missiles capable of striking anywhere in the United States. Analysts say Mr. Kim's government believes nuclear weapons are key to its own survival and could be used to wrest concessions from the US. Tuesday's ICBM launch, confirmed by US and South Korean officials, was a milestone in North Korea's efforts to develop long-range nuclear-armed missiles. But the North isn't there yet, and many analysts say it needs more tests to perfect such an arsenal. Worry spread in Washington and at the United Nations, where the US, Japan, and South Korea requested an emergency UN Security Council session on Wednesday. US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said the US

response would include "stronger measures to hold the DPRK accountable," using the acronym for the nation's formal name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In a show of force, US and South Korean troops fired "deep strike" precision missiles off South Korea's east coast on Wednesday. South Korea's military later released previously shot video showing the test-firing of sophisticated South Korean missiles and a computer-generated image depicting a North Korean flag in flames with the backdrop of a major building in Pyongyang, North Korea's capital. North Korean state media on Wednesday described leader Kim as "feasting his eyes" on the ICBM, which was said to be capable of carrying a large nuclear warhead, before its launch. "With a broad smile on his face," Kim urged his scientists to "frequently send big and small 'gift packages' to the Yankees," it said, an apparent reference to continuing the stream of nuclear and missile tests Kim has ordered since taking power in late 2011. North Korea was also pleased that its test came as Americans celebrated Independence Day. State media said Kim told "scientists and technicians that the US would be displeased to witness the DPRK's strategic option" on its Independence Day. **Kim also said North Korea "would neither put its nukes and ballistic rockets on the table of negotiations in any case nor flinch even an inch from the road of bolstering the nuclear force chosen by itself unless the US hostile policy and nuclear threat to the DPRK are definitely terminated,"** the Korean Central News Agency reported. The missile launch was a direct rebuke to President Trump's earlier declaration on Twitter that such a test "won't happen!" and to South Korea's new president, Moon Jae-in, who was pushing to improve strained ties with the North. South Korea's Defense Ministry said it was unable to verify whether North Korea has mastered re-entry technology for an ICBM. It said North Korea may now conduct a nuclear test with "boosted explosive power" to show off a warhead to be mounted on a missile. The UN Security Council could impose additional sanctions on North Korea, but it's not clear they would stop it from pursuing its nuclear and missile programs since the country is already under multiple rounds of UN sanctions for its previous weapon tests. **"An attempt to curb Kim Jong Un's nuclear and missile ambitions has clearly failed. I think North Korea won't stop its nuclear drive until it feels that it has reached the level that it wants to reach,"** said Lim Eul Chul, a North Korea expert at South Korea's Kyungnam University. "I don't know when North Korea can reach that level. But I would say it's imminent." **There is a consensus among many analysts that Kim's government won't give up its nuclear program because it believes it guarantee its survival from outside threats.** But once it possesses functioning ICBMs, it would also have a stronger bargaining position and might propose talks with the US on reducing those threats, possibly in exchange for freezing but not dismantling some of its nuclear or missile activities, the analysts say.

## **Nukes are Jesus**

**Fifield 17** Anna Fifield, 9-5-2017, "For Kim Jong Un, nuclear weapons are a security blanket. And he wants to keep it.," Washington Post,

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/for-kim-jong-un-nuclear-weapons-are-a-security-blanket-and-he-wants-to-keep-it/2017/09/05/d7b7ecb8-9236-11e7-b9bc-b2f7903bab0d\\_story.html?utm\\_term=.dde3d3d231ba](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/for-kim-jong-un-nuclear-weapons-are-a-security-blanket-and-he-wants-to-keep-it/2017/09/05/d7b7ecb8-9236-11e7-b9bc-b2f7903bab0d_story.html?utm_term=.dde3d3d231ba) //DF

Not only has Kim's regime made quantum leaps at an astonishingly fast pace, but it has done it amid sanctions that were supposed to stop it from getting the parts or the money it needed. Now North Korea can say it is not reliant on anyone for its security and can credibly threaten to retaliate if it comes under attack — unlike Japan and South Korea, which depend on the United States for their defense. "It's a personal triumph for him with the North Korean elite, with the North Korean people. And there will be a lot of world leaders who will be very impressed," Ward said. "Having a working nuclear deterrent turns the leadership from looking like a bunch of incompetent economic managers to being some of the most successful leaders on the continent." But some analysts wonder whether Kim's urgency to become a fully fledged nuclear state belies some uncertainty about the 33-year-old's position at the head of the regime. "The fast pace of the nuclear and missile development may suggest that Kim Jong Un is confident, but it could also signal that he's worried about the future," said Kim Dong-yub, assistant professor at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies and a former South Korean navy commander who participated in military talks with North Korea. "North Korea might think there is a low chance of an American attack for now, but there is no guarantee for the future," Kim said. So the question is no longer how to stop North Korea from getting nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. It is how to persuade it to give up something it has spent so much time and money obtaining. "There are three ways to resolve the North Korean problem," said Lee Soo-hyuck, a former denuclearization negotiator who is now a South Korean lawmaker. "North Korea giving up their nuclear weapons voluntarily, resolving through quid pro quo negotiations, and taking military action," he said. "We all know the first and the last are not realistic options, so negotiation is the only way. We must not forget that." **Can North Korea be persuaded to give up its nuclear weapons? Not absent revolutionary change.** Troy University's Pinkston said. **It's more likely that the pope is going to abandon Jesus Christ."**

## 2. NK sees nukes as essential to their national identity, and will never give them up

**Bolton 17** Derek Bolton [PhD Student International Relations, University of Bath], 2-9-2017, "North Korea's deep sense of national identity is the main obstacle to nuclear negotiations," The Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/north-koreas-deep-sense-of-national-identity-is-the-main-obstacle-to-nuclear-negotiations-72686> //DF

The trouble is, policymakers and analysts have traditionally struggled to account for DPRK foreign policy. It has always been something of a mystery. But a new approach to explaining its past foreign policy might provide useful insights into how best to contend with the country. One such approach is to build a framework around the concept of "ontological security". Ontological security, as explained by psychiatrist R D Laing and sociologist Anthony Giddens, refers to the "security of being". Put simply, in order to feel secure we must possess a stable feeling of self-identity. Our ability to do this is intimately tied to the group to which we belong, providing us with the stability upon which we can build a sense of self. If the foundations of that group are challenged or called into question, then so too is the related sense of self. In North Korea, this largely stemmed from post-colonial nationalism, a response to Japanese occupation and negative interactions with Russia and China during World War II. We have subsequently seen North Korea consistently seeking to uphold a national narrative of extreme independence, unification and non-subservience to great powers. As my ongoing research has found, this has often been done at the expense of its own physical security and economic interests, jeopardising key alliances and undermining access to military and economic support, all while seeking to maintain an aggressive posture against its adversaries. For example, the DPRK repeatedly rejected Chinese military assistance before and during the Korean War. Once China did get involved, the effectiveness of its forces was hindered by North Korean concerns over sovereignty. After the war, subsequent feuds with both China and Russia came at a time North Korea relied on both for its sustenance, again highlighting the priority of national narrative over other interests and considerations. Against this backdrop of behaviour being linked to ontological security, the notion that the international community, or China, can somehow cajole North Korea into making concessions over its nuclear program seems counter intuitive. This is not to say there is no leverage. China is well positioned to crack down on DPRK procurement of the materials and resources required for future progress within its nuclear and ballistic missile weapons program. Should China choose, it also has the capability to put significant pressure on the North Korean economy. But there is little interest from Beijing in seeing the DPRK collapse only for US and South Korean forces to take its place. At best, should China manage to twist North Korea's arm to such an extent their survival depends on change, Pyongyang will undertake the necessary face lift. Whether that change would be lasting or substantial is questionable. North Korea's security interests are now intimately tied to its nuclear weapons program. Perhaps more importantly though, so too are its notions of independence, non-subservience and self-reliance. A failure to account for the DPRK's history when seeking to understand its current interests will lead to misplaced diagnoses and policies. Instead, policymakers need to look to the past in order to understand how we might approach and deal with North Korea in the future. Understanding the North Korean highly protective attitude to its own identity will help us predict DPRK reactions and perhaps shed light on new avenues for engagement. Failure to do so will lead to misunderstanding, and potentially dangerous consequences.

## nR/T No War

### General

We agree with my opponents, war is generally unlikely for all of the reasons they listed. However, they don't interact

## R/T Diplomatic Channels

1. There may be channels, but wars are always a diplomatic breakdown. Historically,
2. In an escalation, diplomacy doesn't become possible because Korean leaders would fear a war coming. They would likely prepare for war with us, not pick up the phone to chat with us.
3. Trump derails every attempt at diplomacy

Kalhan Rosenblatt, 10-2-2017, "Save your energy, Rex': Trump tweet undermines Tillerson on N. Korea talks," NBC News,

<https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/save-your-energy-rex-trump-tweet-undermines-sec-st-ate-tillerson-n806381>

## R/T Tell Your Friends

1. The point of escalation is that it's immediate – North Korea's not going to give us advanced warning to allow us to respond
2. The NK threat is serious and being taken seriously

**Winter 17** Jana Winter, 9-25-2017, "California Is Already Preparing for a North Korean Nuclear Attack," Foreign Policy,

<http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/25/california-is-already-preparing-for-a-north-korean-nuclear-attack/>  
//DF

With U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un trading insults and threatening war, **California officials are taking the threat of nuclear exchange seriously. Noting the heightened North Korean threat, the Los Angeles-area Joint Regional Intelligence Center issued a bulletin last month warning that a nuclear attack on Southern California would be "catastrophic" and urged officials in the region to shore up their nuclear attack response plans.** The report cites North Korea's late July test of an intercontinental ballistic missile that could, in theory, reach the West Coast of the United States. "North Korea's propaganda videos feature ruins of San Francisco and Washington," the document says. The 16-page "Nuclear Attack Response Considerations" bulletin is dated Aug. 16 and marked for "official use only." It was circulated last month to Los Angeles-area local, state, and federal agency personnel and also throughout the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies across the country. The idea behind the unclassified report was to share planning and guidance with as wide a distribution as possible, according to two officials involved in responding to a nuclear strike and who received the bulletin. Many agencies are involved in responding to an attack and are often staffed with personnel without access to classified information.

## R/T Won't Endanger Survival

1. Kim has been paranoid about regime change for his entire rule. He sees taking over the South as the only way to assuage those concerns long-term
2. There is intense domestic pressure for Kim to attack the South. This retains his credibility

# R/T South Korean Nuclearization

## Uniqueness

### **1. Nonunique: President Trump supports other countries, such as SK and Japan, developing nuclear weapons (Miller - The Washington Post).**

Nick Miller (The Washington Post). "Donald Trump thinks more countries should have nuclear weapons. Here's what the research says." April 6, 2016.

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/06/should-more-countries-have-nuclear-weapons-donald-trump-thinks-so/?utm\\_term=.e0369b9e4ff8](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/06/should-more-countries-have-nuclear-weapons-donald-trump-thinks-so/?utm_term=.e0369b9e4ff8)

**According to Donald Trump, the United States should not try so hard to stop nuclear proliferation.** On Sunday night, during a Republican town hall hosted by CNN's Anderson Cooper, **Trump declared that proliferation is "going to happen anyway."** **And just a week earlier, Trump told the New York Times, "If Japan had that nuclear threat, I'm not sure that would be a bad thing for us." Nor would it be so bad, he's said, if South Korea and Saudi Arabia had nuclear weapons, too.** We can break down Trump's assertions into two ideas: Proliferation is inevitable, and it is good for the United States — at least when its allies are the ones going nuclear. What can political science tell us about each of these beliefs? It turns out that both propositions fly in the face of a wide range of recent scholarship. Is nuclear proliferation inevitable? Trump's logic for this idea is based on his belief that the United States is weak and that past proliferation ensures future proliferation. Here's what Trump told the Times about Japan: "If the United States keeps on ... its current path of weakness, [Japan is] going to want to have [nuclear weapons] anyway with or without me discussing it."

### **2. South Korea is already proliferating in the status quo. As of September 5th (Ward- Vox)**

Alex Ward. "South Korea wants the US to station nuclear weapons in the country. That's a bad idea.." *Vox*. 5 Sept. 2017. Web. 5 Sept. 2017. <<https://www.vox.com/world/2017/9/5/16254988/south-korea-nuclear-weapons-north-korea-trump>>

#### **A top South Korean official just floated the idea of having Washington return nuclear weapons to the**

**Korean peninsula** — a provocative idea at a dangerous time. There are just two problems: First, the request came hours after North Korea tested its most powerful bomb to date on September 3. The explosive was around seven times stronger than the one America dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, and experts believe it can level parts of a city. And second, it could worsen relations with China while undermining America's goal of convincing North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons. On Monday, South Korean Defense Minister Song Young-moo noted he talked to US Defense Secretary Jim Mattis about placing American nuclear weapons in the country **for the first time in over 25 years**. He also said South Korea wants "strategic assets" like US aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, and B-52 bombers to deploy to the peninsula more frequently, though not to be permanently housed there. As for the nuclear weapons, a spokesperson for President Moon Jae-in said his government doesn't want those bombs permanently in the country. So this is currently more of a proposal than a policy announcement. But the idea of sending American nuclear weapons to South Korea is now out there — and it's not so farfetched. The US had around 100 nuclear weapons in the country until September 27, 1991, when President George H.W. Bush announced he wanted to take them out. It was part of his initiative to remove and destroy all US nuclear weapons deployed in important regions, including Northeast Asia.

**[Moon said] "We cannot rely only on our ally for our security,"** Moon said in a nationally televised speech on August 15. "When it comes to matters related to the Korean Peninsula, our country has to take the initiative in resolving them." And he's made moves to do just that. **On Monday, Moon told Trump that South Korea wants to build a nuclear submarine. Seoul also wants to increase the payload on its missiles so it can do more damage, and it will also temporarily deploy four THAAD missile-defense systems that it bought from the US,** Reuters reports.

And this morning, it looks like **Trump agreed to sell more military equipment to South Korea (and Japan) to defend itself.**

## IL – R/T Domestic Support

### 1. No internal link: no Moon support

**Hancocks 17** Paula Hancocks and James Griffiths, Cnn, 9-14-2017, "No nuclear weapons in South Korea, says President Moon," CNN,

<http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/14/asia/south-korea-moon-nuclear/index.html> //DF

**South Korean President Moon Jae-in has dismissed the possibility of deploying nuclear weapons in his country, warning it could "lead to a nuclear arms race in northeast Asia."** "I do not agree that South Korea needs to develop our own nuclear weapons or relocate tactical nuclear weapons in the face of North Korea's nuclear threat," he told CNN Thursday in his first televised interview since North Korea's sixth nuclear test. Though he was not supportive of deploying or pursuing nuclear weapons, Moon said South Korea "needs to develop our military capabilities in the face of North Korea's nuclear advancement." Earlier this month, South Korea's defense minister suggested it was worth reviewing the redeployment of US tactical nuclear weapons on the Peninsula in order to deter threats from the North, something conservative US Senator John McCain said should be "seriously considered." A recent Gallup Korea poll found 60% of respondents were in favor of South Korea having its own nuclear weapons, with 35% opposed.

### 2. Lots of internal pressure not to nuclearize (Jang - Harvard University)

Se Young Jang, 5/4/2016 (associate of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, "Will America's Asian Allies Go Nuclear?" <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-americas-asian-allies-go-nuclear-16055>

With the already existing international and bilateral pressure, **another key driver discouraging the ROK and Japanese governments from going nuclear will be domestic pressure in the form of either elections or organized public movements. Korea's recent legislative elections have interesting implications in this regard. One of the reasons that had led some lawmakers from the ruling conservative party to express their pro-nuclear opinion in public early this year was their confidence in victory in the April 2016 election.**

As President Park Geun-hye and her ruling party had high approval ratings and were expected to overwhelmingly win the legislative election, they were less prudent than usual on such a controversial issue as nuclear armament.

## IL – R/T Destroys NPT

### 1. Delink: The NPT is resilient—no cascade of proliferation even if it becomes less credible (Horovitz - CSC)

Liviu Horovitz, 2014 (Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich), JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, Beyond Pessimism: Why the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Will Not Collapse, 2014. Retrieved Apr. 29, 2016 from [https://www.academia.edu/7795260/Beyond\\_Pessimism\\_Why\\_the\\_NPT\\_Will\\_Not\\_Collapse\\_Journal\\_of\\_Strategic\\_Studies\\_2015\\_38\\_1-2\\_126-158](https://www.academia.edu/7795260/Beyond_Pessimism_Why_the_NPT_Will_Not_Collapse_Journal_of_Strategic_Studies_2015_38_1-2_126-158)

Thus, **there is very little evidence that any additional proliferation would somehow cause the NPT's members to become disillusioned with the agreement, consider the treaty's reputation destroyed,** its normative binding flawed, believe nuclear acquisition to be the 'appropriate behaviour', **and start forswearing their membership. The domestic influence of NPT noncompliance also seems overrated.** Interested bureaucracies might be able to use a neighbour's or foe's noncompliance or withdrawal to aid their case. However, the governance model proposed by recent would-be proliferators does not seem very appealing to either policy-makers or publics. Thus, **it is no surprise that emulation of Iraq, Libya, or North Korea is very limited. To the contrary, the detection of further proliferation seems to help generate the consensus to strengthen the NPT regime's constraints:** for example, it was the discovery of Iraq's clandestine programme that spawned the design of enhanced safeguards instruments.<sup>70</sup>

## IL – R/T Proliferation

### 1. The threat of proliferation is way overestimated (Carpenter - Cato Institute)

Carpenter 2007, VP of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies @ Cato

[Ted Galen Carpenter (Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute) "Toward a Grand Bargain with Iran" Mediterranean Quarterly 18:1, 2007, p. 12-27]

Finally, those who favor a more confrontational policy toward Iran warn that if Tehran succeeds in its quest for nuclear weapons, other nations in the region will quickly do the same, creating an especially dangerous security environment. As in the case of concerns about possible blackmail, this fear has some validity. Because of the uncertain reliability of the protection afforded by the US umbrella for some US allies and client states in the Middle East, there is a very real prospect that if Iran develops a nuclear arsenal, sooner or later such countries as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey might follow suit. Indeed, Egypt may already be thinking along those lines. In late September, Gamal Mubarak, President Hosni Mubarak's son and political heir apparent, stated that his country needed to develop a nuclear program for power generation.<sup>19</sup> Although he stressed that the program would be entirely peaceful, his proposal had all the earmarks of a hedging strategy. As we have seen with India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran, "peaceful" nuclear programs can easily become the foundation for a nuclear weapons program. **Whether additional proliferation would reach epidemic proportions and create the nightmare scenarios forecast by some analysts is uncertain.** It is important to recall that **pundits and even international relations experts have tended to overestimate both the probability and the extent of proliferation in the past. The conventional wisdom in the 1960s was that there would be as many as two dozen nuclear weapons powers within a generation.**<sup>20</sup> Similar predictions took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s.<sup>21</sup> [End Page 22]

## Impact Defense – R/T Prolif=War

### Impact defense: Prolif doesn't cause war (Waltz - UC Berkeley)

Waltz 2007 (Kenneth, Professor – UC Berkeley, "A Nuclear Iran", Journal of International Affairs, 3-22, Lexis)

First, nuclear **proliferation is not a problem** because nuclear weapons have not proliferated. "Proliferation" means to spread like wildfire. We have had nuclear military capability for over fifty years, and we have a total of nine militarily capable nuclear states. That's hardly proliferation; that is, indeed, glacial spread. If another country gets nuclear weapons, and if it does so for good reasons, then that isn't an object of great worry. Every once in a while, some prominent person says something that's obviously true. Recently, Jacques Chirac [president of France] said that if Iran had one or two nuclear weapons, it would not pose a danger. Well, he was right. Of course, he had to quickly retract it and say, "Oh no, that slipped out, I didn't know the microphone was on!" Second, **it doesn't matter who has nuclear weapons.** Conversely, the spread of conventional weapons makes a great deal of difference. For instance, if a Hitler-type begins to establish conventional superiority, it becomes very difficult to contain and deter him. But, **with nuclear weapons, it's been proven without exception that whoever gets nuclear weapons behaves with caution and moderation. Every country**--whether they are countries we trust and think of as being highly responsible, like Britain, or countries that we distrust greatly, and for very good reasons, like China during the Cultural Revolution **behaves with such caution.** It is now fashionable for political scientists to test hypotheses. Well, I have one: **If a country has nuclear weapons, it will not be attacked** militarily in ways that threaten its manifestly vital interests. **That is 100 percent true, without exception, over a period of more than fifty years.** Pretty impressive.



# R/T Japan Nuclearization

## IL – R/T Capabilities

### **Japan has little access to the material to build nukes and nuclear scientists are opposed to military work (Wirtz- Stanford- 2012)**

James J. Wirtz (Stanford University) "Over the Horizon Proliferation Threats" **2012**

The 2006 study also suggested that any Japanese effort to construct a nuclear weapon would confront several challenges. First, given that **a fairly limited domestic reserve of natural uranium exists in Japan**, it would be vulnerable to an embargo of fissile materials that could jeopardize any nuclear weapons program. Second, the Japanese scientific and academic communities tend to be populated by pacifists, despite the country's general shift toward becoming a "normal country." **A majority of the Japanese universities and academic societies still embrace the principle of avoiding involvement in military-related research.** Third, selecting the location for nuclear weapon production facilities would surely be a painstaking process for any Japanese government. The political power of local governments is expanding relative to the national government. Even the selection of a location for a radioactive waste storage site has been stalled for several decades. Local activism has been energized following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accidents.

## Impact Turn

### **1. Threat of Japanese nuclearization spurs increased Chinese sanctions on North Korea**

Doug Bandow, 2-18-**2016**, "Why Not a South Korean Nuke?," National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/why-not-south-korean-nuke-15245>

While America's overwhelming nuclear arsenal should deter anyone else from using nukes, conflicts do not always evolve rationally. If Washington's nuclear commitment is triggered, even inadvertently, the United States would find itself wandering down a completely unexpected and dangerous path. South Korea and Japan are important international partners, but their protection is not worth creating an unnecessary existential threat to the American homeland. Indeed, the potential price of initiating nuclear war actually reduces the credibility of Washington's commitment and thus its deterrent value. Better to create a balance of power in which the United States is not a target if nukes start falling. That would be achieved by independent South Korean and Japanese nuclear deterrents. Such a prospect would antagonize, perhaps even convulse, China. But then, such an arsenal would deter the People's Republic of China as well as DPRK—which also would serve American interests. Moreover, the mere threat of spreading nuclear weapons might end up solving the problem. That is, **when faced with the prospect of Japanese and South Korean nuclear weapons, China might come to see the wisdom of applying greater pressure on the North—most importantly, cutting off energy and food shipments.** The U.S.-ROK discussions over THAAD appeared to touch a nerve in Beijing, and Xi Jinping's government indicated its willingness support a UN resolution imposing more pain on the North for its latest nuclear launch. That declaration might end up being mostly for show, but maybe not. And the prospect of having two more nuclear neighbors would concentrate minds in Zhongnanhai. Abandoning nonproliferation is not a decision to take lightly. No one wants a nuclear arms race. More nuclear powers mean more possibilities of misuse or mistake. Moreover, China might retaliate by accelerating its own nuclear development

### **This is critical, as North Korea only negotiates when China cuts off trade**

Go Myong-Hyun, 6-28-**2017**, "Moon's North Korea Policy: Reengaging North Korea to Regain Strategic Initiative," Asian Institute for Policy Studies, <http://en.asianinst.org/contents/moons-north-korea-policy-reengaging-north-korea-to-regain-strategic-balance/>

Unilateral engagement policy also creates major risks for the ROK-US relations. If engagement efforts are not reciprocated by Kim Jong-un, South Korea would have alienated its closest ally without achieving tangible improvements on the nuclear front. And the rupture in the relationship would take place at a time when the US president is skeptical of alliances and free trade, which together form the backbone of South Korea's prosperity and security. Ironically, **Kim is unlikely to engage South Korea in earnest until** his quest for nuclear power status is frustrated and **North Korea's trade with China nosedives.** The rapid ramp-up of provocations in recent years not only indicates mounting North Korean threat, but also Kim's urgency to achieve his strategic goal of nuclear state status sooner rather

than later. If the United States makes an ironclad commitment to deny him nuclear state status, Kim will be forced to explore other options to keep his regime viable. Until then, North Korea is unlikely to make better relations with South Korea the focus of its mainline external policy.

## R/T Arms Race

### 1. Non-unique: Absent THAAD Asian militarization will continue (Low - CNBC)

Michelle Low (CNBC). "US upped military spending, Asian militarization accelerated in 2016: Report." June 23, 2017.

<http://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/21/us-upped-military-spending-asian-militarization-accelerated-in-2016-report.html>

While the U.S. is the world's biggest military spender, making up a solid third of the world's expenditure on that front, **the Asia Pacific is by far the fastest growing region. Countries there collectively spent \$450 billion on defense in 2016 — a 4.6 percent increase from the previous year. Five of the world's top 15 military spenders come from the Asia-Pacific, and regional defense spending has increased by 64 percent in the past decade, a stark reflection of the growing geopolitical tension in the Korean peninsula, East and South China Sea and between India and Pakistan.** China is the Asia Pacific's largest spender, accounting for 48 percent — or close to half — of the region's military expenditure. The rising superpower spent \$215 billion on defense alone, which was almost four times that of its nearest rival, India. Those two nations collectively made up 60 percent of regional spend.

### 2. Nonunique (China and Russia): Russia and China are increasing their military spending while the US decreased spending (Johnson - The Daily Signal).

Justin Johnson (The Daily Signal). "Russia and China Increase Defense Spending While US Continues Cutting." April 11, 2016.

<http://dailysignal.com/2016/04/11/russia-and-china-increase-defense-spending-while-us-continues-cutting/>

While the changes from 2014 to 2015 are notable, they are even more striking when we look at these countries over time. **From 2011 to 2015, the U.S. defense budget went down by 21 percent while China increased its military budget by 38 percent and Russia increased its military budget by 40 percent.** Putting these changes in regional context is even more striking. In the past 10 years, Russian forces have moved across their border to invade neighboring countries, most recently annexing Crimea from Ukraine and actively assisting a separatist force in destabilizing the eastern half of Ukraine. China continues to assert its claims by force in the South China Sea, creating islands in long disputed international waters, then militarizing them, and intimidating other countries from freely using the seas and airspace around them. Iran is more active than ever, testing ballistic missiles, helping to fuel the turmoil being felt throughout the Middle East, and even seizing U.S. sailors.

### 3. Delink/Nonunique (Japan): 1 - Japan is increasing its military spending to counter Chinese militarization 2 - Japan is only focusing on missile defense in response to North Korea (TIME)

NA (TIME Magazine). "Japan Just Approved a Record \$43.6 Billion Military Budget to Counter China and North Korea." December 21, 2016.

<http://time.com/4616114/japan-defense-budget-spending-china-military/>

(TOKYO) - **Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's government on Thursday approved an increase in defense spending to record levels to counter growing Chinese military power in the East China Sea and an escalating North Korean ballistic missile threat. Abe's cabinet on Thursday signed off on a 1.4 percent increase in spending to 5.13 trillion yen (\$43.66 billion) for the year starting April 1.** If approved by lawmakers, which is highly likely given the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's control of parliament, it will be the fifth straight annual increase in outlays. Under Abe, Japan's Self Defense Forces are pivoting away from guarding the nation's north to reinforce an island chain stretching 1,400 km (870 miles) along the southern edge of the East China Sea. That means fewer tank divisions in favor of building a mobile force equipped with hardware such as tilt-rotor Osprey carriers, ships, amphibious vehicles and mobile missile batteries. Japan is also spending more to upgrade its ballistic missile defense, in response to advances in North Korea's ballistic missile program.

#### **4. TURN: Arms Races force diplomatic solutions -> only 25% of conflicts occur after arms buildups, while 77% happen after non-buildups. The reason for this is that when both sides build up arms, it raises the cost of going to war, which in fact makes them more likely to take diplomacy as an option.**

Paul Diehl -- Journal of Peace Research -- "Arms Races and Escalation: A Closer Look\*" -- 1983.

The relationship between arms races and war is a critical consideration in both peace research and strategic planning. This study reconsiders the work of Michael Wallace which has postulated that arms races significantly increase the probability of a serious dispute escalating to war. A critique of Wallace's coding procedures and arms race index precedes an attempt to replicate his findings. In the replication, serious disputes, taken from the Correlates of War Project, among major powers during the years 1816-1970 serve as the population to be tested. Adjustments in coding and index construction from the Wallace work are made. It was discovered that **only 25% of those disputes preceded by a mutual military buildup escalated to war, while almost 77% of the wars in this population were preceded by periods lacking armaments competition.** Controls for inter-century differences and unilateral military buildups failed to alter this apparent lack of a relationship between arms races and dispute escalation. Differences with Wallace's study are analyzed and the implications for peace research discussed.

#### **5. TURN: Deploying THAAD initiates an arms race**

### R/T Moon Pacifist

#### **Maybe in principle, but in practice Moon is becoming ever more militaristic**

**Auslin 17** Michael Auslin, 9-15-2017, "How North Korea Is Ensuring a Nuclear Arms Race in Asia," National Interest,

<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-north-korea-ensuring-nuclear-arms-race-asia-22315?page=2>  
//DF

The wild cards in the current scenario are South Korea and Japan. Despite his preferred approach of negotiating with Kim, South Korean president Moon Jae-in has been pushed to an ever firmer stance. His government recently negotiated a removal of the limits on the size of the conventional warheads on the South's ballistic missiles, and in response to yesterday's missile launch, the South Korean military practiced an attack on a North Korean launch site. Moon has also approved a so-called "decapitation unit," designed to threaten Kim with assassination. Driven by the pace of events, South Korea may wind up retaliating in some way against the North's provocations, which could then tip the peninsula into war. Of more concern is increased signaling from South Korean officials, politicians and opinion-makers that it is time not only for the reintroduction of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons into South Korea (withdrawn by George H.W. Bush in 1991), but that Seoul must consider building its own indigenous nuclear capability. This, of course, would spark a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia, most likely drawing in the Japanese, who would be unlikely to remain the only nonnuclear power in the region. And China would undoubtedly feel forced to massively increase its relatively modest nuclear arsenal if Tokyo and Seoul both went nuclear.

### R/T Kill Chain

**1. (FW/Turn) According to IBP in 2015, Kill Chain is a missile-defense system that just happens to be offensive. Sometimes the best defense is a good offense, but it's still an anti-missile system. Turn all their impacts because they're telling you that anti-missile systems are bad.**

**IPB 15** 2015 "Korea South: Doing Business and Investing in Korea South Guide Volume 1 Strategic, Practical Information and Contacts," IPB,

<https://www.amazon.com/Korea-South-Investing-Information-Investment/dp/1514526956> //DF

Kill Chain **is an offense-oriented defense system that detects missiles in real-time. The goal is to detect any potential threats from the North and take a head start in attacking the nuclear weapon** within 30 minutes. The Kill Chain's main attack means are the fighters and bombing aircraft of the Navy and Air Force. Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) is a lower ground (approx. 20km above ground) defense system where patriot missiles, AMD cells and early warning radar play an indispensable roles. Some of the major procurements of the ROK government are decided on based on establishing these two systems, which includes HUAUV (Global Hawk) and patriot missiles (PAC-2/PAC-3).

## **2. Turn: Jong-kun 13 of Yonsei University explains that South Korea has no way of detecting a North Korean launch on its own; THAAD would give them the radar they need to implement Kill Chain.**

Choi Jong-kun, Professor, 10-22-2013, "To be effective, kill chain policy must take place within context of autonomous defense and engagement with N. Korea," Yonsei University, [http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english\\_edition/e\\_international/608038.html](http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/608038.html)

What are the **South Korea**n military's current detection and strike capabilities? Here the holes are numerous. It **has no military satellites. It is no high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle**. Indeed, it has little more that can be put to military use than the Arirang-5 multi-purpose satellite, the Geumgang and Baekdu reconnaissance aircraft (which are capable of recording and listening in on front-line areas), and the radar on the navy's Aegis vessels. In short, **there is little to nothing it can detect on its own. It simply does not have enough eyes to observe North Korea. Some have blamed this on an overdependence on US intelligence**. But even if the Ministry of National Defense were able to share all military intelligence with the US in real time, there are still very basic questions as to whether it could detect all of North Korea's major attack installations and sensitive targets within one minute. One of the most well-known failures came last winter, when military authorities in South Korea and the US were unable to detect signs of the launch of North Korea's 30-meter-tall Unha-3 rocket, which had been left exposed at its launch site in Tongchang for several days. The focus now is on how - and if - South Korea's military will be able to detect strategic installations throughout North Korea.

## **3. Non-unique. As of September 28th, Moon has called for an increase in their pre-emptive strike capabilities (NYT - Sang-hun)**

Choe Sang-hun. "South Korea Is Speeding Up Arms Buildup to Counter North, Its Leader Says." *Nytimes.com*. 28 Sept. 2017. Web. 28 Sept. 2017. <<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/world/asia/south-korea-military-north.html>>

SEOUL, South Korea — **President Moon** Jae-in **said on Wednesday that South Korea's military would speed up efforts to strengthen its pre-emptive strike, missile defense and retaliatory capabilities against North Korea, and he renewed his call for the armed forces to become more independent of America's**. In a speech to mark South Korea's Armed Forces Day, Mr. Moon said he would push for the South to move more quickly to retake [wartime operational control](#) of its military from the United States. Since the Korean War in the early 1950s, the terms of the countries' alliance have called for an American general to command the South's 650,000-member military should war break out. **Mr. Moon and other liberals have campaigned for South Korea to play a greater role in the alliance, and they have long called for the country to resume responsibility for wartime command as soon as it can feasibly do so.**

But the idea has gotten more public support as remarks by President Trump have led many South Koreans to doubt his commitment to defend the country. Mr. Moon said Thursday that a more self-reliant military could make itself stronger and more feared by North Korea. But he also said the South should strengthen its alliance with Washington. An aide to Mr. Moon said this week that the allies were working on ways to move strategic American military assets into the region more frequently, to help deter North Korea. "The top priority is to secure abilities to counter the North Korean nuclear and missile threats," Mr. Moon said.

# R/T Welfare

**In April, Moon proposed to increase welfare spending**

Reuters 4/17 Reuters, 6-4-2017, "South Korea plans \$10 billion stimulus package to boost jobs, social welfare subsidies," CNBC, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/04/south-korea-plans-10-billion-stimulus-package-to-boost-jobs-social-welfare-subsidies.html> //DF  
South Korea's new President Moon Jae-In speaks during a press conference at the presidential Blue House in Seoul. Jung Yeon-Je | Pool | Reuters  
South Korea's new President Moon Jae-In speaks during a press conference at the presidential Blue House in Seoul. South Korea's new government announced a 11.2 trillion won (\$10.00 billion) fiscal stimulus package on Monday, increasing social welfare subsidies and taking the first steps to deliver on President Moon Jae-in's key election promise - to create 810,000 public sector jobs. The stimulus package allocates 5.4 trillion won to create public sector and social services jobs, including places for fire fighters, teachers and postal workers, the finance ministry said. Another 2.3 trillion won will be used to provide subsidies for maternity leave and for elderly people needing medical care. The government estimates the extra spending will boost economic growth by 0.2 percentage point this year, which may raise its 2017 outlook from the current 2.6 percent. It expects to the extra budget to add 71,000 jobs to the public sector workforce and 15,000 jobs to the private sector.

## R/T Political Capital

### **THAAD is damaging for Moon politically because it angers his base**

**Mount 17** Adam Mount, 6-28-2017, "How to Put the U.S.–South Korean Alliance Back on Track," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-06-28/how-put-us-south-korean-alliance-back-track> //DF

The deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (**THAAD**) system has been a particularly sensitive issue. Shortly before Moon's election, Park's administration authorized the installation of the U.S. missile defense system. China condemned the move and showed its displeasure by sanctioning South Korean businesses that operate in China. Trump exacerbated the pressure on South Korea by appearing to renege on Washington's commitment to funding THAAD in late April. Around six weeks later, lacking consistent support from the United States and facing opposition from China and his own political base, Moon suspended the deployment of the missile batteries. Officially, the original bargain is still on: the Moon government has allowed the parts of THAAD already in place to remain intact and says that it is still open to completing the deployment. In the United States, meanwhile, National Security Adviser H. R. McMaster walked back Trump's demand that Seoul pay for the system. Yet the drama surrounding the deployment has already turned THAAD from a source of strength into a political liability.

## R/T NK Econ Liberalization

### **1. NK already spends so much on its military, THAAD doesn't change much – they don't show the brink**

**Craw 17** Victoria Craw, 4-27-2017, "North Korea spends whopping 22 per cent of GDP on military," NewsComAu, <http://www.news.com.au/world/asia/north-korea-spends-whopping-22-per-cent-of-gdp-on-military-despite-blackouts-and-starving-population/news-story/c09c12d43700f28d389997ee733286d2> //DF

**NORTH KOREA spends more than 20 per cent of its annual GDP on the military despite millions of citizens suffering blackouts and a lack of adequate food.** Amnesty International East Asia researcher Arnold Fang said while the size and capability of the military are virtually impossible to verify, the huge commitment to nuclear capability means citizens suffer in other areas of life. "We know they spend possibly as much as 22 per cent of GDP on military spending. As you can imagine, with that high a proportion, a lot of other public expenses may be compromised," he told news.com.au. "People are drafted into the army for a very long time. It could easily be seven years or I've heard some cases where people spend ten years in the army. This applies to most men who are physically able to do so." Military comparison website Global Fire Power ranks North Korea just one point

below Australia when it comes to the capabilities of 126 nations at number 22 and 23 in the world. Both states have a similar size population with around 10 million citizens fit for service, it estimates.

## 2. NK doesn't work like other countries, they always speed up spending during hardships

**Moon 10** Chung-in Moon, 3-29-2010, "Military Spending and the Arms Race on the Korean Peninsula," Asia Pacific Journal, <http://apjif.org/-Chung-in-Moon/3333/article.html> //DF

Interestingly, **North Korea has rapidly increased its defense spending** since 1998, **in spite of continuing economic hardship**. This could be explained in part by the interaction effect, since South Korea began RMA at this time. As noted before, despite new constraints emanating from democratization, the end of the Cold War, and the financial crisis, the South Korean government continued to upgrade the qualitative nature of its defense forces through the adoption of RMA. Moreover, the Roh Moo-hyun government initiated the Defense Reform 2020 and began to strengthen its endogenous weapons development capability as well as to foster the acquisition of advanced weapons from abroad. North Korea had to respond to such changes in the South Korea by increasing defense spending. Although shortage of hard currency fundamentally limited its efforts to improve the qualitative nature of its defense capability through the acquisition of advanced foreign weapons, **an increase in defense budget allowed the North to** not only make a quantitative response through the expansion of existing weapons stock but also **address some chronic problems such as** poor supply of parts and components of **military equipment and deteriorating welfare of soldiers**.<sup>40</sup> **North Korea's** rapid increase in defense spending can also be explained in part by the adoption of "**military-first politics**" (seongun jeongchi) for the creation of "a strong and prosperous great nation" (gangseong-daeguk), both of which were initiated by Kim Jong Il. **The military in the North**, including the second economy (defense-related economy), **has long been a principal beneficiary of preferential budget allocation** not only because of the military's power, but also because Kim Jong Il elevated its status under the rubric of "military-first politics."<sup>41</sup> As matter of fact, the "military-first doctrine" has helped sustain a relatively large workforce in the defense sector as well as prop up military industries.<sup>42</sup>

## 3. NK will not substantially liberalize

**Toloraya 16** Georgy Toloraya, 7-26-2016, "Deciphering North Korean Economic Policy Intentions," 38 North, <http://www.38north.org/2016/07/etoloraya072616/> //DF

North Koreans will continue the careful search for their "own way" in economic policy by pursuing careful experiments and eliminating outdated elements of the planned economy. Their leaders understandably fear that **any loud announcement of "reform"**—which is and will probably remain a taboo word—**could** endanger morals, **weaken central control and cause factional strife**. The country's fundamental choice is whether to rely on directive planning or, alternately, market levers as a coordination mechanism. The regime must also confront the contradictory prerogatives of arbitrary political power and ownership protected by law. However, **North Korea's political absolutism and the external dangers it faces leave little space for any radical increase in economic freedom**. Beneficiaries of political absolutism will continue to resist ceding power to the "invisible hand" of the free market, and their political "center" is likely to keep its grip on the major economic assets and resources. **In coming years, if not decades, the government will probably stick to a conservative economic middle ground to preserve the existing political system** and the power of Kim's clan.

## 4. Turn: this would force NK's government to become more oppressive

**Lankov 15** Andrei Lankov, 1-16-2015, "Historian: North Korea will reform economically, but not politically," AlJazeera, <http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/fault-lines/articles/2015/1/16/historian-north-koreawillreformeconomicallybutnotpolitically.html> //DF

According to Lankov, the turning point for North Korea's economy was the 1990s. First came the shock of the dissolution of their sponsor state, the Soviet Union, followed by the devastating famine that took the lives of hundreds of thousands of North Koreans. The public distribution system also collapsed and never recovered. North Koreans turned to black markets to attempt to earn a living. The state has pursued different policies towards the markets. According to Lankov, Kim Jong Il made a few failed attempts to exterminate them. But his son, Kim Jong Un, actively ignores them, he says. Beyond tolerating the markets, Lankov believes **Kim Jong Un's government is quietly but actively seeking to emulate the economic reforms of China** in the 1970s and 1980s. **But those shifts won't**

**come easy** to North Korea. **Reforms**, while necessary, **are also a threat to the regime's hold on power**, said Lankov. **And so the government will attempt to tighten its grip on the people to maintain control.**

## R/T Kim wants to reunify

**1. Any elite uprising would be near impossible because of how closely the Kim Regime monitors all with power. coups have failed before. (Ryall - Deutsche Welle 17)**

Deutsche Welle ([Www.Dw](http://www.Dw), 17, 02,06.2017 Can North Korea's elites oust Kim Jong Un?, DW, <http://www.dw.com/en/can-north-koreas-elites-oust-kim-jong-un/a-39091374>, 9-26-2017, (NK)

A study by the RAND Corporation, a US government-funded think tank has proposed a radical new solution to the seemingly intractable problem of North Korea's worsening relationship with the international community. It suggested that incentives such as immunity from prosecution for human rights abuses might be used to encourage senior members of the regime to stage a coup against the country's leader

Kim Jong Un. The report, recently published by RAND's National Security Research Division, says that **North Korean propaganda has indoctrinated the regime's elites to believe that reunification with South Korea would be a disaster to them and result in loss of power, influence, wealth and prestige. In extreme cases, should the collapse of the regime in Pyongyang involve outbreaks of fighting, then it might even cost them their lives.** As a

result, the most critical element of signaling external support for any such uprising against the latest member of the Kim dynasty to rule the

nation will be promising coup plotters that they will be protected and even have a say in a post-Kim North Korea. **Analysts, however, point**

**out that previous coup attempts have failed in the North and that the regime keeps a very close eye on those with any degree of power, making the coordination of any uprising a very difficult**

**proposition.** RAND has identified what it believes are the five conditions that would need to be satisfied for senior members of the present regime in Pyongyang to conclude that reunification of the Korean peninsula would be beneficial for them. The primary condition would be ensuring their individual safety, followed by maintaining their positions, protecting their wealth, ensuring the safety and privileges of their family and the chance to do "something meaningful for their country."

## A/T North Korea Threat

- 1) North Korea is not the threat that we all were taught to believe by the media. His lifeline is his country, and he would much rather die peacefully than in a full fledged attack.
- 2) The impact of this is that there is no reason to for Kim to fire. The only thing that comes out of a missile defense system, is an arms race between countries.

([http://www.slate.com/articles/news\\_and\\_politics/war\\_stories/2017/09/why\\_nuclear\\_deterrence\\_will\\_still\\_work\\_on\\_north\\_korea.html](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2017/09/why_nuclear_deterrence_will_still_work_on_north_korea.html), Fred Kaplan, September 5th 2017, “Why Nuclear Deterrence Will Work On North Korea”)

In short, it's time to pipe down about North Korea—not because Kim is benign or powerless (he's neither), but because the hysteria coming out of Washington these days is overwrought and is making things worse.

There are two reasons not to be so nervous about North Korea's recent tests of missiles and nuclear explosives. First, nuclear deterrence—the theory that Country X won't fire nukes at Country Y if Country Y has nukes it can fire back—works. In the annals of international relations, there are fewer theories that have a better track record than this one. Second, we have thousands of nuclear weapons—stationed worldwide, on land, at sea, and in the air—and there's no way Kim could launch an attack on us without facing an annihilating retaliatory blow.



