

So I realized that a lot of topics have very similar impacts (soft power, relations, heg, econ, blah blah) and that a lot of cards from previous topic blockfiles could be useful in the future.

So basically this file is a bunch of those previous cards organized into a file — the first part is the written up version, the second part is all the cards.

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Written blocks

AT: Hegemony

GOOD: qa

China nuclear war:

1. International affairs professor Robert Gilpin confirms in 2013 that if US hegemony declines and China becomes a challenger, a war between the US and China is practically guaranteed, as no dominant state in history has ever relinquished its position without a fight and no rising power has ever established itself as dominant without winning a great power war. Professor of political science Caitlin Talmadge furthers in 2016 that because China and the US would be unable to distinguish between conventional strikes and attempts to destroy the other's nuclear capability, a US China war would have a high chance of going nuclear. That causes extinction, Carl Shulman at the Machine Intelligence Research Institute finds in 2013 that any nuclear conflict would result in soot and ash being thrown into the atmosphere, which would block out the sun for years, in turn resulting in extinction because agriculture would collapse due to the lack of sunlight.

Generic great power war:

1. International relations professor Joseph Nye explains in 1995 that the decline of the US would make great power conflicts more likely because "Declining nations may attempt to put down rising competitors while growing nations may attack declining ones that they perceive as weak to secure a more favorable place in the international system.

The Khalilzad card:

1. UN Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad explains in 2011 that the closing gap between the capabilities of the US and its rivals both increases the probability of arms races because small countries perceive the US as unable to ensure regional security *and* increases the chance of wars between great powers because they become more competitive to get ahead.

Generic stops war:

1. International affairs professor Stephen Walt explains in 2002 that a stronger US hegemony tary prevents major wars because the cost of war dramatically increases for the competitors and also stops regional wars between other actors who are afraid of the US intervening against them if they start a conflict with a neighbor.

Democracy:

1. Government professor Robert Lieber writes in 2007 that because other countries model their governments on that of the current hegemony, while Chinese and Russian leadership threaten will spread authoritarianism, US primacy is the greatest guarantee

for the future of global democracy. Because democracies answer to their citizens, Larry Diamond of Hoover Institution finds in 1995 that democratic nations don't go to war with each other, don't engage in genocide, don't use weapons of mass destruction, and don't sponsor terrorism.

Multipolarity Bad:

1. Political scientist Andrea Varisco writes in 2013 that a deterioration of American unipolarity would revert us back to the multipolar system at the beginning of the 20th century that caused two world wars. Varisco continues that multipolarity is inherently less stable than unipolarity because when there are multiple powers with similar strength, they're more likely to compete for power and influence because they think they can get ahead of their competitors.

Coop/laundry list:

1. Government professor Stephen Brooks explains in 2013 that US leadership has created joint initiatives and alliances that enable international communication to solve issues like terrorism and pandemics.

AT: Decline inevitable:

1. Decline isn't inevitable. Robert Merry at the National Interest explains in 2012 that the decline [of hegemony]... is a choice and is not an inevitable fate. The kinds of policies a great power wishes to pursue [are what determine whether hegemony lasts].” We argue that increasing military spending is one such policy that preserves hegemony.
2. Their historical analysis of past hegemonies is irrelevant, Michael Beckley of the Belfer Center writes in 2012 that because the US has leveraged advantages from globalization, the US is unlike any past superpower, so “laws of history do not apply to contemporary world politics” and unlike past hegemonies, US power is durable.

AT: High now:

1. Decline is happening now, Dmitry Suslov at the Higher School for Economics finds in 2014 that because of the closing gap in military spending between the US and countries like Russia and China and the shift of economic power to new areas in Asia, US hegemony is declining and unipolarity is no longer a guarantee.

BAD:

Generic Impact D:

1. US hegemony is not the cause of modern peace. Ben Friedman of George Washington University writes in 2014 that “factors other than US power are diminishing war” such as globalization and nuclear proliferation. Chris Fettweis of Tulane University finds empirically in 2011 that when US hegemony and military strength declined, the world grew more peaceful and other actors didn't boost their own forces or start conflicts.
2. No impact to hegemonic decline. Ted Carpenter of the CATO institute reports in 2013 that if US power declined in Europe, the EU and its allies would still be sufficient to deter

Russia in Europe. Carpenter continues that if US hegemony in Asia declined, other countries like Japan, South Korea, and Australia could pick up the slack and create a regional balance of power.

Retrenchment turn + impact D:

1. No impact to hegemonic decline. Political science professor Paul MacDonald finds in 2011 that empirically, the decline of hegemony doesn't cause higher rates of conflict and that US decline will be gradual and controlled, meaning it won't spark great power conflicts because no actor would have the incentive to strike first. He furthers that decline wouldn't start regional arms races because a gradual decline avoids the Chinese expansionism that would start an arms race.
2. Turn, MacDonald finds that adopting a policy of retrenchment in which the US partially withdraws from trying to unilaterally manage global affairs would allow the US to shift security burdens to its allies and multilateral institutions, avoiding the unnecessary military clashes that come with forward deployments while ensuring that China rises peacefully by signalling the US's willingness to accommodate China's rise.

Collapse inevitable:

1. US hegemony is unsustainable. Because of China's inevitable rise, Richard Maher of Brown University writes in 2010 that the US cannot maintain its global power status for very long and needs to start planning for the multipolar world.
2. Trump will destroy hegemony in both worlds. Thomas Wright of the Brookings institute writes in 2016 that Donald Trump will "liquidate the US-led liberal order by ending America's alliances [and] closing the open global economy."

Heg high now:

1. US Hegemony faces few threats. Salvatore Babones of the University of Sydney writes in 2015 writes that "American hegemony has waxed and waned over the last seventy years, but it has never been eclipsed." He concludes that "there are few factual indications that American decline has begun—or that it will begin anytime soon."

China turns:

1. Trying to outpace China triggers an arms race. Michael Swaine at the Carnegie Endowment finds in December that if the US doubled down on dominance in Asia, it would trigger an arms race with China. This would be disastrous, as Political science professor Toby Rider finds in 2000 that arms races increase the chance of war by 5 times because there are higher diplomatic tensions.
2. Pursuing hegemony causes China to cut off cooperation. Political scientist Robert Ross writes in 2012 that when the US increased its presence in Asia, China responded by cutting off cooperation on key issues like North Korean nuclear weapons. This is problematic because Thomas Fingar of Stanford writes that only a cooperative relationship between the US and China can avoid great power wars, resource scarcity, economic collapse, environmental degradation, and increased carbon emissions.

3. Hegemony causes war with China. IR professor Christopher Layne writes in 2008 that China will inevitably rise to power, so “if the United States tries to maintain its current dominance in East Asia, Sino-American conflict is virtually certain” during the transition because the US strategy demands anticipatory violence in order to maintain dominance.

Prolif turn:

1. Turn, Professor Harry van der Linden finds in 2009 that US hegemony forces other countries to proliferate because they are powerless to stop our conventional forces, so they turn to nuclear weapons as a shortcut to deter potential US aggression. International relations professor Matthew Kroenig explains in 2015 that nuclear proliferation increases the risk of nuclear terrorism because A, corrupt states could sell nuclear weapons to terrorist groups, and B, new nuclear states have minimal security, so the weapons could be stolen. Moreover, Kroenig explains that since new nuclear states lack second strike capabilities, they are prone to preemptively launching nukes out of the fear that their nuclear capabilities will be taken out by an enemy.

AT: Cyber security

1. The US isn't as vulnerable as they claim – if we were really that vulnerable Russia or terrorist groups would have already hacked us because they definitely have the intent. In fact, according to Evgeny Morozov of the Wall Street Journal in 2013, much of the threat is drummed up by cybersecurity firms trying to sell more product.
2. Can't solve, Morozov writes that "Ironically, the more we spend on securing the Internet, the less secure we appear to feel" because we can't find real solutions, hackers always get stronger and adapt, and spending just enables more fearmongering.
3. Alt cause — administrative failure. Adam Rice of ComputerWeekly explains that cyber security is failing because of administrative gridlock. He writes, "To develop a cybersecurity plan by computer and manage the administrative burden does almost nothing to prevent an advanced persistent threat actor from running roughshod over a network."

AT: State cyber threat

4. The cyber war threat is overstated. Political scientist Ryan Maness writes in 2015 that large scale state cyber attacks are as unlikely as interstate nuclear war because A, the weapons can only be used once, B, countries fear retaliation, C, there is a high probability of civilian harm, and D, launching a cyber attack is very expensive and has weak payoffs.

AT: Terrorist cyber threat

5. The cyber terror threat is overstated. Political scientist Ryan Maness writes in 2015 that the cyber terror threat is benign because no terrorist organization has the operational capacity to launch an attack.

AT: US Econ

1. The economy is resilient. David Leonhardt at the New York Times explains in 2005 that the US economy has become extremely resilient to shocks by increasing flexibility, surviving wars, hurricanes, financial scandals, soaring oil prices and rising interest rates while continuing to chug along.

AT: Drone strikes good/bad

GENERIC NO IMPACT

1. Drones are rarely used for killing people. Micah Zenko at Foreign Policy explains in 2012 that the vast majority of the time, drones are used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions.

BAD

1. Turn it, drone strikes destroy the US's international credibility. Doyle McManus at the LA Times explains in 2014 that the use of drone strikes has prompted global backlash to America from the entire international community and hasn't reduced the amount of terrorism.
2. Turn it, drone strikes increase terrorism. Law professor Thomas McDonnell finds in 2012 that US drone strikes legitimize the message of terrorist organizations that the US is at war with Islam, strengthening terrorist organizations both internally and externally and boosting terrorist recruitment. Peter Bergen at the Institute for Labor Economics finds empirically in 2011 that a terrorist attack is 8.8% more likely in the 5 days following a successful drone strike.
3. Turn it, drone strikes kill civilians. Hira Bashir at Brown University finds in 2014 that empirically, 94% of US drones strikes killed between 8 and 15 civilians for every terrorist killed.

GOOD

1. Turn it, drones kill terrorists. Lawrence Kapp at the Congressional Research Service finds in 2016 that US operations against ISIL which have focused on air strikes and drones have killed 45,000 ISIL fighters.
2. Turn, drones kill terrorists and ruin their operations. Daniel Byman at the Brookings Institute furthers that between 2008 and 2013, drone strikes killed 3,300 terrorist operatives in Pakistan and Yemen. Byman continues that drone strikes have forced terrorist organizations to stop using electronic communication, making recruiting and training much more difficult because terrorist organizations are too afraid to train new recruits for fear that a drone could wipe out their training camp.
3. Turn, drones are good for civilians. Michael Lewis at the Atlantic reports in 2013 that the most recent drone strikes in Pakistan have a civilian casualty rate of 1.5%, which is lower than every other type of military technology. Tom Weiner at UT San Diego explains in 2014 that drones strikes kill civilians at a rate that is far less than ground troop operations.

AT: ISIL impacts

1. ISIL isn't a threat, as Alex Ward at the Center on International Security finds in 2015 that ISIL's main focus is on territory grabbing and doesn't care about attacking the US, with lone wolf ISIL attacks being relatively small.
2. Status quo solves, as Zack Beauchamp at Vox reports in 2015 that ISIL is losing ground and power in the status quo and is severely outnumbered.
3. Turn, James Fearon of Stanford University writes in 2015 that US attempts to fight ISIL crowd out other local parties from fighting ISIL, which is crucial as he concludes that the only good way to get rid of ISIL in the long run is to let local actors deal with it.

AT: Al Qaeda Impacts

1. Al Qaeda isn't a threat, as Kangil Lee at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research finds in 2015 that Al Qaeda has lost 28 of its 29 leaders to drone strikes, lacks any training centers, communications ability, or funding, and has only launched two successful attacks in the last 20 years. Alex Ward at the Center on International Security finds in 2015 that Al Qaeda's capability to launch major attacks has significantly declined.

AT: Donations to political campaigns

1. Non-unique — special interest influence is growing. The U Chicago Stigler Center reports in 2016 that the amount of donations from big donors is rapidly growing in the status quo, which means their impact is inevitable.
2. No impact, their evidence is a sampling bias — James Synder of MIT finds in 2002 that campaign spending has no effect on policy when controlling for candidate's initial policy positions, and if donations actually influenced policy, they would be a lot higher.

AT: Nuclear terrorism

1. There is no risk of nuclear terrorism, as Leonard Weiss at Stanford explains in 2015 that a terrorist organization acquiring nuclear weapons is virtually impossible, because A, building a nuclear weapon requires overcoming tons of technical barriers, B, stealing a nuclear weapon is practically impossible due to layered safeguards and security, and C, acquiring a nuclear weapon willingly from a state won't happen because nuclear states fear retaliation from other nuclear states.

AT: Interventions

GOOD:

1. Interventions are inevitable, Hailey Bennett at James Madison University explains in 2015 that the US will always intervene in conflicts to pursue its national interests.
2. Their impact studies all have sampling biases: intervention only occurs when the conflict is set to escalate anyways, so the data gets skewed in that direction.
3. Turn, interventions deter war. Professor of Government David Cunningham explains in 2015 that the threat of American intervention deters rebels from starting civil wars because they're scared of a loss, resulting in a 50% decline in the chance of civil war.
4. Turn, interventions shorten conflicts. Political scientist Kyle Joyce finds in 2008 that because interventions shift the balance of power in a conflict, they result in shorter conflicts and a higher chance of a negotiated settlement.
5. Turn, interventions cause less violent conflicts. Matthew Krain of International Studies Quarterly finds that because intervention diverts the resources of the perpetrator, the probability that killings increase is reduced by 14%.
6. Turn, intervention is needed to deliver aid. Janice Stein of the National Academy Press writes in 2000 that organizations can't deliver aid in war torn regions because they lack to security to deliver the goods. However, the United States Institute of Peace explains that these organizations can use the US military for security, which happens more when we increase military spending. Joppe Ree in the 2009 Journal of Development Economics finds empirically that each 10% increase in aid reduces the probability that conflict continues by 8 percentage points.

BAD:

1. Interventions make the initial conflict more deadly, as the Human Security Report finds in 2012 that civil wars with third party interventions are twice as deadly as those without interventions because interventions result in at least one side gaining access to more destructive weapons.
2. They make conflicts last longer, as Nicholas Sambanis of the World Bank finds in 2000 that civil wars with intervention last 6 times longer than those without because interventions prevent diplomatic solutions that would end the conflict peacefully.
3. They cause future conflicts, as Professor Michael Kenwick finds in 2014 that civil conflicts with interveners are 94% more likely to reignite into a new conflict because interventions disrupt the functioning of society and inspire resentment among the populous, making a future war more likely, even if the intervention leads to a peace deal.
4. They increase civilian casualties, as professor of politics Reed Wood finds in 2014 that third party support for one actor in a civil war shifts the balance of power, causing the non-supported actor killing 25 to 40% more civilians to try to maintain control and gather more resources for war.

AT: Soft power/diplomacy

1. Non-unique, Ian Mount of Fortune reports in 2015 that the US empirically has the most soft power of any country in the world.
2. Trump ruins diplomacy. Jed Babbin at The Spectator explains in December that Trump's diplomacy is reminiscent of a "bull who brings his own china shop with him" and Trump has already caused diplomatic backlash over his communications with Pakistan and Taiwan.
3. Jennifer Rubin at the Washington Post confirms in 2014 that empirically, Obama's refusal to back up diplomacy with military force has failed to resolve conflicts in Ukraine, Syria, Iran, and Yemen and has tempted our enemies to act more aggressively because they know they US won't respond.

AT: Multipolarity

1. Multipolarity prevents stability and makes great power wars inevitable. Political scientist Andrea Varisco writes in 2013 that a deterioration of American unipolarity would revert us back to the multipolar system at the beginning of the 20th century that caused two world wars. Varisco continues that multipolarity is inherently less stable than unipolarity because when there are multiple powers with similar strength, they're more likely to compete for power and influence because they think they can get ahead of their competitors.
2. Transition to multipolarity causes war. UN Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad explains in 2011 that the closing gap between the capabilities of the US and its rivals increases the probability of arms races and major wars because small countries perceive the US as unable to ensure regional security and large countries become more competitive to get ahead.
3. Unipolarity is better. International affairs professor Stephen Walt explains in 2002 that a US hegemony prevents major wars because the cost of war dramatically increases for the enemy and regional actors are afraid of a US intervention.

AT: Multilateralism

1. Even if the US stops doing multilateralism, other countries will continue efforts at cooperation, which means your impacts happen in either world. None of your evidence says US efforts at multilateralism are uniquely key.
2. Multilateralism doesn't work. Richard Haas of the Council on Foreign Relations writes in 2014 that divergent national interests and the sheer number of states makes it impossible to have an effective multilateral world order.

AT: Deterrence

1. Deterrence fails: Military strategist Sean Larkin explains in 2011 that because other countries are unpredictable and don't think like the US, we can't make calculated decisions to deter them. Political science professor James Fearon confirms in 2002 that of 58 different encounters, only 2 attempts to deter a conflict were successful. That's a success rate of less than 4%.
2. Turn, deterrence causes miscalculation and conflict. Dallas Boyd at Strategic Studies Quarterly finds in 2016 that US attempts to coerce and deter adversaries will prompt adversaries to misjudge the robustness of deterrence, and, believing in their own military capacities, miscalculate and start a conflict with the US.
3. Turn, deterrence goes too far and we try to deter threats before they even exist. Political scientist Chris Fettweis writes in 2010 that the US obsession with deterrence leads to an inflated perception of threat and therefore creates preventative wars like the one in Iraq that ultimately exacerbate conflict.
4. Deterrence causes adversary lashout. Michael Ruhle at NATO furthers in 2016 that other leaders may adopt risky offensive strategies in response to attempts at deterrence and that other countries have different cost-benefit calculuses that render deterrence ineffective.
5. Predictions are wrong. Defense professor Keith Payne explains in 2015 that while deterrence theory can predict how leaders should behave, it can't be used to make confident predictions because of the gap between theory and how leaders actually make decisions.

AT: China war impacts

AT: China-Japan

1. ThinkProgress explains in 2014 that war between China and Japan is incredibly unlikely because A, China fears US nuclear retaliation, and B, the two countries have such strong economic ties.

AT: China-Taiwan

1. Zachary Keck of the Diplomat writes in 2014 that even absent the US threat, China wouldn't invade Japan because A, the rest of the world would backlash against China, and B, China would have to deal with Taiwanese resistance for years to come. The Taipei Times furthers in 2014 that China and Taiwan finalized a series of deal, signaling an increase in cooperation on various issues.

AT: SCS war

1. China has been expanding in the South China Sea for decades and nothing has happened. Nicolas Jenny of Real Clear World writes in 2015 that there is little risk of conflict in the South China Sea because every actor has such deep economic ties in the region they would never risk it. Miscalculation is also unlikely. Steven Stashwick of the Diplomat writes in 2015 that the threat of miscalculation is overstated and small tensions are unlikely to escalate.

AT: China-US

1. Political scientist Charles Glaser writes in 2011 that even if China surpassed the US in military power, the nuclear deterrent would still be enough to prevent war from even being a possibility. Zachary Keck of the Diplomat furthers in 2014 that even a small conflict between the US and China wouldn't escalate into all out nuclear war because leaders would try to contain the conflict at every step due to mutually assured destruction.

AT: China Aggression

1. China can't continue to be aggressive. Dan Blumenthal of the American Enterprise Institute explains in 2016 that President Xi can't increase Chinese aggression over the squo because A, it would tank his political image at home, B, China's economy is stagnating and can't support further aggression, C, China's economy is completely dependent on the US allowing them access to sea lanes for trade, and D, China's military is already overstretched and is spread too thin.

AT: Russia impacts

1. The US and Russia aren't going to be enemies much longer. NEIL MacFARQUHAR of the New York Times reports in November that Putin and Trump agreed to thaw relations and want to work together on strategic goals.
2. There are alternatives to US deterrence. Ted Carpenter of the CATO institute reports in 2013 that if US power declined in Europe, the EU would still be sufficient to deter Russia in Europe.
3. Russia is only weakening. Harry Kazianis of the Center for the National Interest reports in November that Russia is cutting its military due to demographic and economic challenges that it can't overcome.

AT: US Russia War

1. Russia can't go to war, as James Stewart at the New York Times writes in 2014 that Russia's economy is too vulnerable to fight a war and Russia is economically dependent on Europe for its oil and gas exports, making a conflict basically impossible.

AT: Baltics invasion

1. This is ridiculous. Doug Bandow at the Cato Institute explains in 2016 that Russia will never invade the Baltics because there isn't a large ethnic Russian population there and an invasion would spur population exodus, trigger economic collapse, and cause massive resentment among the Russian people. Even Putin called the idea of a Baltic invasion "nonsense."

AT: North Korea

1. The US isn't key. Ted Carpenter of the CATO institute reports in 2013 that if US hegemony in Asia declined, other countries like Japan, South Korea, and Australia could pick up the slack and create a regional balance of power.

North Korea nuclear lashout

1. Won't happen, Euan McKirdy at CNN reports in 2016 that North Korea has explicitly stated that it won't use its nuclear arsenal unless another nuclear power invades it.

North Korean collapse

1. North Korea won't collapse, as political science professor Chung-in Moon explains in 2015 that North Korea is currently internally stable because Kim Jong Un has consolidated his power base and the economy is improving and becoming more flexible and adaptive.

North Korea does stupid stuff (escalation, lashout, war, invasion, etc)

1. Won't happen. Van Jackson at the Council on Foreign Affairs explains in 2015 that North Korea's track record proves that its primary goal is regime survival, meaning it will avoid escalating current tensions to a full on war which could result in the regime collapsing.

AT: Middle East

1. Middle Eastern instability is a recurring problem that can't be solved by US intervention. Marc Lynch of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace writes in 2017 that countless American approaches to the Middle East have all failed and only resulted in more instability because they can't address the underlying ideological and political divides.
2. TURN: America causes more terrorism. Lynch continues that "A more assertive America, whether in Syria or elsewhere, would likely produce yet another surge of anti-Americanism in response." Eric Neumayer of the London School of Economics finds in a 2011 study that all forms of American military support in the Middle East increase terrorism.

AT: Climate Change

GOOD:

Defense dump

1. Trump means it's too late. Public policy professor Matthew **Nisbet** explains in 2016 that Trump will deliver the fatal blow to the fight against climate change by pulling out of the Paris Accords and UN climate programs, rolling back regulations that cut emissions, and creating an international chilling effect on progress through his disgust for international cooperation.
2. It's too late. Susan **Solomon** at the NOAA explains in 2008 that because CO2 stays in the atmosphere for long periods of time, irreversible climate consequences are already guaranteed. Natural resources professor Guy McPherson furthers in 2012 that status quo temperature increases have triggered irreversible feedback loops that guarantee an eventual 6 degree temperature increase and extinction.
3. CO2 reductions don't solve. The American Meteorological Society finds in 2012 that even if governments, corporations, and individuals cut their emissions drastically, it wouldn't be enough to stop an impending global climate disaster.
4. Not human caused. Dr. Ritesh Arya from the National institute of Hydrology finds in 2012 when studying over 10,000 years of climate data that recent warming is just a result of a completely natural cyclic process. William Jasper at the New American furthers in 2013 that over 1100 peer reviewed paper have found no evidence that climate change is real or human caused.
5. Your models are wrong. IPCC lead author Hans von Storch finds in 2013 that empirically, 98% of climate models overestimated the impact CO2 emissions would have on temperatures. Atmospheric science professor John Christy finds in 2016 that models of the effect of CO2 on temperature have predicted a 2.5 times higher increase in temperature than have been observed in the real world. Former head climate scientist at NASA Roy Spencer finds in 2008 that the ecosystem is less sensitive to climate change than previously thought and atmospheric CO2 levels aren't enough to explain warming that has already occurred.
6. Temperatures aren't increasing and CO2 isn't the cause. University of Oklahoma professor David Deming finds in 2009 that empirically, temperatures haven't significantly changed over the last three decades and an internal EPA report found glaring inconsistencies between the data and the argument that CO2 emissions change the climate.
7. Warming is slow timeframe. Fyfe et al finds in 2016 that the rate of temperature increase has significantly decreased over the last decade due to changes in internal variability, volcanic and solar activity, and aerosol forcing.

Ice age DA (only read one card per U/L/I section unless time permits):

1. UNIQUENESS: Mathematics professor Valentina Zharkova finds in 2015 that solar output will drop 60% by 2030, putting Earth into a mini ice age. Terrance Aym reports in 2011 that NASA and multiple other space agencies agree that the cooling of the sun will cause severe cooling and a full blown ice age by 2030, threatening millions of lives.
2. LINK: Anthony Watts at the University of Gothenburg finds in 2012 that CO2 emissions empirically stopped previous ice ages from occurring and continued emissions will prevent future ice ages. Michael Le Page at New Scientist furthers in 2008 that if humanity hadn't started emitting CO2, we would have entered an ice age lasting millions of years. Simon Que at Lew Rockwell confirms in 2006 that global warming can forestall future ice ages.
3. IMPACT: Phil Chapman at MIT finds in 2008 that the next little ice age will be comparatively worse than global warming because it will kill millions by destroying agriculture, causing cold-related deaths, covering all major land masses with ice, causing a global catastrophe and the collapse of civilization. Jennie Cohen at Columbia furthers in 2012 that previous mini ice ages in the 14th and 19th centuries caused droughts and famines, plunged all of Europe into war, and caused epidemics like the Black Plague which killed 75 million people.

Agriculture [read whatever cards you want for this]:

1. PhD Indur Goklany at the Department of the Interior finds in 2015 that CO2 emissions to date have fertilized plants, resulting in 15% increased crop yield, 14% higher aggregate ecosystem productivity, and increased forest growth. Goklany finds that higher yields have reduced chronic hunger through lower food prices and stabilized supply and higher plant growth has reduced stress on ecosystems, saving a significant number of species from extinction.
2. Professor Richard Tol finds in a 2013 metastudy that higher temperatures have increased global ecosystem productivity by 14%, translating to higher agricultural yields and richer biodiversity.
3. Simon Que at Lew Rockwell explains in 2006 that warming will lengthen growing seasons, increase rainfall, and decrease crop failures, ultimately boosting agricultural productivity.
4. James Taylor at the Heartland Institute confirms in 2011 that a study of 600 years of agricultural trends in Africa have found that warmer climates created better growing conditions, increasing agricultural yield by 6%.
5. Thomas Moore at Stanford finds in 2008 that higher temperatures will increase precipitation and higher CO2 concentrations will fertilize more plants, boosting global agriculture production, reducing food prices.
6. Lower food prices are key, as the Earth Policy Institute finds in 2004 that 3 billion people spend 70% of their income on food and "even a modest rise in food prices can quickly become life-threatening".
7. Moreover, Lester Brown at the Earth Policy Institute finds in 2009 that the US won't be able to dampen the effect of future food price spikes and that these price spikes will result in failed states, terrorism, refugees, and could collapse all of civilization.

Biodiversity:

1. PhD Indur Goklany at the Department of the Interior finds in 2012 that multiple studies have shown warmer temperatures and higher concentrations of CO₂ are comparatively better for overall global biodiversity, even when accounting for habitat loss from sea level rise.

Water shortages:

1. PhD Indur Goklany at the Department of the Interior finds in 2012 that even though higher temperatures will decrease rainfall in some areas, increased rainfall in populated areas due to warming will reduce global water stress on net. That's key because the National Association for Scientific and Cultural Appreciation finds in 2004 that if water shortages get significantly worse, it could conceivably push countries to the brink of nuclear conflict, as states that are running out of water will be willing to fight other states for water.

Hot vs Cold deaths:

1. Professor Richard Tol finds in a 2013 metastudy that global warming has reduced temperature based deaths, as warming reduces deaths from cold, which is a comparatively larger killer than heat based deaths.

BAD:

1. Extinction. Strategic studies professor Robert Sharp explains in 2014 that climate change is the single greatest threat to the survival of humanity, as it will cause natural disasters and rising sea levels that decimate food and water sources, forcing countries into resource wars with threats backed by nuclear weapons.
2. Structural violence. Environmental studies professor David Pellow explains in 2014 that oppressed groups will suffer the most from droughts, natural disasters, diseases, and higher energy costs, making "the struggle for racial, gender, and economic justice... inseparable from" efforts to combat climate change.
3. Phytoplankton. Sean Hodell at Georgia Tech finds in 2016 that due to climate change related increases in ocean temperatures, in the past 16 years, the global phytoplankton population has decreased 30%. Professor of applied mathematics Sergei Petrovskii finds in 2016 that by 2100, the increased water temperature will stop phytoplankton from producing oxygen, resulting in global extinction, as phytoplankton produce $\frac{2}{3}$ of Earth's oxygen.

AT: Credibility/Allied commitments

1. Trump means our credibility is already doomed. Khang Vu at The Diplomat explains in 2016 that Trump intends to withdraw the US's commitment to the security of our allies and that his victory signals to our Asian allies that the US will no longer defend them.
2. NO IMPACT: Decreasing allied commitments doesn't cause conflict, Ted Carpenter of the CATO institute reports in 2013 that if US power declined in Europe, the EU and its allies would still be sufficient to deter Russia in Europe. Carpenter continues that if the US withdrew from Asia, other countries like Japan, South Korea, and Australia could pick up the slack and create a regional balance of power.
3. TURN: US security umbrellas increase conflict. Ben Friedman of CATO in 2012 outlines two reasons for this.
 - a. US commitments embolden countries to take risks that they would have otherwise not have, leading to more provocation and conflict, AND
 - b. It can cause adversaries to feel more threatened and leads to arms races and higher tensions.
4. Turn, Focusing on credibility sets up misperceptions that lead to unneeded conflict. Political scientist Chris Fettweis writes in 2010 that the US obsession with credibility leads to an inflated perception of threat and therefore creates preventative wars like the one in Iraq that ultimately exacerbate conflict.

AT: Allied prolifer

SOUTH KOREA:

1. Se Young Jang at the Harvard Belfer Center explains in 2016 that South Korea will never go nuclear due to internal dissent from the populous, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, international pressure, lack of access to nuclear material due to treaties with the US, and the risk of political and economic backlash.
2. Troy Stangrone at the Korea Economic Institute of America finds in 2016 that if South Korea pursued nuclear weapons, the countries that export nuclear reactor fuel to South Korea would cease exports. Because South Korea is completely dependent on imports to fuel its nuclear reactors, which provide one third of its electricity, Stangrone concludes that South Korea won't pursue nuclear weapons.

JAPAN:

1. Japan won't nuclearize Mark Fitzpatrick at the International Institute for Strategic Studies explains in 2016 Fitzpatrick continues that within Japan's nuclear technology field, there exist numerous anti-nuclear whistleblower scientists and engineers who could immediately veto any attempt at nuclearization.
2. Fitzpatrick continues that internal study ever conducted that has taken into account Japan's motivations and capabilities concludes that there are numerous social, economic, and political factors that will stop Japan from nuclearizing.
3. Se Young Jang at the Harvard Belfer Center explains in 2016 that Japan will never go nuclear due to internal dissent from the populous, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, international pressure, and the risk of political and economic backlash.

NPT COLLAPSE:

1. The NPT won't collapse. Liviu Horowitz at the Center for Security Studies finds in 2015 that in order for the NPT to collapse, more than twenty countries would have to leave the treaty, or over one third of the members.

AT: Military Readiness

1. Readiness is high now. Tom Donilon at Foreign Policy explains in 2014 that the US defense budget is 5 times larger than the next highest spender and the military remains ready to defeat any adversary.
2. Readiness is no longer necessary, as Lawrence Kapp at the Congressional Research Service corroborates in 2016 that precision weaponry, technological advances, and tactical innovations have eliminated the need for a large number of combat ready troops. Economist Satyajit Das furthers in 2014 that the US has maintained military superiority by shifting its focus away from things like troop readiness to technological dominance through drones and other sophisticated weapons systems.
3. The status quo is solving former CIA director David Petraeus writes in 2016 that the Army and Marine Corps are planning on putting a large percentage of their forces through training exercises to improve readiness in 2017, and 90% of military equipment is battle ready.

AT: Dollar Heg

1. Non-unique, dollar heg is increasing now— Ambrose Pritchard at the Telegraph explains in 2016 that the dollar's share in international transactions has increased 20% since 2014 and there are no viable currencies to supplant the dollar, with the Euro being inherently unstable and the Yuan taking decades to make a dent. She concludes the world is more reliant on the dollar than ever. Proves

AT: Trump has crazy fopo

1. Trump can't get through the red tape. International relations professor Stephen Walt explains in 2016 that the national security bureaucracy interfere with all of Trump's outlandish foreign policy proposals, preventing him from doing anything too crazy.
2. Trump's a people pleaser – he'll follow conventions so people will respect him. Damien Paletta at the Wall Street Journal furthers in 2016 that Trump's senior advisers have explicitly said that Trump intends to follow domestic and international consensus in the foreign policy sphere.
3. Turn it, Trump's unpredictability is a ruse. Public Policy professor Peter Navarro explains in 2016 that Trump's unpredictability is actually just Trump utilizing the "madman" theory, in which he pretends to be an irrational actor to get adversaries like Russia, China, and North Korea to back down in the fear that Trump might actually lash out, when in fact, Trump is a completely rational actor and has no intention of doing something stupid.

AT: Renewables transition

1. Non-unique, low oil prices stop the transition. Clifford Krauss at the New York Times explains in December 2016 that since June 2014, global oil prices have plunged 70%, and prices aren't expected to be high again for years to come. Brad Plumer at the Washington Post explains in 2013 that while renewable energy growth has stagnated over the past 20 years, fossil fuel usage has been continually increasing.
2. Oil floods are inevitable. Brad Plumer at the Washington Post explains in 2012 that increasing US and Canadian shale oil production will cause Saudi Arabia to flood the market with oil to try to crush the US's attempt to achieve energy independence.
3. No solvency for warming. Elizabeth Rosenthal at the New York Times explains in 2013 that because renewable technologies like wind and solar are inherently intermittent because and expensive to integrate into power grids, the more effective path to reduce CO2 emissions is to improve the energy efficiency of existing fuels.

AT: Free Trade

GOOD

1. Turn because free trade leads to more democracy. Dan Griswold of the CATO institute reports in 2004 that “free trade promotes democracy and respect for human rights” and that free trade increases the chance that a state is a democracy by 3x. That’s key because Sean Jones at Harvard writes in 1998 that democracies have less violence, enhanced quality of life, and less hunger because the government is accountable to the people.
2. Free trade leads to a reduction in income inequality. Maggie Flanigan reports in 2014 that trade decreases income inequality by facilitating economic growth and providing especially low cost items to the poor.

BAD:

1. Turn, free trade harms the US. Josh Bivens of the EPI finds in 2013 finds that free trade and globalization drives down wages by 5.5% in America because it leads to offshoring and trade deficits, and globalization could essentially erase all wage gains from the past 38 years.
2. Turn, free trade causes income inequality. Jeff Madrick at the Century Foundation furthers in 2014 that most of the gains from free trade have gone to the top of the income spectrum, and even free trade advocates agree that it has reduced wages and job security through outsourcing. Daniel Lederman at the Center for Evaluating Research finds in 2015 that a 1% increase in the Gini coefficient reduces GDP in the long term by 4.5% because inequality undermines long term upward mobility.
3. Turn, free trade kills jobs. Joe Raedle at Newsweek explains in 2016 that because free trade forces US workers to compete with lower wage workers in countries like China and Mexico, free trade has stagnated wages and economic growth in the US and contributed to the loss of 30% of the manufacturing sector
4. NAFTA is bad — Robert Scott at the Economic Policy Institute finds in 2003 that NAFTA caused net job loss, with most losses being in high wage sectors, increasing income inequality.
5. Turn; free trade is empirically bad in developing countries. Alhaji Ibrahim explains in 2013 that globalization has economically marginalized developing countries in Africa by making them dependant on mercantilist western nations for imports of key goods, increasing poverty and income inequality and forcing cultural domination.
6. Turn, economic opening causes less democracy. Dennis Quinn at Georgetown University finds in 2000 that empirically, higher economic openness cause de-democratization because economic openness increases income inequality and fosters corporate corruption.

AT: Unions

GOOD:

1. Matthew Walters at the Economic Policy Institute writes in 2003 that unionized workers have 28% increased compensations, have raised wages for nonunionized workers, and reduced wage inequality because unions raise wages most for the low-wage workers, and provide a multitude of other fringe benefits like health insurance and pension plans.
2. Empirically, unions David Madland, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress writes in 2009 that unions allowed millions of workers to join the middle class and

BAD:

1. Unions decrease the employment of unskilled workers. Kurt Williamsen of The New American in 2013 writes that prevailing wage laws require union wages to be paid to all workers. However, since unions are primarily filled with skilled laborers, this ensures that unskilled labors would never get hired because they would have to pay skilled prices, hurting the poor and minorities.
2. Unions increase racial inequality. According to Tom Ferrick of the Inquirer in 2008, construction unions “jobs ... remain all-male, nearly all-white and the majority live in the suburbs.” Red State furthers in 2011 that construction unions work “against the inclusion of minority workers and minority contractors” by giving racist organizations power over contracting.

AT: Social Movements

Legal reform good:

1. Turn, Law professor Douglas NeJaime explains in 2013 that when reforms pass and are supported by social movements, it makes those movements seem more legitimate and justifies calls for further progress.
2. Turn, Sociology professor David Meyer explains that government action is critical for social movements because “When [...] groups [...] perceive that change is possible in a particular policy area, they are likely to try to mobilize activism,” seen empirically in the women’s rights movement.
3. Turn, social movements cause reform, Professor Frank Baumgartner explains in a 2003 meta-analysis that social movements generate increased attention from Congress and create interest groups that push for government involvement and reforms.
4. Incremental reform is good, Law professor Richard Delgado explains in 2009 that “incremental changes may bring revolutionary changes closer” by creating a snowball effect where small changes set precedent for future reforms.
5. State action is key to successful reform. Law professor Orly Lobel explains in 2007 that the regulations and structures created by the state ensure that legal reforms and community projects are successful. Lobel furthers that only the state can “aid weaker groups in order to promote overall welfare and equity... [while also allowing] Reformers... [to] use [the] law to increase the power and access of vulnerable individuals and group.”

Legal reform bad:

1. Turn, Law professor Orly Lobel writes in 2007 that when social movements push for reform, the “focus on legal reform narrows the causes, deradicalizes the agenda, legitimizes ongoing injustices, and diverts energies away from more effective and transformative alternatives.”
2. Turn,. Sociology professor David Meyer finds in 1996 that in the past, when a social movement received a victory that suddenly breaks from established precedent, it created countermovements that opposed the decision. In this case, that counter movement would likely be a bunch of Republicans who hate the popular vote

AT: LNG impacts

1. It should have already happened. Paul Parfomak at the Congressional Research Service reports in 2008 that because of numerous control systems and the double hulled design of tankers, LNG tankers have carried over 45,000 cargoes and traveled over 100 million miles without a serious accident.
2. No impact. Lloyd's List reports in 2008 that LNG in its liquid form is not flammable or explosive and it's impossible for LNG to be released fast enough to generate an explosion. They continue that claims about LNG having a nuclear explosion level impact refer to the amount of energy contained on an LNG tanker, not what would actually happen in the event of an attack. The San Diego Union Tribune furthers in 2004 that LNG is only explosive within a narrow range of concentrations in the air, between 5 percent to 15 percent.
3. No LNG terrorism. Analyst Tony Muncer explains in 2005 that in order to detonate the entire cargo of an LNG tanker, a group would have to launch a full scale military operation, and even then, the design of tankers would prevent most attacks from succeeding.

AT: 55 Hiroshima bombs

1. This is false, Henry Ozog at ioMosaic explains in 2006 that the 55 Hiroshimas claim is based on a misleading and erroneous estimation about hazard energy potential.

AT: Appeasement/weakness thesis

1. Appeasement is wrong. Matthew Yglesias at the Center for American Progress explains in 2009 that fears of appeasement are out of touch with objective reality and presumes that all foreign leaders are hardcore irrational ideologues. This is a double bind, as Yglesias continues that “Genuine madmen aren’t going to care what “signal” we’re sending, and non-crazy people can be productively bargained with.”
2. No impact to signaling weakness. Shiping Tang at the Center for Regional Security Studies explains in 2005 that because states always use a “worst case” mentality, signals of irresolution or lost reputation are irrelevant because adversaries always assume that a state is resolute to ensure that they don’t miscalculate.
3. Turn, appeasement solves conflicts. Jeffrey Record at the Strategic Studies Institute explains in 2008 that empirically, when the state doing the appeasing is stronger than the appeased state, appeasement reduces tensions by removing the causes of conflict and disagreement.
4. Turn, Ray Takeyh at the Council on Foreign Relations explains in 2009 that US diplomatic concessions that try to change an adversary’s behavior are always good because either the behavior change happens, or the fact that the adversary rejected diplomacy makes it easier for the US to assemble a durable international coalition to pressure the adversary.

AT: WWII Empiric

1. Jeffrey Record continues that the example of appeasement in WWII is fundamentally flawed because A, Europe wasn’t appeasing from a position of strength, and B, Hitler’s Germany was fundamentally unlike EVERY other state actor in history because it was unappeasable and undeterrable

AT: Latin Relations

1. Status quo solved. Shawn Lansing at the Naval War College confirms in 2016 that when the US and Cuba resumed diplomatic relations in 2014, it removed the sticking point in US-Latin American relations and allowed the US to start cooperating with the region again at Summit conferences.
2. Non-unique, Patrick Duddy at Duke University explains in 2013 that US influence in Latin America is unparalleled because the US is Latin America's largest trade partner and is continually increasing economic ties in the region.
3. Trump will never cooperate with Latin America. Ryan Dube at the Wall Street Journal explains in 2016 that Trump intends to undo Obama's attempts to thaw diplomatic tensions between the US and Cuba and drive a wedge between the US and Latin America.
4. Alternate causality to low relations. Professor of Latin American Studies Michael Shifter explains in 2012 that Latin American countries are outraged over the US's failed drug policy which has failed to stop Latin American drug cartels. Ming Tang at the Center for Economic and Policy Research furthers in 2016 that relations with Latin America are at an all time low because of the US's response to the Honduran Coup and the US's Plan Colombia policy.

AT: Federalism

GOOD:

1. Turn, law professor Steven Calabresi explains in 1995 that the spread of American federalism fuels global good governance that ensures peace, stable trade, economic growth, and the protection of human rights.
2. Turn, federalism is key to hegemony. Alice Rivlin at the Brookings Institute explains in 1992 that the federalist system allows states to be responsive to domestic policy needs, which elevates the US on the international stage as an example of good governance, ultimately ensuring the US is an effective world leader. Loss of US hegemony causes war, as UN Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad explains in 2011 that the closing gap between the capabilities of the US and its rivals both increases the probability of arms races because small countries perceive the US as unable to ensure regional security *and* increases the chance of wars between great powers because they become more competitive to get ahead.
3. Turn, federalism spreads democracy. David Broder of the Washington Post in 2001 explains that federalism is vital to answering other countries' concerns about mob rule in democracy, so only with federalism can the US support democratic movements. Because democracies actually care about their citizens, Larry Diamond of Hoover Institution finds in 1995 that democratic nations don't go to war with each other, don't engage in genocide, don't use weapons of mass destruction, and don't sponsor terrorism.

BAD:

1. Non-unique, federalism is gone now which means your impacts should have triggered. Political science professor John Dinan explains in 2009 that because of the recession, power has become centralized in the federal government because people looked to them to solve the economic crisis.
2. No link, federalism isn't about state power. Environmental law professor Bradley Bobertz explains in 2003 that federalism is simply a concept where power is shared between one central power and several subunits. He continues that federalist systems can give the central government far more power than the subunits or vice versa without an impact on whether the system is federalist.
3. No modeling, government professor Alfred Stepan explains in 1999 that developing countries won't model US federalism in their transition to democracy because they are multinational multilingual regions that aren't as unified as the US was.
4. No impact, John McGarry of the Federal Election Commission explains in 1994 that federalism has a poor track record of regulating conflict because minority groups don't get enough governmental representation, which incentivizes things like secession.
5. Turn, Willy Mutunga at The Nation explains in 2001 that because federalism subjects local governments to taxation by state and national governments, it fuels secessionist conflicts.
6. Turn, federalism makes disasters more destructive. Law professor Stephen Griffin explains in 2007 that because federalism divides power between the state and federal

government, it prevents long term planning and coordination to deal with the effects of natural disasters, pandemics, and terrorist attacks. The WHO finds in 2006 that natural disasters produce chaos that independently increase the spread of disease and kills millions. Ultimately, Victoria Yu at Dartmouth University finds in 2009 that new, uncureable viral strains that can undergo antigenic shifts threaten pandemic-level human extinction if disease spreads.

AT: Democracy

BAD

1. Trying to transition to democracy causes civil war. Political science professor Patrick Regan finds in 2009 that empirically, moving from an autocratic government to an anocratic government that is halfway in between autocracy and democracy dramatically increases the chance of a civil war because anocratic regimes have weak institutions and are vulnerable to demands from citizens to change.
2. Turn, Steven Gilbert at Eastern Michigan University explains in 2008 that historically, so-called US democracy promotion is simply a guise for imperialism that cares more about US resource access than actual democracy, and has resulted in the US overthrowing democratic governments that posed small threats to US interests.
3. Turn, Kevin Fujimoto of the Strategic Studies Institute explains in 2012 that US attempts to aggressively and unilaterally impose democracy worldwide alienates countries that don't share the same values, ultimately undermining US interests and global stability. Security professor Bruce Jones furthers in 2011 that using democracy as a yardstick for cooperation will backfire and create cleavages in the international system, provoking non-democracies to band together and oppose US strategic goals.

GOOD

1. Sean Lynn Jones at the Harvard Belfer Center finds in 1998 that empirically, democracies experience less internal violence, much higher economic growth, and lower famine because the government is accountable to the people.
2. Because democracies answer to their citizens, Larry Diamond of Hoover Institution finds in 1995 that democratic nations don't go to war with each other, don't engage in genocide, don't use weapons of mass destruction, and don't sponsor terrorism.

AT: Oil Spills

1. No impact to oil spills. Selena Ross at AOL explains in 2010 that natural ocean bacteria break down oil when spills happen into water and CO₂, resulting in no oil remaining from a spill within a year.

AT: Resource Wars

1. Resource scarcity doesn't cause war, as David Victor at the Council on Foreign Relations explains in 2008 that resource scarcity is almost never the root cause of conflict; instead, states that already have high tensions start conflict.
2. No impact, resource wars won't happen, as Victor continues in 2008 that resource wars are incredibly rare, and will soon be non-existent, as it's cheaper for wealthy nations to get resources through trade than by starting an expensive war.

AT: Microfinance

1. No impact. Sefa K. Awawory of Monash University finds in 2014 that in a meta-analysis of virtually all Microfinance studies, Microloans were found to have an insignificant, or even negative, impact on poverty or economic growth.
2. Microloans entrench poverty. Kentaro Toyama of the Atlantic writes in 2011 that the largest microfinance bank in Latin America charges annual interest rates of 75-100%, and that virtually all other regional banks' rates are higher. This leads to endless cycles of loans, debt, and poverty, as economist Hugh Sinclair states in 2012 that poor individuals end up having to seek out microloans to pay back the high interest rate microloans they took out previously.

AT: Offshore Balancing

1. Offshore balancing causes war. Thomas Fingar at Stanford University finds in 2014 that US attempts at offshore balancing in the past resulted in both world wars and forced the US to intervene militarily to restore stability. He continues that returning to the strategy would today would guarantee great power instability in Eurasia as countries compete to get ahead in the absence of the US.
2. Empirically offshore balancing causes Middle Eastern war. Paul Salem at the Middle East Journal finds in 2016 that Obama's attempts at offshore balancing in the Middle East created a power vacuum that destabilized the region, resulted in multiple failed governments, and allowed for the resurgence of Al Qaeda and the creation of ISIL because the conventional cost benefit calculations that offshore balancing requires to be effective don't extend to terrorist groups.

CARDS

Most Military Drones Do Not Bomb

Micah Zenko, April, 2012, ["10 Things You Didn't Know About Drones" Foreign Policy.com,

P<http://www.twc.edu/sites/default/files/assets/academicCourseDocs/4.%20Zenko,%2010%20Things%20You%20Didn't%20Know%20About%20Drones.pdf>] AMS, 12-16-2016

Although decapitation strikes may get all the headlines, **the vast majority of the time, drones are used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance** — what the military calls ISR. The U.S. Navy's first high-altitude drone can relay black-and-white photos covering roughly half the Persian Gulf; the Global Hawk's advanced radars make detailed images of the Earth and attempt to sniff out chemical or biological agents for telltale signs of weapons of mass destruction. Soon, the Gorgon Stare drone will "be looking at a whole city, so there will be no way for the adversary to know what we're looking at, and we can see everything," according to Maj. Gen. James O. Poss.

Drones cause widespread anti-American sentiment

McManus 2014 [Doyle McManus is a reporter for the LA Times. "The Drone Warfare Drawbacks." Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times, 5 July 2014.

<<http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mcmanus-column-drones-20140706-column.html>>] //CJC

In an almost-invisible campaign that started modestly under Bush and expanded dramatically under Obama, **the U.S. has launched more than 1,600 drone strikes** in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya and even, in one case, in the Philippines, according to Micah Zenko of the Council on Foreign Relations. Drone strikes may be an efficient way to kill terrorists, but they're no way to make friends. That's one of the messages of a stinging new report issued recently by a panel of experts convened by Washington's independent Stimson Center, a thoroughly establishment group of former officials from both Democratic and Republican administrations. Blue- ribbon commissions in Washington often pull their punches; this one, chaired by retired Army Gen. John P. Abizaid and former Pentagon official Rosa Brooks, didn't. Among its highlights: Just because drone wars have succeeded in killing terrorists doesn't mean they're working. "The Obama administration's heavy reliance on targeted killings as a pillar of U.S. counter-terrorism strategy rests on questionable assumptions and risks increasing instability," the report warns. **After a decade of drone strikes, it notes, we face more Islamic extremists, not fewer. The widespread use of drones has created a backlash around the world, and not only in remote villages in Pakistan or Yemen.** The report quotes retired Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the former U.S. commander in Afghanistan,

warning that the tactic creates resentment “much greater than the average American appreciates.” Reliance on drones for “targeted killing” has allowed the CIA and Pentagon to obscure exactly whom we are fighting.

Drones undermine the war on terror

Thomas Michael **McDonnell**, Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, **2012**, George Washington International Law Review, v. 44, ARTICLE: SOW WHAT YOU REAP? USING PREDATOR AND REAPER DRONES TO CARRY OUT ASSASSINATIONS OR TARGETED KILLINGS OF SUSPECTED ISLAMIC TERRORISTS, p. 299-300

At the very least, there is a reasonable doubt that using drones for targeted killing operations of suspected Islamic terrorists will, in the long run, seriously disable the terrorist organizations they lead. Despite the decapitation of numerous Taliban and al Qaeda leaders and the Obama administration's belief that the strikes have effectively paralyzed al Qaeda in the Pakistan tribal areas, there is some evidence to suggest that such operations might actually strengthen such organizations both internally and externally. Employed against these targets, the unchivalrous, seemingly cowardly, method of warfare might result in greater support for terrorists and more terrorist recruits in the Islamic world. Perhaps even more important, compiling hit lists and then using a machine remotely operated from a distant land, to take the life of listed suspected terrorists appears much more like murder than honorable combat and, thereby, undermines world public order. Furthermore despite their precision, drone missile attacks often endanger non-combatants. The United States and its allies should restrict the targeted killing of suspected Islamic terrorists to the exceptional case where a militant poses an imminent threat to the United States, allied troops or civilians, and, as a matter of policy, if not crystallized, international law, ensure that innocent civilians be spared.

Drone Strikes increase vengeance terrorist attacks

Bergen 2011 [Peter, and Jennifer Rowland. "CIA Drone Strikes and the Taliban." Talibanistan (2011): 229-36. Web. <<http://ftp.iza.org/dp6262.pdf>>] //CJC

For the Taliban in Afghanistan the reaction functions we estimate are of the form, 11 where DS_t and DU_t represent drone strikes which were successful and which were not successful in killing a militant leader at time t , respectively. p is The estimation results are reported in table 10, with the second column giving the estimation results from the incidence specification and the fourth column giving the estimation results from the levels specification. We find that there is no large and significant impact of unsuccessful drone strikes on terrorist attacks by the Taliban in Afghanistan, but a terrorist attack in Afghanistan is 8.8% more likely five days after a successful drone strike. This indicates that vengeance effects may be particularly strong when drone strikes are able to kill militant leaders for Taliban violence in Afghanistan.

Drones kill 8-15 civilians for every one dead terrorist

Bashir 2014 [Hira Bashir leads data analytics at Pakistan Body Count. She has co-authored the book, Drones and Pakistan. "International Law and Drone Strikes in Pakistan." (2014).

<<http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2015/The%20Impact%20of%20Drone%20Strikes%20in%20Pakistan.pdf>>] //CJC

If the intensity of **drone attacks** and suicide bombing is analyzed from year 2007 to year 2009, **94% of the time, 15 civilians died** (either by suicide bombing or a drone strike) **for every one terrorist killed by a drone strike.** From year 2010 to year 2012, **eight civilians were killed for every one terrorist.** President Obama has called the presence of Al-Qaeda in the border areas of Pakistan a cancer, at the same time urging Pakistan to fight the cancer of extremism. In light of the data presented in this paper, we should question the appropriateness of this metaphor: Do the ills that plague Pakistan not include drone warfare and its deadly effects on civilians, for whose deaths no one has been held accountable?

Drones smash terrorists

Lawrence Kapp, September 2, Coordinator Specialist in Military Manpower Policy, et al, September 2, 2016, Congressional Research Services, How Big Should an Army Be? Considerations for Congress, <https://fas.org/sqp/crs/natsec/R44612.pdf>

A focused, light-footprint approach proved devastatingly effective against core al-Qaeda, for example. Obama's first term saw an estimated **400 U.S. drone strikes**, compared to roughly 50 during Bush's entire presidency. Those strikes, along with SOF raids and other tools, **killed dozens of al-Qaeda leaders and hundreds of midlevel operatives, and severely disrupted al-Qaeda's operations.** "Drones have turned al-Qaeda's command and training structures into a liability," wrote terrorism and Middle East expert Daniel Byman, "forcing the group to choose between having no leaders and risking dead leaders."³⁶ There were other successes, too. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) took a beating from drone strikes, assistance to local security forces, and other light-footprint methods prior to 2015. Similarly, and although **the rise of IS was a tremendous setback for U.S. policy, a light-footprint strategy centered on airpower**, SOF, and other enablers allowed Syrian and Iraqi partner-forces to roll back IS gains from 2014 onward. By late 2016, **U.S. operations** had helped those partners liberate key points from Manbij to Fallujah, while also **killing perhaps 45,000 IS fighters, in exchange for a handful of American combat deaths.**³⁷ In these cases, Obama's approach leveraged unique U.S. capabilities to wage a cost-effective War on Terror.

Drones save more lives than they harm

Weiner and Sherman 2014 (Robert and Tom; Drones spare troops, have powerful impact; Oct 9; www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/oct/09/drones-troops-impact/; PSR)

A note from Osama bin Laden discovered at his Abbottabad residence by U.S. Seal Team Six during the U.S. raid on May 2, 2011, **revealed**, "Brothers said they were frankly exhausted from the enemy's air bombardments." Osama bin Laden hated drones, because they work. **Drones save American troops from risk of death, kill far fewer civilians than ground troops operations, and make our military more effective against enemy combatants.** Regardless, drones are often decried by many liberals as too invasive, too impersonal and too deadly to innocent civilians. Southern California has been a national leader of the drone industry, ever since the San Diego-based General Atomics pioneered the first Predator drone development more than two decades ago. Currently, 13 California drone manufacturers operate across the state, including 3D Robotics of San Diego and Datron Communication Systems of Vista. Pentagon officials initially purchased 10 drones from General Atomics — that number has now swelled to over 10,000 drones

currently under Pentagon control, according to The Washington Post, and unknown numbers in CIA hands; a Defense News report estimates at least 80. "The defense industry has been a huge incubator of jobs in California, especially Southern California," said Assemblyman Steven Bradford, D-Gardena, last year. "We want these well-paying, high-tech manufacturing jobs to continue to grow here in California." Californians, whether liberal or conservative, should champion drone programs that save American troops from having a larger footprint and having to put their lives in danger in foreign territories. Drones reduce ground troops, yet they have as powerful an impact. Hillary Clinton points out, in her recent memoir "Hard Choices," that during her tenure as secretary of state, drone programs were "one of the most effective and controversial elements of the Obama administration's strategy against Al Qaeda and like-minded terrorists ... bin Laden himself worried about the heavy losses that drones were inflicting." It is a key plus for drones that U.S. troops are three times safer from friendly fire attacks when deployed in war zones covered by drones compared with traditional warfare. During the Gulf War, American casualties totaled 382 in-theater deaths, of which nearly 62 percent were due to either friendly fire or other accidents, according to Navy research. However, during the current age of drones, only 21.5 percent of casualties are classified as "non-hostile," according to Pentagon stats. America and our allies are sometimes literally our own worst enemy on the battlefield. Drones protect our troops from their own traditional battlefield errors. In a letter to President Obama in 2012, 25 congressmen stated, "We are concerned that the use of such "signature" strikes could raise the risk of killing innocent civilians or individuals who may have no relationship to attacks on the United States." They are just wrong. In fact, it is a myth that drones disproportionately kill civilians. After a review of the deaths inflicted by American drones since 2004, the Pakistani Defense Ministry concluded that citizen fatalities occurred at a rate of 3 percent of total kills — a total of 67 innocent civilians.

Most recent drone strikes in Pakistan have 1.5% civilian casualty rate

Lewis 2013 [Michael W. "Drones: Actually the Most Humane Form of Warfare Ever." The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, 21 Aug. 2013. Web. 05 Dec. 2016.

<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/drones-actually-the-most-humane-form-of-warfare-ever/278746/>] //CJC

How do we know that this has succeeded? Bowden mentions studies done by several independent organizations that have assessed civilian casualties caused by drones in Pakistan. The three most well respected and independent sources on this issue are the Long War Journal, the New America Foundation and The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ). Among these, the U.K.-based TBIJ has consistently produced the highest estimates of civilian casualties for drone strikes. According to TBIJ, between January 2012 and July 2013, there were approximately 65 drone strikes in Pakistan, which they estimate to have killed a minimum of 308 people. Yet of these casualties, even TBIJ estimates that only 4 were civilians. This would amount to a civilian casualty rate of less than 1.5 percent, meaning that only 1 in 65 casualties caused by drones over that 19-month period was a civilian. This speaks to drones effective discrimination between civilian and military targets that no other weapons system can possibly match. Another indication that drones cause fewer civilian casualties than traditional warfare was provided by Hamid Karzai in 2011. The U.S. was employing all types of units in Afghanistan, ground troops, airstrikes, artillery and drones. But the source of friction with the Afghan government was not drones but rather special forces night raids. Karzai proclaimed that he would withhold further cooperation until his government was given greater control over night raids. Drones did not cause him or the Afghan people any appreciable concern.

Drones empirically kill tons of terrorists and make it harder for them to train and communicate

Byman 2013 [Daniel L. Byman is a researcher and writer at the Brookings Institute, "Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice." Brookings. N.p., 17 June 2013. Web. 07 Dec. 2016. <<https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-drones-work-the-case-for-washingtons-weapon-of-choice/>>] //CJC

The Obama administration relies on **drones** for one simple reason: they **work**. According to data compiled by the New America Foundation, since Obama has been in the White House, U.S. drones have killed an estimated 3,300 al Qaeda, Taliban, and other jihadist operatives in Pakistan and Yemen. That number includes over 50 senior leaders of al Qaeda and the Taliban—top figures who are not easily replaced. In 2010, Osama bin Laden warned his chief aide, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, who was later killed by a drone strike in the Waziristan region of Pakistan in 2011, that when experienced leaders are eliminated, the result is "the rise of lower leaders who are not as experienced as the former leaders" and who are prone to errors and miscalculations. And drones also hurt terrorist organizations when they eliminate operatives who are lower down on the food chain but who boast special skills: passport forgers, bomb makers, recruiters, and fundraisers. **Drones have also undercut terrorists' ability to communicate and to train new recruits. In order to avoid attracting drones, al Qaeda and Taliban operatives try to avoid using electronic devices or gathering in large numbers. A tip sheet found among jihadists in Mali advised militants to "maintain complete silence of all wireless contacts" and "avoid gathering in open areas."** **Leaders, however, cannot give orders when they are incommunicado, and training on a large scale is nearly impossible when a drone strike could wipe out an entire group of new recruits. Drones have turned al Qaeda's command and training structures into a liability, forcing the group to choose between having no leaders and risking dead leaders.**

ISIS and Al-Qaeda don't pose a threat – their tactics are not new and won't be catastrophic

Ward 15 - Alex Ward, Assistant Director of the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council where he works on U.S. defense policy, strategy and military affairs., 5/29/15("How Much Does ISIS Really Threaten America?," published by How Much does ISIS really Threaten America, Available online at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-much-does-isis-really-threaten-america-12993?page=2>] //CJC

While some concern is warranted, **there is no need for alarm** on the scale we are currently witnessing. The ISIS threat is overhyped, giving the group more power than it deserves while distracting from bigger threats. More to the point, **there is no new phase of terrorism, just the same phase**—but with a different ability to promote use of usual tactics.

Indeed, the threats facing the American homeland today, mostly of the "lone wolf" variety, are threats the United States has faced for years. What is needed now is a new way of dealing with an old problem.

In an era of increased connectivity, the ability of terrorists to contact lone-wolf candidates is greater than ever—and American leaders are worried. Terrorist organizations, like ISIS, have used the means of this hyper-connected era, especially social media, to great effect. A Brookings Institution study showed that ISIS has a “sophisticated and innovative methodology” that makes use of the “at least 46,000 ISIS-supporting Twitter accounts.” This social media strategy—and the appeal of ISIS’ cause—has attracted lone wolves to carry out strikes in the West, with the brutal attack in Paris so far being the most significant. The United States is worried sick about a potential terrorist-inspired lone wolf operation on its own soil and is scrambling to tighten security at military bases and malls alike.

In addition, ISIS’ mastery of social media and messaging inspired a cadre of foreign fighters and people sympathetic to its mission. Many fighters have gone to the battlefields in Iraq, Syria, and beyond in hopes of establishing an Islamic state. Nicholas Rasmussen, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, called the rate of foreign fighters traveling to the area “unprecedented.”

The worry for Western governments is that these fighters will obtain advanced asymmetric warfare training and use them to great effect back in their home states. The thirty to forty Americans who have traveled to the Middle East—a dozen or so who may have joined ISIS—worry U.S. law enforcement because, upon their return, they pose a threat to homeland security.

These trends are certainly concerning, but they do not equate to a “new phase” of terrorism for the U.S. homeland. The reasons why are straightforward.

For one, **ISIS’ main focus is consolidating gains and grabbing new territory** in Syria and Iraq. **What it has been able to do** there certainly constitutes a new phase in the way terrorists operate, but **does not** radically **change the danger calculus** on American land. Indeed, **ISIS is not yet fully focused on bringing chaos to the West**. Yes, it wants to eventually destroy Western targets, but that is currently a lesser concern for ISIS. And, the **lone wolf attacks** the group does inspire will **continue to be smaller and less catastrophic** than has been seen in America’ recent past. Further, **al-Qaeda**—the bigger threat to the United States—**is not at the capacity level at which it once was** due to the United States. **Its ability to pull off a spectacular attack like 9/11 is substantially reduced**, although not impossible. So while the United States should still be vigilant for a large-scale attack, the country can breathe a little easier.

It is also important to note that **what is happening now** with ISIS and many other anti-Western terrorist groups **is not necessarily a new phenomenon**. While ISIS certainly has an amazing ability to inspire action via social media, **the appeal of fighting for an ideological cause has been around since time immemorial**. The Iraq and Afghanistan Wars in the 2000s, the **Afghanistan War** in the late 1970s and early 1980s, **and even the Spanish Civil War** of the 1930s **are just some examples of when foreigners came running** in order to help a cause for which they believed they should die. As for lone wolf or smaller-scale attacks in the United States, **the country has dealt with these kinds of issues for a long time**. Even today the United States experiences “one attack, on average, every thirty-four days.” In essence, the fear from returning foreign fighters should not scare us any more than current domestic terrorists do because they are already here and acting. To claim that ISIS is currently more dangerous to American targets seems off, although a lack of a coherent policy to stem the group could change that calculus.

Al Qaeda does not pose a threat – lack of funds and leadership – drones have empirically been successful in reducing the number of attacks.

Lee 15 - Kangil Lee, research analyst at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research , 2015("DOES AL QAEDA CENTRAL STILL MATTER?," published by Revista UNISCI, Available online at <https://www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-72478/UNISCIDP37-2LEE.pdf>] //CJC

However, scholars who argue the demise of Al Qaeda Central seem to prefer a much simpler approach that measures al Qaeda's operational capability by a couple of simple factors. There are two main pieces of evidence used to support the argument that Al Qaeda has been defeated. Firstly, the death of bin Laden and the demise of Al Qaeda's core group of members, especially members of the Shura council. Secondly, the absence of terrorism in the West that Al Qaeda Central is involved in. These are central pieces of evidence that points towards al Qaeda's demise, which suggest Al Qaeda Central is incapable of carrying out any attacks.

For example, in 2012, Peter Bergen argued **Al Qaeda is defeated because CIA drone policy** in Afghanistan (Al Qaeda Central's stronghold for long time), successfully **eliminated 28 Al Qaeda key members** especially those on the Shura council revealed by Jamal al fadl, a former Al Qaeda member. Bergen said **as a result, Al Qaeda only has one senior leader left**, al Zawahiri, **who lacks charisma**, and who took over the group after the death of Osama bin Laden.³⁶ According to Bergen, **Al Qaeda Central has never launched a successful terrorist attack in the West since 9/11** except for the 7/7 London bombing that killed 52 commuters. Even so-called affiliates and lone wolves inspired by Al Qaeda have only killed 17 people in the United States since 9/11.

Sageman backs up this assertion, and in 2011 added to Bergen's claim, arguing **a comprehensive survey of global neo-jihadi terrorism in the West highlights that there were 60 plots** over the past 20 years, perpetrated by 46 different networks. Of these **only 14 successfully inflicted any casualties, and only two were perpetrated by al-Qaeda** proper in the past 20 years. Over the past five years, global neo-jihadi and al-Qaeda terrorism in the West has been in decline and the vast majority of the plots were perpetrated by independent home-grown groups, inspired by al-Qaeda but not linked to it or its allies.³⁷ Many terrorist attempts launched by like-minded terrorist groups or individuals have not been traced back to Afghanistan. Moreover, he says, there is no evidence Al Qaeda Central was involved in any terrorist plots since 9/11. **Al Qaeda Central currently does not run a training centre** for terrorists, **and the group is not capable of funding terrorist attacks** anymore due to the loss of its financial resources. There has been no global neo-jihadi terrorist casualty in the West in the past four years and none in the U.S. in the past eight years.

According to Javier Jordán, terrorism expert and the author of *The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign against Al Qaeda Central: A Case Study*, US drone policy managed to oppress the group's operational capability. Jordán claims that there were 136 terrorist incidents from 2001 to 2012, and Al Qaeda Central was involved in only 33 cases out of 136, 5 in the United States and 28 in Europe. From 2001 to 2006, Al Qaeda Central was quite active in plotting terrorist attacks, as 20 incidents were conducted during the first half of that period. Whereas, Al Qaeda Central's activity came to a lull especially after 2007, the year US drone activity was stepped up in Afghanistan. Even 13 cases of attacks between 2007 and 2012, did not cause any casualty or damage to Western society. Jordán concludes the complexity and lethality of Al Qaeda Central's terrorist actions on American and European soil have fallen dramatically.³⁸ Jordán evaluates **Al Qaeda endured immense structural damage from the CIA drone campaign**. As a result, **Al Qaeda lost control over affiliates in strategic and operational positions**, and switched into a significantly decentralized organization **that has tried to recover its influence to affiliates but due to difficulties in communicating** with affiliates, their efforts have largely failed. Now Al Qaeda Central has no or very little capability to plot and launch terrorist attacks, probably none outside of Afghanistan and Pakistan.³⁹

After the US drone policy commenced, approximately 60 key members of Al Qaeda were killed by drones. It is unclear exactly how many Al Qaeda members died in this campaign, although Jordán and Sageman presumed around 60. As matter of fact, even bin Laden was concerned about the loss of experienced members and his anxiety is well expressed in one of his documents seized from the Abbottabad raid. It is important to have the leadership in a faraway location to gain expertise in all areas. **When this experienced leadership**

dies, this would lead to the rise of lower leaders who are not as experienced as the former leaders and this would lead to the repeat of mistakes.⁴⁰

Although the effect of the targeted killing policy has never been proved, the killing of key members in the organization seems to have caused some level of disconnection between groups. As per bin Laden's recommendation to avoid wiretapping or signal intercepting by CIA, Al Qaeda members prefer hand-written letters to communicate with each other. This is safe but it takes time to communicate especially with affiliates outside of Afghanistan. Indeed, along with beginning of drone program, al Qaeda's terrorism operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan have significantly decreased since 2008. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) shows that only one terrorist attack occurred in Pakistan after 2008, conducted by Al Qaeda Central.⁴¹ Nevertheless, we have no idea what has brought on the decrease in the number of terrorism incidents.

Money in politics does not buy votes - if it did it would be way higher and empirical evidence denies this

Stephen **Ansolabehere**, John de Figueiredo, James M. **Snyder** June, 2002 [Department of Political Science Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?," https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/18103/CF_JEP_Final.pdf] MJS 3-27-2017

Thirty years ago, Gordon Tullock posed a provocative puzzle: **considering the value of public policies at stake and the reputed influence of campaign contributions in policy-making, why is there so little money in U.S. politics?** In this paper, we argue that **campaign contributions are not a form of policy-buying, but are rather a form of political participation and consumption.** We summarize the data on campaign spending, and show through our descriptive statistics and our econometric analysis that individuals, not special interests, are the main source of campaign contributions. Moreover, we demonstrate that campaign giving is a normal good, dependent upon income, and campaign contributions as a percent of GDP have not risen appreciably in over 100 years- if anything, they have probably fallen. **We then show that only one in four studies from the previous literature support the popular notion that contributions buy legislators' votes.** Finally, we illustrate that **when one controls for unobserved constituent and legislator effects, there is little relationship between money and legislator votes.** Thus, the question is not why there is so little money politics, but rather why organized interests give at all. We conclude by offering potential answers to this question

Spending among big donors specifically has skyrocketed

U Chicago Stigler Center, 5-2-2016 [, "Historical Comparison Shows the Extent of Growth in Political Contributions from Big Donors," Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, <https://research.chicagobooth.edu/stigler/indexes/campaign-financing-capture-index/campaign-financing-capture-historical-comparisons>] MJS 4-12-2017

The 2016 presidential election is widely expected to be the most expensive election in U.S. history. **With campaign expenditures rising to unprecedented levels, evidence is pointing to a growing concentration among campaign donors, with fewer and fewer donors supplying a growing share of political contributions.**

As part of the Stigler Center's Campaign Financing Capture Index—a project tracking the attempts of large political contributors to affect public policy by focusing on the fraction of total funds raised from large donors—we compared the fundraising records of presidential candidates during the 2016 election cycle to candidates' fundraising during the corresponding periods of the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections. The comparison shows the extent of the **rapid growth in political contributions from big donors during the last eight**

years. The Stigler Center's analysis of the latest available fundraising filings from this election's candidates shows that presidential hopefuls raised \$391.1 million in donations above \$5,000, and \$297 million from donors giving more than \$100,000 (as of late March). At this point in the 2008 race, presidential candidates raised only \$3.1 million from donations above \$5,000, and donations above \$100,000 were virtually non-existent. More than a third of total contributions raised by candidates from both parties during the 2016 election cycle have come from donors who gave more than \$5,000. In contrast, \$533.9 million out of the \$537.1 million in individual contributions that were raised by presidential candidates through March 2008 came from donations below \$5,000. **Political contributions from big donors in the 2016 election cycle are 91 percent higher than the large donations raised during the corresponding period in the 2012**

presidential race. In March 2012, donations above \$100,000 represented 41 percent of large campaign contributions—in the 2016 election this figure is currently at 76 percent. A comparison of the 2008, 2012 and 2016 races shows that the growing luster of big donors extends to both parties. During this election cycle, contributions above \$100,000 account for 19 percent of donations to Democratic candidates, and 40.5 percent of donations raised by Republican candidates. During the corresponding period in the 2012 race, those figures were 2.8 percent and 29.7 percent, respectively. Among Republicans, donations above \$5,000 now represent 54.4 percent of all contributions to presidential candidates. At this point in the 2008 race, donations above \$5,000 represented less than 1 percent of contributions to presidential campaigns in both parties. From the beginning of the race through March 2008, Democratic presidential candidates raised \$403.4 million from donors giving less than \$5,000, and \$2.2 million from large donors. In the 2016 election cycle, they have raised \$113.5 million so far from large donors, and \$361.3 million from donors giving less than \$5,000. Among Republicans, the picture becomes more skewed. At this point in the 2008 race, Republican presidential candidates raised only \$900,000 from large donors giving more than \$5,000 (less than the Democrats). In 2012, this number grew to \$88 million (still much less than Democrats). In the 2016 cycle, Republican candidates have raised \$277.6 million from large donors, surpassing the \$232.5 million they raised in donations below \$5,000 and outpacing Democrats among large donors. The Campaign Financing Capture Index analyzes the distribution of political contributions to presidential candidates and takes into account individual contributions and contributions made to the PACs, super PACs and joint fundraising committees that support each candidate. The idea behind the index is that large political contributions represent more than the mere expression of political preference, and are more likely meant to influence policy in favor of the donor's interest. When the percentage of funds raised from large donors is significant, as it has been in recent years, this problem becomes acute.

Risk of nuclear terror is exaggerated – no incentives due to long time frame, resource requirements, and it's contradictory to their cause.

Weiss 15 - Leonard Weiss, visiting scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). He is also a national advisory board member of the Center for Arms control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, 11/27/2015("On Fear and Nuclear Terrorism," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 71, Issue 2, 2015,] //CJC

While fear of **nuclear** weapons is rational, its extension to **terrorism has been a vehicle for fear-mongering that is unjustified by available data.** Some writers have recognized this lack of data on the subject,² and their works have started a lively debate, with pushback by proponents of the more conventional alarmist view (see Mowatt-Larssen, 2010). This debate on nuclear terrorism tends to distract from events that raise the risk of nuclear war, the consequences of which would far exceed the results of terrorist attacks. And the historical record shows that the war risk is real.

Despite the development and deployment of command-and-control systems in all nations with nuclear weapons (some more sophisticated than others), the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated that miscalculation, misinterpretation, and misinformation could lead to a "close call" regarding nuclear war, and that the possibility of a war being launched under conditions of confrontation cannot be dismissed. Accordingly, most analysts believe that reducing the motivation of non-weapon states to acquire nuclear weapons and increasing the motivation of weapon states to reduce and eliminate their nuclear arsenals is a worthwhile ongoing goal.

Achieving this goal has been helped by a number of cases in which countries have halted nuclear weapon programs or activities, or dismantled weapons in their possession.³ In these cases, the calculus dictated that security would be enhanced by giving up nuclear weapons, thus reducing the likelihood of becoming a target of another country's nukes or motivating a rival to acquire such weapons.

If the fear of nuclear war has thus had some positive effects, the fear of nuclear terrorism has had mainly negative effects on the lives of millions of people around the world, including in the United States, and even affects negatively the prospects for a more peaceful world. Although there has been much commentary on the interest that Osama bin Laden, when he was alive, reportedly expressed in obtaining nuclear weapons (see Mowatt-Larssen, 2010), and some terrorists no doubt desire to obtain such weapons, evidence of any terrorist group working seriously toward the theft of nuclear weapons or the acquisition of such weapons by other means is virtually nonexistent. This may be due to a combination of reasons. Terrorists understand that *it is not hard to terrorize a population without committing mass murder*. In 2002, a single sniper in the Washington, DC area, operating within his own automobile and with one accomplice, killed 10 people and changed the behavior of virtually the entire populace of the city over a period of three weeks by instilling fear of being a randomly chosen shooting victim when out shopping.

Terrorists who believe the commission of violence helps their cause have access to many explosive materials and conventional weapons to ply their "trade." If public sympathy is important to their cause, an apparent plan or commission of mass murder is not going to help them, and indeed *will make their enemies even more implacable*, reducing the prospects of achieving their goals. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists is not like the acquisition of conventional weapons; it *requires significant time, planning, resources, and expertise, with no guarantees that an acquired device would work*. It requires putting aside at least some aspects of a group's more immediate activities and goals for an attempted operation that no terrorist group has previously accomplished. While absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence (as then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld kept reminding us during the search for Saddam's nonexistent nuclear weapons), it is reasonable to conclude that the fear of nuclear terrorism has swamped realistic consideration of the threat. As Brian Jenkins, a longtime observer of terrorist groups, wrote in 2008:

They can't steal a weapon – dozens of safeguards and international collaboration account for loose nukes and irrational states

Weiss 15 - Leonard Weiss, visiting scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). He is also a national advisory board member of the Center for Arms control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, 11/27/2015("On Fear and Nuclear Terrorism," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 71, Issue 2, 2015] //CJC

Stealing nukes. Nothing is better protected in a nuclear weapon state than the weapons themselves, which have multiple layers of safeguards that, in the United States, include intelligence and surveillance, electronic locks (including so-called "permissive action links" that prevent detonation unless a code is entered into the lock), gated and locked

storage facilities, armed guards, and teams of elite responders if an attempt at theft were to occur. We know that most weapon states have such protections, and there is no reason to believe that such protections are missing in the remaining states, since no weapon state would want to put itself at risk of an unintended nuclear detonation of its own weapons by a malevolent agent. Thus, the likelihood of an unauthorized agent secretly planning a theft, without being discovered, and getting access to weapons with the intent and physical ability to carry them off in the face of such layers of protection is extremely low—but it isn't impossible, especially in the case where the thief is an insider.

The insider threat helped give credibility to the stories, circulating about 20 years ago, that there were “loose nukes” in the USSR, based on some statements by a Soviet general who claimed the regime could not account for more than 40 “suitcase nukes” that had been built. The Russian government denied the claim, and at this point there is no evidence that any nukes were ever loose. Now, it is unclear if any such weapon would even work after 20 years of corrosion of both the nuclear and non-nuclear materials in the device and the radioactive decay of certain isotopes.

Because of the large number of terrorist groups operating in its geographic vicinity, Pakistan is frequently suggested as a possible candidate for scenarios in which a terrorist group either seizes a weapon via collaboration with insiders sympathetic to its cause, or in which terrorists “inherit” nuclear weapons by taking over the arsenal of a failed nuclear state that has devolved into chaos. Attacks by a terrorist group on a Pakistani military base, at Kamra, which is believed to house nuclear weapons in some form, have been referenced in connection with such security concerns (Nelson and Hussain, 2012). However, the Kamra base contained US fighter planes, including F-16s, used to bomb Taliban bases in tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, so the planes, not nuclear weapons, were the likely target of the terrorists, and in any case the mission was a failure. Moreover, Pakistan is not about to collapse, and the Pakistanis are known to have received major international assistance in technologies for protecting their weapons from unauthorized use, store them in somewhat disassembled fashion at multiple locations, and have a sophisticated nuclear security structure in place (see Gregory, 2013; Khan, 2012). However, the weapons are assembled at times of high tension in the region, and, to keep a degree of uncertainty in their location, they are moved from place to place, making them more vulnerable to seizure at such times (Goldberg and Ambinder, 2011). (It should be noted that US nuclear weapons were subject to such risks during various times when the weapons traveled US highways in disguised trucks and accompanying vehicles, but such travel and the possibility of terrorist seizure was never mentioned publicly.) Such scenarios of seizure in Pakistan would require a major security breakdown within the army leading to a takeover of weapons by a nihilistic terrorist group with little warning, while army loyalists along with India and other interested parties (like the United States) stand by and do not intervene. This is not a particularly realistic scenario, but it's also not a reason to conclude that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is of no concern. It is, not only because of an internal threat, but especially because it raises the possibility of nuclear war with India. For this and other reasons, intelligence agencies in multiple countries spend considerable resources tracking the Pakistani nuclear situation to reduce the likelihood of surprises. But any consideration of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal does bring home (once again) the folly of US policy in the 1980s, when stopping the Pakistani nuclear program was put on a back burner in order to prosecute the Cold War against the Soviets in Afghanistan (which ultimately led to the establishment of Al Qaeda). Some of the loudest voices expressing concern about nuclear terrorism belong to former senior government officials who supported US assistance to the mujahideen and the accompanying diminution of US opposition to Pakistan's nuclear activities.

States won't give terrorists nukes – there are no guarantees terrorists will cooperate and only results in the state becoming a nuclear target.

Weiss 15 - Leonard Weiss, visiting scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). He is also a national advisory board member of the Center

for Arms control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, 11/27/2015("On Fear and Nuclear Terrorism," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 71, Issue 2, 2015,] //CJC

Acquiring nukes as a gift. Following the shock of 9/11, government officials and the media imagined many scenarios in which terrorists obtain nuclear weapons; one of those scenarios involves a weapon state using a terrorist group for delivery of a nuclear weapon. There are at least two reasons why this scenario is unlikely: First, once a weapon state loses control of a weapon, *it cannot be sure the weapon will be used* by the terrorist group *as intended*. Second, the state cannot be sure that the transfer of the *weapon has been undetected either before or after the fact of its detonation* (see Lieber and Press, 2013). The use of the weapon by a terrorist group will ultimately result in the transferring nation becoming a nuclear target just as if it had itself detonated the device. This is a powerful deterrent to such a transfer, making the transfer a low-probability event.

It is impossible for terrorists to build a nuke – hundreds of challenges

Weiss 15 - Leonard Weiss, visiting scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). He is also a national advisory board member of the Center for Arms control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, 11/27/2015("On Fear and Nuclear Terrorism," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 71, Issue 2, 2015] //CJC

Manufacturing a nuclear weapon. To accomplish this, a terrorist group would have to obtain an appropriate amount of one of the two most popular materials for nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium separated from fuel used in a production reactor or a power reactor. Weapon-grade plutonium is found in weapon manufacturing facilities in nuclear weapon states and is very highly protected until it is inserted in a weapon. Reactor-grade plutonium, although still capable of being weaponized, is less protected, and in that sense is a more attractive target for a terrorist, especially since it has been produced and stored in prodigious quantities in a number of nuclear weapon states and non-weapon states, particularly Japan.

But terrorist use of plutonium for a nuclear explosive device would require the construction of an implosion weapon, requiring the fashioning of an appropriate explosive lens of TNT, a notoriously difficult technical problem. And if a high nuclear yield (much greater than 1 kiloton) is desired, the use of reactor-grade plutonium would require a still more sophisticated design. Moreover, if the plutonium is only available through chemical separation from some (presumably stolen) spent fuel rods, additional technical complications present themselves. There is at least one study showing that a small team of people with the appropriate technical skills and equipment could, in principle, build a plutonium-based nuclear explosive device (Mark et al., 1986). But even if one discounts the high probability that the plan would be discovered at some stage (missing plutonium or spent fuel rods would put the authorities and intelligence operations under high alert), translating this into a real-world situation suggests an extremely low probability of technical success. More likely, according to one well-known weapon designer,⁴ would be the death of the person or persons in the attempt to build the device.

There is the possibility of an insider threat; in one example, a team of people working at a reactor or reprocessing site could conspire to steal some material and try to hide the diversion as MUF (materials unaccounted for) within the nuclear safeguards system. But this scenario would require intimate knowledge of the materials accounting system on which safeguards in that state are based and adds another layer of complexity to an operation with low probability of success.

The situation is different in the case of using highly enriched uranium, which presents fewer technical challenges. Here an implosion design is not necessary, and a “gun type” design is the more likely approach. Fear of this scenario has sometimes been promoted in the literature via the quotation of a famous statement by nuclear physicist Luis Alvarez that dropping a subcritical amount of HEU onto another subcritical amount from a distance of five feet could result in a nuclear yield. The probability of such a yield (and its size) would depend on the geometry of the HEU components and the amount of material. More likely than a substantial nuclear explosion from such a scenario would be a criticality accident that would release an intense burst of radiation, killing persons in the immediate vicinity, or (even less likely) a low-yield nuclear “fizzle” that could be quite damaging locally (like a large TNT explosion) but also carry a psychological effect because of its nuclear dimension.

In any case, since the critical mass of a bare metal perfect sphere of pure U-235 is approximately 56 kilograms, **stealing that much highly enriched material** (and getting away without detection, an armed fight, or a criticality accident) **is a major problem for any thief** and one significantly greater than the stealing of small amounts of HEU and lower-enriched material that has been reported from time to time over the past two decades, mostly from former Soviet sites that have since had their security greatly strengthened. Moreover, fashioning the material into a form more useful or convenient for explosive purposes could likely mean a need for still more material than suggested above, plus a means for machining it, as would be the case for HEU fuel assemblies from a research reactor. In a recent paper, physics professor B. C. Reed discusses the feasibility of terrorists building a low-yield, gun-type fission weapon, but admittedly avoids the issue of whether the terrorists would likely have the technical ability to carry feasibility to realization and whether the terrorists are likely to be successful in stealing the needed material and hiding their project as it proceeds (Reed, 2014). But this is the crux of the nuclear terrorism issue. There is no argument about feasibility, which has been accepted for decades, even for plutonium-based weapons, ever since Ted Taylor first raised it in the early 1970s and a Senate subcommittee held hearings in the late 1970s on a weapon design created by a Harvard dropout from information he obtained from the public section of the Los Alamos National Laboratory library (Fialka, 1978). Likewise, no one can deny the terrible consequences of a nuclear explosion. The question is the level of risk, and what steps are acceptable in a democracy for reducing it.

Although the attention in the literature given to nuclear terrorism scenarios involving HEU would suggest major attempts to obtain such material by terrorist groups, **there is only one known case of a major theft** of HEU. It involves a US government contractor processing HEU for the US Navy in Apollo, Pennsylvania in the 1970s **at a time when security and materials accounting were extremely lax. The theft was almost surely carried out by agents of the Israeli government** with the probable involvement of a person or persons working for the contractor, **not a sub-national terrorist group** intent on making its own weapons (Gilinsky and Mattson, 2010). The circumstances under which this theft occurred were unique, and there was significant information about the contractor’s relationship to Israel that should have rung alarm bells and would do so today. Although it involved a government and not a sub-national group, the theft underscores the importance of security and accounting of nuclear materials, especially because the technical requirements for making an HEU weapon are less daunting than for a plutonium weapon, and the probability of success by a terrorist group, though low, is certainly greater than zero. Over the past two decades, there has been a significant effort to increase protection of such materials, particularly in recent years through the efforts of nongovernmental organizations like the International Panel on Fissile Materials⁶ and advocates like Matthew Bunn working within the Obama administration (Bunn and Newman, 2008), though the administration has apparently not seen the need to make the materials as secure as the weapons themselves.

The US will always intervene in intrastate conflicts to pursue its interests

Bennett 2015 [Hailey Bennett is a BA in political science from James Madison University, “Causes of Third Party Military Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts”, *James Madison University*, <<http://commons.lib.jmu.edu/honors201019/7/>>] //CJC

Since the conclusion of World War II, the number of expansive interstate wars has decreased while devastating intrastate wars and conflicts have increased exponentially. The Cold War ushered in an era of international stability in the bipolar balance of power, but proxy wars, wars of succession and independence, genocide and civil war made the era anything but peaceful. These conflicts proved to be breeding grounds for third party military interventions, which increased simultaneously. In this thesis, I attempted to determine what factors encouraged third party states to intervene militarily in the affairs of other states in the post-World War II era. I conducted a mixed methods approach, incorporating statistical analyses and case studies to identify global and specific trends in intervention. The cross-national statistical analyses include logit and ordered probit analyses and support the role of threat to influence in the international system, power discrepancy, alliance capability and economic conditions of the crisis actor as significant factors to decision-making. On the other hand, the case studies focus on three cases of U.S. intervention (or lack of) across time. They are Lebanon from 1982-1984, Algeria in 1992 and Libya in 2011. The results of the case studies support factors such as threat to influence, media attention and previous successful interventions in the crisis state as causes of U.S. military intervention. Ultimately, I establish that the United States will pursue interventions for the sake of its national interests abroad.

Perceived higher chance of intervention deters civil war outbreak (use a cred/perception/commitment link)

Cunningham 2015 [David Cunningham, professor of government at the University of Maryland. "Preventing Civil War: How the potential for international intervention can deter conflict onset", *Peace Research Institute*, http://www.davidcunninghampolisci.com/uploads/4/2/9/7/42974855/cunningham_preventing_civil_war_feb112015.pdf] //CJC

Civil wars occur in some countries at some times and not in others. I examine how the potential for large-scale external intervention can prevent civil wars. I argue that intervention by external states in civil war can be so overwhelming that it reduces one side's probability of victory to essentially zero. When dissidents anticipate this type of intervention on the side of government, they anticipate no chance of achieving success through violence and do not initiate civil wars.

[...]

In this article, I examine how the potential for large-scale international military intervention on the government side can deter the outbreak of civil war. There is a large literature on external intervention, but that literature has almost exclusively focused on the intervention in ongoing civil wars. In a few cases, scholars have examined how, under certain conditions, the potential for intervention can make civil war more likely. Here, by contrast, I examine how the potential for intervention can prevent conflict. I analyze the process by which states and dissidents decide whether to use violence to resolve political conflicts and argue that, for civil war to occur, dissidents must have a motivation for violence, believe that violence will help them achieve their goals, and be unable to negotiate a compromise settlement with the state prior to the outbreak of conflict. I argue that when dissidents anticipate that an external state or set of states will intervene on the side of the government to a degree that is so overwhelming that dissidents' costs of fighting exceed their probability of victory, they will anticipate gaining no benefit from fighting and not initiate civil war. I further argue that, by freeing states from the threat of violent rebellion, governments anticipating this type of support can operate with a freer hand toward their population and therefore be more repressive. While this repression will increase grievance it should not increase the likelihood of civil war, rather, dissidents will choose other strategies of dissent to seek political change. I test these arguments using indicators of the likelihood of external intervention on behalf of the government. The primary indicator is that of U.S. hierarchy. Drawing on Lake's (2009) arguments that the U.S. enters into hierarchical relationships in which subordinate states give up some sovereign control in return for the United States providing "order," I argue that this provision of order means that potential rebels anticipate that the U.S. will intervene in a civil war. Consistent with the expectations of the theory, I find that states in more hierarchical

relationships with the United States are less likely to experience civil wars, more repressive, more likely to experience nonviolent campaigns and more prone to terrorist attacks. I conclude by discussing the implications of this argument for our understanding of civil war, and how external relations of states affect statedissident interactions.

[...]

Holding the other continuous variables constant at their mean and discrete variables at their mode, **states at the 10th percentile on the security hierarchy index have a 1.8% chance of experiencing a 1,000 battle death civil war onset in a given year, while those at the 90th percentile have a 0.97% chance, a decline in the probability of civil war of almost 50%.**

Link: Intervention for either side always makes conflicts ends faster and increases the chance of a negotiated settlement

JOYCE 2008 [Kyle Joyce, department of political science at Pennsylvania State University, "Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process", *Journal of Peace Research*, <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/27640678.pdf>>] //CJC

Third-Party Support for Government or Opposition **Third-party intervention on the side of the government alters a government's decision calculus - specifically, the cost and benefits to the government for pursuing specific policy choices (e.g. continued fighting) - and, in turn, the probability of specific outcomes occurring. The presence of third-party support enables the government to reduce the rent it extracts from its populace to finance its civil war effort.** In turn, the reduced necessity to exact resources from the population, as well as the potential for an increase in the degree of security enabled by third-party resources, **allows a government to shore up political support**, while at the same time reducing the ability of an opposition group to gain a foothold on popular allegiance. Additionally, **third-party intervention on behalf of a government enables the latter to alter the probability of various civil war outcomes occurring, as the availability of greater military, political, and economic capability increases a government's odds of winning militarily**, provides it with greater leverage over the terms of negotiation, and reduces its odds of losing militarily. Similarly, **third-party interventions on the side of an opposition group influence the behavior of the opposition group. Third-party intervention facilitates the ability of the opposition to impose costs on a government. An opposition group supported by a third-party is more likely to challenge the government with a capable military threat**, thereby increasing the cost to the government of confronting the opposition, as well as **increasing the opposition groups chances of achieving victory**. Third-party support for the opposition enables the latter to demonstrate to the civil war state's populace that it presents a credible threat to the government. By providing resources to the opposition, third-party support increases the capacity of the opposition to disrupt a government's provision of security, goods, and services to its citizens. Indeed, **third-party support may enable the opposition to bid for popular support by providing a rival source of goods and services** and, in turn, challenging the government's monopoly over the 'hearts and minds' of its citizens. In general, **third-party support increases the likelihood that a combatant will more rapidly win the conflict militarily.**

[...]

Our first hypothesis anticipates that third-party support will increase the likelihood of the supported group achieving military victory, while decreasing the likelihood of the unsupported group achieving military victory. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for intervention for government in the Government Military Victory model indicates that third-party intervention on behalf of the government of the civil war state increases the risk that the civil war will end in a government military victory and, therefore, decreases the time until such a victory will occur. The interaction between this variable and the natural log of time is negatively signed and statistically significant, indicating that, as a civil war persists, the benefit of third-party support for the government decreases the risk of a civil war ending in a government military victory. The coefficient for intervention for government in the Opposition Military Victory model is not statistically significant and is positive and statistically significant in the Negotiated Settlement model, suggesting that interventions on behalf of the government have no statistically significant effect on the time until an opposition military victory and decrease the time until a negotiated settlement. Interestingly, civil wars have a higher risk of ending in a negotiated settlement than a government military victory when a third-party intervenes on the side of the government. The results for this variable demonstrate the advantage of the competing risks approach, namely, that the effect varies across the three civil war outcomes. Figure 1 presents the estimated baseline survivor function for each civil war outcome when there is an intervention on the side of the government.¹¹ This figure demonstrates that a third-party intervention on the side of the government has a different effect on the expected probability of a civil war surviving past a given point in time for each civil war outcome. Importantly, these differing effects would not be evident had we estimated a Cox model where we pooled the three civil war outcomes. Turning to the results corresponding to intervention for opposition, the statistically significant coefficient for the Government Military Victory model indicates that third party support for the opposition decreases the risk that a civil war will end in a government military victory. The positively signed and statistically significant coefficient for this variable in the Opposition Military Victory model suggests that third-party support increases the risk that a civil war will end in an opposition military victory and, thus, decreases the time until such a victory will occur. Finally, the positively signed and statistically significant coefficient in the Negotiated Settlement model suggests that intervention on behalf of the opposition increases the risk of a civil war concluding more rapidly in negotiated settlement, lending support to our second hypothesis, though the risk is smaller than military victory by the opposition.

Diverts resources, 14% less genocide

Krain, Matthew. ["International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides." International Studies Quarterly (2005): n. pag. Genocide Watch. Web, http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/AboutGen_International_Intervention_and_the_Severity_of_Genocides_and_Politicides.pdf] MJS

“Note that this theoretical argument does not assume that interventions change the balance of power between the perpetrator and the target. Rather, the introduction of forces against the perpetrators (1) signals that the international context has changed from permissive to prohibitive, and that the genocidaires no longer remain unchallenged and (2) diverts valuable time and resources from policies of domestic group eradication toward defense against an external challenger. Because neither impartial interventions nor

interventions that support the perpetrator address both of these simultaneously, neither are likely to reduce the severity of state-sponsored mass murder.”

“Even a single intervention against the perpetrator has a measurable effect on the severity of genocide or politicide in the “typical” case. **When a single international actor challenges the perpetrator, the predicted probability that the killings will escalate drops from 0.6422 to 0.5510, while the probability that the killings will decrease jumps from 0.2836 to 0.3664.** If two actors challenge the perpetrator, the probability of escalation drops further to 0.4564, while the probability that the killings will abate increases to 0.4580. Three challenging interventions increase the probability of lives saved to 0.5527.”

$(64-55)/64 = 14\%$ reduction.

$(36-28)/28 = 30\%$ increase.

NGO’s increase conflict, Military security required; Empirics galore

Stein, 2000. “New Challenges to Conflict Resolution: Humanitarian Nongovernmental Organizations in Complex Emergencies.” *The National Academies Press*. Janice Gross Stein. <https://www.nap.edu/read/9897/chapter/11#384> GST

The evidence is strong, though not determining, that in recent complex humanitarian emergencies the assistance **that NGOs have provided to endangered populations has at times become the fuel for continued and renewed warfare.**²⁴ In Somalia, for example, food was extraordinarily scarce as a result of drought and civil conflict and, consequently, its absolute value rose to unprecedented levels. Its high price, in the context of economic collapse, mass unemployment, and a dramatic drop in family income, increased the relative value of food. Therefore, **food brought into Somalia through the relief effort was plundered by** merchants, by **organized gangs** of young men profiteering from the black market, and by militia leaders **who used the wealth that the food brought to buy weapons and the loyalty of followers.**²⁵ In Rwanda and Sierra Leone, as well as Somalia and Sudan, assistance has been “taxed” or stolen to fuel processes of conflict escalation rather than promote conflict resolution. Resources channeled into Somalia by UN agencies and NGOs became part of a complex economy of warfare between rival militias and clans. Theft of those resources by militias was common. Equally significant was the ability of militias, **in the absence of a security envelope for the local population and NGO personnel, to use force and the threat of force to compel NGOs to hire some of the same forces to guard relief supplies and convoys that were the source of the humanitarian crisis.**²⁶ In so doing, the NGOs legitimated those who were preying on local populations.²⁷

In **Sierra Leone** and **Liberia** conflict analysts and medical NGOs learned that they could plan by following the pattern of UN food deliveries: when food was distributed to a village or displaced-persons camp, the militias would quickly attack to steal the relief supplies, killing dozens of villagers as they did so. In **Sudan**, food, agricultural tools, and livestock were transferred from weaker to strong groups through restrictions on the passage of food aid by government forces and militias. In **Somalia** as well as Sudan, this transfer of assets was integrated into a parallel black economy controlled at the highest political levels.²⁸ The one supported the other.

UN and NGO resources in eastern Zaire were subject to political control and taxation by the forces that perpetrated the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Less by theft and diversion than by

controlling the distribution of relief supplies and the flow of information, Rwanda's genocidaires turned UN-managed and NGO-operated refugee camps into political and resource bases for continued and renewed genocidal warfare, in both **Zaire** and **western Rwanda**.²⁹ When the post-1994 Rwandan regime sought to break the genocidaires' control of the camps, civilian refugees became moving shields between two armies. Relief supplies and the NGO presence were used to lure starving refugees out of hiding in the forests of Zaire, and these refugees were then slaughtered by the tens of thousands. At the extreme, NGOs were transformed from sources of protection into resources for destruction.

[...]

The violence is perpetuated as well, critics continue, because humanitarian organizations have reluctantly acceded to the constraining conditions imposed by governments and militias to gain access to populations at risk.³⁴ In complex humanitarian emergencies, **NGOs indeed have experienced enormous difficulties in gaining access to populations vulnerable to violence**.³⁵ These difficulties are deliberately created by warring parties that exploit the vulnerability of civilian populations for political or military purposes.³⁶ NGOs find themselves constantly renegotiating access and facing new designations of previously consented space as off limits. **Variants of these negotiations have occurred in Sudan, Angola, Ethiopia, Bosnia, and Rwanda**. The warring parties in turn frequently use negotiated access agreements to build international credibility. At the extreme **this leads to the perverse outcome that the more killing that is done the more NGOs respond with additional resources**.³⁷

[...]

Critics insist that **NGOs are being substituted for effective action by the major powers and exploited as a cover for their absence**.⁴¹ As I argued earlier, there is indeed a growing international indifference to humanitarian crises. Governments have privatized their assistance policies and adopted strategies of containment.⁴² They are increasingly resistant to accepting refugees and unwilling to grant asylum as mandated by the international refugee regime, even as they are less inclined to intervene politically or militarily to protect populations at risk.

[...]

Strategies to minimize diversion, alone or together, can reduce the scope and severity but never completely eliminate the transfer of assets to warriors and other negative externalities of emergency assistance. **Analysis of these cases suggests that the more complex the conflict, the more chaotic the security markets, and the more traumatized the social order, the more important an adequate security envelope is for effective delivery of humanitarian assistance**. For humanitarians working in complex emergencies, painful choices will continue to arise as long as the UN or regional organizations are unable to provide security as a public good and the major powers continue to disengage and privatize assistance as a substitute for political action.

[...]

CONCLUSION

Wittingly and unwittingly, humanitarian NGOs have become important participants in conflict resolution as assistance has been privatized and security has become a very scarce public good in many parts of the world. In large part **because of the failure** of the wider international community **to provide security** as a public good, **humanitarians increasingly find themselves confronting painful choices**. In complex humanitarian emergencies, **where**

security is absent, some of **the assistance NGOs provide has gone to those who prey on the vulnerable and has prolonged and even fueled the cycle of violence.** Rather than contributing to conflict resolution, humanitarians have inadvertently contributed to conflict escalation.

[...]

I have argued that these painful choices have grown out of the disengagement of the major powers, the privatization of assistance, and the complexity of contemporary emergencies. Humanitarian emergencies are triggered by the failure of states or their capture by one group that uses the instruments of the state against another and the violent economic and social disruptions that follow as societies break apart and refugees spill across borders. A recent study concluded that **humanitarian emergencies constitute the most serious contemporary threat to security and that they are likely to continue into the foreseeable future.** The strategies of conflict resolution that I have identified as appropriate for humanitarian NGOs are no panacea even for the humanitarian community. On the contrary, each raises deep ethical, political, and strategic problems. Collectively, they underline the continuing importance of states, regional organizations, and global institutions, the traditional providers of security as a public good. **When security is scarce—or absent— no strategy of conflict resolution, postwar reconstruction, or peace building is likely to succeed.**

NGO military cooperation.

United States Institute of Peace. "NGOs in Conflict"

<http://www.usip.org/node/5607> GST

Traditionally, NGOs and the military have perceived their roles to be distinctly different and separate. NGOs have felt uneasy working with military forces, whether from their own country or from the country receiving assistance. NGOs are conscious of the need to preserve their impartiality because of the protection that affords them. Military leaders have tended to regard NGOs as undisciplined and their operations as uncoordinated and disjointed. **Yet NGO staff working in complex emergencies often need the help of the military for protection, logistics, and even evacuation.** **Attitudes on both sides have begun to change.** Exposure to each other's strengths and capabilities has increased the military's respect for the innovation and dedication of NGOs and fostered an appreciation among NGOs for the unsurpassed logistical capacity of the military.

[...]

The Defense Department's Directive on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (Department of Defense 2006), **established peace and stability operations as core missions for the U.S. Defense Department and the U.S. military.** To implement this mission, **the directive states that the military should be prepared to engage in planning and operations with a range of civilian agencies, international organizations, and NGOs.** The directive makes clear that coordination should begin before NGOs and the military first interact on the ground. In light of the directive, both groups are gaining a greater understanding of their respective roles, motivations, and responsibilities.

Aid reduces conflict

Ree, Joppe D., and Eleonora Nillesen. "Aiding Violence or Peace? The Impact of Foreign Aid on the Risk of Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Journal of Development Economics* 88 (2009): 301-13. DIW. Web.

http://www.diw.de/documents/dokumentenarchiv/17/90684/diwppublication_de_enillesen.pdf.

Ree: Utrecht University, The Netherlands

Nillesen: DIW (German Institute for Economic Research)

The main empirical finding is as follows: foreign aid is directly affecting the probability of civil conflict continuation (i.e., the probability of having conflict at t , conditional on having conflict at $t-1$), negatively and significantly. **Aid flows therefore reduce the duration of civil conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. A 10% increase in foreign aid is estimated to decrease the probability of continuation by about 8% points (the unconditional probability of conflict continuation is about 90%).**

Trump diplomacy fails

Babbin Dec 5 2016 [Jed Babbin is a writer for the Spectator, "Trump-Style Diplomacy", *The Spectator*, <https://spectator.org/trump-style-diplomacy/>] //CJC

Trump has been contacting other nations' leaders since before he was elected. He **diplomatic style is reminiscent of** what Winston Churchill said of John Foster Dulles: "He is **the only bull who brings his own china shop with him.**" That's not necessarily bad, because American diplomacy has for eight long years been a disaster that shunned our allies, embraced our enemies, and reduced us from a superpower to a France-like also-ran. **Trump's international relations** are styled just as his campaign was. He **seems to be breaking every taboo** and, for the most part, getting it right. But what he's getting wrong may come back to bite him. In August, Mexican President Peña Nieto invited both Trump and Clinton to visit. Only Trump went. Both Trump and Peña Nieto had mild reactions to the meeting, which apparently was cordial. The border wall was mentioned, but apparently there was no agreement who'd pay for it. Since the election, **Trump** has had about fifty conversations with other nations' leaders, some of which are controversial. He **called Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and told him he was a "terrific guy."** **In that conversation Trump offered to help solve any problems the Pakistanis have. That's an awful idea. Pakistan,** since its founding, has been at war with India over the disputed province of Kashmir. Its foreign policy consists of enmity with India over Kashmir and **sponsorship of Sunni Islamic terrorism.** Pakistan was the nation that gave Osama bin Laden sanctuary for about a decade, hiding him from American forces seeking to capture or kill him. India is the world's most populous democracy and should be our natural ally, but we've been pushing it away since the Bill Clinton era. We've been cozy with Pakistan over India since 9/11 because they enabled American forces to land and travel over their territory to reach landlocked Afghanistan. There's no explanation from the Pakistanis for why bin Laden was given sanctuary. **Pakistan is a state sponsor of terrorism.** Terrorist networks based in Pakistan have conducted horrific attacks in India such as the 2008 Lakshar-e-Taiba attack in Mumbai that killed at least 164 people. Trying to solve Pakistan's problems will almost certainly create more problems for us. The most controversial of **Trump's** diplomatic conversations wasn't that one. Though he spoke earlier with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Trump **accepted a**

call last week from the recently elected president of Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen. The two reportedly exchanged congratulations, and little else was said. The last time an American leader spoke to a Taiwanese leader was in 1979, when Jimmy Carter threw democratic Taiwan over the side in favor of declaring a “one China” policy that recognized Communist China as the only legitimate nation by that name. Predictably, not only are the Chicoms in a carefully-staged uproar that Trump would even speak with Ing-Wen, our media morons are as well. CNN has written reports on the call that don't even mention Ing-Wen's name for fear of angering the Chicoms. Trump was right to take the call. No nation has any right to limit who an American president or president-elect speaks to. As one of my Navy evil-genius friends pointed out in an email, Trump may have blown up a Chinese plan to create a crisis over Taiwan in Trump's first days in office. We'll never know if that was true, but Trump should continue, whenever he feels the need, to speak to those national leaders regardless of what our enemies and adversaries (or State Department bureaucrats) think. Trump is and will continue to be his own chief diplomat. He probably needs a score keeper more than a secretary of state. Congress and the diplomatic community will want a secretary of state to keep Trump on a tight leash. Good luck with that. No one is even going to be able to control his Twitter feed. For better and for worse, our next president will be himself wherever he goes and the ambassadors he chooses will be expected to faithfully deliver his messages, no matter how undiplomatic or politically incorrect they may be.

Soft power fails – it takes too long and signals weakness, allowing conflicts to escalate.

Rubin 14 (Jennifer Rubin, Columnist and blogger for The Washington Post on domestic and foreign policy, “The evolution of Obama’s quarter-baked war plan,” The Washington Post, October 23 2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2014/10/23/the-evolution-of-obamas-quarter-baked-war-plan/>, *fc)

The results are entirely predictable. Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry repeatedly ruled out force or at least effective force (“boots on the ground”) while promising that conflicts can be resolved at the bargaining table. Obama did it with Syria, and Kerry insists diplomacy hasn’t failed, to the amazement of critics such as Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.). He did it with Russia (which remains ensconced in Ukraine). He is doing it with Iran. **Absent force or the threat of force, these negotiations prove to be fruitless.** And they have led us to a ridiculous war plan.

The results could hardly be a surprise, given recent history. Waiting around for soft power or multilateral bodies to work led to mass civilian deaths in Kosovo and Rwanda in the 1990s. It is not just that Obama repudiated his own liberal advisers’ idea that we have a “responsibility to protect” (R2P) those facing aggression and mass murder; it is that we have turned it on its head. The administration now asserts that it would be irresponsible to protect others. It is monstrously immoral, demanding that we must stand idly by while innocents are harmed and threats to our security build — and that others must, too. **You don’t have to believe that Obama wants dictators, mass murderers and terrorists to win to see that his policies make it more tempting for them to try and more likely that they will prevail.**

Eventually, Obama must succumb (e.g. against Libya, the Islamic State) to international realities and use some force. But if he can't avoid force altogether, he will do the next best thing — use such limited, distant force that he can claim his ban on hard power is more or less intact. He insisted on an airpower-only strategy in Libya, then subcontracted even that to NATO and now cannot be bothered to see that the country is once again a haven for jihadists. And Yemen, which he cited as a success in his minimalist use of force doctrine? The Post editorial board recently explained, “Now Yemen appears in danger of disintegrating, as sectarian insurgents backed by Iran capture large parts of the country’s north, even while al-Qaeda forces surge in the south. Once again a narrowly focused U.S. engagement has helped make the breakdown possible.”

That brings us back to the war against the Islamic State. No boots on the ground was the first and predictable edict (although about 1,500 booted members of the U.S. military are currently in Iraq). The lack of success brought a win-some-lose-some attitude toward Kobane. But realizing that a major defeat and civilian massacre would send a deadly signal to Iraq, the Kurds and the Free Syrian Army and humiliate the United States, Obama stepped up bombing and now strives, still by air only, to prevent Kobane's fall. And now a war premised on getting the help of locals on the ground in Syria risks failure because we won't put our own troops in there to help.

After six years, the notion that soft power can be divorced from hard lies in rubble. The idea that if we really must resort to force to defend our interests we should use the least force (and the least effective force) has proved disastrous. Now it may lead to our inability to defeat a vicious foe.

US has most soft power in world

Mount 2016 [Ian Mount at Fortune, "The U.S. Jumps to the Top of the World's 'Soft Power' Index", *Fortune*, <<http://fortune.com/2016/06/14/world-soft-power-index/>>] //CJC

But President Obama's work over the last eight years to reposition the U.S. as more diplomatic and less belligerent seems to be paying some dividends, at least according to a survey released today by the London PR firm Portland in partnership with Facebook.

In the Soft Power 30 report, an annual ranking of countries on their ability to achieve objectives through attraction and persuasion instead of coercion, the U.S. leapfrogged the U.K. and Germany to claim the top spot, while Canada, under its popular and photogenic new Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, jumped France to claim fourth place.

Based on a theory of global political power developed by Joseph Nye, a Harvard political science professor, the survey uses both polling and digital data to rank countries on more than 75 metrics gathered under the three pillars of soft power: political values, culture, and foreign policy.

Hegemony has proven to prevent great power wars; multipolarity fails

Andrea E. **Varisco 13**, Ph.D. candidate at the Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit of the University of York, holds a Master in International Affairs, Peace and Conflict Studies specialisation from the Australian National University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo and a Master in Politics and Comparative Institutions from the University of Milano, 6/3/13, "Towards a Multi-Polar International System: Which Prospects for Global Peace?," <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/03/towards-a-multi-polar-international-system-which-prospects-for-global-peace/>] //CJC

During the 20th century multi-polar international systems resulted in instability and led to two world wars in less than 50 years. The balance of power and the system of alliances of the early 20th century was swept away by the assassination of Franz Ferdinand of Austria in 1914. That event triggered World War I, a global conflict that caused the death of more than 15 million people in less than five years. After few decades, the multi-polar world emerged by World War I with a new system of alliances and the multilateral body of the League of Nations was not able to tame the totalitarian aspirations of Hitler. The German invasion of Poland in 1939 triggered World War II, the deadliest conflict of the history which resulted in millions of deaths and in the holocaust. Since the end of the World War II the world has never been multi-polar again, nevertheless these historical accounts seem to indicate how multi-polarity often created an unstable and unpredictable world, characterized by shifting alliances and by the aspiration of the rising powers to change the balance of power and create a new order. These historical features of multi-polarity will likely distinguish also the future multi-polar world, in spite of its strong economic interconnection and institutionalization. History indeed has also shown how the effects on stability of a global economy and of multilateral institutions have been sometimes overestimated. The multi-polar world at the beginning of the 20th century was highly economically interconnected and characterized by a large cross-border flows of goods, capital and people, at the point that the ratio of trade to output indicates that "Britain and France are only slightly more open to trade today than they were in 1913, while Japan is less open now than then" (The Economist, 99; Van den Bossche, 4). Nevertheless, this high interconnection was swept away by World War I. Furthermore, the presence of the League of Nations did not

prevent World War II; likewise, the multilateral organization of the UN has not always been effective in promoting peace and security, and membership in the European Union did not prevent European countries from having different positions and antithetic behaviors in the wake of US war in Iraq in 2003. A shifting from a well defined hierarchy of power to a great power rivalry will therefore result in a less stable world order.

Closing military gap causes arms race, miscalc, and no US response to conflict because higher risks — empirically US leadership is best for peace

Khalilzad, 2011 – former director of planning at the Defense Department [Zalmay February 8, 2011 The Economy and National Security Accessed July 29 <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad?page=1> The National Review Online]

If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. **The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers**, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, **and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation**. The stakes are high. **In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership**. By contrast, **multi-polar systems have been unstable**, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. **Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars**. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. **Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats**. Under this scenario, there would be a **heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict**. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, **hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions**. As rival powers rise, **Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition**. Beijing's economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China's strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. **Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China's expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations** with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, **the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression**.

Hegemony creates peace by preventing both great power and regional conflicts

Stephen M. **Walt**, 2002, American professor of international affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, "AMERICAN PRIMACY: Its Prospects and Pitfalls", <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/swalt/files/art1-sp2.pdf>] //CJC

A second consequence of U.S. primacy is a decreased danger of great-power rivalry and a higher level of overall international tranquility. Ironically, those who argue that primacy is no longer important, because the danger of war is slight, overlook the fact that the extent of American primacy is one of the main reasons

why the risk of great-power war is as low as it is. For most of the past four centuries, relations among the major powers have been intensely competitive, often punctuated by major wars and occasionally by all-out struggles for hegemony. In the first half of the twentieth century, for example, great-power wars killed over eighty million people. Today, however, the dominant position of the United States places significant limits on the possibility of great-power competition, for at least two reasons. One reason is that because the United States is currently so far ahead, other major powers are not inclined to challenge its dominant position. Not only is there no possibility of a “hegemonic war” (because there is no potential hegemon to mount a challenge), but the risk of war via miscalculation is reduced by the overwhelming gap between the United States and the other major powers. Miscalculation is more likely to lead to war when the balance of power is fairly even, because in this situation both sides can convince themselves that they might be able to win. When the balance of power is heavily skewed, however, the leading state does not need to go to war and weaker states dare not try.⁸ 12 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

The second reason is that the continued deployment of roughly two hundred thousand troops in Europe and in Asia provides a further barrier to conflict in each region. So long as U.S. troops are committed abroad, regional powers know that launching a war is likely to lead to a confrontation with the United States. Thus, states within these regions do not worry as much about each other, because the U.S. presence effectively prevents regional conflicts from breaking out. What Joseph Joffe has termed the “American pacifier” is not the only barrier to conflict in Europe and Asia, but it is an important one. This tranquilizing effect is not lost on America’s allies in Europe and Asia. They resent U.S. dominance and dislike playing host to American troops, but they also do not want “Uncle Sam” to leave.⁹ Thus, U.S. primacy is of benefit to the United States, and to other countries as well, because it dampens the overall level of international insecurity. World politics might be more interesting if the United States were weaker and if other states were forced to compete with each other more actively, but a more exciting world is not necessarily a better one. A comparatively boring era may provide few opportunities for genuine heroism, but it is probably a good deal more pleasant to live in than “interesting” decades like the 1930s or 1940s.

Multi-Lateralism is Impossible and fails due to different national interests

Richard N. Haas November/December 2014, [President of the Council on Foreign Relations, The Unraveling: How to respond to a Disordered World, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2014-10-20/unraveling>] MJS

As for global governance, international accords are often hard to come by for many reasons. The sheer number of states makes consensus difficult or impossible. So, too, do divergent national interests. As a result, attempts to construct new global arrangements to foster trade and frustrate climate change have foundered. Sometimes countries just disagree on what is to be done and what they are prepared to sacrifice to achieve a goal, or they are reluctant to support an initiative for fear of setting a precedent that could be used against them later. There is thus decidedly less of an “international community” than the frequent use of the phrase would suggest.

Deterrence empirically fails

Fearon 2002 [James Fearon at Department of Political Science, Stanford, “SELECTION EFFECTS AND DETERRENCE”, *International Interactions Magazine*, <<https://web.stanford.edu/group/fearon-research/cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Selection-Effects-and-Deterrence.pdf>>] //CJC

How often and under what conditions do threats issued in the course of an international dispute successfully deter aggressive action by the state challenging the status quo? This important and apparently straightforward empirical question provoked a heated debate in the field of international relations in the late 80s and early 90s. On one side, Paul Huth and Bruce Russett argued that **deterrent threats succeeded in 34, or almost 60 percent, of the 58 “extended immediate deterrence” crises they identified.** On the other side, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein forcefully disputed this assessment. By their reading, **only 10 of Huth and Russett’s cases were properly regarded as “deterrence encounters” and at most two of these contained instances of successful deterrent threats.**

Hardline deterrence strategies will fail - We cannot assess or influence North Korea, Russia, and China's decision calculus - History proves

Larkin 11 - USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT CRACKS IN THE NEW JAR: THE LIMITS OF TAILORED DETERRENCE by Lieutenant Colonel Sean P. Larkin United States Air Force Dr. R. Craig Nation Project Adviser (<http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a560099.pdf>) CM

Assessing Adversaries' Decision Calculus **Tailored deterrence requires that the U.S. understand each adversary's decision calculus with a high level of certainty and detail** in order to design deterrent actions that will achieve decisive influence over adversaries' choices. However, **tailored deterrence's assumptions oversimplify the basis on which people actually make decisions. People** make choices based in part on their perceptions of expected utility, but they **are** also **heavily influenced by other factors, including** their **personal perspectives and cognitive biases**. Many of these factors are enigmatic even **to the actors themselves, making decision calculus exceptionally difficult** to assess and leaving adversaries' choices largely unpredictable. History provides many examples of deterrence failures in which the defender misunderstood the adversary's decision calculus and was therefore surprised by an "irrational" action. Keith Payne cites the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, **China's entry into the Korean War, and the Soviet deployment of nuclear missiles to Cuba as examples in which U.S. estimates of adversary decision calculus predicted the opposite outcome.** 59 Janet Gross Stein uses Egypt's 1973 surprise attack against Israel and Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait as other case studies of intelligence and deterrence failures. 60 In all these examples, the defenders assessed that their presumably rational adversary would refrain from action because upsetting the status quo would result in a net loss. However, the deterrence failures listed above cannot be attributed to irrationality. As Keith Payne observed, there is an often-unappreciated difference between rational and reasonable decision-making. 61 If an actor is rational, then they make decisions that logically link to their objectives. However, whether or not an actor's decisions are reasonable is a matter of perspective. If an outside observer does not share or understand the adversary's goals and values, then the adversary's decisions may appear unreasonable, and will therefore be unpredictable. 62 Second-wave theory and tailored deterrence both correctly assume that truly irrational actors are rare, but fail to appreciate how little this assumption matters when compared to the impact of the actors' divergent perspectives on a deterrence relationship. The Adversary's Perspective. **Opposing leaders frequently see the world much differently because of the large differences in the leaders' individual expectations and beliefs. Cognitive psychology shows that all people develop unique belief systems, or “schemata,” based on their experiences to help organize and interpret information.** These schemata are necessary to functioning in a complex world, but they also “constrain and condition how and what leaders perceive.” 63 As a result of these differing contexts, leaders may interpret the same situation quite differently. For example, while **the U.S. confidently concluded that China would stay out of the Korean War, Mao Zedong attacked the U.S. Eighth Army in North Korea because he believed China was being encircled by America.** 64 **Leaders' perceptions are also shaped by the mental shortcuts, or “heuristics,” that all people use to selectively process and recall information. One of the most powerful heuristics results in the availability bias—the**

tendency for people to interpret events in terms of other events they can easily remember.⁶⁵ This results in leaders being disproportionately influenced by historical events that they or their country experienced directly.⁶⁶ Saddam Hussein's perspective on combat in the Iran-Iraq War led him to disregard U.S. airpower; he similarly concluded from the U.S. experience in Lebanon that America was casualty averse and would not be able to remove him from Kuwait.⁶⁷ 16 Third-wave theory also maintains that **domestic political considerations are often a critical factor in adversaries' decisions**. This factor is consistent with Robert Jervis' observation that leaders often make a decision based on one value dimension (e.g. domestic politics) without fully considering its impact on other dimensions. ⁶⁸ Thus, Anwar Sadat's primary concerns in 1973 were domestic politics, regaining lost honor and the consequences of not attacking, rather than the probable military outcome of attacking Israel. ⁶⁹ The Deterrence's Perspective. In its estimation of adversary decision calculus, **the U.S. is constrained by the same cognitive barriers that influence an adversary's viewpoint, as well as other biases that commonly undermine intelligence analysis and policy making. Intelligence estimates of all kinds are prone to the bias of mirror-imaging**, which is **the assumption that the adversary thinks and operates like the analyst's country**.⁷⁰ Mirror-imaging is closely related to the availability heuristic, since when reliable intelligence is lacking, analysts and policymakers alike will tend to fill in the blanks with information that is readily recalled: their nation's capabilities, plans, and intentions. For example, Israel's emphasis on airpower drove it to judge Egypt's readiness in 1973 by an Israeli standard. Due to this mirror-imaging, Israel ignored compelling evidence of an imminent Egyptian attack, believing that Sadat would be deterred at least until Egypt reconstituted its air force. ⁷¹ Analysts also tend to be biased toward viewing the adversary's actions as the result of centralized direction and to underestimate other explanations, such as coincidences, accidents or mistakes. ⁷² The centralized direction bias is particularly 17 troublesome for the analysis of adversary decision calculus since it causes analysts to "overestimate the extent to which other countries are pursuing coherent, rational, goalmaximizing policies" and to "overestimate the predictability of future events in other countries."⁷³ The power of this bias and the unpredictability of even a well-known adversary were highlighted in 1962, shortly before the U.S. discovered Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. The U.S. erroneously concluded in a Special National Intelligence Estimate that the Soviet Union would not put offensive weapons in Cuba because such a move would be inconsistent with the observed patterns of Soviet behavior and American estimates of Khrushchev's decision calculus. ⁷⁴ **Decision-makers may also be affected by motivated biases, which result from subconscious psychological pressure that distorts perception. Motivated biases differ from cognitive biases because the source of the error is the person's fear and needs, rather than expectations or cognitive limits.**⁷⁵ This tendency results in defensive avoidance techniques to **selectively process information that supports their favored policy to reduce anxiety**. In May 1967, pressure from domestic and Arab constituencies probably motivated Egypt's overestimation of its chances of winning a war with Israel. Egypt's leaders initially assessed that war would result in low benefits and high costs. However, contrary to rational deterrence theory's requirements, Egypt's leaders reversed their estimate a few weeks later and chose war. ⁷⁶ Motivated biases are more powerful when decision-makers are afraid or feel helpless. ⁷⁷ **Fear and anxiety can disrupt information processing, such as retention and memory, and can result "in distorted processes of defensive avoidance and hypervigilance."** ⁷⁸ These insights indicate that predicting or influencing adversary 18 decision calculus is even more difficult in crisis situations. They also call into question deterrence's objective of compelling rational behavior by instilling fear. Third-wave theory and case studies demonstrate that assessing adversaries' decision calculus is extremely difficult and cannot be used as a reliable anchor for tailored deterrence strategies. One final example serves to demonstrate that **misperception and bias are the norm**, not the exception in intelligence and international relations. In 2003, coercive threats against Saddam Hussein failed to compel Iraq's compliance with U.S. demands because Saddam was much more concerned about preventing a coup and the threat from Iran than he was about U.S. threats to invade. The misunderstanding was mutual, as Saddam believed he understood enough about Washington's decision calculus to at least deter a U.S. march to Baghdad, if not an invasion of southern Iraq.⁷⁹ Given the pervasive nature of such misperceptions, the assumption that the U.S. can reliably assess adversaries' decision calculus is clearly in error and represents a significant flaw in tailored deterrence. **The U.S. assumption that it can decisively influence adversaries' choices is the second flaw** in tailored deterrence. **This assumption is erroneous** for three reasons. First, **misperceptions and biases limit an actor's ability to send effective deterrent messages**. Second, **adversaries are** similarly **constrained in their understanding of** such **signals**. Third, tailored deterrence campaigns are limited by **a lack of interagency unity of effort and inescapable friction in execution**. These limitations suggest that **only**

the most overt, overwhelming and credible deterrent threats have utility, while attempts to deter gradually via precise messages are often misguided. The Challenge of Sending Effective Deterrent Messages. In addition to the previously described difficulties in understanding adversaries' decision calculus, a deterring actor is constrained by biases that accompany attempts to influence others. The egocentric bias leads people to overestimate their influence over others and to see cause-and-effect linkages that do not exist. This tendency can cause policymakers to perceive an adversary's behavior as targeted toward them and that the adversary's behavior was caused by the policymaker's previous actions. ⁸⁰ This phenomenon is a double threat to deterrence strategies. First, the egocentric bias may inflate the policymaker's belief that an adversary can be deterred. Second, the bias can result in erroneous assessments that deterrence is working when, in fact, the adversary's restraint is explained by other factors. ⁸¹ Another common limitation on an actor's ability to send deterrence messages is a lack of empathy for how an adversary sees the world. ⁸²

Policymakers have such powerful beliefs about their nations and they spend so much time immersed in their own plans that they have trouble imagining that an adversary may have different views. ⁸³ For example, the U.S. failed to understand Japan's perspective before Pearl Harbor. While Washington thought that Japan would view the prospect of war with the U.S. as disastrous, Japanese leaders concluded they had no other choice but to attack. ⁸⁴ A third bias, which is related to the egocentric bias and lack of empathy, is overconfidence: people tend to overestimate their capacity to make complex judgments. Overconfidence leads policymakers to overestimate their ability to influence an adversary via discrete messages. ⁸⁵ There is probably no better example of such hubris than U.S. attempts to decisively influence North Vietnamese behavior via incremental airstrikes and carefully calibrated force deployments. Although these messages were sent from the highest levels of government in Washington, Hanoi did not notice the subtleties, nor did it receive any messages compelling enough to modify its decision calculus. ⁸⁶ Adversary Perceptions of Deterrent Messages. Deterrent messages that are clear and credible to the sender and impartial parties may still be missed, misunderstood, or discarded by the receiver. ⁸⁷ Adversaries' may misperceive due to any number of factors described above, such as: the availability bias, differing schemata, mirror-imaging, motivated biases and the distorting effects of anxiety. Actors' perceptions are also heavily influenced by their most recent experiences and concerns. The "evoked set" of data that is active in a person's mind creates a context based on recent events for interpreting new information. If the receiver's context differs from the sender's, misperception is more likely. ⁸⁸ Deterrent messages may fail to persuade because an adversary's perception is skewed by other distractions.

Achieving decisive influence over an adversary's choices requires that deterrent signals overcome cognitive biases and persuade the decision-maker to change core beliefs about the likely results of a contemplated course of action. However, strongly held beliefs, such as a leader's conviction that war is necessary, are the most resistant to change. ⁸⁹ In order to change a person's attitude, new information must overcome many layers of subconscious defenses. ⁹⁰ A person's first defense is failing to see that new information contradicts existing beliefs. The information can be evaded by ignoring it, or interpreting it to fit the person's views, particularly if the data is ambiguous. The second mechanism is to accept that the information is discrepant, but to reject its validity. A third and related defense is to reject the source of the information as unreliable. Subsequent defenses include acknowledging the contradiction but setting it aside and bolstering the belief by seeking a new justification for an old decision. ⁹¹ The subconscious lengths to which people will go to preserve their beliefs make it difficult to deter an adversary gradually with discrete messages. A sufficiently motivated or confused adversary can ignore deterrent signals such as diplomatic messages or the deployment of military forces, especially if such signals are sent incrementally. Adversaries can accommodate isolated messages without changing their beliefs, but are more

likely to reevaluate their convictions if a large amount of contradictory information arrives all at once. 92 By this same logic, subtle signals should have more utility against an adversary who is already deterred, since such messages would seek only to reinforce an existing perception. Since adversaries' beliefs are resistant to change, it follows that adversaries' perceptions of credibility and interests are dominant factors in deterrence outcomes. First, deterrence signals cannot create credibility that does not exist in the mind of the adversary. Unambiguous scenarios where survival interests are at stake, such as the superpowers' defense of their homelands during the Cold War, provide clarity that reduces the chance of misperception. 93 In contrast, America's ambiguous policy toward South Korea in 1950 and Kuwait in 1990 left much more room for adversary error. Second, carefully crafted deterrence messages cannot balance an inherent asymmetry of interests. The U.S. and South Korea have apparently deterred a second North Korean invasion since 1953, but have been unable to deter Pyongyang from building nuclear weapons or conducting deadly attacks on South Korean forces. Despite the substantial U.S. commitment to preventing all three scenarios, North Korea clearly possessed a much greater interest in acquiring a nuclear deterrent and in manufacturing crises.

Deterrence theory wrong - arms buildup makes miscalc inevitable

Boyd 16 (Dallas Boyd is a National security professional with expertise in nuclear weapons policy, nuclear counterterrorism policy, deterrence theory, and adversary decision-making. "Revealed Preference and the Minimum Requirements of Nuclear Deterrence," Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2016. www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/Spring16/Boyd.pdf) jsk
Ultimately, this analysis rests on inferences about the true risk tolerance of US leaders and the confidence of their adversaries in both resisting nuclear coercion and retaliating after a nuclear strike. Because neither of these variables can be established conclusively before a crisis occurs, there is room for disagreement about their potential implications. What should be uncontroversial, however, is that widely divergent perceptions of capability and resolve in a crisis may lead to catastrophic misjudgments.⁶¹ Additionally, there should be no doubt that such divergences exist. Consider the multiple levels of perception that would be operative if the United States attempted nuclear coercion—much less a first strike. First would be US leaders' confidence in their counterforce capabilities, followed by the enemy's estimation of them. Next would be the enemy's confidence in its ability to retaliate after absorbing a counterforce strike and the United States' assessment of this probability. Beneath these first-order judgments are even more subjective evaluations: American leaders' perception of the enemy's perception of US first-strike capabilities, the enemy's perception of US leaders' perception of its retaliatory capability, and so on. Mistaken assumptions in any one of these dimensions could result in grave errors. For example, if US leaders are so enamored of their first-strike capabilities that they perceive little risk of retaliation, the threshold for launching a preemptive attack—or merely engaging in nuclear coercion—might be dangerously low. Indeed, this prospect has not escaped foreign strategists. Chinese analysts Li Bin and Nie Hongyi have noted that the limitations of US offensive forces are "not clear enough" to American leaders, creating the possibility that they "may think they have" the capability to neutralize China's retaliatory forces. According to Li and Nie, the Americans' "blind confidence" might give rise to attempts at nuclear saber rattling or worse.⁶² Compounding this danger is the possibility that a state subjected to American coercion may believe just as strongly in its own capacity to retaliate. Moreover, if either side believes that the other privately shares its own assessment, they may fatally misjudge the robustness of deterrence. In particular, foreign leaders may take at face value US rhetoric on nuclear terrorism and conclude that the ability to deliver a single bomb is sufficient to deter the United States. In this circumstance, they may discount the gravity of American threats even if they are quite sincere. Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Spring 2016 Dallas Boyd [64] Because US offensive capabilities are the chief source of these potential risks, the responsibility arguably falls to the United States to minimize them. One doctrinal option is simply to limit offensive nuclear forces exclusively to damage-limitation roles, that is, reducing the brunt of an enemy attack when it is not merely likely but imminent or under way. Striking first in this scenario requires no great tolerance for risk, because some level of damage is inevitable, and preemption merely reduces that damage as

much as possible. However, this option would leave counterforce capabilities intact, offering no assurance that American leaders would forswear preemptive attacks in less than dire circumstances. The most effective means of preventing nuclear aggression—and the terrible risks entailed—is to dismantle counterforce capabilities altogether.

Understanding global strategic cultures key to effective deterrence

Ruhle 16 (Michael Ruhle is Head of Energy Security Section at the NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division. "The Comeback of Nuclear Deterrence," Berlin Policy Journal, Jan 19 2016. berlinpolicyjournal.com/the-comeback-of-nuclear-deterrence/) jsk

We're Only Human A stable deterrence regime requires all actors to adhere to a "rational" cost-benefit calculus. Thus, nuclear deterrence cannot work against actors that are "irrational" to begin with, e.g. fanatical martyrs. Deterrence may also fail when rationality evaporates in a crisis: certain ideologies or strains of nationalism, for example, may produce the kind of myopia that make leaders adopt risky offensive strategies. But the more important scenario in which rationality could disappear is essentially defensive. Since humans will always give priority to avoiding losses rather than to acquiring gains, the fear of losing something valuable will make leaders take far greater risks than the opportunity to change the status quo in their favor. Hence, as much as one would want to have the upper hand in a crisis, one should still avoid pushing a nuclear adversary into a corner. Know Your Adversary's Culture Deterrence may be a universal concept, but its practical application may well be culture-specific. For example, a culture that attaches great value to sacrifice or even martyrdom will be much harder to deter with the specter of military punishment than a "post-heroic" society. This is not to say that certain states are "undeterrable", but their cost-benefit calculus might be so different as to render the defender's deterrence messages ineffective. Hence, if you want your adversary to understand your deterrence message correctly, you need to have a fairly good grasp of their "strategic culture": historical experiences, values, core beliefs, military traditions, and, last but not least, language. Despite your best efforts, you will never get it perfectly right – but you might not get it quite so wrong.

Even if they win deterrence is good in theory, they can't predict its effectiveness in policy

Payne 15 (Dr. Keith B. Payne is president of the National Institute for Public Policy, and professor and department head at the Graduate School of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (Washington campus). He is a former deputy assistant secretary of defense and served on the bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture Commission (Perry-Schlesinger Commission). *Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age*, 2015. Available on Muse, accessed via the Wake Forest library system.) jsk
Nevertheless, in the absence of "knowing the opponent" and tailoring deterrence policies to fit the specific case, regional deterrence in the second nuclear age will be too unpredictable for us to assume its effectiveness. Even when information about the challenger is available and efforts are made to tailor deterrence to the occasion, its effectiveness will not be "ensured" or "conclusive." U.S. leaders, in sharp contrast to past practice, will need to take seriously the potential for deterrence failure. This potential will likely be considerably more pronounced in U.S. relations with regional rogues, but it is an irreducible risk in any attempt to translate deterrence theory into deterrence policy. Repeated claims by senior officials and commentators to the contrary, in the absence of substantial intelligence and "tailoring," confident promises about deterrence working predictably should be recognized as hubris. Deterrence theory can explain how leaders should behave, assuming the challenger's rationality and a variety of additional contextual conditions. Deterrence policies, however, cannot provide the basis for confident prediction about how a particular challenger will behave because Of the stark gap separating deterrence theory assumptions concerning decision-making and the manner in which leaders sometimes actually make decisions. The now-traditional deterrence framework of the Cold War discounted the various factors that can degrade rational and well informed decision-making, including the potential for ignorance, miscalculation,

misjudgment, and irrationality. Yet, historical case studies typically demonstrate that such factors can and in fact have affected decision-making, particularly under conditions of crisis and stress.

Credibility doesn't deter, creates a misperception which sets up unneeded conflict

Chris **Fettweis 2010**, [Associate Professor, Tulane University, Department of Political Science, 2012-present, "Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy" p.61-62, <http://web.b.ebscohost.com/turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=b3304f16-980f-4384-9ec6-c359f80193c0%40sessionmgr111&vid=1&hid=115>] MJS

For individuals as well as **states**, pathologies – **mistaken** or incorrect **beliefs that inspire irrational action – create their own reality and drive behaviour accordingly**. In individuals, pathologies reside in the mind, while **state-level pathologies exist as shared irrational beliefs among leaders and the public**. Strategic pathologies, then, are incorrect beliefs that drive destructive, or at least counterproductive, state behaviour. **The United States suffers from several. The credibility imperative is a clear** example, one that continues to have a particularly strong influence upon the United States.⁷ **Credibility, when used in policy debates, is a code word for the prestige and reputation** of a state; it is, in Henry Kissinger's words, 'the coin with which we conduct our foreign policy', an intangible asset that helps states influence the actions of others.⁸ **In periods of high credibility, policymakers believe, a state can deter and compel behaviour** and accomplish goals short of war. When credibility is low, skeptical adversaries and allies may be tempted to ignore threats and promises. national leaders, therefore, healthy credibility seems to be the equivalent of many armed divisions, and is worth protecting at almost any cost. **This belief rests on a shaky foundation**, to put it mildly. **Decades of scholarship have been unable to produce much evidence that high credibility helps a state achieve its goals**, or that low credibility makes rivals or allies act any differently.⁹ Although study after study has refuted the basic assumptions of the credibility imperative, the pathology continues to affect policymaking in the new century, inspiring new instances of irrational, unnecessary action. The imperative, like many foreign-policy pathologies, typically inspires belligerence in those under its spell.¹⁰ Credibility is always maintained through action, usually military action, no matter how small the issue or large the odds. Insecurity, likewise, whether real or imagined, leads to expansive, internationalist, interventionist grand strategies. **The more danger a state perceives, the greater its willingness to go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. The 'preventive' war in Iraq is the most obvious consequence of the inflated US perception of threat**, but is hardly the only one. **America's insecurity pathology is in need of diagnosis and cure**, lest Iraq be not a singular debacle but a harbinger of other disasters to come. Strategic performance can be improved if pathologies are recognised and eliminated. Better policy would result from a dispassionate, rational analysis of material costs and benefits of proposed action. In other words, although states do not always act rationally, they would usually be better off if they did. Of course, this sometimes involves the oversimplification of reality, because such calculations are not normally possible in the real world where neither costs nor benefits are knowable a priori. If they were – if rationality were not bounded – foreign-policy decisions would be easy to make. And any discussion of rationality necessarily implies assumptions about values, since rarely are costs and benefits neatly comparable. No equation can tell a policymaker precisely how many lives are worth sacrificing in pursuit of a particular national interest. Nonetheless, states can take steps toward maximising the chance for rationality in their choices. One obvious way is to recognise the States do not always act rationally irrational motivators for behaviour, and work to eliminate those impulses that tend to have a high probability of producing low-quality results. **Good foreign policy cannot be built upon an irrational foundation**. Indeed, rationality in decision-making should be thought of as a minimum requirement for sagacious leaders, for their own good and for that of the international system as a whole.

Sino-Japanese War Unlikely Because of Nukes

ThinkProgress, 2014 [ThinkProgress, “Why Everyone Needs To Stop Freaking Out About War With China”, *ThinkProgress*, <https://thinkprogress.org/why-everyone-needs-to-stop-freaking-out-about-war-with-china-29354eaa709d#.c93ucq1h9>] //AKC

War between China and Japan is more than unlikely: it would fly in the face of most of what we know about the two countries, and international relations more broadly. It’s not that a replay of 1914 is impossible. It’s just deeply, vanishingly unlikely.

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But **there’s one big factor shaping the balance of power in East Asia that means the talk is likely to remain just that: nuclear weapons.** The tagline for World War I in 1914—“The War To End All Wars”—would have a decidedly different meaning in 2014, as war’s end would be accomplished by the world’s end. So whereas, in 1914, all of the European powers thought they could win the war decisively, **East Asia’s great powers recognize the risk of a nuclear exchange between the United States and China to be catastrophic. Carleton University’s Stephen Saideman calls this the end of the “preemption temptation;” nobody thinks they can win by striking first anymore. Indeed, despite the words of some of its military leaders, China (at least nominally) has a no-clash-with-Japan policy in place over the islands.**

Sino-Japanese War Unlikely Because of Money

ThinkProgress, 2014 [ThinkProgress, “Why Everyone Needs To Stop Freaking Out About War With China”, *ThinkProgress*, <https://thinkprogress.org/why-everyone-needs-to-stop-freaking-out-about-war-with-china-29354eaa709d#.c93ucq1h9>] //AKC

It’s wrong to talk about incentives to go war in purely military terms. A key component of the Senkaku/Diaoyou is economic: the islands contain a ton of natural resources, particularly oil and gas. **But far more valuable are the trade ties between the two countries. China is Japan’s largest export market, so war would hurt Japan more than China, but it’d be pretty painful for both.**

Angell may have been wrong about Europe, but he’s probably right about East Asia. M.G. Koo, a political scientist at Chung-Ang University, surveyed several Senkaku-Diaoyu flareups between 1969 and 2009. **He found that economic ties between the two countries played an increasingly large role in defusing tensions as the trade relationship between the two countries deepened.**

The 1978 crisis over the islands is a good example. Bilateral trade had grown substantially since the end of the last big dispute (1972), but they had entered into a new phase after Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms began in 1978. A key part of the early modernization plan was the Peace and Friendship Treaty (PFT) with Japan, **a diplomatic treaty** that (among other things) **“facilitated a rush of Japanese firms into the Chinese market.”** According to Koo, **“policy circles in China and Japan” had “increasingly recognized that the [Senkaku/Diaoyu] sovereignty issue could possibly jeopardize the**

PFT negotiations, thus undermining economic gains.” The leadership tamped down tensions and, afterwards, “shelving territorial claims for economic development seemingly became the two countries’ diplomatic leitmotif in the treatment of the island dispute.”

There’s reason to believe today’s China and Japan aren’t bucking the historical pattern. Despite a year of heated rhetoric and economic tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, bilateral trade has been recovering nicely of late. Quartz’s Matt Phillips, looking over the numbers, concluded that “the China-Japan trade war is pretty much over.” Sure, Chinese business leaders are making some nationalistic noises, but Phillips points out that the “lack of mass, nationalistic protests in China suggests the powers-that-be have decided there’s no need for that to hurt an important business relationship.” Trade really does appear to be calming the waves in the East China Sea.

No Taiwan war- China doesn’t want to invade, and deterrence checks escalation

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Even assuming China’s military capabilities are great enough to prevent the U.S. from intervening, there are two forces that would likely be sufficient to deter China from invading Taiwan. The first and least important is the dramatic impact this would have on how countries in the region and around the world would view such a move. Globally, China seizing Taiwan would result in it being permanently viewed as a malicious nation. Regionally, China’s invasion of Taiwan would diminish any lingering debate over how Beijing will use its growing power. Every regional power would see its own fate in Taiwan. Although Beijing would try to reassure countries by claiming that Taiwan was part of China already, and thus the operation was a domestic stability one, this narrative would be convincing to none of China’s neighbors. Consequently, Beijing would face an environment in which each state was dedicated to cooperating with others to balance against Chinese power. But the more important deterrent for China would be the uncertainty of success. To be sure, China’s military capabilities are growing to the point where it will soon be assured of its ability to quickly defeat Taiwan’s military forces. A little longer down the road it will also likely be confident that it can prevent the U.S. from intervening in the conflict. However, as recent U.S. military conflicts have adequately demonstrated, being able to defeat another nation’s armed forces and being able to pacify the country are two different things altogether. It is in this latter aim that China’s strategy is likely to falter. Taiwanese are adamantly opposed to being incorporated into a non-Democratic China. These feelings would only harden in the aftermath of the invasion. Thus, even if it quickly defeated Taiwan’s formal military forces, the PLA would continue to have to contend with the remnants of resistance for years to come. Such a scenario would be deeply unsettling for leaders in Beijing as this defiance would likely inspire similar resistance among various groups on the mainland, starting first and foremost with ethnic minorities in the western China. Should the PLA resort to harsh oppression to squash resistance in Taiwan, this would deeply unsettle even Han Chinese on the mainland. In fact, the clear parallels with how Imperial Japan sought to pacify Taiwan and China would be lost on no one in China and elsewhere. The entire situation would be *a nightmare for Chinese leaders*. Consequently, they are *nearly certain* to avoid provoking it by invading Taiwan. The only real scenario in which they would invade Taiwan is if the island nation formally declared independence. But if Taiwanese leaders have avoided doing so to date, they are unlikely to think the idea is very wise as China goes stronger. Thus, the status-quo in the Taiwanese strait is

unlikely to be changed by military force. Instead, Beijing is likely to continue drawing Taiwan closer economically, and seeking to disrupt the U.S.-Taiwanese bilateral relationship. The hope would be that leaders in Taipei will ultimately conclude that they cannot resist being absorbed into China, something China itself can facilitate this by offering favorable terms.

China and Taiwan are reaching consensus on key issues now with cooperation

Taipei Times 2014 [Staff writer "Taiwan, China reach consensus on nine deals,"
<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/02/23/2003584158>] //AGK

Taiwan and China on Friday reached a consensus on proposals to improve the implementation of nine of 19 agreements they have signed to date. The consensus came after a two-day meeting in China's Changsha between the intermediary bodies handling negotiations for the two countries in the absence of official ties — the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Beijing-based Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). The Changsha meeting was held to review the implementation and impact of the 19 cross-strait pacts signed since 2008 when President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) set in motion a more conciliatory approach toward China. During the review, **consensus was reached on improving the implementation of accords covering cooperation in the fields of finance, air transportation, sea transportation, healthcare, crime fighting, food safety, investment protection, fishing crews and agricultural quarantines.**

No risk of SCS conflicts – Globalization checks

Jenny, 15 – [Nicolas Jenny, Masters at Fudan University in Shanghai, 1-28-15, Trade Goes on as Usual in the South China Sea,
www.realclearworld.com/articles/2015/01/28/trade_goes_on_as_usual_in_the_south_china_sea_110939.html] //CJC

International relations scholars and journalists have intensely debated the reasons behind China's increased assertiveness in the South China Sea. But Beijing's foreign policy actions in the region have made most countries suspicious if not completely resentful of China.¶ This has led some to claim that, 'China today faces the worst regional environment since Tiananmen. Its relations with Japan are at a record low; China-ASEAN ties have similarly deteriorated due to the South China Sea disputes and China's heavy-handed use of its clout to divide ASEAN.'¶ Despite this resentment, analysts have largely overlooked the trade dynamics between China and other claimants in the South China Sea dispute. One would naturally assume that deep suspicions or resentment of Beijing would translate into diminishing trade ties, yet the opposite has taken place.¶ For example, Vietnam recorded an 18.9% increase in Chinese imports in 2014 despite Hanoi's attempts to broaden its import partners. The issue became particularly relevant following China's decision to place an oil rig in disputed waters earlier in 2014.¶ The Philippines, no stranger to Chinese pressure in the South China Sea, also reported a 12.4% increase of exports to China during the first nine months of 2014. Coincidentally, China is also the Philippines' third largest, and Vietnam's largest trading partner.¶ While smaller East Asian states continue to hedge their bets against China, there is a resounding pattern in their trade statistics - they all present a strong trade deficit in China's favour. Vietnam's trade deficit with China reached a record high in 2014 while the Philippines' highest trade deficit is with China, representing 16% of imports, a 35% increase from previous years.¶ Herein lays the conundrum of the South China Sea dispute: while claimant states rally against Beijing's nine-dash line, economically, they need China more than China needs them. Access to China's market has forced foreign companies and their governments to compromise on politics. While European companies have compromised on issues such as internet censorship, Southeast Asia's governments have been forced to

compromise on sovereignty in the South China Sea.¶ This economic fact of life for Southeast Asian states has produced ripple effects across policy. For example, following the deadly anti-China riots in Vietnam, Hanoi promised to reimburse and rebuild China's factories damaged by the protests. Similarly, the Philippines' economy suffered tremendously in 2012 when China drastically cut banana imports.¶ China will soon have successfully leveraged its economic power to reach political ends - the consolidation of the South China Sea as Beijing's core interest. It will not have primarily been through vast military expansion as many had predicted, but rather through its economic might. Trade has arguably been China's most widely used foreign policy tool and as China's wealth increases, this is only set to continue.¶ As it should be remembered, the South China Sea dispute is not all about potential energy deposits in the region. It is a dispute over competing visions of the South China Sea and a weary China who sees itself surrounded. Heightened trade flows between China and the claimant states can assure a certain amount of stability in the region.¶ And although many are quick to remind us that trade cannot serve as a deterrent to conflict, today's globalised world stands in stark contrast to the beginning of the 20th century. Even the Philippine president, Aquino, argued that territorial disputes in the South China Sea were unlikely to lead to conflict because **no one was willing to sacrifice the huge trade flows in the region.**¶ Therefore, **despite the issues over sovereignty and the occasional flare-ups between various claimants, peace, no matter how precarious, will prevail - no country is ready, particularly China, to sacrifice trade at the expense of stability.**

No SCS miscalc - Empirics prove. Increased presence of CG ships actually results in less potential for conflict.

Stashwick, 15 [Steven, spent 10 years on active duty as a U.S. naval officer, made several deployments to the Western Pacific, and completed graduate studies in international relations at the University of Chicago. He is a Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve.2015 ("South China Sea: Conflict Escalation and 'Miscalculation' Myths," The Diplomat, September 25, 2015, Accessible Online at: <http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-china-sea-conflict-escalation-and-miscalculation-myths/>] //CJC

In Asia, **there is recent and dramatic precedent for restraint**, even after an unambiguously hostile local event, which belies theoretical arguments about the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation. When the **South Korean warship Cheonan was sunk** in 2010, South Korea determined that North Korea was responsible. Far from a mere 'incident' of the sort worried over in the South China Sea, this was a belligerent act against South Korea's armed forces. And **yet, there was no miscalculation-fueled conflict spiral, and instead a strategically calibrated response.**

It remains unknown whether the sinking of the Cheonan was ordered by the North Koreans (they continue to deny any responsibility), the act of a renegade, or, perhaps least plausibly, an accident. What is clear is that **despite a sunken ship and 46 sailors killed, the incident did not spiral out of control.** This suggests that **South Korea's political calculus did not view militarily punishing North Korea worth the risk of a renewed – and potentially nuclear – war**, which is to say that an extraordinary but tactical-level event did not trump strategic preferences. Even so, **some take the miscalculation-escalation dynamic so far as to suggest that incidents between fishing vessels and coast guards in the South China Sea might lead to war.** In view of the Cold War record and the recent Cheonan example, such **propositions are drastically overstated.** It is conceivable that a state already resolved to escalate a dispute militarily might view a local maritime incident as a convenient casus belli. But in that emphatically calculated case, no institutional impediments to such incidents would prevent the hostility.

On the contrary, **the prevalence of coast guards and fishing vessels is actually a sign of restraint.** For a front so often considered a "flashpoint," it is notable how few incidents in the South China Sea are between naval assets. This is not accident or luck, but instead suggests that **regional players deliberately use lightly armed coast guard and other para-military "white hull" vessels to enforce their claims.** Because **these units do not have the ability to escalate force the way warships do,** it in fact **signals their desire to avoid escalation.** And while **"gray hull" naval vessels** may be just over the horizon providing an implicit threat of force, they can also **provide a**

further **constraint on potential incidents**; their very presence compels parties to consider how far to escalate without inviting more serious responses.

As in the Cold War, parties in the South China Sea have sought diplomatic mitigation of maritime incidents, principally through the perennially-stalled Code of Conduct, the year-old Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), and the bilateral Military Maritime Consultative Agreement between the U.S. and China. But underpinning concerns about miscalculation and escalation-, and mitigation efforts like CUES, is the idea that by avoiding incidents the region will avoid war. This belief is dangerous insofar as it conflates the symptoms of the disputes (incidents at sea) with the terms of the dispute itself (maritime rights and sovereignty). Incidents and the activities that precipitate them help establish new and accepted regional norms and "facts on the ground" (bloodlessly, if inelegantly). In that sense, avoiding incidents sets back the de facto resolution of the disputes. Since the balance of these evolving norms and facts on the ground appears to favor China's efforts (e.g., using its coast guard to eject fishing vessels from disputed waters and island reclamation projects), it is neither surprising that China's regional rivals propose institutional remedies like CUES and the Code of Conduct, nor that China only agrees to them after negotiating away any legally binding provisions.

The record suggests that **miscalculation concerns over incidents in the maritime realm are exaggerated and can artificially increase tensions, raise threat perceptions, and justify arms build-ups.**

Whether an incident is deliberate, or a true organic accident, if it occurs within a dispute context where neither side desires armed conflict, it will not escalate at the strategic level. However, because of the very seriousness of that perceived escalation threat, the miscalculation narrative can also motivate positive diplomatic efforts like INCSEA, DMA, and now CUES (not to overstate their realistic contribution to resolving disputes).

Further, for all its conceptual and historical problems, and not least its potential to feed narratives of aggression, another possible advantage of focusing on "miscalculation" in the South China Sea is that it allows countries to maintain ambiguity about the real terms of dispute. Avoiding war is a distinct objective from "solving" disputes; war is a dispute resolution mechanism after all. But if peace is the priority, ambiguity may be preferable if all that clarity reveals is just how intractable those disputes may be. Clarity can rob governments of the flexibility to equivocate to their domestic audiences (and competitors) and force a choice between escalating a conflict and backing down from their claims. Then open conflict might become more realistic. Conversely, if all parties are more or less content to live with ambiguity in the region's maritime claims, then a somewhat mutually dissatisfying peace prevails, *but peace nonetheless*. Everyone wants to win, but **as long as everyone also wants to avoid losing even more, occasional incidents do not have to fuel strategic tension.**

US-China war is impossible – deterrence checks even if they overtake us

Glaser 11 - Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Director of the Elliott School's Institute for Security and Conflict Studies (Charles, "Will China's Rise Lead to War?" Foreign Affairs, April 2011)
//CJC

What does all this imply about the rise of China? At the broadest level, the news is good. Current international conditions should enable both the United States and China to protect their vital interests without posing large threats to each other. Nuclear weapons make it relatively easy for major powers to maintain highly effective deterrent forces. Even if Chinese power were to greatly exceed U.S. power somewhere down the road, the United States would still be able to maintain nuclear forces that could survive any Chinese attack and threaten massive damage in retaliation. Large-scale conventional attacks by China against the U.S. homeland, meanwhile, are virtually impossible because the United States and China are separated by the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean, across which it would be difficult to attack. No foreseeable increase in China's power would be large enough to overcome these twin advantages of defense for the United States. The same defensive advantages, moreover, apply to China as well. Although China is currently much weaker than the United States militarily, it will soon be able to build a nuclear force that meets its requirements for deterrence. And China should not find the United States' massive conventional

capabilities especially threatening, because the bulk of U.S. forces, logistics, and support lie across the Pacific. The overall effect of these conditions is to greatly moderate the security dilemma. Both the United States and China will be able to maintain high levels of security now and through any potential rise of China to superpower status. This should help Washington and Beijing avoid truly strained geopolitical relations, which should in turn help ensure that the security dilemma stays moderate, thereby facilitating cooperation. The United States, for example, will have the option to forego responding to China's modernization of its nuclear force. This restraint will help reassure China that the United States does not want to threaten its security--and thus help head off a downward political spiral fueled by nuclear competition.

Low-level conflicts won't escalate to accidental war –MAD and diplomacy still checks

Keck 13 - Former Deputy Editor of E-International Relations (Zachary, The Diplomat, "Why China and the U.S. (Probably) Won't Go to War," <http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/why-china-and-the-us-probably-wont-go-to-war/>)/CJC

These can and should be supplemented with clear and open communication channels, which can be especially useful when unexpected crises arise, like an exchange of fire between low-level naval officers in the increasingly crowded waters in the region. While this possibility is real and frightening, it's hard to imagine a plausible scenario where it leads to a nuclear exchange between China and the United States. After all, at each stage of the crisis leaders know that if it is not properly contained, a nuclear war could ensue, and the complete destruction of a leader's country is a more frightening possibility than losing credibility among hawkish elements of society. In any case, measured means of retaliation would be available to the party wronged, and behind-the-scenes diplomacy could help facilitate the process of finding mutually acceptable retaliatory measures.

US Hegemony is not needed in East Asia; China and Japan prove

Ted **Carpenter** April 2013, [a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor to *The National Interest*, is the author of nine books and more than 500 articles and policy studies, "Delusions of Indispensability" <http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/delusions-indispensability-8145>] MJS

Prospects in other regions are less definite, but there are still opportunities for Washington to reduce its military exposure and risks. The most important region to the United States, East Asia, presents a less encouraging picture than does Europe for off-loading security obligations, since there is no cohesive, multilateral organization comparable to the EU to undertake those responsibilities. Yet even in East Asia there are alternatives to U.S. hegemony, which has been in place since 1945. Washington's dominance was born in an era in which there were no credible challengers. Although the USSR had some ambitions in the western Pacific, its primary goals were elsewhere, largely in Eastern Europe and the emerging states of the Third World. China after the Chinese Revolution in 1949 was belligerent, but also weak and poor. Japan, utterly defeated in World War II and worried about Soviet and Chinese intentions, was content

to maintain a pacifist image and rely heavily on the United States for defense. The rest of the region consisted of new, weak states arising out of rapidly decaying European colonial empires. As in Europe, the situation today is totally different. Japan has the world's third-largest economy, China is an emerging great power, and East Asia has an assortment of other significant economic and political players. It will be increasingly difficult for the United States, a nation thousands of miles away, to dominate a region with an ever-expanding roster of major powers. Instead of frantically trying to prop up a slipping hegemony, U.S. policy makers must focus on helping to shape a new security environment. Among other steps, Washington should wean its principal allies in the region—especially Japan, South Korea and Australia—from their overreliance on U.S. defense guarantees. Not only should U.S. leaders make it clear that the United States intends to reduce its military presence, but they should emphasize that those allies now must take far greater responsibility for their own defense and the overall stability of the region. The most likely outcome of such a policy shift would be the emergence of an approximate balance of power in East Asia. China would be the single strongest country, but if Japan, South Korea, and other actors such as Vietnam and Indonesia take the actions necessary to protect their own interests, Beijing will fall far short of having enough power to become the new hegemon. A balance-of-power system would be somewhat less stable than the current arrangement, but it would likely be sufficient to protect crucial American interests. And it may be Washington's only realistic option over the medium and long term. Clinging to an increasingly unsustainable hegemony is not a realistic strategy.

North Korea wont lash out unless directly threatened

McKirdy and Kwon '16 Euan- Digital Producer based in Hong Kong for CNN, KJ- CNN producer based out of Seoul, 5-8-16, "Kim Jong Un: We'll only use nuclear weapons if sovereignty threatened," <http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/07/asia/north-korea-nuclear-use-sovereignty/> //CJC

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said the country would not use a nuclear weapon unless its sovereignty is encroached by "invasive hostile forces with nuclear weapons," according to the country's state news agency KCNA. He made the remarks Saturday at the ruling Workers' Party of Korea's Seventh Congress in Pyongyang, which began the day before. Kim also reportedly said North Korea will faithfully fulfill its nuclear nonproliferation obligations and make an effort to realize global denuclearization. In his 15-minute opening speech Friday, Kim touted the country's weapons development, saying they had "elevated our respect to the world and enemies."

No NoKo collapse — economic reforms and shifts in power structure increase flexibility

Moon et. al. 15 — Chung-in Moon, a professor of political science at Yonsei University in Seoul, South Korea, and Ildo Hwang, a journalist with Donga Ilbo who specialises in North Korean affairs, 2015 ("North Korea still stable despite external vulnerabilities," *East Asia Forum*,

December 28th, Available Online at <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/12/28/north-korea-still-stable-despite-external-vulnerabilities/>, Accessed 07-21-16)

North Korea seems to have had an *internally stable 2015*. Its economy is far from faltering and Kim Jong-un has firmly consolidated his power base. There were no explicit signs of internal challenge. Kim is both reigning and ruling. But Pyongyang's provocative behaviour in the international domain could produce severe consequences for North Korea. Uncertainty remains high.

In late October, Pyongyang announced that it will hold the Seventh Congress of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) in May 2016, 35 years after the Sixth Party Congress in 1980. At the first Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, the late North Korean chairman Kim Jong-il mentioned to then South Korean president Kim Dae-jung that he would convene a congress, but it was never realised. Kim Jong-un succeeded power without the congress ever being held. This announcement is therefore a significant move.

Kim Jong-un is likely to use the upcoming party congress as a platform to declare the beginning of a new era under his leadership. His 2015 New Year speech had already hinted the possibility of redirecting the governing ideology.

Kim Jong-un's previous New Year speeches made it clear that his rule is founded on two pillars: the ideological lines of his grandfather Kim Il-sung and father Kim Jong-il. But in 2015, such ideological edifices did not appear. Instead, Kim Jong-un routinely mentioned old rhetoric such as strengthening monolithic leadership, *juche* (self-reliance), as well as the importance of *songun* (military first) politics. The North Korean leader may well introduce his own brand of ruling ideology at the Seventh Party Congress in 2016.

The decision reveals Kim Jong-un's growing confidence in economic performance and power consolidation. North Korea underwent major economic difficulties in 2015 — partly because of international sanctions and poor harvests, and partly because of falling prices of coal and iron ore that accounted for almost half of its exports.

But Pyongyang's economic performance has remained rather robust, owing to the flourishing informal sector. Since 2009, more than 400 *jangmadang* (informal marketplaces) have been introduced. They have facilitated the distribution of necessary consumer goods through a quasi-market mechanism. Such informal markets critically mitigated the negative consequences of severe drought and poor harvest. This was a sharp contrast to the period of mass starvation of the 1990s, after which the public distribution system collapsed. Equally important is the advent of *donju* (money holders) who are serving as new agents of capital accumulation as well as sources of valuable hard currency.

The size of the informal sector is now believed to be larger than that of the formal sector. Some experts even compare the current North Korean economy to the Chinese economy under Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening up initiative. As the logic behind a market economy becomes more widespread, the state economy is becoming increasingly flexible. The state no longer commands and dictates the economy. Citizens themselves have become increasingly adaptive and entrepreneurial, seeking their own survival through whatever means available.

Paradoxically, the adaptive behaviour of ordinary citizens has weakened the effectiveness of international sanctions.

The power structure has also been shifting from old, vested interests (such as the military) to the party and the cabinet. They now control overall economic activities, including foreign

exchange earnings and foreign direct investment. Cadres from the Organisation and Guidance Department of the KWP — which played a pivotal role in Kim Jong-un's smooth succession to power — have emerged as the core power elite group.

The generational change of the power elite has been another defining characteristic of the Kim Jong-un leadership in 2015. Relatively young party members have been extensively recruited. Old guards, such as the second generation of revolutionary leaders and military personnel who were powerful during the Kim Jong-il era, have been either purged or discharged.

Your authors are just wrong — North Korea cares too much about regime survival to escalate

Jackson and Suh, 7-9-15 – [Van Jackson, Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, Hannah Suh, Asia-Pacific Security Program at Center for a New American Security, 7-9-2015, The Biggest Myth about North Korea, The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-biggest-myth-about-north-korea-13290>] //CJC

A million lives and a trillion dollars. Experts in the 1990s predicted that the costs of war with North Korea would reach at least this magnitude. While this is probably true of a worst-case scenario, and estimates would doubtless be even higher today, pundits and officials alike have allowed it to cloud reasoned judgment about North Korea. A strawman argument has taken hold that any actions against North Korea will lead to cataclysmic death and destruction. This is wrong. Alliance military actions against North Korea will not automatically trigger a nuclear holocaust or the annihilation of Seoul. Fear, risk aversion and a misunderstanding of North Korea have allowed the most dangerous scenario to be conflated with the most likely one. Rather than being paralyzed by the fact that anything is possible, alliance policy and military planning needs to recognize a simple reality: no matter what North Korea threatens, it will assiduously seek to avoid war-triggering actions. North Korea's own historical behavior and its widely presumed goal of regime survival confirms as much. It isn't hard to find pundits who would have us believe North Korea is prepared to immolate the Korean Peninsula in a blaze of glory at the first hint of conflict. One argument goes that offensive military action "likely would trigger a war which would devastate South Korea." Another offers that even an "extremely limited" preemptive strike "...risks sparking a major military conflict...that might have devastating consequences for the [United States], Korea, and beyond..." Still others argue that there's nothing the United States or South Korea can do because North Korean artillery aimed at Seoul prevents even minor military actions, implying that any attacks on North Korea will trigger the worst scenario imaginable. One analyst even pointedly remarks that using force against North Korea would be worse than allowing its nuclear program to expand. Nor is this illogic limited to pundits; successive U.S. administrations have fallen prey to the same fear-based, rather than logic-based, thinking. During the George W. Bush administration, the prevailing view "...was that if any kind of military strike starts against North Korea, the North Koreans would invade...and they will cause enormous destruction of Seoul." And former secretary of defense Robert Gates wrote in his memoir of the Obama administration's hyperventilating pleas with the highest levels of the South Korean government not to retaliate against North Korea for its November 2010 artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island. Widespread fear of a North Korean total war is a pathology based on an imaginary North Korea. No matter one's political leanings, right and left alike agree that North Korea's primary goal is regime survival, meaning that North Korea will not only take actions to safeguard its regime, but also avoid taking actions that put its survival at risk. This bears out in sixty years of observing North Korean behavior—even during the so-called "second Korean war" of the late 1960s, North Korea never escalated beyond isolated military attacks. Today, North Korea threatens South Korean NGOs that send propaganda balloons into its territory, yet fires at the balloons and not the people launching them. In repeated naval clashes with South Korea in the Yellow Sea, North Korea strikes some blows and suffers others, but it never escalates beyond the local clash. North Korea has had countless opportunities to escalate or broaden conflicts in a crisis, yet has consistently chosen restraint. Whatever North Korea's rhetoric and motivations for violence, its track

record shows a preference for not taking actions that would jeopardize the regime, and the North Korean escalation that everyone fears would do precisely that. Even if North Korea responded with violence when attacked or retaliated against, **there is a massive difference between responding with limited or tit-for-tat violence (its historical modus operandi) and responding with the most devastatingly lethal response it can come up with, like a nuclear first-strike or artillery barrages against Seoul. The latter are regime-ending actions, while the former may demonstrate resolve against the alliance and allow both sides a chance to sue for peace.**

No solvency – the problems of the Middle East are internal. Outside intervention can't solve them

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https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Winter2017_Lynch.pdf

That does not, however, mean that the Middle East will not change. The internal contradictions of today's Middle East, including intense domestic instability in almost every Arab country and the destabilizing effects of multiple unresolved wars, may weaken those structural constraints on the new administration and open the possibility for more fundamental changes to regional order. But **it will not be because of Trump's policies—or any initiatives from outside the region—it will fundamentally be because of structure—or changes from within the region—as has been true for decades.** Trump is the third consecutive new president to come to office vowing fundamental change in America's Middle East policy. Both George W. Bush and Barack Obama came to office determined to scale back U.S. presence in the Middle East. Each president ended up with much different results than anticipated. **Each left office with a region marked by destabilizing wars, failed democratic change, intense anti-Americanism, strained alliances, and dangerously evolving jihadist networks.** Each succeeded at their top objectives—Bush by overthrowing Saddam Hussein, Obama by signing the nuclear agreement with Iran—but neither immediately saw the expected benefits of these policies to materialize. The similarities in their otherwise divergent trajectories offer a critical case study in the limits of any president's ability to change U.S. posture in the Middle East, and of the likely fate of Trump's ambitions.

[...]

This pattern of failed transformation and unintended consequences has less to do with any specific decisions or policies than with the overarching stickiness of structure. Changing the Middle East from the outside in any direction is inherently difficult. Long-standing patterns of power, rivalry, and identity tend to reassert themselves even after major upheavals. The mechanism by which structure trumped agency in the Bush

administration was the inexorable costs of the Iraqi quagmire, while for the Obama administration it was primarily the resistance by U.S. allies to his aspirations. Their resistance to change incorporated the full arsenal of alliance politics, from foot-dragging to leash-slipping to open opposition.

[...]

The United States is trapped in the Middle East by an unforgiving structure, one largely of its own making, from which it now cannot escape. **Trump will likely attempt to redirect Obama's policies by focusing on combatting radical Islam and the containment of Iran, rebuilding relations with traditional U.S. allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, and dropping calls for democracy in favor of transactional relations with autocratic regimes.** This approach assumes the ability of friendly autocrats to enforce unpopular foreign policies and effectively control their own societies. And during the Clinton and Bush administrations, this required the forward deployment of U.S. military forces at levels unlikely to be sustainable today, especially since it would require a significant and politically contentious increase following Obama's years of restraint and the American public's domestic focus.

Increased intervention causes massive Anti-Americanism

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Trump's avowed reticence to intervene in the Middle East outside of counterterrorism may prove popular at home, but it's unlikely to significantly change regional public opinion of the United States. Whatever the calculations of Arab leaders, an intense, persistent anti-Americanism has characterized Arab public opinion for decades, regardless of changing American policies or public diplomacy initiatives. The 2016 wave of the respected Arab Barometer survey asked respondents to name the most positive thing the United States could do for the region: 62 percent of Egyptians and 50 percent of Tunisians said "the [United States] should not get involved." 9 **A more assertive America, whether in Syria or elsewhere, would likely produce yet another surge of anti-Americanism in response.**

Any form of US military support increases terrorism

Eric **Neumayer** (London School of Economics) "Foreign terror on Americans" 2011 <http://www.grammatikhilfe.com/geographyAndEnvironment/whosWho/profiles/neumayer/pdf/Terror%20on%20Americans.pdf>

Turning to our variables of main interest, we find evidence in favour of our hypothesis. In particular, the three **'military support' variables exert a positive impact on the number of US victims.** All three show a significant and positive relation to the number of American terror

Krauss Dec 2016 [Clifford Krauss, writer at NYT, "Volatility? Simple Economics", *New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/energy-environment/oil-prices.html?_r=0>] //CJC

The oil industry, with its history of booms and busts, has been in its deepest downturn since the 1990s, if not earlier. Earnings are down for companies that made record profits in recent years, leading them to decommission about two-thirds of their rigs and sharply cut investment in exploration and production. Scores of companies have gone bankrupt and an estimated 250,000 oil workers — about half in the United States — have lost their jobs. **The cause is the plunging price of oil barrels, which at one point fell more than 70 percent compared with June 2014 levels.** Prices have recovered a few times over the last year, and although the industry has managed to cut costs, many wells remain unprofitable. Executives think **it will be years before oil returns to \$90 or \$100 a barrel**, a price that was pretty much the norm over the last decade.

Flood attempt Inev: U.S. shale production will encourage a Saudi flood

Plumer, 12 (Brad, domestic correspondent for the Washington Post, “OPEC is worried about cheaper oil. Why isn’t Saudi Arabia?”, Washington Post, 6/13/2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/opec-is-worried-about-cheap-oil-why-isnt-saudi-arabia/2012/06/13/gJQA7F3ZaV_blog.html //CJC

Right now, the world is pumping more oil than it needs. That means falling prices: good for oil consumers in the U.S. and Europe, bad for producers in the Middle East. So when OPEC meets Thursday, some oil states like Iraq will ask the cartel to throttle output and push prices back up. But Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil producer, appears to be okay with letting prices fall further — even below their current price of \$96 per barrel. At first glance, that might seem odd. Shouldn’t the Saudis *want* sky-high prices? Wouldn’t that mean more money for them? Perhaps. Yet according to energy economist Philip Verleger, the Saudis have all sorts of subtle reasons for wanting prices to ease up further — from punishing Iran and Russia to staving off America’s quest for oil independence. The first thing to note, Verleger explained in a phone interview, is that Saudi Arabia is most concerned about two countries — Iran and Russia. Iran’s nuclear program is causing other Middle Eastern governments to sweat uncomfortably. And the Saudi king recently suggested, in a rare rebuke, that he was unhappy with Russia’s veto of a U.N. resolution to curtail the violence in nearby Syria. Both Iran and Russia are major oil producers. And their economies would be hurt by lower crude prices. Many analysts believe that Iran needs oil prices well above \$100 per barrel to balance its budget. That gives Saudi Arabia a lot of leverage. “The Saudis know that lower prices are a much better way to put pressure on Iran than sanctions,” says Verleger. Second, Saudi Arabia is a member of the G-20 and wants to stay in the good graces of the United States and Europe. So, Verleger says, the Saudis may want to let prices drop further — even below their current, still-historically-high level of \$96 per barrel — to provide further economic stimulus to the rest of the world. “The Saudis believe that letting prices fall 50 percent in 1999 helped the world recover from the Asian debt crisis,” Verleger says. Third, Verleger says, **the Saudis are casting a wary eye on the nascent shale-drilling boom in the United State and Canada.** “Some of those [North American] producers are very sensitive to the price of oil,” he says, “so if the Saudis let oil prices keep falling, that will slow production.” Saudi Arabia is **none too keen on other countries developing their own sources of oil anytime soon.** Those three reasons may help explain why Saudi Arabia recently called for a higher target for OPEC’s crude output — even though prices are already dropping. Saudi production has driven the recent boom in oil supply, cranking out 9.9 million barrels per day in May, its highest level all year. Because of its gargantuan reserves, Saudi Arabia can still play a major role in determining the price of crude, at least when demand is slack. If the Saudis decided to cut back their output — as happened after the financial crisis in 2009 — they could put a floor on prices. But they seem to have little interest in doing so for the time being. Other OPEC countries, particularly Iran, Russia, Venezuela and Iraq may not like this state of affairs. “But there’s not much they can do about it,” Verleger says. “The Saudis run the show.”

Transition not happening – fossil fuels outpacing renewables

Plumer, 7/10 (Brad, Washington Post, “Bad news: The world’s energy supply isn’t getting any cleaner”, 2013, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/workblog/wp/2013/07/10/bad-news-fossil-fuels-are-more-than-keeping-up-with-clean-energy/>) //CJC

We’ve seen plenty of charts over the past few years showing that wind and solar power are growing at astronomical rates — not just in the United States, but around the world. That seems like an encouraging sign for efforts to tackle global warming. **But here’s a sobering counterpoint.** Roger Pielke, Jr., an environmental studies professor at the University of Colorado, has charted data on the share of carbon-free energy as a fraction of the world’s overall consumption. When you look at things this way, **the share of clean energy around the world has actually stagnated over the past 20 years:** It’s true that carbon-free sources like wind and solar and hydropower and geothermal have been growing rapidly. But fossil fuels like oil, coal, and natural gas have also been growing rapidly in the past two decades — particularly in China and India. **The result is a stalemate of sorts.** The world’s energy supply isn’t any cleaner than it was in the 1990s. (By the way, fans of nuclear will note that the share of carbon-free energy grew most quickly 1965 and 1999 — a period, Pielke notes, when “nuclear power increas[ed] by a factor of 100 and hydropower by a factor of 6.”) Another way to look at the same phenomenon is to measure the “carbon-intensity” of the world’s energy sector — that is, how many tons of carbon dioxide are released into the atmosphere for each unit of energy that’s generated. This takes into account improvements in efficiency and the fact that natural gas is a cleaner fossil fuel than coal. Here, too, there’s been a real stagnation over the past few decades. Check out that gray line: **This chart comes from a report this year by the International Energy Agency, which notes that since 1990, the carbon-intensity of the global economy has improved by a mere 1 percent** — despite all the concern and all the conferences on climate change. **If that trend continues, the IEA says, global carbon-dioxide emissions will keep rising sharply and climate models suggest the Earth could heat up by as much as 6°C (10.8°F) over the long term.** That’s what the purple line represents. By the way, the World Bank isn’t sure that humanity will be able to adapt to even 4°C of warming. So 6°C isn’t exactly ideal. **Now, alternatively, if the world wants to avoid that balmy fate and keep global warming below 2°C, then carbon intensity will have to improve dramatically — far more dramatically than we’ve seen over the last four decades.** That’s what the blue line represents. Is the blue line actually possible? That’s the trillion-dollar question. The full IEA report, “Tracking Clean Energy Progress 2013” (pdf) has a slew of ideas on how to clean up the world’s energy sector. For instance, global coal use would have to peak before 2020; power plants and factories would have to get a lot more efficient; things like nuclear power and renewables would have to expand at an even faster rate. **For now, though, the world’s not on track.**

Renewables not a standalone strategy – intermittency, efficiency is a prerequisite, grid alterations, electricity prices, and European examples aren’t in the context of the US grid.

Rosenthal 3-23 (Elisabeth, “Life After Oil and Gas”, NYTimes, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/24/sunday-review/life-after-oil-and-gas.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) //CJC

“There is plenty of room for wind and solar to grow and they are becoming more competitive, but these **are still variable resources** — the sun doesn’t always shine and the wind doesn’t always blow,” said Alex Klein, the research director of IHS Emerging Energy Research, a consulting firm on renewable energy. **“An industrial economy needs a reliable power** source, so we think **fossil fuel will be** an **important** foundation of our energy mix **for** the next few

decades.” Fatih Birol, chief economist at the 28-nation International Energy Agency, which includes the United States, said that reducing fossil fuel use was crucial to curbing global temperature rise, but added that improving the energy efficiency of homes, vehicles and industry was an easier short-term strategy. He noted that the 19.5 million residents of New York State consume as much energy as the 800 million in sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) and that, even with President Obama’s automotive fuel standards, European vehicles were on average more than 30 percent more fuel efficient than American ones. He cautioned that a rapid expansion of renewable power would be complicated and costly. Using large amounts of renewable energy often requires modifying national power grids, and renewable energy is still generally more expensive than using fossil fuels. That is particularly true in the United States, where natural gas is plentiful and, therefore, a cheap way to generate electricity (while producing half the carbon dioxide emissions of other fossil fuels, like coal). Promoting wind and solar would mean higher electricity costs for consumers and industry. Indeed, many of the European countries that have led the way in adopting renewables had little fossil fuel of their own, so electricity costs were already high. Others had strong environmental movements that made it politically acceptable to endure higher prices in order to reduce emissions.

Free Trade Increases Democracy by 3x and Reduces Political Tyranny by 9x

CATO Institute, January 9, **2004**, “How Free Trade Promotes Democracy” Dan **Griswold** [Former Director of Center for Trade Policy Studies]

<https://www.cato.org/events/how-free-trade-promotes-democracy> MRS

“A new Cato study finds strong evidence that free trade promotes democracy and respect for human rights in countries that open their borders to the global economy. Specifically, the research finds that countries that are the most open to trade are three times more likely to enjoy full civil and political liberties than those that are closed, and are nine times less likely to suffer under political tyranny. Cato scholar Dan Griswold will discuss the findings of his study and their implications for U.S. trade policy toward China, the Middle East, Central America, and Cuba.”

Trade Helps Fight Income Inequality (Warrant List)

Flanigan, 2014 [Maggie, associate, “Can International Trade Help Decrease Economic Inequality?”, *BusinessForward*, <http://www.businessfwd.org/blog/can-international-trade-help-decrease-economic-inequality>] //AKC

A new report by Progressive Economy Executive Director Edward Gresser finds that trade agreements can help to decrease economic inequality. Overall, the gains from trade would outweigh the risks.

Here is a summary of the report’s key findings:

Many Trade Barriers Hurt Low-Income Americans

International trade policy is especially influential on the lives of lower-income consumers. Tariffs for necessary consumer goods such as shoes, clothes, and blankets make up a greater proportion of the final price than those on higher-end counterparts.

New trade agreements have the potential to correct this regressive taxation and increase the purchasing power of lower-income individuals.

....

Trade Can Increase Economic Growth

International trade helps to increase economic growth, which counteracts income inequality.

The Progressive Economy report argues that though international trade is a secondary factor in affecting inequality, it does expand the pool of consumers to which businesses can export. Last year, every \$1 billion of exports supported nearly 6,000 jobs. Increasing exports would lead U.S. businesses to expand and hire. Even if the income gap between the richest and the poorest is not directly decreased because of international trade, the overall standard of living for the least affluent is improved.

Democracy Impacts

Lynn-Jones, 1998. ["Why the United States Should Spread Democracy." Author: Sean M. Lynn-Jones | March 1998. *Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School*

<https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/why-united-states-should-spread-democracy>] GST

2. Liberal Democracies are Less Likely to Use Violence Against Their Own People.

Second, America should spread liberal democracy because the citizens of liberal democracies are less likely to suffer violent death in civil unrest or at the hands of their governments.²⁷ These two findings are supported by many studies, but particularly by the work of R.J. Rummel. Rummel finds that **democracies-by** which he means liberal democracies-between 1900 and 1987 **saw only 0.14% of their populations (on average) die annually in internal violence.** **The corresponding figure for authoritarian regimes was 0.59% and for totalitarian regimes 1.48%.**²⁸ Rummel also finds that citizens of liberal democracies are far less likely to die at the hands of their governments. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have been responsible for the overwhelming majority of genocides and mass murders of civilians in the twentieth century. **The states that have killed millions of their citizens all have been authoritarian or totalitarian: the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Nazi Germany, Nationalist China, Imperial Japan, and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge.** **Democracies have virtually never massacred their own citizens on a large scale,** although they have killed foreign civilians during wartime. The American and British bombing campaigns against Germany and Japan, U.S. atrocities in Vietnam, massacres of Filipinos during the guerrilla war that followed U.S. colonization of the Philippines after 1898, and French killings of Algerians during the Algerian War are some prominent examples.²⁹

[...]

Why do democracies perform better than autocracies over the long run? Two reasons are particularly persuasive explanations. First, **democracies-especially liberal democracies-are more likely to have market economies, and market economies tend to produce economic growth over the long run.** Most of the world's leading economies thus tend to be market economies, including the United States, Japan, the "tiger" economies of Southeast Asia, and the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Two recent studies suggest that there is a direct connection between economic liberalization and economic performance. Freedom House conducted a World Survey of Economic Freedom for 1995-96, which evaluated 80 countries that account for 90% of the world's population and 99% of the world's wealth on the basis of criteria such as the right to own property, operate a business, or belong to a trade union. **It found that the countries rated "free" generated 81% of the world's output even though they had only 17% of the world's population.**³⁷ A second recent study confirms the connection between economic freedom and economic growth. The Heritage Foundation has constructed an Index of Economic Freedom that looks at 10 key areas: trade policy, taxation, government intervention, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking policy, wage and price controls, property rights, regulation, and black market activity. It has found that countries classified as "**free**" had annual 1980-1993 real per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (expressed in terms of purchasing power parities) **growth rates of 2.88%. In "mostly free" countries the rate was 0.97%, in "mostly not free" ones -0.32%, and in "repressed" countries -1.44%.**³⁸ Of course, some democracies do not adopt market economies and some autocracies do, but liberal democracies generally are more likely to pursue liberal economic policies.

[....]

Democracies do not experience famines for two reasons. First, in **democracies governments are accountable to their populations and their leaders** have electoral incentives to prevent mass starvation. The need to be reelected impels politicians to ensure that their people do not starve. As Sen points out, "the plight of famine victims is easy to politicize" and "the effectiveness of democracy in the prevention of famine has tended to depend on the politicization of the plight of famine victims, through the process of public discussion, which generates political solidarity."⁴⁵ On the other hand, **authoritarian and totalitarian regimes are not accountable to the public; they are less likely to pay a political price for failing to prevent famines.** Moreover, authoritarian and totalitarian rulers often have political incentives to use famine as a means of exterminating their domestic opponents.

Second, the existence of a **free press and the free flow of information in democracies prevents famine by serving as an early warning system on the effects of natural catastrophes such as floods and droughts that may cause food scarcities.** A free press that criticizes government policies also can publicize the true level of food stocks and reveal problems of distribution that might cause famines even when food is plentiful.⁴⁶ Inadequate information has contributed to several famines. During the 1958-61 famine in China that killed 20-30 million people, the Chinese authorities overestimated the country's grain reserves by 100 million metric tons. This disaster later led Mao Zedong to concede that "Without democracy, you have no understanding of what is happening down below."⁴⁷ The 1974 Bangladesh famine also

could have been avoided if the government had had better information. The food supply was high, but floods, unemployment, and panic made it harder for those in need to obtain food.⁴⁸

Globalization empirically bad in weak/unstable countries as shown in Africa (also has all the warrants)

Ibrahim, 13 [Alhaji Ahmadu Ibrahim, Professor of Sociology at Yobe State University, 'The Impact of Globalization on Africa',

http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_3_No_15_August_2013/11.pdf] PP

The negative impacts of globalization on Africa:

1. Tendon (1998) states that the cold war which was born out of the process for globalization has had significant consequences for Africa. During its height in the 1960's and 1970's, the cold war witnessed the emergence of authoritarian regimes in the form of one-party or military regimes. This was largely a result of the support of the two blocks to keep African countries in their respective camps. This has in turn, substantially reduced Africa's international negotiating power and its ability to maneuver in the international system. In sum then, the cold war and its demise has worked against democracy and economic development in Africa.
2. Specific impact of globalization on Africa were identified according to Oyejide (1998) in the political sphere, the most important consequence is **the erosion of sovereignty, especially on economic and financial matters**, as a result of the imposition of models, strategies and policies of development on African countries by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization.
3. **More important is the fact that globalization for most part does not facilitate the establishment of the economic conditions necessary for genuine democracy and good governance to take solid roots and thrives.**
4. Economically, globalization has, on the whole, **reinforced the economic marginalization of African economies and their dependence on a few primary goods for which demand and prices are externally determined**. This has, in turn **accentuated poverty and economic inequality** as well as the ability of the vast number of Africans to participate meaningfully in the social and political life of their countries.
5. As a result of the cultural domination from outside that goes with globalization, African countries are rapidly **losing their cultural identity and therefore their ability to interact with other cultures on an equal and autonomous basis**, borrowing from other cultures only those aspects that meet its requirements and needs.
6. The scientific and technological forces unleashed by globalization have facilitated the **extinction of the indigenous development of technology and distorting patterns of production in Africa.**
7. Globalization on the whole impacts **negatively on the development and consolidation of democratic governance**. One form of this is the **reduction of the capacity of governments to determine and control events in their countries, and thus their accountability and responsiveness to their people,** given the fact that the context, institutions and processes by which these decisions are taken are far from democratic.

8. **Globalization introduces anti-developmentalism by declaring the state irrelevant or marginal to the developmental effort.** Development strategies and policies that focus on stabilization and privatization, rather than growth, **development and poverty eradication, are pushed by external donors, leading to greater poverty and inequality and undermining the ability of the people to participate effectively in the political and social processes in their countries.** Welfare and other programs intended to meet the basic needs of the majority of the population are transferred from governments to non-governmental organizations that begin to replace governments making them to lose the little authority and legitimacy they have.
9. By imposing economic specialization based on the needs and interests of external forces and transforming the economies of African countries into series of enslaved economies linked to the outside but with very little linkages among them, **Democracy, with its emphasis on tolerance and compromise, can hardly thrive in such an environment** (Rodrik 1994).
10. Further, Mule (2000) views that the economic specialization imposed on African countries makes rapid and sustainable growth and development impossible, conflicts over the distribution of the limited gains realized from globalization becomes more acute and politicized. Vulnerable groups, such as women, the youth, and rural inhabitants, fare very badly in this contest and are discriminated against. This further erodes the national ethos of solidarity and reciprocity that are essential to successful democracies.
11. Globalization, by **insisting** on African countries **opening their economies to foreign goods and entrepreneurs, limits the ability of African governments to take proactive and conscious measures to facilitate the emergence of an indigenous entrepreneurial class.** (Mowlana 1998).
12. Globalization has encouraged illicit trade in drugs, prostitution, pornography, human smuggling, dumping of dangerous waste and depletion of the environment by unscrupulous entrepreneurs.
13. Globalization has freed labour across boundaries and facilitated brain drain. It facilitated “brain drain” in developing countries, thus reducing further their human capacity.

The current world, where resources and benefits are concentrated in the hands of very few, is not a comfortable world for anybody. And to sustain it is to breed future insecurity as the mass of the poor strives to get a share of the riches concentrated in the hands of the few. It is clear that globalization benefits those who have the capacity to harness it but can be very detrimental to those whom it finds not prepared. Most African States are not prepared, especially in terms of having the requisite capacity.

No impact—LNG not explosive

Lloyd's List 2008 (One of the world's oldest continuously-running journals, having provided weekly shipping news as early as 1734, “LNG is not an explosive issue”, Lexis)//CJC

INTEMPERATE language has been employed in attacking the liquefied natural gas industry ever since its inception almost 50 years ago. But in the roll call of vilification, a recent article in the Los Angeles Times takes some beating. Referring to the potential of a piracy incident, a "specialist in maritime energy security" quoted by the newspaper warns that "an LNG tanker going up is like 50 Hiroshimas". It is this kind of ill-informed sensationalism that has fuelled an overly fearful attitude to the industry, particularly in the US, where the consequences of a terrorist attack on an LNG carrier or terminal have been hotly debated. The Los Angeles Times report actually concerned the seizure of the Sirius Star, a sufficiently serious incident in its own right, one would think. But the article's specialist went on to speculate: "If it was an LNG tanker seized, we're looking at something potentially catastrophic." The seizure of any gas carrier or oil tanker is an event of some gravity. But as the Center for Liquefied Natural Gas points out, LNG is not explosive or flammable in its liquid state. "Although a large amount of energy is stored in LNG, as in any hydrocarbon, it cannot be released rapidly enough to cause the over-pressures associated with an explosion." the Center says. Thus, the "atomic bomb" allusions refer to the total energy an LNG carrier contains, not the rate at which the energy would be released in an incident. The fact that the Center for Liquefied Natural Gas is an industry trade association should not detract from its arguments, which have been corroborated by numerous studies. The Los Angeles Times report serves only to feed the misconceptions that have surrounded the supposed dangers represented by LNG carriers. It cannot be stated often enough that LNG shipping has an impeccable safety record, with eight accidents in almost 50 years, none of which led to loss of life or a breach of a vessel's cargo containment system.

Ship design checks—prevention measures.

Tony Muncer 2005 (Managing Director, UAE Lloyd's Register EMEA, "Balance debate key to eradicating sensationalist untruths," Lloyd's List, Lexis) //CJC

Many who denounce LNG base their calculations on the total volume of LNG in a ship. It is unrealistic to imagine, however, that the entire cargo of any ship can be released instantaneously. To mount such an attack would require the equivalent of a full-scale military operation like that carried out against the USS Cole. It is more likely that the LNG would be released over time, based on the size of the breach in the inner hull. Similarly, the 'against' lobbies often quote the 9 m hole blown into the side of the Limburg to demonstrate that large holes can easily be created in the side of a ship. What they fail to understand is that this was the size of the hole in the outer hull; it is the size of the hole in the inner hull which dictates the outflow rate and, in the case of the Limburg, this was only 1 m - enough to lose containment but not enough to allow instant out-pouring of the cargo. This slow release has a significant mitigating effect on the potential consequences of a spill. It is for this reason that the idea that LNG carriers are potential atom bombs is erroneous. There is a lot of energy in LNG, as in any hydrocarbon. However, the 'atomic bomb' statement refers to the total energy an LNG carrier contains, not the rate at which the energy would be released in an incident. For example, a lump of coal contains lots of energy, but when it is burned, its energy does not all come out instantly like a bomb. Instead, the coal burns over a period of time releasing its energy as it goes. Similarly, LNG carriers contain large quantities of energy, but the energy can only be released slowly in the event of a spill or a fire.

Not probable

Parfomak & Vann '8 (Paul, specialist in Energy and Infrastructure, and Adam, legislative attorney, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, "Liquefied Natural Gas

(LNG) Import Terminals: Siting, Safety, and Regulation,” 10-7, RL32205, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32205_20081007.pdf)

The LNG tanker industry claims a record of relative safety over the last 45 years; since international LNG shipping began in 1959, tankers reportedly have carried over 45,000 LNG cargoes and traveled over 100 million miles without a serious accident at sea or in port.²³ LNG tankers have experienced groundings and collisions during this period, but none has resulted in a major spill.²⁴ The LNG marine safety record is partly due to the double-hulled design of LNG tankers. This design makes them more robust and less prone to accidental spills than old singlehulled oil and fuel tankers like the *Exxon Valdez*, which caused a major Alaskan oil spill after grounding in 1989.²⁵ LNG tankers also carry radar, global positioning systems, automatic distress systems and beacons to signal if they are in trouble. Cargo safety systems include instruments that can shut operations if they deviate from normal as well as gas and fire detection systems.²⁶

Never been a spill

Oil & Gas Investor '4

(July/August 2004, p.Proquest) //CJC

Like nuclear, the LNG industry has overall racked up a close-to-excellent safety record over nearly half a century. Ships carrying LNG have made some 33,000 voyages over the years without a significant spill. But a safety record is not the same thing as public perception. And environmentalists have not been slow to weigh in with querulous concerns about environmental safeguards.

No impact—LNG explosion is extremely unlikely even if there is a spill

San Diego Union-Tribune '4

(February 7, 2004, p.Lexis) //CJC

The industry notes that liquefied natural gas is explosive only within a narrow range of concentrations in the air, 5 percent to 15 percent). Within that range, however, the fuel is combustible, so an uncontrolled release of LNG could trigger an explosion or fire. If liquefied gas spills but doesn't immediately ignite, the evaporating gas will form a vapor cloud that could drift away from the spill site. If the cloud encounters an ignition source, it can catch fire or, less likely, explode.

Social Movements influence policy

Baumgartner 2003 [Frank, “Social Movements, the Rise of New Issues, and the Public Agenda, *Penn State Publications*. Accessed at:

<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.198.9969&rep=rep1&type=pdf>.] //DNP

This paper gives some idea of where we may look for the impacts of social movements on public policy. It also should make clear that social movements are neither the only sources of new public policies nor likely to have an impact on their own. Rather, when they have a long-term impact on public policy they interact closely with other groups within their organizational fields. Further, as government activities have grown, often in response to initial demands by social movements, different constituencies have been mobilized and organizational fields themselves have been transformed. **Thus, the chain reactions of attention,**

spending, and vested interest that social movements may put into action can have long-lasting effects on public policy, social movements themselves, and other organizations such as professional and trade groups. The dynamics of public policy ensure that new sets of participants will become active in issue-areas as these areas become the objects of considerable state activity, spending, and regulation (see DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Frank et al. 2000). From health care to elderly issues to environmental causes of all kinds, we can see the tremendous impact of various social movements in American politics. Similarly, in the traditional areas of extensive government activity that have not been the objects of social movement mobilizations, we have seen a steady atrophy not only in attention but in spending as well. **The agenda of the federal government has been transformed** in the post-World War Two period in large part (though not exclusively) **by the rise of new social movements.** Our discussion of the linkages between organizational mobilization and congressional attention across five areas of social movement activity has shown some consistencies as well as some important differences. The most important consistent feature of the data is the long-term correspondence between the two trends: **Where social movement organizations develop in great numbers, so too does congressional attention rise.** Clearly, social movements and the organizations they spawn are not the only cause of increased congressional concern with new issues. Public opinion, technological advance, demographic change, and Presidential initiatives play a role, among other factors. No matter where the initial surge in attention comes from, however, our five cases all show a consistent pattern in which **Washington based interest groups associated with the social movement develop in great numbers** (or with great membership) **and act to focus attention on continued government involvement** in that issue area. The links between social movements and public policy are not simple or unidirectional, but they are close. These **Washington-based advocates continue to push for congressional attention even when** more traditional **social movement** activities **have declined.** Minkoff's (1997) research on the civil rights and women's movement shows that while protest events declined over time, SMOs continued to form until the advocacy communities reached a critical density, at which point the formal organizations grew more slowly in numbers, but maintained a high level of organizational presence. Tarrow's (1983) work on cycles of protest provides a model for understanding how the increased collective action of the civil rights movement spread to other issue areas and also how protest activity may decline. The civil rights movement is often seen as the catalyst for the mobilization of numerous subsequent movements including the four others we discuss here. Whether discussed in terms of a change in the opportunity structure or in the introduction of a master frame, the rise of civil rights and minority movements altered the political environment in a manner which facilitated the mobilization of women, peace activists, environmentalists, anti-nuclear advocates among others (McAdam 1996; Snow and Benford 1992). But it is the very nature of a cycle of protest that, over time, the intensity and frequency will decline for both the broader cycle and the specific movements operating within it. **While the activity of the movements may ebb, the formalized institutions those movements spawned will go on.** This is clearly demonstrated by our data; for all four social movements on which we have the number of SMOs, the number of viable groups that endure far outweighs the number those that ceased to exist. **Further, this growth and subsequent institutionalization far outlasted the period during which the social movements themselves were at their peak of activity and protest.**

LNG explosion does not cause extinction – not equivalent to 55 Hiroshima bombs

Kalelkar, **06** - Dr. G. A. Melhem, President and CEO at ioMosaic), Dr. A. S. Kalelkar, Principal Consultant at ioMosaic, Dr. S. Saraf, partner at ioMosaic, and Henry **Ozog**, general partner at ioMosaic ("Managing LNG Risks: Separating the Facts from the Myths," August, ioMosaic Corporation, a leading provider of safety and risk management consulting services. <http://archives1.iomosaic.com/whitepapers/Managing%20LNG%20Risks.pdf> //CJC

Myth No. 1 An LNG tanker holds thirty three million gallons of LNG, or twenty billion gallons of natural gas, the energy equivalent of fifty five Hiroshima bombs.

Fact :The estimation of hazard based on energy content is very misleading and erroneous. Using the same flawed reasoning relating LNG energy content to hazard potential, one can conclude that:

- 3 hours of sun shine over 10 square feet equals 3.2 lbs of TNT explosive

- A 24 gal automobile gasoline tank equals 1,225 lbs of TNT explosive
- 1,000 lbs of wood equals 3,530 lbs of TNT explosive
- 1,000 lbs of coal equals 4,470 lbs of TNT explosive

Hazard potential depends on both the amount of energy and the rate at which it is released. Energy release during LNG burning is relatively slow. Explosion energy is released “lightning-like” causing the formation of a shock wave that travels outwards and can cause severe damage to people and property.

Thesis of the DA is wrong – signals are BS, and if leaders are as crazy and power hungry as your ev assumes, signals don’t matter

Yglesias 08 (Matthew Yglesias, senior editor at the Center for American Progress Action Fund, “The Appeasement Paradox” May 23, 2008
<http://prospect.org/article/appeasement-paradox-0>, //CJC

One defining feature of appeasement-phobia, after all, is a curious tendency to underrate the importance of objective reality in determining the behavior of foreign countries.

In a speech Tuesday on Cuba policy, McCain derided willingness to “sit down unconditionally for a presidential meeting with Raul Castro” on the grounds that this would “send the worst possible signal to Cuba’s dictators -- there is no need to undertake fundamental reforms; they can simply wait for a unilateral change in U.S. policy.” **The idea that Cuban decision-making would hinge on a “signal” from Washington is baffling.** After

all, the past 50 years of failed American efforts to starve the Cuban people into rebelling against the Castro regime is better evidence than any signal that **Havana has no need to back down in the face of our embargo.** Similarly, Buckley worried that meeting Khrushchev would signal low U.S. morale to Moscow, with unspecified dire results. And McCain says the trouble with meeting with Iranian leaders (when he’s not too busy being confused about who the leaders of Iran are) is that a meeting “is the most prestigious card we have to play” and scheduling one might give the Iranians an ego boost and “confer both international legitimacy on the Iranian president and could strengthen him domestically.” ¶ That’s all fine, but **the premise of the appeasement frame is that we’re dealing with hardcore irrational ideologues who’ll stop at nothing to destroy us.**

Adolf Hitler actually was such a man and, not coincidentally, he wasn’t particularly interested in acquiring the international prestige and legitimacy associated with a sit-down with English politicians -- he wanted a giant war. In general, **the right wants us to believe that world history is littered with countries whose rulers, like Hitler, will stop at nothing short of world-domination** but who also spend their evenings fondly dreaming of the chance at a White House photo-op. But that’s absurd. **One shouldn’t, of course, strike a bad bargain with a foreign country just because you held a meeting, but to fear that the very act of holding a meeting is a blow to the national interest is silly. Genuine madmen aren’t going to care what “signal” we’re sending, and non-crazy people can be productively bargained with.**

More evidence – credibility’s not a thing – states have externals incentive to presume resolve

Tang ‘5 Shipping Tang, associate research fellow and deputy director of the Center for Regional Security Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, January-March 2005, “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict,” Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 34-62 //CJC

This article goes further than Mercer and argues that **reputation cannot form in conflicts because of the anarchical nature of international politics**. Because of its simplicity, parsimony, explanatory power, and better fit with empirical findings, this explanation is superior to Mercer's. **Anarchy remains the defining feature of international politics, so states operate within an environment of uncertainty. Anarchy produces "a strong sense of peril and doom"**⁶² and "a conservative **tendency to think of the future in the worst possible or worst plausible cause terms**".⁶³ States have to consistently assume the worst possible scenario, especially when they are engaged in conflicts.⁶⁴ **This "worst-case mentality" has major implications for reputation under anarchy** on at least two fronts.⁶⁵ Foremost, **because** a state's **security ultimately depends on self-help**, the worst-case mentality means that **a state has to assume its adversaries to be resolute and its allies to be irresolute**. Essentially, this worst-case assumption sets a baseline image for both adversaries and allies, and reputation becomes impossible to develop under anarchy. **A state cannot lose nor gain reputation among its adversaries by either backing down or standing firm in a conflict because its adversaries will always assume the state to be resolute** (the baseline image) **in the next conflict**. By the same token, a state cannot lose nor gain reputation among its allies by either backing down or standing firm in a conflict, for its allies will always assume the state to be irresolute in the next conflict. A state is assigned its baseline image by its adversaries and allies at the beginning of a crisis, and no past behavior can change that image ex ante.⁶⁶

Appeasement good when strong— empirically solves conflicts, the WWII comparison is moot

Record 8 (Jeffrey, defense policy critic and teaches strategy at the Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama, Summer 2008, "Retiring Hitler and 'Appeasement' from the National Security Debate,"

<http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/08summer/record.pdf>) //CJC **Appeasement**, which became a politically charged term only after World War II, **actually means "to pacify, quiet, or satisfy"**, especially by giving in to the demands of," according to Webster's New World Dictionary and Thesaurus, which goes on to list synonyms including "amends, settlement, reparation, conciliation, and compromise."¹³ These terms are consistent with what most historians and international relations theorists understand to be **the phenomenon of appeasement: states seeking to adjust or settle their differences by measures short of war**. Theorist Stephen Rock defines appeasement as simply **"the policy of reducing tensions with one's adversary by removing the causes of conflict and disagreement"**,¹⁴ a definition echoed by political scientists Gordon Craig and Alexander George: "the reduction of tension between [two] states by the methodical removal of the principal causes of conflict and disagreement between them."¹⁵ Thus Richard Nixon was guilty of "appeasing" Communist China in 1972 by embracing Beijing's one-China policy, and Ronald Reagan was guilty of "appeasing" the Soviet Union in 1987 by resolving tensions with Moscow over actual and planned deployments of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe.¹⁶ Unfortunately, Anglo-French behavior toward Nazi Germany gave appeasement such a bad name that the term is no longer usable except as a political pejorative. Before Munich, however, observes historian Paul Kennedy, **"the policy of settling international . . . quarrels by admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to an armed conflict which would be expensive, bloody, and possibly very dangerous"** was generally viewed as "constructive, positive, and honorable."¹⁶ Five years after World War II, Winston Churchill, the great anti-appeaser of Hitler, **declared, "Appeasement in itself may be good or bad according to the circumstances. Appeasement from weakness and fear is alike futile and fatal."** He added, **"Appeasement from strength is magnanimous and noble, and might be the surest and only path to world peace."**¹⁷ An oft-cited case of successful appeasement from a position of strength is

Great Britain's resolution of disputes with the United States from 1896 to 1903.¹⁸ By the 1890s the number and power of Britain's enemies were growing. Britain had no great-power allies and faced rising challenges from Germany and Russia coupled with continuing tensions with France and the United States. Tensions with industrially expanding and increasingly bellicose Germany became especially acute when in 1898 Berlin gratuitously moved to challenge British naval supremacy in European waters. Accordingly, Britain decided to reduce the potential demands on its military power by resolving outstanding disputes with the United States and France. With respect to the United States, it agreed to American demands that Britain explicitly accept the Monroe Doctrine; submit British Guiana's border dispute with Venezuela to international arbitration; agree to US construction, operation, and fortification of an interoceanic canal through Central America; and settle an Alaskan-Canadian border dispute in America's favor. None of these concessions involved vital British security interests, which in fact were advanced by transforming the world's greatest industrial power from a potential enemy into a friend (and later indispensable ally). Accepting US dominance within the Western Hemisphere not only laid the foundation of American entry on Britain's side in World War I; it also permitted a British naval evacuation of the hemisphere for operations in European waters. Meaning of the Word Use of the Munich analogy not only twists the meaning of appeasement; it also ignores the extraordinary nature of the Nazi German threat.

Though the analogy's power to persuade is undeniable, Nazi Germany remains without equal as a state threat. Genuinely Hitlerian security threats to the United States have not been replicated since 1945. The scope of Hitler's nihilism, recklessness, military power, and territorial-racial ambitions posed a mortal threat to western civilization, and there was nothing inevitable about his ultimate defeat. No other authoritarian or totalitarian regime ever employed such a powerful military instrument in such an aggressive manner on behalf of such a monstrous agenda. Hitler was simultaneously unappeasable and undeterrable—a rare combination that made war the only means of bringing him down. He understood that he could not achieve his international ambitions without war, and no territorial or political concessions the democracies might offer him would ever be enough.

Engagement works – diplomacy may be a long process, but it's the only way to solve

Takeyh 9 (Ray, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 10/7/2009, Council for Foreign Relations, "The Essence of Diplomatic Engagement," <http://www.cfr.org/diplomacy-and-statecraft/essence-diplomatic-engagement/p20362>) //CJC

As the Obama administration charts its foreign policy, there is increasing unease about its lack of achievements. The Iraq war lingers, Afghanistan continues to be mired in its endless cycle of tribal disarray and Islamist resurgence, Guantanamo remains open. Still, Obama has introduced important changes in both the style and substance of US diplomacy. An honest dialogue with the international community has at times led the president to acknowledge our own culpabilities and shortcomings. Even more dramatic has been Obama's willingness to reach out to America's adversaries and seek negotiated solutions to some of the world's thorniest problems. It is Obama's declared engagement policy that has raised the ire of critics and led them to once more take refuge in the spurious yet incendiary charge of appeasement. Columnist Charles Krauthammer recently exclaimed, "When France chides you for appeasement, you know you're scraping bottom." Acknowledgement of America's misjudgments is derided as an unseemly apologia while diplomacy is denigrated as a misguided exercise in self-delusion. After all, North Korea continues to test its nuclear weapons and missiles, Cuba spurns America's offers of a greater opening, and the Iranian mullahs contrive conspiracy theories about how George Soros and the CIA are instigating a velvet revolution in their country. Tough-minded conservatives are urging a course correction and a resolute approach to the gallery of rogues that the president pledges to embrace. Such views miscast the essence of diplomatic engagement. Diplomacy is likely to be a painstaking process and it may not work with every targeted nation. However, the purpose of such a policy is not to transform adversaries into allies, but to seek adjustments in their behavior and ambitions. North Korea, Cuba, Syria, and Iran would be offered a path toward realizing their essential national interests should they conform to global conventions on issues such as terrorism and proliferation. Should these regimes fail to grasp the opportunities before them, then Washington has a better chance of assembling a durable international coalition to isolate and pressure them. One of the problems with a unilateralist Bush administration that prided itself on disparaging diplomatic outreach was that it often made

America the issue and gave many states an excuse for passivity. The Obama administration's expansive diplomatic vision has deprived fence-sitters of such justifications. An administration that has reached out to North Korea, communicated its sincere desire for better ties to Iran, and dispatched high-level emissaries to Syria cannot be accused of diplomatic indifference.¶ The administration's approach has already yielded results in one of the most intractable global problems: Iran's nuclear imbroglio. The Bush team's years of harsh rhetoric and threats of military retribution failed to adjust Iran's nuclear ambitions in any tangible manner. A country that had no measurable nuclear infrastructure before Bush's inaugural made tremendous strides during his tenure. Unable to gain Iranian capitulation or international cooperation, the Bush administration was left plaintively witnessing Iran's accelerating nuclear time clock. In a dramatic twist of events, the Obama administration's offer of direct diplomacy has altered the landscape and yielded an unprecedented international consensus that has put the recalcitrant theocracy on the defensive. Iran's mounting nuclear infractions and its enveloping isolation caused it to recalibrate its position and open its latest nuclear facility to inspection and potentially ship out its stock of low-enriched uranium for processing in Russia. Deprived of such fuel, Iran would not have the necessary resources to quickly assemble a bomb. In a short amount of time, the administration has succeeded in putting important barriers to Iran's nuclear weapons aspirations.¶ The United States will persistently confront crises that require the totality of its national power. The tumultuous Bush years have demonstrated the limitations of military force. **Diplomatic interaction requires mutual concessions and acceptance of less than ideal outcomes.** Moreover, as the United States charts its course, there is nothing wrong with acknowledging past errors. Instead of clinging to its self-proclaimed exceptionalism, America would be wise to take into account the judgment of other nations that are increasingly central to its economy and security.

US Latin American Rels terminally non-unique. All advantages must postdate 2015 Summit of Americas and/or our 2016.

Shawn Lansing, December 2016. CUBA EMBARGO MYOPIA MISSES THE STRATEGIC POINT.

<https://warontherocks.com/2016/12/cuba-embargo-myopia-misses-the-strategic-point/>

This sticking point in U.S.-Latin America relations seemed to reach a resolution in December 2014, when Cuba and the United States resumed diplomatic relations and opened talks aimed at lifting the trade embargo. Matt Ferchen, a resident scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, believes “the Cuba deal changes everything in terms of how the United States can set a positive agenda in the region.” Rapprochement quickly reshaped U.S. image and influence in Latin America, with many of the region’s influential leaders hailing the thawing of relations as “positive.” **When Presidents Barack Obama and Raul Castro shook hands at the April 2015 Summit of the Americas in Panama, discussions moved on from the embargo to larger substantive issues challenging the region such as trade, partnerships, and human rights.**

US Drug policy block US-Latin American relations

Shifter ‘12

(Michael is an Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and writes for the Council's journal Foreign Affairs. He serves as the President of Inter-American Dialogue. “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, <http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf>) //CJC

In the spirit of “shared responsibility,” often invoked by senior US policy officials, **it is critical that the US government respond to** increasing **calls from Latin American leaders for a serious review of drug policy.** **As the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy made clear, current measures addressing the drug problem are not working** and alternatives need to be considered. That commission, led by

three highly regarded former Latin American presidents—Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil, Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico, and César Gaviria of Colombia—rightly emphasized that **drug problems** and their contributions to criminal violence and widespread corruption **threaten the rule of law in a number of countries**. **The commission's recommendations**—including the decriminalization of marijuana, greater emphasis on drugs as a public health problem, and increased support for harm reduction—**should be taken seriously** and should serve as a starting point **for an honest US-Latin American dialogue on the drug question**. More serious attention and **resources directed at reducing consumption in the United States are essential**. Since the commission's report in 2009, even some sitting Latin American presidents, including Mexico's Felipe Calderón, Colombia's Juan Manuel Santos, and Guatemala's Otto Pérez Molina, have called for collective pursuit of new drug policy options, including consideration of legalization. Although there is debate about the merits of alternative policies—and political obstacles in the region and, particularly, in the United States, remain strong—a serious discussion is urgently needed about how to be more effective in dealing with the drug problem. This sense of urgency is underscored by the alarming crime statistics reported in the region. According to the United Nations, Latin America has the highest rate of homicides per capita of any region in the world. Although the causes are many, the narcotics trade is a key contributor.

US influence in Latin America's resilient and the thesis of the DA is wrong

Duddy & Mora 5-1-13 [Patrick – US Ambassador to Venezuela until 2010 and Senior Lecturer at Duke. And Frank – Director of Latin American Center at Florida Intl University and former Assistant Secretary of Defense – Western Hemisphere (09-13). “Latin America: Is U.S. influence waning?” 5/1/13 <http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/01/3375160/latin-america-is-us-influence.html#storylink=cpy>] //CJC

As Moises Naim notes in his recent book, *The End of Power*, **there has been an important change in power distribution in the world away from states toward an expanding and increasingly mobile set of actors that are dramatically shaping the nature and scope of global relationships**. In Latin America, many of the most substantive and dynamic forms of engagement are occurring **ina web of cross-national relationships involving small and large companies, people-to-people contact through student exchanges and social media, travel and migration**. Trade and investment remain the most enduring and measurable dimensions of U.S. relations with the region. It is certainly the case that our economic interests alone would justify more U.S. attention to the region. **Many observers who worry about declining U.S. influence in this area point to** the rise of trade with **China** and the presence of European companies and investors. While it is true that other countries are important to the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, it is also still true that the **United States is by far the largest and most important economic partner of the region and trade is growing** even with those countries with which we do not have free trade agreements. An area of immense importance to regional economies that we often overlook is the exponential growth in travel, tourism and migration. It is commonplace to note the enormous presence of foreign students in the United States but in 2011, according to the Institute of International Education, after Europe, Latin America was the second most popular destination for U.S. university students. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. tourists travel every year to Latin America and the Caribbean helping to support thousands of jobs. From 2006-2011 U.S. non-government organizations, such as churches, think tanks and universities increased the number of partnerships with their regional cohorts by a factor of four. Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean from the United States totaled \$64 billion in 2012. Particularly for the smaller economies of Central America and the Caribbean these flows can sometimes constitute more than 10 percent of gross domestic product. Finally, **one should not underestimate the resiliency of U.S. soft power in the region. The power of national reputation, popular culture, values and institutions continues to contribute to U.S. influence in ways that are difficult to measure and impossible to quantify**. Example: Despite 14 years of strident anti-American rhetoric during the Chávez government, tens of thousands of Venezuelans apply for U.S. nonimmigrant visas every year, including many thousands of Chávez loyalists. Does this mean we can feel comfortable relegating U.S. relations with the

hemisphere to the second or third tier of our international concerns? Certainly not. We have real and proliferating interests in the region. As the president and his team head to Mexico and Costa Rica, it is important to recognize the importance of our ties to the region.¶We have many individual national partners in the Americas. We don't need a new template for relations with the hemisphere as a whole or another grand U.S.-Latin America strategy. A greater commitment to work more intensely with the individual countries on the issues most relevant to them would be appropriate. **The United States still has the economic and cultural heft in the region to play a fundamental role and to advance its own interests.**

Trump's hardline stance is alienating Latin America

Ryan Dube, Reed Johnson, 11-28-2016 [staff writers, "Donald Trump's Line on Cuba Unsettles Latin America," WSJ, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trumps-line-on-cuba-unsettles-latin-america-1480372939>] MJS 1-21-2017

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump's threats to reverse the Obama administration's historic re-engagement with Cuba could drive a new wedge between Washington and Latin America, a region already suspicious of the next American leader over his rhetoric on immigration and trade. Mr. Trump on Monday said he would roll back the U.S.'s improved relations with Cuba forged by President Barack Obama unless Cuba's Communist government offers "a better deal," following statements from his aides that he wants to pressure Havana for more democratic reform.

Any undoing of the detente between Washington and Havana would be viewed as a big step back in the region, not only by leftist allies of Cuba like Venezuela and Bolivia but also by conservative governments in Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Colombia. It would also likely complicate regional cooperation on a range of issues, from immigration to security and anti-drug efforts. "It would be a grave error by Mr. Trump," said former Ecuadorean Foreign Relations Minister Jose Ayala-Lasso. "It wouldn't only be a measure that would affect relations between Cuba and the United States, but I think **all of Latin America that promoted a normalization of these relations would feel rejected and offended.**"

The U.S. trade embargo on Cuba has complicated Washington's relations with the hemisphere for decades. Like Arabic-speaking countries in the Middle East, Latin America is largely tied together through language and culture, compelling countries to often try to show solidarity with one another. **A history of U.S. interference in the region has also long engendered a shared resentment.**

Alt causes to law relations — Plan Colombia and Honduras

Tang 2016 [Ming Tang at the Center for Economic and Policy Research, "U.S.-Latin American relations are at an all-time low", *The Hill*, <<http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/281277-us-latin-american-relations-are-at-an-all-time-low>>] //CJC

When former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton sat down with the New York Daily News editorial board in April, she was asked what must have been a surprising and unwelcome question. In the years since **the 2009 coup in Honduras, there has been remarkably little scrutiny in the major media of how Clinton's State Department handled it**, and she has had to answer few questions about it. But Juan González asked why she resisted cutting off aid to the coup regime and instead brokered a deal for new elections. Clinton controversially doubled down on defending the coup, outrageously suggesting that the oligarchs and generals who had forced President Manuel Zelaya out had a legal justification. Worse, she suggested that **Honduras emulate Plan Colombia: the U.S.-funded war on drugs and guerrillas that sparked the biggest internal refugee crisis in the world outside of Syria, involved the deliberate killing of thousands of innocent civilians by Colombian armed forces, and fostered death squads now poised to stick around even as the country nears an end to its civil war.**

Honduras also pops up in Clinton's memoir, "Hard Choices." The paperback edition, published shortly after she launched her presidential campaign, is roughly 100 pages shorter than the original hardcover edition, but some of the abridgments seem rather convenient. In her original account of the coup and its aftermath, which was entirely deleted from the paperback, Clinton openly admits to having intervened directly to prevent Zelaya from returning to office: In the subsequent days [after the coup] I spoke with my counterparts around the hemisphere, including Secretary Espinosa in Mexico. We strategized on a plan to restore order in Honduras and ensure that free and fair elections could be held quickly and legitimately, which would render the question of Zelaya moot and give the Honduran people a chance to choose their own future. Clinton's declassified emails shed light on her role in prolonging negotiations so that elections would occur before Zelaya returned to office. In an email a week after the coup, Assistant Secretary for

Western Hemisphere Affairs Tom Shannon raises the possibility of former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias serving as mediator. **This enabled the U.S. to avoid working through the Organization of American States (OAS)**, where most governments insisted on restoring

Zelaya to the presidency and isolating the coup regime. A July 31 email from Craig Kelly, Shannon's deputy, makes it clear that this was indeed the U.S.' motive: "The OAS meeting today turned into a non-event — just as we hoped. We want Arias out front. We will keep at it." When Zelaya attempted to return to Honduras from exile, via the Nicaragua border on July 24, Clinton condemned it as "reckless" and counterproductive "to the broader effort to restore democratic and constitutional order." And whereas

the U.S. was quick to suspend aid following Madagascar's March 17, 2009 coup, it would take months before the State Department would act in a similar fashion with Honduras.

Notably, the U.S. suspended Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) money three days after Madagascar's coup, but declined to hold up the more than \$190 million of MCC funds designated for Honduras. As secretary of state, Clinton chaired the MCC board of directors at the time. **The split between the U.S. and its neighbors widened when, on September 28, 2009, U.S. State Department officials blocked the OAS from adopting a resolution on Honduras that would have refused to recognize Honduran elections without the prior restoration of the country's elected president.**

While Latin America — seeing the inherent danger from the precedent of a successful military coup — demanded Zelaya's "immediate and unconditional" restoration, the U.S. pushed instead for a "national unity government." In Clinton's telling, this was something she triumphantly pressured regime head Roberto Micheletti into accepting. The question is why this was the goal, instead of the restoration of democracy. Seen from another angle, Clinton's State Department collaborated with an illegal government that had seized power through force. When Shannon made the administration's true intentions public on November 3, by telling CNN en Español that Zelaya's return to the presidency prior to the elections was not necessary, the coup regime had all the leverage and Zelaya and his elected government suddenly had none. The November 2009 elections, held under a coup government, were widely seen as illegitimate, **and the**

OAS, the European Union, and the Carter Center refused to send observers. Following the elections, Honduras continued to be excluded from the OAS for almost two years. **Most significantly, though, the actions of Clinton and her State Department precipitated a new low point in U.S.-Latin American relations. In a clear sign of rejection of U.S. regional influence, all the countries in the Western Hemisphere formed a new group,** the

Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) — all of them, that is, except for the U.S. and Canada, which were excluded. **If Clinton's State Department was concerned by the extent of this foreign diplomacy failure in what Washington used to refer to as its "backyard,"** their emails and diplomatic cables do not hint at it. Rather, senior officials appeared to revel at having gotten one over on Brazil and other governments that wanted to see Honduras' democratic government restored. Just after the November 2009 election results were announced, Shannon emailed Clinton triumphantly, noting, "The turnout [...] and the clear

rejection of [Zelaya's] Liberal Party shows our approach was the right one, and puts Brazil and others who would not recognize the election in an impossible position."

Liberalization leads to democratic reversals

Quinn 2000 [Dennis Quinn, "Democracy and International Financial Liberalization," *Georgetown University*. Accessed at: <http://faculty.msb.edu/quinn/papers/demfin.PDF>.] //DNP

I further proposed that capital account liberalization is a risk factor to democracies. The results from the PCSTS models showed the **higher levels of capital account openness were indeed robustly 31 associated with decreasing democratization** many years later. The VAR models showed that for some countries, particularly those with **higher levels of income inequality, capital account liberalization led to subsequent de-democratization.**

Anocracy causes civil war

Regan 2009 [Patrick Regan, professor of political science, "Changing Lanes or Stuck in the Middle: Why are anocracies more prone to civil wars?", *Binghamton University*, <
[Past research on regime type and civil war points to **anocratic regimes as having a high probability of civil war onset**. The specific characteristics of anocratic regimes that lead to their predisposition for civil war have been left unexplained. In this paper we examine how the transitional characteristics of anocracy explain the enhanced risk of civil war onset. Our results point towards three important conclusions. First, **anocratic regimes are most likely to experience civil war in the first few years of their duration.** Second, **transitions into anocracy from democracy leave states at a higher risk of civil war.** Third, **the probability of civil war onset increases with the magnitude of a transition into anocracy.**](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwi9heOchP3RAhWI0FQKHdGpCcssQFggdMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww3.nd.edu%2F~pregan3%2FPRQFinalDraft.2.23.09.doc&usq=AFQjCNF6BEYBeCDiD8AfxCy3de4Gu6zrA&sig2=Ag4FE_aqE2EluJb4V59COA&bvm=bv.146094739,d.cGw>] //CJC</p></div><div data-bbox=)

Research into the causes of civil war has identified anocratic governance and/or the existence of a political transition as particularly high-risk regime characteristics. Many – possibly the modal category of studies – demonstrate a curvilinear relationship between regime characteristics and the likelihood of civil war onset, with **highly autocratic and highly democratic states being considerably less vulnerable than anocracies** (eg. Reynal-Querol, 2002; Sambanis, 2004; Urdal, 2005; Regan and Norton, 2005). In short, **there seems to be something about the vulnerability of states with political regimes in the middle of the autocratic-democratic continuum that makes them more prone to the outbreak of civil war.**

[...]

Anocracy, moreover, is not a regime-type as we might generally think of as a democratic one. The term is used to denote a mix of institutional characteristics that often constrain or facilitate democratic processes. As such most scholars identify a range of institutional constraints that describe adequately a democratic or autocratic regime, respectively, and relegate combinations that fall into neither ideal type to a catch-all anocratic category. This range of institutional characteristics is necessarily broader than either of its polar corollaries. We adopt the anocratic convention in part because it has been convention, but also because it is in these ranges of political institutional arrangements that empirical results suggest a link to civil war. Gates et al (2006) support this categorization of regimes with empirical evidence suggesting that regimes break along lines of institutional consistency. Although not conceptually identical, their category of institutionally inconsistent regimes is conceptually convergent with what we and others label anocracies.
[...]

The institutional characteristics of transitioning into an anocratic regime affect two aspects of the instability process. First, weak institutions limit the ability of the state to provide social welfare payments; second, those same weak institutions present at least a modicum of opportunity for the citizenry to make demands on the state and rebel. The interaction of these two processes can be unstable. Within the broad category of anocracy we are likely to observe these two characteristics working along a continuum.

Spilled oil disperses – bacteria break down droplets

Ross, 10 (Selena, "BP Experts: Everything You Know About the Oil Spill is Wrong," AOL NEWS, 8-1-10, www.aolnews.com/gulf-oil-spill/article/gulf-oil-spill-cleanup-bp-consultants-discuss-what-they-see-as-misconceptions/19572133?icid=main|main|dl1|link5|http%3A%2F%2Fwww.aolnews.com%2Fgulf-oil-spill%2Farticle%2Fgulf-oil-spill-cleanup-bp-consultants-d) //CJC

There is no mass of Deepwater oil where we can't see it, and there are no traveling plumes of heavy oil miles away from the well head, the three experts say. "That would never happen, and all the monitoring that's been going on has been showing very low -- and decreasing -- concentrations of oil," Lewis says. When oil is dispersed into tiny droplets, the droplets separate from each other and are diluted in the open ocean, he explains. They do not get weighed down and cannot rejoin each other under water. Bacteria break them down into carbon dioxide and water in a predictable way, and when they can't be found, it's because they are no longer there. Lewis points to a huge eco-monitoring project started by the British government after the big Sea Empress spill was dispersed in 1996, Lewis says. "There were no effects the next year," he says. "If the oil is dispersed at sea, you can go back a year later and you can't find it."

No resource wars – too expensive and market checks

Victor '8

David G.,- Adjunct Senior Fellow for Science and Technology, Council on Foreign Relations; Director, Program on Energy and Sustainable Development @ Stanford "Smoke and Mirror" <http://www.nationalinterest.org/PrinterFriendly.aspx?id=16530> //CJC
MY ARGUMENT is that classic resource wars—hot conflicts driven by a struggle to grab resources—are increasingly rare. Even where resources play a role, they are rarely the root cause of bloodshed. Rather, the root cause usually lies in various failures of governance. That argument—in both its classic form and in its more nuanced incarnation—is hardly a straw man, as Thomas Homer-Dixon asserts. Setting aside hyperbole, the punditry increasingly points to resources as a cause of war. And so do social scientists and policy analysts, even with their more nuanced views. I've triggered this debate because conventional wisdom puts too much emphasis on resources as a cause of conflict. Getting the story right has big implications for social scientists trying to unravel cause-and-effect and often even larger implications for public policy. Michael Klare is right to underscore Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, the only classic resource conflict in recent memory. That episode highlights two of the reasons why classic resource wars are becoming rare—they're expensive and rarely work. (And even in Kuwait's case, many other forces also spurred the invasion. Notably, Iraq felt insecure with its only access to the sea a

narrow strip of land sandwiched between Kuwait on one side and its archenemy Iran on the other.) In the end, **on the order of \$100 billion** (plus his country and then his head) **in his quest for Kuwait's 1.5 million barrels** per day of combined oil and gas output. By contrast, Exxon paid \$80 billion to get Mobil's 1.7 million barrels per day of oil and gas production—a merger that has held and flourished. **As the bulging sovereign wealth funds are discovering, it is easier to get resources through the stock exchange than the gun barrel.**

Awawory 2014 [Sefa K. Awawory, "Impact of Microfinance Interventions: A Meta-analysis," *Monash University Business and Economics*, March 2014
<http://business.monash.edu/economics/research/publications/2014/0314impactawaworyi.pdf>]
/WGC

"We conduct a meta-analysis to review 25 empirical studies with a total of 595 estimates of the impact of microcredit and access to credit on poverty and microenterprises. We formulate four hypotheses to examine the empirical evidence and to provide a general conclusion on the impacts of microfinance, while addressing issues of within and between-study variations. The hypotheses examined are: 1) Microcredit has a positive impact on poverty (H1), 2) Microcredit has a positive impact on microenterprises (H2); 3) Access to microcredit has a positive impact on poverty (H3); 4) Access to microcredit has a positive impact on microenterprises (H4). We consider consumption/expenditure, assets, income and income growth as proxies for poverty, and labour supply, business profits and revenue for microenterprises. Overall, we find no robust evidence of any significant impact on microenterprises. **With regards to impact on poverty, there is no evidence any strong positive impact. Evidence mainly suggest an insignificant impact however, exceptions can be made for** impacts on assets, which is positive but weak, with practically no economic relevant, and also **impact on income growth, which is negative.**"

Not using microloans for investment makes them useless. Similar to US financial crisis.

Hugh Sinclair Wharton interview. 2012. The Dark Side of Microfinance: An Industry Where the Poor Play 'Cameo Roles'

<http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-dark-side-of-microfinance-an-industry-where-the-poor-play-cameo-roles/>

Knowledge@Wharton: You quote someone from the microfinance community in your book as saying that nine out of 10 microfinance loans are for consumption rather than to start or grow an enterprise or even to buy food or clothing. Doesn't that undermine the whole basis, the whole theoretical underpinning, of microfinance?

Sinclair: It does totally. And it was [said] by a noted expert, John Hatch from FINCA, one of the biggest networks in the world, in the Harvard Business Review. Yes, it does totally undermine it.

No one really knows [the numbers] because there is no good data on how much is used for consumption and investment. But very rarely do you have anyone saying [spending on consumption] is under 50%. John Hatch suggests it's 90%. I have no idea where it is within that range, but **yes, large amounts of money are used for nothing other than to buy a new TV or to some new clothes. in addition to that, you have to take into account the amount of money that is used simply to repay off other loans.**

Knowledge@Wharton: **Right. Poor people borrow from one bank, at a high interest rate, and then borrow from another bank to pay off the first bank, and then they get into serious debt.** You also talk about mission drift, the idea that microfinance has forgotten its mission to serve the poor and really exists to make a profit for the officials running the programs. Is this common?

Sinclair: Yes it is, and **increasingly so.** What happened at the end of the 1990s and this century was the era of so called commercialization, **when large banks and profit-motivated specialist investment funds piled into the microfinance sector, aware of potentially vast profits at the bottom of the pyramid. We saw the first big \$100 million, \$200 million IPOs with massive payouts to individual people.**

Mission drift is a very, very serious problem, and it has been so since the beginning of the microfinance movement. But it's really accelerated in the last few years. There are people who are very well aware of it, and institutions that actively manage mission drift. It's something that has to be actively managed. You have to constantly be aware of it and fight it every day to stop yourself drifting. But yes, it is pervasive.

Knowledge@Wharton: That gets to the whole question of the role of big banks and investment funds in all of this. **It sounds like the banks, the investors, the ratings agencies, the MFIs themselves are almost in a conspiracy to enrich themselves and hide what's really going on, at least with some of the programs that you cite.** Or is this too harsh?

Sinclair: I think that's too harsh, particularly with the ratings agencies. Actually I think the specialized ratings agencies for the microfinance sector are, if anything, something that other ratings agencies could learn from because they have demonstrated on a number of occasions that their [information] ... is extremely accurate, often more accurate than the information that the microfinance investment funds themselves [have].

But **it is true, [especially] when you think of the financial crisis that has happened in Europe and the United States recently involving large, supposedly regulated Wall Street banks and these sorts of profit-motivated institutions, and you look at the mess that they have caused in the developed world. Is it really much of a surprise that if you take these same players and you place them into a totally unregulated market with much more vulnerable clients who lack the protection of a regulator acting in the best interest of its citizens, is it really much of a surprise that things have gone wrong?**

Micro Loans have absurdly high interests rates.

Kentaro Toyama 2011, The Atlantic: Lies, Hype, and Profit: The Truth About Microfinance
<https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/01/lies-hype-and-profit-the-truth-about-microfinance/70405/>

To understand the backlash, let's go back to August 2010. **SKS Microfinance**, the country's most rapidly successful microcredit organization, **held a public IPO that** made millions for its founder, ex-McKinsey-consultant Vikram Akula. **Many hailed** the achievement as proof that microcredit could be financially self-sustaining. Local politicians saw it **as Robin Hood inverted - a plot to steal from the poor and give to the rich.** They persuaded borrowers to stop paying back their loans. Another controversy occurred in Mexico in 2007. Banco Compartamos, a non-profit organization turned for-profit bank, raised nearly half a billion dollars in its IPO.

Compartamos makes loans at an APR in the range of 75-100%. Yunus blasted Compartamos, saying, "Microcredit was created to fight the money lender, not to become the money lender." **Most microfinance institutions justify their high rates by arguing that they need to absorb costs of administration. Compartamos further adds that if it were to drop rates any lower, it would shut out its competitors, who charge even higher interest rates.** I recently spoke with Alvaro Rodriguez, chairman of Compartamos, who claims, "We need to encourage an ecosystem of microcredit. We can't serve everyone who needs loans on our own."

4. Laundry list of reasons for stagnation- aging, resources/water, lack of innovation, IPRs

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Additional Challenges: Demography also portends stagnation. Demography can cause social and political crisis when there are too many young people and not enough jobs. **China is** instead rapidly aging (by demographic standards), **heading toward a situation of hundreds of millions of elderly** requiring support **and not enough workers to support them and expand economic activity.** The government reports the number of working-age people started to inch downward in 2012 and has fallen progressively more sharply each year through 2015. These numbers may not be entirely accurate, but the work force will certainly shrink before this decade ends and continue to shrink throughout the next decade. The contribution of labor to growth will fade until labor actually detracts from growth, as it does in Japan and parts of Europe. Older countries tend to stagnate. In addition, **growth based on natural resources has disappeared.** In the 1980s, farm productivity soared, permitting those who had become unnecessary farmers to become manufacturing workers and helping create the world's new factory. **Land and natural resources will not spur economic growth again for the foreseeable future because the PRC has significantly depleted its resource endowment.** Illustrations of this range from arable land to zinc deposits, but the clearest is water. **The World Bank cites water stress starting at 1,000 cubic meters of water per person per year;** northern China offers one-fifth of that. Three-fifths of monitored national groundwater sites are rated by Beijing as unfit for drinking. Just as hefty payments are due on financial debt, they are also due on environmental debt, making growth even more difficult. **Weakness in other sources of growth means increasing reliance on** something that is hard to measure: **innovation.** **The PRC has** successfully **imported foreign technology, legally and through the theft of intellectual property.** **As countries climb the technological ladder,** however, **they no longer benefit greatly from** merely **absorbing what others offer, and**

innovation becomes more challenging. The government's response is exactly wrong. Sustained, broad innovation that drives growth must be bottom-up while the infamous indigenous innovation program is top-down. It is highly unlikely the government will be able to anticipate years of change in computing, telecom, energy, and elsewhere. Moreover, intellectual property is still not well protected, reducing the incentive to innovate. Continued regulatory protection of SOEs means the private sector cannot succeed beyond a certain point in the two dozen industries that SOEs dominate, sharply curbing innovation in those industries.

5. China is self-defeating- CCP fear of social instability leads to lack of economic growth

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Reform Prospects Dim: State action brought China to this point. More state action—such as credit provision or infrastructure spending—cannot reverse it. A return to a healthy economic trajectory will require resuming pro-market reform. The party seemed to recognize this under Xi Jinping when the November 2013 plenary meetings promised to give the market a "decisive" role. Premier Li Keqiang has said reforms will be as painful as cutting one's own flesh. This was certainly better than the public investment boom inaugurating the Hu Jintao government. However, the reform restart praised by many was badly designed from the outset. Greater labor mobility could mitigate aging by letting workers move freely to desired jobs. The PRC still discourages mobility by denying pension and other benefits to those working in the "wrong" area. Pledged changes keep the most popular urban centers cordoned off and retain most barriers between rural and urban areas at least until 2020—important lost years. If this is due to continued fear of migration breeding social instability, the party will restrict workers indefinitely. Reform could also sharply increase the value of natural resources, along the lines of the American shale boom. This would require China to mimic at least parts of the American model, featuring private ownership of rural land, open competition among energy firms, and legal protection of innovators. The policy platform and actions to date show no progress in any of these areas. Notably, outright environmental damage is being reduced. But this means less harm to future growth, not a boost. Finance has seen reform, most importantly in bank licenses for private entities. While interest rate liberalization wins headlines, it has little value when the vast bulk of the financial system must follow party orders. What is needed is the commercial—not political—lending, which can only come from independent institutions. The private licenses will bolster the return on capital, and thus growth, eventually. But it could take decades for private banks to substantially erode the state's 90+ percent share of banking assets, even while unsound lending adds to the debt pile. Much more radical steps are needed. The best solution is to fix the SOEs that state banks are required to lend to. Regrettably, there has been no pro-market reform in the state sector—quite the opposite. The party's original pledges went the wrong direction: rather than shrinking SOEs to make space for private competition, they call for private cooperation with the state. This is essentially an attempt at private bailout of public-sector errors. Further, rather than being sold or allowed to fail, SOEs are being merged to become even bigger. This also affects innovation. Beijing sees super-large SOEs winning global competitions, but faced with no competition at home, these firms have considerably less reason to innovate. Chinese consumers will continue to be offered inferior products, and many state giants will eventually lose ground overseas, no matter their size. Only private firms, forced to compete at home and overseas, can succeed fully. Global Economic Implications: Absent powerful pro-market reform that is nowhere in sight, true economic growth will halt by the end of this decade, no matter what the government claims. The most important implication concerns the dollar: the RMB will fall well short of challenging the dollar, and the future of the world's reserve currency will depend almost entirely on American choices.

6. China's growth is a myth- GDP indicators are falsified and it's stuck in the middle income trap

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China's economy is stalling. The most likely economic scenario over the course of the next decade is not high growth or an economic collapse, but stagnation. If this occurs, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will have difficulty sustaining its ambitious national development and strategic plans. In particular, Beijing will not be able to avoid a more serious "guns v. butter" tradeoff. This has sharp implications for American policy. Most importantly, while the US certainly has its own structural problems, it is far wealthier and more powerful than China, and that gap may actually grow or at least hold, rather than shrink. The dominant Sino-US relations paradigm of a declining power managing a rising power is inaccurate. A truer depiction of the Sino-American relationship is that China is a capable great power seeking to compete with US primacy in Asia, much as Russia has become a US rival in Europe and the Middle East, while Iran challenges American interests in the Persian Gulf. To attribute to China the capability to "overtake" the US or compete with it globally—or to describe the power dynamics as a "power transition" from Washington to Beijing—is at best premature. Neither Preeminence nor Collapse - The Stagnation Case: To understand why stagnation is likely, first consider other countries. While the categories are not well-defined, far more economies rise out of poverty than become truly rich. This is sometimes referred to as the middle-income trap. In the postwar era, the most impressive economic success stories are in East Asia, which bodes well. However, in comparison with the world as a whole, Japan became rich before World War II, and much of its growth during 1946–1990 was a return to the status quo. Hong Kong and Singapore are mere cities, while Taiwan's population is about the same as Shanghai's. The structure of these microeconomies is fundamentally different than China's economy, and they hardly demonstrate that the PRC can become rich. In contrast, the middle-income trap has not been kind to large nations. Only one country with a population over 30 million has become rich for the first time in the postwar era: South Korea. A long list of countries that have not gone beyond middle-income, from Argentina to Thailand. It would not be surprising if Chinese cities the size of Singapore had income levels similar to France. It would be astonishing for the PRC as a whole to match French income, much more astonishing than what it has accomplished to date. Second, evaluate Chinese growth. The government continues to report comparatively rapid gains in gross domestic product (GDP) and will do so indefinitely. But official statistics are not a reliable indicator of how the economy is doing. Information control is a vital tool for the party, and economic information is obviously a sensitive component. Purported GDP receives the most attention but is wildly overrated as a measure of success. GDP per person is close to meaningless; it is purely an accounting device that cannot be spent or invested. In terms of what people actually have in their pockets, China reported disposable income per person equivalent to \$3,400 at the end of 2015, less than one-tenth of the US. China "bulls" typically claim that, while the PRC is poorer than the US, it continues to catch up—yet possibly not, according to Credit Suisse, which reports net private wealth figures for all major economies. From the end of 2011 to the middle of 2015, Chinese net private wealth grew 19 percent. American net private wealth grew 43 percent. The two countries' public sectors are harder to measure, but China's debt performance over this period is atrocious, approximately 40 percent is attributable to state corporates, and their share is rising.

7. Political pressures are increasing- The social bargain is failing which ensures social unrest and no economic growth

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The Politics of Stagnation: Xi Jinping inherited a debt-plagued economy that had abandoned reform. If that wasn't enough, Xi also had to contend with the exposure of high-level CCP corruption prompted by the Bo Xilai case. Bo was a charismatic party leader of Chongqing province who built his reputation as being "tough on crime and corruption" and his legacy as the son of a prominent Mao contemporary. But his family's corruption was exposed when his wife was arrested for the murder of a British fixer, who had helped the family launder money. Bo's public fall from grace not only raised uncomfortable questions among ordinary people about the magnitude of the corruption among the CCP elite, it exposed a rift in the upper echelons of the CCP over who would succeed Hu Jintao. As a result, Xi's first order of business was to gain control over a fractious party leadership. To consolidate control, he has pursued a threefold political strategy. First, he has largely tossed out Deng's post-Mao model of consensus-driven leadership. To the extent possible under a dictatorship, Deng had put in place decision-making checks and balances and a relatively stable succession process. Deng was trying to ensure both that Maoist-style totalitarians would not reemerge and that his ambitious reform plans would be enacted. Shortly after taking power, Xi began to undo the CCP's collective leadership structure and consolidated power for himself. Xi now holds 10 government and party titles, including "not only head of state and head of the military but also leader of the Party's most powerful committees." As of 2014, Xi chaired six of the CCP's 11 "leading small groups," informal

committees that direct policy. In terms of the formal exercise of power, Xi may be the strongest Chinese leader since Mao. The second element of Xi's political strategy has been a high-profile crackdown on corruption, an area in which previous leaders looked the other way, at best. Thus far, the campaign has indicted thousands of officials, ranging from former politburo members to provincial apparatchiks. Absent very high levels of economic growth, Xi has to demonstrate to the people that the CCP still deserves the "mandate of heaven"—a legitimacy that always relies on the perception that the government is a virtuous one. The anti-corruption campaign thus serves two purposes: it is both a demonstration that Xi is removing the rot inside the government and a strategy for neutralizing potentially powerful opponents. According to Minxin Pei, "although Xi's signature campaign appears to be popular, it has almost overnight dismantled the system the ruling elites painstakingly constructed in the post-Tiananmen era to maintain their unity." Corruption, which in essence was a guarantee to party elites that they would get rich, and consensus-based leadership are no longer the glue holding the party together. The third element of his political strategy is the escalation of CCP repression of civil society, including foreign media, nonprofits, human rights activities, and religious groups. This crackdown is also meant to expunge China of Western "spiritual pollution." Xi has stated that "all news media run by the Party must work to speak for the Party's will and its propositions, and protect the Party's authority and unity" and acted accordingly. In February 2016, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology released new rules stating that foreign media outlets were prohibited from publishing online in China without explicit government approval. China has passed a law severely limiting the activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and attempted to purge the teaching of "harmful" Western ideas from educational curricula. In January 2015, the minister of education stated that schools should limit use of Western educational materials in higher education in order to avoid undermining the party. The CCP has also continued to brazenly arrest its political enemies. Just last year mainland authorities abducted five booksellers from Hong Kong who published material critical of the party. All this means that Xi has eschewed another political strategy available to him: restarting Deng-style reforms. While market-driven reforms would have been politically painful, Xi's strategy carries serious risks as well. It is now probable that a powerful enemy, harmed by Xi, will emerge to try to undermine him. Elites marginalized from decision making and exposed to corruption investigations are doubtless waiting for the opportunity to strike back. For example, there was already open discontent over Xi's handling of the July 2015 stock market crash, leaving elites wondering if Xi knows how to manage the economy. It is now possible to imagine a coalition of disgruntled party leaders, members of the business class, and embittered reformers emerging to pose a real threat to Xi. This development ought to be worrisome for a CCP that has survived post-Tiananmen by remaining more or less unified at the top. The CCP is no longer upholding its end of the social bargain with the people: economic growth in exchange for political quiescence. So now the two pillars of CCP survival—elite unity and economic growth—are crumbling. As the promise of a rapidly increasing quality of life diminishes for many Chinese, incidents of protest against the regime's many injustices will also increase. CCP leaders have always worried that "external influences" are working with Chinese citizens to "subvert" Communist rule, whether they are Uighurs influenced by international Islamic movements or lawyers who get support from foreign NGOs. Under Xi this concern has intensified. Perhaps because of the fractures caused by his anticorruption campaign, his takedown of powerful internal security czar Zhou Yongkang, the fallen Bo Xilai's ties to the security services, and growing sources of unrest throughout China, Xi has reemphasized to the security services their allegiance to him and the party. As Murray Tanner argues, "Beginning soon after coming to office, Xi made inspection visits to People's Armed Police units, issued numerous important security policy directives, and made major speeches to national meetings of police and judicial officials." In 2014, Xi gave a high-profile counterterrorism speech titled "Safeguard National Security and Social Stability," stating that Chinese people must be vigilant against both internal and external threats. All this comes with increased financial costs. According to Cheng Li, The cost of 'maintaining social stability' (weiwen), primarily through the police force, has become astonishingly high. The Chinese government's official budget for national defense in 2012 was 670.3 billion renminbi (about \$109 billion), while the budget for police and public security was 701.8 billion renminbi (more than \$114 billion). Notwithstanding China's notorious budgetary opacity, there is reason to believe that maintaining a surveillance state costs as much as maintaining the People's Liberation Army. Increasing social welfare costs should be counted as internal security expenses, since an aging population that is uncared for would undoubtedly cause enormous social dissension. China has not had a real social safety net since the dismantling of the Communist work unit, and its pension and "social security" systems are grossly underfunded. Greater Pacific Capital reports: China, due to its historic one-child policy, has a fertility rate of 1.6 (below replacement levels) and a well-documented looming demographic cliff with its old-age dependency ratio set to increase to close to by almost 4x between 2010 and 2050. . . . Pension expenditure is already the single largest expense of the Chinese government, at US\$200bn annually, higher than infrastructure, healthcare or defence, almost 20% of its total budget, (but still only totaling 2.7% of annual GDP), with coverage provided to less than half of the population above the age of sixty. These numbers will only rise. These are only rough estimates, and retirees will certainly not be funded at the same level as their counterparts in Western countries. But the financial liabilities are large nonetheless and will far exceed spending on foreign and internal security policy. Given the levels of debt, China will have difficulty funding obligations to its elderly. It seems almost unimaginable that it can sustain rapid growth in security spending as well. Xi's only political option given these circumstances is to create and sustain a new elite coalition around his nationalist program of

“national rejuvenation” and the “China dream.” Given slow economic growth and unfunded promises to seniors, Xi like Mao before him will have to ready his people for “sacrifices” in furtherance of China’s return to greatness.

1. Chinese aggression is overstated- Xi can’t afford to go to war (military overstretch, decreasing budget, and possibility of a loss)

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Xi’s Foreign Policy in the Era of Stagnation: Even as he faces greater financial strain, thus far Xi’s national security approach has been to centralize control over security policy, to expand internal security, and most importantly to continue with Hu’s more muscular stand on territorial claims in the South and East China Seas. In addition to these efforts, Xi has also put forth an ambitious development and strategic plan called One Belt One Road (OBOR), in which China will create a network of infrastructure projects linking itself with over 60 Central Asian, Middle Eastern, and European countries. Just as Hu halted economic reform, he also initiated a more assertive foreign policy. For example, Hu had to respond to a commodities shock (with high growth, China’s commodities demand rocketed higher), so he encouraged state companies to scour the earth for resources. He followed this “going out” strategy with a call for the People’s Liberation Navy to undertake “New Historic Missions” to protect China’s newfound overseas interests in the Gulf and Africa. As Chinese entities went overseas to find resources, security leaders feared that the US and its allies could cut off supply in the event of a downturn in Sino-American relations. To expand its maritime presence, China has deployed a naval task force in the Gulf of Aden since 2008, developed military forces able to project power into both the South China Sea and Indian Ocean, and built diplomatic and military logistics relationships through port calls in the Persian Gulf and Africa. Plans are on track to build China’s first overseas base in Djibouti, as well. Hu also began to press maritime claims in the East and South China seas and demonstrated a dangerous capability with a high-profile anti-satellite weapons test in 2007. While Hu began to demonstrate Chinese power, Xi has taken the approach one step further. Under Xi, China has more decisively shifted the balance of power in East Asia’s littoral seas. In the South China Sea, China has constructed over 3,000 acres of manmade military outposts and begun forward deploying missiles batteries, drones, and fighter aircraft to these new bases. All the while, Chinese coast guard and fishing fleets continue to harass Filipino, Vietnamese, and Indonesian fishing and coast guard vessels. In the East China Sea, Chinese maritime militias and fishing fleets maintain a regular presence around the Senkaku islands, which Beijing disputes with Tokyo. Chinese air force activity in Japanese airspace has increased dramatically in the past five years. In 2015 alone, Japan scrambled jets a record 571 times to escort intruding Chinese fighters. If Beijing’s maritime ambitions were not enough, Xi has also turned west with OBOR. The grandiose hope is to link Asia with Europe, a plan so ambitious it leaves Xi enough room for variegated assessments of success or failure. If OBOR is mostly a way to rid China of excess capacity and purchase more influence in neighboring countries, it may well “succeed.” But if the strategy is meant to reshuffle Eurasian geopolitics by creating a “New Silk Road” linking East and West, with China at the heart, it will almost surely fail. The biggest stumbling block is the long-term ability to fund such an endeavor, let alone protect it. For now, Chinese overseas direct investment to wealthy locales, such as the US and Australia, is increasing faster than investment to high-risk OBOR nations in continental Asia. OBOR funding must compete for state resources with PLA modernization, internal security budgets, a rising pension burden, and environmental remediation projects that are unprecedented in size and duration. The risks of Xi’s foreign policy approach are twofold. First, as Xi acquires a base in an unstable region, devotes more resources to Central Asia, and pushes contested maritime claims, the chances of a foreign policy failure have grown. China has little experience managing a high-stakes competition with a set of capable rivals such as the US and Japan, or countries willing to stand up to it under certain conditions such as Vietnam. Eventually, one of its rivals may push back hard (e.g., demonstrating that the militarized new “islands” are indefensible or placing US and allied exercises closer and closer to its shores), leaving Beijing with few palatable options. This scenario could be highly embarrassing to Xi who has cultivated a strong-man image. Part of the party’s claim to the mandate of heaven is that it is reversing centuries of foreign humiliation. No CCP leader can be seen creating new humiliations. Second, his ambitions may be unaffordable under conditions of economic stagnation. Xi himself hinted at these realities this spring, “In the face of mounting pressure resulting from the economic downturn, with a slowdown in budgetary income and growing expenditure, it is not easy to secure a normal rise in the military budget anymore.” A PLA with budget increasing at “only” 5 percent a year will still be a formidable fighting force in East Asia, but overseas basing, far seas missions, and infrastructure protection on the Asian continent are expensive endeavors. And 5 percent increases will become an increasing strain on China’s economy. A stagnating China’s best analogue is not the stagnant Japan

of the past two decades. Because of Beijing's geopolitical ambitions, the better comparison is to Putin's Russia, albeit with a much larger economy and thus more durable power. Despite already poor demographic conditions and a shrinking economy, Putin continues to exert Russian power abroad. He remains a popular leader and therefore can sustain these ambitions for a strategically relevant period of time. Similar to Russia, China is discontent with an American-dominated geopolitical order and has a strong sense that it should be the leading power in its region. Political power will likely remain centralized, and opposition will be put down ruthlessly. Xi will walk a tightrope on foreign policy adventurism. Right now his activities in the South China Sea serve both strategic goals and his nationalist domestic policy goals. The risk of this approach has been, and will remain, low as long as the US continues its tepid response. Going forward, he will calibrate assertiveness based on how much he needs to fuel nationalism and how great the strategic payoff China receives, measured against the risk of a real or perceived failure (e.g., the US effectively stops China from creating new manmade islands).

US Policy Implications: China's stagnation has two broad implications for US strategy. First, Washington has more strategic leverage in the bilateral relationship than it imagines. Since the 2008 financial crisis, the central organizing ideas driving Washington's China policy are that the US is in relative decline and that economic "interdependence" limits more assertive US options to challenge China's aggression. Both of these ideas are inaccurate. While the US has serious long-term fiscal problems, it is far more powerful and wealthy than China. According to net private wealth statistics and other data relevant to national economic capabilities, the economic gap between the US and China is vast and may continue to grow. The US can choose to put itself on a better fiscal course and translate more of its wealth into geopolitical and military power in ways that China would be hard pressed to challenge. And "interdependence" does not quite describe the bilateral relationship. China depends on the US for secure sea lines of communication needed to import commodities, for contributions to its food supply ranging from soybeans to pork, and as a safe repository for its finances—for example the US has become China's preferred choice for discretionary overseas investment. Most important, the US continues to provide stewardship over the international economic system, and its willingness to run by far the world's largest trade deficit drives global growth in a way China never has. In contrast, although the US has benefited from Chinese investment and the import of low-cost consumer goods assembled in China, these goods are already starting to be sourced from other locales, and falling Chinese reserves have already started to limit investment potential. If relations deteriorated, the US can inflict far more economic harm on China than the reverse. This is not interdependence. Strategic Leverage: In short, the US will retain the clear upper hand in a relationship that is growing more competitive. Washington should reorient its strategy based on its strategic leverage. The huge gap between the two country's private sectors and deterioration in the economic position of the Chinese state leave the US a budget deal and entitlement reform plan away from translating economic advantage into even greater strategic advantage. Another key source of American leverage is CCP insecurity. Xi needs to inspire nationalism and demonstrate that he is leading the process of national rejuvenation, but he cannot risk a foreign policy failure that would make him look weak at home. That means he will press on contentious issues until it becomes too risky to continue. For example, his South China Sea aggression has worked. He has paid no real cost and can credibly claim to his people that he is retaking lost territory and gaining control over China's historic seas. But if the US took action to stop China from dredging new "islands" in such places as the Scarborough Shoal, Xi would not have many responses. If the US began to convoy fishermen to waters they can legally fish, Xi would be left with a host of bad options. If the US began an active diplomatic initiative with maritime claimants in Southeast Asia to resolve conflicting issues of maritime rights and territories without China, Beijing would be isolated. These strategic initiatives should be accompanied by a renewed US informational campaign emphasizing how Xi is isolating China when there are many other options to integrate the country with the international community. The US should make it clear that it is not seeking confrontation with China. Indeed, Washington has done much to welcome China as a great power. Rather, US strategy should be aimed at demonstrating that a policy of aggression and assertion will not end well for Xi and the CCP and that there are better options. Indeed, exercising strategic leverage could enforce a second American goal: China's return

to Deng-like reforms. China's troubles are not cause for unbridled celebration. Yes, they provide the US with the opportunity to push back against China's aggression. But in the longer term, a stagnating China constitutes a far more unpredictable geopolitical rival. The brief history of the PRC offers examples of foreign policy adventures used to sway the people to support grand, transformational political initiatives. Domestic radicalization has caused problems for the US in particular (e.g., the Great Leap Forward and the Taiwan Strait crisis). On the other hand, relations with China improved substantially when Deng Xiaoping started economic reform. Bilateral ties were also more stable during Jiang's and Zhu's reforms of the mid- and late-1990s as Beijing developed much more interest in a stable international financial system. Admittedly, China was less capable of pushing its security interests at that time. American strategic objectives should be to deter highly aggressive moves by Xi to clearly show that the US will take advantage of the risks he has taken, while using high-level diplomacy and economic carrots to further market-based cooperation.

3. China's economy is actually stagnant- Xi's rolled back Deng's reforms and they're in debt

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Beijing's Blues: Nor is all of this a blip. The PRC's economic weakness did not appear in 2015, as some seem to think. It did even not begin with the 2008 financial crisis. It began in 2003. From 1978 to 2002, several waves of partial pro-market reform created a new economic powerhouse. In 2003, the new government under Hu Jintao decided state-owned banks lending to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) should continue to constitute the core of the economy, employing large numbers of people and otherwise serving the party's aims. Fresh market-oriented reforms were soon displaced by soaring publicly directed investment. The National Bureau of Statistics reported investment growth jumped from 12 percent in 2001 to more than 26 percent in 2003, more than four-fifths by state-controlled enterprises. Investment growth then exceeded 25 percent annually for the next nine years, doubling the pace of official GDP—the huge imbalance between investment and consumption is not endemic but rather was created starting in late 2002. After a four-year boom, the economy began to hiccup. It was no longer greater productivity from market reform driving the numbers but increasing dependence on foreign consumption to buy the goods ultimately produced. The global financial crisis was a double blow. Foreign demand plummeted. And on top of the previous public investment surge, Beijing conducted arguably history's biggest stimulus through state-run banks. Loans grew 32 percent in 2009 alone, even as profit opportunities vanished. At this point the stagnation path became clearly visible. Since then, credit expansion has slowed but remains staggering. In a smaller economy, China's broad money supply is 75 percent larger than America's. The inevitable outcome of such leveraging is overcapacity and debt. In 2003, the government identified three industries suffering from overcapacity; in 2013, that number had ballooned to 19. Sustained overinvestment and overproduction have badly damaged the environment, exacerbated income inequality, and, most important, created a crippling debt burden. The PRC's national debt is in excess of \$25 trillion and climbing. Roughly two-thirds has been accumulated in the past nine years. In 2015, total debt rose four times as fast as nominal GDP, mocking the idea that China continues to enjoy comparatively rapid economic growth. When a country has already spent so much, the return on yet more spending is low. This is the main reason growth has slowed. A related point is that, when a country's debt is so large, a large amount of capital is spent paying it back. This is the main reason growth will slow further.

Empirically, offshore balancing means world war

Thomas **Fingar**, 2014, Fingar is an academic at Stanford University, an Asia expert, and a former high-ranking official in the U.S. State Department and intelligence community, similarly believes that China has neither the incentive nor the intention of disrupting the current global system from which it has benefited so greatly. Instead, Fingar asserts that China will seek

marginal adjustments to the existing rules and institutions to accommodate its growing stature and interests. Haddick, Robert (2014-09-15). Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific (p. 28). Naval Institute Press. Kindle Edition.

There are alternatives to this approach, as examined above. Proponents of these alternatives are seeking other strategies that will reduce America's exposure to risk, cut its security costs, or fashion a diplomatic solution that will avert a clash of interests among the region's great powers. However, these alternatives to forward presence will not achieve these aims. **Offshore balancing** aims to reduce America's exposure to risky entanglements and to reduce the costly burden of forward presence. Proponents claim that this approach will give U.S. policymakers more freedom of action, including the option to reassert U.S. power in Eurasia to prevent the arrival of a hegemon that could threaten U.S. interests. However, **this strategy only assures dangerous great-power instability in Eurasia that will very likely result in a costly U.S. return under highly unfavorable circumstances. The U.S. experience with offshore balancing during the first half of the twentieth century was very expensive, with two world wars and the three costly U.S. military campaigns required to restore stability. It is little wonder that no U.S. president since World War II has returned to offshore balancing.** Haddick, Robert (2014-09-15). Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific (p. 49). Naval Institute Press. Kindle Edition.

Power vacuum from offshore balancing

Paul Salem, Fall, 2016, The Middle East Journal, Navigating a Turbulent Middle East: Priorities for Our Next President, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/634694> Paul Salem is vice president for policy and research at The Middle East Institute, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/634694>

The Obama Administration rushed to reverse the Bush Administration's overreach, **bring troops home, and reprise the offshore balancer** role of yore. However, **that role presumes a tentative regional balance that can be managed and preserved from offshore; and it also presumes a state-based regional order in which power balancing, deterrence, and cost-benefit calculations are effective.** By the time the wave of popular uprisings swept the Middle East in 2011, any tentative regional balance had been shattered by the dramatic de-containment and empowering of Iran after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. There was no regional stability or balance to maintain, and **the US attempt to move offshore created a real and perceived regional power vacuum that made the destabilizing regional imbalance worse.**

By 2013, **the events of the so-called Arab Spring had brought down several states and created conditions for the rise or resurgence of major armed non-state actors from ISIS to Hizbullah. While offshore balancing presumes a balancing of states, groups like ISIS or alQa'ida, or even Hizbullah for that matter, do not play by the same rules.**

THE US AND RUSSIA ARE GOING TO BE ALLIES SOON

NEIL MacFARQUHAR, (New York Times), "Putin and Trump Talk on Phone and Agree to Improve Ties, Kremlin Says," November 14, 2016
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/world/europe/putin-calls-trump.html>

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and President-elect Donald J. Trump spoke by telephone for the first time on Monday, agreeing to review what both consider the poor state of relations between the two countries, according to a statement from the Kremlin.

The two agreed "on the absolutely unsatisfactory state of bilateral relations," said the statement, and they both endorsed the idea of undertaking joint efforts "to normalize relations and pursue constructive cooperation on the broadest possible range of issues." The issues discussed included trade and economic ties as well as combating terrorism. Mr. Putin was one of the first world leaders to congratulate Mr. Trump last Wednesday, sending him a telegram about an hour after he had emerged the victor, but the two men have not met nor had they spoken previously.

Mr. Putin repeated the congratulations over the phone. The Russian president said he hoped that Moscow could build a "collaborative dialogue" with Washington on the bases of "equality, mutual respect and noninterference in the other's internal affairs," the release said.

Hegemony isn't needed in Europe, EU actors fill the void

Ted Carpenter **April 2013**, [a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor to *The National Interest*, is the author of nine books and more than 500 articles and policy studies, "Delusions of Indispensability" <http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/delusions-indispensability-8145>] MJS

But even during the final decades of the Cold War, the U.S. security blanket unfortunately caused an excessive and unhealthy dependence on the part of democratic Europe. And with the demise of the Soviet Union, a policy based on U.S. dominance now reeks of obsolescence. Despite its recent financial struggles, the European Union collectively has both a population and an economy larger than those of the United States. And Russia, if it poses a threat at all, is a far less serious menace than was the Soviet Union. Yet U.S. leaders act as though the EU nations are inherently incapable of managing Europe's security affairs. And for their part, the European allies are content to continue free riding on Washington's exertions, keeping their defense budgets at minimal levels and letting the United States take primary responsibility for security issues that affect Europe far more than America. Even a modest increase in defense spending by the principal European powers would enable the EU to handle any security problems that are likely to arise in the region. In that sense, Washington's dominant role in dealing with the Balkan conflicts in the 1990s was not evidence of the continuing need for U.S. leadership, but rather underscored the negative consequences of having encouraged Europe's security dependence on the United States for so many decades. The reality is that the threat environment in Europe is quite benign. There are few plausible security threats, and the ones that might arise are on the scale of the Balkan spats—problems that the European powers should be able to handle without undue exertion. Washington can safely off-load responsibility for European security and

stability to the countries directly involved. The United States is most certainly not indispensable to the Continent's security any longer.

Russia's military budget is collapsing, no war risk

Harry J. **Kazianis** (@grecianformula) is **director of defense studies at the Center for the National Interest**, founded by former U.S. President Richard M. Nixon. Kazianis also presently serves as Executive Editor of the National Interest and fellow at both the Potomac Foundation and the Center for China Policy at the University of Nottingham (UK). He is the author of the book *The Tao of A2/AD: China's Rationale for the Creation of Anti-Access*. Kazianis in the past has led the foreign policy communication efforts of the Heritage Foundation, is the former editor-in-chief of *The Diplomat* and a fellow at CSIS:PACNET. **November, 14, 2016**

http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2016/11/14/how_donald_trump_can_make_the_pivot_to_asia_great_again_112118.html

While Russia might be flexing its muscles in Ukraine and in Syria, **Moscow faces long-term and well documented demographic and economic challenges it will not easily overcome. And with big cuts coming to its military budget starting next year, we might be witnessing the peak of Russian military and diplomatic might.**

Economic interdependence prevents a US-Russia War.

Stewart 3/7/14, staff writer for the New York Times, cites a study by J.P. Morgan Securities, quotes a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, (James B., March 7, 2014, "Why Russia Can't Afford Another Cold War", New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/08/business/why-russia-cant-afford-another-cold-war.html?_r=0)/CJC

Russia is far more exposed to market fluctuations than many countries, since it owns a majority stake in a number of the country's largest companies. Gazprom, the energy concern that is Russia's largest company by market capitalization, is majority-owned by the Russian Federation. At the same time, Gazprom's shares are listed on the London stock exchange and are traded over the counter as American depositary receipts in the United States as well as on the Berlin and Paris exchanges. Over half of its shareholders are American, according to J. P. Morgan Securities. And the custodian bank for its depositary receipts is the Bank of New York Mellon. Many Russian companies and banks are fully integrated into the global financial system. This week, Glencore Xstrata, the mining giant based in Switzerland, was in the middle of a roughly \$1 billion debt-to-equity refinancing deal with the Russian oil company Russneft. Glencore said it expected to complete the deal despite the crisis. Glencore's revenue last year was substantially larger than the entire gross domestic product of Ukraine, which was \$176 billion, according to the World Bank. The old Soviet Union, in stark contrast, was all but impervious to foreign economic or business pressure, thanks in part to an ideological

commitment to self-sufficiency. As recently as 1985, foreign trade amounted to just 4 percent of the country's gross domestic product, and nearly all that was with the communist satellite countries of Eastern Europe. But the Soviet Union's economic insularity and resulting economic stagnation was a major cause of the Soviet Union's collapse. According to Mr. Talbott, the Soviet Union's president at the time, Mikhail Gorbachev, was heavily influenced by Soviet economists and other academics who warned that by the turn of the century in 2000, the Soviet economy would be smaller than South Korea's if it did not introduce major economic reforms and participate in the global economy. To attract investment capital, Mr. Gorbachev created the Moscow stock exchange in 1990 and issued an order permitting Soviet citizens to own and trade stocks, bonds and other securities for the first time since the 1917 Bolshevik revolution. (Before then, Russia had a flourishing stock exchange in St. Petersburg, established by order of Peter the Great. It was housed in an elegant neoclassical building directly across the waterfront from the Winter Palace. As a symbol of wealth and capitalism, it was one of the earliest casualties of the revolution.) Even before this week's gyrations, the Russian stock market index had dropped near 8 percent last year, and it and the Russian economy have been suffering from low commodity prices and investor concerns about the Federal Reserve's tapering of bond purchases — factors of little significance during the Cold War. **By contrast, today "Russia is too weak and vulnerable economically to go to war,"** Mr. Aslund said. **"The Kremlin's fundamental mistake has been to ignore its economic weakness and dependence on Europe. Almost half of Russia's exports go to Europe, and three-quarters of its total exports consist of oil and gas.** The energy boom is over, and Europe can turn the tables on Russia after its prior gas supply cuts in 2006 and 2009. Europe can replace this gas with liquefied natural gas, gas from Norway and shale gas. If the European Union sanctioned Russia's gas supply to Europe, Russia would lose \$100 billion or one-fifth of its export revenues, and the Russian economy would be in rampant crisis."

No Baltic invasion

Bandow 2016 [Doug Bandow is senior fellow at the Cato Institute, "Russia Won't Attack the Baltic States", *Cato Institute*, <<https://www.cato.org/blog/russia-wont-attack-baltic-states>>] //CJC

Equally striking is how NATO membership has discouraged the Baltic nations from doing much for their own defense. Last year Latvia and Lithuania devoted 1.06 percent and 1.14 percent, respectively, of GDP to the military. Estonia was 2.04 percent—the first time Tallinn met the official NATO standard. Yet **the surging fear over Russian adventurism is misplaced.** **Vladimir Putin's behavior is bad, but poses little threat to America, "old" Europe, or even most of Russia's neighbors.** He has taken Moscow back to the Russian Empire, not the Soviet Union. His government demands respect for its status, protection of Russia's borders, and consideration of its interests. Mikhail Saakashvili's Georgia was actively anti-Russian, pursued close ties with America, and sought membership in NATO—all certain to antagonize Moscow. Ukraine always mattered more to Moscow than Georgia or the Baltics for historical and cultural reasons, as well as the naval base of Sebastopol. Putin acted only after Europe pushed a trade agreement to reorient Ukraine away from Russia and both Brussels and Washington backed a street revolution against the elected president who leaned toward Russia. Even then, Putin sought to weaken, not conquer, Ukraine. His brutal response was murderous and unjustified, but militarily on par with U.S. interventions. **Putin continues to demonstrate no interest in ruling those likely to resist Russia's tender mercies. Seizing the Baltic states likely would generate substantial popular resistance.** Moreover, as weak nations currently containing no foreign troops, **the Baltics pose no potential threat to Russia.** Finally, **the Baltic ethnic Russian populations, though significant, demonstrate little sentiment for joining Mother Russia.** They prefer cultural connection to political affiliation, creating a poor target for the sort of destabilizing tactics deployed against Ukraine. So what would Russia gain from attacking the Baltics? A recalcitrant, majority non-ethnic Russian population. A possible temporary nationalist surge at home. A likely short-lived victory over the West. As I argue in National Interest: **"The costs would be far greater. Grabbing the Baltics likely would spur population exodus and**

trigger economic collapse. Launching a war without the convincing pretext present in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine might leave the Russian public angry over the retaliation certain to come.

Wages fell by 5.5%

Josh Bivens, 3-22-2013, "Using standard models to benchmark the costs of globalization for American workers without a college degree", Economic Policy Institute,
<http://www.epi.org/publication/standard-models-benchmark-costs-globalization/>

A standard model estimating the impact of trade on American wages indicates that **growing trade** with less-developed countries **lowered [annual] wages** in 2011 **by 5.5 percent**—or by roughly \$1,800—for a full-time, full-year worker earning the average wage for workers without a four-year college degree. One-third of this total effect is due to growing trade with just China.

A study by the Economic Policy Institute looking at American income finds that wage losses because of trade flows have increased 7% in one year which would essentially erase all wage gains in the past 38 years if the trend continues.

Josh Bivens, 2007, "Globalization and American Wages", Economic Policy Institute,
<http://www.epi.org/publication/bp196/>

In 2006, the impact of trade flows increased the inequality of earnings by roughly 7%, with the resulting loss to a representative household (two earners making the median wage and working the average amount of (household) hours each year) reaching more than \$2,000. This amount rivals the entire annual federal income tax bill paid by this household. Over the next 10-20 years, if some prominent forecasts of the reach of service-sector offshoring hold true, and, *if current patterns of trade roughly characterize this offshoring, then globalization could essentially erase all wage gains made since 1979 by workers without a four-year college degree.*

Trade with low-wage countries makes up 90% of the reason that wage premium for 4 year degree workers has risen in comparison to those without one [warrant later in card]

Josh Bivens, 3-22-2013, "Using standard models to benchmark the costs of globalization for American workers without a college degree", Economic Policy Institute,
<http://www.epi.org/publication/standard-models-benchmark-costs-globalization/>

Trade with low-wage countries can explain roughly a third of the overall rise since 1979 in the wage premium earned by workers with at least a four-year college degree relative to those without one. However, *trade with low-wage countries explains more than 90 percent of the rise in this premium since 1995.*

Importantly, the wage effects of global integration reach beyond those workers exposed directly to foreign competition. As imports displace non-college-educated workers from tradeable sectors (such as manufacturing), these laid-off workers need to accept lower wages to obtain work in other sectors (such as landscaping or construction). Further, the competition provided by these

workers helps to lower the wages of similar workers already employed in these sectors.

Trade caused 25% of the growth in wage inequality

Robert Scott, 11-17-2003, "The high price of 'free' trade: NAFTA's failure has cost the United States jobs across the nation", Economic Policy Institute,
http://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_bp147/

When trying to identify the causes behind trends such as the disappearance of manufacturing jobs, the rise in income inequality, and the decline in wages in the United States, NAFTA and growing trade deficits only provide part of the picture. Other major contributors include deregulation and privatization, declining rates of unionization, sustained high levels of unemployment, and technological change. While each of these factors has played some role, **a large body of economic research has concluded that trade is responsible for at least 15% to 25% of the growth in wage inequality in the United States** (U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission 2000, 110-18). In addition, trade also has indirect effects on wage inequality by contributing to many of these other causes. For example, the decline of the manufacturing sector attributable to increased globalization has resulted in a reduction in unionization rates, since unions represent a larger share of the workforce in this sector than in other sectors of the economy.

Income inequality causes long-term economic harm

Daniel Lederman [Economics Research Group; World Bank] 07 July 2015. "Effects of income inequality on economic growth." Center for Evaluating Research. [// AA](http://voxeu.org/article/effects-income-inequality-economic-growth)

Our empirical analysis shows that for the average country in the sample during 1970-2010, increases in income inequality reduce GDP per capita. **Specifically, we find that, on average, a 1 percentage point increase in the Gini coefficient reduces GDP per capita by around 1.1% over a five-year period; the long-run (cumulative) effect is larger and amounts to about -4.5%.** To be clear, this finding implies that, on average, increases in the level of income inequality lead to lower transitional GDP per capita growth. Increases in the level of income inequality have a negative long-run effect on the level of GDP per capita. We document the robustness of this result to alternative measures of income inequality, alternative income inequality data sources, splitting the sample between pre- and post-1990 period (end of the Cold War), and restricting the sample to countries located in Latin America and the Caribbean or Asia.

Most lost jobs are high-wage positions – caused higher income inequality

Robert Scott, 11-17-2003, "The high price of 'free' trade: NAFTA's failure has cost the United States jobs across the nation", Economic Policy Institute,
http://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_bp147/

Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed in 1993, the rise in the U.S. trade deficit with Canada and Mexico through 2002 has caused the displacement of production that supported 879,280 U.S. jobs. Most of those lost jobs were high-wage positions in manufacturing industries. The loss of these jobs is just the most visible tip of NAFTA's impact on the U.S. economy. In fact, NAFTA has also contributed to rising income inequality, suppressed real wages for production workers, weakened workers' collective bargaining powers and ability to organize unions, and reduced fringe benefits.

Net Loss in every state

Robert Scott, 11-17-2003, "The high price of 'free' trade: NAFTA's failure has cost the United States jobs across the nation", Economic Policy Institute,
http://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_bp147/

All 50 states and the District of Columbia have experienced a net loss of jobs

under NAFTA (see Table 2). Exports from every state have been offset by faster rising imports. Table 2 provides detailed estimates of job gains due to the growth in exports, job losses due to changes in imports, and the trade balance for each state. In every case, many more jobs are lost due to growing imports than are gained by increasing exports.

Free trade harmed America — outsourcing, wages, etc

Madrick 2014 [Jeff Madrick is senior fellow at the Century Foundation, "Our Misplaced Faith in Free Trade", *New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/04/opinion/sunday/our-misplaced-faith-in-free-trade.html?_r=0>] //CJC

The skeptics are on to something. **Free trade creates winners and losers — and American workers have been among the losers. Free trade has been a major (but not the only) factor behind the erosion in wages and job security among American workers. It has created tremendous prosperity — but mostly for those at the top.**

Little wonder, then, that Americans, in another Pew survey, last winter, ranked protecting jobs as the second-most-important goal for foreign policy, barely below protecting us from terrorism. Many economists dismiss these attitudes as the griping of people on the losing end of globalization, but they would do better to look inward, at the flaws in their models and theories. Since the 1970s, economic orthodoxy has argued for low tariffs, free capital flows, elimination of industrial subsidies, deregulation of labor markets, balanced budgets and low inflation. This philosophy — later known as the Washington Consensus — was the basis of advice the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank gave to developing countries in return for financial help. The irony is that during the Industrial Revolution, today's rich countries — Britain, France and the United States — pursued the very opposite policies: high tariffs, government investment in industry, financial regulations and fixed values for currencies. Trade expanded, and capital flowed anyway. World War II changed everything. Tariffs were seen as having exacerbated the Depression, and inadequate globalization as one cause of the two world wars. So, through the late 1970s, the United States and Europe cut tariffs, though currencies were fixed and capital was still highly controlled. Astonishing American prosperity in the three decades after 1945 led economists to overestimate the impact of free trade. In reality, high growth in those years resulted from many factors: pent-up demand from the war; the Marshall Plan; Cold War military spending; investments in universities, highways and scientific research; and falling oil prices. Starting in the 1970s, however, under the influence of free-market enthusiasts like Milton Friedman, economists urged further removal of barriers to trade and capital flows, hoping to turn the world into one highly efficient market, unobstructed by government. The results were often disastrous. The lowering of protective tariffs did not lead to rapid growth in Latin America, which stagnated in the 1980s. Mr. Friedman's acolytes also urged the reduction or elimination of capital controls — starting in the 1970s in the United States, and in the 1980s in Europe — along with lower tariffs. This, too, was ruinous. An exodus of short-term investments contributed to financial crises in East Asia, Russia, Argentina and Turkey in the mid-1990s, and to the collapse of the Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund in 1998 (a prelude to the 2008 crisis). Though these mistakes were recognized, the World Trade Organization continued to push one-size-fits-all rules, premised more on ideology than experience, that hurt developing countries. In 1995, it demanded that members substantially reduce subsidies for export industries. Imagine what would have happened if South Korea, Japan and Taiwan had had to follow this guidance; they became economic powerhouses in the 1960s and 1970s by nurturing their export sectors. (To join the W.T.O., in 2001, China was forced to slash industrial subsidies, but it resorted to currency manipulation to boost its export sector.) Also that year, the W.T.O. adopted a rule obliging members to abide by rich nations' patent laws. (Never mind that Americans stole technologies from Europe throughout the 1800s.) These laws typically enabled investors in rich countries to reap substantial rewards, while poor nations like India were forced to pay the same price for patented drugs as the rich West,

because they were not allowed to make generic substitutes. **But the consensus was flawed. Even free-trade advocates**

now admit that American wages have been reduced as a result of outsourcing, the erosion of manufacturing and an ever-increasing reliance on imports. Middle-income countries, meanwhile, have been blocked from adopting policies that might make them world-class competitors. Nations that have ignored the nostrums of the Washington Consensus — China, India and Brazil — have grown rapidly and raised their standards of living. Improvements in poverty and inequality occurred in Latin America only in the 2000s, after the I.M.F. and the World Bank reduced their grip on those nations.

Free trade bad for America—jobs, wages, econ

Raedle 2016 [Joe Raedle at Newsweek, "ARE FREE TRADE DEALS BAD FOR AMERICA?", *Newsweek*, <<http://www.newsweek.com/2016/06/24/free-trade-trans-pacific-partnership-469693.html>>] //CJC

The question then is: Who is right? Are the trade deals that Trump has turned into epithets bad for the country? Critics of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the 1993 trade and investment pact ratified by the U.S., Canada and Mexico, or of China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which the U.S. championed, argue that allowing **unfettered imports from low-wage countries (like China or Mexico) puts the U.S. and its manufacturing workers in a "race to the bottom."** Trade critic Alan Tonelson says **it's a race that we can't win, given how much more a U.S. industrial worker earns than his or her counterpart in, say, China's** Yangtze River Delta. From this, critics contend that **bad trade agreements have led to the decline of U.S. manufacturing employment—down 30 percent since 2000—as well as stagnation in manufacturing wages and,** because of persistently large merchandise trade deficits (which decrease gross domestic product), the overall **sluggish pace of U.S. economic growth.**

Wage laws mean unions hurt low skill workers

Williamsen, 2013 [Kurt Williamsen, staff writer, "Do Progressive Policies Hurt Black Americans?," Thursday, 21 November 2013, The New American, <http://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/family/item/16963-do-progressive-policies-hurt-black-americans>] MJS

The first federal law to mandate that a prevailing wage be paid was the Davis-Bacon Act of 1931. **Prevailing wage laws require that the prevailing local wage — usually the union wage in the area — be paid to laborers working on government building contracts so that itinerant workers can't work for less money than local workers.**

The Davis-Bacon Act was passed because out-of-state contractors were low-bidding building contracts in New York through the use of black laborers from the South — the same reason the first of these type laws was passed at the state level in Kansas in 1891.³⁶ Many representatives were very open about the reason for the new law. Representative Clayton Allgood said, "Reference has been made to a contractor from Alabama who went to New York with bootleg labor. This is a fact. That contractor has cheap colored labor that he transports ... and it is labor of that sort that is in competition with white labor throughout the country."³⁶ The movement to pass laws against black labor was moved ahead through the efforts of a labor union, the American Federation of Labor, as Williams pointed out: William Green, president of the American Federation of Labor, made clear the unions' interests: "[C]olored labor is being sought to demoralize wage rates [in Tennessee]."³⁶

At the same time "blacks were excluded from most major construction unions."³⁶ And the prevailing wage laws did what their backers wanted them to do: They kept blacks from getting jobs and skills to advance in the job market. In practice, **the act's wage and work jurisdiction requirements make it costly for non-union shops to hire and train unskilled workers, because they had to pay workers wages and benefits that exceed worker productivity.**

Initially, the act's regulations did not make a distinction between unskilled and skilled workers unless the former were members of a union apprenticeship program. As a result, contractors were forced to pay a worker who was not a member of such a program the same wage as a skilled worker. [Emphasis added.]³⁶ Still today, this ensures, said Williams, quoting Ralph C. Thomas, the executive director of the National Association of Minority Contractors, "that a contractor has 'no choice but to hire skilled tradesmen, the majority of which are majority [white].... Davis-Bacon ... closes the door in such an activity in an industry most capable of employing the largest numbers of minorities."³⁶ The repercussions of such laws are real and tragic, as, again, pointed out by Williams. The director of one Chicago-based social service organization ... found that Davis-Bacon adds as much as 25 percent to her housing renovation costs.

It frequently prevents her from hiring the low-income, low-skills residents to do rehabilitation work in the housing project in which they live. Elzie Higginbottom [who] builds low-income housing in Chicago ... says, "I've got to start out a guy at \$16 an hour to find out if he knows how to dig a hole. I can't do that." As a result he is prevented from hiring unskilled local blacks.

Ralph L. Jones ... manages housing projects for HUD. [In 1990,] when Jones decided to repair 200 dilapidated units, he planned to employ unskilled residents, at \$5 an hour, to pull out unsalvageable parts of the building and later to assist skilled craftsmen in restoring the property. However the Davis-Bacon Act required that he pay laborers \$14 an hour. **He was forced to hire only skilled laborers, very few of whom were blacks or residents of the project.**³⁶

Davis-Bacon also has hefty government paperwork requirements, which give advantages to large union shops that can afford lawyers over small non-union shops that can't, penalizing black small businesses.

Construction unions discriminate

Red State, 2011 [Redstate.com, April 10th, 2011, "Unions & Racism: An Age-Old, Institutional Problem Continues Unabated," <http://www.redstate.com/laborunionreport/2011/04/10/unions-racism-an-age-old-institutional-problem-continues-unabated/>] JSM

"It is rather ironic that, last week, union bosses used the anniversary Rev. Martin Luther King's assassination to try to drum up support for the union cause. You see, even after all these years, racism and discrimination within the walls of the House of Labor is still very real. As noted by UnionFacts.com, since 2000, there have been over 4,200 complaints filed against unions for racial discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission. In some cities, it is a bigger problem than in others. However, the one area where union racism seems to rear its ugly head the most often is with the construction trade unions, where African Americans are often excluded from work." "A January 2008 review of trade unionists working on \$500-million worth of Philly public projects during the preceding five years conducted by then Inquirer columnist Tom Ferrick concluded, "these well paid union jobs ... remain all-male, nearly all-white and the majority live in the suburbs." The source of this current suburban give-away by Mayor Nutter is a thing called a Project Labor Agreement (PLA). PLAs are contractual arrangements giving construction trade unions control over jobs, generally on public works projects. PLAs require all companies receiving contracts for those projects to hire union workers. PLA's have an ugly history of working against the inclusion of minority workers and minority contractors. The exclusion comes from the legacy of aggressive job discrimination in too many trade unions ... race discrimination by the large white construction firms that generally get public works contracts abet both actively and passively."

Countermovements

Meyer, 1996 [Ph. D DAVID S. MEYER Professor, Sociology, UC Irvine, May 1996, "Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity," https://webfiles.uci.edu/dmeyer/meyerprof_files/mcmsop.ajs.pdf]

Issues rarely become "closed" with a single outcome such as new legislation, the recommendation of a government agency, or a court ruling. In the case of cigarette smoking, U.S. policies did not change immediately after the surgeon general's first report on smoking was released in 1964 but were the result of years of lobbying by anti-smoking forces (see Troyer and Markle 1983). In the American abortion conflict, the Supreme Court ruling that legalized abortion throughout the country in 1973 would seem to be an example of a decisive victory, but it spurred the growth of an anti-abortion countermovement rather than foreclosing protest. In this instance, the change was sudden and both proponents and

opponents of legal abortion had difficulty believing it had really occurred. Moreover, anti-abortion activists could fight the Court action by shifting to other arenas such as Congress or state legislatures. Movement victories that are truly decisive preclude the possibility of countermove- ment action in alternative arenas.

Legal reform kills movements, extralegal activism is the alternative

Lobel 2007 [Orly Lobel is assistant professor of law. "THE PARADOX OF EXTRALEGAL ACTIVISM: CRITICAL LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSFORMATIVE POLITICS", *Harvard Law Review*, <<http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/lobel.pdf>>] //CJC

The limits of the law as a means of effecting social change have been a key focus of legal thinkers over the past several decades. The aggregate impact of emerging schools of thought challenging the value of legal reform in producing social change has been the development of a contemporary critical legal consciousness — a conventional wisdom about the relative inefficacy of law.¹ Critical claims go further than simply expressing disappointment in the capacity of the legal system to achieve the desired goals of a social movement. An argument that has become increasingly prevalent in legal scholarship states that the law often brings more harm than good to social movements that rely on legal strategies to advance their goals. The law entices groups to choose legal strategies to advance their social goals but ultimately proves to be a detrimental path. The negative effect is generally understood as “legal cooptation” — a process by which the focus on legal reform narrows the causes, deradicalizes the agenda, legitimizes ongoing injustices, and diverts energies away from more effective and transformative alternatives. Consequently, the argument proceeds, the turn to the law actually reinforces existing institutions and ideologies. As they engage with the law, social reform groups become absorbed by the system even as they struggle against it. When examining closely the dominant set of assumptions underlying recent critical scholarship, one must face the question: what is uniquely legal about cooptation? This Article considers the claims of legal cooptation as they have been developed vis-à-vis former periods of social activism — primarily the New Deal labor movement and the 1960s civil rights movement — in relation to recent scholarship that purports to provide alternatives to cooptive legal processes. It traces the impact of critical understandings of the law to three strands of contemporary “extralegal” schools of thought that operate under a critical legal consciousness. The Article argues that the limits of social change are not confined to legal reform, but in fact are as likely (if not more so) to occur in the realm of extralegal activism. Moreover, the very idea of opting out of the legal arena creates a false binary between social spheres that in reality permeate one another. Under the contemporary axiomatic skepticism about the law, analysts often bundle and collapse legal cooptation claims rather than differentiate among myriad, distinct sets of concerns. When claims about the failures of legal reform are unbundled, they provide a window into our assumptions about the possibilities and rhythms of change in general, not merely change via the path of the law. Accordingly, this Article asserts that contemporary critical legal consciousness has eclipsed the origins of critical

theory, which situated various forms of social action — all of which potentially have cooptive as well as transformative effects — on more equal grounds.

NeJaime, 2013 [Douglas NeJaime, Professor of Law at UCLA, “Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements,”

<http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1065&context=mlr>] PP

Important decisions become part of a narrative in which social movement actors, among others, use such decisions to explain legitimate social change, repudiate past injustices, and justify calls for further development. Social movements may seize on canonical cases to articulate demands in the present day. Loving v. Virginia,⁴ for instance, serves as a rallying cry for the marriage equality campaign. Cases that we now look at with collective regret and shame become equally significant.

Meyer, 1996 [Ph. D DAVID S. MEYER Professor, Sociology, UC Irvine, May 1996, “Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity,”

https://webfiles.uci.edu/dmeyer/meyerprof_files/mcmsop.ajs.pdf] PP

Authorities, to be sure, are important: In the case of the Operation Rescue events in the United States, for example, police and local authorities must mediate between the opposing movements and may favor one side over the other in their management of the protest. The courts have ruled on the legality of tactics and the penalties to be imposed on offenders, and Congress has passed legislation dealing with abortion clinic protests. Most recently, the murders of health care providers by antiabortion activists, together with the demands of abortion rights advocates, have forced the federal government to help protect clinics. **These actions by authorities are critical,** but it is interactions between movements and countermovements, including both discrete events and ongoing relationships, that shape state responses.

[...]

Whereas Eisinger (1973) and Tilly (1978) viewed protest mobilization as a response to partly open governmental structures, we can refine this essential insight to look at particular issues. Individual movements make political claims on limited sets of issues, responding to particular conjunc- tures of policies and political alignments. Advocates of specific policy alternatives adopt the form of a social movement when they believe that such approaches are potentially efficacious. **During periods when the "relative openness" of state structures to dissent is generally stable, op- portunities vary across issues over time in response to changes in public policy (Meyer 1993b).** When aggrieved groups or movement entrepre- neurs perceive that change is possible in a particular policy area, they are likely to try to mobilize activism. **When an issue is "closed" and there is little or no opportunity to effect change in current policies, move- ments and countermovements are unlikely to form.**

Policies on cigarette smoking in the United States provide an example of an issue area in which there is little likelihood that a strong smokers' rights countermovement could emerge to overturn antismoking mea- sures, despite the best efforts of threatened interests. Numerous restric- tions

on smoking now enjoy widespread support, even among smokers. 4 Although the tobacco industry has tried to stir up smokers' rights sentiments, opposition has largely been confined to the efforts of the industry itself, and citizens' groups, whether industry affiliated or not, have generally remained small and ineffectual. In this case, changes in attitudes and laws regarding smoking are so extensive that few believe a reversal in policy is possible.

Reformism is good and solves

Richard **Delgado, 2009**, Richard Delgado is a self-appointed Minority scholar, Chair of Law at the University of Alabama Law School, J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, his books have won eight national book prizes, including six Gustavus Myers awards for outstanding book on human rights in North America, the American Library Association's Outstanding Academic Book, and a Pulitzer Prize nomination. Professor Delgado's teaching and writing focus on race, the legal profession, and social change, "Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want, Arguing about Law," p. 588-590

2. The CLS critique of piecemeal reform Critical scholars reject the idea of piecemeal reform. Incremental change, they argue, merely postpones the wholesale reformation that must occur to create a decent society. Even worse, an unfair social system survives by using piecemeal reform to disguise and legitimize oppression. Those who control the system weaken resistance by pointing to the occasional concession to, or periodic court victory of, a black plaintiff or worker as evidence that the system is fair and just. In fact, Critics believe that teaching the common law or using the case method in law school is a disguised means of preaching incrementalism and thereby maintaining the current power structure. "To avoid this, CLS scholars urge law professors to abandon the case method, give up the effort to find rationality and order in the case law, and teach in an unabashedly political fashion. The CLS critique of piecemeal reform is familiar, imperialistic and wrong. Minorities know from bitter experience that occasional court victories do not mean the Promised Land is at hand. The critique is imperialistic in that it tells minorities and other oppressed peoples how they should interpret events affecting them. A court order directing a housing authority to disburse funds for heating in subsidized housing may postpone the revolution, or it may not. In the meantime, the order keeps a number of poor families warm. This may mean more to them than it does to a comfortable academic working in a warm office. It smacks of paternalism to assert that the possibility of revolution later outweighs the certainty of heat now, unless there is evidence for that possibility. The Critics do not offer such evidence. Indeed, some incremental changes may bring revolutionary changes closer, not push them further away. Not all small reforms induce complacency; some may whet the appetite for further combat. The welfare family may hold a tenants' union meeting in their heated living room. CLS scholars' critique of piecemeal reform often misses these possibilities, and neglects the question of whether total change, when it comes, will be what we want.

Giving up on the transformative potential of institutional legal reform creates a higher level of cooptation and complacency – the alt fails

Lobel 7 (Orly Lobel, Assistant Professor of Law, University of San Diego, THE PARADOX OF EXTRALEGAL ACTIVISM: CRITICAL LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSFORMATIVE POLITICS, Harvard Law Review, 2007, Vol. 120)

Both the practical failures and the fallacy of rigid boundaries generated by **extralegal activism** rhetoric permit us to broaden our inquiry to the underlying assumptions of current proposals regarding transformative politics — that is, attempts to produce meaningful changes in the political and socioeconomic landscapes. The suggested alternatives produce a new image of social and political action. This vision **rejects a shared theory of social reform, rejects formal programmatic agendas**, and embraces a multiplicity of forms and practices. Thus, it is described in such terms as a plan of no plan,²¹¹ “a project of pro- jects,”²¹² “anti-theory theory,”²¹³ politics rather than goals,²¹⁴ presence rather than power,²¹⁵ “practice over theory,”²¹⁶ and chaos and openness over order and formality. As a result, the contemporary message rarely includes a comprehensive vision of common social claims, but rather engages in the description of fragmented efforts. As Professor Joel Handler argues, the commonality of struggle and social vision that existed during the civil rights movement has disappeared.²¹⁷ There is no unifying discourse or set of values, but rather an aversion to any metanarrative and a resignation from theory. Professor Handler warns that **this move away from grand narratives is self-defeating** precisely because only certain parts of the political spectrum have accepted this new stance: “[T]he opposition is not playing that game [E]veryone else is operating as if there were Grand Narratives”²¹⁸ Intertwined with the resignation from law and policy, the new bromide of “neither left nor right” has become axiomatic only for some.²¹⁹ The contemporary critical legal consciousness informs the scholarship of those who are interested in progressive social activism, but less so that of those who are interested, for example, in a more competitive securities market. Indeed, an interesting recent development has been the rise of “conservative public interest lawyer[ing].”²²⁰ Although “public interest law” was originally associated exclusively with liberal projects, in the past three decades conservative advocacy groups have rapidly grown both in number and in their vigorous use of traditional legal strategies to promote their causes.²²¹ This growth in conservative advocacy is particularly salient in juxtaposition to the decline of traditional progressive advocacy. Most recently, some thinkers have even suggested that there may be “something inherent in the left’s conception of social change — focused as it is on participation and empowerment — that produces a unique distrust of legal expertise.”²²² Once again, this conclusion reveals flaws parallel to the original disenchantment with legal reform. **Although the new extralegal frames present themselves as apt alternatives to legal reform models and as capable of producing significant changes to the social map, in practice they generate very limited improvement in existing social arrangements.** Most strikingly, the cooptation effect here can be explained in terms of the most profound risk of the typology — that of legitimization. The common pattern of extralegal scholarship is to describe an inherent instability in dominant structures by pointing, for example, to grassroots strategies,²²³ and then to assume that specific instances of counterhegemonic activities translate into a more complete transformation. This **celebration of multiple micro-resistances seems to rely on an aggregate approach — an idea that the multiplication of practices will evolve into something substantial.** In fact, **the myth of engagement obscures the actual lack of change being produced, while the broader pattern of equating extralegal activism with social reform produces a false belief in the potential of change.** There are few instances of meaningful reordering of social and economic arrangements and macro-redistribution. Scholars write about decoding what is really happening, as though the scholarly narrative has the power to unpack more than the actual conventional experience will admit.²²⁴ Unrelated efforts become related and part of a whole through mere reframing. At the same time, the elephant in the room — the rising level of economic inequality — is left unaddressed and comes to be understood as natural and inevitable.²²⁵ This is precisely the problematic process that critical theorists decry as losers’ self-mystification, through which marginalized groups come to see systemic losses as the product of their own actions and thereby begin to focus on minor achievements as representing the boundaries of their willed reality. The explorations of micro-instances of activism are often fundamentally performative, obscuring the distance between the descriptive and the prescriptive. **The manifestations of extralegal activism — the law and organizing model; the proliferation of informal, soft norms and norm-generating actors; and the celebrated, separate nongovernmental sphere of action — all produce a fantasy that change can be brought about through small-scale, decentralized transformation.** The emphasis is local, but the locality is described as a microcosm of the whole and the audience is national and global. In the context of the humanities, Professor Carol Greenhouse

poses a comparable challenge to ethnographic studies from the 1990s, which utilized the genres of narrative and community studies, the latter including works on American cities and neighborhoods in trouble.²²⁶ The aspiration of these genres was that each individual story could translate into a “time of the nation” body of knowledge and motivation.²²⁷ In contemporary legal thought, a corresponding gap opens between the local scale and the larger, translocal one. In reality, although there has been a recent proliferation of associations and grassroots groups, few new local-statenational federations have emerged in the United States since the 1960s and 1970s, and many of the existing voluntary federations that flourished in the mid-twentieth century are in decline.²²⁸ There is, therefore, an absence of links between the local and the national, an absent intermediate public sphere, which has been termed “the missing middle” by Professor Theda Skocpol.²²⁹ **New social movements have for the most part failed in sustaining coalitions or producing significant institutional change** through grassroots activism.

Extralegal activist criticism fails – can’t produce substantive change and risks cooption

Lobel 7 (Orly Lobel, Assistant Professor of Law, University of San Diego, THE PARADOX OF EXTRALEGAL ACTIVISM: CRITICAL LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSFORMATIVE POLITICS, Harvard Law Review, 2007, Vol. 120)

Professor Handler concludes that this failure is due in part to the ideas of contingency, pluralism, and localism that are so embedded in current activism.²³⁰ Is the focus on small-scale dynamics simply an evasion of the need to engage in broader substantive debate? It is important for next-generation progressive legal scholars, while maintaining a critical legal consciousness, to recognize that not all extralegal associational life is transformative. We must differentiate, for example, between inward-looking groups, which tend to be self-regarding and depoliticized, and social movements that participate in political activities, engage the public debate, and aim to challenge and reform existing realities.²³¹ We must differentiate between professional associations and more inclusive forms of institutions that act as trustees for larger segments of the community.²³² As described above, **extralegal activism tends to operate on a more divided and hence a smaller scale** than earlier social movements, which had national reform agendas. Consequently, **within critical discourse there is a need to recognize the limited capacity of small-scale action. We should question the narrative that imagines consciousness-raising as directly translating into action and action as directly translating into change.** Certainly not every cultural description is political. Indeed, it is questionable whether forms of activism that are opposed to programmatic reconstruction of a social agenda should even be understood as social movements. In fact, when **groups are situated in opposition** to any form of institutionalized power, they **may be simply mirroring what they are fighting against and merely producing moot activism** that settles for what seems possible within the narrow space that is left in a rising convergence of ideologies. **The original vision is consequently coopted**, and contemporary discontent is legitimated through a process of self-mystification.

Extralegal reform fails – too limited and reinforces the structures they oppose and gets absorbed by conservatives

Orly Lobel 2007, University of San Diego Assistant Professor of Law, "The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics," 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, <http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/lobel.pdf>

Most importantly, the emergence of a sphereoriented discourse abandons a critical perspective that distinguishes between valuing traditional gender-based characteristics and celebrating feminine difference in a universalist and essentialist manner.¹⁷⁴ Not surprisingly then, some feminist writers have responded to civil society revivalism with great skepticism, arguing that efforts to align feminine values and agendas with classic republican theory of civil society activism should be understood, at least in part, as a way of legitimizing historical social structures that subordinated women.¹⁷⁵ The feminist lesson on the law/exit pendulum reveals a broader pattern. In a classic example of cooptation, **activists should be concerned about the infusion (or indeed confusion) of nonlegal strategies with conservative privatization agendas.** Indeed, **in significant social policy contexts, legal scholarship oriented toward the exploration of extralegal paths reinforces the exact narrative that it originally resisted — that the state cannot and should not be accountable for sustaining and improving the lifeworld of individuals in the twenty-first-century economy and that we must seek alternative ways to bring about social reform.** Whether using the terminology of a path-dependent process, an inevitable downward spiral, a transnational prisoner's dilemma, or a global race to the bottom, current analyses often suggest a lack of control over the forces of new economic realities. Rather than countering the story of lack of control, pointing to the ongoing role of government and showing the contradictions between that which is being kept regulated and that which is privatized, alternative extralegal scholarship accepts these developments as natural and inevitable. Similar to the arguments developed in relation to the labor movement — in which focusing on a limited right to collective bargaining demobilized workers and stripped them of their voice, participation, and decisionmaking power — **contemporary extralegal agendas are limited to very narrow and patterned sets of reforms.**

Madland, 2009 [David Madland, senior fellow, "Unions Are Good for the American Economy", Center for American Progress, <https://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/economy/news/2009/02/18/5597/unions-are-good-for-the-american-economy-2/>] //AKC

Unions paved the way to the middle class for millions of American workers and pioneered benefits such as paid health care and pensions along the way. Even today, **union workers earn significantly more on average than their non-union counterparts, and union employers are more likely to provide benefits.** And non-union workers—particularly in highly unionized industries—receive financial benefits from employers who increase wages to match what unions would win in order to avoid unionization.

Walters, 2003 [Matthew Walters, writer, "How unions help all workers", Economic Policy Institute, http://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_bp143/] //AKC

Some of the conclusions are: **Unions raise wages of unionized workers by roughly 20% and raise compensation, including both wages and benefits, by about 28%. Unions reduce wage inequality because they raise wages more for low- and middle- wage**

workers than for higher-wage workers, more for blue-collar than for white-collar workers, and more for workers who do not have a college degree. Strong unions set a pay standard that nonunion employers follow. For example, a high school graduate whose workplace is not unionized but whose industry is 25% unionized is paid 5% more than similar workers in less unionized industries. The impact of unions on total nonunion wages is almost as large as the impact on total union wages. The most sweeping advantage for unionized workers is in fringe benefits. Unionized workers are more likely than their nonunionized counterparts to receive paid leave, are approximately 18% to 28% more likely to have employer-provided health insurance, and are 23% to 54% more likely to be in employer-provided pension plans. Unionized workers receive more generous health benefits than nonunionized workers. They also pay 18% lower health care deductibles and a smaller share of the costs for family coverage. In retirement, unionized workers are 24% more likely to be covered by health insurance paid for by their employer. Unionized workers receive better pension plans. Not only are they more likely to have a guaranteed benefit in retirement, their employers contribute 28% more toward pensions. Unionized workers receive 26% more vacation time and 14% more total paid leave (vacations and holidays).

Impact turn: Federalism leads to ineffective responses to disease outbreaks, terrorist attacks, and natural disaster.

Griffin, 07 (Stephen M., Professor in Constitutional Law, Tulane School St. Johns Journal of Legal Commentary Spring-
"Symposium: Federalism Past, Federalism Future: A Constitutional Law Symposium: Stop Federalism Before It Kills Again: Reflections On Hurricane Katrina, 2007) //CJC

And so it is still the case that when natural disasters strike, the divided power of the federal structure presents a coordination problem. The kind of coordination that had to occur to avoid the Katrina disaster requires long-term planning before the event. The American constitutional system makes taking intergovernmental action difficult and complex. The process of coordinating governments can take years. In many ways, the government was just at the beginning of that process at the time of Katrina, ⁿ⁴⁸ although we are now four years distant from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 that set the latest round of disaster coordination in motion. Suppose, however, that we don't have the luxury of taking the time to satisfy every official with a veto. This is the key point of tension between what contemporary governance demands and what the Constitution permits. The kind of limited change that occurred in 1927 can take us only so far. What Hurricane Katrina showed was that even after decades of experience with natural disasters, the federal and state governments were still uncoordinated and unprepared. The reasons they were unprepared go to the heart of the constitutional order. Unless we learn some lessons, Katrina will happen again. It may be a massive earthquake, an influenza pandemic, a terrorist attack, or even another hurricane, but the same ill-coordinated response will indeed happen again unless some attention is paid to the constitutional and institutional lessons of Katrina. We need to "stop federalism" before it kills again. That is, we need to stop our customary thinking about what federalism requires in order to prevent another horrific loss of life and property.

Pandemic→ Extinction

Yu 9 Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Science (Victoria, Human Extinction: The Uncertainty of Our Fate, 22 May 2009, <http://dujs.dartmouth.edu/spring-2009/human-extinction-the-uncertainty-of-our-fate>) //CJC

A **pandemic will kill off all humans**. In the past, humans have indeed fallen victim to viruses. Perhaps the best-known case was the bubonic plague that killed up to one third of the European population in the mid-14th century (7). While vaccines have been developed for the plague and some other infectious diseases, **new viral strains are constantly emerging – a process that maintains the possibility of a pandemic-facilitated human extinction**. Some surveyed students mentioned AIDS as a potential pandemic-causing virus. It is true that scientists have been unable thus far to find a sustainable cure for AIDS, mainly due to HIV's rapid and constant evolution. Specifically, two factors account for the virus's abnormally high mutation rate: 1. HIV's use of reverse transcriptase, which does not have a proof-reading mechanism, and 2. the lack of an error-correction mechanism in HIV DNA polymerase (8). Luckily, though, there are certain characteristics of HIV that make it a poor candidate for a large-scale global infection: HIV can lie dormant in the human body for years without manifesting itself, and AIDS itself does not kill directly, but rather through the weakening of the immune system. However, for more easily transmitted viruses such as influenza, the evolution of **new strains could prove far more consequential**. The **simultaneous occurrence of antigenic drift and antigenic shift** (the inter-species transfer of disease) in the influenza virus **could produce a new version of influenza for which scientists may not immediately find a cure**. Since influenza can spread quickly, this lag time could potentially lead to a "global influenza pandemic," according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (9). The most recent scare of this variety came in 1918 when bird flu managed to kill over 50 million people around the world in what is sometimes referred to as the Spanish flu pandemic. Perhaps even more frightening is the fact that only 25 mutations were required to convert the original viral strain — which could only infect birds — into a human-viable strain (10).

Natural disasters greatly increase the probability of a disease outbreak — and independently kill millions

WHO 2006, World Health Organization 2006

(Communicable diseases following natural disasters -- Risk assessment and priority interventions, WHO/CDS/NTD/DCE/2006.4, Retrieved 9-11-2006 from http://www.who.int/diseasecontrol_emergencies/en/) //CJC

Natural disasters are catastrophic events with atmospheric, geologic and hydrologic origins. They include earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, landslides, tsunamis, floods and drought. Natural disasters can have rapid or slow onset, and serious health, social and economic consequences. During the past two decades, natural disasters have killed millions of people, adversely affecting the lives of at least one billion more people and resulting in substantial economic damage (1). Developing countries are disproportionately affected because of their lack of resources, infrastructure and disaster preparedness systems.

The potential impact of communicable diseases is often presumed to be very high in the chaos that follows natural disasters. Increases in endemic diseases and the risk of outbreaks, however, are dependent upon many factors that must be systematically evaluated with a comprehensive risk assessment. This allows the prioritization of interventions to reduce the impact of communicable diseases post-disaster.

U.S. federalism won't be modeled – too many factors in the development of democracy

Stepan 99 [Alfred Stepan, Wallace Sayre Professor of Government at Columbia University, 1999, Journal of Democracy Volume 10, "Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model," http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v010/10.4stepan.html] //CJC

The U.S. model of federalism, in terms of the analytical categories developed in this article, is "comingtogether" in its origin, "constitutionally symmetrical" in its structure, and "demos-constraining" in its political consequences. Despite the prestige of this U.S. model of federalism, it would seem to hold greater historical interest than contemporary attraction for other democracies.

Since the emergence of nation-states on the world stage in the after-math of the French

Revolution, no sovereign democratic nation-states have ever "come together" in an enduring federation. Three largely unitary states, however (Belgium, Spain, and India) have constructed "holding-together" federations. In contrast to the United States, these federations are constitutionally asymmetrical and more "demos-enabling" than [End Page 32] "demos-constraining." Should the United Kingdom ever become a federation, it would also be "holding-together" in origin. Since it is extremely unlikely that Wales, Scotland, or Northern Ireland would have the same number of seats as England in the upper chamber of the new federation, or that the new upper chamber of the federation would be nearly equal in power to the lower chamber, the new federation would not be "demos-constraining" as I have defined that term. Finally, it would obviously defeat the purpose of such a new federation if it were constitutionally symmetrical. A U.K. federation, then, would not follow the U.S. model. The fact that since the French Revolution no fully independent nation-states have come together to pool their sovereignty in a new and more powerful polity constructed in the form of a federation would seem to have implications for the future evolution of the European Union. The European Union is composed of independent states, most of which are nation-states. These states are indeed increasingly becoming "functionally federal." Were there to be a prolonged recession (or a depression), however, and were some EU member states to experience very high unemployment rates in comparison to others, member states could vote to dismantle some of the economic federal structures of the federation that were perceived as being "politically dysfunctional." Unlike most classic federations, such as the United States, the European Union will most likely continue to be marked by the presumption of freedom of exit. Finally, many of the new federations that could emerge from the currently nondemocratic parts of the world would probably be territorially based, multilingual, and multinational. For the reasons spelled out in this article, very few, if any, such polities would attempt to consolidate democracy using the U.S. model of "coming-together," "demos-constraining," symmetrical federalism.

Federalism sparks ethnic conflict

Willy Mutunga, Executive Director of the Kenya Human Rights Commission, The Nation, May 20, 2001. //CJC

Federalism promotes localism, ethnic and racial xenophobia and undermines the sense of nationhood. Unsurprising the United States and Nigeria are living survivors of debilitating separatist wars between their regions; India, despite its federal miracle still bleeds from secessionist movements. The introduction of ethnic-based 'quasi-regionalism' in post-Mengistu Ethiopia has fuelled the conflict over the proposed Oromia state by members of the Oromo ethnic population. Majimboism in the early 1960s had let off the lid of secessionist movements, particularly by Kenyan Somalis in North Eastern Province and the clamour for an autonomous "Mwambao" on the Coast. There is no guarantee that this time around, majimboism will not trigger ethnic recidivism and separatist movements, especially in North Eastern, Coast and Eastern province where the Oromo population may lean towards the movement for an Oromia state. **Federalism's** main weakness is that it is a very expensive system that duplicates services and office holders at the regional and federal levels. It lacks uniform policies on such issues of national concern as laws regulating marriages, divorce, abortions, liquor, voting rights and public education. Rather than ensuring economic equity, as many proponents of majimboism assume, it sets those regions, states or cantons with a weak market-base, capital, and resources down the spiral of economic decline. It subjects local governments to double subordination-by the central and regional governments-and the citizens to triple taxation. At a time when the country's economy is on its knees, the feasibility of a well-financed transition is highly doubtful.

Impact d: Federalism does not work to solve conflicts

John Warren **McGarry and Brendan O'Leary.** "The political regulation of national and ethnic conflict." Parliamentary Affairs v47.n1 (Jan 1994): pp94(22). //CJC

Unfortunately, **federalism has a poor track record as a conflict-regulating device** in multi-national and polyethnic states, even where it allows a degree of minority self-government. **Democratic federations have broken...Federal failures have occurred because minorities**

continue to be outnumbered at the federal level of government. The resulting frustrations, combined with an already defined boundary and the significant institutional resources flowing from control of their own province or state, provide considerable incentives to attempt secession, which in turn can invite harsh responses from the rest of the federation...

genuine democratic federalism is clearly an attractive way to regulate national conflict, with obvious moral advantages over pure control. The argument that it should be condemned because it leads to secession and civil war can be sustained only in three circumstances: first, if without federalism there would be no secessionist bid and, second, if it can be shown that national or ethnic conflict can be justly and consensually managed by alternative democratic means; and third, if the secessionist unit is likely to exercise hegemonic control (or worse) of its indigenous minorities.

No internal link – federalism refers to a concept, not a particular distribution of power

Bobertz 2003 (Bradley Bobertz, Environmental Law Professor, PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW, 2003, pp. 88-9) //CJC

Let us begin by demystifying the word "federalism." Federalism, itself, simply refers to any system of power-sharing in which authority is distributed between what is typically a larger political unit, such as the United States, and what are typically smaller political subdivisions, such as the states, which are a part of, but at least partially independent from, the larger body. The European Union and its constituent nations are an example of federalism, as were the Articles of Confederation that the Constitution supplanted. Federalism, in other words, is a structural notion that has no meaning independent of its particularizing details. Under any given system of federalism, the larger political body can have a great deal more power than its political subunits, as is the case in some European nations, or the subunits can wield comparatively more power than the larger political unit, as was the case under the Confederate Constitution during the American Civil War. In normal usage, then, the term "federalism" is agnostic as to how power is distributed. "Federalists" of the founding generation favored a strong national government in relation to the states, while the modern Federalist Society appears to favor the diminishment of national power vis-a-vis the states

Non-U: The economic recession killed federalism

John Dinan and Shama Gamkhar May 14th, 2009 (Dinan is a professor of political science at Wake Forest, Gamkhar is a professor of public affairs at the University of Texas at Austin) "The State of American Federalism 2008–2009: The Presidential Election, the Economic Downturn, and the Consequences for Federalism" Published in Publius: The Journal of Federalism" page online: <http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/pjp012>.] //CJC

The most consequential developments for American federalism in 2008–2009 were the presidential election and economic recession. After several years when states were the primary innovators on many issues that topped the policy agenda, the economic downturn drew renewed attention to federal policy-making, given the greater resources and capacities of the federal government. Although federalism was not a dominant issue in the presidential campaign, Barack Obama's election and sizable Democratic congressional gains had important implications for federal-state relations by putting federal power in the service of a different set of policy goals, encouraging state experimentation on a different set of policy issues, and producing a greater willingness to respond to state pleas for financial assistance. The two most consequential developments for American federalism in 2008–2009 were the presidential election and a severe economic recession that began in late 2007 and is expected to last well into 2009. The recession had a clear and predictable centralizing effect. As is generally the case during wars and economic downturns, the

public looked primarily to the federal government, with its greater resources and capacities, to ameliorate the economic hardships and prevent the situation from worsening. Federal officials from both parties responded, albeit with varying degrees of enthusiasm, by issuing tax rebates, rescuing banks, mortgage lenders, and auto-makers, and proposing increased federal regulation of various financial institutions. Whereas in the last several years states were the primary innovators on many policy issues that topped the political agenda, the economic downturn and prominence of economic issues in the presidential election drew renewed attention to federal policy-making.

US leadership is preserved by the balance of federalism.

Rivlin 92

Alice Rivlin, *Brookings Institution*, "Reviving the American Dream: The Economy, The States, and the Federal Government," 1992. //CJC

The inexorably rising frequency and complexity of U.S. interaction with the rest of the world add to the stress on federal decisionmaking processes and underline the need for making those processes simpler and more effective. **If the United States is to be an effective world leader, it cannot afford a cumbersome national government** overlapping responsibilities between the federal government and the states, and confusion over which level is in charge of specific domestic government functions. As the world shrinks, international concerns will continue threatening to crowd out domestic policy on the federal agenda. Paradoxically, however, **effective domestic policy is now more crucial** than ever precisely **because it is essential to U.S. leadership in world affairs. Unless we have a strong productive economy, a healthy, well-educated population, and a responsive democratic government, we will not be among the major shapers of the future of this interdependent world.** If the American standard of living is falling behind that of other countries and its government structure is paralyzed, the United States will find its credibility in world councils eroding. International considerations provide additional rationale, if more were needed, for the United States to have a strong effective domestic policy. **One answer to this paradox is to rediscover the strengths of our federal system,** the division of labor between the states and the national government. **Washington not only has too much to do, it has taken on domestic responsibilities that would be handled better by the states.** Revitalizing the economy may depend on restoring a cleaner division of responsibility between the states and the national government.

Closing military gap causes arms race, miscalc, and no US response to conflict because higher risks — empirically US leadership is best for peace

Khalilzad, 2011 – former director of planning at the Defense Department [Zalmay February 8, 2011

The Economy and National Security Accessed July 29 <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad?page=1> The National Review Online]

If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. **The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers,** increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, **and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation.** The stakes are high. **In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership.** By contrast, **multi-polar systems have been unstable,** with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. **Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars.** American

retrenchment could have devastating consequences. **Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats.** Under this scenario, there would be a **heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict.** Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, **hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions.** As rival powers rise, **Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition.** Beijing's economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China's strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. **Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China's expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations** with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, **the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression.**

US federalism is essential to democracy worldwide

David Broder, *Washington Post*, June 24, 2001, "Lessons On Freedom." //CJC

Even more persistent were the questions about the role the United States would play, under this new administration, in supporting democratic movements around the world.

It is sobering to be reminded how often, during the long decades of the Cold War, this country backed (and in some cases, created) undemocratic regimes, simply because we thought military rulers and other autocrats were more reliable allies against communism. The week of the Salzburg Seminar coincided with President Bush's first tour of Europe. He was a target of jokes and ridicule for many of the fellows as the week began. But the coverage of his meetings and, especially, his major address in Poland on his vision of Europe's future and America's role in it, earned him grudging respect, even though it remains uncertain how high a priority human rights and promotion of democracy will have in the Bush foreign policy.

Another great lesson for an American reporter is that **the struggle to maintain the legitimacy of representative government in the eyes of the public is a worldwide battle.** Election turnouts are dropping in almost all the established democracies, so much so that seminar participants seriously discussed the advisability of compulsory voting, before most of them rejected it as smacking too much of authoritarian regimes. Political parties -- which most of us have regarded as essential agents of democracy -- are in decline everywhere. They are viewed by more and more of the national publics as being tied to special interests or locked in increasingly irrelevant or petty rivalries -- anything but effective instruments for tackling current challenges. One large but unresolved question throughout the week: Can you organize and sustain representative government without strong parties? The single most impressive visitor to the seminar was Vaira Vike-Freiberga, the president of Latvia, a woman of Thatcherite determination when it comes to pressing for her country's admission to NATO, but a democrat who has gone through exile four times in her quest for freedom. She is a member of no party, chosen unanimously by a parliament of eight parties, and bolstered by her popular support. But how many such leaders are there? Meantime, even as democracy is tested everywhere from Venezuela to Romania to the Philippines, a new and perhaps tougher accountability examination awaits in the supranational organizations. The European Union has operated so far with a strong council, where each nation has a veto, and a weak parliament, with majority rule. But with its membership seemingly certain to expand, **the age-old dilemma of democracy -- majority rule vs. minority and individual rights -- is bound to come to the fore.** **The principle of federalism will be vital to its success.** And, once again, **the United States has important lessons to teach. But only if we can keep democracy strong and vital in our own country.**

Democracy solves nuke prolif, war, and risk of extinction

Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution senior fellow, co-editor of the *Journal of Democracy*, December 1995, A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, "Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives,"

<http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm> MJS

OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. **Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly**

endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality,

accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. **Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to**

war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically “cleanse” their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships.

In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. **They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments.** They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

Laundry list: Federalism is modeled globally and is key to peace, econ, human rights

Calabresi 95 (Steven G. Calabresi, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers,” Michigan Law Review December, 1995) //CJC

First, **the rules of constitutional federalism should be enforced because federalism is a good thing,** and it is the best and most important structural feature of the U.S. Constitution. Second, the political branches cannot be relied upon to enforce constitutional federalism, notwithstanding the contrary writings of Professor Jesse Choper. Third, the Supreme Court is institutionally competent to enforce constitutional federalism. Fourth, the Court is at least as qualified to act in this area as it is in the Fourteenth Amendment area. And, fifth, the doctrine of stare [*831] decisis does not pose a barrier to the creation of any new, prospectively applicable Commerce Clause case law. The conventional wisdom is that Lopez is nothing more than a flash in the pan. 232 Elite opinion holds that the future of American constitutional law will involve the continuing elaboration of the Court's national codes on matters like abortion regulation, pornography, rules on holiday displays, and rules on how the states should conduct their own criminal investigations and trials. Public choice theory suggests many reasons why it is likely that the Court will continue to pick on the states and give Congress a free ride. But, it would be a very good thing for this country if the Court decided to surprise us and continued on its way down the Lopez path. Those of us who comment on the Court's work, whether in the law reviews or in the newspapers, should encourage the Court to follow the path on which it has now embarked. The country and the world would be a better place if it did. We have seen that a desire for both international **federalism has swept across the world in recent years.** To a significant extent, **this is due to global fascination with and emulation of our own American federalism success story.** The global trend toward federalism is an enormously positive development **that greatly increases the likelihood of future peace, free trade, economic growth,** respect for social and cultural diversity, and **protection of individual human rights.** It depends for its success on the willingness of sovereign nations to **strike federalism deals in the belief that those deals will be kept.** 233 The U.S. Supreme Court can do its part to encourage the future striking of such deals by enforcing vigorously our own American federalism deal. Lopez could be a first step in that process, if only the Justices and the legal academy would wake up to the importance of what is at stake.

Extinction – climate change, global wars, and turns case

Nisbet 16 (Matthew, Associate Professor of Communication Studies and Affiliate Associate Professor of Public Policy and Urban Affairs at Northeastern University who studies the role of communication, media, and public opinion in debates over science, technology, and the environment, New Scientist, 5/27, "Trump would deliver fatal blow to fight against climate change," <http://www.northeastern.edu/camd/commstudies/people/matthew-nisbet/#sthash.Zoq2zrjr.dpuf>)

Trump would deliver fatal blow to fight against climate change A Donald Trump presidency would disrupt the fight against climate change in a way that threatens to snuff out all hope, warns Matthew Nisbet Trump on a podium, with his hilarious hair Bad for the environment Robyn Beck/AFP/Getty Images By Matthew Nisbet Donald Trump has just **promised to "cancel the Paris climate agreement", end US funding for United Nations climate change programmes, and roll back** the "stupid" Obama administration **regulations to cut power plant emissions**. The Republican presidential candidate has often defied party orthodoxy on major issues, shocking conservatives with his off-the-cuff remarks. But his scripted speech yesterday to an oil industry meeting directly echoed the party's line on climate change and energy. Trump trails Hillary Clinton, the likely Democratic rival for the White House, in fundraising, and his speech was a clear sign that he seeks to capitalise on financial support from the powerful fossil fuel industry. His call to roll back industry regulations also deepens his appeal to voters in oil, gas and coal-producing states. "Obama has done everything he can to get in the way of American energy, for whatever reason," Trump said, in an attack sure to be a centrepiece of his campaign. "If 'crooked' Hillary Clinton is in charge, things will get much worse, believe me." Climate incoherence Yet *a Trump presidency poses an existential threat qualitatively different from past Republican candidates* who have doubted climate change. *It could set in motion a wave of political and economic crises, creating global turmoil that would fatally disrupt efforts to tackle this issue* in the US and abroad. Alarmed by the possibility of a Trump victory in November, international negotiators are urgently working to finalise the UN Paris agreement, in the hope that it can become legally binding before President Obama leaves office. Yet even if the gambit is successful, a Trump victory could cripple international progress in other ways. To meet the aggressive targets set at Paris, **countries will have to substantially ratchet up efforts to end reliance on fossil fuels** over the next few years. At the very moment when the world needs American leadership on this, **Trump's incoherence on climate and energy policy and his outright disgust for global collaboration would have a severe chilling effect on progress**. In past comments, he has said he is "not a believer in man-made global warming", declaring that climate change is a "total hoax" and "bullshit", "created by and for the Chinese" to hurt US manufacturing. On energy policy, he has appeared befuddled when asked about specifics, even fumbling the name of the Environmental Protection Agency, which he has promised to abolish. Civil unrest The broader disruption of a Trump presidency would do even greater damage, weakening efforts to create a sense of urgency over climate change. Trump's candidacy has brought public discourse in the US to its ugliest level, as he trades in trash talk and outrageous insults, spreading falsehood and innuendo, fomenting bigotry and prejudice. He has threatened the censure of critics in the media, even condoning violence against protesters, calling them "thugs" and "criminals". His success emboldens far right and ultra-nationalist movements in the US and across Europe, risking further destabilisation. At home, Trump's promise to ban Muslims from entering the US, to erect a wall at the Mexican border, and to deport millions of immigrants will provoke widespread protest and civil unrest. Abroad, **Trump's bravado and reckless unpredictability**, his vow to renegotiate trade deals and to walk away from security alliances **will generate deep tensions with China, Russia and Europe, risking financial collapse and military conflict**. In the midst of such dysfunction and upheaval, the glimmer of hope offered by the historic climate change pact agreed to in Paris last year may forever fade. The **stakes riding on a US presidential election have never been higher**.

Warming causes extinction and turns every impact

Sharp and Kennedy 14 (Robert and Edward, an associate professor on the faculty of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA) AND renewable energy and climate change specialist who has worked for the World Bank and the Spanish Electric Utility ENDESA

on carbon policy and markets, 8-22, "Climate Change and Implications for National Security"
<http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2014/08/22/climate-change-implications-national-security/> //CJC

Our planet is 4.5 billion years old. If that whole time was to be reflected on a single one-year calendar then the dinosaurs died off sometime late in the afternoon of December 27th and modern humans emerged 200,000 years ago, or at around lunchtime on December 28th. Therefore, human life on earth is very recent. Sometime on December 28th humans made the first fires – wood fires – neutral in the carbon balance. Now reflect on those most recent 200,000 years again on a single one-year calendar and you might be surprised to learn that the industrial revolution began only a few hours ago during the middle of the afternoon on December 31st, 250 years ago, coinciding with the discovery of underground carbon fuels. Over the 250 years carbon fuels have enabled tremendous technological advances including a population growth from about 800 million then to 7.5 billion today and the consequent demand to extract even more carbon. This has occurred during a handful of generations, which is hardly noticeable on our imaginary one-year calendar. The release of this **carbon** – however – **is changing our climate at such a rapid rate that it threatens our survival and presence on earth**. It defies imagination that so much damage

has been done in such a relatively short time. The implications of **climate change are the single most significant threat to life on earth** and, put simply, we are not doing enough to rectify the damage.

This relatively very recent ability to change our climate is an inconvenient truth; the science is sound. We know of the complex set of interrelated **national and global security risks that are a result of global warming** and the velocity at which climate change is occurring. We worry it may already be too late. Climate change writ large has informed few, interested some, confused many, and polarized politics. It has already **led to an increase in natural disasters** including but not limited to droughts, storms, floods, fires etc. The year 2012 was among the 10 warmest years on record according to an American Meteorological Society (AMS) report. Research suggests that climate change is already affecting human displacement; reportedly 36 million people were displaced in 2008 alone because of sudden natural disasters.

Figures for 2010 and 2011 paint a grimmer picture of people displaced because of rising sea levels, heat and storms. Climate change affects all natural systems. It impacts temperature and consequently it affects water and weather patterns. It contributes to desertification, deforestation and acidification of the oceans. Changes in weather patterns may mean droughts in one area and floods in another. Counter-intuitively, perhaps, sea levels rise but perennial river water supplies are reduced because glaciers are retreating. **As glaciers and polar ice caps melt, there is an albedo effect, which is a double whammy of less temperature** regulation because of less surface area of ice present. This means that less absorption occurs and also there is less reflection of the sun's light. A potentially critical wild card could be runaway climate change due to the release of methane from melting tundra. Worldwide permafrost soils contain about 1,700 Giga Tons of carbon, which is about four times more than all the carbon released through human activity thus far. The planet has already adapted itself to dramatic climate change including a wide range of distinct geologic periods and multiple extinctions, and at a pace that it can be managed. It is **human intervention that has accelerated the pace dramatically**. An increased surface temperature, coupled with more severe weather and changes in water distribution will create uneven **threats to our agricultural systems** and will foster and support the spread of insect borne diseases like Malaria, Dengue and the West Nile virus. **Rising sea levels will increasingly threaten** our coastal population and infrastructure centers and with **more than 3.5 billion people – half the planet** – depending on the ocean for their primary source of food, ocean acidification may dangerously undercut critical natural food systems which would result in reduced rations. Climate change also carries significant inertia. Even if emissions were completely halted today, temperature increases would continue for some time. Thus **the impact is not only to the environment, water, coastal homes, agriculture and fisheries as mentioned, but also would lead to conflict and thus impact national security**. **Resource wars are inevitable as countries respond, adapt and compete for the shrinking set of those available resources**. These wars have arguably already started and will continue in the future because climate change will force countries to act for national survival; the so-called Climate Wars. As early as 2003 Greenpeace alluded to a report which it claimed was commissioned by the Pentagon titled:

An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for U.S. National Security. It painted a picture of a world in turmoil because global warming had accelerated. The scenario outlined was both abrupt and alarming. The report offered recommendations but backed away from declaring climate change an immediate problem, concluding that it would actually be more incremental and measured; as such it would be an irritant, not a shock for national security systems. In 2006 the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) – Institute of Public Research – convened a board of 11 senior retired generals and admirals to assess National Security and the Threat to Climate Change. Their initial report was published in April 2007 and made no mention of the potential acceleration of climate change. The team found that climate change *was a serious threat to national security* and that it was: “most likely to happen in regions of the world that are already fertile ground for extremism.” The team made recommendations from their analysis of regional impacts which suggested the following. *Europe* would experience some fracturing because of border migration. *Africa* would need more stability and humanitarian operations provided by the United States. *The Middle East* would experience a “loss of food and water security (which) will increase pressure to emigrate across borders.” *Asia* would suffer from “threats to water and the spread of infectious disease.” In 2009 the CIA opened a Center on Climate Change and National Security to coordinate across the intelligence community and to focus policy. In May 2014, CNA again convened a Military Advisory Board but this time to assess National Security and the Accelerating Risk of Climate Change. The report *concludes* that climate change is no longer a future threat *but occurring right now* and the authors appeal to the security community, the entire government and the American people to not only build resilience against projected climate change impacts but to form agreements to stabilize climate change and also to *integrate climate change across all strategy and planning*. The calm of the 2007 report is replaced by a tone of anxiety concerning the future coupled with calls for public discourse and debate because “time and tide wait for no man.” The report notes a key distinction between resilience (mitigating the impact of climate change) and agreements (ways to stabilize climate change) and states that: Actions by the United States and the international community have been insufficient to adapt to the challenges associated with projected climate change. Strengthening resilience to climate impacts already locked into the system is critical, but this will reduce *long-term risk only* if improvements in resilience are accompanied by actionable agreements on ways to stabilize climate change. The 9/11 Report framed the terrorist attacks as less of a failure of intelligence than a failure of imagination. Greenpeace’s 2003 account of the **Pentagon’s** alleged **report describes a coming climate Armageddon** which to readers was unimaginable and hence the report was not really taken seriously. It described: **A world thrown into turmoil by drought, floods, typhoons. Whole countries rendered uninhabitable.** The capital of the Netherlands submerged. The borders of the U.S. and Australia patrolled by armies firing into waves of starving boat people desperate to find a new home. Fishing boats armed with cannon to drive off competitors. **Demands for access to water and farmland backed up with nuclear weapons.** The CNA and Greenpeace/Pentagon reports are both mirrored by similar analysis by the World Bank which highlighted not only the physical manifestations of climate change, but also the significant human **impacts that threaten to unravel decades of economic development, which will ultimately foster conflict.** Climate change is the quintessential “Tragedy of the Commons,” where the cumulative impact of many individual actions (carbon emission in this case) is not seen as linked to the marginal gains available to each individual action and not seen as cause and effect. It is simultaneously huge, yet amorphous and nearly invisible from day to day. It is occurring very fast in geologic time terms, but in human time it is (was) slow and incremental. Among environmental problems, it is uniquely global. With our planet and culture figuratively and literally honeycombed with a reliance on fossil fuels, we face systemic challenges in changing the reliance across multiple layers of consumption, investment patterns, and political decisions; it will be hard to fix!

Climate change causes racism, sexism, structural violence

Pellow 2012 [David Pellow is Professor of Environmental Studies, “Climate Disruption in the Global South and in African American Communities”, *Joint Center for Political Economic Studies*, <http://jointcenter.org/sites/default/files/White_Paper_Climate_Disruption_final.pdf>] //CJC

While contributing the least of anyone to the causes of **climate disruption, people of color, women, indigenous communities, and global South nations often bear the brunt of climate disruption** in terms of ecological, economic, and health burdens—thereby giving rise to the concept of climate injustice (Roberts and Parks 2007). **These communities are among the first to experience the effects of climate disruption, which can include “natural” disasters, rising levels of respiratory illness and infectious disease, heat-related morbidity and mortality, and large increases in energy costs.** They also bear the burdens created by ill-conceived policies confronting African American communities. The paper also explores alternative policy frameworks and community-based responses and visions for moving toward climate justice. The piece draws on numerous sources, including documents produced by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and scholars designed to prevent climate disruption. The effects of climate injustice have been evident for years. **Flooding from severe storms, rising sea levels and melting glaciers affect millions in Asia and Latin America, while sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing sustained droughts.** Consider that nearly 75 percent the world’s annual CO2 emissions come from the global North, where only 15 percent of the global population resides. If historic responsibility for climate change is taken into account, global North nations have consumed more than three times their share of the atmosphere (in terms of the amount of emissions that we can safely put into the atmosphere) while the poorest 10 percent of the world’s population has contributed less than 1 percent of carbon emissions. Thus **the struggle for racial, gender, and economic justice is inseparable from any effort to combat climate disruption.** Climate justice is a vision aimed at dissolving and alleviating the unequal burdens created by climate change. The topic of climate justice is a major point of tension in both U.S. and international policy efforts to address climate disruption because it would require wealthy nations that have contributed the most to the problem to take on greater responsibilities for solutions. For many observers, the path is clear: for humanity’s survival, for justice, and for sustainability, they maintain that we must reduce our emissions and consumption here at home in the global North.

FAT TURN: Trump’s unpredictability and irrationality is a ruse—he’s just using “madman” game theory to make deterrence of Russia and NoKo more effective and is actually a completely rational actor

Navarro 16 Peter Navarro is a professor at the University of California-Irvine. Trump, Putin and Kim Jong-un Walk Into a Deterrence Bar, 1-27-16 <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/trump-putin-kim-jong-un-walk-deterrence-bar-15036?page=2> //CJC

Should we wring our hands and roll our eyes in the face of such Trumpisms? Or has “The Donald” captured an essential truth about the art of leadership and the deterrence of naked aggression? In fact, all **Donald Trump is doing is tipping his “Make America Great Again!” cap to the power of the “Madman Theory”** first espoused in American politics by President Richard Nixon. **This theory is a well-known staple of game theory,** and one of the most important tools used to analyze various strategies to deter aggression and prevent the use of nuclear weapons. **In Nixon’s case, he deliberately feigned angry and erratic behavior as a strategy to convince the North Vietnamese to agree to American terms during the Paris peace negotiations.** In describing his “Madman Theory” to an aide, Nixon revealed: **“I want the North Vietnamese to believe I’ve reached the point where I might do anything to stop**

the war. We'll just slip the word to them that, 'for God's sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about communism. We can't restrain him when he's angry—and he has his hand on the nuclear button' and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace." Of course, in this particular negotiation, Nixon's feigning of madness failed miserably in deterring North Vietnam's aggression. Indeed, North Vietnamese negotiators knew full well that Nixon was more desperate than mad. That left Henry Kissinger with little leverage in Paris, and North Vietnam took Nixon and Kissinger to the negotiating cleaners—ultimately taking South Vietnam from an America in full retreat. The failure of Nixon's madman ruse notwithstanding, the importance of madness versus rationality in deterring ruthless and "crazy" guys like Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un can be highlighted by taking a page out of the book of game theorist Thomas Schelling. Here's how Schelling might put the current North Korean conundrum: "If North Korea's Kim Jong-un does not act according to America's conventional assumptions and international norms of behavior, America will consider Kim's behavior "irrational," and Kim's perceived irrationality might result in him winning the competition. However, if Kim is not really irrational but simply but simply using his madman behavior as part of a conscious bargaining or competitive strategy to get more food and fuel from the West while holding on to his nukes, then this so-called irrationality is effectively rational in relation to the game's 'payoffs.'" In other words, the feigning of "madness" can be "wickedly rational." As to how this applies to any American president dealing with the likes of Putin and Kim, here's the obvious deterrence problem: Both Putin and especially Kim Jong-un project a willingness to start a nuclear war to get their way. Since that would mean the end of the world as we know it, many political leaders in the West perceive this behavior as irrational. So far the "rational" response of the Obama White House to Putin's particular brand of brinkmanship and "craziness" has been to use economic sanctions as a means of forcing Russia to cease its revanchist aggression. With Putin not fearing any military intervention—because he believes President Obama fears any such intervention might lead to nuclear war—Putin continues to have his ruthless, revanchist and really quite rational way with Ukraine and parts of Eastern Europe. And that is exactly what Donald Trump is seeing in "Vladimir the Great" and why he admires Putin—certainly not for his aggression but at least for his rational madman cunning. So what if Trump were elected president instead of ratiocinators like Hillary Clinton or Bernie Sanders or Marco Rubio? In this scenario, Putin would know Trump is as rationally "mad" as he is and that Trump won't never back down should Russian push come to American shove. Understanding he has met his madman match, Putin should therefore be far less likely to press the revanchist envelope in the same cavalier way he now does with the ultimate ratiocinator, President Obama. Score one for a "crazy" Trump. In fact, a hawkishly uncertain demeanor was the ultimate power of Ronald Reagan in dealing with the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders could never really be sure what "the cowboy" would do, and in this way Reagan quite rationally kept the peace. In the case of Kim Jong-un, the Obama White House likewise is pursuing a rational "carrot and stick" path. The carrot has been the prospect of aid to North Korea if it disarms while the stick as been the same kind of economic sanctions strategy Obama is (mis)using with Russia. Thus far, of course, this has been an utterly failed policy as a "crazy" Kim continues to test his bombs, refine his missile technology, and advance his nuclear proliferation agenda. As for what steps the next American president might take to rein in a "crazy" North Korea, the most obvious is to put the clamps down on China—a country that is not just North Korea's primary benefactor but also America's largest trading partner. At this juncture, a President Trump appears to be far more likely to take such a dramatic step without regard for the economic consequences than any of the other candidates on either side of the aisle. Knowing this, China should therefore be more likely to crack down on North Korea and thereby avert a confrontation under a Trump presidency. Score another one for a "crazy" Trump. The

second, more draconian, option to deal with North Korea is to simply drop a precision bomb on Kim Jong-un and eliminate him. And here's the Trumpian rub: **If Trump were elected president, Kim might actually begin to fear that Trump might indeed hunt him down with a swarm of F-22s, a drone or a long-range missile. In this scenario, the United States wouldn't even have to assassinate Kim. All Kim would have to believe is that a President Trump would be "crazy" enough to do it; and that would be enough to restrain Kim's behavior.** And **so the dance of deterrence goes—and so goes the argument that a "crazy" Donald Trump is actually smart like a fox and more likely to bring about peace in Eastern Europe and Asia than a "rational" President Obama** who relies on the tools of conventional western diplomacy. It's risky business of course, but so far ratiocinator diplomacy is striking out from Moscow and Beijing to Pyongyang.

National security bureaucracy stops Trump

Stephen M. **Walt 2-2-16**, the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, The Big 5 and the Sad State of Foreign Policy in 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/02/the-big-5-and-the-sad-state-of-foreign-policy-in-2016-sanders-clinton-trump-cruz-rubio/> //CJC

Moreover, **whenever the next president is elected, he or she is going to get an earful from the permanent national security bureaucracy** about the difference between the fairy tales peddled during the campaign and the realities of the real world. **Obama got schooled before he took office, and even an egomaniac like Trump might pay attention when experienced officials explain to him why his ideas make no sense.** And even if Trump or Cruz remains unchastened, **bureaucracies have lots of ways to slow down, obstruct, interfere, and dilute whatever cockamamie ideas a president might try to pursue.**¶ Does this mean the election doesn't matter? Of course not. The United States is still the strongest country in the world, and whoever sits in the Oval Office can still make a huge difference, both in the people he or she appoints and the decisions he or she makes. And that's what saddens me most as I contemplate this election: Instead of being excited by a smart new leader with a promising vision for addressing our current challenges, I've been reduced to hoping that **the foreign-policy establishment will rein in the various candidates' worst instincts.**

Trump will moderate – numerous checks.

Paletta 6-8-16. [Damian, reporter, "Trump Will Consult Congress, Agencies On Iran Deal and Muslim Ban, Adviser Says" Wall Street Journal -- blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/06/08/trump-will-consult-congress-agencies-on-iran-deal-and-muslim-ban-adviser-says/] //CJC

Presumptive Republican White House nominee Donald **Trump would consult with Congress and federal agencies on a number of his signature foreign policy initiatives,** including reworking a nuclear deal with Iran and a proposed ban on the entry of Muslims into the U.S., a top adviser said Wednesday. Walid Phares, one of Mr. **Trump's senior foreign policy advisers, said the candidate**

would seek domestic and international “consensus” on a range of foreign policy initiatives. During an hour-long interview with Wall Street Journal reporters and editors, Mr. Phares offered nuance to a number of Mr. Trump’s foreign policy ideas, suggesting **some aren’t set in stone and could be modified** as the campaign progresses. For example, Mr. Trump has called a recent nuclear deal with Iran “terrible” and “horrible” but Mr. Phares said Mr. Trump wouldn’t immediately attempt to negate it once in office. “He is going to be revising, reviewing, and maybe trying to modify the Iran deal,” Mr. Phares said. One option, he said, would be to resubmit the deal – or something like it – to Congress for a vote, a process whose outcome would depend on the makeup of Congress next year. Many bankers are watching the U.S. election closely and waiting for a clearer understanding of future U.S. policy towards Iran before doing business with the country. Mr. Phares’s suggestion Mr. Trump would revise the agreement instead of completely voiding it could influence the way some financial institutions deal with companies in Iran seeking access to global markets. Similarly, Mr. Phares said Mr. Trump would consult with immigration, national security, law enforcement, and other officials before proceeding with his proposed temporary ban on the entry of Muslims into the U.S. “His position which was strong – in terms of the ban – was based on the fact that the Obama administration — the Obama-Clinton administration — for the last seven to eight years was not able to equip us with systems by which we were able to identify the jihadists,” he said. Mr. Trump has faced criticism for his foreign policy platform, which breaks from GOP orthodoxy. Mr. Phares said Mr. Trump’s worldview doesn’t fit neatly into traditional labels of “isolationist” or “interventionist.” Rather, he described Mr. Trump as a “functionalist” who would work with allies when necessary but not overextend the U.S. in matters in which there isn’t an American interest. He also said that many of Mr. Trump’s proposals so far have only been offered as single ideas, which he compared to pieces of a puzzle. Once more proposals are set forward, something Mr. Phares predicted would happen soon, a broader approach to foreign policy would become clear, he said. “The expectation is the more she’s going to attack, the more he’s going to respond, and if he’s going to respond, he most likely he will address these issues,” Mr. Phares said, referring to Hillary Clinton, the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee. One key challenge for any Trump administration would be building bridges with Arab countries, many of which have been alarmed by some of Mr. Trump’s proposals so far. Mr. Phares said he is interviewed by Arab media outlets at least once a day, and works to explain Mr. Trump’s approach to the region. He predicted that numerous countries would be relieved to have a fresh start with the White House next year following several years of frosty relations with the Obama administration. Mr. Phares dismissed the caricature of Mr. Trump that Mrs. Clinton has worked hard to describe, suggesting, for instance, that he would rush into a nuclear conflict if his feelings get hurt or if another country insults him. **“I don’t see an unusual Trump presidency** as Madame Clinton is explaining **where he’s** going to go crazy and start **pressing buttons right away.**” Mr. Phares said, tapping on the table. **“That’s not going to happen. We have a rational institution here.”**

Dollar heg high now

Evans Pritchard 2016 [Ambrose Evans-Pritchard at the Telegraph, “AEP: Dollar hegemony endures as share of global transactions keeps rising”, *The Telegraph*, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/09/01/dollar-hegemony-endures-as-share-of-global-transactions-keeps-ri/>] //CJC

The US dollar is tightening its grip on the global financial system at the expense of the euro, entrenching American hegemony and rendering the US Federal Reserve more powerful than at any time in history. Newly-released data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) show that **the dollar’s share of the \$5.1 trillion in foreign exchange trades each day has continued rising to 87.6pc of all transactions. It is the latest evidence confirming the extraordinary resilience of the dollar-based international order, confounding expectations of US financial decline a decade ago.** Roughly 60pc of the global economy is either in the dollar zone or closely tied to it through currency pegs or ‘dirty floats’, and the level of debt issued in dollars outside US jurisdiction has soared to \$9 trillion. This has profound implications for monetary policy. The Fed has become the world’s central bank whether it likes it or not, setting borrowing costs for much of the global system. The BIS data shows that **the volume of transactions in which the euro was on one side of the trade has slipped to 31.3pc from 37pc in 2007. The dollar share has ratcheted up to 87.6pc over the same period.** It is much the same picture for the foreign exchange reserves of central banks, a good barometer of global trust. **The dollar share has recovered to 63.6pc, roughly where it was a decade ago.** The Fed has become the world’s central bank whether it likes it or not, setting borrowing costs for much of the global system. The euro share has tumbled over the last eight years from 28pc to 20.4pc, and is barely above Deutsche Mark share in the early 1990s. **“There are no foreseeable rivals to the dollar as a viable reserve currency,”** said Eswar Prasad from Cornell University, author of “The Dollar Trap: How the US Dollar Tightened Its Grip on Global

Finance". "The US is hard to beat. The US has deep financial markets, a powerful central bank and legal framework the rest of the world has a great deal of trust in," he said. The eurozone is crippled by the lack of a unified EU treasury, joint bond issuance, and a genuine banking union to back up the currency. It would require a change in the German constitution to open the way for fiscal union, an unthinkable prospect in the current political climate. Neither the euro nor the yuan have succeeded in displacing the dollar. "There are existential questions about the euro. The tensions pulling monetary union apart have not been resolved. It not going to challenge the dollar even if it does get its economic act together, and that doesn't look likely," he said. Prof Prasad, former head of the International Monetary Fund's China desk, said the Chinese yuan is gaining global currency share steadily - at the cost of the euro – but it would be decades before it comes of age. First China has to tame its \$27 trillion credit bubble and break out of the middle-income trap, weaning its economy from investment-led catch-up growth on steroids. He said the Communist system had become even more rigid under president Xi Jinping, raising the risk that social and political order "might unravel suddenly and dramatically," in the event of an economic shock. With hindsight it is clear that the US was never as weak as it looked in the aftermath of the Lehman crisis in 2008, when China seemed to be walking tall and much of the emerging world was in a secular commodity boom. The pendulum has since swung back. Zero rates and quantitative easing by the Fed flooded emerging markets with dollar liquidity, leading to credit booms that have mostly ended painfully over the last few years. The shale revolution in the US and the revival of its energy intensive industries have eliminated much of America's current account deficit. The US Treasury's draconian policies forced a quick clean-up of the US banking industry, in stark contrast to years of debilitating drift in Europe. The 20pc surge in the dollar index since mid-2014 has silenced any serious talk of a dollar crisis, and revealed just how painful this can be for emerging markets. "The world is more reliant on the dollar than ever before. I don't think people appreciate this enough," said Stephen Jen from Eurizon SLJ Capital.

America will remain the world's superpower – strongest defense budget, forces, and alliances.

Donilon 14 (Tom Donilon, Lawyer with a J.D. from the University of Virginia, "We're No. 1 (and We're Going to Stay That Way)," Foreign Policy, 3 July 2014, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/03/were-no-1-and-were-going-to-stay-that-way/>,] //CJC

By any measure, our military power is unmatched, and that's not likely to change anytime soon. In terms of sheer size, the United States spends more each year on defense than the next 10 nations put together. Our defense budget is more than five times bigger than that of our nearest competitor, China — despite that country's rapid military buildup. Even after 13 years of war — the longest period of continuous conflict our armed forces have ever seen — we remain capable of defeating any adversary.

But even these measurements underestimate our military's true advantages. The U.S. Navy owns 11 of the world's 20 aircraft carriers, making America the only country on Earth with a truly global power projection. With more than a decade of experience fighting terrorism, our special operations forces have become a unique American asset. The May 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan — over 7,000 miles away from the United States — was only the most visible example of how our battle-tested special operators successfully execute complex missions in dangerous places across the globe.

And by historical measures, the current U.S. defense burden is not excessive as a share of GDP. As we wind down the war in Afghanistan, our military now stands on a more sustainable footing, without the kind of overstretch that some have worried about.

We also possess a network of formal alliances with over 50 nations — the largest in history. Centered on our treaty alliances in Asia and Europe, this network has been built for over half a century on a bipartisan basis. No other country can look to anything like it. These enduring partnerships are a unique American strength, and we continue to deepen them across the globe today.

American hard power high now – huge spending, advanced weapons, and large military.

Das 14 (Satyajit Das, Economic Consult with a B.A. in Commerce and Law from the University of New South Wales, “America’s Hard & Soft Power,” EconoMonitor, December 15 2014, <http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2014/12/americas-hard-soft-power/>,] //CJC

The US remains a formidable military power. America spends around 40% of the total amount spent globally on defence, around six times second placed China. **The technical and economic capacity to maintain, integrate and operate up-to-date complex defence systems provides America with a significant advantage.**

The strategic shift to stand-off and remote weapons systems, such as drones, as well more technologically sophisticated weapons systems enhance its capabilities to protect its interests. Whatever the moral and legal implications of drone strikes against its enemies, **America’s ability to project power in support its interests remain unsurpassed.**

America’s political and economic interests increasingly dictate withdrawal from military engagements such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Reduced reliance on foreign energy supplies may allow the US to reduce its commitment to guarding crucial sea lanes such as the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca Straits.

In the post-cold war era, **America has served as the “indispensable nation”** (a phrase suggested by former Secretary of State Madeline Albright) policing the world’s conflicts. But America is increasingly wary of “entangling alliances” (Thomas Jefferson) and overseas adventures “in search of monsters to destroy” (John Quincy Adams).

Emerging technologies, tactical innovations, capability enhancements, joint warfare means we don’t need a larger army.

Lawrence Kapp, Coordinator Specialist in Military Manpower Policy, et al, **September 2, 2016**, Congressional Research Services, How Big Should an Army Be? Considerations for Congress, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44612.pdf>

On the other hand, the above arguments notwithstanding, other observers maintain that most of **the functions** listed above **can be adequately performed with lower troop levels due to emerging technologies, tactical innovations, and military capability advancements.**¹⁹ **Proponents of this concept, which is often referred to as “transformation,” or a “revolution in military affairs,” maintain that special operations forces, combined with precision guided munitions, can have the kinds of decisive effects on the battlefield that used to be achieved through massive ground troop formations.**²⁰ Others believe that the Army is “overreacting” in its arguments for increased troop strength to meet the emerging strategic environment. Contrary to arguments that the Army would be overmatched in a contest with Russian forces, some maintain that **“it is exceedingly unlikely the U.S. Army will ever be ‘outranged and outgunned’” due to advances in joint warfare, and in particular, Air Force and Naval Air support to ground operations.**²¹ **Finally, some question whether the United States has the political appetite to engage in these kinds of ground-force intensive contingencies in the future.** As evidence, they refer to the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance which states that, “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.”²² Indeed, as former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said, “in my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined,’ as General MacArthur so delicately put it.”²³ Still, he went on to note, ...when it comes to

predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten it right, from the Mayaguez to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and more—we had no idea a year before any of these missions that we would be so engaged.²⁴

Squo solves readiness deficits - 2017 training exercises

Petraeus 2016 [Mr. Petraeus, a retired Army general, commanded coalition forces in Iraq (2007-08) and in Afghanistan (2010-11) and later served as director of the CIA (2011-12), “The Myth of a U.S. Military ‘Readiness Crisis’”, *The Wall Street Journal*, August 9, 2016.]
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-myth-of-a-u-s-military-readiness-crisis-1470783221> //WGC

“U.S. military readiness is again a hot issue in the presidential election, but unfortunately the current debate glosses over some of the most important facts. While Congress’s sequestration-mandated cuts to military spending have hurt preparedness, **America’s fighting forces remain ready for battle. They have extensive combat experience across multiple theaters since 9/11, a tremendous high-tech defense industry supplying advanced weaponry, and support from an extraordinary intelligence community.** For those concerned that America’s military is in decline or somehow not up to the next challenge, we offer a few reassuring facts: • **The current national defense budget of over \$600 billion a year far exceeds the Cold War average of about \$525 billion (in inflation-adjusted 2016 dollars)** and the \$400 billion spent in 2001, according to official Pentagon and Office of Management and Budget data. The national defense budget, which doesn’t include Veterans Affairs or the Department of Homeland Security, constitutes 35% of global military spending and is more than that of the next eight countries—including China and Russia—combined. **Spending has been reduced from the levels of the late Bush and early Obama years, but that isn’t unreasonable in light of scaled-down combat operations abroad** and fiscal pressures at home. • Assuming no return to sequestration, as occurred in 2013, **Pentagon budgets to buy equipment now exceed \$100 billion a year, a healthy and sustainable level. The so-called “procurement holiday” of the 1990s and early 2000s is over.** • While some categories of aircraft and other key weapons are aging and will need replacement or major refurbishment soon, **most equipment remains in fairly good shape. According to our sources in the military, Army equipment has, on average, mission-capable rates today exceeding 90%—a historically high level.** Marine Corps aviation is an exception and urgently needs to be addressed. • Training for full-spectrum operations is resuming after over a decade of appropriate focus on counterinsurgency. **By 2017 the Army plans to rotate nearly 20 brigades—about a third of its force—through national training centers each year. The Marine Corps plans to put 12 infantry battalions—about half its force—through large training exercises. The Air Force is funding its training and readiness programs at 80%-98% of what it considers fully resourced levels.** This situation isn’t perfect, but it has improved—and while the military is still engaged in combat operations across the world. The men and women of today’s all-volunteer military continue to be outstanding and committed to protecting America. Typical scores of new recruits on the armed forces qualification test are now significantly better than in the Reagan years or the immediate pre-9/11 period, two useful benchmarks. **The average time in service, a reflection of the experience of the force, is now about 80 months in the enlisted ranks,**

according to Defense Department data. That is not quite as good as in the 1990s, when the average was 85-90 months, but is better than the 75-month norm of the 1980s. While there are areas of concern, **there is no crisis in military readiness**. But that doesn't mean the U.S. is good enough—especially in a world of rapidly changing technology, new threats emerging across several regions, and a constantly evolving strategic landscape. Here are some of the most pressing issues:

Our defense trumps their means and motives warrants—all ev goes neg

Fitzpatrick, 16—Executive Director, IISS-Americas (Mark, *Asia's Latent Nuclear Powers* pg 109, dml)

That Japan has remained a non-nuclear-weapons state throughout the post-war period, despite having both the capabilities and the presumptive motivations, points to the strength of the enduring constraints. The reasons Japan did not seek nuclear weapons at any time over the past 50 years remain dispositive today. **As every internal study over the years has found, the social, political, economic and strategic factors all continue to weigh heavily against nuclearisation.** Citing these reasons, former US State Department Japan expert Kevin Maher said in 2011: "We've never had any concern about the Japanese government building a nuclear weapon."¹⁶²

Even if they win the link, internal whistleblowers will put a brake on the nuclear program

Fitzpatrick, 16—Executive Director, IISS-Americas (Mark, *Asia's Latent Nuclear Powers* pg 110-111, dml)

Societal opposition to nuclear weapons is *particularly strong* in the academic and scientific communities, including in the nuclear technology field, which is both *pacifist* and *leak-prone*. If a hawkish prime minister were to decide nuclear weapons must be built, former Foreign Ministry official Kaneko believes that **scientists and engineers would refuse to go along and** that some **would become whistleblowers.** The openness of Japanese society is the **most effective brake on a nuclear-weapons programme**, he contends.¹⁶⁸ Hymans calls such pacifist scientists and other opponents of **nuclearisation "veto players"**, and notes that **Japan has them in even greater numbers after Fukushima.**¹⁶⁹ This societal transparency, combined with the **highly intrusive IAEA monitoring presence in Japan, would make it nigh on impossible for Japan to pursue a clandestine path to nuclear weapons.**

Our ev accounts for security breakdown

Fitzpatrick, 16—Executive Director, IISS-Americas (Mark, *Asia's Latent Nuclear Powers* pg 99-100, dml)

If Japan were to go nuclear, it would be the result of a *severe deterioration in its security situation* in the face of a strong threat and a perception that Japan could *no longer count on America's extended deterrence*. **A breakdown in the global nuclear non-proliferation regime** might add to the motivation. Such a nightmare combination is unlikely in the foreseeable future. And even if one or more of the factors did materialise, *nuclearisation is far from inevitable*. In fact, **each of these situations has arisen to a certain extent over the past two and a half decades**. When the *Soviet threat* disappeared with the end of the Cold War, many Japanese worried that the US would have less reason to extend a defence commitment. *China's nuclear modernisation* and growing conventional capabilities threaten Japanese security, as does *North Korea's nuclear posture*. **The emergence in Asia of three new declared nuclear states since 1998 showed an unravelling of the non-proliferation order. And yet Japan has steadfastly remained non-nuclear. It looks set to remain so.**

America's Asian allies won't go nuclear

Jang 5/4/16 (Se Young Jang is currently completing her Ph.D. dissertation on U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy towards South Korea from 1953 to 1981, and her research is based on extensive multi-archival research in the United States, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, and South Korea. "Will America's Asian Allies Go Nuclear?" <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-americas-asian-allies-go-nuclear-16055?page=show/>, AB)

Some policy experts argue that South Korea and Japan would not attempt to join the nuclear club regardless of their level of nuclear capability. The decision to go nuclear would certainly bring a major risk of political and economic isolation. Moreover, as previous U.S. administrations have done, Washington would not simply let them develop their own nuclear weapons. Currently, there is no reason to believe that the United States would risk losing its influence in the region and stand by growing military tension and domino effects caused by nuclear newcomers. **Needless to say, South Korea and Japan, both state parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), would not want to join North Korea as the only country having ever withdrawn from the treaty which they have been upholding for almost half a century. Finally, Japan's own experience with atomic bombs in the Second World War is another aspect to be considered; antinuclear sentiments are deeply rooted in the identity of many Japanese, and the Japanese government might not willingly abandon its position as the only "victim" of a nuclear attack by pursuing nuclear armament.**

When it comes to South Korea, it is interesting to note that public opinion about nuclear weapons is clearly divided and sometimes tilts in favor of acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent. According to several polls taken after North Korea's fourth nuclear test, between 52 and 68 percent of respondents were in favor of developing nuclear armament in the South, notwithstanding a decline in public support from 2013. Furthermore, some politicians from conservative circles do not hide their wish to have those weapons in spite of the South Korean government's official support for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. For instance, Chung Mong-joon, a seventh-term lawmaker of the ruling Saenuri Party as well as a son of the founder of the Hyundai Group, is one of the prominent political figures who have continuously opined that South Korea should have its own deterrent. Lately, this pronuclear argument has been reinforced by new supporters, including lawmaker Won Yoo-chul, parliamentary floor leader of the Saenuri Party. At the National Assembly in February, Won stated that "[t]he time has come for us to seriously consider effective and substantial measures of self-defense and deterrence again <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-americas-asian-allies-go-nuclear-16055?page=showst> North Korea," proposing that South Korea develop its own nuclear arsenal, or that U.S. tactical nuclear weapons be brought back to the South. **In reality, however, the arguments of these politicians would not be implementable even if they gained more traction, because of the legal and technological restrictions imposed on South Korea. One of these restrictions is the U.S.-ROK Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, which prohibits South Korea from reprocessing spent nuclear fuel,** while

the South's long lasting efforts to acquire a right to pyroprocess the fuel have a still long way to go. As far as Japan is concerned, its nuclear intentions have not been stated clearly, but its capability to reprocess spent nuclear fuel increasingly concerns the international community. Unlike South Korea, Japan has been allowed to enrich uranium and to reprocess spent fuel under the the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, and has been building the Rokkasho reprocessing plant with the support of French state-owned company Areva since the early 1990s. Even though the plant's opening has been postponed again until 2018 after a series of delays, Japan has accumulated a huge surplus of plutonium stocks. Currently, Japan stockpiles eleven metric tons of plutonium in domestic sites, while another thirty-six metric tons are waiting to be returned to Japan from Britain and France where they have been reprocessed. This is a sufficient amount of plutonium to produce nearly six thousand atomic bombs. On that account, Japan is

often regarded as a "latent" nuclear-weapon state. Although 730 pounds of weapons-grade plutonium were transported to the United States in March, this is a tiny portion of Japan's plutonium stockpiles, and it will not ease international security concerns. The fact that the Japanese cabinet approved a bill to guarantee funding for the reprocessing plant also shows that Tokyo does not intend to reconsider its current policy on the reprocessing of nuclear fuel. As long as Japan continues to pursue reprocessing while maintaining or not significantly reducing its plutonium stockpiles, the United States and Japan will have a hard time justifying their anxieties about China's plans to develop a reprocessing capability. Nuclear weapons programs are generally clandestine by nature. However, the global nonproliferation regime put in place by the NPT is now well established, and significantly affects its member states' decisions. If any "democratic" state party to the NPT wanted to develop nuclear weapons, that country would be subjected to the double

pressure: from the international community, and from domestic opinion. In the cases of South Korea and Japan, it would be a triple pressure, including the U.S. government, their closest ally. Thus, if the international community intends to prevent further nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia, close consideration should be given to how these three pressures against potential proliferators can be used and coordinated. With the already existing international and bilateral pressure, another key driver discouraging the ROK and Japanese governments from going nuclear will be domestic pressure in the form of either elections or organized public movements.

Korea's recent legislative elections have interesting implications in this regard. One of the reasons that had led some lawmakers from the ruling conservative party to express their pro-nuclear opinion in public early this year was their confidence in victory in the April 2016 election. As President Park Geun-hye and her ruling party had high approval ratings and were expected to overwhelmingly win the legislative election, they were less prudent than usual on such a controversial issue as nuclear armament. The election, however, turned out to be a humiliating defeat for the ruling Saenuri Party; not only did the party lose the parliamentary majority that they had held for sixteen years, but they secured even fewer seats than the main opposition Minjoo Party. This poor result is likely to restrain the attempts of some right-wing politicians to use the North Korean threat for their pronuclear arguments. Furthermore, opposition parties supportive of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula are expected to have a stronger voice in security issues when

a new parliamentary term starts at the end of May. In Japan, the likelihood of opposition parties being able to pressure Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's administration on nuclear policy is more limited because the dominance of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the Diet is not expected to change in the near future. Yet Japanese civil society has nurtured a solid antinuclear culture through its own experiences: the U.S. atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, and the Fukushima disaster in 2011. The antinuclear movements in Japan started in the 1950s, and since then have mostly focused on opposing nuclear arms. For instance, Hidankyo (the Japan Confederation of A- and H- Bomb Sufferers Organizations) was nominated three times for the Nobel Peace Prize for its invaluable work to prevent a nuclear war and to eliminate nuclear weapons, and Mayors for Peace, initiated by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1982, has also been actively working to raise international awareness about the necessity for the total abolition of nuclear weapons. However, it was not until when the Fukushima disaster happened that antinuclear sentiments, particularly against nuclear power, became popular among ordinary Japanese citizens. In June 2012, Japan witnessed the largest turnout of demonstrators in Tokyo since the 1960s—two hundred thousand people, according to the maximum estimates—in response to the government's decision to restart Units 3 and 4 at the Oi nuclear power plant. Even though anti-nuclear power protests seem to have lost their momentum after the pronuclear LDP returned to power at the end of 2012, Japan's once highly motivated anti-nuclear power movements have the potential to grow into a civil movement against Japan's development of nuclear weapons, should the time come. South Korea and Japan would not easily abandon their nuclear ambitions if China and North Korea held their current speed in nuclear proliferation. Demanding that only South Korea and Japan comply with their nonproliferation obligations in Northeast Asia will be increasingly difficult to justify. However, a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia is ultimately in nobody's interest. Together with a variety of international and bilateral efforts to curb the proliferation trend in the region, it is also important to strengthen domestic antinuclear voices that can check and control these governments' decisions on nuclear weapons. As long as South Korea and Japan remain democratic, going nuclear will be a complicated task.

Their disad doesn't come close to the threshold required for treaty breakdown

Horovitz, 15—Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich (Liviu, “Beyond Pessimism: Why the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Will Not Collapse,” Journal of Strategic Studies Volume 38, Issue 1-2, 2015, pages 126-158, dml)

Finally, even assuming that the rate of proliferation will increase, the question remains: **how many withdrawals are actually necessary to generate a mass exodus, thus terminating the treaty.** Research shows that for every participant in an arrangement, the perceived necessary critical mass of partakers will be different, contingent on a number of specific impetuses. With the departure of some participants, the mass might diminish and reach the threshold for some others. Their departure will cause yet more to abandon the agreement. Ultimately, this process could reach a threshold, beyond which nobody will continue to engage within the **NPT**. While who withdraws would surely play a key role, **there is little reason to believe that a ‘point of no return’ can be reached with less than one-third of the participants abandoning the treaty.**⁷¹ While the withdrawal of a major power would surely hurt the NPT’s attractiveness, it *remains unclear* how, on its own, such a step could *destroy the treaty*. Similarly, multiple withdrawals will surely be damaging to the NPT’s many attributes, but appear *unlikely to be lethal*. **Even NPT analyses that suggest a grim outlook conclude that the critical mass necessary for the non-proliferation norm to decay would most probably be over 20 states.** Given the barriers and limits to reactive proliferation considerations outlined above, the NPT’s demise as a result of proliferation begetting more proliferation seems to be anything but imminent.

Trump crushes Asian stability — comparatively larger internal link.

Vu 16 — Khang Vu, Analyst from New London, New Hampshire who studies International Relations, China, and International Political Economy, 2016 (“Why A Trump Presidency Would Be Bad For Asia,” *The Diplomat*, April 7th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/why-a-trump-presidency-would-be-bad-for-asia/>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

As the race to the White House is heating up, Asian countries are paying close attention to the candidates’ foreign policy platforms. For the last few weeks, international headlines have focused on Donald Trump’s vision of a nuclearized Northeast Asia and his proposal to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea and Japan if the two countries do not contribute more to the alliance. For the most part, scholars and strategists have denounced Trump’s plan. However, despite these negative remarks, primary results have shown that Trump is undoubtedly the Republican front-runner for the presidency. Even though the final result of the presidential campaign is not decided until November, Trump’s negative impacts on Asia are too clear to be ignored.

Trump’s foreign policy can be broken down into three main components. First, he **seeks to limit** the scope of U.S. **foreign policy**, from a major international player **to an isolationist**. Second, **Trump wants to withdraw** U.S. **commitment to** America’s East Asian **allies, at the** potential **cost** **of Japan and South Korea acquiring** their own **nuclear weapons**. And third, Trump wants to conduct foreign policy as a form of doing business, which means America must get benefits from any relationship with another country. A thorough examination at each of these

components will provide a comprehensive look at potential consequences of Trump's policies towards Asia.

First, the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy since the end of World War II has always been the desire to construct and safeguard a liberal world order that every country is required to adhere to. Widespread U.S. interventions into global issues have strengthened the foundation for such a rule-based political order, **and the presence of the United States has constrained the rise of new non-Western countries that seek to upset international standards and norms.** Unfortunately, **a Trump presidency is likely to pull America out of its role,** giving rising powers like China greater leeway to impose its vision of order on neighboring countries. Moreover, **such a decline in U.S. influence will send a dangerous signal to its East Asian allies that America is no longer willing to come to their defense,** prompting them to resort to necessary security measures in order to make up for the loss of American commitment.

As a consequence of American isolationism, **Trump has suggested withdrawing troops from South Korea and Japan and allowing the two countries to develop their own nuclear weapons.** Trump's intention is based on two major assumptions. First, upgrading and maintaining a large, modern conventional force is not an effective deterrent compared to developing a nuclear capability. Second, allowing South Korea and Japan to have nukes will relieve America of its responsibility as a "nuclear umbrella," preventing the U.S. from engaging in a nuclear war with North Korea.

Security Umbrellas Are Bad

Ben Friedman, (Cato Institute), "Why the U.S. Military Budget is 'Foolish and Sustainable'", Spring 2012

<https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/articles/logan-friendman-obis-spring-2012.pdf>

The argument that U.S. alliances are necessary for stability and global commerce is only slightly more credible. **One problem with this claim is that U.S. security guarantees can create moral hazard—emboldening weak allies to take risks they would otherwise avoid in their dealings with neighbors. Alliances can then discourage accommodation among neighboring states, heightening instability and threatening to pull the United States into wars facilitated by its benevolence.** Another point against this argument is that even if regional balancing did lead to war, it would not obviously be more costly to the U.S. economy than the cost of the alliance said to prevent it. **Neutrality historically pays.¹⁰ The larger problem with the idea that our alliances are justified by the balancing they prevent is that wars generally require more than the mutual fear that arms competition provokes.**

Namely, there is usually a territorial conflict or a state bent on conflict. Historical examples of arms races alone causing wars are few.¹¹ This confusion probably results from misconstruing the causes of World War I—seeing it as a consequence of mutual fear alone rather than fear produced by the proximity of territorially ambitious states.

US intervention empirically makes civil wars last longer

Sambanis 2000 [Nicholas Sambanis is a writer and researcher for the World Bank. "External Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars." World Bank, 2000.

<<https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/373430892.pdf>>] //CJC

Out of 138 intra-state conflicts since 1944, 89 attracted external interventions by at least one external third party. Within the 89 cases, if repeated interventions were taken into account the total number of interventions amounts to 190, of which 76 were accounted for by major powers.

The countries with the dubious distinction of having the highest number of interventions are: USA (35), Former USSR/Russia (16), France (10), UK (9), China (6) and Cuba (5). Out of the 190 interventions, only 57 have led to an end in the fighting. External interventions are associated with longer-lasting wars. **A scatter diagram of war duration and external interventions during 1960-99 for all countries that have experienced civil wars reveals an upward-sloping relationship (Figure 3.B).** Moreover, **the mean duration of civil wars that were terminated and which had external interventions was nine years; while those wars that were terminated but did not have an intervention had a mean duration of only 1.5 years.**"

Even if US intervention causes a peace deal it still increases the risk of future conflict by 94%

Kenwick 2014 [Michael Kenwick at Pennsylvania State University. "Military Intervention and Settlement Durability in Civil Conflicts." Pennsylvania State University, 2014. Web. 1 Dec. 2016

<http://sites.psu.edu/mikekenwick/wp-content/uploads/sites/19790/2014/10/kenwick_intervention_july141.pdf>] //CJC

Despite the importance of this issue, extant literature does not provide a direct/complete answer to the question at hand. **Existing research on military interventions has focused primarily on its short term effects on the duration and outcome of ongoing conflicts** (Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom 2004, **Regan 2002**, Lemke & **Regan 2008**, **Cunningham 2010**, Balch-Lindsay, Enterline & **Joyce 2008**, Gent 2008). **Work that has studied the impact of third parties on the peace process, on the other hand, generally focuses on the role of non-combatant forces, such as peacekeeping missions and the role of non-combatant guarantors that intervene after hostilities have ended** (Walter 1997, **Fortna 2004a**, Doyle & **Sambanis 2000**, Diehl 1994, Diehl 2008). Comparatively little is known about how the presence of foreign troops in an ongoing conflict affects the peace that follows

[...]

Furthermore, **military interventions prior to peace agreements increase the hazard of conflict recurrence.** The Intervention coefficient summed with the interaction between the Intervention and Negotiated settlement ($\beta_{\text{Intervention}} + \beta_{\text{Intervention} \times \text{Negotiated Settlement}}$) is statistically significant with a value of 0.662, and a two-tailed, 95% confidence interval [0.007, 1.317]. Substantively, these results indicate that **civil conflicts that end in negotiated settlements with interveners present are 94% more likely to experience peace failure than conflicts ending in negotiated settlements that do not feature third party interveners.** The two-tailed 95% confidence interval around this effect is [0.7%, 273%]. As predicted by the Intervention Hypothesis, intervention decreases peace duration when civil conflicts end in a negotiated settlement."

[...]

Civil War codes whether a conflict produced at least one thousand battle-related deaths in at least one year of its duration (Gleditsch et al. 2002). **Empirical evidence has shown that third party interventions may be less likely in conflicts that have produced a large number of fatalities** (Regan 1998). Increasing fatalities may also reduce both the likelihood that a civil conflict will end in a negotiated settlement (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline & Joyce 2008). Like conflict duration, fatalities may also function to disseminate information between combatants, which then reduces uncertainty and increases settlement durability. For these reasons, an indicator of whether a conflict episode resulted in a civil war is also included.

One-sided military interventions shift the balance of power and causes the threatened actor to kill 25-40% more civilians

Wood 2012 [Reed Wood, professor of politics and global studies, “Armed intervention and civilian victimization in intrastate conflicts”, *Journal of Peace Research*, <http://www.public.asu.edu/~rmwood4/woodkathgent_jpr.pdf>] //CJC

Research has begun to examine the relationship between changes in the conflict environment and levels of civilian victimization. We extend this work by examining the effect of external armed intervention on the decisions of governments and insurgent organizations to victimize civilians during civil wars. We theorize that changes in the balance of power in an intrastate conflict influence combatant strategies of violence. **As a conflict actor weakens relative to its adversary, it employs increasingly violent tactics toward the civilian population** as a means of reshaping the strategic landscape to its benefit. The reason for this is twofold. First, **declining capabilities increase resource needs at the moment that extractive capacity is in decline**. Second, **declining capabilities inhibit control and policing, making less violent means of defection deterrence more difficult**. **As both resource extraction difficulties and internal threats increase, actors' incentives for violence against the population increase**. To the extent that **biased military interventions shift the balance of power between conflict actors, we argue that they alter actor incentives to victimize civilians**. Specifically, intervention should reduce the level of violence employed by the supported faction and increase the level employed by the opposed faction. We test these arguments using data on civilian casualties and armed intervention in intrastate conflicts from 1989 to 2004. Our results support our expectations, suggesting that interventions shift the power balance and affect the levels of violence employed by combatants.

[...]

To examine the substantive significance of this relationship we simulate the expected level of one-sided rebel violence for changes in the balance of intervention forces. 15 As Figure 1 demonstrates, **when the balance of intervention forces shifts to favor the rebels** (positive movements along the x-axis toward “0” or parity), **the group reduces its use of anti-civilian violence**. Conversely, **as the balance shifts against them, the rebels increase violence**. Specifically, **a one standard deviation decrease in the intervention variable from parity (i.e., an intervention of 1,293 troops in favor of the government in a conflict with no previous intervention) raises the expected number of civilians killed by insurgents from 107 to 134—an increase of 25%**. Intervention clearly has a substantial effect on the scale of one-sided rebel violence. [FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Now consider the analysis of government violence presented in the third column of Table 1. The intervention ratio variable has a positive and statistically significant effect on the level of one-sided government violence. Thus, as the size of a rebel intervention increases relative to the size of a government intervention, governments target civilians in greater numbers. This result also indicates that interventions favoring the government over rebel forces decrease the regime's use of anti-civilian violence, providing further support for our hypothesis. Figure 2 reports simulation estimates to demonstrate the substantive effects of the relationship.

From parity, a one standard deviation increase in the intervention variable (i.e., a 1,398 troop intervention in favor of the rebels in a conflict with no previous intervention) increases the expected number of annual civilian killings by government forces from 73 to 102, nearly a 40% increase. 15 All simulations were performed using Clarify in Stata 11 (King, Tomz & Wittenberg, 2000). Simulations were conducted with all continuous independent variables at their means and dichotomous variables at their modal values, assuming that actors perpetrated one-sided rebel violence in the previous year. 22 government violence. These results demonstrate that **shifts in the power balance by external military interveners contribute to changes in the use of violence.**

Intervention makes civil wars 2x more deadly

HSR 2012 [The Human Security Report, "State-Based Armed Conflict", *HSR*, <http://hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/HSR2012/HSRP2012_Chapter%205.pdf>] //CJC

In 2009 the three deadliest conflicts in the world were all in Central and South Asia—in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. There were just three high-intensity conflicts outside of Central and South Asia in 2009: in Iraq, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where Rwandan and Congolese forces battled the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR).⁸ Of these six high-intensity conflicts, those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and the DRC are **internationalized intrastate conflicts. This type of conflict, as we explain later, tends to be considerably deadlier than civil wars in which there is no military intervention by external powers.** Four of 2009's six most deadly conflicts, those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Somalia, are associated with international and local campaigns against Islamist groups. The security implications of this association were discussed in the last Human Security Report. ⁹

[...]

Many of the deadliest conflicts of the past two decades have involved external military forces fighting in civil wars. **These internationalized intrastate conflicts are, on average, twice as deadly as intrastate conflicts where there is no military intervention.**¹³ Interstate wars tend to have far higher battle-death tolls than civil wars with or without external military support, but as shown in Figure 5.7, conflicts between states have become extraordinarily rare. Since the end of the Cold War there have been three times as many internationalized intrastate conflicts as interstate conflicts. **Internationalized intrastate conflicts are a type of civil conflict in which the military forces of one or more external governments fight in support of one of the warring parties.**¹⁴ This includes so-called humanitarian interventions if external military forces officially take sides and support ¹⁵a party to the conflict with troops. However, the definition does not include most peacekeeping missions, which are usually deployed to support negotiated settlements—and sometimes to help protect the peace against spoilers—but not to further the goals of a combatant.¹⁵ States intervene militarily in civil conflicts in other countries for a variety of reasons. They may send forces to protect political or ideological interests, as was the case in the so called proxy wars of the Cold War era, or in response to humanitarian crises. Intervening states often have a complex combination of motivating factors, many of which may remain unstated. Our data do not provide information on these motivations but rather enable us to focus on the common characteristic of these conflicts: the presence of external military forces supporting at least one of the warring side

No threats to Heg in the squo

Salvatore **Babones**, June 11th, 2015, [an associate professor of sociology and social policy at the University of Sydney. He is a comparative sociologist who writes on comparative international development and on quantitative methods for the social sciences, "American Hegemony Is Here to Stay ", <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/american-hegemony-here-stay-13089>] MJS

Ultimately, **it is inevitable that in the long run** American power will weaken and **American hegemony** over the rest of the world **will fade**. But how long is the long run? **There are few factual indications that American decline has begun—or that it will begin anytime** soon. Short-term fluctuations should not be extrapolated into long-term trends. Without a doubt, 1991 was a moment of supreme U.S. superiority. But so was 1946, after which came the Soviet bomb, Korea and Vietnam. **American hegemony has waxed and waned** over the last seventy years, **but** it has **never** been **eclipsed**. And it is unlikely that the eclipse is nigh.

No significant cyber attacks – civilian harm, can only be used once, can be reversed to target the attacker, retribution, resource limits, need luck, lack of assets

Ryan C. **Maness**, 2015 **Northeastern University, Department of Political Science**, and Brandon **Valeriano**, **University of Glasglow**, **Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System**, Kindle Edition, pp. 16-17

We find that the security dilemma has no place in these international interactions. The cyber world is nebulous; an infiltration against a military facility in this realm could bleed into the public sector. **Malicious cyber incidents on infrastructure have been and will continue to be rare to nonexistent because states are restrained due to the high probability of civilian harm, the nature of the weapons (single use), and the weak payoffs if** utilized (Gartzke 2013). **These types of offensive cyber actions are just as unlikely as interstate nuclear or chemical weapons attacks. There is a system of normative restraint in cyber operations based on the conditions of collateral damage, plus the factors of blowback and replication.** Foreign policy tactics in the cyber world can be replicated and reproduced. **Any cyber weapon used can be turned right back on its initiator. On top of this, it is likely that severe cyber operations will be bring retribution and consequences that many states are not willing to accept. We have seen many interstate conflicts since the advent of the Internet age,** but the largest and only cyber operation thus far during a conventional military conflict, **the 2008 Russo-Georgian skirmish**, consisted of almost trivial DDoS and vandalism. **Since then, Russia has even avoided using cyber weapons during the Crimean and larger Ukrainian crises of 2014.** **Other operations are mainly propaganda operations or occur in the realm of espionage.** That the United States did not use cyber tactics against Iraq, Afghanistan, or Libya, at least as directed at the executive level, signifies that cyber tactics are typically restrained despite significant constituencies in the military that want to use the weapons. **Stuxnet is the outlier,** as our data demonstrate, not the norm or the harbinger of the future to come. **Cyber operations are limited in that their value is negligible, the consequences of a massive cyber incident are drastic, and the requirements to carry one out are vast. The idea of a lone cyber hacker being able to bring states to their knees is a fantastic one. Cyber operations like Stuxnet require an exceptional amount of funds, technical**

knowledge, luck, and on-the-ground assets for successful implementation. Massive and truly dangerous cyber operations are beyond the means of most countries. **These statements are not opinions, but contentions made based on the facts at hand and the data we have collected.** We also see regionalism dominate in cyberspace. Despite the vastness and transboundary capacity of the Internet, most operations are limited to local targets connected to traditional causes of conflict, such as territorial disputes and leadership disagreements. Issues are important (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981) in world politics and in cyber politics. This is why international relations scholarship is so important in relation to the cyber question. Cyber operations are not taken devoid of their international and historical contexts. What has happened in the past will influence how future technologies are leveraged and where they are applied. The goal of this book will be to use this theoretical frame to explain the cyber conflict dynamics of rival states, as well as non-state actors willing and able to launch cyber malice

() No impact to Cyber attacks

Ryan C. Maness, 2015 Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, and Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, p. 213

We developed our theory of cyber engagement fully in Chapter 3. The argument considers that cyber restraint is expected to dominate cyber interactions and should be predictive of future cyber operations. **States will restrain themselves from crossing the “red lines” of cyber conflict because of the high operational and normative cost associated with these operations. They will not shut down military networks, knock out power grids, or black out Wall Street; the fear of blowback and retaliation not only in cyberspace, but by conventional means as well, is too great. States will also avoid these actions because of fears of collateral damage and infecting the rest of the Internet. Actions taken in cyberspace tend to invade all aspects of cyberspace. Even when states take actions to keep operations in the realm of cyber, the operations tend to spread and proliferate in ways not predicted.** Escalated offensive capabilities will not be used because they could lead directly to war, civilian harm, and economic retaliation, which would then escalate conflict among states. These tactics would spread the conflict from the cyber realm to conventional conflict. **Therefore, restraint is what we expect to find when we examine cyber conflict among states. States will do what they believe they can get away with and then will go no further.** Restraint is the outcome we expect to see among states, while the process we expect to see at work is what we term cyber straitjacketing. **The low level and limited amount of cyber conflict we do observe will mostly be between regional rivals,** an unexpected result given the global reach of cyber technologies. Cyber regionalism is the assertion that most rival interactions in cyberspace will have a regional context, usually tied to territorial issues and other traditional issues between regional actors. However, **because cyber conflict is restrained, these cyber incidents and disputes will usually take the form of propaganda, vandalism, or inconvenient denial of service methods and will not escalate to militarized conflict solely because of cyber issues. Escalation,** especially among regional rivals, **has been prevented through restraint** thus far.

Countries only engage in cyber espionage, not war

Ryan C. Maness, 2015, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, and Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, pp. 49-50

Going further, we spell out a theory of cyber espionage and how cyber terrorism will be utilized by states. Here we define cyber espionage as the use of dangerous and offensive intelligence measures to steal, corrupt, or erase information in the cybersphere of interactions. What is

unusual about cyber espionage is the paradox of the tactic being common, but also literally the least a state can do. When cyber actions are exhibited, they tend to be low-level espionage actions that do not rise to the level of conflict or warfare. **States seem to be very measured and concentrated in their cyber espionage activities.** They take action for specific reasons if there is a demonstrated weakness in a target. If a target seems to take few measures to protect the home base and its resources, the initiator will exploit the vulnerability. **In the espionage realm, states seem to be doing the least they can, given that their demonstrated capabilities often far outweigh their actual expressions of activity. States will restrain themselves from unleashing the full weight of their cyber capabilities, because the damage done is not worth the costs.** Simple cost-benefit analysis would suggest that this will be the course of cyber operations in the future, yet the discourse takes on a troubling and inflammatory tone, in terms of what others predict. In short, some hype the collective fears in the system for their own ends. **What we end up seeing in this domain is spycraft, not warcraft. Operations are taken to exploit a weakness in security, rather than operations taken to exploit or crush a target.** Choices in the cyber realm are not made based on a need to infiltrate a target, but almost solely on the opportunity to hit a target based on its failures to secure basic protection. **When the walls are down, the state will do what it can to gather information. When the walls are up, the state will be restrained** and will not seek to use methods to break down the walls, because there will be consequences for these actions. **China has been notorious for finding and exploiting gaps in American cyberspace defenses, but it has also sought to limit its conflictual interactions with the United States in most other realms.** In this way, we see cyber espionage activities as a method to make known what can be done in relation to defense gaps, rather than a method to seek exploitation based on offensive capabilities.

No cyber terror threat

Ryan C. Maness, 2015 Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, and Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasgow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, pp. 16-17

Non-state cyber terrorism is relatively weak and benign. To reiterate, our focus here is on state-based actions, but we should make it clear that **non-state actor terrorist initiatives in cyberspace are limited because of the nature of the tactic**— therefore our selection of domains is warranted and critical. Instead of being an easily utilized method of hitting an enemy, as common myths indicate, **extreme cyber actions are generally only available to state-based actors because of the money, time, and skill involved to exploit cyber targets.** We will dive into the reasons for the weakness of non-state/ terrorist actors more fully in Chapter 7, when we examine the process of Cyber Gaza and other operations. Stuxnet is also indicative of this process, and we will explore it in more depth in Chapter 6. In the Stuxnet case, the state actors must have had massive amounts of money and technological knowledge to create, transport, and initiate the cyber weapon. They also must have had assets inside the target willing to help make the operation a success. On top of this, they had to be incredibly lucky (or unlucky, in terms of how Stuxnet was released into the wild). **Paradoxically, powerful states are the only ones who can really marshal offensive cyber capabilities to commit state-**

sponsored cyber terrorism, but they will not utilize this step, since the action would be so costly in terms of reputation.

Cyber threats never go away with more money – that's b/c they aren't real

Evgeny Morozov, 2013 [staff writer, "Battling the Cyber Warmongers," WSJ, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704370704575228653351323986>] MJS 1-2-2017

Ironically, the more we spend on securing the Internet, the less secure we appear to feel.

A 2009 report by Input, a marketing intelligence firm, projected that government spending on cybersecurity would grow at a compound rate of 8.1% in the next five years. A March report from consulting firm Market Research Media estimates that the government's total spending on cybersecurity between now and 2015 is set to hit \$55 billion, with strong growth predicted in areas such as Internet-traffic surveillance and monitoring. **Given the previous history of excessively tight connections between our government and many of its contractors, it's quite possible that the over-dramatized rhetoric of those cheerleading the cyberwar has helped to add at least a few billion dollars to this price tag.** Mr. McConnell's current employer, Booz Allen Hamilton, has just landed \$34 million in cyber security contracts with the Air Force. In addition to writing books on the subject, Richard Clarke is a partner in a security firm, Good Harbor Consulting. Steven Walt, a professor of international politics at Harvard, believes that the nascent debate about **cyberwar presents "a classical opportunity for**

threat inflation." Mr Walt points to the resemblance between our current deliberations about online security and the debate about nuclear arms during the Cold War. Back then, those working in weapons labs and the military tended to hold more alarmist views than many academic experts, arguably because the livelihoods of university professors did not depend on having to hype up the need for arms racing. Markus Ranum, a veteran of the network security industry and a noted critic of the cyber war hype, points to another similarity with the Cold War. Today's hype, he says, leads us to believe that "we need to develop an offensive capability in order to defend against an attack that isn't coming—*it's the old 'bomber gap' all over again: a flimsy excuse to militarize.*" Perfect security—in cyberspace or in the real world—has huge political and social costs, and most democratic societies would find it undesirable. **There may be no petty crime in North Korea, but achieving such "security" requires accepting all other demands of living in an Orwellian police state.** Just like we don't put up armed guards to protect every city wall from graffiti, we should not overreact in cyberspace. For example, a **re-engineering of the Internet** to make it easier to trace the location of cyberattackers, as some have called for, **would surely be expensive, impractical and extremely harmful to privacy.** If today's attacks are mostly anonymous, tomorrow they would be performed using hijacked and fully authenticated computers of old ladies. What is worse, any major re-engineering of the Internet could derail other ambitious initiatives of the U.S. government, especially its efforts to promote Internet freedom. Urging China and Iran to keep their hands off the Internet would work only if Washington sticks to its own advice; otherwise, we are trading in hype. **In reality, we don't need to develop a new set of fancy all-powerful weaponry to secure cyberspace. In most cases the threats are the same as they were 20 years ago;** we still need to patch security flaws, update anti-virus databases and ban suspicious users from our sites. It's human nature, not the Internet, that we need to conquer and re-engineer to feel more secure. But it's through rational deliberation, not fear-mongering, that we can devise policies that will accomplish this.

Cyber Security Failing for Administrative Reasons

<http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Can-cybersecurity-spending-protect-the-US-government> Adam Rice 2016, *Computer Weekly* "Can cybersecurity spending protect the US government?"

When it comes to cybersecurity, the government is big on rules, rules and more rules. It has spent millions on writing down, in painful details, exactly what needs to be done -- and what cannot be done. The Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) has created an environment that's all about compliance with the administration of systems, not securing them. It is true that you can be FISMA compliant and still have a network that the bad guys can infiltrate. **To develop a cybersecurity plan by computer and manage the administrative burden does almost nothing to prevent an advanced persistent threat actor from running roughshod over a network.** but that approach does create lots of work and budget for busy government contractors and employees.

Multitude of reasons why ROK won't proliferate despite assurance being low now

Stangrone 2/29/16—Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade at the Korea Economic Institute of America (Troy, "Going Nuclear Wouldn't Be Easy for South Korea." National Interest. nationalinterest.org/feature/going-nuclear-wouldnt-be-easy-south-korea-15345?page=2)

North Korea has conducted four nuclear tests, pushed boundaries with its missile tests, is pursuing second strike capabilities, and shows no indication of slowing down. South Korea in response has made a strategic bet that closing the Kaesong Industrial Complex can help to create leverage internationally to convince Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear ambitions, but some in Seoul and Washington are suggesting that South Korea should consider developing its own nuclear umbrella as leverage in talks with North Korea. However, *this would be much more difficult than proponents generally acknowledge.* ¶ Since abandoning its own pursuit of nuclear weapons in the 1970s, South Korea has relied on United States *nuclear umbrella* for extended deterrence to prevent either a large scale invasion by the North or a nuclear attack. However, as North Korea continues to advance its nuclear and missile programs in spite of the international sanctions, it is understandable that experts and policy makers would look for new ways of deterring North Korea and incentivizing it to roll back its nuclear weapons and missile programs. ¶ Arguments in favor of South Korea developing an independent nuclear deterrent tend to center around four arguments. First, that once North Korea has a range of deployable nuclear weapons with a second strike capability the military balance on the peninsula will have changed in a dangerous way. Second, that the international community has been ineffective in convincing North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program, jeopardizing South Korea's national security. As a result South Korea needs to take responsibility for its own defense. Only with its own nuclear deterrent would Seoul have the ability to negotiate the elimination or reduction of Pyongyang's program. Third, that whether now or in the future the protection of the United States might become untenable. This is often expressed in the question of whether the United States would risk Los Angeles to save Seoul or concerns over future U.S. defense cuts. And lastly, that the prospect of a nuclear armed South Korea, and potentially Japan, might focus minds in Beijing on resolving the problem of North Korea. ¶ Ads by Adblade ¶ Trending Offers and Articles ¶ You Won't Believe Your Eyes with These Perfectly Timed Pictures! ¶ 13 Child Stars Who Have Changed Over The Years ¶ 22 Dog Breeds Most Likely to Turn on Their Owners! #8 Will surprise you! ¶ The South Korean public has also shown support for domestic nuclear weapon. Polls taken shortly after the closing of the Kaesong Industrial Complex show domestic support ranging from 52.2 percent to 67.7 percent and *polling done by the Asan Institute for Public Policy after North Korea's third nuclear test indicated that South Korean faith in U.S. extended deterrence was waning.* ¶ However, South Koreans are rarely asked if they would be willing to bear the costs of a

domestic nuclear weapon. Those cost would likely come in the form of diminished international standing, economic hardship, and uncertain strategic benefits.¶ For South Korea to develop its own nuclear weapons program it would have to join North Korea as the only country to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), an ignominious club for sure. Withdrawal would dent Seoul's growing international standing and make it the only member of MIKTA, an emerging club of middle powers, to have a nuclear weapon, something which would not enhance South Korea's middle power prestige.¶ While a loss of international stature to ensure domestic security might be an acceptable trade off, *there would likely be economic costs as well.* **Developing a nuclear weapon would have consequences for South Korea's own nuclear industry. Nuclear power provides a third of South Korea's electricity and represents 13 percent of its primary energy consumption.** Lacking adequate domestic reserves of nuclear fuel, **South Korea is dependent upon members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group which conditions supply on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Pursuing a nuclear option would put the fuel supply for South Korea's domestic reactors at risk.**¶ **South Korea also has designs on becoming a major exporter of nuclear power plants.** In 2009, it won a \$40 billion contract to construct and manage four nuclear power plants in the UAE and in 2013 a bid for a research reactor in Jordan. Those deals and **any future potential exports would be put risk.**¶ **South Korea would also potential face economic sanctions.** Iran and North Korea have both faced significant financial and economic sanctions for their pursuit of nuclear weapons, while India and Pakistan faced sanctions as well. *Because South Korea is perhaps one of the world's most trade dependent nations it would be especially vulnerable to external economic pressure.*

Decline in US hegemony inevitable – US should look towards post-unipolar world

Richard **Maher 10**, [Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science department at Brown University, 12/10/10, "The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World," Orbis, Volume 55, Issue 1,

<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438710000633>] MJS

The **decline in the United States' relative position is in part a consequence of the burdens and susceptibilities produced by unipolarity.** Contrary to the conventional wisdom, **the U.S. position** both internationally and domestically **may actually be strengthened once this period of unipolarity has passed.** Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the **end of the Cold War, world politics has been unipolar,** defined by American preponderance in each of the core components of state power—military, economic, and technological. **Such an imbalanced distribution of power in favor of a single country is unprecedented in the modern state system. This material advantage does not automatically translate into America's preferred political and diplomatic outcomes, however. Other states,** if now only at the margins, **are challenging U.S. power and authority.** Additionally, on a range of issues, **the United States is finding it increasingly difficult to realize its goals and ambitions.** The even bigger challenge for policymakers in Washington is how to respond to signs that **America's unquestioned preeminence in international politics is waning.** This decline in the United States'

relative position is in part a consequence of the burdens and susceptibilities produced by unipolarity. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the U.S. position both internationally and domestically may actually be strengthened once this period of unipolarity has passed. On pure material terms, the gap between the United States and the rest of the world is indeed vast. The U.S. economy, with a GDP of over \$14 trillion, is nearly three times the size of China's, now the world's second-largest national economy. The United States today accounts for approximately 25 percent of global economic output, a figure that has held relatively stable despite steadily increasing economic growth in China, India, Brazil, and other countries. Among the group of six or seven great powers, this figure approaches 50 percent. When one takes discretionary spending into account, the United States today spends more on its military than the rest of the world combined. This imbalance is even further magnified by the fact that five of the next seven biggest spenders are close U.S. allies. China, the country often seen as America's next great geopolitical rival, has a defense budget that is one-seventh of what the United

States spends on its military. There is also a vast gap in terms of the reach and sophistication of advanced weapons systems. By some measures, the United States spends more on research and development for its military than the rest of the world combined. What is remarkable is that the United States can do all of this without completely breaking the bank. The United States today devotes approximately 4 percent of GDP to defense. As a percentage of GDP, the United States today spends far less on its military than it did during the Cold War, when defense spending hovered around 10 percent of gross economic output. As one would expect, the United States today enjoys unquestioned preeminence in the military realm. No other state comes close to having the capability to project military power like the United States.¹ And yet, despite this material preeminence, the United States sees its political and strategic influence diminishing around the world. It is involved in two costly and destructive wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, where success has been elusive and the end remains out of sight. China has adopted a new assertiveness recently, on everything from U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, currency convertibility, and America's growing debt (which China largely finances). Pakistan, one of America's closest strategic allies, is facing the threat of social and political collapse. Russia is using its vast energy resources to reassert its dominance in what it views as its historical sphere of influence. Negotiations with North Korea and Iran have gone nowhere in dismantling their nuclear programs. Brazil's growing economic and political influence offer another option for partnership and investment for countries in the Western Hemisphere. And relations with Japan, following the election that brought the opposition Democratic Party into power, are at their frostiest in decades. To many observers, it seems that America's vast power is not translating into America's preferred outcomes. As the United States has come to learn, raw power does not automatically translate into the realization of one's preferences, nor is it necessarily easy to maintain one's predominant position in world politics. There are many costs that come with predominance – material, political, and reputational. Vast imbalances of power create apprehension and anxiety in others, in one's friends just as much as in one's rivals. In this view, it is not necessarily *American* predominance that produces unease but rather *American predominance.* Predominance also makes one a tempting target, and a scapegoat for other countries' own problems and unrealized ambitions. Many a Third World autocrat has blamed his country's economic and social woes on an ostensible U.S. conspiracy to keep the country fractured, underdeveloped, and subservient to America's own interests. Predominant power likewise breeds envy, resentment, and alienation. How is it possible for one country to be so rich and powerful when so many others are weak, divided, and poor? Legitimacy—the perception that one's role and purpose is acceptable and one's power is used justly—is indispensable for maintaining power and influence in world politics. As we witness the emergence (or re-emergence) of great powers in other parts of the world, we realize that American predominance cannot last forever. It is inevitable that the distribution of power and influence will become more balanced in the future, and that the United States will necessarily see its relative power decline. While the United States naturally should avoid hastening the end of this current period of American predominance, it should not look upon the next period of global politics and international history with dread or foreboding. It certainly should not seek to maintain its predominance at any cost, devoting unlimited ambition, resources, and prestige to the cause. In fact, contrary to what many have argued about the importance of maintaining its predominance, America's position in the world—both at home and internationally—could very well be strengthened once its era of preeminence is over. It is, therefore, necessary for the United States to start thinking about how best to position itself in the “post-unipolar” world.

Trump collapses US hegemony—irreversible

Wright 16 Thomas, fellow and director of the Project on International Order and Strategy @ the Brookings Institute, *Politico*, January 16, “Trump’s 19th-century foreign policy,”

<http://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-19th-century-foreign-policy-presidential-campaign/>
//CJC

Thus, beneath the bluster, the ego and the showmanship is the long-considered worldview of a man who has had problems with U.S. foreign policy for decades. Trump has thought long and hard about America’s global role and he knows what he wants to do. There is virtually no chance that he would “tack back to the center” and embrace a conservative internationalist foreign policy. If he did get elected president, he would do his utmost to liquidate the U.S.-

led liberal order by ending America's alliances, closing the open global economy, and **cutting deals with Russia and China**. He would find this hard to do, not least because the entire U.S. foreign policy establishment would be opposed to him and he needs people to staff his National Security Council, State Department and Defense Department. But there is real power in the presidency, especially if there is clear guidance about the chief executive's wishes. In any event, **the mere fact that the American people would have elected somebody with a mandate to destroy the U.S.-led order might be sufficient to damage it beyond repair**. After his election, **other countries will immediately hedge against the risk of abandonment**. **There will be massive uncertainty around America's commitments**. Would Trump defend the Baltics? Would he defend the Senkaku Islands? Or Saudi Arabia? Some nations will give in to China, Russia and Iran. **Others, like Japan, will push back, perhaps by acquiring nuclear weapons**. **Trump may well see such uncertainty as a positive**. **Putting everything in play would give him great leverage**. But by undoing the work of Truman and his secretary of state, Dean Acheson, **it would be the end of the American era**.

No impact to heg – data

Fettweis, 11 Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is *no evidence* to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have *suggest the opposite may be true*. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending \$100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.⁵¹ To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security. "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace."⁵² On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: **The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces**. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. **No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing** occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States

suggests that the current **peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military** spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view *on faith alone*.

Hegemony doesn't produce peace, peace is a product of modern technology

Benjamin H. **Friedman 2014**, [research fellow in defense and homeland security studies. He writes about U.S. defense politics, focusing on strategy, budgeting, and wars, graduate of Dartmouth College, a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and an Adjunct Lecturer at George Washington's Elliot School of International Affairs, "Debating American Engagement: The Future of U.S. Grand Strategy", http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_c_00140] MJS

An increasingly peaceful world. An array of research, some of which Brooks et al. cite, indicates that **factors other than U.S. power are diminishing interstate war and security competition.** These factors **combine to make the costs of military aggression very high, and its benefits low.**³ A **major reason for peace is that conquest has grown more costly. Nuclear weapons make it nearly suicidal in some cases.**⁴ Asia, the region where future great power competition is most likely, **has a "geography of peace":** its maritime and mountainous regions are formidable barriers to conflict. **Conquest also yields lower economic returns than in the past.** Post-industrial economies that rely heavily on human capital and information are more difficult to exploit.⁶ Communications and transport technologies aid nationalism and other identity politics that make foreigners harder to manage. **The lowering of trade barriers limits the returns from their forcible opening.**⁷ Although states are slow learners, they increasingly appreciate these trends. That should not surprise structural realists. Through two world wars, the international system "selected against" hyper aggressive states and demonstrated even to victors the costs of major war. Others adapt to the changed calculus of military aggression through socialization.⁸

When rising power challenges Heg it ends in war w/o concessions

Allison 2015 [Graham Allison, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. "The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?", *The Atlantic*, <<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756>>] //CJC

The defining question about global order for this generation is whether China and the United States can escape Thucydides's Trap. The Greek historian's metaphor reminds us of the attendant dangers when a rising power rivals a ruling power—as Athens challenged Sparta in ancient Greece, or as Germany did Britain a century ago. **Most such contests have ended badly, often for both nations,** a team of mine at the Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs has concluded after analyzing the historical record. **In 12 of 16 cases over the past 500 years, the result was war. When the parties avoided war, it required huge, painful adjustments in attitudes and actions on the part not just of the challenger but also the challenged.**

Based on the current trajectory, war between the United States and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than recognized at the moment. Indeed, judging by the historical record, war is more likely than not. Moreover, current underestimations and misapprehensions of the hazards inherent in the U.S.-China relationship contribute greatly to those hazards. A risk associated with Thucydides's Trap is that business as usual—not just an unexpected, extraordinary event—can trigger large-scale conflict. When a rising power is threatening to displace a ruling power, standard crises that would otherwise be contained, like the assassination of an archduke in 1914, can initiate a cascade of reactions that, in turn, produce outcomes none of the parties would otherwise have chosen.

War, however, is not inevitable. Four of the 16 cases in our review did not end in bloodshed. Those successes, as well as the failures, offer pertinent lessons for today's world leaders. Escaping the Trap requires tremendous effort. As Xi Jinping himself said during a visit to Seattle on Tuesday, "There is no such thing as the so-called Thucydides Trap in the world. But should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves."

Retrenchment solves *LITERALLY EVERYTHING THIS CARD IS FIRE* AF YO--Chris "FLAMES!"--Will SERIOUSLY YOU WILL NEVER LOSE TO HEG IF YOU READ THIS CARD

MacDonald 2011 [Paul MacDonald, professor of political science at Williams College, "Graceful Decline?", *International Security*, <http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00034>] //CJC

Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. **Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades.** In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. **Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility.** Yet **our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness.** Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one's reputation is a greater **geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers.** Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. **Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify**

and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, **periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline.** ^{The}

last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition.⁹³ China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy

adventurism.⁹⁴ Most important, **the United States is not in free fall.** Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate **the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China** sometime in the next decade or two.⁹⁵ Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, **the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal.** The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. **Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness.**⁹⁶ **Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy,** in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. **In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism.** Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. **The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul.**⁹⁷ **U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict.**⁹⁸ **Moreover, Washington’s support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order.**⁹⁹ **A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas.** Indeed, **even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory.**¹⁰⁰ **By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China.** Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. **Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes.**¹⁰¹ Conclusion This article has advanced three main arguments. First, **retrenchment pessimists are incorrect when they suggest that retrenchment is an uncommon policy response to great power decline. States often curtail their commitments and mellow their ambitions as they fall in the ranks of great powers.** ^{Second and related,} declining great powers react in a prompt and proportionate manner to their dwindling fortunes. They do this for the same reason that they tend to seize opportunities to expand: international incentives are strong inducements. In the high-stakes world of great power politics, states can seldom afford to fool themselves or pamper parochial interests when relative power is perilously slipping away. Third, the rate of relative decline explains not only the extent of retrenchment but also the form. The faster the rate of decline, the more likely states are to reform their militaries, increase reliance on allies, and refrain from using force in international disputes. Taken together, **these findings suggest that retrenchment is an attractive strategy for dealing with great power decline.** Although we make no claim that the rate of relative decline explains everything, we suggest that our study represents a solid first cut and that domestic political factors loom too large in discussions of power transitions and hegemonic change. **Retrenchment has a bad reputation, but our findings suggest its benefits are overlooked. Competition spurs states**

to improve themselves, and if done intelligently this makes states better. The historical record gives little cause for despair; spending can be curbed, interest groups controlled, and innovation fostered. And there is a fair chance of rebound; declining powers rise to the challenge of decline so well that they recapture their former glory with some regularity.

Doubling down on spending will create arms race, new cold war, kills coop

Michael **Swaine**, Joseph Prueher, J. Stapleton Roy, Paul Heer, David Lampton, Ezra Vogel, **December 12, 2016** [Swaine is a senior fellow, "How America Can Lead in Asia," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/12/12/how-america-can-lead-in-asia-pub-66428>] MJS 12-22-2016

The security imperatives of China and the United States are potentially, but not inherently, incompatible. They become incompatible only if neither side is willing to accommodate, in some fashion, to the other's fundamental interests. The solution is not for the United States to double down militarily, spending vast amounts of money in a futile attempt to remain militarily predominant across all of maritime East Asia. Such an approach would be virtually certain to result in an intensifying arms race and political rivalry with Beijing that would undermine the basis for vital Sino-U.S. cooperation in other areas. At worst, it could generate a new Cold War that benefits no one. Washington also needs to adapt its security posture in the region to one that the U.S. economy can sustain, and the U.S. polity can endorse, especially given America's myriad domestic priorities.

Arms race causes 2x chance of militarized interstate dispute (MID), chance of war up 5x

Rider 2000 [Toby J. Rider at the Department of Political Science at Texas Tech University, "Taking Arms Against a Sea of Troubles: Conventional Arms Races During Periods of Rivalry." World Bank, 2000. Web. 1 Dec. 2016. <<http://saramitchell.org/Gibleretal.pdf>>] //CJC

In addition to escalation, arms races seem to have an important substantive impact on the likelihood of conflict, especially in comparison with the other variables in our models. For example, as Table II shows, the chance of a MID for strategic rivals more than doubles, from 16% on average to 35% during an arms race year, and the chance of war changes from 1 in 100 to 1 in 20 during arms race years. These results are especially dramatic in comparison with the two other variables that are statistically significant across both models – contiguity increases the probability of both types of conflict by just over 23%, and an alliance decreases these probabilities by more than half.

Pivot and Alliances will not deter – recent history proves.

Ross 2012 Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and an Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, “The Problem With the Pivot: Obama’s New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive,” China US Focus, December, 2012, <http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-problem-with-the-pivot-obamas-new-asia-policy-is-unnecessary-and-counterproductive/>

Even if the United States had limited its response to China’s nationalist diplomacy to improving defense ties with its maritime allies in the region, China’s leaders would not have been pleased. But, those steps were necessary for U.S. security, occurred far from China’s borders, and built on the policies of previous administrations. When Washington got directly involved in China’s sovereignty disputes and increased its presence on China’s land borders, however, Beijing predictably saw this departure from past U.S. policy as gratuitous, expansionist, and threatening. As might be expected from a great power faced with a deteriorating strategic environment, China has pushed back against the pivot with concrete policies rather than the merely aggressive rhetoric it employed in the past. One result has been that China has all but given up its effort to use its leverage over North Korea to get it to abandon its nuclear program. Since 2011, Beijing has substantially increased its food aid to Pyongyang, imported more of North Korea’s mineral resources, and made significant investments in North Korean mining, infrastructure, and manufacturing. China has also withdrawn its support for the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear program, forcing Washington to pursue bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang. Meanwhile, North Korea continues to develop its nuclear weapons capability. The PLA has also put pressure on those of China’s neighbors that have boosted their defense cooperation with the United States. In the spring of 2011, tensions between Beijing and Hanoi escalated as Chinese patrol ships harassed Vietnamese seismic survey boats in disputed waters, and several Chinese military officers advocated the use of force against the Vietnamese navy. Similarly, China’s maritime confrontation earlier this year with the Philippines over the contested Scarborough Shoal suggests that Beijing will push back against countries that rely on the United States to support them in sovereignty disputes. China sent combat-ready patrols to defend its claim to the shoal and, after the Philippines withdrew its ships, established a permanent presence there. Also this year, Chinese national oil companies announced unprecedented plans to drill for oil in disputed waters—the other claimants have been active in these waters for years—and the PLA formed a new military garrison charged with defending the country’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. Since then, China has continued to actively strengthen its presence throughout the disputed waters and islands. As all these events suggest, the Obama administration’s pivot has not contributed to stability in Asia. Quite the opposite: it has made the region more tense and conflict-prone. Military aircraft and naval ships now crowd the region’s skies and waters. And the United States risks getting involved in hostilities over strategically irrelevant and economically marginal islands. If the risk is greatest of an accidental conflict, then it seems counter intuitive to increase the risk of an accident.

Maintaining hegemony causes transition conflicts in Asia – the US will attempt to hold on

Layne '08 - Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, international relations theorist [Christopher Layne, “China’s Challenge to U.S. Hegemony” Current History, January 2008, pages 14-18, <http://acme.highpoint.edu/~msetzler/IR/IRreadingsbank/chinauscontain.ch08.6.pdf> / Alisa Yang]

China’s rise affects the United States because of what international relations scholars call the “power transition” effect: Throughout the history of the modern international state system, ascending powers have always challenged the position of the dominant (hegemonic) power in the international “peaceful rise.” an ascending China inevitably will challenge the geopolitical equilibrium in East Asia. The doctrine of peaceful rise thus is a reassurance strategy employed by Beijing in an attempt to allay others’ fears of growing Chinese power and to forestall the United States from acting

preventively during the dangerous transition period when China is catching up to the United States. Does this mean that the United States and China are on a collision course that will lead to a war in the next decade or two? Not necessarily. What happens in Sino-American relations largely depends on what strategy Washington chooses to adopt toward China. If the United States tries to maintain its current dominance in East Asia, Sino-American conflict is virtually certain, because u s grand strategy has incorporated the logic of anticipatory violence as an instrument for maintaining American primacy. For a declining hegemon, "strangling the baby in the crib" by attacking a rising challenger preventively—that is, while the hegemon still holds the upper hand militarily—has always been a tempting strategic option.

Failure of US China relations results in intensifying international problems – multiple factors. Only a cooperative relationship between the US and China can avoid great power wars, resource scarcity, economic collapse, environmental degradation, and increased carbon emissions

Fingar and Garrett 13 (Thomas Fingar, Stanford University and Banning Garrett, Atlantic Council, September 2013, "China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future," Atlantic Council, [http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/China-US Cooperation Key to the Global Future WEB.pdf](http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/China-US_Cooperation_Key_to_the_Global_Future_WEB.pdf)) DDI – JT

As the megatrends and uncertainties evolve over the coming two decades and beyond, China and the United States, along with the rest of the world, will face unprecedented challenges and unpredictable, disruptive change. We offer three global scenarios to illustrate how the complex megatrends, key uncertainties, and disruptive changes could play out, depending in large part on whether the relationship between China and the United States is primarily cooperative or conflictual. • Global Drift and Erosion: This scenario is characterized by the inability of China and the United States to work together effectively, if at all, to address key global challenges and to resolve regional conflicts. Problems created or exacerbated by the megatrends, key uncertainties, and their interactions worsen, creating a world that is less peaceful, less stable, and less prosperous. The debacle of the 2009 Copenhagen UN climate change conference demonstrated the global impact of the failure of the United States and China to agree on far-reaching steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In this future, the US and China again fail to respond adequately to continuing problems such as economic imbalances associated with the efforts of many countries to break into and then move from middle income status to that of high income. There is disruptive socio-political change related in part to both economic and demographic transitions, and environmental problems involving inadequate energy, water, and food resources. Washington and Beijing could be too preoccupied with political and military competition and territorial disputes in the Western Pacific, as well as by bilateral differences over intellectual property and other trade issues, to tackle these pressing problems. Among possible developments, US-China tensions could adversely affect global responses to energy challenges. These range from threats to security of supplies resulting from conflict in the Middle East and Persian Gulf to the need for a global energy transition away from fossil fuels to minimize carbon emissions and the impact of energy price

volatility on global economic growth. Further, China and the United States also could fail to cooperate in efforts to mitigate the potentially disruptive impact of greatly increased demand for food, water, and other resources created by the addition of more than one billion people to the global population by 2030 as well as possibly two billion or more people to the developing world middle class. Without adequate international cooperation and global governmental mechanisms, this could lead to deeper economic crises, unresolved political conflicts, and worsening environmental conditions.

- **Zero-Sum World:** A second possible trajectory could lead to the emergence of an even more competitive and dangerous zerosum world, in which nations pursue narrow national interests. For example, the world could experience intense monetary and trade protectionism, with countries seeking geopolitical advantage at the expense of international cooperation for the common good. It could see intensifying rivalries, creating hostilities and rendering cooperation on global challenges nearly impossible as global governmental mechanisms break down or are marginalized. In this scenario, the impact of megatrends and critical challenges on global developments is overwhelmingly negative. The world economy is in a tailspin, brought on, perhaps, by a deepening European recession followed by a new meltdown of the global financial system and then a worse recession than that sparked by the 2008 financial crisis. Regional conflicts and disputes in East Asia intensify suspicions and threaten to ignite conflict among the major powers. The United States and China not only fail to cooperate on longer-term global issues but also fail to work together to resolve immediate regional tensions which spin out of control, leading to military conflict that threatens to drag the US and China into direct confrontation.
- **Global Revitalization and Cooperation:** A third possible trajectory could lead to a world in which sustained and effective cooperation builds/rebuilds key institutions to address old and emerging challenges as well as “black swans.” Globalization and global integration continue apace with more successful efforts to mitigate or prepare for negative consequences. This scenario is characterized by greater strategic stability among major powers and by sustained prosperity and economic growth in China, the United States, and most other countries. Through cooperative development and deployment of new technologies countries implement effective measures to manage energy, water, governance, and other challenges. The result would be a wide range of win-win outcomes for all nations. It is difficult to find any credible path to such “global revitalization and cooperation” that does not include a cooperative US-China relationship. This makes efforts to achieve such an outcome imperative for the leaders of both countries, despite the differences and suspicions between them.

US-China co-operation is crucial to solving all global threats and crises – war, warming, resource wars, and more – most qualled

Fingar, Ph.D, et al 13 – (Thomas Fingar is the inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He was the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford during January to December 2009 and holds a Ph.D in political science from Stanford; Banning Garrett is the director of the Asia Program at the Atlantic Council of the United States and also directs the Strategic Foresight Initiative, which works with the National Intelligence Council on their quadrennial long-term assessments, he holds a PhD from Brandeis University and has previously directed the Initiative for US-China Cooperation on Energy and Climate Change at the Asia Society's Center for US-China relations, and was the founding executive director of the Institute for Sino-American International Dialogue at the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver; also includes input by Stephen J. Hadley (former US national security advisor to President George W. Bush). Barry Hughes (Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures, University of Denver), Li Zhaoxing (China Public Diplomacy Association), Qu Xing (China Institute of International Studies), Wang Jisi (Peking University), and Ruan Zongze (CIIS); Published by the China Institute of International Studies, whose staff consists of nearly one hundred researchers and other professionals. Among them are senior diplomats, leading area-study specialists, and preeminent experts in major fields of foreign affairs. Young scholars at CIIS all have advanced university degree in I.R. or related disciplines. Research at the Institute is focused primarily on medium and long-term policy issues of strategic importance, particularly those concerning international politics and world economy. It also includes comments and policy recommendations on the world's major events and hot-spot issues; also cites 20 other professors or directors at research institutes and you can access the full list by clicking the url and going to page 5 of the pdf; September 2013, “China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future,” http://cusef.org.hk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/05_eng.pdf, Accessed 7/8/16, HWilson)

Preface: *Global Future Depends on Depth of China-US Cooperation*

The world has achieved unprecedented peace, prosperity, and inter-dependence, but past achievements — and further progress — are threatened by a host of looming challenges. Global institutions that served us well and transformed the world are becoming victims of their own success and must be reformed or replaced to deal with new challenges and take advantage of new opportunities. Governments everywhere face rising expectations and increasing demands but find themselves less able to manage the challenges they face.

The next round of challenges can only be managed successfully if nations, especially major powers, cooperate. Moreover, the most difficult and most consequential challenges cannot be managed effectively without sustained cooperation between the largest developing country, China, and the largest developed country, the United States. Stated another way, the ability of China and the United States to work together on critical global challenges will determine whether the world is able to sustain and enhance mutually beneficial developments or fails to cope with the issues critical to the global future and to the security and prosperity of the United States and China.

This shared conviction persuades us that we must do more than just hope that our countries will find ways to cooperate. This report represents a joint effort to develop both the rationale and concrete mechanisms for sustained, proactive collaboration to address challenges resulting from long-term global trends and consequential uncertainties. It builds on the findings of independent efforts to identify megatrends and potential game-changers with the goal of developing a framework for the US-China relationship that will better enable us to meet the challenges facing the global community and the strategic needs of both countries.

The Joint Working Group recognizes that China and the United States hold different views on many bilateral and international issues, and that our relationship is constrained by mutual suspicion and strategic mistrust. Nevertheless, our common strategic interests and responsibility as major powers are more important than the specific issues that divide us; we must not make cooperation on critical global issues contingent on prior resolution of bilateral disputes. Our disagreements on bilateral issues are important, but they are not as important to our long-term security and prosperity as is our ability to cooperate on key challenges to global security and our increasingly intertwined futures. We must cooperate on global challenges not as a favor to one another or because other nations expect us to exercise leadership in the international system. We must do it because failure to cooperate on key global challenges will have profoundly negative consequences for the citizens of our own countries.

The Joint Working Group has no illusions about how difficult the task ahead will be. Leaders in both countries face relentless domestic pressures to focus on near-term issues, often to the detriment of long-term interests, as well as on looming US-China bilateral differences and mutual suspicions. This report seeks to illustrate why it is imperative and how it is possible to pursue long- and short-term interests at the same time.

How We Reached Key Assessments and Recommendations

Generous support from the China-United States Exchange Foundation enabled the Atlantic Council and the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) to establish a Joint Working Group of experts from both countries. The members of the group met in Beijing and Washington in the spring and summer of 2012 to compare and integrate the findings of separate Chinese and US draft reports on global trends. The Chinese projection of trends, entitled *Global Trends to 2030 and the Prospects for China-US Relations*, was prepared by CIIS with contributions from the School of International Studies at Peking University. The US report, *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds*, was prepared by the US National Intelligence Council (NIC).^[1] The Atlantic Council contributed to the NIC report and members of the NIC team attended (as observers) the joint assessment meetings.

This review confirmed that the independently developed reports were generally consistent in their assessments of global trends and provided a solid basis for development of scenarios to illustrate what might happen under different assumptions about cooperation between China and the United States. The scenarios in both analyses depict markedly different outcomes for China, the United States, and the world. When China and the United States cooperate to meet looming challenges, both countries benefit. When they fail to cooperate and pursue narrow interests or win-lose or zero-sum outcomes, both countries lose. Continuing down the path of drift and episodic cooperation that we are on now also leads to lose-lose outcomes.

The obvious advantages of win-win outcomes and dangerous implications of behaviors that eschew or minimize cooperation create strong incentives to focus on megatrends, critical challenges, and enhancing the likelihood of success and mutual benefit through close and continuous collaboration. This report outlines the case for collaboration and makes several specific recommendations to make cooperation both possible and fruitful. It was drafted and circulated among group members for revisions and to ensure consensus.

China and the United States have different interests, objectives, and perspectives on many matters, and the number of issues in dispute may well grow as we broaden our bilateral relationship and at times disagree with one another on the world stage. Resolving some of these issues will be difficult and require much time and effort.

The resolution of these contentious issues in the US-China relationship, however, must not be made a prerequisite for cooperation on a limited but arguably more important set of issues with the clear potential to harm both of our interests. Continued drift toward strategic competition and failure to find a balance of interests on core issues will undermine support in both countries for cooperation on major global issues of mutual interest and benefit. Cooperation on shared global challenges may build trust and make it easier to resolve nettlesome bilateral issues. But that would be an ancillary benefit and should not be the primary reason for collaboration on the global challenges identified in the independently prepared studies and summarized elsewhere in this report.

The primary reasons we need to work together on the global challenges are that they cannot be addressed successfully unless we do, and that failure to deal effectively with consequential megatrends will have deleterious consequences for China, the United States, and the world. **It is difficult to envision a stable, prosperous global system absent a US-China relationship that is largely a cooperative one.**

Forces and megatrends that are visible but not well understood today will shape the futures of people everywhere. The list includes consequences of globalization that increase prosperity but also increase demand for water, food, and energy. It also includes demographic change and effects of climate change that will intensify the consequences of other megatrends and make them more difficult to manage. Some of the megatrends and the way they interact will threaten social and political stability unless managed effectively. All have profound implications for governance and global stability. How effectively governments meet and manage these challenges in the next ten to twenty years will determine how beneficial or detrimental they will be for our countries and our children.

Successfully navigating the turbulent waters ahead will require understanding the challenges we face and foresight about the implications of alternative paths. Our common goal must be to avert or ameliorate negative outcomes, and to maximize the chances of achieving desirable outcomes. To accomplish this goal, China and the United States must establish and draw on a continuing dialogue on the evolution, implications, and possible policy responses to the most consequential megatrends, key uncertainties, and disruptive change. The framework and policy recommendations of this report seek to jumpstart that process by suggesting mechanisms for collaboration that begin bilaterally but eventually include other nations critical to finding paths to a better future for all.

I. Critical Importance of China-US Cooperation

The global future is likely to be increasingly volatile and uncertain. The rate of **change is increasing**, driven by the accelerating pace of technological development, unprecedented urbanization and growth of the global middle class, and a wide range of challenges beyond the control of any one country but potentially affecting the prosperity and security of all countries. Disruptive **change in one geographic or functional area will spread** quickly.. **No country**, and certainly not those with the largest populations and largest economies, **will be immune**. Global challenges like ***climate change, food and water shortages, and resource scarcities will shape the strategic context for all nations and require reconsideration of traditional national concerns*** such as sovereignty and *maximizing the ability of national leaders to control their country's destiny*.

What **China and the United States** do, individually and together, **will have a major impact on the future of the global system**. As importantly, our individual fates will be inextricably linked to how that future plays out. The three illustrative **scenarios** sketched out below **underscore how *critical the future of the US-China relationship is to each country and to the world.***

- Global Drift and Erosion (the present world trajectory): In a world in which nations fail to resolve global problems and strengthen mechanisms of global cooperation, **governments gradually turn inward**. Each nation seeks to protect and advance **its own narrow national interests** or to preserve an unsustainable status quo that is rapidly changing in ways that erode the international order. **The international community's lack of ability to cooperate** to meet global challenges **leads to international crises and instability**.

- Zero-Sum World: Unsustainable drift leads to **a world of predominantly zero-sum competition and conflict in the face of severe resource constraints**. **The result is economic crises and internal instability** as well as interstate confrontation. There is risk of **military conflict between major powers**, which increases global mistrust and uncertainty and fosters an "each nation for itself" mentality that **further undermines the ability of states to cooperate** in the face of growing common challenges.

- Global Revitalization and Cooperation: To escape the perils of drift or zero-sum competition, leaders in countries with the most to lose work together to manage and take advantage of global challenges and megatrends. Cooperation makes it possible to achieve win-win outcomes that avoid or mitigate negative consequences of *increased*

demand for resources and the impact of climate change as well as to harness new technologies to improve living conditions through sustainable development.

Cooperation creates and utilizes new transnational institutions to prevent conflict and enhance security for all. China and the United States become more prosperous as we work together.

The possible futures sketched out above (and developed at greater length below) are intended to stimulate thinking about how current trends and uncertainties could lead to very different global and national outcomes. For many reasons, **the United States and China will have greater ability and incentives than other countries to cooperate in determining and shaping developments over the next two decades.** Indeed, **it is very difficult to imagine a pathway to “global revitalization and cooperation” in which China and the United States do not cooperate and provide critical international leadership.**

Many factors will shape the future, some of which are beyond the control of any nation state, but **China and the United States — and the character of the US-China relationship — will be critical.**

The mutual dependence on each other's economic performance and the success of the global economy as a whole was demonstrated during the 2008 financial crisis that began in the United States but quickly spread around the world. US and Chinese leaders recognized that they were in the “same boat” strategically and engaged in a closely coordinated response to the crisis, which played a key—if not decisive—role in preventing the situation from becoming much worse. The need for joint and coordinated responses to economic crises and to mounting economic challenges and threats is certain to increase as globalization continues and interdependence deepens.

Nuclear proliferation results in nuclear war- laundry list of reasons — lack of second strike

Kroenig, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair at Georgetown, **2015**
(Matthew Kroenig, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, "The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?", The Journal of Strategic Studies, 2015 Vol. 38, Nos. 1–2,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273960071_The_History_of_Proliferation_Optimism_Does_It_Have_a_Future] //CJC

The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but **it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used** again simply because they have not been used for some time. After

all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dotcom bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great Recession of the late 2000s.⁴⁸ This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first.

For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will

have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran's nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel's aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use them or lose them pressures. That is, in a crisis, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.⁴⁹ If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli-Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, there is still a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. Iran's theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear armed adversaries. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war.⁵⁰

This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly to the nuclear level. During the Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO's conventional inferiority.⁵¹ As Russia's conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan's military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a US superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also

discussed above, leaders can make a 'threat that leaves something to chance'.⁵² They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war.⁵³ When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel,

with fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, we can see that there is a real risk that a future crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange.

Nuclear proliferation increases the risk of nuclear terrorism-intentional transfers, underdeveloped security, and state collapse

Kroenig, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair at Georgetown, **2015**

(Matthew Kroenig, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, "The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?", The Journal of Strategic Studies, 2015 Vol. 38, Nos. 1–2,

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273960071_The_History_of_Proliferation_Optimism_Does_It_Have_a_Future] //CJC

The spread of nuclear weapons also increases the risk of nuclear terrorism.⁵⁴ While September 11th was one of the greatest tragedies in American history, it would have been much worse had Osama Bin Laden possessed nuclear weapons. Bin Laden declared it a 'religious duty' for Al-Qa'eda to acquire nuclear weapons and radical clerics have issued fatwas declaring it permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad against the West.⁵⁵ Unlike states, which can be more easily deterred, there is little doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they would use them.⁵⁶ Indeed, in recent years, many US politicians and security analysts have argued that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to US national security.⁵⁷ Analysts have pointed out the tremendous hurdles that terrorists would have to overcome in order to acquire nuclear weapons.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that they will eventually fall into terrorist hands increases. States could intentionally transfer nuclear weapons, or the fissile material required to build them, to terrorist groups. There are good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, but, as nuclear weapons spread, the probability that a leader might someday purposely arm a terrorist group increases. Some fear, for example, that Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and Hizballah, might be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even if no state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, a new nuclear state, with underdeveloped security procedures, might be vulnerable to theft, allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or ideologically motivated insiders to transfer dangerous material to terrorists. There is evidence, for example, that representatives from Pakistan's atomic energy establishment met with Al-Qa'eda members to discuss a possible nuclear deal.⁵⁹ Finally, a nuclear-armed state could collapse, resulting in a breakdown of law and order and a loose nukes problem. US officials are currently very concerned about what would happen to Pakistan's nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this problem is only further amplified. Iran is a country with a history of revolutions and a government with a tenuous hold on power. The regime change that Washington has long dreamed about in Tehran could actually become a nightmare if a nuclear-armed Iran suffered a breakdown in authority, forcing us to worry about the fate of Iran's nuclear arsenal.

Heg causes prolif — shortcut to self defense

Van der Linden 2009 [Harry van der Linden is a philosophy professor at Butler University, "Questioning the Resort to U.S. Hegemonic Military Force", *Butler University*,

<http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1075&context=facsch_papers>] //CJC

To further discuss the global security costs of American military hegemony, we must look in some detail at what the options are for countries whose sovereignty might be violated by the United States, whether in the form of a limited military strike or by way of a full-scale war. Given current political reality, these countries will most likely be **non-nuclear powers in the South**. Now **consider that the United States is engaged in an act of aggression against one of those countries**, say, as the United States (on many accounts) was in its 2003 war with Iraq or

with its 1998 cruise missile strike on the al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, Sudan.¹⁰ How should the country under attack respond? Here just war theory (JWT) and a mere calculus of national self-interest will lead to the same answer. **A limited military response against the United States would lead to escalating violence and the ultimate result would be that the country would be defeated by the American military,** as would happen in the case of full-scale war in the first place. So the national self-interest of the country demands that it not respond militarily to a limited American strike, and, in the case that the United States seeks to defeat and occupy the country, it would be better to surrender quickly in order to prevent many casualties and a destroyed infrastructure. According to JWT, the very same response to U.S. aggression should be followed because even though there is a just cause for military action by the attacked country, to opt for it would violate the *jus ad bellum* criteria of reasonable chance of success and proportionality.¹¹ Defeat is certain and the good that may come out of acting on the just cause, such as upholding justice, is intangible and greatly disproportionate to the huge harms that would be engendered by resisting American military force. The country may appeal to the United Nations to take coercive measures against the United States, including military ones, but since the United States has veto power in the U.N. Security Council (and is, at any rate, militarily dominant), we cannot anticipate any action from the United Nations other than some moral support. **Countries in the South can largely avoid this predicament of conventional military powerlessness by creating a credible deterrent against potential U.S. aggression, notably, the acquisition of nuclear weapons.** **Possession of nuclear weapons greatly reduces the chance of conventional war with the United States and would make the United States think twice before ordering limited missile strikes.** Once the United States would have a successful Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, the deterrent impact of a limited nuclear capability by countries in the South might be significantly reduced, but the BMD is still far from reality.¹² Accordingly, **nuclear proliferation is a security cost of American military hegemony.** Recent U.S. national security policy recognizes that nuclear weapons are sought in order “to overcome our nation’s advantage in conventional forces,” but it fails to see that **projecting U.S. military dominance across the globe might be a contributing factor.** Instead, it claims that the weapons are sought “to deter us [America] from responding to aggression against our friends and allies in regions of vital interest.”¹³ To some extent, **the continuing interests of some countries in the South in chemical and biological weapons can be analyzed along similar lines.**

China catching up to the US causes great power war — every historical example proves

Gilpin 2013 [Robert Gilpin is professor of international affairs at Princeton, “Theory of Hegemonic War”, *Policytensor*, <<https://policytensor.com/2013/02/25/theory-of-hegemonic-war/>>] //CJC

What we can say is that China has tremendous war potential. **If China continues to grow rapidly and modernizes its military, China would be able to balance the US perhaps as early as 2025.** The world would then become bipolar. A necessary condition of this first step towards superpower status would be for China to secure its energy supply by becoming militarily preponderant in Central Asia. If it continues to industrialize and grow for another decade or two it would emerge as a serious “peer competitor” to America. The United States will try in vain to shore up its power position, perhaps launching a cold war when it finds itself in relative decline. Initial moves towards such a scenario have already begun with the Obama administration’s initiative to “rebalance towards east Asia”. I think Copeland is right: it will be America that initiates a hawkish containment policy as soon as US policymakers are certain about relative decline. **Once serious decline sets in the US, the governance of the international system will become weak and ineffective. There will most certainly be a struggle for hegemony. Hopefully, it will be a series of localized wars and no nuclear weapons will be used.** Once the Strait of Malacca comes under Chinese protection, everyone will know who the top dog is. **No dominant state in history has ever relinquished its power position without a fight and no rising hegemon has ever established itself as the dominant state in the**

international order without fighting and winning a hegemonic war. **There is no reason to believe that we have somehow passed into post-history** because of some ideational revolution in human consciousness. The rule of force in world affairs has not been transcended. The organizing principle of the international system is still anarchy. The international relations of states are still primarily characterized by power politics.

Decline of hegemony invites great power war

Nye 1995 [Joseph Nye is professor of international relations at Harvard, ""International Conflicts After the Cold War"", *Aspen Institute*, <<http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/nye4152.htm>>] //CJC

There are two general approaches to understanding the causes of international conflict. Realists argue that "wars arise from the efforts of states to acquire power and security in an anarchic world." [p. 66] Realism implies a pessimistic view of the usefulness of international institutions in preventing conflicts. Strong international institutions can only exist when there is sufficient agreement among the great powers to allow them to exist. Disharmony among great powers makes strong international institutions impossible. Liberals argue that conflicts "are determined not only by the balance of power, but by the domestic structure of states, their values, identities and cultures and international institutions for conflict resolution." [p. 66] Liberalism supports trade, since trade makes nations more interdependent, and so less likely to go to war. Liberals also note the democratic nations

almost never war against one another. Nye argues that neither view is adequate on its own. By drawing upon elements of both perspectives, **Nye describes two sources of great power conflict.** First, **power transitions often lead to conflict.** **Declining nations may attempt to put down rising competitors.** **Sensing weakness, growing nations may attack declining ones to secure a more favorable place in the international system.** The present era is one of dramatic power transitions. However, Nye argues that "the United States is the only true superpower, with global assets in all the dimensions of power." [p. 67] **Were the U.S. in decline, great powers conflict would be more likely.** **As it stands the U.S.'s enduring and clearly superior position tends to stabilize the international system.**

Conflict goes nuclear – can't tell whether attacks are conventional or attempts to destroy other side's nukes

Talmadge 16 – Caitlin Talmadge, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at Elliot School of International Relations at George Washington University, February 2016 ("Preventing Nuclear Escalation in U.S.-China Conflict", Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/china_policy_brief_talmadge_0.pdf) //CJC

Conventional war between the United States and China remains a low-probability event. **But if such a war were to break out, the risk of nuclear escalation**—that is, actual detonation of nuclear weapons—likely **would be higher** than many observers realize. Some **aspects of a likely U.S. campaign** in a conventional war against China could look to China like an attempt at conventional counterforce, **pressuring China to escalate to nuclear use while it still could.** This escalation scenario is distinct from other possible pathways to nuclear use. For example, **in the Cold War the classic scenario for escalation was pre-emption**, the notion that one side might try to use its nuclear weapons to pre-emptively destroy the arsenal of the other. Other scenarios for nuclear escalation include **mistaken launch** based on faulty warning information, **and unauthorized launch** by a commander who is physically able to use nuclear weapons but does not have political permission to do so. In addition, some states develop doctrines that deliberately threaten to escalate to the first use of nuclear weapons in the event of rapid conventional losses. **Nuclear escalation in response to an opponent's perceived attempt at conventional counterforce constitutes an alternative** pathway to nuclear escalation. **It can arise when one side's conventional military campaign infringes or appears**

poised to infringe on the other side's ability to use or control its nuclear arsenal. For example, conventional military attacks by one side against the other's command and control networks, air defenses, early warning radars, submarines, and missile sites have the potential not only to degrade that side's conventional capabilities but also its nuclear capabilities. After all, command and control networks for conventional forces may also be relevant to the control of nuclear weapons; air defense systems may protect both conventional and nuclear assets; early warning radars are relevant to both conventional and nuclear operations; attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines share shore-based infrastructure, with the former often protecting the latter; and the same sites can house both conventional and nuclear missiles (called co-location).

For all of these reasons, a state subject to attack on these targets may have a difficult time distinguishing whether the adversary is merely conducting a normal conventional campaign, or is seeking to neuter the state's nuclear capabilities. If the state fears the latter, it may wish to escalate to nuclear use while it still has the ability to do so. Such fears also could lead the state to engage in behaviors that make other pathways to escalation more likely. For example, the state could opt for more decentralized control of nuclear weapons, which would reduce vulnerability to conventional counterforce but heighten the danger of unauthorized launch.

Nuclear winter causes extinction

SHULMAN 2013 (Carl Shulman is a Research Fellow at the Machine Intelligence Research Institute, Some notes on existential risk from nuclear war, December 9, http://lesswrong.com/lw/jb9/some_notes_on_existential_risk_from_nuclear_war/)

If harm from explosions, fire, radiation, and the collapse of infrastructure were the only causes of death, then at least some humans would be able to survive, even in a much reduced state: the damage would be non-uniform, and survivors could sustain a population at some level. The damage would also spare some countries and regions. Nuclear winter makes civilizational collapse and extinction more plausible because it provides a mechanism for nuclear weapons to disrupt food supplies worldwide. If survivors of initial damage find themselves unable to produce or collect food to sustain themselves anywhere, then human extinction would result as soon as stockpiles were exhausted. Nuclear winter would result from burning cities under the right conditions propelling material into the upper atmosphere and blocking solar radiation, cooling the Earth to a degree dependent upon the number and magnitude of firestorms (among other things). The effect would decay over time, most rapidly at first, as the material gradually fell.

Neither relative nor absolute decline is inevitable but the US must choose to maintain primacy—reject their ahistorical analysis

Merry, The National Interest Editor, **12** [Robert W., 2/8/12, The National Interest, "Understanding America's Fall," nationalinterest.org/commentary/understanding-americas-fall-6473] //CJC

Kagan goes after the notion, put forth by Harvard's Stephen Walt and others, that while American power remains relatively strong, the country no longer has the capacity to have its way over as much of the globe as in the past. Kagan argues that nothing much has changed there. Since 1945, he writes, the challenge of maintaining America's position in the

world and fostering global stability has always generated defeats, frustrations and embarrassments along with the triumphs. "We tend to think back on the early years of the Cold War as a moment of complete American global dominance," he writes. "They were nothing of the sort." He provides some pretty good history of those years' foreign tribulations, including the communist takeover of China, the Korean War agony, the loss of America's nuclear monopoly, Suez, the Vietnam debacle and Japan's economic rise. All of these things led **many in America to decry the country's loss of relative power in the world, and yet America always managed to spring back.** And there certainly were times akin to today when America truly did lose standing in the world and things could have gone badly—most notably the late 1970s, when the U.S. economy faltered, Soviet adventurism was on the rise, Mideast oil politics was turning against America and the Iranian hostage crisis was at full intensity. And yet American ingenuity and resilience once again prevailed, and under Ronald Reagan the country came back with greater force than ever, remediating its faulty economy and out-competing the Soviets into oblivion. "The difficulties in shaping the international environment in any era are immense," writes Kagan. "Few powers even attempt it, and even the strongest rarely achieve all or even most of their goals."

That's why, he avers, **"preserving the present world order requires constant American leadership and constant American commitment."** In the end, he says, **the decision is in the hands of Americans. "Decline, as Charles Krauthammer has observed, is a choice. It is not an inevitable fate"**—at least not yet." Here's where the analysis gets a bit ragged. Contra Krauthammer, **great powers** never make a "choice" to slip into decline. They **may choose to accept the decline that fate forces upon them**, as Britain eventually did. But **the choice is really over what kinds of policies a great power wishes to pursue on the global stage and whether those policies will bolster or undermine its global status.** Hence, Kagan's catalogue of America's Cold War defeats and difficulties is instructive but perhaps not precisely as he intends. He seems to be saying that all great powers experience such defeats and difficulties, so we should just go for it. A better lesson is that such experiences suggest caution, a measured approach to foreign policy that preserves power for when it's really needed and places power bets that are commensurate with the possible payoff—and the risks involved.

US hegemony is unique from past eras – empirics irrelevant

Michael **Beckley 12**, [research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2012, "China's Century?," *International Security*, Vol. 36, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Chinas_Century.pdf] MJS

At its core, the debate about U.S. decline is a debate about the relevance of history. Declinists contend that history tends to repeat itself and that the history of world politics can be characterized as a "succession of hegemonies,"⁸ as the recurrent "rise and fall of the great powers,"⁹ as an "observable pattern of great power emergence,"¹⁰ or as a series of "long cycles."¹¹ The Habsburg, French, and British Empires were defeated and surpassed by rising challengers. **It is therefore natural for America's "unipolar moment" to be similarly consigned to the ash-heap of history.**¹² Several established academic theories underpin this cyclical view of history. First, declinists fuse hegemonic stability theory with traditional balance of power theory.¹³ In this view, the United States, like Great Britain in the nineteenth century, supplies the world with public goods. Weaker states not only free-ride on these services, but also engage in sabotage, erecting diplomatic and economic obstacles to U.S. initiatives and forming anti-American alliances.¹⁴ As a result, others rise while the United States suffers from "imperial overstretch."¹⁵ Second is the theory of convergence and its claim that, in an open global economy, poor countries tend to grow faster than rich countries.¹⁶ China, like Germany, Japan, and South Korea before it, can reap the "advantages of backwardness," adopting modern technologies

and methods while skipping the long, arduous process of inventing them.¹⁷ Meanwhile U.S. investment in foreign countries “tends to abort the reinvigoration of the American domestic economy and its technical infrastructure.”¹⁸ Globalization thus stimulates growth abroad while undercutting it at home, diffusing not just technology but also technological and military capabilities. **By contrast, the basic argument of the alternative perspective is that the laws of history do not apply to contemporary world politics. The United States is not like Britain**; rather, its “combination of quantitative and qualitative material advantages is unprecedented, and it translates into a unique geopolitical position.”¹⁹ **Moreover, China is not like past rising challengers**; “its emergence is occurring in the context of a transformation in the manner in which production is organized, a shift that makes China’s rise categorically different from that of predecessors such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea.”²⁰ In sum, the declinist perspective emphasizes how U.S. hegemony and the current global economy resemble those of past eras, whereas the alternative perspective emphasizes how they are unique. I elaborate these two focal points of debate below.

The rise of China does not lead to the decline of US hegemony

Michael **Beckley 12**, [research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2012, “China’s Century?,” *International Security*, Vol. 36, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Chinas_Century.pdf] MJS

According to the Global Language Monitor, which tracks the top 50,000 media sources throughout the world, the “rise of China” has been the most read-about news story of the twenty-first century, surpassing the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Iraq War, the election of Barack Obama, and the British royal wedding.¹ One reason for the story’s popularity, presumably, **is that the rise of China entails the decline of the United States**. While China’s economy grows at 9 percent annually, the United States reels from economic recession, costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and massive budget deficits. This divergence in fortunes has produced two pieces of conventional wisdom in U.S. and Chinese foreign policy debates.² First, the United States is in decline relative to China. Second, **much of this decline is the result of globalization—the integration of national economies and resultant diffusion of technology from developed to developing countries—and the hegemonic burdens the United States bears to sustain globalization**. *An alternative*, though less prevalent, *perspective rejects both of these assumptions*.³ In this view, **U.S. power is durable, and globalization and America’s hegemonic role are the main reasons why**. The United States derives competitive advantages from its preponderant position, and globalization allows it to exploit these advantages, attracting economic activity and manipulating the international system to its benefit. Resolving the debate between these two perspectives is imperative for prudent policymaking. If proponents of the dominant, or “declinist,” perspective are correct, then the United States should contain China’s growth by “[adopting] a neomercantilist international economic policy” and subdue China’s ambitions by “disengag[ing] from current alliance commitments in East Asia.”⁴ If, however, the United States is not in decline, and if globalization and hegemony are the main reasons why, then the United States should do the opposite: it should contain China’s growth by maintaining a liberal international economic policy, and it should subdue China’s ambitions by sustaining a robust political and military presence in Asia. With few exceptions, however, existing studies on the decline of the United States and the rise of China suffer from at least one of the following shortcomings.⁵ First, most studies do not look at a comprehensive set of indicators. Instead they paint impressionistic pictures of the balance of power, presenting tidbits of information on a handful of metrics. In general, this approach biases results in favor of the

declinist perspective because most standard indicators of national power—for example, gross domestic product (GDP), population, and energy consumption—conflate size with power and thereby overstate the capabilities of large but underdeveloped countries. For example, in a recent study Arvind Subramanian contends that “China's dominance is a sure thing” based on “an index of dominance combining just three factors: a country's GDP, its trade (measured as the sum of its exports and imports of goods), and the extent to which it is a net creditor to the world.”⁶ The United States and China, however, are each declining by some measures while rising in terms of others. To distinguish between ascendance and decline writ large, therefore, requires analyzing many indicators and determining how much each one matters in relation to others. Second, many studies are static, presenting single-year snapshots of U.S. and Chinese power. This flaw tends to bias results in favor of the alternative perspective because the United States retains a significant lead in most categories. The key question, however, is not whether the United States is more powerful than China at present, but whether it will remain so in the future. Without a dynamic analysis, it is impossible to answer this question. This study addresses these shortcomings by comparing the United States and China across a large set of economic, technological, and military indicators over the past twenty years. The results are mixed, but the bulk of the evidence supports the alternative perspective. Over the last two decades, globalization and U.S. hegemonic burdens have expanded significantly, yet the United States has not declined; in fact it is now wealthier, more innovative, and more militarily powerful compared to China than it was in 1991. China has narrowed the gap in terms of GDP and now exports a greater volume of high-technology products and employs more scientists than any country in the world. However, GDP correlates poorly with national power; more than 90 percent of China's high-tech exports are produced by foreign firms and consist of low-tech components; and China's quantitative advantage in scientists has not yet translated into qualitative advantages in innovation. The United States suffers from a huge debt problem that its political system appears ill-suited to solve. China, however, faces its own fiscal mess, which may be more intractable than America's. The widespread misperception that China is catching up to the United States stems from a number of analytical flaws, the most common of which is the tendency to draw conclusions about the U.S.-China power balance from data that compare China only to its former self. For example, many studies note that the growth rates of China's per capita income, value added in high-technology industries, and military spending exceed those of the United States and then conclude that China is catching up. This focus on growth rates, however, obscures China's decline relative to the United States in all of these categories. China's growth rates are high because its starting point was low. China is rising, but it is not catching up.⁷

Hegemony is declining now—shifts to Asia and decreasing military spending gap

Suslov 14 – National Research University Higher School of Economics (Dmitry, “US Global Leadership Dilemma as a Challenge for the US-Russia Relations,” p. 3-6, February 20, 2014)
//AGK

The central challenge that the US faces today is that in less than 20 years since **the US** declared victory in the Cold War, **became the only superpower and quickly assumed the role of a center of the unipolar world, a global leader** and manager of its own international system with a global reach, a global sheriff and bearer of values that seemed universal, it faced a sudden and comprehensive economic, foreign policy and political crisis.² The magnitude and

shock of this crisis, which is still to be realized and comprehended, is no less dramatic, than the history of the US rise itself, which in 200 years turned itself from a colony to the only superpower and center of a unipolar world.³ Indeed, the US history

is a history of unprecedented success, expansion and dynamism. Moreover, until now it seemed as if the historic development itself was "proving" the basic American ideological assumptions: that it is an exceptional nation with universal values, which is destined to lead the world to a universal democratic peace. But as soon as the US reached the apex and, it appeared as if a key and decisive moment has come for the US to fulfill its historic mission – transform the international system in accordance with the US interests and values – something went wrong.⁴ In the economy, the US, still being the biggest nation-state economy in the world, most diversified and traditionally dynamic and technologically advanced among the developed economies, still the founder and most influential player of the global economic governance institutions, became the center of the deepest economic crisis since the Great Depression. The major pillar of the world economic order has become its major problem. The role the US plays in global economic and financial governance is increasingly at odds with the volume of its foreign debt and to American monetary policies (printing more dollars). It takes a much longer time than it used to be for the US to resume growth after crisis (and the ways out of the current "Great Recession" are unclear).

Unemployment is high (for US standards) and not reducing. Finally, for the 1st time in a century **the US is losing an image of the most vibrant, dynamic economy and foundation of the world's economic**

growth to China.⁵ China, India, other **"new rising centers" and Asia as a whole are perceived today as the "last hope" of the world economy, not the US.** While trust in the US

economic dynamism and progress has been one of the major foundations of American soft and hard power. Symbolic (in terms of determining perceptions of the vector, which is of utmost importance in today world) is a comparison between the

booming Shanghai with the aging infrastructure in the US. Politically, the US is facing unprecedented in recent decades and self-destructing polarization between Democrats and Republicans, which can hardly find anything to agree upon in both domestic and foreign policies, and their mutual diminishing popularity and loss of appeal – witness the Tea Party movement. Both Parties, and especially the Republicans, are undergoing dangerous transformation, with the traditional center depleting and the center of gravity going to the flanks, which aggravates polarization. This means that for the next years the US political system will remain to be paralyzed, and thus reducing effectiveness of the US domestic and foreign policies, reducing a US capacity to act as a responsible and a reliable partner. In foreign and national security policy the US faces a crisis of leadership and military overextension.⁶ It turned out that indispensable of all its power preponderance and global presence, its diplomatic, military, economic, ideological, cultural and other instruments and assets, it is incapable of directing development of the international system in a way favorable for the US, incapable of transforming the world as it wishes. **Despite the fact that the US is still**

the most powerful nation on Earth – militarily, diplomatically and economically, despite its efforts to consolidate unipolarity and global leadership under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush and

renew its global leadership under Barack Obama, despite its efforts to transform the international system in accordance with the US interests and values, *the world is clearly*

developing in a way unfavorable for the United States.⁷ And quite notably, that it started developing that way after the US acquired a hegemonic positions in the world. The US

has failed to preserve itself as an undisputed pole of a unipolar system. The "unipolar moment" was indeed a moment, while "unipolar stability" turned out to be a fake in the global context. The US has failed to achieve the macro- and micro tasks in the sphere of global security it was claiming to deal with during the last 2 decades. Afghanistan and Iraq, democratization and modernization of the Broader Middle East, Arab-Israeli conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, etc. – in all or majority of cases the situation is worse than before the American "management". There are reasons to say that Libya and Syria will follow these examples. Power is shifting from the West, including the US, to the rising centers, especially in Asia, and also diffusing more broadly among multiple actors.⁸ Thus, it is increasingly difficult for the US to consolidate and organize others to fulfill an American agenda: these others are more and more either unwilling or demand a bigger price for their cooperation. The examples of Syria, Iran, North Korea, Middle Eastern conflict, US-Chinese relations, global climate change, nuclear reduction agenda, etc. vividly depict that the capacity of the US to determine and drive events, both multilaterally and unilaterally, has reduced. As the power of the "new centers" rise, while the US relative and even absolute (decreasing defense budget and Armed Forces personnel, unwillingness of the Americans to fight new wars, economic troubles, deficit) power decreases, the US needs these new power centers to fulfill its agenda and pursue – sometimes vital - national interests. However, unless there is a convergence of interests, which is far from being the rule, these centers are unwilling to cooperate. Due to the diffusion of power the correlation of interests between the US and its allies and partners is becoming more complicated and non-linear. On some cases they can be strong supporters of the US policy, while on the other, sometimes no less important ones for the US, they create difficulties. Turkish policies on Syria on the one hand, and on Iran and Iraq, on the other hand, is a bright example of this complexity. This puts additional limits on American leadership. The world is again becoming pluralistic and heterogeneous in terms of values. Universality of the American values is again under fire, which undermines the US basic ideological beliefs and world perceptions.⁹ The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that the capacity of the US military power to fulfill the necessary political targets – promoting democratization and overall reform of the international system through forceful regime change from the outside - was limited, and that the US is incapable to pursue an imperial foreign policy in the current conditions – just as all the other great powers. Besides these wars guarantee that the US will not return to an imperial practice in the observable future – which is already stipulated on the official level in Obama Administration's Strategic Defense Guidance in 2012 (rejection of long-term occupation).¹⁰ This significantly reduces the transformative component in the US Grand Strategy as such, making it to do more with the US "conventional" national

interests, rather than with transformation of the international system, especially with the help of the military force. Moreover, these **wars have exhausted**

the US military, decreased American physical capability and moral will to engage in new wars (witness the Obama Administration's approach on Libya, Syria and Iran), and contributed

to a situation, when the US was compelled to start reducing its defense budget and reviewing its global defense role and responsibility. The latter is illustrated in the 2012

Strategic Defense Guidance and the 2011 "National Strategic Narrative" paper by "Mr.Y".¹¹

This contrasts with dynamic increase of the new poles' defense budgets, including

China, Russia and India. For the 1st time since the end of the Cold War **the gap in military**

expenditures between the US and the nonWestern power centers started to shrink. It is still enormous, but dynamic and vector matter. This all makes the future of the American global leadership in the increasingly multipolar and even polycentric world the central problem of the US foreign policy for the years to come.¹² The **major challenge that the US faces is how to adapt itself to the new international conditions**, what kind of modus operandi to employ, **to preserve the US primacy and leadership and reverse the tendency of the international environment becoming less favorable for the US.** This adaptation was – and still is – at the core of the Obama's Grand Strategy. Another answer to the same question is provided by the Republicans.

US Latin America Democracy promotion is imperialism and causes interventions

Gilbert 2008 [Steven Gilbert at Eastern Michigan University, "The U.S. Policy of Democracy Promotion in Latin America", *Eastern Michigan University*, <<http://commons.emich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1147&context=honors>>] //CJC

The U.S. policy of democracy promotion in Latin America has consisted of promoting governments that are favorable to U.S. political and economic interests rather than democracy itself. While the U.S. claims to have a tradition of "promoting democracy" in Latin America, justification for U.S. intervention has been questionable and inconsistent. **U.S. support for Latin American regimes has coincided with favorable economic policies rather than with the strength of democracy within a country.** Historically, **the protection of resources for extraction has been one of the main goals of U.S. policy in Latin America.** U.S. A historical overview of U.S. relations in Latin America shows that the promotion of democracy is secondary to economic and social factors. **Relations between the U.S. and Latin America show that the U.S. has used democracy promotion as cover for U.S. imperialism in Latin America.** During the Cold War, the U.S. supported anticommunist regimes that were often undemocratic because they were capable of protecting U.S. interests. Since the mid-1980s, we have seen a wave of democratization in Latin America and an embrace of market democracy. U.S. relations in Latin America since the end of the Cold War reveal that the U.S. is merely changing its means of establishing U.S. friendly governments by promoting low-intensity democracy. This low-intensity democracy is characteristic polyarchy, in which elites who adhere to the neoliberal model control the government. **When democratic governments within Latin America have veered too far from this outline for democracy and have threatened U.S. interests, the U.S. has intervened to undermine and attempt to overthrow these governments.**

US military leadership key to defusing global threats – terrorism, pandemics, climate

Brooks, Dartmouth government professor, et al., 13 [Brooks, Stephen G., Ikenberry, G. John, Wohlforth, William C., STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Foreign Affairs, "Lean Forward", Jan/Feb2013, Vol. 92, Issue 1, Academic Search Complete, accessed 7-2-13, AFB] //CJC

CREATING COOPERATION. What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability. U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds."

Heg decline inevitable — only abandoning aggressive unilateral democracy promotion and focusing on building multilateral international liberal order solves

Fujimoto 2012 [Kevin, "Preserving US National Security Interests Through a Liberal World Construct," *Strategic Studies Institute*. Accessed at: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Preserving-US-National-Security-Interests-Liberal-World-Construct/2012/1/11.>] //DNP

The emergence of peer competitors, not terrorism, presents the greatest long-term threat to our national security. Over the past decade, while the United States concentrated its

geopolitical focus on fighting two land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, China has quietly begun implementing a strategy to emerge as the dominant imperial power within Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Within the next 2 decades, **China will likely replace the United States as the Asia-Pacific regional hegemonic power,** if not replace us as the global superpower.¹

Although **China presents its rise as peaceful** and non-hegemonic, **its construction of naval bases in neighboring countries and military expansion in the region contradict** that

argument. With a credible threat to its leading position in a unipolar global order, **the United States should adopt a grand strategy of "investment," building legitimacy and capacity in**

the very institutions that will protect our interests in a liberal global construct of the future **when we are no longer the dominant imperial power.** Similar to the Clinton era's grand

strategy of "enlargement,"² investment supports a world order predicated upon a system of basic rules and principles, however, it differs in that the **United States should concentrate on**

the institutions (i.e., United Nations, World Trade Organization, ASEAN, alliances, etc.) **that support a world order, as opposed to expanding democracy** as a system of governance for other sovereign nations.

Despite its claims of a benevolent expansion, China is already executing a strategy of expansion similar to that of Imperial Japan's Manchukuo policy during the 1930s.³ This three-part strategy involves: "(i) (providing) significant investments in economic infrastructure for extracting natural resources; (ii) (conducting) military interventions (to) protect economic interests; and, (iii) . . . (annexing) via installation of puppet governments."⁴ China has already solidified its control over neighboring North Korea and Burma, and has similarly begun more ambitious engagements in Africa and Central Asia where it seeks to expand its frontier.⁵ Noted political scientist Samuel P. Huntington provides further analysis of the motives behind China's imperial aspirations. He contends that "China (has) historically conceived itself as encompassing a "Sinic Zone" . . . (with) two goals: to become the champion of Chinese culture . . . and to resume its historical position, which it lost in the nineteenth century, as the hegemonic power in East Asia."⁶ Furthermore, China holds one quarter of the world's population, and rapid economic growth will increase its demand for natural resources from outside its borders as its people seek a standard of living comparable to that of Western civilization. The rise of peer competitors has historically resulted in regional instability and one should compare "the emergence

of China to the rise of. . . Germany as the dominant power in Europe in the late nineteenth century."⁷ Furthermore, **the rise of another peer**

competitor on the level of the Soviet Union of the Cold War ultimately **threatens U.S. global influence, challenging its concepts of human rights, liberalism, and democracy;** as well as

its ability to co-opt other nations to accept them.⁸ This **decline in influence,** while initially limited to the Asia-Pacific region, **threatens to result in significant conflict** if it ultimately leads

to a paradigm shift in the ideas and principles that govern the existing world order. A grand strategy of investment **to address the threat of China requires investing in institutions,**

addressing ungoverned states, and building legitimacy through multilateralism. The United

States must build capacity in the existing institutions and alliances accepted globally as legitimate representative bodies of the world's governments. For true legitimacy, the United States must support these institutions, not only when convenient, in order to avoid the appearance of unilateralism, which would ultimately undermine the very organizations upon whom it will rely when it is no longer the global hegemon. The United States must also address ungoverned states, not only as breeding grounds for terrorism, but as conflicts that threaten to spread into regional instability, thereby drawing in superpowers with competing interests. Huntington proposes that the greatest source of conflict will come from what he defines as one "core" nation's involvement in a conflict between another core nation and a minor state within its immediate sphere of influence.⁹ For example, regional instability in South Asia¹⁰

threatens to involve combatants from the United States, India, China, and the surrounding nations. Appropriately, **the United States,** as a global power, **must** apply all elements of its national power now to **address the**

problem of weak and failing states, which threaten to serve as the principal catalysts of

future global conflicts.¹¹ Admittedly, the application of American power in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation raises issues. Experts have posed the question of whether the United States should act as the world's enforcer of stability, imposing its concepts of human rights on other states. In response to this concern, The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty authored a study titled, The Responsibility to Protect,¹² calling for revisions to the understanding of sovereignty within the United Nations (UN) charter. This commission places the responsibility to protect peoples of sovereign nations on both the state itself and, more importantly, on the international community.¹³ If approved, this revision will establish a precedent whereby the United States has not only the authority and responsibility to act within the internal affairs of a repressive government, but does so

with global legitimacy if done under the auspices of a UN mandate. **Any effort to legitimize and support a**

liberal world construct requires the United States to adopt **a multilateral doctrine which**

avoids the precepts of the previous administration: "preemptive war, democratization, and U.S. primacy of unilateralism,"¹⁴ which have resulted in the alienation of former allies worldwide.

Predominantly Muslim nations, whose citizens had previously looked to the United States as an example of representative governance, viewed the Iraq invasion as the seminal dividing action between the Western and the Islamic world. Appropriately, any future American interventions into the internal affairs of another sovereign nation must first seek to establish consensus by gaining the approval of a body representing global opinion, and must reject military unilateralism as a threat to that governing body's legitimacy. Despite the long-standing U.S. tradition of a liberal foreign policy since the start of the Cold War, the famous liberal leviathan, John Ikenberry, argues that "the post-9/11 doctrine of national security strategy . . . has been based on . . . American global dominance, the preventative use of force, coalitions of the willing, and the struggle between liberty and evil."¹⁵

American foreign policy has misguidedly focused on spreading democracy, as opposed to building a liberal international order based on universally accepted principles that actually set the conditions for individual nation states to select their own system of governance.

Anne-Marie Slaughter, the former Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, argues that true Wilsonian idealists "support liberal democracy, but reject the possibility of democratizing peoples . . ."¹⁶ and reject military primacy in favor of supporting a rules-based system of order. **Investment in a liberal world order would also set the conditions for the United States to garner support from noncommitted regional**

powers (i.e., Russia, India, Japan, etc.), or "swing civilizations," in countering China's increasing hegemonic influence.¹⁷ These states reside within close proximity to the Indian Ocean, which will likely emerge as the geopolitical focus of the American foreign policy during the 21st century, and appropriately have the ability to offset China's imperial dominance in the region.¹⁸ Critics of a liberal world construct argue that idealism is not necessary, based on the assumption that nations that trade together will not go to war with each other.¹⁹ In response, foreign affairs columnist Thomas L. Friedman rebukes their arguments, acknowledging the predicate of commercial interdependence as a factor only in the decision to go to war, and argues that while globalization is creating a new international order, differences between civilizations still create friction that may overcome all other factors and lead to conflict.²⁰ Detractors also warn that as China grows in power, it will no longer observe "the basic rules and principles of a liberal international order," which largely result from Western concepts of foreign relations. Ikenberry addresses this risk, citing that China's leaders already recognize that they will gain more authority within the existing liberal order, as opposed to contesting it. China's leaders "want the protection and rights that come from the international order's . . . defense of sovereignty,"²¹ from which they have benefitted during their recent history of economic growth and international expansion. Even if China executes a peaceful rise and the United States overestimates a Sinic threat to its national security interest, the emergence of a new imperial power will challenge American leadership in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region. That being said, it is more likely that China, as evidenced by its military and economic expansion, will displace the United States as the regional hegemonic power. Recognizing this threat now,

the United States must prepare for the eventual transition and immediately begin building the legitimacy and support of a system of rules that will protect its interests later when we are no longer the world's only superpower.

Elevating democracy instead of accepting diverse regimes causes policy failure and backlash against every U.S. priority

Jones, 2011 (Bruce, Director of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, director of the Managing Global Order project and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at The Brookings Institution, senior external advisor for the World Bank's World Development Report 2011 on Conflict, Security, and Development, consulting professor at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, "Managing a Changing World," Foreign Policy, March 14, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/14/building_the_new_world_order?page=full) //CJC

Finally, it is important to touch on what may be the most contentious of issues between the United States and the emerging powers, namely human rights. On basic human rights issues, the key dynamic will be between the West and China. Neither domestic reality, nor good strategy, will allow the United States to ignore the human rights issues with China. But U.S. diplomacy on the issue should be cognizant of the relatively limited impact that outside pressure will have on China's evolution and the broader context to the relationship—a balance admirably struck by President Obama during President Hu Jintao's January 2011 visit to Washington. President Hu's acknowledgment that China had "issues" with human rights was a mild opening, but certainly one worth pursuing. More broadly, **using human rights standards or issues of democracy promotion as a yardstick for cooperation will backfire.**

On both issues, **emerging power behavior combines a defense of sovereignty** (fundamental to their security) **with a tradition of resisting western interventionism.** Democratic India, Brazil and South Africa routinely vote with their NAM friends and against the West in the Human Rights Council. Moreover, while issues like "the responsibility to protect" are presumed to divide the "West from the rest," and do so in rhetoric, reality is more complex. India and South Africa spoke out strongly against NATO's action in Kosovo, which was supported by the Organization

of Islamic Countries; France, Russia and Germany banded together to block U.S. action in Iraq. So, contentious, yes; neatly dividing the west from the rest, no. There is complexity not cleavage here. And **an effort to use human rights or democratic criteria to drive hard cleavages in the international system would likely provoke more serious banding together by the emerging powers-against, not in favor of, our strategy**. CONCLUSION America has rebounded from dips in its influence before. An oil price rise before economic downturn, a brewing crisis in Iran, a rising competitor, domestic divides and a Democratic president facing a resurgent right-welcome to 1978. Still, absent dramatic change, an economic shift to "the rest" will continue, and political influence will follow. If we foster cooperation where interests allow, and devote serious resources to global economic and energy diplomacy, we can balance the contentious dynamics of regional security and human rights. **Preparing for crises by investing in management tools can help de-escalate them when they arrive.**

Economy is resilient

David Leonhardt, 10-8-2005, New York Times,

<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/08/business/08fedex.html?ex=1136696400&en=f1fd879411772cc6&ei=5070>

The recent birth of that small fleet, at a multimillion-dollar price tag, explains a lot about how the **nation's economy has become so much more resilient**. Think of it as the FedEx economy, a system that constantly recalibrates itself to cope with surprises. **The United States has endured an almost biblical series of calamities in recent years - wars, hurricanes, financial scandals, soaring oil prices and rising interest rates - but the economy keeps chugging along at an annual growth rate of roughly 3 percent.** It has been able to do so with the help of technology that allows businesses to react ever more quickly to changes. **But with little notice, those reactions have also created a new feature of the business cycle: the micro-recession.** When one of them strikes, activity slows for a few weeks, sometimes in just certain sectors or regions, as companies adjust to a dip in demand. It has happened much more often in the last few years than in earlier expansions, but growth has picked up each time, thanks in part to the adjustments that businesses have made. No company embodies this change, for better and worse, quite like FedEx. When Alan Greenspan, the Federal Reserve chairman, sees Frederick W. Smith, FedEx's chief executive, during halftime of Washington Redskins games, Mr. Greenspan uses the company's vast reach to check in on the economy. "He always asks, 'We still O.K.?' " said Mr. Smith, a part-owner of the team whose stadium suite abuts the one Mr. Greenspan uses. More formally, Federal Reserve staff members rely on FedEx and the nearly six million packages it delivers every day for real-time data that helps set interest rate policy. The company's around-the-world flights - fuller coming from Asia than going to it - are the shipping lanes of the global economy, bringing goods from Chinese factories to American shelves in just days. FedEx technology helps Procter & Gamble managers send more Crest to Wal-Mart whenever somebody buys a tube, and the managers can then watch the replacement move through the supply chain from their computer screens. All this - combined with financial innovations that allow companies to hedge their bets and, some say, the deregulation of pivotal transportation industries - has helped mute the economy's swings. The business cycle has certainly not been eliminated, as some dreamers suggested during the 1990's boom, but recessions really do seem to happen less often. There have been only two recessions in the last two decades. From the late 1960's through the early 80's, the economy endured four of them, including two of the deepest in decades, which left millions of people out of work. **"The more flexible an economy, the greater its ability to self-correct after inevitable, often unanticipated disturbances,"** Mr. Greenspan argued in a recent speech. **"The impressive performance of the U.S. economy over the past couple of decades, despite shocks that in the past would have surely produced marked economic contraction, offers the clearest evidence of the benefits of increased market flexibility."**

Warming leads to a loss of phytoplankton

Hodell 16 --- [Sean Hodell is currently a student at Georgia Tech in Atlanta, GA studying Public Policy, cites Peter Franks, a professor of Oceanography at UC San Diego, 3/14/16, "Phytoplankton's demise from global warming is bad news if you like oxygen and seafood,"

<https://citizensclimatelobby.org/phytoplanktons-demise-from-global-warming-is-bad-news-if-you-like-oxygen-and-seafood/>>] //CJC

Humans have to eat and breathe, but the fate of a tiny plant in the world's oceans might affect our ability to do both. A recent study on the Indian Ocean published in Geophysical Research Letters showed that there is an "alarming decrease" in **phytoplankton** in this region over the past six decades. In fact, **the population fell 30 percent in the last 16 years, in large part because of global warming.** Peter Franks, a professor at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography at UC San Diego, says even "though there are regional differences due to different physical systems in different parts of the world ocean, **global warming is expected to lead to a general decrease in the amount of phytoplankton.**" Researchers pointed out that previous studies of the Indian Ocean that had reported a growth in phytoplankton had not looked at long-term trends and therefore did not make accurate predictions for changes in phytoplankton concentrations. **Phytoplankton** are microscopic plants that reside in the upper layer of ocean water where they are able to receive adequate sunlight. They **produce as much as half of all the oxygen on the planet through photosynthesis.** The researchers analyzed the color of ocean surface waters from satellite images taken over decades. Like plants on land, phytoplankton contain chlorophyll that gives off a green color. The higher the concentration of phytoplankton in the ocean, the greener the water will be. This allowed the researchers to easily distinguish that the phytoplankton population has fallen. This reduction in phytoplankton concentrations can be attributed to increases in the temperature of ocean water brought about by global warming. As the air is heated from greenhouse gases, the oceans warm along with it. Warmer waters lead to stratification of the ocean layers, which prevents subsurface nutrients such as nitrates from mixing with surface waters. Phytoplankton depend on these nutrients for survival. **Phytoplankton serve as the base of the ocean food chain and are the food source "for a wide range of sea creatures including whales, shrimp, snails, and jellyfish."** Disrupting the food chain can have devastating consequences for all marine animals, **not just the ones that directly depend on phytoplankton as their main food source. Humans will also be heavily affected by the loss of these tiny plants.** Many who live on the coast of the Indian Ocean could lose their livelihoods because of a shortage in the supply of fish. Fishermen are already having to venture further and longer to catch increasingly smaller amounts of fish. **Overfishing can be attributed to the shortage, but the main contributor is climate change and the ever-increasing ocean temperatures.** It has already been measured that the rate of ocean heat storage has doubled in the last 18 years, which means oceans are now absorbing heat twice as fast as they were only two decades ago. Many coastal countries that border the Indian Ocean depend on the seafood industry, not just for economic means, but also for their diet. Further research is needed to prove the findings, as the study mentioned above discloses. A five-year research vessel will be sent out into the Indian Ocean later this year to verify the results. However, this is not a problem that can be overlooked in the present, as climate models predict further warming throughout this century. The reduction in phytoplankton concentrations are a great example of unintended consequences of climate change. Like many other consequences — sea level rise, food shortages, storm damage, etc. — **the impact and severity will depend on how quickly we can reduce greenhouse gas emissions** that are heating up our biosphere. Those reductions will occur faster with efficient and effective carbon pricing like Carbon Fee-and-Dividend.

Loss of phytoplankton leads to a total loss of oxygen by 2100

George 16 --- writer citing studies done by scientists and professors (Russ, 6/17/16, "PLANKTON WILL STOP MAKING OXYGEN BY END OF CENTURY," <http://russgeorge.net/2016/06/17/plankton-will-stop-making-oxygen-by-end-of-century/>>] //CJC

A study of ocean plankton led by **Sergei Petrovskii, Professor in Applied Mathematics** (specializing in ecological mathematics) from the University of Leicester's Department of Mathematics, has shown that **an increase in the water temperature** of the world's oceans of around six degrees Celsius – **which some scientists predict could occur as soon as 2100 – could stop oxygen production by phytoplankton by disrupting the process of photosynthesis.** The paper Mathematical Modelling of Plankton–Oxygen Dynamics Under the Climate Change was published in late 2015 in the Journal Applied Mathematics. Image above is an oxygen breathing station in Beijing. **"By 2100, the earth at sea level could have atmospheric oxygen levels comparable to the top of Mount Everest today. And as far as I know, people cannot normally stay on Everest without**

oxygen masks for more than a few minutes,” Petrovskii said. [ocean_heat_records](#) Global Ocean Heat Rising Dramatically Over 50 Years – click to enlarge Professor Petrovskii explained: “Global warming has been a focus of attention of science and politics for about two decades now. A lot has been said about its expected disastrous consequences; perhaps the most notorious is the global flooding that may result from melting of Antarctic ice if the warming exceeds a few degrees compared to the pre-industrial level. However, it now appears that this is probably not even close to the biggest danger that the warming can cause to the humanity.” Additional support for the model comes from direct measurement of a mysterious decline of oxygen in the atmosphere. Within the past several years scientists have found that oxygen (O₂) in the atmosphere has been dropping, and at higher rates than just the amount that goes into the increase of CO₂ from burning fossil fuels, some 2 to 4-times as much, and accelerating since 2002-2003. Simultaneously, oxygen levels in the world’s oceans have also been falling in an expanding fashion for the past fifty years, and will continue into the foreseeable future.

[phytoplankton_diversity2](#) Phytoplankton outnumber all but the bacteria on the blue planet – click to enlarge The fundamental cause of oxygen decline in the oceans that has not been mentioned in many studies is the failure of phytoplankton in the oceans to regenerate oxygen by photosynthesis. Phytoplankton is responsible for most of the primary productivity in the oceans that supports the entire marine food web and accounts for the majority of the planet’s primary production from photosynthesis. Phytoplankton grows more than a thousand times faster than green plants on land, turning over in 2 to 6 days compared to ~19 years on average for land plants, forests take centuries. However, collapse of vital mineral dust has interrupted and collapsed ocean primary productivity at a rate of 1% per year, this in turn had resulted in damaging feedback mechanisms of ocean warming and acidification which are further accelerating the catastrophic damage to the largest and most potent ecosystem on this blue planet the all important ocean pastures and their phytoplankton. [plankton_bloom_like_art1](#) An Endangered Plankton Bloom near the Shetland Islands June 2016 as seen from space in true color. The whitish area is a coccolithophore bloom, a group whose loss in past ages has resulted in mass extinctions – click to read more The threat has been “mostly overlooked by climate scientists”, Petrovskii said, “noting that such a global disaster would come with little notice.” “A distinct feature of this catastrophe is that there will be few warning signs and little change before it is too late,” he said. “That’s because phytoplankton can continue to produce oxygen and photosynthesize at levels below 6 degrees of temperature rise. Under a 2-degree increase, we will probably see no change; the 4-degree increase would already be dangerously close.” “About **two-thirds of the planet’s total atmospheric oxygen is produced by ocean phytoplankton – and therefore cessation would result in the depletion of atmospheric oxygen on a global scale. This would likely result in the mass mortality of animals and humans.**”

Policy action can’t solve- claims that warming is reversible neglect CO₂ longevity

Solomon 2008 [Susan Solomon, Chemical Sciences Division, Earth System Research Laboratory, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. “Irreversible climate change due to carbon dioxide emissions”, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* of the United States of America, Dec 16, 2008, <<http://www.pnas.org/content/106/6/1704.long>>] //CJC

It is sometimes imagined that slow processes such as climate changes pose small risks, on the basis of **the assumption that a choice can always be made to quickly reduce emissions and thereby reverse any harm** within a few years or decades. We have shown that **this assumption is incorrect for carbon dioxide emissions, because of the longevity of the atmospheric CO₂ perturbation and ocean warming. Irreversible climate changes due to carbon dioxide emissions have already taken place,** and future carbon dioxide emissions would imply further irreversible effects on the planet, with attendant long legacies for choices made by contemporary society. Discount rates used in some estimates of economic trade-offs assume that more efficient climate mitigation can occur in a future richer world, but neglect the irreversibility shown here. Similarly, understanding of irreversibility reveals limitations in trading of greenhouse gases on the basis of 100-year estimated climate changes (global warming

potentials, GWPs), because this metric neglects carbon dioxide's unique long-term effects. In this paper we have quantified how societal decisions regarding carbon dioxide concentrations that have already occurred or could occur in the coming century imply irreversible dangers relating to climate change for some illustrative populations and regions. These and other dangers pose substantial challenges to humanity and nature, with a magnitude that is directly linked to the peak level of carbon dioxide reached.

Warming is irreversible regardless of CO2 emissions- even complete cessation does not solve.

Solomon 2008 [Susan Solomon, Chemical Sciences Division, Earth System Research Laboratory, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. "Irreversible climate change due to carbon dioxide emissions", *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* of the United States of America, Dec 16, 2008, <<http://www.pnas.org/content/106/6/1704.long>>] //CJC

Over the 20th century, the atmospheric concentrations of key greenhouse gases increased due to human activities. The stated objective (Article 2) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is to achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a low enough level to prevent "dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system." Many studies have focused on projections of possible 21st century dangers (1–3). However, the principles (Article 3) of the UNFCCC specifically emphasize "threats of serious or irreversible damage," underscoring the importance of the longer term. While some irreversible climate changes such as ice sheet collapse are possible but highly uncertain (1, 4), others can now be identified with greater confidence, and examples among the latter are presented in this paper. It is not generally appreciated that the atmospheric temperature increases caused by rising carbon dioxide concentrations are not expected to decrease significantly even if carbon emissions were to completely cease (5–7) (see Fig. 1). Future carbon dioxide emissions in the 21st century will hence lead to adverse climate changes on both short and long time scales that would be essentially irreversible (where irreversible is defined here as a time scale exceeding the end of the millennium in year 3000; note that we do not consider geo-engineering measures that might be able to remove gases already in the atmosphere or to introduce active cooling to counteract warming). For the same reason, the physical climate changes that are due to anthropogenic carbon dioxide already in the atmosphere today are expected to be largely irreversible. Such climate changes will lead to a range of damaging impacts in different regions and sectors, some of which occur promptly in association with warming, while others build up under sustained warming because of the time lags of the processes involved. Here we illustrate 2 such aspects of the irreversibly altered world that should be expected. These aspects are among reasons for concern but are not comprehensive; other possible climate impacts include Arctic sea ice retreat, increases in heavy rainfall and flooding, permafrost melt, loss of glaciers and snowpack with attendant changes in water supply, increased intensity of hurricanes, etc. A complete climate impacts review is presented elsewhere (8) and is beyond the scope of this paper. We focus on illustrative adverse and irreversible climate impacts for which 3 criteria are met: (i) observed changes are already occurring and there is evidence for anthropogenic contributions to these changes, (ii) the phenomenon is based upon physical principles thought to be well understood, and (iii) projections are available and are broadly robust across models.

Positive feedback loops guarantee extinction

McPherson 2012 [Guy R. McPherson, Professor Emeritus of Natural Resources and Ecology and Evolutionary Biology at University of Arizona. "We're Done", 6/22/12; <<http://www.collapsenet.com/free-resources/collapsenet-public-access/item/8363-guy-mcpherson-were-done>>] //CJC

As I pointed out in this space a few years ago, I concluded in 2002 that we had set into motion climate-change processes likely to cause our own extinction by 2030. I mourned for months, to the bewilderment of the three people who noticed. And then, shortly thereafter, I was elated to learn about a hail-Mary pass that just might allow our persistence for a few more generations: Peak oil and its economic consequences might bring the industrial economy to an overdue close, just in time. Like Pandora with her vessel, I retained hope. No more. Stick a fork in us. We're done, broiled beyond We're Donewishful thinking. It seems we've experienced a lethal combination of too much cheap oil and too little wisdom. Yet again, I've begun mourning. It's no easier the second time. As always, I'm open to alternative views — in fact, I'm begging for them, considering the gravity of this particular situation — but the supporting evidence will have to be extraordinary. By the way, irrationally invoking Al Gore doesn't count as evidence. Ditto for unsubstantiated rumors about global cooling. A small dose of critical thinking might be required, rather than the ability to repeat lines touted by neo-conservatives and their owners in the fossil-fuel industries. Before you launch into the ridicule I've come to expect from those who comment anonymously from a position of hubris and ignorance in the blogosphere, I invite you to fully consider the information below. I recommend setting aside normalcy bias and wishful thinking as you peruse the remainder of this brief essay. (While you're at it, go ahead and look up the word "peruse." It probably doesn't mean what you think it means. I'll make it easy: Here's a link to the definition.) We know Earth's temperature is nearly one degree Centigrade higher than it was at the beginning of the industrial revolution. And 1 C is catastrophic, as indicated by a decades-old cover-up. Already, we've triggered several positive feedbacks, none of which were expected to occur by mainstream scientists until we reached 2 C above baseline global average temperature. We also know that the situation is far worse than indicated by recent data and models (which are reviewed in the following paragraphs). We've known for more than a decade what happens when the planes stop flying: Because particulates were removed when airplanes were grounded, Earth warmed by more than 1 C in the three days following 11 September 2001. In other words, Earth's temperature is already about 2 C higher than the industrial-revolution baseline. And because of positive feedbacks, 2 C leads directly and rapidly to 6 C, acidification-induced death of the world's oceans, and the near-term demise of Homo sapiens. We can't live without life-filled oceans, home to the tiny organisms that generate half the planet's oxygen while comprising the base of the global food chain (contrary to the common belief that Wal-Mart forms the base of the food chain). So much for the wisdom of the self-proclaimed wise ape. With completion of the on-going demise of the industrial economy, we're there: We've crossed the horrifically dire 2 C rubicon, as will be obvious when most of the world's planes are grounded. Without completion of the on-going demise of the industrial economy, we're there: We've crossed the horrifically dire 2 C rubicon, as described below. Joseph Heller, anybody? I've detailed the increasingly dire assessments. And I've explained how we've pulled the trigger on five positive-feedback events at lower global average temperature than expected, while also pointing out that any one of these five phenomena likely leads to near-term human extinction. None of these positive-feedback events were expected by scientists until we exceed 2 C warming above the pre-industrial baseline. My previous efforts were absurdly optimistic, as demonstrated by frequent updates (for example, here, here, and here, in chronological order). Yet my frequent writing, rooted in scientific analyses, can barely keep up with increasingly terrifying information about climate change. Every day, we have more reliable knowledge about the abyss into which we have plunged. Consider, for example, the International Energy Agency's forecast of business-as-usual leading to a 6 C warmer planet by 2035. Malcolm Light, writing for the Arctic Methane Emergency Group, considers one of the many positive feedbacks we've triggered in one planetary region and reaches this conclusion: "This process of methane release will accelerate exponentially, release huge quantities of methane into the atmosphere and lead to the demise of all life on earth before the middle of this century." Please read that sentence again. Light is a retired earth-systems scientist. As nearly as I can distinguish, he has no hidden agenda, though he believes geo-engineering will save us (an approach that would take several years to implement, and one that we'd almost certainly FUBAR). Forecasts by the International Energy Agency and the Arctic Methane Emergency group match the recent trend of increasingly dire assessments based on collection and interpretation of more data and increasingly powerful models. If these forecasts are close to accurate, we've only a requiem to write for human beings on Earth. It's time to modify Keynes' famous line thusly: "In

the short run, we're all dead. For those of us living in the interior of a large continent, much less on a rock-pile in the desert, I'd give us until 2020 at the latest. Carpe diem, reveling in the one life we get.

Warming is irreversible, global disaster inevitable

Whitaker 2012 [Sterling Whitaker, Examiner reporter, citing study by the American Meteorological Society. "New Report Calls Global Warming 'Irreversible', predicts global collapse", *The Examiner*, <<http://www.examiner.com/article/new-report-calls-global-warming-irreversible-predicts-global-collapse>>] //CJC

Global warming has become irreversible, according to a new report from the American Meteorological Society. EIN Newswire reports that the AMS made the startling finding in an information report published on August 20, 2012. The report finds that even if governments, corporations and individuals cut their greenhouse gas emissions drastically today, it would still be too late to head off a coming global disaster. Those findings echo the claims made in the 1972 report 'Limits to Growth,' in which a team of MIT researchers entered a variety of different economic and environmental scenarios into a computer model. Most of those scenarios indicated that without significant limits to human consumption patterns, the result would be a complete global economic collapse by 2030. The 1972 report also stated that to avoid the predicted consequences, drastic changes were required to protect the environment. In the ensuing decades the environmental outlook has continued to worsen, human consumption has grown and the population of the world has exploded.

Geologic Cycles Disprove Anthropogenic Warming Theory – Prefer Our Evidence, It Looks at Warming Over a Longer Period of Time

Rana, 2012 [Y.S. Rana, writer for The India Post, Based on Research by Dr. Ritesh Arya, Member @ Nat'l Institute of Hydrology, Former researcher at CAS Geology Panjab University Chandigar, and former Hydrogeologist at Groundwater Organisation, Irrigation & Public Health Govt of Himachal Pradesh, "Global Warming Is Not Man-Made Says Dr Arya" April 10th 2012, Online @ <http://www.theindiapost.com/environment/global-warming-man-made-dr-arya/>] //CJC

Global warming is a natural process and man's activities have no role to play in enhancing or reducing the cyclic process sounds incredible but it is true for Dr Ritesh Arya, a renowned geologist of Himachal Pradesh. He seeks to redefine the phenomenon as a natural cyclic process, holds Guinness record for his feat of drilling the highest bore well in the world, will be leaving for Lisbon, Portugal in July next to present his latest research paper on the subject at the "Global Conference on Global Warming." His new concept of bio-geologic cycle may demolish the "myth" that global warming is man-made phenomenon and says it's a "100 per cent natural cyclic process." He termed the views propounded by the Nobel prize-winning Inter-Governmental Panel on climate change (IPCC) as an "unnecessary myth about global warming." Dr Arya is all set to introduce a new concept of bio-geologic cycle to explain the relevance of global warming in shaping the earth now and in the future. At present, he is busy in giving the final touch to his research paper to be presented at the conference. "My research contains actual field geological evidence collected in the cold desert of Ladakh region to show global warming is a 100 per cent natural cyclic process. We are now in a global warming era and it has been continuing since the last Ice-age, believed to have

ended around 10,000 years ago.” says Dr Arya. He will be employing qualitative and quantitative distinctions in the deposition of sediments (now solidified as rock) to demonstrate the cyclical warming and cooling phases that the earth seems to have undergone over the time. Dr Arya, who was listed among the top 10 small-scale renewable energy innovators at the World Future Energy Summit held at Abu Dhabi in January, 2011 for his work on geo-thermal energy in the Himalayas. Stressing his point of research, he said that **the IPCC stated global warming was man-made especially from uncontrolled carbon dioxide emissions. But the Indus Valley Civilization had been destroyed nearly 5000 years ago because of the melting of Indus glacier** and when there were no sign of pollution or vehicular traffic, says Dr Arya. While elaborating his research, he said that the centre of C-alphabet representing a global warming maxima and it was at this time where maximum mountain flash flooding leading to maximum destruction and erosion along the glacio-fluvial basin took place and led to a sea-level rise and submerged of land near coastal areas. **“By knowing which part of the C-curve paleo signature we are in, we may predict if we are entering the global warming or cooling phase and when the next global warming maxima will come. But a lot depends on the accuracy of exact age of the last Ice-age, he stated. “Presently, we are in the half-cycle and it seems that we have entered into a warming phenomenon.** The flash-flood and mud-slide in Leh and other parts of the world last year are indicators that we are either at the maxima of global warming or near it,” Arya said. “The phenomenon should be put in right perspective as today almost every human activity right from vehicular emissions to use of polythene is being linked to global warming which was a much larger event that started as soon as the Ice Age ended. **The fact was that the “biotic” agents (man and other living organisms) had a very small role compared to the “abiotic”** (geological, geomorphologic, climatologic, planetary and hydrological) **events like earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, movement of glaciers and landslides”** he told He said that the **core material found during deep drilling at Khardung La (over 18,000 ft) was geologically similar to the one found on the banks of Indus river** and that established a link between global warming and glacial movements. **Disappearance of river Saraswati was a geological event caused by global warming.**

97% of climatologists may agree with you, but 98% of their data is wrong.

Taylor 2013 [James M. Taylor is the managing editor of Environment and Climate News, senior fellow at the Heartland Institute, environmentalist JD from Syracuse University. “IPCC Lead Author Says Climate Models are Failing”, *Heartland*,
<http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/2013/07/13/ipcc-lead-author-says-climate-models-are-failing>] //CJC

United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change lead author Hans von Storch told Der Spiegel that **climate models are having a difficult time replicating the lack of global warming during the past 15 years.** “So far, no one has been able to provide a compelling answer to why climate change seems to be taking a break,” said Storch. Storch said the models say **the planet should be warming much more than it has.** “According to most climate models, **we should have seen temperatures rise by around 0.25 degrees Celsius (0.45 degrees Fahrenheit) over the past 10 years.** **That hasn't happened.** In fact, the increase

over the last 15 years was **just 0.06 degrees Celsius (0.11 degrees Fahrenheit) -- a value very close to zero,**" Storch told Der Spiegel. "This is a serious scientific problem that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) will have to confront when it presents its next Assessment Report late next year. 98 Percent of Models Wrong IPCC may have to revise its climate models to reflect real-world climate conditions, Storch noted. "At my institute, we analyzed how often such a 15-year stagnation in global warming occurred in the simulations. The answer was: in under 2 percent of all the times we ran the simulation. In other words, **over 98 percent of forecasts show CO2 emissions as high as we have had in recent years leading to more of a temperature increase,**" Storch told the magazine. "If things continue as they have been, in five years, at the latest, **we will need to acknowledge that something is fundamentally wrong with our climate models.** A 20-year pause in global warming does not occur in a single modeled scenario. But even today, we are finding it very difficult to reconcile actual temperature trends with our expectations," he explained. Rewards of Scientific Method "Hans von Storch is simply doing what all real scientists do: examine the most recently available data and use it to guide your path to conclusions," meteorologist Anthony Watts, proprietor of the popular WattsUpWithThat.com climate science website, told Environment & Climate News. "The nature of science is to go where the data tells you to go, not to go where you believe you should, and that is what von Storch is doing as a scientist," Watts explained. "Meanwhile, those who go in the direction they believe they should go—or are told to go—are continuing on like lemmings marching to the sea, blissfully unaware that the road of science has a U-turn sign up ahead. The belief-system pileup at the U-turn will be something to behold." "The latest admission regarding the failure of IPCC's climate models in accounting for the stasis in the global temperature trend for the past 15 years is really no surprise," Cambridge, Massachusetts climate scientist Willie Soon said. "It is merely professor Hans von Storch reporting the scientific evidence in an honest manner. The IPCC climate models have a long history of predicting too much warming, and Storch's observations show that is still the case. There is a strong disconnect between carbon dioxide emissions and global temperatures. The evidence for this is every day becoming more difficult to deny," Soon added.

Their authors are paid-off and manufacture a false consensus based on flawed science and censorship.

Jasper 2013 [William F. Jasper is the senior editor of TNA, top investigative reporter, attendant of several international UN conferences, author. "Climate "Consensus" Con Game: Desperate Effort Before Release of UN Report", *The New American*, <<http://www.thenewamerican.com/tech/environment/item/15465-climate-consensus-con-game-desperate-effort-before-release-of-un-report>>] //CJC

The UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is in trouble, and climate alarmists are hoping the much-ballyhooed report by Australian activist John Cook, released last week, will convince the public to be very afraid of global warming. The last few years have not been kind to the global-warming alarmists. In the 17th century, François, Duc de La Rochefoucauld is credited with famously quipping, "There goes another beautiful theory about to be murdered by a brutal gang of facts." Unfortunately, for the climate catastrophists, their pet theory (though hardly beautiful) has been slaughtered many times over by a brutal and relentless onslaught of facts. Unfortunately, for the rest of us, however, the global-warming alarmists keep coming back like the undead in a B-grade horror flick. The fanatical proponents of anthropogenic (human caused) global warming, or AGW, have powerful supporters with deep pockets who keep resuscitating them. They have a massive institutional base among Big Government, Big Media, Big Foundations, Big Business, and Big Green, all of which have huge incentives to perpetuate AGW alarmism. **No matter how many times the AGW fearmongers' predictions are shot down, they are resurrected and sent back to frighten more voters/taxpayers into submission to global policies, taxes, and controls.** Utilizing brute power and deception, they intend to reverse de La Rochefoucauld's prediction and see the facts murdered by their own triumphant theory. As we have reported ("Global Warming 'Consensus': Cooking the Books") AGW activist John Cook has been the recipient of a media promotion bonanza for his recent study

claiming that 97 percent of climate scientists endorse the global-warming alarmist position. President Obama and Big Media turned it into a claim that 97 percent of all scientists endorse the AGW position. Both claims are wrong. Stung by numerous setbacks, the AGW lobby is desperately attempting to regain ground through a giant bluff, hoping that their false claim of the near unanimity of all scientists will convince politicians and the public to give them the global power and funding they crave. Among the

many fatal blows the climate alarmists have sustained along the way and managed to bounce back from are: Climategate (see here, here, here, and here), Climategate 2, Glacieregate, Polar beargate (see here and here), Himalayagate, Amazongate, Sea levelgate, Hockey stickgate, and more than 120 additional scandals that have repeatedly exposed the discredited premises, fraudulent research, and faulty computer models on which the AGW fright pedaling empire has been built. The Next Big IPCC Propaganda Push Now the United Nations' IPCC is getting set to release the first of three installments of its latest Assessment Report.

And the powers that be are obviously concerned that they do not have sufficient public support in the United States to get Congress to enact the type of trillion-dollar transfers and the "complete transformation of the world" envisioned. The IPCC is scheduled to release its Working Group I (WGI) report on the physical science basis of its latest Assessment in September, and they are desperate to gain support for it. In addition to the main stumbling block of American public resistance, they are also running into problems with European countries that once appeared to be locked in as supporters, but which are now revolting due to the crushing costs of alternative "green energy" and their own mounting debt and fiscal problems. Many of these countries are jumping ship and now want to switch to the more affordable natural gas that is flooding the global market, thanks to new "fracking" technology. This has the UN and the globalists in a dither. Last September, Fatih Birol, the chief economist at the UN's International Energy Agency, warned that "governments are feeling more and more uncomfortable to put money in renewables especially in the days of austerity, and some governments are cutting their support." "The availability of cheap or lower gas prices are putting additional pressure on renewable energies," Birol said. This is a bad thing, said the UN economist. Reuters gave this report on Birol's apocalyptic warning regarding these developments: Birol said that any reduction in investment in renewable energy would increase the risk of an increase in global temperatures by 6 degree Celsius this century, describing the current trend as "catastrophic." "If there are no urgent and bold policies put in place the door to a 2 degrees trajectory, the door to a normal life for us and for our children, will be closed and will be closed forever," he said. The "increase in global temperatures by 6

degree Celsius this century" is one of the many absurd — and persistent — claims made by AGW fanatics. Dr. William Happer, one of America's preeminent physicists and a professor of physics at Princeton University, explains here why the six-degree increase bogeyman is ridiculous and completely without foundation in

science. (A less technical layman's version of the Happer article is available here.) Many of the world's leading authorities in climatology, meteorology, atmospheric physics, paleo-geology, and many other disciplines (see below) have been weighing in on the skeptical/realist side over the past few years and taking the position that it is beyond irresponsible for scientists and politicians to burden humanity with enormous and unprecedented tax and regulatory burdens based merely on frightening computer model scenarios that cannot sustain critical scientific examination. In science, facts and truth are discovered by measurement

and experiment, independent of surveys, opinion, popularity contests, and "consensus." A fact remains a fact whether or not one percent, 97 percent, or 100 percent of scientists believe it to be a fact. And, conversely, a falsehood remains false even if 97 percent or even 100 percent of scientists believe it to be true. The history of science is littered with many discarded falsehoods that were once universally embraced by the scientific

consensus of the day. Nevertheless, a credible claim of a consensus of 97 percent — near unanimity — of scientists specializing in climate research (or any area of science) is not one that the common layman can, or should, lightly dismiss. After all, we laymen must rely on expert scientific opinion, on specialists, for many important issues involving health, medicine, energy, national defense, etc. And if virtually all scientists say something is true, we would be foolish to challenge their claims — unless we have extraordinary evidence to the contrary. There are key words and questions involved here: Do we have a "credible claim of consensus of 97%," or is there "extraordinary evidence to the contrary"? The answer to the former is a resounding "No," and to the latter an equally resounding "Yes." Crash Goes the Phony Consensus One of the biggest lies of the AGW alarmist camp has been that virtually all scientists of any stature and expertise support the claims of AGW activists. Only old dinosaurs unfamiliar with modern climate research or corrupt scientists bought off by the fossil fuel industry disagree, goes their argument. The truth is strikingly at odds with this claim. As we noted last year ("Climate Science" in Shambles: Real Scientists Battle UN Agenda) two of the most important AGW scientist activists have jumped ship and now battle against the cause they once supported: James Lovelock (photo above), the British inventor, NASA scientist, author, and originator of the Gaia Hypothesis; and Professor Fritz Vahrenholt, a founding father of Germany's environmental movement and a director of one of Europe's largest alternative energy companies. But that dynamic duo comprises only a minute fraction of the

thousands of distinguished scientists who take issue with the AGW activists. In the same article last year, we noted that some of the IPCC's severest critics are scientists who have served as lead authors and expert reviewers of IPCC reports and have witnessed from the inside the blatant bias and politics masquerading as science. Former and current IPCC experts who have spoken out against the IPCC's abuse of science include such prominent scientists as: • Dr. Judith Curry, chair of the Georgia Institute of Technology's School of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences; • Mike Hulme, professor of climate science at East Anglia University where the Climategate e-mails were hacked; • Dr. Richard Lindzen, MIT climate physicist and Alfred P. Sloan professor of meteorology, Dept. of Earth, Atmospheric and Planetary Sciences; • Dr. John Christy, climatologist of the University of Alabama in Huntsville and NASA; • Dr. Lee C. Gerhard, past director and state geologist with the Kansas Geological Society and senior scientist emeritus of the University of Kansas; • Dr. Patrick J. Michaels, former Virginia State climatologist, a UN IPCC reviewer, and University of Virginia professor of environmental sciences; • Dr. Vincent Gray, New Zealand chemist and climate researcher; • Dr. Tom V. Segalstad, geologist/geochemist, head of the Geological Museum in Norway; and • Dr. John T. Everett, a former National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) senior manager and project manager for the UN Atlas of the Oceans. In 2010, Marc Morano of ClimateDepot.com published an important 321-page report featuring the statements of more than 1,000 renowned scientists worldwide who have challenged the IPCC's manmade global-warming claims. (The full report may be downloaded for free, as a PDF, here.) The 1,000+ lineup of scientists reads like a Who's Who of the global scientific community. It includes: • Dr. Willie Soon, Harvard-Smithsonian Center astrophysicist; • Dr. William Happer, Cyrus Fogg Brackett professor of physics, Princeton University; • Dr. Leonard Weinstein, 35 years at the NASA Langley Research Center and presently a senior research fellow at the National Institute of Aerospace; • Dr. Robert B. Laughlin, Nobel Prize-winning Stanford University physicist, formerly a research scientist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; • Dr. Anatoly Levitin, the head of the geomagnetic variations laboratory at the Institute of Terrestrial Magnetism, Ionosphere and Radiowave Propagation of the Russian Academy of Sciences; • Dr. Hans Jelbring, Swedish climatologist of the Paleogeophysics & Geodynamics Unit at Stockholm University; • Burt Rutan, renowned engineer, inventor, and aviation/space pioneer; • Dr. Syun-Ichi Akasofu, emeritus professor of physics, and founding director, International Arctic Research Center of the University of Alaska Fairbanks; • Dr. Bjarne Andresen, physicist, and professor, The Niels Bohr Institute, University of Copenhagen, Denmark; and • Dr. Ian D. Clark, professor, isotope hydrogeology and paleoclimatology, University of Ottawa, Canada. And if still more proof is needed that the science is not "settled" — as Al Gore, the IPCC, the UN, and other members of the alarmist choir claim — more than 31,000 scientists in the United States have signed a petition urging the U.S. government to reject the types of actions that have been proposed at UN forums in Kyoto, Copenhagen, Cancun, and Rio. The Petition Project, organized by Dr. Arthur Robinson of the Oregon Institute of

Science and Medicine and Dr. Frederick Seitz, past president of the National Academy of Sciences, demonstrates a resounding rejection of claims that there is any kind of "overwhelming consensus" that anthropogenic global warming is a crisis or serious threat. The petition reads, in part: The proposed limits on greenhouse gases would harm the environment, hinder the advance

of science and technology, and damage the health and welfare of mankind. **There is no convincing scientific evidence that human release of carbon dioxide, methane, or other greenhouse gasses is causing or will, in the foreseeable future, cause catastrophic heating of the Earth's atmosphere and disruption of the Earth's climate.** Many of the scientists cited above, as well as hundreds more among those featured in the ClimateDepot study cited, have published peer-reviewed articles in scientific journals, but as our report on the Cook study noted, these articles by skeptic/realist authors have been systematically filtered out of the lists of accepted studies, with the obvious intent of supporting the thesis that published scientists overwhelmingly subscribe to the manmade global warming thesis. The Cook study claimed to be able to find only 78 published studies that supported the skeptical viewpoint. However, PopularTechnology.net published a list of **"1100+ Peer-Reviewed Papers Supporting Skeptic Arguments Against ACC/AGW Alarm,"** which, again, underscores the shoddy (or intentionally censorious and dishonest) research involved in the celebrated Cook study. Since we've mentioned censorship, it is worthy of note that the 2009 Climategate e-mail scandal at East Anglia University exposed a vicious and seamy side of the climate-change fraternity that outraged even many of the alarmists' supporters. As shown here, here, and here, some of the most famous scientists, journals, and institutions promoting AGW alarmism have unethically and maliciously blocked (and/or attempted to block) the publication of papers by fellow scientists who were considered to be opponents of AGW, or who were considered to be simply insufficiently alarmist. Some of the alarmists went even further, attempting to destroy the reputations of skeptics and/or get them fired. If they can't achieve their "consensus" one way, they'll get it another. As we draw closer to the release of the IPCC's WGI report in September, we can expect that the campaign of climate-alarmist misinformation and disinformation will intensify.

Empirics prove no warming and impacts are hyperbolic – their authors use fraudulent data and are ideologically biased.

Deming 2009 [David Deming is a geophysicist and associate professor at the University of Oklahoma. "Global Warming is a Fraud", *Lew Rockwell*, <<http://www.lewrockwell.com/2009/06/david-deming/global-warming-is-a-fraud/>>] //CJC

As the years pass and data accumulate, it is becoming evident that global warming is a fraud. Climate change is natural and ongoing, but the Earth has not warmed significantly over the last thirty years. Nor has there been a single negative effect of any type that can be unambiguously attributed to global warming. As I write, satellite data show that the mean global temperature is the same that it was in 1979. The extent of global sea ice is also unchanged from 1979. Since the end of the last Ice Age, sea level has risen more than a hundred meters. But for the last three years, there has been no rise in sea level. If the polar ice sheets are melting, why isn't sea level rising? Global warming is supposed to increase the severity and frequency of tropical storms. But hurricane and typhoon activity is at a record low. Every year in the US, more than forty thousand people are killed in traffic accidents. But not one single person has ever been killed by global warming. The number of species that have gone extinct from global warming is exactly zero. Both the Antarctic and Greenland Ice Sheets are stable. The polar bear population is increasing. There has been no increase in infectious disease that can be attributed to climate change. We are not currently experiencing more floods, droughts, or forest fires. In short, there is no evidence of any type to support the idea that we are entering an era when significant climate change is occurring and will cause the deterioration of either the natural environment or the human standard of living. Why do people think the planet is warming? One reason is that the temperature data from weather stations appear to be hopelessly contaminated by urban heat effects. A survey of the 1221 temperature stations in the US by meteorologist Anthony Watts and his colleagues is now more than 80 percent complete. The magnitude of putative global warming over the last 150 years is about 0.7 C. But only 9 percent of meteorological stations in the US are likely to have temperature errors lower than 1 C. More than two-thirds of temperature sensors used to estimate global warming are located near artificial heating sources such as air conditioning vents, asphalt paving, or buildings. These sources are likely to introduce artifacts greater than 2 C

into the temperature record. **Another cause of global warming hysteria is the infiltration of science by ideological zealots who place politics above truth.** Earlier this month, the Obama administration issued a report that concluded global warming would have a number of deleterious effects on the US. In 1995, **one of the lead authors of this report told me that we had to alter the historical temperature record by “getting rid” of the Medieval Warm Period.** The Obama report refers to — six times — the work of a **climate scientist named Stephen H. Schneider. In 1989, Schneider told Discover magazine that “we have to offer up scary scenarios, make simplified, dramatic statements, and make little mention of any doubts we might have.”** Schneider concluded “each of us has to decide what the right balance is between being effective and being honest.” Schneider’s position is not unusual. In 2007, Mike Hulme, the founding director of the Tyndall Center for Climate Change Research in Britain, told the Guardian newspaper that **“scientists and politicians must trade truth for influence.”** While releasing a politicized report that prostitutes science to politics, the Obama administration simultaneously suppressed an **internal EPA report that concluded there were “glaring inconsistencies” between the scientific data and the hypothesis that carbon dioxide emissions were changing the climate.** If we had an appreciation for history, we would not be fooled so easily. **It has all happened before, albeit on a smaller scale in an age where people had more common sense. On May 19, 1912, the Washington Post posed these questions: “Is the climate of the world changing? Is it becoming warmer in the polar regions?”** On November 2, 1922, the Associated Press reported that “the Arctic Ocean is warming up, icebergs are growing scarcer and in some places the seals are finding the waters too hot.” On February 25, 1923, the New York Times concluded that “the Arctic appears to be warming up.” On December 21, 1930, the Times noted that “Alpine glaciers are in full retreat.” A few months later the New York Times concluded that there was “a radical change in climatic conditions and hitherto unheard of warmth” in Greenland. About the only thing that has changed at the Times since 1930 is that no one working there today is literate enough to use the word “hitherto.” **After the warm weather of the 1930s gave way to a cooling trend beginning in 1940, the media began speculating on the imminent arrival of a new Ice Age. We have now come full circle, mired in a hopeless cycle of reincarnated ignorance. H. L. Mencken understood this process when he explained “the whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed by an endless series of hobgoblins, most of them imaginary.”**

Warming improves biodiversity.

Goklany 2012 [Indur M. Goklany is a PhD in electrical engineering and science and technology policy analyst for the US Department of the Interior. “Is Climate Change the Number One Threat to Humanity?”, *Goklany*, <http://goklany.org/library/Goklany_WIREs.pdf>] //CJC

Despite concerns about the ecological impacts of **warming, the FTA studies suggest that it may actually reduce existing stresses on ecosystems and biodiversity** through 2085–2100. Table 4, provides FTA results for 2085–2100 regarding the variation in three specific ecological indicators across the different IPCC scenarios. 23,25 One indicator is the net biome productivity (a measure of the terrestrial biosphere’s net carbon sink capacity). The second indicator is the area of cropland (a crude measure of the amount of habitat converted to human use; the lower it is, the better is it for maintaining biodiversity and ecosystems). Such land conversion to agriculture is perhaps the single largest threat to global terrestrial biodiversity. 114,115 The third indicator is the global loss of coastal wetlands relative to 1990 levels. The table shows that **biosphere’s sink capacity under each scenario would be higher in 2100 than in the base year (1990), largely due to higher CO 2 concentrations and because these effects were not projected to be overridden by the negative effects of higher temperatures over that period.** For the same reasons, global sink capacity would be higher for the A1FI and A2 scenarios. Partly for the same reasons and its lower population compared to other scenarios, the amount of cropland in 2100 would be lowest for the A1FI world. This is followed by the B1 and B2 worlds. [Levy et al. did not provide cropland estimates for the A2 scenario.] Thus, **through 2100 the warmest (A1FI) scenario would have the least habitat loss and, therefore, pose the smallest risk to terrestrial biodiversity and ecosystems**, while the B2 scenario would pose the greatest risk to habitat, biodiversity

and ecosystems. Regarding coastal wetlands, although losses due to sea level rise (SLR) are substantial, the contribution of global warming to total losses in 2085 are smaller than losses due to subsidence from other man - made causes. 23 Table 4 shows that wetland losses are much higher for the A1FI and A2 scenarios than for the B1 and B2 scenarios. This is, however, due mainly to the assumption that the first two scenarios would have higher non - climate change related subsidence (Ref. 23, p. 76) but this assumption is questionable. 9

Global warming reduces water shortages – precipitation, empirics, and adaptation.

Goklany 2012 [Indur M. Goklany is a PhD in electrical engineering and science and technology policy analyst for the US Department of the Interior. “Is Climate Change the Number One Threat to Humanity?”, Goklany, <http://goklany.org/library/Goklany_WIREs.pdf>] //CJC

The possibility of water shortages leading to droughts and hunger are recurring themes in the climate change literature. 31,33 However, several global impact studies indicate that warming may reduce net global PAR for water stress. Deaths from droughts are probably the best indicator of the socioeconomic impact of such water shortages. However, since the 1920s despite a more - than - tripling of the global population, deaths and death rates from droughts have declined by 99.97% and 99.99%, respectively. 50 Yet another concern is access to safer water. But between 1990 and 2008, although global population increased 27%, the percentage of global population with such access increased from 76.8% to 86.8%. This translates into an additional 1.8 billion people gaining access to safer water over this period. 110,111 Simultaneously, 1.3 billion more people got access to improved sanitation. Even in Sub - Saharan Africa the population with access to improved water sources increased from 48.9% to 59.7% from 1990–2008, which translates into 240 million additional people. Such improvements attest to the fact that despite any warming, climate - sensitive indicators of human well - being can and have advanced. That is, human adaptive responses have more than offset any possible deterioration from warming. Regarding the future, Figure 5 provides estimates of the global PAR for water stress in 2085 from the FTA water resources analysis. 21 It displays changes in PAR due to climate change alone and total PAR after climate change. Despite totally ignoring autonomous adaptations which, therefore, overestimates net adverse impacts, the FTA study indicates that **warming could, as previously noted, reduce net global PAR for water stress.** 78 This occurs **because warming should increase global precipitation,** and although some areas may receive less precipitation, other, more populated areas are, serendipitously, projected to receive more. Other studies, e.g., Oki and Kanae’s review of global freshwater impact studies, also suggest a net decline in water stress due to warming 112 . Similarly, Alcamo et al. 26 found that by 2050, relative to current conditions, water stress would increase in 62%–76% of total global river basin area but decrease in 20%–29% under the A2 and B2 scenarios. However, in only 10% of the area would climate change be the principal cause of the increasing stress. In the other 90%, it would be higher water withdrawals. On the other hand, climate change would be the major factor in most of the area (approximately 50–80%) experiencing decreasing stress. More recently, van Vuuren et al. 34 found that net PAR for water stress would decline in 2100 under a scenario corresponding to a global temperature increase of 3.5 °C above the 1960 - 1990 average. This analysis also ignored changes in adaptive capacity which, as noted, overestimates increases in the water - stressed population while underestimating declines. Using a similar methodology, Arnell et al.’s (2011) 113 results also show that the net increase in the water - stressed population from 2000 to 2100 would be dominated by non - climate change factors by at least three to one (relative to warming). They also show that climate change may not increase the net water - stressed population through 2100 (relative to “no climate change”). Similarly, even after mitigation to limit the average global temperature increase to 2°C, the net water - stressed population may be higher relative to the “no climate change” case. Equally

importantly, mitigation may actually increase the net water - stressed population over the unmitigated climate change scenario.

Warming boosts agriculture – 600 years of African trends prove

Taylor, 2011 [James Taylor, managing editor of Environment & Climate News and a senior fellow for The Heartland Institute focusing on environmental issues. “Climate Change Weekly: Global Warming Benefiting Africa’s Sahel Region” *Heartland Institute*, <<http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/2011/12/15/climate-change-weekly-global-warming-benefiting-africas-sahel-region> Accessed 6/18/12>] //CJC

Global warming activists are sounding four-alarm fire bells over a new study claiming global warming is causing drought and killing trees in the Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa. Much like previous claims that have fallen by the wayside, the notion that global warming is devastating the Sahel is unlikely to stand the dual tests of time and scientific scrutiny. According to the new study, a rise in temperatures and a decline in precipitation during the 20th century reduced tree densities in the Sahel by approximately 18 percent from 1954 through 2002. Lead author Patrick Gonzalez says in a press release accompanying the study, “Rainfall in the Sahel has dropped 20-30 percent in the 20th century...” At first glance, the study and accompanying press release might present a persuasive argument for Western democracies to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Then again, the argument that Western democracies should reduce carbon dioxide emissions may have been driving the study, rather than the other way around. Lead author Gonzalez is also a lead author for the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), whose funding and very existence are dependent on the assertion that humans are causing a global warming crisis. Moreover, IPCC is on record claiming global warming is causing an increase in drought, so having a new study claiming global warming is causing drought and related problems in Africa’s Sahel region bolsters the shared interests of Gonzalez and IPCC. Gonzalez also spent half of the past decade as a staffer for the Nature Conservancy environmental activist group. The Nature Conservancy is one of the most vocal proponents of global warming alarmism and has also long asserted Western democracies must dramatically reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Further, NASA and the U.S. Geological Survey funded the study. If such funded studies find little about which to be concerned, NASA and U.S. Geological Survey funds dry up, as do funds for Gonzalez and his National Park Service employers. This is not to say that readers should dismiss out of hand a study published by a Nature Conservancy staffer and United Nations representative with clear incentives to conclude global warming is causing drought and tree deaths. Such a background and incentives should, however, cause readers to look a little more deeply at the facts before accepting the study’s conclusions at face value. Turning to the science, assertions that global warming is causing drought and tree deaths in the Sahel is surprising news to many scientists and Sahel observers. The Sahel is a relatively narrow band of land stretching east-west across the African continent at the southern edge of the Sahara Desert. Contrary to what Gonzalez reports in his new study, **many studies have documented improving conditions in the Sahel as the earth has warmed.** “The southern Saharan desert is in retreat, making farming viable again in what were some of the most arid parts of Africa,” New Scientist reported in 2002 (<http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn2811-africas-deserts-are-in-spectacular-retreat.html>). **Burkina Faso, one of the West African countries devastated by drought and advancing deserts 20 years ago, is growing so much greener** that families who fled to wetter coastal regions are starting to go home.” An “analysis of satellite images completed this summer reveals that dunes are retreating right across the Sahel region on the southern edge of the Sahara desert,” New Scientist explained. **Vegetation is ousting sand** across a swathe of land stretching from Mauritania on the shores of the Atlantic to Eritrea 6000 kilometres away on the Red Sea coast. Nor is it just a short-term trend. **Analysts say the gradual greening has been happening since the mid-1980s.** “There are more trees for firewood and more grassland for livestock. And a survey among farmers shows a 70 per cent increase in yields of local cereals such as sorghum and millet in one province in recent years,” New Scientist added. These trends have continued throughout the past decade. In 2009 scientists at Boston University used satellite data to study African vegetation patterns since the mid-1990s. As reported by BBC News, **satellite images from the last 15 years do seem to show a recovery of vegetation in**

the Southern Sahara. "The broader picture is reinforced by studies carried out in the **Namib Desert** in Namibia," BBC News added. "This is a region with an average rainfall of just 12 millimetres per year – what scientists call 'hyper-arid'. Scientists have been measuring rainfall here for the last 60 years. Last year the local research centre, called Gobabeb, measured 80mm of rain." **Scientists at Brown** University and the University of Minnesota-Duluth **confirmed a longer term improvement in African soil moisture.** **After studying African drought patterns since the 1400s, the scientists reported in January 2007 in the peer-reviewed science journal Geology that Africa is "experiencing an unusually prolonged period of stable, wet conditions in comparison to previous centuries of the past millennium."** Moreover, "the patterns and variability of twentieth-century rainfall in central Africa have been unusually conducive to human welfare in the context of the past 1400 yr," the scientists explained. **The same patterns are occurring globally. Analyzing satellite imagery that has been available since 1982, scientists reported in a 2003 peer-reviewed study in Science, "We present a global investigation of vegetation responses to climatic changes by analyzing 18 years (1982 to 1999) of both climatic data and satellite observations of vegetation activity. Our results indicate that global changes in climate have eased several critical climatic constraints to plant growth, such that net primary production increased 6% (3.4 petagrams of carbon over 18 years) globally."** With so many studies and data indicating global warming is benefiting soil moisture, plant growth and forest expansion in the Sahel region, Africa as a whole and globally, the new assertion that global warming is causing a climate crisis in the Sahel is speculative and controversial at best. Perhaps Gonzalez inadvertently revealed the true purpose of his new study when he concluded his press release by saying, "We in the U.S. and other industrialized nations have it in our power, with current technologies and practices, to avert more drastic impacts around the world by reducing our greenhouse gas emissions." This is certainly something we would expect a Nature Conservancy staffer and United Nations representative to say.

Warming good laundry list: solves ice age, resources, agriculture, econ and disease AND adaptation mitigates the worst impacts

Que 2006 -[Simon Que is a Stanford-educated electrical engineer. "The Bright Side of Global Warming", Lew Rockwell, < <http://www.lewrockwell.com/2006/06/simon-que/the-bright-side-of-global-warming/>>] //CJC

Despite all the doomsday reports from environmentalists about global warming, there is reason to rejoice if the earth does get warmer. In his Anti-Environmentalist Manifesto, Lew Rockwell writes: "There is no evidence of global warming, but even if it were to take place, many scientists say the effect would be good: **it would lengthen growing seasons, make the earth more liveable, and forestall any future ice age."** Many researchers have studied and documented the bright side of a warming world climate trend. Thomas Gale Moore, an economist at Stanford University's Hoover Institute, is the author of Climate of Fear: Why We Shouldn't Worry about Global Warming, a book that describes the many ways that warmer weather helps human beings in all areas of life. And Moore is not alone in taking this view. **Many researchers have discovered the gains that human society makes in warmer weather by studying its impact in various areas such as health and agriculture. Perhaps the most direct and obvious benefit of warmer climate is its impact on human mortality rates. Both extreme heat and extreme coldness bring the risk of death. Statistically and historically in the West, however, winters have posed a greater threat to humans than summers have.** According to William. R. Keatinge and Gavin. C. Donaldson, two researchers at the University of London, "Cold-related deaths are far more numerous than heat-related deaths in the United States, Europe, and almost all countries outside the tropics, and almost all of them are due to common illnesses that are increased by cold." One of their studies of various regions of Europe

showed that cold-related deaths outnumbered heat-related deaths by nearly ten to one. Sherwood B. Idso, Craig D. Idso, and Keith E. Idso, researchers at the Center for the Study of CO₂ and Global Change in Tempe, AZ, agree. They point out that in both cold and warm countries, the risk of both cardiovascular and respiratory diseases is higher in the winter months. Some have suggested that in warmer weather, mosquito-borne diseases such as malaria may increase as the climate becomes more favorable to mosquito life. Historically, in England, malaria made a significant contribution to human deaths during a cold period, and declined as temperatures rose during the 19th century. The same can be said of yellow fever, dengue, and tick-borne encephalitis. Other studies show that there is either **no connection between climate change and incidence of these diseases**, or that they **decrease in warmer weather**. The Idsos provide an explanation for this counterintuitive finding. They suggest that human-dependent "factors such as the quality of public health services, irrigation and agricultural activities, land uses practices," etc., have a far greater impact on reducing vector-borne diseases. Draining wetlands for development, for example, eliminates potential mosquito breeding grounds. Warmer weather is conducive to many of these activities. **A warmer world would also directly impact agricultural productivity**, according to Moore. Warmer weather means a **longer growing season, and thus greater output**. It would also result in **greater rainfall**, providing much-needed water for plants. The **risk of crop failures would decrease** with shorter, milder winters. As a result of elevated levels of carbon dioxide, the **quality and quantity of agricultural products have risen as well**. Given the significant role that agriculture plays in feeding people around the world, this is a huge benefit. Even if people do not consume more grown food, they still benefit from the drop in prices that accompanies an expansion of supply. High carbon dioxide levels from industrial output, the alleged culprit behind global warming, also improve the quality of certain plants. For example, many types of plants contain antioxidants, substances that protect the body against destructive molecular radicals. In many plants, the concentration of antioxidants such as vitamin C increases significantly under higher levels of carbon dioxide. The Idsos report their findings in their article. Given the medical properties of these substances, greater CO₂ levels are a very important health benefit. This should not come as a surprise to anyone who has studied chemistry and plant biology. As part of photosynthesis, plants take in carbon dioxide and transform it into organic compounds. These compounds are what give the plant its mass, nutritional value, and other beneficial properties. As college freshmen learn in chemistry class, the rate of many chemical processes is proportional to the concentration of the inputs. A greater concentration of carbon dioxide results in a greater rate of turnover, as more carbon dioxide is converted into plant matter in a given time span. Consequently, plants grown under increased CO₂ levels contain more biomass and nutrition. Warming climates are advantageous to other forms of human activity as well. The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), **a study prepared by the Arctic Council, found that a warmer Arctic would have more available resources.** By reducing the polar ice caps, Arctic warming opens up resources that were trapped by ice to human exploration and use. In light of recent gas prices, one especially important advantage is **increased access to oil deposits in the Arctic**. Transportation also benefits from more clement weather. Heavy rain and snow during the winter disrupt both ground and air transportation, resulting in costly delays and hazardous conditions. The ACIA has also found that reduced ice caps would open up sea routes through the arctic. Currently, many freighters must take the Panama Canal to reach the other side of North America. (The ones that cannot fit in the canal must go around South America!) **A shortened route through the Arctic would cause shipping costs to plummet, benefiting a multitude of industries that depend on carrying goods between continents.** The fishing industry stands to benefit as well. Moore notes a study that found that in a cooler world, fish, shellfish, and crustacean catches would decline. Turning this analysis around, he concludes that **warmer climate would boost fishery productivity**. The ACIA report agrees, citing the prospect of more productive fisheries in the Arctic due to the northward migration of cod and capelin, made possible by warmer weather. On land, improved weather conditions would benefit traffic as well. Currently, winter storms are one of the biggest factors in causing traffic problems and delays. They create unsafe driving conditions. They force airports to postpone flights. If winters became shorter due to warming trends, road and airport conditions would improve massively. **A warming trend brings many benefits to economic activity.** Since so many people around the world are dependent on oil, fish, transportation, and shipping, the economic advantages of warmer climate reach far and wide. As the supply of these goods rises along with temperatures, prices would fall, allowing consumers to enjoy more without paying more. **History shows that warmer weather has always been on the side of**

human civilization. Moore describes the role that the climate has played in primitive societies: "Primitive man and hunter-gatherer tribes were at the mercy of the weather, as are societies that are still almost totally bound to the soil. A series of bad years can be devastating." In warm years, the growing season was long and fruitful. Animals flourished, providing food for societies that relied on hunting. Disruptions in climate would have greatly reduced their means of sustenance. In fact, climate changes may have played a key role in the transition from hunter-gatherer societies to farming societies. Moore points to the coincidence of the end of the Ice Age with the rise of agriculture and domestication about 10,000 years ago. As a result, populations that grew food could grow larger and larger without being constrained by a limited supply of wildlife. According to Moore's book, there was little population growth in Europe during the late first millennium A.D. Mountain passes restricted trade and movement, and many settlements were abandoned. When the warmer 11th century came, towns grew and trade flourished. Marshes dried up to yield good farmland. Human life expectancy in England reached 48 by the year 1276. In Greenland, settlers even grew corn — it was truly a "green land." This trend of warmth reversed itself starting around 1300, ushering in a Mini-Ice Age. Glaciers in North America expanded. The once-flourishing civilization in Greenland was abandoned. Europe experienced crop failures due to a shortened growing season. The coldness generated storms and turned good land into bogs and marshes. Moore believes that this cooling period even contributed to the Black Death plague. "The unpleasant weather is likely to have confined people to their homes where they were more likely to be exposed to the fleas that carried the disease," he says. "In addition, the inclement weather may have induced rats to take shelter in buildings, exposing their inhabitants to the bacillus." As a result, life expectancy in Britain plummeted to 38 by the late 14th century. He documents similar historical trends in Asia. **Human civilization prospered during periods of warm weather in history and faced hardships and setbacks during cold periods.** Says Moore, "During the best of times, human populations have gone up rapidly, new techniques and practices have developed, and building and art have flourished." Although the Industrial Revolution has reduced the dependence of human activity upon the climate, warmer weather still makes a difference today. Despite all the benefits, many scientists still claim global warming is a problem. Some of their concerns may be valid, such as the possible flooding of small islands. The question is, how can we weigh the gains against the losses? How should global warming be judged when it could be both advantageous and disadvantageous for people? Here is where the realm of science ends. Science can tell us the bare facts about what will happen as a result of natural, physical processes. However, it cannot tell us how people will or should act in response to these processes. According to Thomas Gale Moore in an interview, global warming is not so much a scientific issue as an economic issue. **People are fully capable of adjusting to new conditions — just as they have done for thousands of years.** A farmer who finds that his crops can no longer grow under the new climate, for instance, could either move south or find a more suitable crop. The result of human adaptability can be seen today in the fact that people today can live in both extreme heat and extreme cold due to good insulation and air conditioning. "That's the interesting thing about human beings," says Moore. If it turns out to be true, global warming may change the world in many ways. **But as long as people are capable of acting and adjusting, they can compensate for the negative effects of warming while enjoying its positive fruits.** Moore agrees: "There's no reason to think that warm weather is bad."

Looming global water shortages will trigger nuclear war and extinction

NASCA 2004 ["Water shortages – only a matter of time," National Association for Scientific and Cultural Appreciation, <<http://www.markedbyteachers.com/gcse/geography/world-resources-scarcity-and-conflict-views-on-the-future.html>>] //CJC

Water is one of the prime essentials for life as we know it. The plain fact is - no water, no life! This becomes all the more worrying when we realise that the worlds supply of drinkable water will soon diminish quite rapidly. In fact a recent report commissioned by **the United Nations** **has emphasised that by the year 2025 at least 66% of the worlds population will be without an adequate water supply.** As a disaster in the making water shortage ranks in the

top category. **Without water we are finished**, and it is thus imperative that we protect the mechanism through which we derive our supply of this life giving fluid. Unfortunately the exact opposite is the case. We are doing incalculable damage to the planets capacity to generate water and this will have far ranging consequences for the not too distant future. The United Nations has warned that burning of fossil fuels is the prime cause of water shortage. While there may be other reasons such as increased solar activity it is clear that this is a situation over which we can exert a great deal of control. If not then the future will be very bleak indeed! Already the warning signs are there. The last year has seen devastating heatwaves in many parts of the world including the USA where the state of Texas experienced its worst drought on record. Elsewhere in the United States forest fires raged out of control, while other regions of the globe experienced drought conditions that were even more severe. Parts of Iran, Afghanistan, China and other neighbouring countries experienced their worst droughts on record. These conditions also extended throughout many parts of Africa and it is clear that if circumstances remain unchanged we are facing a disaster of epic proportions. Moreover it will be one for which there is no easy answer. **The spectre of a world water shortage evokes a truly frightening scenario.** In fact **the United Nations warns that disputes over water will become the prime source of conflict in the not too distant future. Where these shortages become ever more acute it could foreseeably lead to the brink of nuclear conflict.** On a lesser scale water, and the price of it, will acquire an importance somewhat like the current value placed on oil. The difference of course is that while oil is not vital for life, water most certainly is! It seems clear then that in future years **countries rich in water will enjoy an importance that perhaps they do not have today. In these circumstances power shifts are inevitable, and this will undoubtedly create its own strife and tension.** In the long term the implications do not look encouraging. It is a two edged sword. First the shortage of water, and then the increased stresses this will impose upon an already stressed world of politics. It means that answers need to be found immediately. Answers that will both ameliorate the damage to the environment, and also find new sources of water for future consumption. If not, and the problem is left unresolved there will eventually come the day when we shall find ourselves with a nightmare situation for which there will be no obvious answer.

3B people die from food price increase

Earth Policy Institute 2004 ("Outgrowing the earth", book, <http://www.earth-policy.org/Books/Out/index.htm>)

"Many Americans see terrorism as the principal threat to security," said Brown, "but for much of humanity, the effect of water shortages and rising temperatures on food security are far more important issues. **For the 3 billion people who live on 2 dollars a day or less and who spend up to 70 percent of their income on food, even a modest rise in food prices can quickly become life-threatening.** For them, it is the next meal that is the overriding concern."

Agriculture collapses will destroy civilization

Brown 2009 [Lester, environmental analyst, founder of the Worldwatch Institute, and founder and president of the Earth Policy Institute, "COULD FOOD SHORTAGES BRING DOWN CIVILIZATION?," Scientific American, May 2009, Vol. 300 Issue 5, p50-57, <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/civilization-food-shortages/><https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/civilization-food-shortages/>] //CJC

For most of us, **the idea that civilization itself could disintegrate** probably **seems preposterous.** Who would not find it hard to think seriously about such a complete departure from what we expect of ordinary life? What evidence could make us heed a warning so dire--and how would we go about responding to it? **We are so inured to a long list of highly unlikely catastrophes that we are virtually programmed to dismiss them all with a wave of the hand:** Sure, our civilization might devolve into chaos--and Earth might collide with an asteroid, too!¶ For many years **I have studied global agricultural, population, environmental and economic trends and their interactions. The combined effects of those trends and the political tensions they generate point to the breakdown of governments and**

societies. Yet I, too, have resisted the idea that **food shortages could bring down** not only individual governments but also **our global civilization.**¶ I can no longer ignore that risk. Our continuing failure to deal with the environmental declines that are undermining the world food economy--**most important, falling water tables**, eroding soils and rising temperatures--**forces me to conclude that such a collapse is possible.**

High food prices and food insecurity is comparatively the GREATEST threat to humanity. Causes failed states, terrorism and independently collapses civilization

Brown 2009 [Lester, environmental analyst, founder of the Worldwatch Institute, and founder and president of the Earth Policy Institute, "COULD FOOD SHORTAGES BRING DOWN CIVILIZATION?," Scientific American, May 2009, Vol. 300 Issue 5, p50-57, <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/civilization-food-shortages/> //CJC

In six of the past nine years world grain production has fallen short of consumption, forcing a steady drawdown in **stocks**. When the 2008 harvest began, world carryover stocks of grain (the amount in the bin when the new harvest begins) were at 62 days of consumption, a near record low. In response, world grain prices in the spring and summer of last year climbed to the highest level ever.¶ **As demand for food rises faster than supplies are growing, the resulting food-price inflation puts severe stress on the governments of countries already teetering on the edge of chaos.** Unable to buy grain or grow their own, **hungry people take to the streets.** Indeed, even before the steep climb in grain prices in 2008, the number of failing states was expanding [see sidebar at left]. Many of their problem's stem from a failure to slow the growth of their populations. But **if the food situation continues to deteriorate**, entire **nations will break down** at an ever increasing rate. **We have entered a new era in geopolitics. In the 20th century the main threat to international security was superpower conflict; today it is failing states.** It is not the concentration of power but its absence that puts us at risk.¶ **States fail when national governments can no longer provide** personal security, **food security** and basic social services such as education and health care. They often lose control of part or all of their territory. When governments lose their monopoly on power, law and order begin to disintegrate. After a point, countries can become so dangerous that food relief workers are no longer safe and their programs are halted; in Somalia and Afghanistan, deteriorating conditions have already put such programs in jeopardy.¶ **Failing states are of international concern because they are a source of terrorists, drugs, weapons and refugees, threatening political stability everywhere.** Somalia, number one on the 2008 list of failing states, has become a base for piracy. Iraq, number five, is **a hotbed for terrorist training.** Afghanistan, number seven, is the world's leading supplier of heroin. Following the massive genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, refugees from that troubled state, thousands of armed soldiers among them, helped to destabilize neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (number six).¶ Our global civilization depends on a functioning network of politically healthy nation-states to control the spread of infectious disease, to manage the international monetary system, to control international terrorism and to reach scores of other common goals. If the system for controlling infectious diseases--such as polio, SARS or avian flu--breaks down, humanity will be in trouble. Once states fail, no one assumes responsibility for their debt to outside lenders. **If enough states disintegrate, their fall will threaten the stability of global civilization** itself.

No checks to food shortages — the next spike will cause catastrophe

Brown 2011 [Lester, environmental analyst, founder of the Worldwatch Institute, and founder and president of the Earth Policy Institute, “The New Geopolitics of Food,”
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/25/the_new_geopolitics_of_food>] //CJC

More alarming still, **the world is losing its ability to soften the effect of shortages. In response to previous price surges, the United States**, the world's largest grain producer, **was effectively able to steer the world away from potential catastrophe**. From the mid-20th century until 1995, the United States had either grain surpluses or idle cropland that could be planted to rescue countries in trouble. When the Indian monsoon failed in 1965, for example, President Lyndon Johnson's administration shipped one-fifth of the U.S. wheat crop to India, successfully staving off famine. **We can't do that anymore; the safety cushion is gone.**

CO2 key to global food production and biodiversity – faster than their impacts

Goklany 15 [Indur Goklany, PhD, was a member of the US delegation that established the IPCC and helped develop its First Assessment Report, Fellow at the Political Economy Research Center, Senior Adviser for Program Coordination at the U.S. Interior Department's Office of Policy Analysis, Global Warming Policy Foundation, October 2015, “CARBON DIOXIDE The good news”, <http://www.thegwpf.org/content/uploads/2015/10/benefits1.pdf>

But, as will be shown in Part II of this study, **there is little or no empirical evidence that the warming that has occurred** – or any changes it may have caused – since the end of the last ice age or since the putative start of manmade warming around 1950 **is actually causing net harm** or diminishing human or environmental wellbeing. Yes, there have been changes, but a change is not necessarily detrimental. In fact, the changes have frequently been beneficial, as will be discussed in Section 7, which deals with trends in various climate-sensitive indicators of human and environmental wellbeing. Yet these are routinely ignored in discussions of manmade global warming.

This paper argues that **the benefits of increasing carbon dioxide have been underestimated**, that **the risks from increasing carbon dioxide have been overestimated**, and that carbon dioxide emission reduction policies will start to reduce the **benefits of higher carbon dioxide concentrations immediately**, **without reducing climate change** and its associated costs **until much later, if at all.**

2 Impacts of carbon dioxide on biological productivity Evidence for enhanced plant growth That carbon dioxide is plant food has been known since the publication in 1804 of Nicolas-Théodore de Saussure's Recherches Chimiques sur la Végétation. 12 Thousands of experiments since then have shown that the majority of plants grow faster and larger, both above and below ground, if they are exposed to higher carbon dioxide concentrations. The owners of commercial greenhouses routinely pump in carbon dioxide so as to enhance the growth rates of plants, and the optimal level for plant growth is considered to be between 700 and 900 parts per million (ppm), 13 roughly twice today's ambient concentration of 400 ppm. However, plants may continue to respond positively at even higher carbon dioxide levels. For some species such as loblolly pine¹⁴ and cuphea,¹⁵ growth tops out at around 20,000 ppm or more. Indeed, it has been shown that the addition of supplemental carbon dioxide to a greenhouse enhances the growth of lettuces even if the temperature of the greenhouse is lowered, thus causing a net decrease in the carbon footprint of the operation.¹⁶ A database of peer-reviewed papers assembled from studies of the effect of carbon dioxide on plant growth by the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change (CSCDGC) shows that for the 45 crops that account for 95% of global crop production, an increase of 300 ppm of carbon dioxide would increase yields by between 5% and 78%.¹⁷ The median increase for these crops was 41% and the production-weighted yield increase was 34.6%. Experiments also show that the benefits of carbon dioxide for plants are not restricted to faster and greater growth; the efficiency with which they consume water is also increased. Consequently, all else being equal, under higher carbon dioxide conditions, less water is needed to increase a plant's biomass by any given amount. In other words, higher carbon dioxide levels increase plants' ability to adapt to water-limited (or drought) conditions, precisely the conditions that some environmentalists claim are already occurring – notwithstanding the finding of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to the contrary – or will occur in the future. A recent experimental study on grasslands found that elevated levels of carbon dioxide further lengthened the growing season under warming conditions.¹⁸ The reason for the increased adaptability is that the size and density of stomata – tiny pores on the underside of leaves, which allow air, water vapour, and other gases to enter and leave the plant – are typically reduced as carbon dioxide levels increase. Thus higher carbon dioxide levels reduce water loss from the leaves. For the same reason, higher carbon dioxide levels reduce the rate at which ozone and other gases toxic to plants enter the plant, reducing the damage they inflict. In fact, Taub, in a summary article notes, 'Across experiments with all plant species, the enhancement of growth by elevated carbon dioxide is much greater under conditions of ozone stress than otherwise'.¹⁹ The IPCC AR5 WGI report acknowledges that '[f]ield experiments provide a [sic] direct evidence of increased photosynthesis rates and water use efficiency...in plants growing under elevated carbon dioxide'.²⁰ It also notes that this effect occurs in more than two thirds of the experiments and that net primary productivity (NPP) increases by about 20–25% if carbon dioxide is doubled relative to the pre-industrial level.²¹ Previously it had been argued

that these increases might not be sustainable over the long term, but AR5 reports that new experimental evidence from long-term free-air carbon dioxide enrichment (FACE) experiments in temperate ecosystems show that these higher rates of carbon accumulation can be sustained for 'multiple years'.²² In AR5, the IPCC says that the reduced carbon dioxide fertilisation effect seen in some experiments and the complete absence in others is 'very likely' due to nitrogen limitation in temperate and boreal ecosystems, and phosphorus limitation in the tropics, with a possible effect due to interaction with deficiencies of other micronutrients such as molybdenum.²³ The report concludes, '...with high confidence, the carbon dioxide fertilisation effect will lead to enhanced NPP, but significant uncertainties remain on the magnitude of this effect, given the lack of experiments outside of temperate climates'. But the IPCC protests too much. It overstates the uncertainty regarding the magnitude of the effect under real world conditions. Consider managed ecosystems, particularly agriculture and forestry. Nutrient and micronutrient deficiencies are among the many routine challenges faced by farmers and foresters. Managing them is not terra incognita. Moreover, adaptations to cope with such deficiencies become more likely as technology inexorably advances and societies become wealthier, as indeed they are projected to become under all IPCC emission scenarios.^{24,25} Therefore, farmers and foresters should be able to adapt successfully, unless some technologies are foreclosed under a perverse application of the precautionary principle.²⁶ Such perversity, however, cannot be ruled out given the antipathy of many environmentalists towards biotechnology. Foreclosing options such as genetically modified (GM) crops that would be more resistant to drought, water logging, or other adverse conditions will increase the likelihood that environmentalists' warnings – that AGW will lower food production and increase hunger – become self-fulfilling prophecies. It has also been suggested that carbon dioxide enrichment inhibits the assimilation of nitrate into organic nitrogen compounds, which then may be largely responsible for carbon dioxide acclimation, and a decline in photosynthesis and growth of C3+ plants, as well as a reduction in protein content because of the resulting increase in the carbon/nitrogen ratio.^{27,28,29} While the precise cause(s) and biochemical pathway(s) responsible for such acclimation are still being investigated, several approaches have been proposed to limit, if not overcome, such acclimation. These include making more nitrogen available to the plant to match the increase in carbon, for example through increased nitrogen fertilisation, greater reliance on ammonium rather than nitrate fertilizers, or improving nitrogen uptake and nitrogen-use efficiency through the development of new crop varieties via conventional breeding or bioengineering.^{30,31} Present-day contribution of carbon dioxide to increases in crop yields If more carbon dioxide increases the productivity of plants, how much have crop yields increased so far because of carbon dioxide increases since pre-industrial times? Currently, the carbon dioxide level is at 400 ppm (0.04%). By comparison, the preindustrial level is estimated to have been 277 ppm (0.028%).³² If one assumes that the carbon dioxide fertilisation effect on productivity increases linearly, then the AR5 estimate of a 20–25% yield increase for a doubling of carbon dioxide levels since preindustrial times translates into a 9–11% yield increase so far.

Alternatively, **a 34.6% increase in yield from a 300-ppm increase** in carbon dioxide concentration, as calculated by the CSDGCG,[†] **translates into a 15% yield increase due to anthropogenic emissions to date.** These are underestimates if the growth response to increasing carbon dioxide levels bends downwards at higher concentrations. These estimates suggest that a portion of the **crop yield increases** seen in recent decades, **which most observers credit to technological change,** **should actually be credited to carbon dioxide fertilisation.** A recent econometric **analysis, which pooled sixty years of historical data** on US crop yields with output from FACE trials and records of temperature, precipitation, and carbon dioxide levels, **estimated that significant proportions of observed yield increases could be attributed to carbon dioxide** rather than technological change (see Table 1).³³ These estimates suggest that the beneficial effect of carbon dioxide could be even greater than the 9–15% yield increase estimated by CSDGCG.

The same study also found that **higher carbon dioxide levels are associated with lower variation in yields** for each crop. This is consistent with the notion that increased carbon dioxide levels reduce the sensitivity of yield to other factors (e.g. water shortages and air pollution). All else being equal, **lower variation translates into a more stable supply of food, as well as more stable food prices** which benefits all consumers everywhere.

Idso (2013) has attempted to translate these yield increases into a monetary value. He finds that **over 50 years the extra produce grown by farmers has been \$274 billion for wheat, \$182 billion for maize and \$579 billion for rice,** and that **the current value of the carbon dioxide fertilisation effect on all crops is currently about \$140 billion a year.** Of course, these numbers cannot be precise, but note that they are based on actual experimental data and existing yields, so they are far less speculative than monetary measures of the harm due to future climate change and its impacts on food security using models that have not been externally validated (see Section 8).³⁴

Impact of carbon dioxide enrichment on pests and weeds All crops are engaged in a battle of attrition with fungal parasites, insect predators and plant competitors, among other pests. Human intervention to help the crops prevail, using pesticides, genetic modification or by changing agronomic practices, is the main determinant of how much of the crop is lost. However, it is possible that carbon dioxide enrichment can improve the capacity of plants to resist pests.³⁵ Insects do not grow faster in higher concentrations of carbon dioxide, and while some experiments show that carbon dioxide enrichment reduces crop resistance to pathogens,³⁶ others show that it can help crops resist such enemies. For example, in one experiment doubling carbon dioxide levels in the air fully compensated for any growth reduction caused by a fungal pathogen in tomatoes.³⁷ In another study, the parasitic weed *Striga hermonthica*, which devastates many crops in sub-Saharan Africa, was shown to do only half as much damage to rice yields when carbon dioxide concentrations are doubled.³⁸

In another study, higher carbon dioxide levels were found to enhance the production of phenolic compounds in rice and, since these are known to inhibit the growth of the most noxious weeds in rice fields, the authors conclude that the rise in the air's carbon dioxide concentration may well 'increase plant resistance to specific weeds, pests and pathogens'.³⁹ Moreover, many crops are C3 plants and many **weeds are C4 plants, which respond less to carbon dioxide enrichment.** Thus **as carbon dioxide levels rise, C3 crops may enhance their growth rates more than C4 weeds do.** A Chinese experiment tested this idea by enriching carbon dioxide levels over plots of rice to almost twice the ambient level. This enhanced the ear weight of the rice by 37.6% while reducing the growth of a common weed, barnyard grass, by 47.9%, because the faster-growing rice shaded the weeds.⁴⁰ Figure 1 illustrates the differing responses to elevated carbon dioxide concentrations of rice, a C3 plant, and the green foxtail *Setaria viridis*, a grass sometimes proposed as a genetic model system to study C4 photosynthesis.^{41,42} It is worth noting that the vast majority of plants are C3, perhaps because higher carbon dioxide levels are more the norm in Earth's history.

Contribution of carbon dioxide to increases in biological productivity in unmanaged ecosystems

As early as 1985, Bacastow and colleagues detected a steady increase in the amplitude of seasonal variation in the carbon dioxide levels in the northern hemisphere,⁴³ and deduced that it implied an increase in summer vegetation. This was the first hint of global greening, a phenomenon now established by satellite observations. More recent aircraft-based observations of carbon dioxide above the north Pacific and the Arctic Ocean indicate that between 1958–61 and 2009–11 the seasonal amplitude at altitudes of

3–6 km increased by 25% for the northern hemisphere from 10°N to 45°N, and 50% from 45°N to 90°N.⁴⁴ Satellite observations confirm that the increase in greenness of the globe is not confined to managed ecosystems (such as croplands), but is happening in unmanaged and lightly managed ecosystems too. Trend analysis of global greenness using satellite data indicates that from 1982 to 2011 – a period during which atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration increased by 15% – 31% of the global vegetated area became greener while 3% became less green (see Figure 2).⁴⁵

The productivity of global ecosystems has increased by 14% in aggregate. Notably, all vegetation types have greened,⁴⁶ including tropical rain forests, deciduous and evergreen boreal forests, scrubland, semi-deserts, grasslands and all other wild ecosystems, including those that do not even have indirect input of man-made nitrogen fertilizer. Some ecosystems show a relatively poorer response in NPP at higher carbon dioxide levels. The progressive nitrogen limitation (PNL) hypothesis⁴⁷ argues that this is due to nitrogen deficiency. However, the human activities that are major emitters of greenhouse gases – fossil fuel consumption and the use of nitrogen fertilizers for agriculture – also emit so-called ‘reactive’ nitrogen, which can be used directly or indirectly by biological organisms to grow. The concentration of N₂O has risen by 7% over those 30 years. However, the evidence regarding the PNL hypothesis is mixed.^{48,49,50,51,52,53,54} The increased greening detected via satellite and aircraft measurements is consistent with the increases in crop yields seen over the past 50 years or more,^{55,56} but also with a bottom-up estimate of changes in the amount of carbon sequestered in forests.⁵⁷ These forest stock-and-flux estimates are derived from on-the-ground forest inventory data and long-term ecosystem carbon studies, and represent 3.9 billion hectares of global forests, or 95% of the total. They indicate that from 1990 to 2007 forests served as a net carbon sink, to the tune of 1.1 Pg C per year.[‡]

Other long-term on-the-ground observational records also find increased forest growth. For example, an analysis of data from unmanaged or lightly managed stands in central European forests, going back in some instances to 1870,[§] indicates that the volume of 75-year-old stands of the dominant tree species grew 10–30% faster in 2000 than in 1960.⁵⁸ The standing stock volumes were also greater in 2000 than in 1960, by 6–7%. Similarly, data ranging over 5–18 years indicate that carbon uptake increased in six out of seven forests across the northeast and midwest United States.⁵⁹ However, the 14% increase in global vegetation cannot be attributed entirely to higher carbon dioxide levels and nitrogen deposition: part of it could also be due to a more equable climate for plant growth, possibly because of AGW. Donohoe et al. analyzed satellite observations after first processing them to remove the effect of variations in rainfall.⁶⁰ Their results showed that the vegetation cover across arid environments, where water is the dominant constraint to growth, increased by 11% during the period 1982–2010, largely because of increased water-use efficiency by plants at higher carbon dioxide concentrations. Unfortunately, estimates of productivity increases solely from carbon dioxide increases are not available for other ecosystems or the globe as a whole.

Of course, increases in plant production are likely to result in increases in aggregate animal biomass too.

In summary, higher carbon dioxide levels increase both crop yields and biosphere productivity more generally. 3 Ancillary benefits of increased biospheric productivity Improved human wellbeing Higher agricultural yields reduce food prices in general. This provides a double dividend for humanity. Firstly, it reduces chronic hunger, but secondly a reduction in chronic hunger is the first step toward improvements in public health.^{61,62} Reduced habitat loss and pressure on biodiversity No less important, higher yields also provide a double dividend for the rest of nature. Firstly, they free up habitat for the rest of nature, which reduces the pressure on ecosystems. Had it not been for the increase in yields of 9–15%, global cropland would have had to be increased by a similar amount to produce the same amount of food, all else being equal. That figure means that an area equivalent to the combined area of Myanmar, Thailand and Malaysia has been saved from the plough. Secondly, land that has not been appropriated by humans also produces more food for other species. Consequently, this increases the aggregate biomass – that is, the product of number of species and representatives of each species – that the planet can sustain. How much would the food available for other species have decreased in the absence of anthropogenic increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide? To calculate this figure, assume that:

- the productivity of unmanaged ecosystems also increased by 9–15% because of higher carbon dioxide concentrations (as estimated for crops)
- human beings currently ‘appropriate’ 25% of the earth’s NPP.⁶³

Therefore, had there been no anthropogenic increase in carbon dioxide, satisfying current human demand for food, timber, feed for domesticated animals and other plant-derived product would have required the share of NPP available for the rest of nature to decline by 11–17%. Alternatively, if one assumes that human beings currently use 40% of global NPP⁶⁴ and retain the other assumptions intact then the present share of NPP available for the rest of nature would have had to decline by 14–22%. In either case, in the absence of any carbon dioxide fertilisation there would have been a significant increase in the number of species at risk of extinction.

Emissions good, increases welfare, prevents starvation. Deaths from cold outweigh heat
Ridley 13 (Matt, Climate Journalist. “Why Climate Change is Good for the World” October 19th 2013, <http://www.spectator.co.uk/2013/10/carry-on-warming/>)

Climate change has done more good than harm so far and is likely to continue doing so for most of this century. This is not some barmy, right-wing fantasy; it is the consensus of expert opinion. Yet almost nobody seems to know this. Whenever I make the point in public, I am told by those who are paid to insult anybody who departs from climate alarm that I have got it embarrassingly

wrong, don't know what I am talking about, must be referring to Britain only, rather than the world as a whole, and so forth.

At first, I thought this was just their usual bluster. But then I realised that they are genuinely unaware. Good news is no news, which is why the mainstream media largely ignores all studies showing net benefits of climate change. And academics have not exactly been keen to push such analysis forward. So here follows, for possibly the first time in history, an entire article in the national press on the net benefits of climate change.

There are many likely effects of climate change: positive and negative, economic and ecological, humanitarian and financial. And **if you aggregate them all, the overall effect is positive today — and likely to stay positive until around 2080. That was the conclusion of Professor Richard Tol of Sussex University after he reviewed 14 different studies of the effects of future climate trends.**

To be precise, Prof Tol calculated that climate change would be beneficial up to 2.2°C of warming from 2009 (when he wrote his paper). This means approximately 3°C from pre-industrial levels, since about 0.8°C of warming has happened in the last 150 years. The latest estimates of climate sensitivity suggest that such temperatures may not be reached till the end of the century — if at all. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, whose reports define the consensus, is sticking to older assumptions, however, which would mean net benefits till about 2080. Either way, it's a long way off.

Now Prof Tol has a new paper, published as a chapter in a new book, called *How Much have Global Problems Cost the World?*, which is edited by Bjorn Lomborg, director of the Copenhagen Consensus Centre, and was reviewed by a group of leading economists. In this paper he casts his gaze backwards to the last century. He concludes that climate change did indeed raise human and planetary welfare during the 20th century.

You can choose not to believe the studies Prof Tol has collated. Or you can say the net benefit is small (which it is), you can argue that the benefits have accrued more to rich countries than poor countries (which is true) or you can emphasise that after 2080 climate change would probably do net harm to the world (which may also be true). You can even say you do not trust the models involved (though they have proved more reliable than the temperature models). But what you cannot do is deny that this is the current consensus. If you wish to accept the consensus on temperature models, then you should accept the consensus on economic benefit.

Overall, Prof Tol finds that **climate change in the past century improved human welfare.** By how much? **He calculates by 1.4 per cent of global economic output, rising to 1.5 per cent by 2025. For some people, this means the difference between survival and starvation.**

It will still be 1.2 per cent around 2050 and will not turn negative until around 2080. In short, my children will be very old before global warming stops benefiting the world. Note that if the world continues to grow at 3 per cent a year, then the average person will be about nine times as rich in 2080 as she is today. So low-lying Bangladesh will be able to afford the same kind of flood defences that the Dutch have today.

The chief benefits of global warming include: fewer winter deaths; lower energy costs; better agricultural yields; probably fewer droughts; maybe richer biodiversity. It is a little-known fact that winter deaths exceed summer deaths — not just in countries like Britain but **also those with very warm summers,** including Greece. Both Britain and Greece see mortality

rates rise by 18 per cent each winter. Especially cold winters cause a rise in heart failures far greater than the rise in deaths during heatwaves.

Cold, not the heat, is the biggest killer. For the last decade, Brits have been dying from the cold at the average rate of 29,000 excess deaths each winter. Compare this to the heatwave ten years ago, which claimed 15,000 lives in France and just 2,000 in Britain. In the ten years since, there has been no summer death spike at all. Excess winter deaths hit the poor harder than the rich for the obvious reason: they cannot afford heating. And it is not just those at risk who benefit from moderate warming. Global warming has so far cut heating bills more than it has raised cooling bills. If it resumes after its current 17-year hiatus, and if the energy efficiency of our homes improves, then at some point the cost of cooling probably will exceed the cost of heating — probably from about 2035, Prof Tol estimates.

The greatest benefit from climate change comes not from temperature change but from carbon dioxide itself. It is not pollution, but the raw material from which plants make carbohydrates and thence proteins and fats. As it is an extremely rare trace gas in the air — less than 0.04 per cent of the air on average — plants struggle to absorb enough of it. On a windless, sunny day, a field of corn can suck half the carbon dioxide out of the air. Commercial greenhouse operators therefore pump carbon dioxide into their greenhouses to raise plant growth rates.

The increase in average carbon dioxide levels over the past century, from 0.03 per cent to 0.04 per cent of the air, has had a measurable impact on plant growth rates. It is responsible for a startling change in the amount of greenery on the planet. As Dr Ranga Myneni of Boston University has documented, using three decades of satellite data, 31 per cent of the global vegetated area of the planet has become greener and just 3 per cent has become less green.

This translates into a 14 per cent increase in productivity of ecosystems and has been observed in all vegetation types.

Dr Randall Donohue and colleagues of the CSIRO Land and Water department in Australia also analysed satellite data and found greening to be clearly attributable in part to the carbon dioxide fertilisation effect. Greening is especially pronounced in dry areas like the Sahel region of Africa, where satellites show a big increase in green vegetation since the 1970s.

It is often argued that global warming will hurt the world's poorest hardest. What is seldom heard is that the decline of famines in the Sahel in recent years is partly due to more rainfall caused by moderate warming and partly due to more carbon dioxide itself: more greenery for goats to eat means more greenery left over for gazelles, so entire ecosystems have benefited.

Even polar bears are thriving so far, though this is mainly because of the cessation of hunting. None the less, it's worth noting that the three years with the lowest polar bear cub survival in the western Hudson Bay (1974, 1984 and 1992) were the years when the sea ice was too thick for ringed seals to appear in good numbers in spring. Bears need broken ice.

Well yes, you may argue, but what about all the weather disasters caused by climate change? Entirely mythical — so far. The latest IPCC report is admirably frank about this, reporting 'no significant observed trends in global tropical cyclone frequency over the past century ... lack of evidence and thus low confidence regarding the sign of trend in the magnitude and/or frequency offloads on a global scale ... low confidence in observed trends in small-scale severe weather phenomena such as hail and thunderstorms'.

In fact, the death rate from droughts, floods and storms has dropped by 98 per cent since the 1920s, according to a careful study by the independent scholar Indur Goklany. Not because

weather has become less dangerous but because people have gained better protection as they got richer: witness the remarkable success of cyclone warnings in India last week. That's the thing about climate change — we will probably pocket the benefits and mitigate at least some of the harm by adapting. For example, experts now agree that malaria will continue its rapid worldwide decline whatever the climate does.

Yet cherry-picking the bad news remains rife. A remarkable example of this was the IPCC's last report in 2007, which said that global warming would cause 'hundreds of millions of people [to be] exposed to increased water stress' under four different scenarios of future warming. It cited a study, which had also counted numbers of people at reduced risk of water stress — and in each case that number was higher. The IPCC simply omitted the positive numbers. Why does this matter? Even if climate change does produce slightly more welfare for the next 70 years, why take the risk that it will do great harm thereafter? There is one obvious reason: climate policy is already doing harm. Building wind turbines, growing biofuels and substituting wood for coal in power stations — all policies designed explicitly to fight climate change — have had negligible effects on carbon dioxide emissions. But they have driven people into fuel poverty, made industries uncompetitive, driven up food prices, accelerated the destruction of forests, killed rare birds of prey, and divided communities. To name just some of the effects. Mr Goklany estimates that globally nearly 200,000 people are dying every year, because we are turning 5 per cent of the world's grain crop into motor fuel instead of food: that pushes people into malnutrition and death. In this country, 65 people a day are dying because they cannot afford to heat their homes properly, according to Christine Liddell of the University of Ulster, yet the government is planning to double the cost of electricity to consumers by 2030.

As Bjorn Lomborg has pointed out, the European Union will pay £165 billion for its current climate policies each and every year for the next 87 years. Britain's climate policies — subsidising windmills, wood-burners, anaerobic digesters, electric vehicles and all the rest — is due to cost us £1.8 trillion over the course of this century. In exchange for that Brobdingnagian sum, we hope to lower the air temperature by about 0.005°C — which will be undetectable by normal thermometers. The accepted consensus among economists is that every £100 spent fighting climate change brings £3 of benefit. So we are doing real harm now to impede a change that will produce net benefits for 70 years. That's like having radiotherapy because you are feeling too well. I just don't share the certainty of so many in the green establishment that it's worth it. It may be, but it may not.

Warming much slower than their impacts assume – their models are flawed and our authors use the newest and best science

Fyfe et. al 16 [John, Canadian Centre for Climate Modelling and Analysis, Environment and Climate Change university of Vancouver, Gerald Meehl, National Center for Atmospheric Research, Boulder, Colorado, Matthew England, ARC Centre of Excellence for Climate System Science, University of New South Wales, Michael Mann, Department of Meteorology and Earth and Environmental Systems Institute, Pennsylvania State University, Benjamin Santer, Program for Climate Model Diagnosis and Intercomparison (PCMDI), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Gregory Flato, Canadian Centre for Climate Modelling and Analysis, Environment and Climate Change Canada, University of Victoria, Ed Hawkins, National Centre for Atmospheric Science, Department of Meteorology, University of Reading, Nathan Gillet, Canadian Centre for Climate Modelling and Analysis, Environment and Climate Change Canada, University of Victoria, Shang-Ping Xie, Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California San Diego, Yu Kosaka, Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, University of Tokyo, "Making sense of the early-2000s warming slowdown", Nature Journal March 2016, pg. 227-28]

Our results support previous findings of **a reduced rate of surface warming over the 2001–2014 period** — a period in which anthropogenic forcing increased at a relatively constant rate. Recent research that has identified and corrected the errors and inhomogeneities in the surface air temperature record⁴ is of high scientific value. Investigations have also identified non-climatic artefacts in tropospheric temperatures inferred from radiosondes³⁰ and satellites³¹, and important errors in ocean heat uptake estimates²⁵. Newly identified observational errors do not, however, negate the existence of a real reduction in the surface warming rate in the early twenty-first century relative to the 1970s–1990s. **This reduction arises through the combined effects of internal decadal variability^{11–18}, volcanic^{19,23} and solar activity, and decadal changes in anthropogenic aerosol forcing³².** The warming slowdown has motivated substantial research into decadal climate variability and uncertainties in key external forcings. As a result, the scientific community is now better able to explain temperature variations such as those experienced during the early twenty-first century³³, and perhaps even to make skilful predictions of such fluctuations in the future. For example, climate model predictions initialized with recent observations indicate a transition to a positive phase of the IPO with increased rates of global surface temperature warming (ref. 34, and G.A. Meehl, A. Hu and H. Teng, manuscript in preparation).

In summary, **climate models did not** (on average) **reproduce the observed temperature trend over the early twenty-first century⁶**, in spite of the continued increase in anthropogenic forcing. This mismatch focused attention on a compelling science problem — a problem deserving of scientific scrutiny. Based on our analysis, which relies on physical understanding of the key processes and forcings involved, we find that the rate of warming over the early twenty-first century is slower than that of the previous few decades. This slowdown is evident in time series of GMST and in the global mean temperature of the lower troposphere. The magnitude and statistical significance of observed trends (and the magnitude and significance of their differences relative to model expectations) depends on the start and end dates of the intervals considered²³.

Research into the nature and causes of the slowdown has triggered improved understanding of observational biases, radiative forcing and internal variability. This has led to widespread recognition **that modulation by internal variability is large enough to produce a significantly reduced rate of surface temperature increase for a decade or even more** — particularly if internal variability is augmented by the externally driven cooling caused by a succession of volcanic eruptions. The legacy of this new understanding will certainly outlive the recent warming slowdown. This is particularly true in the embryonic field of decadal climate prediction, where the challenge is to simulate how the combined effects of external forcing and internal variability produce the time-evolving regional climate we will experience over the next ten years.

Models overestimate the effect of Co2 emissions

John Christy '16, Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric Science at the University of Alabama in Huntsville, Awarded NASA Medal for Exceptional Scientific Achievement (1991), awarded Special Award, American Meteorological Society (1996), Lead Author, Contributing Author and Reviewer of United Nations IPCC assessments, "Testimony in front of the U.S. House

Committee on Science, Space & Technology,” 2/2/16, pgs. 10-14,
<http://docs.house.gov/meetings/SY/SY00/20160202/104399/HHRG-114-SY00-Wstate-ChristyJ-20160202.pdf>

(2) How well do we understand climate change?

A critical scientific goal in our era is to determine whether emissions from human activities impact the climate and if so by how much. This is made especially difficult because we know the climate system already is subject to significant changes without the influence of humans. Because there is no measuring device that explicitly determines the cause of the climate changes we can measure, such as temperature, our science must take a different approach to seek understanding as to what causes the changes, i.e. how much is natural and how much is human induced. The basic approach today utilizes climate models. (The projections of these models are being utilized for carbon policies as well.)

It is important to understand that output from these models, (i.e. projections of the future climate and the specific link that increasing CO2 might have on the climate) are properly defined as scientific hypotheses or claims – model output cannot be considered as providing proof of the links between climate variations and greenhouse gases. These models are complex computer programs which attempt to describe through mathematical equations as many factors that affect the climate as is possible and thus estimate how the climate might change in the future. The model, it is hoped, will provide accurate responses of the climate variables, like temperature, when extra greenhouse gases are included in the model. However, the equations for nearly all of the important climate processes are not exact, representing the best approximations modelers can devise and that computers can handle at this point.

A fundamental aspect of the scientific method is that if we say we understand a system (such as the climate system) then we should be able to predict its behavior. If we are unable to make accurate predictions, then at least some of the factors in the system are not well defined or perhaps even missing. [Note, however, that merely replicating the behavior of the system (i.e. reproducing “what” the climate does) does not guarantee that the fundamental physics are well-known. In other words, it is possible to obtain the right answer for the wrong reasons, i.e. getting the “what” of climate right but missing the “why”.]

Do we understand how greenhouse gases affect the climate, i.e. the link between emissions and climate effects? As noted above, a very basic metric for climate studies is the temperature of the bulk atmospheric layer known as the troposphere, roughly from the surface to 50,000 ft altitude. This is the layer that, according to models, should warm significantly as CO2 increases – even faster than the surface. Unlike the surface temperature, this bulk temperature informs us about the crux of the global warming question – how much heat is accumulating in the global atmosphere? And, this CO2-caused warming should be easily detectable by now, according to models. This provides a good test of how well we understand the climate system because since 1979 we have had two independent means of monitoring this layer – satellites from above and balloons with thermometers released from the surface.

I was able to access 102 CMIP-5 rcp4.5 (representative concentration pathways) climate model simulations of the atmospheric temperatures for the tropospheric layer and generate bulk temperatures from the models for an apples-to-apples comparison with the observations from satellites and balloons. These models were developed in institutions throughout the world and used in the IPCC AR5 Scientific Assessment (2013).

Above: Global average mid-tropospheric temperature variations (5-year averages) for 32 models (lines) representing 102 individual simulations. Circles (balloons) and squares (satellites) depict the observations. The Russian model (INM-CM4) was the only model close to the observations.

The information in this figure provides clear evidence that the models have a strong tendency to over-warm the atmosphere relative to actual observations. On average the models warm the global atmosphere at a rate 2.5 times that of the real world. This is not a short-term, specially-selected episode, but represents the past 37 years, over a third of a century. This is also the period with the highest concentration of greenhouse gases and thus the period in which the response should be of largest magnitude.

Following the scientific method of testing claims against data, we would conclude that the models do not accurately represent at least some of the important processes that impact the climate because they were unable to “predict” what has already occurred. In other words, **these models failed at the simple test of telling us “what” has already happened, and thus would not be in a position to give us a confident answer to “what” may happen in the future and “why.”** As such, they would be of highly questionable value in determining policy that should depend on a very confident understanding of how the climate system works.

Comparative climate models prove a) the climate is not as sensitive as previously thought and b) Co2 concentrations can't explain past warming

Spencer 8 –former head climate scientist @ NASA

(Roy Spencer, principal research scientist at the University of Alabama, former senior scientist for climate studied at NASA and now leads the U.S. science team for the Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer for EOS on NASA's Aqua satellite.

[<http://www.drroyspencer.com/research-articles/global-warming-as-a-natural-response/>] “Global Warming as a Natural Response to Cloud Changes Associated with the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO)”/December 29)

A simple climate model forced by satellite-observed changes in the Earth's radiative budget associated with the Pacific Decadal Oscillation is shown to mimic the major features of global average temperature change during the 20th Century – including three-quarters of the warming trend. A mostly-natural source of global warming is also consistent with mounting observational evidence that the climate system is much less sensitive to carbon dioxide emissions than the IPCC's climate models simulate.

1. INTRODUCTION The main arguments for global warming being manmade go something like this: “What else COULD it be? After all, we know that increasing carbon dioxide concentrations are sufficient to explain recent warming, so what's the point of looking for any other cause?” But for those who have followed my writings and publications in the last 18 months (e.g. [Spencer et al., 2007](#); [Spencer, 2008](#)), you know that we are finding satellite evidence that the climate system is much less sensitive to greenhouse gas emissions than the U.N.'s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) climate models suggest that it is. And if that is true, then mankind's CO2 emissions are not strong enough to have caused the global warming we've seen over the last 100 years. To show that we are not the only researchers who have documented evidence contradicting the IPCC models on the subject of climate sensitivity, I made the following figure (Fig. 1) to contrast the IPCC-projected warming from a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide with the warming that would result if the climate sensitivity is as low as implied by various kinds of observational evidence. The dashed line in Fig. 1 comes from our recent apples-to-apples comparison between satellite-based feedback estimates and IPCC model-diagnosed feedbacks, all computed from 5-year periods (see Fig. 2). In that comparison, there were NO five year periods from ANY of the IPCC model simulations which produced a feedback parameter with as low a climate sensitivity as that found in the satellite data. The discrepancy between the models and observations seen in Figs. 1 and 2 is stark. If the sensitivity of the climate system is as low as some of these observational results suggest, then the IPCC models are grossly in error, and we have little to fear from manmade global warming. [I am told that the 1.1 deg. C sensitivity of

Schwartz (2007) has more recently been revised upward to 1.9 deg. C.] But it also means that the radiative forcing caused by increasing atmospheric concentrations of CO2 is not sufficient to cause PAST warming, either. So, this then leaves a critical unanswered question: What has caused the warming seen over the last 100 years or so? Here I present new evidence that most of the warming could be the result of a natural cycle in cloud cover forced by a well-known mode of natural climate variability: the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO). While the PDO is primarily a geographic rearrangement in atmospheric and oceanic circulation patterns in the North Pacific, it is well known that such regional changes can also influence weather patterns over much larger areas, for instance North America or the entire Northern Hemisphere (which is, by the way, the region over which the vast majority of global warming has occurred). The IPCC has simply ASSUMED that these natural fluctuations in weather patterns do not cause climate change. But all it would take is a small change in global average (or Northern Hemispheric average) cloudiness to cause global warming. Unfortunately, our global observations of cloudiness have not been complete or accurate enough to document such a change...until recently.

Ice age by 2030 (1/2)

Goldbaum, citing Zharkova, 7/18/15 [Elizabeth Goldbaum has master's degrees in Journalism and science. "Is a Mini Ice Age Coming? 'Maunder Minimum' Spurs Controversy", *Live Science*, <<http://www.livescience.com/51597-maunder-minimum-mini-ice-age.html>>] //CJC

A scientist who claims waning solar activity in the next 15 years will trigger what some are calling a mini ice age has revived talk about the effects of man-made versus natural disruptors to Earth's climate.

Valentina Zharkova, a professor of mathematics at Northumbria University in the United Kingdom, used a new model of the sun's solar cycle, which is the periodic change in solar radiation, sunspots and other solar activity over a span of 11 years, to predict that "solar activity will fall by 60 percent during the 2030s to conditions last seen during the 'mini ice age' that began in 1645," according to a statement.

At the National Astronomy meeting in Llanduno, north Wales last week, Zharkova said that a series of solar phenomena will lead to a "Maunder Minimum," which refers to the seven decades, from 1645 to 1715, when the sun's surface ceased its heat-releasing magnetic storms and coincided with the Little Ice Age, a period of chillier temperatures, from around 1550 to 1850 in Europe, North America and Asia, according to NASA.

Ice age by 2030 (2/2)

BEC Crew, citing Zharkova, 7/13/15 [BEC Crew, "A 'mini ice age' is coming in the next 15 years", *Science Alert*, <<http://www.sciencealert.com/a-mini-ice-age-is-coming-in-the-next-15-years>>] //CJC

A new model that predicts the solar cycles more accurately than ever before has suggested that solar magnetic activity will drop by 60 percent between 2030 and 2040, which means

in just 15 years' time, Earth could sink into what researchers are calling a mini ice age.

Such low solar activity has not been seen since the last mini ice age, called the Maunder Minimum, which plunged the northern hemisphere in particular into a series of bitterly cold winters between 1645 and 1715. The prediction is based on what's known as the Sun's '11-year heartbeat'. The Sun's magnetic activity is not the same year in year out, it fluctuates over a cycle that lasts between 10 and 12 years. Ever since this was discovered 172 years ago, scientists have struggled to predict what each cycle will look like. But just last week at the National Astronomy Meeting in Wales, **mathematics professor Valentina Zharkova** from Northumbria University in the UK has presented a new model that can forecast what these solar cycles will look like based on the dynamo effects at play in two layers of the Sun. **Zharkova says she can predict their influence with an accuracy of 97 percent.**

Space agencies all agree – Ice Age is imminent.

Aym, 2011 [Terrence Aym, author of *Mysteries of the Multiverse: 25 True Stories of Time and Space*, contributor to *Science 360*, and writer, "Scientists Suns Approaching Grand Cooling Assures New Ice Age," *Science 360*, <<http://www.sciences360.com/index.php/scientists-suns-approaching-grand-cooling-assures-new-ice-age-6259/>>] //CJC

NASA and the ESA agree, and so does the Russian space agency, Roscosmos—the sun is headed for a Grand Solar Minimum and a Grand Cooling will commence. The aptly named Grand Cooling is exactly what it implies: the sun is going to cool. That cooling will also cool off the Earth. It will last from 30 to 50 years. What exactly does global cooling mean? Well for one, Al Gore was sure wrong! The Earth isn't going to warm, it's going to get colder. Much colder. So cold a little or full-blown Ice Age will ensue. As a matter of fact, some scientists claim we're already in the early stages of an Ice Age. Maybe the Nobel Committee and the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences should ask Mr. Gore to return his awards. Dutch Professor Cees de Jager, a prominent astronomer and solar expert, forcefully asserts that we the world is indeed entering for a long period of very low solar activity. The professor and his colleagues are certain Earth is heading for a "long Grand Minimum"—defined as either a Solar Wolf-Gleissberg or a Maunder Minimum—"not shorter than a century." His 2010 paper, "The forthcoming Grand Minimum of solar activity," outlined the extended period of time that the diminished solar radiation would affect the Earth. The Maunder minimum lasted from 1645 to 1715. It was marked by a period of general cooling over the entire planet. The Minimum coincided with the coldest year of the Little Ice Age. The astronomer, formerly the head of the Utrecht University Observatory in the Netherlands, has laid out the basis for the upcoming Ice Age. Another very respected scientist, the late Dr. Theodor Landscheidt, founder of the Schroeter Institute for Research in Cycles of Solar Activity in Waldmuenchen, Germany, was considered a giant in the field of climate research. A prodigious author of many research papers, leader of studies, and the author of several books, Landscheidt investigated the Gleissberg Minimum. He rejected the now proven flawed science of anthropogenic global warming and even the concept of long-term global warming itself. "Contrary to the IPCC's speculation about man-made global warming as high as 5.8° C within the next hundred years," he said, "a long period of cool climate with its coldest phase around 2030 is to be expected." Referring to the sun's cycles, he pointed to their correlation with other periods of prehistory when ice spread across the northern hemisphere. "It can be seen that the Gleissberg minimum around 2030 and another one around 2200 will be of the Maunder Minimum type accompanied by severe cooling on Earth." A few of the doctor's many papers on the sun's relation to Earth's climate include "Solar activity: A dominant factor in climate dynamics," and "New confirmation of strong solar forcing of climate." Both show the sun's relationship to Earth's climate and abrupt changes in that climate during periods of

transition from warming to cooling and back to warming. It is unfortunate that Al Gore's inconvenient truth turned out to be a fallacy. **Global warming is much preferable to the climate the Earth actually seems on the verge of slipping into within a few short years.** Depending on the severity of the Ice Age, agriculture could be severely affected and **millions could perish.**

CO2 prevents the ice age.

Le Page, 2008 [Michael Le Page, features editor @ New Scientist, "Humans may have prevented super ice age," *New Scientist*, 11/12/08, <<http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16026-humans-may-have-prevented-super-ice-age.html#.U8mMKYBdU00>>] //CJC

Our impact on Earth's climate might be even more profound than we realise. **Before we started pumping massive amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, the planet was on the brink of entering a semi-permanent ice age.** two researchers have proposed. **Had we not radically altered the atmosphere,** say Thomas Crowley of the University of Edinburgh, UK, and William Hyde of the University of Toronto in Canada, the current cycle of **ice ages and interglacials would have given way in the not-too-distant future to an ice age lasting millions of years.** "It's not proven but it's more than just an interesting idea," says Crowley. For much of the 500 million years or so since complex life evolved, Earth's climate has been much hotter than it is now, with no ice at the poles. During the last of these "hothouse Earth" phases, from around 100 to 50 million years ago, the Antarctic was covered by lush forests and shallow seas submerged vast areas of America, Europe and Africa. Since that time, though, CO2 levels have slowly fallen, possibly due to the rise of the Himalayas. As a result Earth has gradually cooled, with permanent ice sheets starting to form in Antarctica around 30 million years ago and later in the Arctic. Then, 2.5 million years ago, the climate entered a curious new phase: it started oscillating wildly, see-sawing between interglacial periods with conditions similar to today's and ice ages during which the amount of permanent ice in the northern hemisphere expanded hugely. **At the peaks of these transient ice ages, much of northern Europe, northern Asia and North America were covered in ice sheets** up to 4 kilometres thick, and sea levels were 120 metres lower than today. From a "deep time" perspective, this ice age-interglacial cycle may be just another brief transitional phase. It has been becoming ever more variable, Crowley says. When the cycle began, the climate went from ice age to interglacial and back roughly every 41,000 years. More recently, it has been happening every 100,000 years. The temperature swings have also become greater: the interglacials have been no warmer but the ice ages have become much colder. So the overall cooling trend was continuing - until the arrival of the Anthropocene, the period in which humans have started to have a major affect on Earth's climate and ecosystems. According to a simple climate model developed by Crowley and Hyde, this increasing variability was a sign that the climate was about to flip into a new stable state - a semi-permanent ice age. **This ice age might well have lasted for tens of millions of years** or more, Crowley says. In the model runs best resembling actual climate history, the switch to a long-lasting ice age happened as early as 10,000 to 100,000 years from now. However, Crowley stresses that not too much confidence can be placed on the results of single runs out of many. **The idea of the world becoming locked in an ice age is certainly plausible,** says James Zachos of the University of California, Santa Cruz, who studies past climate. **It's not that rare for the climate to switch from one state into another,** he says. And there were extensive and long-lived ice ages during the Carboniferous period, around 300 million years, points out climate modeller Andy Ridgwell of the University of Bristol, UK. Further back, around 700 million years ago, there was an even colder period known as "Snowball Earth", when the planet froze over nearly completely. However, Crowley and Hyde are going to have to do a lot more work to convince their peers. Because of the vast lengths of time involved, they used a very basic model to simplify calculations. "It is not as complex as everyone wants it to be, but you can run it for a very long time," says Crowley. None of the researchers contacted by New Scientist thought the model's predictions are worth taking seriously. It appears to have a bias to forming large and stable ice sheets, says Ridgwell. "So it does not come as a shock that they find a transition point to an even greater ice mass state." Still, everyone agrees that it is an intriguing idea. "It is worth delving into deeper," says Ridgwell. The idea **that humans have averted an ice age may ring a bell** with regular New Scientist readers. **Climatologist Bill Ruddiman has suggested** that Stone Age **farmers prevented an ice age by releasing greenhouse gases.** However, the two ideas are quite distinct: Ruddiman thinks that without human intervention we would now be entering another transient ice age like all the previous ones, while Crowley thinks that at some time in the future the whole ice age-interglacial cycle would have ended.

CO2 emissions prevent the coming Ice Age

Watts 2012 [Anthony Watts, citing the University of Gothenburg, "New paper suggests that CO2 '...could prove to be our salvation from the next ice age", November 8, 2012,

<<http://wattsupwiththat.com/2012/11/08/co2-could-prove-to-be-our-salvation-from-the-next-ice-age/>>]
//CJC

Mankind's **emissions of fossil carbon** and the resulting **increase in temperature** **could prove to** be our **salvation from the next ice age**. **According to new research from the University of Gothenburg**, Sweden, the current increase in the extent of peatland is having the opposite effect. **"We are** probably **entering a new ice age** right now. However, **we're not noticing it due to the effects of carbon dioxide"**, says researcher Professor Lars Franzén. Looking back over the past three million years, the earth has experienced at least 30 periods of ice age, known as ice age pulses. The periods in between are called interglacials. The researchers believe that **the Little Ice Age of the 16th to 18th centuries may have been halted as a result of human activity**. Increased felling of woodlands and growing areas of agricultural land, combined with the early stages of industrialisation, resulted in increased emissions of carbon dioxide which probably slowed down, or even reversed, the cooling trend. **"It is certainly possible that mankind's various activities contributed towards extending our ice age interval by keeping carbon dioxide levels high** enough," explains Lars Franzén, Professor of Physical Geography at the University of Gothenburg. **Without the human impact, the inevitable progression towards an ice age would have continued**. The spread of peatlands is an important factor."

Ice age causes extinction—it comparatively outweighs warming

Chapman 2008 [Phil Chapman, geophysicist and astronautical engineer, bachelor of science degree in Physics and Mathematics from Sydney University, a master of science degree in Aeronautics and Astronautics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "Sorry to ruin the fun, but an ice age cometh," 4/23/08, *The Australian*, <<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/sorry-to-ruin-the-fun-but-an-ice-age-cometh/story-e6frg73o-1111116134873>>] //CJC

What is scary about the picture is that there is only one tiny sunspot. Disconcerting as it may be to true believers in global warming, the average temperature on Earth has remained steady or slowly declined during the past decade, despite the continued increase in the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, and now the **global temperature is falling precipitously**. All four agencies that track Earth's temperature (the Hadley Climate Research Unit in Britain, the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies in New York, the Christy group at the University of Alabama, and Remote Sensing Systems Inc in California) report that it cooled by about 0.7C in 2007. This is the fastest temperature change in the instrumental record and it puts us back where we were in 1930. If the temperature does not soon recover, we will have to conclude that global warming is over. There is also plenty of anecdotal evidence that 2007 was exceptionally cold. It snowed in Baghdad for the first time in centuries, the winter in China was simply terrible and the extent of Antarctic sea ice in the austral winter was the greatest on record since James Cook discovered the place in 1770. It is generally not possible to draw conclusions about climatic trends from events in a single year, so I would normally dismiss this cold snap as transient, pending what happens in the next few years. This is where SOHO comes in. **The sunspot number follows a cycle of somewhat variable length, averaging 11 years**. The most recent minimum was in March last year. **The new cycle, No.24, was supposed to start soon after that, with a gradual build-up in sunspot numbers**. It didn't happen. **The first sunspot appeared in January this year and lasted only two days**. A tiny spot appeared last Monday but vanished within 24 hours. Another little spot appeared this Monday. Pray that there will be many more, and soon. The reason this matters is that **there is a close correlation between variations in the sunspot cycle and Earth's climate**. The previous time a cycle was delayed like this was in the Dalton Minimum, an especially cold period that lasted several decades from 1790. Northern winters became ferocious: in particular, the rout of Napoleon's Grand Army during the retreat from Moscow in 1812 was at least partly due to the lack of sunspots. That the

rapid temperature decline in 2007 coincided with the failure of cycle No.24 to begin on schedule is not proof of a causal connection but it is cause for concern. It is time to put aside the global warming dogma, at least to begin contingency planning about what to do if we are moving into another little ice age, similar to the one that lasted from 1100 to 1850. There is no doubt that the next little ice age would be much worse than the previous one and much more harmful than anything warming may do. There are many more people now and we have become dependent on a few temperate agricultural areas, especially in the US and Canada. Global warming would increase agricultural output, but global cooling will decrease it. Millions will starve if we do nothing to prepare for it (such as planning changes in agriculture to compensate), and millions more will die from cold-related diseases. There is also another possibility, remote but much more serious. The Greenland and Antarctic ice cores and other evidence show that for the past several million years, severe glaciation has almost always afflicted our planet. The bleak truth is that, under normal conditions, most of North America and Europe are buried under about 1.5km of ice. This bitterly frigid climate is interrupted occasionally by brief warm interglacials, typically lasting less than 10,000 years. The interglacial we have enjoyed throughout recorded human history, called the Holocene, began 11,000 years ago, so the ice is overdue. We also know that glaciation can occur quickly: the required decline in global temperature is about 12C and it can happen in 20 years. The next descent into an ice age is inevitable but may not happen for another 1000 years. On the other hand, it must be noted that the cooling in 2007 was even faster than in typical glacial transitions. If it continued for 20 years, the temperature would be 14C cooler in 2027. By then, most of the advanced nations would have ceased to exist, vanishing under the ice, and the rest of the world would be faced with a catastrophe beyond imagining. Australia may escape total annihilation but would surely be overrun by millions of refugees. Once the glaciation starts, it will last 1000 centuries, an incomprehensible stretch of time. If the ice age is coming, there is a small chance that we could prevent or at least delay the transition, if we are prepared to take action soon enough and on a large enough scale. For example: We could gather all the bulldozers in the world and use them to dirty the snow in Canada and Siberia in the hope of reducing the reflectance so as to absorb more warmth from the sun. We also may be able to release enormous floods of methane (a potent greenhouse gas) from the hydrates under the Arctic permafrost and on the continental shelves, perhaps using nuclear weapons to destabilise the deposits. We cannot really know, but my guess is that the odds are at least 50-50 that we will see significant cooling rather than warming in coming decades. The probability that we are witnessing the onset of a real ice age is much less, perhaps one in 500, but not totally negligible. All those urging action to curb global warming need to take off the blinkers and give some thought to what we should do if we are facing global cooling instead. It will be difficult for people to face the truth when their reputations, careers, government grants or hopes for social change depend on global warming, but the fate of civilisation may be at stake. In the famous words of Oliver Cromwell, "I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken."

Empirically even a Little Ice Age causes famine, disease, economic collapse, and war.

Cohen, 2012 [Jennie Cohen, writer, editor, multimedia journalist, Master's degree in new media journalism from Columbia University, former writer @ the New York Sun, "Little Ice Age, Big Consequences," 1/31/12, *History*, <<http://www.history.com/news/little-ice-age-big-consequences>>] //CJC

Between the early 14th and late 19th centuries, a period of cooling known as the Little Ice Age chilled the planet. Europe bore the brunt of its ill effects, experiencing harsh and fickle weather for several centuries and especially from 1560 to 1660. Scientists continue to debate the cause and timeline of the cold spell, which has been blamed for catastrophes ranging from droughts and famines to wars and epidemics. According to the latest study, described by an international team in this week's *Geophysical Research Letters*, volcanic eruptions just before the year 1300 triggered the expansion of Arctic sea ice, setting off a chain reaction that lowered temperatures worldwide. Find out about some of the numerous trends and events climatologists and historians have chalked up to the Little Ice Age—either rightly or wrongly—over the years. Great Famine Beginning in the spring of 1315, cold weather and torrential rains decimated crops and

livestock across Europe. Class **warfare and political strife destabilized** formerly prosperous **countries as millions** of people **starved**, setting the stage for the crises of the Late Middle Ages. According to reports, some desperate Europeans resorted to cannibalism during the so-called Great Famine, which persisted until the early 1320s. Black Death Typically considered an outbreak of the bubonic plague, which is transmitted by rats and fleas, **the Black Death wreaked havoc** on Europe, North Africa and Central Asia in the mid-14th century. **It killed** an estimated **75 million people**, including 30 to 60 percent of Europe's population. Some **experts have tied the outbreak to the food shortages of the Little Ice Age**, which purportedly **weakened human immune systems** while allowing rats to flourish. Manchu Conquest of China In the first half of the 17th century, famines and floods caused by unusually cold, dry weather enfeebled China's ruling Ming Dynasty. Unable to pay their taxes, peasants rose up in revolt and by 1644 had overthrown the imperial authorities. Manchurian invaders from the north capitalized on the power vacuum by crossing the Great Wall, allying with the rebels and establishing the Qing Dynasty. Witch Hunts In 1484, Pope Innocent VIII recognized the existence of witches and echoed popular sentiment by blaming them for the cold temperatures and resulting misfortunes plaguing Europe. His declaration ushered in an era of hysteria, accusations and executions on both sides of the Atlantic. Historians have shown that surges in European witch trials coincided with some of the Little Ice Age's most bitter phases during the 16th and 17th centuries. Thirty Years' War Among other **military conflicts**, the brutal Thirty Years' War between Protestants and Catholics **across** central **Europe has been linked to the Little Ice Age**. **Chilly conditions** curbed agricultural production and inflated grain prices, **fueling civil discontent and weakening the economies** of European powers. **These factors** indirectly **plunged** much of **the continent into war** from 1618 to 1648, according to this model. Rise of the Potato When Spanish conquistadors first introduced the potato in the late 16th century, Europeans scoffed at the unfamiliar starch. In the mid-1700s, however, some countries began promoting the hardy tuber as an alternative to crops indigenous to the region, which often failed to withstand the Little Ice Age's colder seasons. It soon caught on with farmers throughout Europe, particularly in Ireland. French Revolution As the 18th century drew to a close, two decades of poor cereal harvests, drought, cattle disease and skyrocketing bread prices had kindled unrest among peasants and the urban poor in France. Many expressed their desperation and resentment toward a regime that imposed heavy taxes yet failed to provide relief by rioting, looting and striking. Tensions erupted into the French Revolution of 1789, which some historians have connected to the Little Ice Age.